EJIA | Issue 2, May 2014

ISSUE 2, MAY 2014

It is our great pleasure to announce the second edition of the Emory Journal of International Affairs (EJIA). Since its formation only two years ago, EJIA has published numerous opinion-editorial pieces and longer-form academic articles on important international issues and current events. All of our pieces are written by undergraduate students at Emory University from a variety of disciplines, including Political Science, Business, Philosophy, and Economics. Over the past year, they have written about such divergent topics as polio eradication, the protests in Egypt, and Sino-Japanese relations. The goal of EJIA is to encourage dialogue and debate about the topic of international affairs, through articles published on our website and in our annual journals.

In this issue, we are happy to again demonstrate the variety of research interests explored by our writers. Nikhil Bontha explores French politics the impact of the country’s economy on the Front National party. Nicole Goetz continues to look at Eurasia by focusing on the authenticity of Russian democracy and challenges to further democratization. Kate Moran brings us to the Middle East to examine the challenges of Israel’s growing refugee population. Alexis Suh challenges us to reconsider our image of North Korea. Finally, Lauren Webb presents a sobering image of Afghanistan’s near future. We hope you will enjoy these articles as much as we have!

We would like to extend our heartfelt appreciation to our incredible staff writers for their impressive articles, both on our website and within this issue. Without them, this journal would not be possible. We would also like to thank our faculty adviser, Dr. Shawn Ramirez, and our graphic designer, Matthew Muenzer. Our appreciation over the past year cannot possibly be conveyed in the words on this page. Lauren Webb, Editor-in-ChiefMartin Sigalow, Publications EditorChristopher Linnan, Managing Editor

Hello!

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 2, May 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LE PEN ANd THE MyTH OF “dE-dEMONizATiON”NIKHIL BONTHA

4

RuSSiA’S dEMOCRATiC FAçAdENICOLE GOETZ

7

STRANgERS iN A STRANgE LANd: A SNAPSHOT OF iSRAEL’S gROwiNgREFugEE POPuLATiON

KATE MORAN15

NORTH KOREA: LEARNiNg TO uNdERSTANd, NOT TO ANTAgONizEALEXIS SUH

23

AFgHANiSTAN ANd THE ROLE OF wOMEN iN dEVELOPMENTLAUREN WEBB

26

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 2, May 2014

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 2, May 2014, 7-10

LE PEN ANd THE MyTH OF “dE-dEMONizATiON”

NIKHIL BOTHA

In 2011, France’s Front National party founder Jean-Marie Le Pen stepped down as the party’s president and his daughter, Marine Le Pen, took his place. The following year, she exceeded expectations by finishing third in the French presidential elections. Although Marine Le Pen did not qualify for the runoff round like her father did in 2002, she set a party record by garnering nearly 20% of the vote. Many observers of French politics have attributed Marine Le Pen’s success to moderating the party through a strategy of “de-demonization.” However, her political beliefs, specifically on immigration and globalization, are almost exactly the same as her father’s. The Front National has actually failed to attract more moderate voters. Instead, parts of the electorate are actually adopting more extreme positions on immigration and France’s European Union membership. Thus, Marine Le Pen was successful because her extreme anti-immigration and anti-European Union stances attracted voters who are increasingly concerned about unemployment and the Eurozone crisis. Specifically, the working class and French youth voted for Marine Le Pen in larger numbers than ever before. Marine Le Pen has certainly been more moderate than her father in terms of the rhetoric that she has used. Jean-Marie Le Pen has been the subject of controversy on multiple occasions for making racist and anti-Semitic comments. For example, he once said that the Nazi death camps were only but “a mere detail” of World War II. He has also accused former French President Jacques Chirac of being “in the pay of Jewish organizations.”1 Marine Le Pen, on the other hand, has not made nearly as many political gaffes as her father. By several accounts, she is more “polished” than her father and avoids making political gaffes.2 Nevertheless, she too was recently accused of racism by the media and other politicians when she equated Muslims praying on the streets to a “[Nazi] occupation of territory.”3

Even if Marine Le Pen is perceived as politically more moderate than Jean-Marie Le Pen, she has still attracted the same type of voters as her father. In one study of voting trends, voters for Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen were placed on an ideological scale from 1 to 7, 1 being the most leftist voters and 7 being the most right-wing voters. In the four elections where Jean-Marie Le Pen ran for president, the higher a voter scored on the seven-point scale, the higher the probability that he or she will choose him in the general

1 Anti-Defamation League. “Backgrounder: Jean-Marie Le Pen and the National Front.” 23 Apr. 2002. Web. 26 Apr. 2013.

2 Williams, Michelle H. “A New Era for French Far Right Politics? Comparing the FN under Two Le Pens.” Análise Social 201 (2011): 692. Web.

