Page54ELECTION LAW Atty. Gallant Soriano2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015JUAN
FRIVALDO VS. COMELECG.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989
DOCTRINE:Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all
public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution
"allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section
42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective
office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a
qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section
117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides further that a qualified
voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Qualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office
but during the officer's entire tenure. Filipino citizenship, if
previously renounced, may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization, or by repatriation.FACTS: PetitionerJuan
Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of Sorsogon province on
January 22, 1988 and assumed office in due time. Respondent
Salvador Estuye, president of the League of Municipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
annulment of the election and proclamation of Frivaldo on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized
in the United States in 1983. Frivaldos American citizenship was
admitted by him and was reflected in a certification issued by a US
District Court. However, he pleaded the defense that the American
citizenship was forced on him as a measure of protection from the
persecution of the Marcos Dictatorship and that by actively
participating in the elections, he automatically forfeited the same
under the laws of the United States. He further contends that by
filing his certificate of candidacy he had already effectively
recovered Philippine citizenship.ISSUE:Whether or notFrivaldo was a
citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January
18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.HELD:NO. Philippine
citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered.
Under CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.Frivaldo did not invoke either of the first two
methods and it cannot also be said that he was repatriated because
even if he lose his naturalized citizenship by filing a certificate
of candidacy with the COMELEC, it did not and could not have the
effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced.The reason for resolving
Frivaldos citizenship at the time of his election is the provision
in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public
officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution
"allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section
42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective
office must beinter aliaa citizen of the Philippines and a
qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section
117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides further that a qualified
voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.Qualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office
but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.The
fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse
this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office
and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by
the electorate alone. Hence, Frivaldo is not a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of
the Province of Sorsogon.
RAMON L. LABO, JR. VS. COMELECG.R. No. 86564 August 1,
1989DOCTRINE:The will of the electorate cannot change the
requirement of the Local Government Code and the Constitution as
would permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of
their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege
over their countrymen.The probability that many of those who voted
for the public official with alleged lack of citizenship may have
done so in the belief that he was qualified, only strengthens the
conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the
qualifications for the office held by him. These qualifications are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited.FACTS:Petitioner Ramon Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of
Baguio City on January 20, 1988. Questioning Labos citizenship as a
qualification for his office, private respondent LuizLardizabal
filed a petition for quo warranto on January 26, 1988, but the
filing fee was paid only on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days
after his proclamation.Labocontends that the petition should not be
given due course as it was filed beyond the reglementary period of
ten days under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.Prior to
the filing of the petition for quo warranto, two administrative
decisions were rendered on the question of the Labos citizenship.
The first was rendered by the COMELEC finding Labo to be a citizen
of the Philippines on the ground that there was no direct proof
that he had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia.
The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, acting upon Labos application for the cancellation of
his alien certificate of registration.It ruled that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines based on the official statement of the
Australian Government that Labo was an Australian citizen by reason
of his naturalization in 1976. However,Laboclaims that his marriage
to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him
of Philippine citizenship, but instead it made him a dual national.
He further argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a futile
technicality that should not frustrate the will of the electorate
of Baguio City, who elected him by a majority. ISSUE:Whether or not
Petitioner Labois eligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio
City.HELD: NO. Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation. It did not appear in the
record, nor did the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.For this reason,
Labos claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines must be
denied. Labo was not a citizen of the Philippines on the day of the
local elections on January 18, 1988. He was not even a qualified
voter under the Constitution because of his alienage. He was
therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under
Section 42 of the Local Government Code which provides that An
elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at
least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter
registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province
where he proposes to be elected Moreover, even if Labo was elected
by the majority, the people of that locality could not change the
requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. The
electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total
allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless
individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the
Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.The
probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may
have done so in the belief that he was qualified, only strengthens
the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the
qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications
are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the
case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not
subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place
on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from
running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to
serve as such.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELECG.R. No. 119976 September 18,
1995
DOCTRINE: For the purposes of election law, residence is
synonymous with domicile. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: (1)
An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) Abona
fideintention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and (3) Acts which correspond with the
purpose.FACTS:Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and Cirilo Roy Montejo were
candidates for the Congressional seat in the First District of
Leyte. Montejo filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" against Marcos on the ground that the latter did
not meet the constitutional requirement for residency, which is not
less than one year immediately preceding the election. Marcos
declared in her certificate of candidacy that she has been a
resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for
seven months only. Marcos filed an Amended certificate of candidacy
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no.
8 of the amended certificate but the Provincial Election Supervisor
of Leyte rejected the certificate on the ground that it was filed
out of time. Marcos went ahead and filed the same certificate with
the COMELECs Head Office in Manila. She contends that "she has
always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence.Thereafter, the 2nd division of the COMELEC granted
Montejos petition for disqualification and cancelled Marcos
original certificate of candidacy. It held that In election cases,
the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with
"domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. Furthermore, it held that
when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, she chose San Juan,
Metro Manila as her residence. Thus, heranimus revertendiis pointed
to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.After the May 1995 elections, the
COMELEC issued two resolutions, the first allowed Marcos
proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections
in the First District of Leyte, but such resolution was reversed on
the same day it was issued and directed that Marcos proclamation be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of
votes.Marcos filed a petition averring that she won the elections
for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte based on
the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency
requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the ConstitutionSC
RULING: YESThe court ruled that Residence, in its ordinary
conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given
area, community or country. However,for the purposes of election
law, residence is synonymous with domicile. The court ruled that it
is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not
and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. It further held that Marcos merely
committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the
space provided for the residency qualification requirement. An
individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Marcos held various
residences for different purposes during the last four decades but
none of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.Lastly, it ruled
that domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect
a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) An actual removal
or an actual change of domicile; (2) Abona fideintention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and (3) Acts which correspond with the purpose. All the three
requirements must concur, otherwise, the presumption of continuity
of residence cannot be rebutted.
Aquino vs. COMELECG.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
DOCTRINE:Domicileof origin is not easily lost. To successfully
effect a change ofdomicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal
or an actual change ofdomicile; abona fideintention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose.FACTS:Agapito
Aquino is a candidate for a congressional post in the the new
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of
candidacy, he declared that he is a resident in the constituency
where he seeks to be elected for a period of 10 months. Thereafter,
Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City,
filed a petition to disqualify on the ground that latter lacked the
residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under
Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a
period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8,
1995 elections. The following day, Aquino filed another certificate
of candidacy where he declared that he resided in the constituency
where he sought to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13)
days. During the hearing of the case against Aquino, the latter
presented among others, a lease contract between him &
Feliciano. In May 6, 1995, The COMELEC declares Aquino eligible to
run for the Office of Representative in the Second Legislative
District of Makati City. Move Makati &Bedon filed a motion for
reconsideration. After the elections were held, Aquino garnered the
highest number of votes as against his two other competitors.
Therafter, Move Makati &Bedon filed an Urgent Motion to suspend
Aquinos proclamation. On May 15, 1995, the COMELEC issued an Order
suspending Aquinos proclamation.Aquino filed a motion to lift the
suspension, and on June 2, the COMELEC resolved to proceed with the
proclamation. However, on the same day, the COMELEC reversed the
May 6 resolution and declared Aquino ineligible to run for office
and thus disqualified as a candidate. Hence this present
petition.ISSUE: WON petitioner failed to comply with the residency
requirement mandated by the Constitution?SC RULING: YESThe Court
agreed with the COMELEC that in order that Aquino could qualify as
a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati
City the latter "must prove that he has established not just
residence butdomicileof choice.It held that the place "where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home,"where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain,i.e., his domicile, is that to which
the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law.The Court upheld the COMELECs findings
that Aquino is a resident of San Jose, Concepcion Tarlac for 52
years immediately preceding the 1992 elections, that his birth
certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of
his parents. It is therefore clear that domicileof originof record
up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of
candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Furthermore, Aquinos intention not to establish a permanent home in
Makati City was evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead
of buying one. Domicileof origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change ofdomicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actual change ofdomicile; abona fideintention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Dela Torre vs. Comelec G.R. No. 121592. July 5, 1996Doctrine: In
determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude the
Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes in mala in
se involve moral turpitude while crimes in mala prohibita do not.
Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances
surrounding the violation of the statute. Actual knowledge by the
fence of the fact that property received is stolen displays a
degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that
which animated the robbery or theft which by their very nature are
crimes of moral turpitude. The legal effect of probation is only to
suspend the execution of the sentence.Facts:On May 6, 1995, Comelec
declared Ronaldo Dela Torre disqualified from running as the Mayor
of Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8, 1995 citing Sec. 40 (a) of RA
7160 (Local Govt. Code 1991) that a person who is sentenced by
final judgement for an offence involving moral turpitude for an
offense by 1 year or more of imprisonment within 2 years after
serving sentence is disqualified from running for any elective
local position. Comelec further held that Dela Torre was found to
be guilty of violation of the Anti fencing law by the Municipal
Trial Court on June 1, 1990 and the decision was later affirmed on
appeal in the RTC and became final by January 18, 1991. Comelec
held that there exist a legal ground to disqualify Dela Torre to
run as a candidate since the nature of the offence of the Anti
Fencing Law certainly involves moral turpitude.Dela Torre claims
that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to
his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC on
December 21, 1994 which suspended the execution of the judgment of
conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom,
rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.Issue: 1. Whether or
not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude. 2. Whether or
not a grant of probation affects Section 40 (a)s
applicability.Held:1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman
or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
From Sec 2 of PD 1612 fencing may be committed when The accused
knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft
Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual
knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received is stolen
displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful
property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by
their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the
participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point
in time and in degree, both the fence and the actual perpetrator/s
of the robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain -
thus deliberately reneging in the process private duties they owe
their fellowmen or society in a manner contrary to x x x accepted
and customary rule of right and duty x x x, justice, honesty x x x
or good morals.2. No. Dela Torres conviction of fencing which we
have heretofore declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus
falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40
(a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the
grant of probation
Moreno vs. COMELEC and MejesG.R. No. 168550 August 10,
2006DOCTRINE:In harmonizing the LGC and the Probation Law, the
Courts deem that the Probation Law is an exception to the LGC. Sec.
40(a) which provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective
local position and this should not include probationers since they
do not serve the sentence adjudged to them since probation suspends
it and final discharge of probation shall operate to restore him
all civil rights lost or suspended.FACTS:In this Petition dated
July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the
ResolutionCOMELEC which disqualified him from running for the
elective office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram,
Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and
SangguniangKabataan Elections. The disqualification was an off
shoot of a petition filed by Norma L. Mejes on the ground that the
latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27,
1998. Moreno filed an answer claiming that the petition states no
cause of action because he was already granted probation. But the
COMELEC since he was only released from probation on December 20,
2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2)
years thereafter thus he is still disqualified for the upcoming
elections.Petitioner argues that the disqualification applies only
to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers
because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The
Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local
Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to
probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his
subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an
implied pardon of his previous misconduct.Hence, this
petition.ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from
running as Punong Barangay.SC RULING: NOThe Probation Law is an
exception to the provision of the LGC as the legislature did not
intend the inclusion of probationers in the disqualification as it
can be gleaned from its act when it can, through its legislative
wisdom and power, include Probationers since those covered by the
disqualification also covers those who can apply for Probation.