3 The Telegraph. “Marine Le Pen: Muslims in France ‘like Nazi Occupation’.” 12 Dec. 2012. Web. 26 Apr. 2013.

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election.4 Similarly, in the 2012 presidential election, nearly half of the voters for Marine Le Pen scored a 7 on the ideological spectrum.5 Marine Le Pen’s popularity among the right wing French electorate has only been increasing. A 2011 poll showed that Marine Le Pen was the leading right-wing candidate after she captured 29% of the popular vote, beating out former president Nicolas Sarkozy by a full nine percentage points.6 Additionally, Marine Le Pen attracted more voters who scored a 5 or a 6 on the scale than her father.7

The only explanation for Marine Le Pen’s surge in the polls is that right-wing voters are taking more extreme stances on issues like immigration, not that Marine Le Pen is more moderate than her father. As a matter of fact, Marine Le Pen’s anti-immigration stance closely mirrors that of her father’s. Jean-Marie Le Pen made the immigration issue the cornerstone of the Front National’s platform in 1973 when anti-immigrant riots broke out in Paris and Marseilles. Around this time, polls showed that a majority of the French population thought that there were too many immigrants in France.8 Jean-Marie framed his anti-immigration stance around domestic security and unemployment concerns. He would routinely reference the anti-immigrant riots in his speeches and two of his most famous election slogans were “France for the French first” and “one million unemployed is one million immigrants too many.”9 His speeches and rhetoric were successful in making immigration one of France’s biggest elections issues. Immigration up until this point, however, “was not a contentious issue driving French political behavior … until the [Front National] made it an issue in the minds of people.”10 Even when other mainstream French political parties began to take sides on the immigration question, the “‘issue ownership’ already belonged to the [Front National].”11 Thus, instead of stealing votes away from the Front National, the “larger party encroachment served to increase the [Front National’s] stature, moving the French political center farther to the right.”12

Marine Le Pen used the same anti-immigration strategy in the 2012 elections. After French-Algerian Mohammed Merah shot and killed seven people near Toulouse, Marine Le Pen framed her anti-immigration agenda around domestic security just like her father. In a speech, the National Front leader warned of the possible threat of radical Islamism in France by asking, “How many [more] Mohammed Merahs are arriving on boats and planes each day?”13 Her message appeals to many people in France. Numerous opinion surveys have found that Muslim immigration to France has become a major concern for a large portion of the French

4 Mayer, Nonna. “From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right.” Parliamentary Affairs 66 (2013): 164. Oxford Journals. Web.

5 Ibid.

6 Williams, Michelle H. “A New Era for French Far Right Politics? Comparing the FN under Two Le Pens.” Análise Social 201 (2011): 687. Web.

7 Mayer 164.

8 Ellinas, Antonis A. The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist Card. New York: Cambridge UP (2010): 174. Print.

9 Ellinas 175.

10 Williams 685.

11 Ibid, 683.

12 Ibid.

13 The Economist. “Are 18% of French People Racist?” 24 Apr. 2012. Web. 26 Apr. 2013.

electorate.14 The French government recently passed several new naturalization restrictions that make it harder for Muslims and other immigrants to become French citizens. Specifically, all citizenship candidates must now pass French culture exams, be able to speak French fluently, and “pledge allegiance to French values.”15 Marine Le Pen not only wants to make these restrictions more stringent, but she also wants to reduce the amount of legal immigrants per year from 200,000 entries to just 10,000.16 Voters for the Front National party in previous presidential elections tended to rate immigration as the most important election issue. Front National voters have historically been more ethnocentric than the average voter.17 According to surveys conducted between 1988 and 2012, voters for both Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen “intensely [rejected] foreigners, immigrants, [and] minorities.”18 Even though the French population as a whole has become more open and tolerant because of “rising education levels and generational turnover,” 88% of Marine Le Pen voters in 2012 said that the number of immigrants in France was too high.19 Additionally, 50% of Front National voters in the 2012 election rated immigration as the most important issue, whereas 50% of the entire French electorate rated unemployment as the most important issue.20

A secondary, yet increasingly significant, reason why more people are voting for the Front National is because the party is opposed to France’s European Union membership. Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen both argue that the EU’s pro-globalization policies such as its free trade agreements have increased unemployment because low-skilled jobs can be cheaply offshored to developing countries. In 2005, during the negotiations of the Treaty of Lisbon, Jean-Marie Le Pen attacked the EU constitution and said that the new treaty would severely undermine France’s national and economic interests.21 Marine Le Pen also referred to the EU as “the Trojan horse of ultraliberal globalization” and compared the EU to “a European Soviet Union.”22

The immigration and Eurozone sovereign debt issues are both linked by the worsening unemployment situation in France. The unemployment rate in France rose to nearly 11 percent in 2012 from a low of 7.5 percent in 2008.23 A sizeable portion of the working class in France has been drawn to the Front National party because of the country’s declining economy. In the 2012 presidential elections, Marine Le Pen won a Front National record 33% of the working class vote.24 More recent polls have even indicated that as much as

14 Kern, Soeren. “The Islamization of France in 2012.” Gatestone Institute, 2 Jan. 2013. Web. 26 Apr. 2013.

15 Ibid.

16 Inzaurralde, Bastien. “Why French Far-right Candidate Marine Le Pen Is Attracting Youth.” The Christian Science Monitor, 11 Apr. 2012. Web. 26 Apr. 2013.