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at
first glance. The phrase service of sentence, understood in
itsgeneral and common sense, means the confinement of a
convictedperson in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the
court. COMELEC has broadened the coverage of the law to include
even those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they
were granted probation.It is to be noted that those who have not
served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which,
the Court reiterates, should not be equated with service of
sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a
local elective office because the two (2)-year period of
ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does
not even begin to run. Moreover, Sec. 4 of the Probation Law
specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the
execution of the sentence and during the period of probation, the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the
court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order.
Grego v. Comelec and BascoG.R. No. 125955 June 19, 1997
DOCTRINE:Absent any express provision in the Law, a newly
enacted statute applies prospectively and not retroactively. There
is no provision in the statue which would clearly indicate that the
same operates retroactively. Lexprospicit, non respicit. The law
looks forward, not backward. Thus, the LGC only applies to
instances that occurred on January 1, 1992 and thereafter.
FACTS:The instant special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition impugns the resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc in SPA No. 95-212 dated July 31, 1996, dismissing
petitioners motion for reconsideration of an earlier resolution
rendered by the COMELECs First Division on October 6, 1995, which
also dismissed the petition for disqualificationfiled by petitioner
Wilmer Grego against private respondent HumbertoBasco.On October
31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by
no less than this Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an
administrative complaint lodged by a certain NenaTordesillas. The
Court held:WHEREFORE, FINDING THE RESPONDENT DEPUTY SHERIFF
HUMBERTO BASCO OF THE CITY COURT OF MANILA GUILTY OF SERIOUS
MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE FOR THE SECOND TIME, HE IS HEREBY DISMISSED
FROM THE SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND
WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.Basco ran for councilor
of the Second District of Manila and won in the three elections he
participated in, respectively the Jan. 18, 1988 elections, May 11,
1992 synchronized National Elections and May 8, 1995. His second
election was contested due to the Tordesillas ruling but was
dismissed. On his third election, Grego filed for his
disqualification. The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on
May 14, 1995, where it ordered the parties to submit simultaneously
their respective memoranda.Before the parties could comply with
this directive, however, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco on
May 17, 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District
of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the
seats. Basco immediately took his oath of office before the
Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-Camarista, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.Petitioner herein, comes to the Court
for relief and anchors his basis for disqualification of Basco on
the retroactive effect of the LGC, the irregularity of the implied
condonation of the electorate, the invalidity of the proclamation
of Basco because it was. He asks thatRomualdoMaranan, the 7th in
the elections and next to Basco be proclaimed as the winner of the
last slot. ISSUE:Whether or not respondent is disqualified because
he was removed from office due to an administrative case which
removed him from Office in 1981.SC RULING: NOThe court proclaimed
that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction evinced by COMELEC in dismissing the
petition for disqualification of Basco. In answering the
contentions of Grego, the Court ruled that in construing Sec. 40
(b) of the LGC, which provides for the disqualification from
running in an elective office of people removed from office as a
result of an Administrative Case which was promulgated and took
effect on January 1, 1992. Absent any express provision in the Law,
a newly enacted statute applies prospectively and not
retroactively.
REYES vs. COMELECGR No. 120905, March 17, 1996
DOCTRINE: The filing of a petition for certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court did not prevent the administrative decision
from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an
independent action and does not interrupt the course of the
principal action nor the running of the reglementary period
involved in the proceeding; a case shall not be rendered moot and
academic if dilatory tactics were employed to render such case moot
and academic; the second highest in votes cannot be proclaimed
winner if should it appear that the candidate with the highest
votes was declared disqualified.FACTS: Petitioner Renato U. Reyes
was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental
Mindoro. An administrative complaint was filed against him with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. After learning that the Sanggunian had
terminated the proceedings in the case and WAS ABOUT TO RENDER
JUDGMENT, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction with the Regional Trial Court, alleging that the
proceedings had been terminated without giving him a chance to be
heard. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN found petitoner guilty.A temporary
restraining order was issued by the court, enjoining the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with the case. As a
result, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be
served upon Reyes. Following the expiration of the temporary
restraining order and without any injunction being issued by the
Regional Trial Court, an attempt was made to serve the decision
upon petitioners counsel in Manila. However, the latter refused to
accept the decision. Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon
petitioner himself also failed, as he also refused to accept the
decision.Petitoner filed a certificate of candidacy with the
COMELEC in Bongabong. A complainant sought the disqualification of
petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing the Local Government Code
of 1991 (LGC) which states that persons removed from office as a
result of an administrative case are disqualified from running for
any elective postition. Nonetheless, because of the absence of any
contrary order from the COMELEC, petitioner Reyes was voted for in
the elections held on May 8, 1995.COMELECs Second Division issued
the questioned resolution, which found the petitioner DISQUALIFIED
from running for public office, in conformity with the Local
Government Code. Julius M. Garcia, who obtained the second highest
number of votes next to petitioner Reyes intervened in the COMELEC,
contending that because Reyes was disqualified, he (Garcia) was
entitled to be proclaimed mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. The
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, apparently unaware of
the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed him the
duly-elected mayor.ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the filing of petition
for certiorari prevented the Sangguning Panlalawigan from attaining
finality.2. Whether or not Reyes' reelection rendered the
administrative complaint against him moot and academic.3. Whether
or not Garcia is entitled to be proclamed mayor of
Bongabong.RULING:1. No. The filing of a petition for certiorari
with the Regional Trial Court did not prevent the administrative
decision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari
is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the
principal action nor the running of the reglementary period
involved in the proceeding. Consequently, to arrest the course of
the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari
proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the
lower court.In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining
order was issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary
injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order
issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no
more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner.
The net result is that when the elections were held on May 8, 1995,
the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become
final and executory.2. No. Herein respondent Mayor Reyes was given
by this Sanggunian a period of sixty one (61) days to file his
verified answer however, he resorted to dilatory motions which in
the end proved fatal to his cause. Veritably, he neither filed nor
furnished the complainant a copy of his answer. Failure of the
respondent to file his verified answer within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the complaint shall be considered a waiver of his
rights to present evidence in his behalf (Art. 126 of Rules and
Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991). All
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies (Sec.
16, Art. III of the Contitution).Indeed, it appears that petitioner
was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer. He failed to
do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be
presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on the date
set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this was because
he had filed a motion for postponement and was awaiting a ruling
thereon. This only betrays the pattern of delay he employed to
render the case against him moot by his election.3. No. In the
latest ruling on the question, this Court said:To simplistically
assume that the second placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The
second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections.
He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under the circumstances.Garcias plea that
the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes
cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that
Reyes was qualified and for that reason can not be treated as
stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is
disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to
invalidate the votes cast for him.
MERCADO vs. MANZANO and COMELECGR No. 135083, May 26, 1999
DOCTRINE: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The prohibition in Section 5 of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution) was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A.
No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance.FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private
respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the
City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Eduardo B. Manzano
(si Kuya Edu!) obtained the highest votes; followed by Ernesto S.
Mercado and Gabriel Daza. The proclamation of private respondent
(Kuya Edu) was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged
that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of
the United States. [Born in the US (jus soli), of Filipino parents
(jus sanguinis)]In its resolution, the Second Division of the
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent
on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position.Kuya Edu filed
a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending even
until after the election held on May 11, 1998. Accordingly,
pursuant to the above COMELEC Resolution, the board of canvassers
tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.Petitioner sought to
intervene in the case. However, this motion was not resolved by
COMELEC. Instead, COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second
Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Pursuant
this resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers,
proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
Petitioner filed certiorari before SC.ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Kuya
Edu is disqualified from running for any elective position on the
ground of dual citizenship under the LGC. NORULING: 1. No. Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers
to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
POSITIVE ACT, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship
is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals
volition.With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Section 5 of
the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This
provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:.
. . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is
not dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas
Committee according to which a dual allegiance - and I reiterate a
dual allegiance - is larger and more threatening than that of mere
double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed
marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question
double citizenship at all.Clearly, in including Section 5 in
Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship
in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20
must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship,
it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states. This is similar to the requirement that an
applicant for naturalization must renounce all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of
which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be
issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines.
Lopez vs. ComelecG.R. No. 182701. July 23, 2008
Doctrine: Citizen Retention and Reaquisition Act of 2003
expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired
Filipino citizenship may run for public office in the Philippines.
i.e. that they make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship Garnering the most number of votes does not
validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity. Facts:Eusebio
Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29,
2007.On October 25, 2007, Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition
before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of
Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the
ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from
running for any public office.
Lopez argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the
same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act
of 2003. Thus possessing all the qualifications to run for Barangay
Chairman. After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed,
petitioner emerged as the winner.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution
granting the petition for disqualification of Lopez, ruling that he
was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship in the manner
provided by law. According to the poll body, to be able to qualify
as a candidate in the elections, petitioner should have made a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
which he failed to do.Issue: Is Lopez a qualified candidate in the
elections?Held:No. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the
conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may
run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5(2) of the
said law states that those who retain or reaquire their citizenship
and seek elective public office must meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. While Lopez re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship under the cited law, the law explicitly provides that
should one seek elective public office, he should first make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Lopez
failed to comply with this requirement. There is no evidence
presented that will show that respondent complied with the
provision of R.A. No. 9225. The affiant must state in clear and
unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for
it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopezs failure
to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an
affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to
believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law.
Absent such proof Lopez cannot be allowed respondent to run for
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.While it is true that
petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge
the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the
defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does
not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
Case no. 11
Rodriguez v. COMELEC
Doctrine: The Marquez Decision defining "fugitive from justice
includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade
is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a
particular jurisdiction. Obviously, there can only be an intent to
evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the
fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a
promulgated judgment of conviction.
Facts:Petitioner won the Gobernatorial post in Quezon City
Province during the May, 1992 elections. Respondent Marquez then
challenged such victory contending that Rodriguez was a fugitive
from justice which is a ground for his
disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local
Government Code. Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the US where
a charge, filed on November 12,1985 is pending against the latter
before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance
claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal
property.Petitioner on the other hand contends that long before the
felony complaint was allegedly filed, he was already in the
Philippines and he did not know of the filing of the same nor was
he aware that he was being proceeded against criminally. He cannot
be deemed a fugitive from justice, because to be so, one must be
aware of the filing of the criminal complaint, and his
disappearance in the place where the long arm of the law, thru the
warrant of arrest, may reach him is predicated on a clear desire to
avoid and evade the warrant.
Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice as
comprehended in the Marquez Decision
Held:No. The Marquez Decision defining "fugitive from justice
includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution The intent to evade is the compelling factor that
animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And
obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or
punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an
already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction.
Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no
dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25,
1985, preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los
Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date
of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost 5
months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about
such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the
US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less
conviction to speak of yet at such time.
Case no. 12
Mateo Caasi v. CA
Doctrine: To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the
Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green
card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country." The waiver of an immigrant status
must be manifested by some act/s independent of and done prior to
the filing of candidacy for elective office in the country for
without such prior waiver, he is disqualified to run for any
office.
Facts:Respondent Merito Miguel won as the Mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan during the 1988 local elections. Petitioner Caasi sought
Meritos disqualification on the ground that the former is a green
card holder, hence a permanents resident in US and not Bolinao.
Merito contended that although he holds a green card, he is not a
permanent resident in US but in Bolinao, that he obtained the green
card only for convenience, and that he was able to vote in all
previous elections including the plebiscite, ratification of the
Constitution and the Congressional elections in 1987.