17 Mayer 165.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Mayer 166.

21 The Guardian. “Le Pen Calls for No Vote on EU Plan.” 10 Apr. 2005. Web. 26 Apr. 2013.

22 Mestre, Abel. “Marine Le Pen: The Face of French Euroscepticism.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 26 Jan. 2012. Web. 24 Apr. 2013.

23 Trading Economics. “France Unemployment Rate.” 7 Mar. 2013. Web. 26 Apr. 2013.

24 Mayer 171.

7NiKHiL BOTHA

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42% of the working class supports Marine Le Pen.25 The Front National is also especially popular in regions “where industry has migrated abroad and unemployment is high.”26

In addition to the French working class, more young people than ever before are turning out for the Front National party in general elections. A March 2012 poll found that 23% of 18-22 year-olds in France supported Marine Le Pen, the highest percentage ever recorded for a Front National leader.27 She is especially popular with young people from working class backgrounds, or “blue-collars’ children.”28 Young people, especially “blue-collars’ children,” are highly exposed to unemployment and therefore are “[concerned] that immigrants are taking the few jobs available to them in France’s crisis-stricken economy.”29

Thus, the recent voting trends of the working class and the French youth may seem to suggest that the Front National has become more moderate, but actually the party has remained ideologically the same and it is largely these two segments of the electorate that have become more extreme. The 2008 recession and subsequent economic downturn have most negatively affected the French working class and youth population, which has caused many of them to resent immigrants and the Eurozone. Immigrants are viewed as more competition for the already scarce amount of job opportunities in a struggling French economy. These two groups also blame the Eurozone and its pro-free trade policies because it is cheaper for France to import many of its goods rather than having to pay domestic workers higher wages to produce the same goods. Unless France’s government and majority parties can curb unemployment and stabilize the economy, the Front National will only continue to attract more votes in the national elections.

25 Williams 689.

26 Von Rohr, Mathieu. “Madame Rage: Marine Le Pen’s Populism for the Masses.” Spiegel Online. N.p., 7 July 2011. Web. 26 Apr. 2013.

27 Inzaurralde.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

Nikhil Bontha is a junior and political science major at Emory University. He is also a member of the Barkley Forum, Emory’s national debate and outreach program.

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 2, May 2014, 11-13

RuSSiA’S dEMOCRATiC FAçAdE

NICOLE GOETZ

When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, the democratic world, especially the United States, was eager to see the transition of a strong, democratic Russia rise from the ashes of the former Soviet Union. After two decades full of chaotic political and economic reforms, Russia proudly claims it is a democracy. However, actions speak louder than words and in that sense, Russia is not a democracy. Although Russia holds elections and has a democratic constitution, these two traits alone do not make it a true democratic country, but a country with democratic qualities. Since Vladimir Putin came to power as president in 2000, Russia has undergone a severe weakening of democratic institutions. During Putin’s time as president, he has diminished political and legal transparency in the state, weakened checks and balances, and made it nearly impossible for independent media groups and other nongovernmental actors to flourish within the Russian civil society.1 While there are many other factors that have disrupted Russia’s growth towards a strong democracy, these three factors mentioned above have clearly obstructed the framework of what potentially could have been a strong and true democratic country. By Robert Dahl’s definition, democracy requires not only free, fair, and competitive elections, but also freedoms that make such elections meaningful.2 These freedoms include the right to assemble, the freedom of expression, the access to alternative sources of information, and that the government policies and elected officials are a direct reflection of the citizens’ desires.3 The absence of these freedoms suggests that Russia cannot truly claim to uphold democratic principles. It certainly holds free elections, but the extent to which the elections are fair and have true contestation is questionable. Further light may be shed with investigation of the state institutions that Russia fails to uphold. Perhaps Russia’s transition to democracy was doomed from the start. When former president Boris Yeltsin and his administration devised the new constitution in 1993, it would pave the way for a system that emphasized presidential power.4 Putin would take full advantage of this. Since his election in 2000, Putin has been the face of Russian politics. Putin has a hand in all levels of government, from local to national. Whether he is calling the shots directly or through his appointed government puppets, Putin has a terrifying and disproportional amount of power when compared to the judiciary and legislative branches of the Russian

1 Patrick H. O’Neil, Karl Fields, and Don Share, Cases in Comparative Politics: Fourth Edition (United States: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013), 316.

2 Robert Dahl, Polarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 39.

3 Larry J. Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13, Vol. 2 (2002): 21.

4 O’Neil, Fields, and Share, Cases in Comparative Politics, 327.

10 NiCOLE gOETz

government. From his very first day in office, Putin has been accumulating more and more power. Now, checks and balances hardly exist in the Russian government. An example of this is with Putin’s power over Russia’s regional governors. Putin appoints all regional governors, and although they must be approved by local legislators, the local legislators have yet to reject an appointee. This is likely because going against Putin’s judgment would have severe consequences. An example of this would be in 2010, when a Moscow mayor criticized the president for his indecisiveness, the mayor was quickly removed via presidential decree.5

From a Western perspective, what Russia needs is more democracy, but from the point of view of Russians, what the country lacks is order. Disorder is extremely evident in everyday life. Russia’s mortality statistics reveal high rates of death from avoidable causes, such as drunkenness, accidents, and murder.6 It is also evident in the violence caused by the mafia “enforcing” their code and in the corruption of “kleptocrats” that have used political connections to secure opportunities worth billions of dollars.7 Rose says, “If Russia is to become a complete democracy, it must have order as well as elected officeholders - and that requires a different state from the one that Boris Yeltsin was able to establish.”8 When Putin took office, the legacy left before him was a state that did not adhere to the rule of the law. Because of this, Putin is able to delegate much of the power in Russia to himself. The Russian people themselves are not necessarily opposed to because they desire “order.” As a leader, Putin offers strong leadership, toughness, law and order, and stability. As long as order is achieved, democracy and the limits of power are not priorities to the Russian people. Moreover, there is a diminished sense of legal and political transparency in the state. The holding of regular elections confirms that Russia is democratic, but the consistent lawless practices of the state’s leaders prove that it is not yet a modern state. The lack of the rule of law can be seen in the state’s handling of economic and political affairs. The Siloviki, or the “man of power,” is made up of military and security elites (Putin’s main men) that are given control over nationalized posts and firms. The members of the Siloviki become incredibly wealthy over this, but the way they got the posts and firms is a grey area. In most cases, Putin and the government would seize these large, private companies by first arresting the owner and then confiscating their funds and property. A famous case of this was back in 2003 when Mikhail Khordkovsky, an oligarch from Yeltsin’s time and oil and gas entrepreneur, was arrested for tax evasion. Previously, he had come under pressure by the government for criticizing Putin. While it was likely Khordkovsky had some trouble with tax evasion, it is also very likely that the Russian government overstepped their power boundaries to eliminate someone who was a threat to their power and the government. The functioning of Putin’s government is clearly very opaque. With so much power invested in the government elites and with nobody to keep them in check, it is difficult to tell what is truly illegal or what was simply made up by the politicians for their own personal gains. If the corruption in Russia continues at this rate, the growth of democracy will be forever stunted. If not, it will regress as time goes on. As mentioned earlier, for a state to truly enjoy free and fair elections, voters must enjoy freedoms that include the right to assemble and freedom of expression. It seems expression has always been suppressed in Russia. On top of the state controlling many corporations in Russia, they also control the main media

5 Ibid., 338.

6 Tulip Mazumdar, “Vodka blamed for high death rates in Russia,” BBC, January 31, 2014, accessed March 17, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/health-25961063.

7 Richard Rose and Neil Munro, Elections without Order: Russia’s Challenge to Vladimir Putin, (Cambridge: University Press, 2002), 1.

8 Ibid., 8.

companies and outlets. This means that most main sources are all state propaganda based. The few independent media outlets that still exist are very limited in what they promote and in what they say. If a media outlet were to publish or say something even slightly negative about Putin or the government, then it would face the consequences of a state-takeover. This eliminates any chance of the media keeping the government in check. This inability to voice such criticisms is a hindrance to the contestation factor in the democratic practice. Furthermore, civil society has taken a hit due to the ever-increasing restrictions on political parties, NGOs, and civil society groups. For example, any event or activity by the civil society group must be approved by the state. The restrictions have gotten so tight, that NGOs have decided to stop investing their time in Russia because it would be impossible to get anything done or accomplished. And due to the revisions Putin has made on elections, it is nearly impossible for small political parties to thrive. In 2007 Putin changed the state Duma elections to a proportional system and raised the party threshold from five to seven percent to prevent small political parties from fragmenting the government. Thus making his already dominant-party, United Russia, even more powerful. These changes in civil society have stripped what would have been basic freedoms if the country were more democratic in order to maintain power in the elites. With that being said, with such institutions lacking from the system, it is unfeasible that Russia has a chance at being a strong democracy because it lacks basic, defining democratic entities such as political parties, media and civil institutions. Contemporary Russia is not a democracy. Despite all of these shortcomings, the nature of and the democratic potential within Russia is still a prominent discussion among many scholars and world leaders. However, as long as Russia has authoritarian leaders, such as Putin, who will most likely be in power well into the 2020’s (there have been rumors of changing the terms from four to seven years), then true democracy will never be achieved in Russia and it will continue to be a hybrid regime of democratic and authoritarian traits. Currently Russia does not function as a democracy because it lacks the basic institutions that cause democracy to thrive. But as stated before, the Russian people are not looking to achieve pure democracy, but order. Order is the one thing that strong, authoritarian leaders such as Putin can deliver. This will not only have a serious effect on the future of Russia, but the international realm as well as Russia continues and grows to be an even heavier influence at the world’s negotiating table, especially with topics concerning Iran, Syria, and eastern Europe.