Issue:W.O.N. Miguel had waived his status as a permanent
resident/or of immigrant to USA prior to local elections in
1988?
Held:NO. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the
Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green
card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country", Sec. 68 of BP 881. The waiver of
an immigrant status must be manifested by some act/s independent of
and done prior to the filing of candidacy for elective office in
the country for without such prior waiver, he is disqualified to
run for any office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not
hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run
for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing
his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a
candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap.
1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that
qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United
States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3)
months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in
November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on
January 18, 1988.
CASE TITLE: Villaber V. COMELECGR NO. 148326 DATE: November 15,
2001DOCTRINE: The presence of the second element manifests moral
turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda, we held that a conviction
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly relates
to and affects the good moral character of a person. The effects of
the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case
of Lozano vs. Martinez, through Justice Pedro L. Yap, transcends
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large.
The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder,
but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless
commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare
of society and the public interest. FACTS:Both petitioner Pablo
Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cougas were rival candidate for
a congressional seat in the First District of Davao Del Sur dating
the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Congressman on Feb. 1, 2001 file Cagas filed
his on Feb. 28, 2001. On March 4 ,2001, Cagas filed with the Office
of the Provincial Election Supervisor, COMELEC, Davao Del Sur, a
consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the
latter COC. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on
March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the RTC of Manila for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 and was sentenced to suffer 1
year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of
P100,00.00. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral
turpitude; hence under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC), he is disqualified to run for any public office. In his
answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that
his conviction has not become final and executory because the
affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for
promulgation in his presence. Further, even if the judgment of
conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis
for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not
involve moral turpitude.ISSUE:WON violation of B.P. Blg. 22
involves moral turpitude HELD:Yes, violation of B.P. Blg. 22
involves moral turpitude, because its violation imports deceit and
certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person. A drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges
on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner
contract to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice,
honesty or food morals.
CASE 14 CASE TITLE: De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La
UnionGR NO. L-24721 DATE: November 3, 1925DOCTRINE:When the
Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed
form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest
mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him
who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been
used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of
voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest
expression of the popular will, the law will be held directory and
such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity.FACTS:
Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme
Court seeking to compel the Board of Canvassers of La Union to
annul the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him
as the duly elected governor of La Union based on the fact that
certificate of candidacy filed by Juan Lucero was not made under
oath in violation of Sec. 404 of the Election Law. Lucero filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the
court has no jurisdiction on the subject-matter of the complaint;
(2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the
members of the board of canvassers; and (3) the petition failed to
state a cause of action. ISSUE: WON the failure of Lucero in filing
his certificate of candidacy under oath was fatal to his
proclamation as the duly elected governor of La Union HELD: No. The
seeming irregularity in the filing of Luceros certificate of
candidacy does not invalidate his election for the fundamental
reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan
T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of
the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in
that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to.
In the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo, it was held that The provisions
of the Election Law declaring that a certain irregularity in an
election procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of the
returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly
defeated by a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are
mandatory. When the Election Law does not provide that a departure
from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been
due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law
on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and such
departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or
for the intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been
a free and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be
held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless
irregularity. And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, it was held that he
rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory
before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after
the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is
possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory,
innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault
on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the Election
Law were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the
affairs of the government and not to defeat that object. When the
voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be
nullified simply because the officers appointed under the law to
direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not
done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action,
against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of
the honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be
protected and upheld.
CASE 15CASE TITLE: RODILLAS vs. COMELECGR NO. 119055 DATE: July
10, 1995DOCTRINE: The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a
mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential
requirement without which the decision appealed from would become
final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right to
appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in
the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provision of
the law. FACTS: Petitioner (Roy Rodillas) and private respondent
(IsabeloDotimas) were both candidates for Punong Barangay in
Barangay San Rafael, San Nicolas, Pangasinan in the May 9, 1994
elections. Petitioner obtained 65 votes as against private
respondent's 61 votes. An election protest was consequently filed
by respondent with the 9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayug
San Nicolas presided by respondent Judge. After due hearing, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered its judgment on May 27, 1994
finding private respondent to have obtained 68 votes as against
petitioner's 66 votes. On May 31, 1994, petitioner filed a notice
of appeal with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and paid P150.00
as appeal fees with the Regional Trial Court, Tayug, Pangasinan. On
June 14, 1994, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court forwarded the
records of the case to the COMELEC. At the same time, petitioner
paid with the COMELEC the amount of P510.00. On July 20, 1994, the
First Division of the COMELEC denied the appeal for petitioner's
belated filing of the appeal and legal research fees. Hence, this
petition. ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the appeal outright when the most it could
have done was to refuse to take action on the case until the fees
were paid in full HELD: No, The procedure for perfecting an appeal
from the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in a barangay
election protest case is set forth in the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as follows: Sec. 3. Notice of Appeal. Within five (5)
days after promulgation of the decision of the court, the aggrieved
party may file with said court a notice of appeal, and serve a copy
thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse party (Rule 22).
Sec. 3. Appeal fees. The appellant in election cases shall pay an
appeal fee as follows: (b) Election cases appealed from courts of
limited jurisdiction. . . . P500.00. Sec. 18. Non-payment of
prescribed fees. If the fees above prescribed are not paid,
Commission may refuse to take action until they are paid and
dismiss the action or proceeding (Rule 40). The mere filing of the
notice of appeal was not enough. It should be accompanied by the
payment of the correct amount of appeal fee Petitioner had only
five days from receipt of the decision of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court or until June 5, 1994 to perfect his appeal. While he
timely filed his Amended Notice of Appeal on June 2, 1994, he paid
the amount of P510.00 representing the appeal and legal research
fees only on June 14, 1994. It is, therefore, evident that
petitioner belatedly paid said amount. Besides, the correct amounts
of the appeal and the research fees are P500.00 and P20.00
respectively, or P520.00 not P510.00 as paid by petitioner.
PNOC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARCELINO TONGCO,
petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MANUEL S.
PINEDA, respondents.
G.R. No. 100947May 31, 1993
DOCRTINE: Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, even those organized under the general laws on
incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative
charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law
but under the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes
just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set
forth in the Labor Code, as amended.
FACTS: Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the PNOC-EDC (a
subsidiary of PNOC) as Geothermal Construction Secretary. Pineda
decided to run and eventually proclaimed elected to, the office of
councilor. Despite so qualifying as councilor, and assuming his
duties as such, he continued working for PNOC-EDC as the latter's
Geothermal Construction Secretary.
Upon inquiry by Tongco (Dept Manager PNOC-EDC), the Legal
Department rendered an opinion to the effect that Manuel S. Pineda
should be considered ipso facto resigned upon the filing of his
Certificate of Candidacy in November, 1987, in accordance with
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Pineda, invoked that while the government-owned or controlled
corporations are covered by the Civil Service Law (as is taken to
mean in Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code of 1985), the
subsidiaries or corporate offsprings are not."
ISSUE: Whether or not an employee in a government-owned or
controlled corporations without an original charter (and therefore
not covered by Civil Service Law) nevertheless falls within the
scope of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
HELD: YES. Sec. 66. Any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
It was no doubt aware that in light of Section 2 (1), Article IX
of the 1987 Constitution: (a) government-owned or controlled
corporations were of two (2) categories those with original
charters, and those organized under the general law and (b)
employees of these corporations were of two (2) kinds those covered
by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations because employed in
corporations having original charters, and those not subject to
Civil Service Law but to the Labor Code because employed in said
corporations organized under the general law, or the Corporation
Code. Yet Congress made no effort to distinguish between these two
classes of government-owned or controlled corporations or their
employees in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent related
statutes, particularly as regards the rule that any employee "in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy."
What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code applies to officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, even those organized under the general
laws on incorporation and therefore not having an original or
legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil
Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66
constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to
those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.
REP. MA. CATALINA L. GOvs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 147741 May 10, 2001
DOCTRINE: An administrative resolution can not contradict, much
less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Such
requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience.
It is not mandatory or jurisdictional.
FACTS: On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal
election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a
certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.On 28 February
2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another
certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte.
Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial
election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for
mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. However, the provincial
election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of
withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution,
she should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay,
Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.
At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the
deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or withdrawal
thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to
Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit
of withdrawal by fax to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter
submitted the same to the office of the election officer of Baybay,
Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001.5 On the same day, at 1:15 p.m.,
the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received the original of the
affidavit of withdrawal.
ISSUE: Is there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of
candidacy for municipal mayor of Baybay, Leyte?
HELD: YES.
The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election
officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a
substantial compliance with the requirement of the law.
Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code, provides that:
"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be
filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of
candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for
any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the
filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has file more
than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office
for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of
candidacy for the other office or offices."
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the
affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where
the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it
can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the
office of the regional election director concerned, the office of
the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the
municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal
election officer of the said municipality.
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No.
3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal
be filed before the election officer of the place where the
certificate of candidacy was filed,such requirement is merely
directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or
jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not contradict,
much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law.
Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of
candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such
candidacy. the COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it declare petitioner ineligible for both positions for which
she filed certificates of candidacy.
Luna v COMELECG.R. No. 165983 April 24, 2007
Doctrine: If after the last day for the filing of certificates
of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political
party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate
who died, withdrew or was disqualified. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election
and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any
board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he
is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by
the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.Facts:
Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
vice-mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who
withdrew his certificate of candidacy on the same date. Ruperto
Blanco, Election Officer of Lagayan, Abra removed the name of Hans
Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name of Luna.
Private respondents filed a petition for the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy or disqualification of Luna. They alleged
that Luna made a false material representation in her certificate
of candidacy because Luna is not a registered voter of Lagayan,
Abra but a registered voter of Bangued, Abra. They also claimed
that Lunas certificate of candidacy was not validly filed because
the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid and that Hans
Roger was only 20 years old on Election Day and, therefore, he was
disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be substituted by
Luna. COMELEC affirmed the finding that Hans Roger, being underage,
may not be validly substituted by Luna. It also ruled that Lunas
right to due process was not violated because Luna was notified of
the petition and was given the opportunity to be heard. However,
the COMELEC ruled that Luna was a registered voter of Lagayan,
Abra. Hence, this petition.Issue: Whether the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there was no valid
substitution by Luna for Hans Roger.Ruling: YES. Section 77 of the
Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of an official
candidate of a registered political party who dies, withdraws, or
is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of
certificate of candidacy.Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day
for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate
of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and
certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political
party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the
office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later
than mid-day of election day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before
the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be
filed with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates
to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy
and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural
requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute
for Hans Roger. In this case, there was no petition to deny due
course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger For
if the COMELEC cancelled Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy after
the proper proceedings, then he is no candidate at all and there
can be no substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy
has been cancelled and denied due course. However, Hans Rogers
certificate of candidacy was never cancelled or denied due course
by the COMELEC. Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his
certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC declared that he was
not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless Hans Rogers certificate of
candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in accordance with
Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Rogers certificate of
candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna.