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Nikhil Bontha is a junior and political science major at Emory University. He is also a member of the Barkley Forum, Emory’s national debate and outreach program.

STRANgERS iN A STRANgE LANd: A SNAPSHOT

OF iSRAEL’S gROwiNg REFugEE POPuLATiON

KATE MORAN

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 2, May 2014, 14-17

It is Friday afternoon in Tel Aviv. In just a few short hours, the sun will set and the Sabbath will begin. For the next 24 hours, the city will take on a sluggish quality: shops and restaurants will be closed, buses will operate on limited schedules, and parks and other public places will be predictably vacant. But for the city’s non-Jewish residents, this day is just like any other. In south Tel Aviv, the streets are alive and bustling with activity. The street signs are in Hebrew, and while native Israelis are not an altogether uncommon sight, the shops and restaurants in this area clearly cater to a burgeoning African population. Young Eritrean men loiter on front stoops. Sudanese women with babies strapped to their backs visit family members and neighborhood friends. Many are refugees, seeking asylum in Israel’s largest metropolis. They are recent émigrés from war-torn, impoverished nations, such as Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia. They are Christians and Muslims, fleeing religious and political persecution, civil war, or worse. They arrive with stories of genocide and sexual violence and expulsion from their homes. They have many stories, but not much else. At present, there are more than 55,000 African migrants currently residing in Israel.1 If forced to return to their home countries, they could face life-threatening persecution. Nearly 60,000 Africans have entered Israel illegally through the Sinai Peninsula since 2006. 17,258 Africans crossed into Israel in 2011 alone. Part of the reason Israel is a favored destination for Africans is because it is the only nation of thriving institutional infrastructure and relative peace they can reach on foot.2 This makes the country, for obvious reasons, an attractive and viable option for individuals with limited economic means. These individuals come seeking better lives for themselves and their children, but in many cases, these dreams never become a reality. Poverty and crime have become significant issues, not only in south Tel Aviv, but also in other areas of

1 Hartman, Ben. “Statistics Show Dramatic Drop in Illegal Migration to Israel.” Www.JPost.com. Accessed November 11, 2013. http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Statistics-show-dramatic-drop-in-illegal-migration-to-Israel-330704.

2 Booth, William, and Ruth Eglash. “Israel Says It Won’t Forcibly Deport Illegal African Migrants, but It Wants Them to Leave.” Washington Post. December 21, 2013. Accessed March 17, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israel-says-it-wont-forcibly-deport-illegal-african-migrants-but-it-wants-them-to-leave/2013/12/20/1c81d8be-5cf2-11e3-8d24-31c016b976b2_story.html.

the country where African refugees have settled. Families of ten or twelve crowd into tiny apartments, trash litters the streets, and public parks are overrun with the homeless. While there exist local organizations3 that seek to acclimate Africans to their new home—providing social and health services, education, and even resettlement aid to migrants—many Israelis wholly reject their presence in the country. These Israelis decry the degradation of their neighborhoods, and many have ultimately chosen to relocate. Those who stay rarely go out at night, and when they must, arm themselves with pepper spray. For these citizens, who view the Africans’ presence as demographic a threat to Israel’s national existence as a Jewish state, deportation is the only solution.4

The high poverty rates among African migrants are due in part to economic policies implemented by the Israeli government. Such policy plays a significant role in the successful integration—both socially and otherwise—of Africans into Israeli society. In an effort to curb the number of Africans coming into the country, and to apply pressure to those who have already arrived, the Knesset has made it incredibly difficult for illegal immigrants to obtain the necessary work authorization papers. Because Israel cannot forcibly deport many Eritrean and Sudanese migrants—due to restrictions placed on the state by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—they instead grant temporary residence permits to the Africans, which must be renewed every three months. Often, they are denied renewal. As a result, thousands of Israel’s undocumented Africans are forced to work illegally for extremely low wages and to put themselves at constant risk of expulsion.5 Such working conditions perpetuate the poverty so prevalent within Israel’s African migrant communities. The problem is both systemic and cyclical. Economic security is not the only challenge Africans face when they seek asylum in Israel; there are also significant obstacles to their social integration. Protests and public demonstrations calling for the forced deportation of African migrants and other undocumented workers are becoming more and more common. At a recent event in Tel Aviv, Israeli MP and member of the Likud Party, Miri Regev, attacked Africans, calling them a “cancer” in the body of the nation. Since the first African migrants began arriving in 2006, Interior Minister Eli Yishai has pressed the Israeli government to take definitive steps to stop “infiltrators” from penetrating Israel’s southern border. In the past, Yishai has also pushed for stricter employment laws, hoping to pass legislation that would make it illegal for Israeli businesses to employ migrant workers.6 In renewed efforts to crack down on Africans attempting to sneak across the country’s border with Egypt, Israel recently announced the opening of a detention center in the country’s southern desert.7 The center operates as a type of “half-way house;” detainees can leave but must report back three times a day, including at nightfall. Additionally, they can be held indefinitely pending voluntary repatriation, implementation of

3 “Israel Gives-About Us.” IsraelGives. Accessed March 17, 2014. http://www.israelgives.org/aboutisraelgives.

4 “Eli Yishai: Infiltrators Pose Existential Threat to Israel.” Haaretz.com. November 22, 2010. Accessed March 17, 2014. http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/eli-yishai-infiltrators-pose-existential-threat-to-israel-1.326075.

5 Dana, Joseph. “African Refugees Seeking Asylum in Israel Fight for Their Rights.” Latest and Breaking News. January 2, 2014. Accessed March 17, 2014. http://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/african-refugees-seeking-asylum-in-israel-fight-for-their-rights.

6 “Eli Yishai: Infiltrators Pose Existential Threat to Israel.” Haaretz.com. November 22, 2010. Accessed March 17, 2014. http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/eli-yishai-infiltrators-pose-existential-threat-to-israel-1.326075.

7 Elias, Nir. “Thousands of African Migrants Protest Israel Detention Policy.” Reuters. January 05, 2014. Accessed March 17, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/05/us-israel-migrants-idUSBREA0409820140105.

13KATE MORAN

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deportation orders or resolution of their asylum requests.8 The facility is a low-lying, enclosed compound, encircled by a barbed wire fence. According to Israeli reports, the detention centers are designed to hold upwards of 11,000 people.9 It is unclear whether such facilities will prove to be an effective means of curbing illegal immigration; regardless, the ethicality of these centers is another question entirely. Many people, including the families affected by this controversial policy and politicians on the Israeli Left, have likened Israel’s treatment of African immigrants to South African apartheid.10 Counter-protests have begun among migrant communities and their advocates in Israel and around the world. In early January 2014, more than 10,000 migrants gathered in front of the Israeli Knesset to protest Israel’s “draconian” detention policies,11 shouting, “We need protection!” “We are asylum-seekers!” and “We are refugees!” Despite the migrants’ efforts, many Israeli politicians remain unmoved. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long sought to limit the number of African refugees in Israel. He has on numerous occasions expressed his belief that they are a tangible threat to the country’s distinct Jewish identity.12

As the only Jewish state in the world and one of the Middle East’s only legitimate representative democracies, it is not unreasonable to expect that Israel would feel threatened by such an influx of non-Jewish individuals. Surrounded by hostile nations and in a perpetual state of dormant war, Israel does not believe that it can afford to compromise its demographic integrity as a Jewish state by absorbing non-Jewish refugees. Just as important, it cannot afford to alienate any more world powers through unethical immigration policies. In Israel’s constant struggle to remain both a Jewish state and a democracy, it is often forced to make difficult policy decisions out of self-interest and national preservation. These policies are sometimes seen as controversial by other world powers, particularly those who feel threatened by Israel. As a nation founded by immigrants, many Africans thought Israel a natural choice for asylum, and thus do not understand why they are being turned away. When it comes to Israel, no decision is an easy one, nor an easily understood one. Just as the United States acts in its best interests, so too does the Jewish State. The current Israeli leadership believes it is doing so by pursuing stricter immigration policies and erecting barriers to illegal movement across their borders. The task of the Israeli government, then, is to find a solution that can accommodate the needs of both the Israelis and Africans already in the country. There is no simple solution, and, certainly, a resolution for the issue of immigration and immigrant rights will not be achieved overnight. For the foreseeable future, the legal and social status of African refugees and other migrants in Israel will remain tenuous, at best. The Israeli government has proved to be unbending in its pursuit of a more rigid overall immigration policy. Africans too have proven resilient in skirting limitations. As the world becomes increasingly globalized, travel is made more accessible and affordable, and the political conditions in various parts of the world

8 “African Migrants Protest Israel Detention Law.” Al Jazeera. January 6, 2014. Accessed March 17, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/african-migrants-protest-israel-detention-law-20141613236301345.html.

9 Lior, Ilan, and Gili Cohen. “Israel’s Fenced-in Detention Facility for African Migrants to Open in Two Weeks.” Haaretz.com. November 26, 2013. Accessed March 17, 2014. http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.560290.

10 Eisenbud, Daniel K. “More than 10,000 African Migrants Protest in Front of Knesset.” Www.JPost.com. January 8, 2014. Accessed March 17, 2014. http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Migrant-protesters-en-route-to-Jerusalem-337447.