Monsale v. NicoG.R. No. L-2539 May 28, 1949
Doctrine:The evident purposes of the law in requiring the
filling of certificates of candidacy and in fixing a time limit
therefor are (a) to enable the voter to know, at least sixty days
before a regular election the candidate among whom they are to make
the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the
tabulation of the votes cast; for if the law did not confine the
choice or election by the voter to duly registered candidates,
there might be as many person voted for as there were voters, and
votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious person as a mark
to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in
the same election.Facts:Monsale withdrew his certificate of
candidacy on October 10, 1947, but on November 7, attempted to
revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal. The COMELEC, however,
rules on November 8 that Monsale could no longer be a candidate in
spite of his desire to withdrawal. A canvass of the election
returns showed that Paulino M. Nico received 2,291 votes; another
candidate, Gregorio Fagutao126, votes; and the protestant Jose F.
Monsale, none, evidently because the vote cast in his favor had not
been counted for the reason that he was not a registered candidate.
Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected.Issue: Whether a
candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy may revive
it, either by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal or by filling a
new certificate of candidacy, after the deadline provided by law
for the filling of such certificate.Ruling: No. Section 31 of the
Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180) providesthat "no
person shall be eligible unless, within the time fixed by law, he
files a duty signed and sworn certificate of candidacy." Section 36
provides that "at least sixty days before a regular election and
thirty days at least before a special election, the . . .
certificates of candidacy for municipal offices shall be filed with
the municipal secretary, who shall immediately send copies thereof
to the polling place concerned, to the secretary of the provincial
board and to the Commission on Elections." Section 38 further that
"if, after the expiration of the time limit for filling certificate
of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly
filed should die or become disqualified, any legally qualified
citizen may file a certificate of candidacy for the office for
which the deceased or disqualified person was a candidate in
accordance with the preceding section on or before midday of the
day of the election, and, if the death or disqualification should
occur between the day before the election and the midday of
election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of
inspection of the political division where he is a candidate or in
the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate,
with the Commission on Elections."Therefore, thirty-one days before
the election, the protestant ceased to be candidate by his own
voluntary act. When he withdrew his withdrawal of his certificate
of candidacy, can only be considered as a new certificate of
candidacy which, having been filed only four days before the
election, could not legally be accepted under the law, which
expressly provides that such certificate should be filed at sixty
days before the election.The only instance wherein the law permit
the filling of a certificate ofcandidacy after the expiration of
the time limit for filing it is when a candidate with a certificate
of candidacy duty filed dies or becomes disqualified.The Commission
on Election was, therefore, right in holding as it did that the
protestant "can no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to
withdraw his withdrawal."
CASE TITLE: CIPRIANO VS COMELECG.R. No. 158830 August 10,
2004
DOCTRINE: The denial of due course or cancellation of ones
certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of
the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions.FACTS:Petitioner Ellan Marie Cipriano
filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of
the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections. On the date of
the elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 adopting the
recommendation of the Commissions Law Department to deny due course
to or cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates
for the SK elections, including petitioner. The ruling was based on
the findings of the Law Department that petitioner and all the
other candidates affected by said resolution were not registered
voters in the barangay where they intended to run. Despite this,
her name was not deleted on the list and she later on landed as the
winner. After learning of Resolution No. 5363, petitioner filed
with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of said resolution.
Petitioner claimed that she was denied due process when her
certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the Commission without
notice and hearing. The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to
motu proprio deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy based on its broad administrative power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
elections. ISSUE:Whether the COMELEC, in the exercise of its
administrative power erred in disqualifying petitioner.HELD:YES. It
was an error on the part of the COMELEC to disqualify a candidate
while in the exercise of its administrative power.The COMELEC as an
independent Constitutional Commission is clothed with the three
powers of government - executive or administrative, legislative,
and quasi-judicial powers. Administrative power is concerned with
the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by
proper governmental organs. On the other hand, where a power rests
in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a
judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial
officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.The Commission may not, by
itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a
candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. While the
Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may
not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the
usual and proper cognizance of said body.The denial of due course
or cancellation of ones certificate of candidacy is not within the
administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The determination whether
a material representation in the certificate of candidacy is false
or not, or the determination whether a candidate is eligible for
the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where
both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their
contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a
deprivation of ones right to run for public office, or, as in this
case, ones right to hold public office, it is only proper and fair
that the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against
him and that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations
against him.
CASE TITLE: ABCEDE VS IMPERIALG.R. No. L-13001 March 18,
1958
DOCTRINE:in the absence of clear and positive provision to such
effect in the law, the COMELEC cannot pass upon the question as to
whether a candidate is qualified to run for the aspired
position.FACTS:In anticipation of the upcoming presidential
election, petitioner Alfredo Abcede filed before the COMELEC a
certificate of candidacy for presidency. After which, the COMELEC
celled its attention together with other candidates to appear
before the same on "to show cause why their certificates of
candidacy should be considered as filed in good faith and to be
given due course". After due hearing, at which Abcede appeared and
introduced evidence, the Commission issued a resolution, ordering
that the certificates of candidacy of including that of said
petitioner, "shall not be given due course. The commission reasoned
that with petitioners platform of redeeming the Japanese war notes
which is in violation of Fraud Order No. 2 issued by Bureau of
Posts, his filing of certificate of candidacy was attendant with
bad faithas he was engaged in a scheme to obtain money from the
public by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The Commission is
convinced that the certificate of candidacy of Alfredo Abcede was
filed for motives other than a bona fide desire to obtain a
substantial number of votes of the electorate.ISSUE:Whether or not
the COMELEC erred in denying the certificate of candidacy of
petitioner.HELD: Yes. The COMELEC erred in denying petitioners
certificate of candidacy. The Revised Election Code in Section 36
and 37 mandates the commission to accept certificate of candidacy
and shall order the preparation and distribution of copies for the
same to all the election precincts of the Philippines. The laws
give the Commission no discretion to give or not to give due course
to petitioner's certificate of candidacy. On the contrary, the
Commission has, admittedly, the "ministerial" duty to receive said
certificate of candidacy. As the branch of the executive department
to which the Constitution has given the "exclusive charge" of the
"enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections," the power of decision of the Commission is limited
to purely "administrative questions." (Article X, sec. 2,
Constitution of the Philippines.) It cannot therefore rule as to
who whether among the individuals who equally possess the minimum
requirements of the law can run and pursue its candidacy. The
question whether in order to enjoy those benefits a candidate must
be capable of "understanding the full meaning of his acts and the
true significance of election," and must have over a month prior,
to the elections "the tiniest chance to obtain the favorable
indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate," is a
matter of policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law,
which policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its
legislative functions. Apart from the absence of specific statutory
grant of such general, broad power as the Commission claims to
have, it is dubious minate and undefined manner necessary in order
that it could pass upon the factors relied upon in said resolution
and such grant must not he deemed made, in the absence of clear and
positive provision to such effect, which is absent in the case at
bar.Hence, it was an error on the part of the COMELEC to deny
petitioners certificate of candidacy.