11 Ibid.

12 Ravid, Barak. “Netanyahu: Illegal African Immigrants - a Threat to Israel’s Jewish Character.” Haaretz.com. July 18, 2010. Accessed March 17, 2014. http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/netanyahu-illegal-african-immigrants-a-threat-to-israel-s-jewish-character-1.302653.

deteriorate further, Israel (and other nations in the Mediterranean) will be forced to confront and grapple with difficult questions such as immigrants’ rights. Detention centers like the ones Israel has begun building are a temporary solution. Such policies will alienate migrant populations, exacerbate tensions between ethnic groups, and contribute to a human rights crisis for the country. A permanent solution must be found that neither prejudices the rights of Africans to freedom from persecution, nor threatens Israel’s existence as the world’s only Jewish state.

15KATE MORAN

Kate Moran, a junior at Emory, is a Middle Eastern/South Asian Studies and Arabic major. Her academic interests include international health and development, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, and refugee issues. Following her graduation in 2015, Kate intends to pursue a career in international development or academia.

NORTH KOREA: LEARNiNg TO uNdERSTANd, NOT TO

ANTAgONizEALEXIS SUH

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 2, May 2014, 18-21

North Korea is a mystery to the majority of the world. The North Korean political system is not like any other functioning system in the world, and there is little known of the day to day lives of the people, even as more information has come to light in recent years. The American media tends to portray North Korea as an antagonist, instead of trying to learn about and understand the unknown. Articles about North Korea tend to ignore the web of international politics and fragile relationships built up over time, involving not only the two Koreas, but also the United States and China. Media’s portrayal of North Korea has led to ignorance on the subject, and many people end up simply thinking of North Korea as an antagonist. Especially in order to determine the optimal approach nations should take when interacting with North Korea, it is crucial to first understand the history of the peninsula and then carefully filter through the information in the mainstream media. The Soviet Union and United States split Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel after World War II.1 It was a temporary solution, but the Korean War solidified the split. After the Korean War, the two Koreas “branded each other as ‘national traitors’ or ‘a puppet government.’ Each claimed that the other was ‘selling our nation and fatherland’ to foreign powers, thus disqualifying them as member of the new Korean community.”2 Both Koreas’ nationalism became centered on this rhetoric of claiming to be the legitimate Korea. Especially for North Korea, this ethnocentric nationalism has led to extreme “demands of conformity and a violent process of exclusion” within the country.3

The Korean War has never officially ended. Instead of a peace treaty, “[o]n July 1953, the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, and the United Nations Command signed an armistice to end the fighting.”4 Therefore to end the war, South Korea is not needed. This gives North Koreans another reason to not acknowledge South Korea as a sovereign nation. Because the war has not officially ended, North Korea considers itself to be still in a state of war. In

1 Armstrong, Charles K. “Koreas in the World.” In The Koreas. New York: Routledge, 2007. 14.

2 Shin, Gi-Wook. “Roots and Politics of Korean Nationalism.” In Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: genealogy, politics, and legacy. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006. 156.

3 Ibid., 165

4 Armstrong, Charles K. “Koreas in the World.” In The Koreas. New York: Routledge, 2007. 16.

the 1990s, North Korea faced its greatest threat to its existence, starting with the loss of all of its communist allies in Eastern Europe.5 Finding itself alone in standing against the capitalist regimes, North Korea turned to nuclear power for leverage. 1993 was the first year North Korea conducted its first successful nuclear missile test. In 2013, continuing American and South Korean military exercises further agitated the North Korean government, prompting North Korea to retaliate by launching test missiles. South Korea, United States and China scrambled to plan meetings of negotiation with North Korea. These conferences are merely a show to deter away from a war breaking out. Naturally, the American media portrays its state and allies in a positive light and its enemies in a negative light. Although less extreme, this is no different from the North Korean media, portraying the United States and capitalism as the devil. The American media puts North Korea under a microscope, criticizing its every move. Rarely though, will you see headlines about U.S. human rights violations in its own media. This has been a pattern since the Korean War. During the war, United States destroyed “forty to ninety percent” of North Korean cities, spraying them with napalm.6 They also massacred innocent South Koreans. One unfortunate day, civilians, mostly women, children and elderly attempted to find shelter and flee to the south under the No Gun Ri Bridge. Little did they know orders had been given to the American soldiers not to let anyone cross the bridge? The U.S. army shot into the crowd, and then came back day after day with air raids to make sure everyone was dead.7 Such atrocities were not reported in American newspapers at the time, and are not taught in the American public education system. The media further enforces this trend of presenting only the brutalities of the opposing side. Huffington Post’s article titled “North Korea Won’t Give Up its Weapons, Pyongyang Says”8 stays true to its title and only focuses on the actions of North Korea. There is only emphasis on only the actions of North Korea, and these articles do not delve into the potential reasons North Korea acts so rebelliously. On the other hand, allegations of North Korean human rights violations have merit and also must be taken into consideration. There is an “estimated 200,000 political prisoners who fester in concentration camps.”9 Song also provides a first-hand account of the famine in the 1990s, during which she lost her husband. Such deteriorating living conditions are the result of a failure in the governing system, creating ironic situations such as, “the markets were stocked with food…yet people were dying from hunger.”10 Every nation violates various human rights. Actions should be taken to lessen human rights violations in all nations, including North Korea, not solely North Korea. Media tends to portray North Korea as a place that is frozen in the past and completely isolated, calling it the hermit kingdom. Yet, North Korea is not as disconnected from the world. Chul, a North Korean defector,