Case No. 22Garvida v. SalesG.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997
Doctrine: The general rule is that an elective official of the
Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 years of age on the
day of his election. The only exception is when the official
reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. The SK official
must hot have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading
Section 423 (b) together with Section 428 of the Local Government
Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21
years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth
official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day.
Facts:On April 13, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguning Kabataan, Brgy.
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The election officer disapproved
petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that she
exceeded the age limit. The COMELEC en banc issued an order
directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers to
suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event that she won.
Petitioner garnered 78 votes as against respondents votes of 76. In
accordance with the COMELEC order, the Board of Election Tellers
did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant
petition.Issue:Whether or not petitioner was eligible to run as SK
Chairman.Held:No.In the case at bar, petitioner was 21 years old,
11 months and 5 days on the day of the election. If the candidate
is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is
ineligible. In view whereof, petitioner is declared ineligible for
being over the age qualification for candidacy and is ordered to
vacate her position as SK Chairman.
Case No. 23Loong v. ComelecG.R. No. 93986. December 22,
1992.
Doctrine:Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that in
case a filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false
representation, a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy
may be filed within 25 days from the time the certificate was
filed. Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure which
provides that the petition for disqualification may be filed at any
time after the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy but
not later than the date of proclamation cannot
apply.Facts:Petitioner Loong filed his certificate of candidacy on
15 January 1990 (the last day for the filing of the same) for
vice-governor of the Muslim Mindanao Autonomous Region. Private
respondent filed the petition (SPA 90-006) to disqualify candidate
Loong on the ground that petitioner made a false representation as
to his age only 49 days from the date Loongs certificate of
candidacy was filed, and 16 days after the election
itself.Issue:Whether the petition for disqualification was timely
filed.Held:No. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that
in case a filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false
representation, a petition to cancel the certificate of the
aforesaid person may be filed within 25 days from the time the
certificate was filed. Clearly SPA 90-006 was filed beyond the
25-day period. We do not agree with respondents contention that the
petition for disqualification may be filed at any time after the
last day for filing a certificate of candidacy but not later than
the date of proclamation, applying Section 3, Rule 25 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. The petition filed to disqualify
petitioner on the ground that the latter made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age does
not fall under the grounds for disqualification in Rule 25.
Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 is merely a procedural rule issued by
respondent Commission which has no legislative power. Thus, it
cannot supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a
legislative enactment.
Case No. 24Lanot v. ComelecG.R. No. 164858. November 16,
2006.Doctrine: The essential elements of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code are (1) a person engages in an election campaign or
partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate; (3) the act is done
outside the campaign period. The second element requires the
existence of a candidate. Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one
who has filed a certificate of candidacy to an elective public
office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is
not a candidate.Facts:On 19 March 2004, petitioners filed a
petition for disqualification under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code against Vicente Eusebio before the Comelec.
Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in
various forms on various occasions outside the designated campaign
period. The Comelec granted the petition, but later on reversed the
same with the issuance of another order.Issue:Whether or not
respondent was guilty of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code.Held:No.Because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for
purposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed his
certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however,
never intended the filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2
January 2004 to make the person filing to become immediately a
candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots.Under
Section 3(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, the campaign period for
local officials commences 45 days before election day. For the 2004
local elections, this puts the campaign period on 24 March 2004.
This also puts the last day for filing of COCs on 23 March 2004.
Eusebio is deemed to have filed his COC on this date for purposes
other than the printing of ballots because this is the
interpretation of Section 80 most favorable to the one charged with
this violation. Thus, Eusebio became a candidate only on 23 March
2004. Acts committed by Eusebio prior to his becoming a candidate
even constituting election campaigning or partisan election
activities are not punishable under Section 80.
BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSG.R. No. 103956.
March 31, 1992DOCTRINE: COMELEC cannot impose prohibitions which
will curtail rights enshrined under the Constitution. FACTS: On
January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347.
Petitioner BloUmparAdiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11,
1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it
prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places
like cars and other moving vehicles. Sec 21(f) RA 2134.ISSUE:
whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit
the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or
private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized
posting areas that it fixes. RULING: The COMELEC's prohibition is
null and void on constitutional grounds. First the prohibition
unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). In the
National Press Club, case, the Court had occasion to reiterate the
preferred status of freedom of expression even as it validated
COMELEC regulation of campaigns through political advertisements.
When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a
candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the
electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining
clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC,
should lean in favor of freedom. Prohibition did not pass the clear
and preset danger rule. Second the questioned prohibition premised
on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for
overbreadth. It is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's
private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle.
In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule
prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1,
Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law. Third the
constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor
candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards
their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article
XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the
Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on
cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the
posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles,
pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner
of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes
crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial
resources of the candidate.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMELECG.R. No. 133486.
January 28, 2000
DOCTRINE: COMELEC cannot ban exit polls. FACTS: ABS-CBN (Lopez
Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to c