5 Ibid., 80

6 Cumings, Bruce. “”The Most Disproportionate Result”: The Air War.” In The Korean War: A History. New York: Modern Library, 2010. 160.

7 Time, “The Bridge at No Gun Ri,” October 11, 1999, accessed December 13, 2013. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2054848,00.html

8 The World Post, “North Korea Won’t Give Up Nuclear Weapons, Pyongyang Says,” April 20, 2013, accessed December 20, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/20/north-korea-nuclear-weapons_n_3121427.html

9 The Economist, “North Korea: Rumblings from below,” February 9, 2013.

10 Demick, Barbara. “The Good Cook: A Battle Against Famine in North Korea.” The New Yorker, November 9, 2009.

17ALEXiS SuH

“would cross back over the Sino-Korean border with some food and money for his parents.”11 However, there is danger in crossing the border. For instance, one woman was “sentenced to death for helping two girls leave the country.”12 But there are signs that the rigid system is loosening up, and information is flowing in and out of North Korea. For years the songbun, a hierarchy based on bloodlines predetermined a North Korean’s job and quality of life. Recently, a new class of capitalists is overturning the songbun. In North Korea, “’[p]eople increasingly believe that money is more important than your background.’”13 In addition, for those at the bottom of the social ladder, black markets allow people to be innovative in their survival methods. Song Hee-suk, a North Korean defector, tried everything from creating a garden to baking cookies in efforts to keep her family alive.14 This disproves the notion that the North Korean government controls every single movement of its citizens. North Koreans are also increasingly gaining access to the outside world. Illegal South Korean and American television shows, radios and computers are making it way through China into North Korea.15 The optimal solution would be for the nations to compromise with one another, draft a peace treaty and achieve world peace. However, like most of international relations, peaceful political resolution or reunification will be difficult. Then the next common suggestion is to topple the North Korean regime. This idea is also impossible because it is not in the best interest of the United States, China or South Korea. For China, if the North Korean regime collapses, “millions of desperate hungry refugees streaming across the North Korean border into China,’” said Jim Butterworth, creator of the film Seoul Train.16 Americans would no longer have reason to keep its troops in South Korea, and would no longer have a way to keep an eye on China, one of their growing rivals. Finally, in South Korea there is the younger generation who feels disconnected from its northern neighbor. As the older generation is being replaced by those who have never known the Korean peninsula unified, South Koreans are increasingly finding war to reunify an unnecessary sacrifice. And as a democracy, the South Korean government will not go to a war that its citizens deem unnecessary. South Korea’s former president Kim Dae Jung took another approach in interacting with North Korea. His “Sunshine Policy” was built on the basis that “any positive change will more likely come about through engagement rather than isolation.”17 The “Sunshine Policy” improved the two nation’s relationship. Tensions rose again when former American president George W. Bush called North Korea an “axis of evil.” Nations should return to focusing on engaging North Korea through its economic sector. The overturning of the songbun hierarchy, emphasizing capital instead of unity and tradition, may be the beginning of a class that will rise up against the North Korean regime. Certain North Koreans, who have made fortunes in the black markets, are able to buy into governmental jobs. Although, for now, these North Koreans have only

11 Chung, Byung-Ho. “Between Defector and Migrant: Identities and Strategies of North Koreans in South Korea.” Korean Studies 32 (2009)

12 The Economist, “North Korea: Rumblings from below,” February 9, 2013.

13 Sullivan, Tim. “North Korea’s Songbun Caste System Faces Power of Wealth.” Huffington Post, December 29, 2012.

14 Demick, Barbara. “The Good Cook: A Battle Against Famine in North Korea.” The New Yorker, November 9, 2009.

15 The Economist, “North Korea: Rumblings from below,” February 9, 2013.

16 Cooper, Anderson. “North Korean defectors beaten, killed.” CNN, April 8, 2013, accessed December 13, 2013. http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/08/north-korean-defectors-beaten-killed/

17 Armstrong, Charles K. “North Korea: The Logic and Limits of “Self-Reliance”.” In The Koreas. New York: Routledge, 2007. 84.

18 ALEXiS SuH

Alexis Suh is a junior at Emory University studying International Studies and Journalism. She is interested in Asian American studies, comparative politics and women’s studies.

penetrated onto the lower rungs of the ladder, if they are able to seep more into the system, these families may begin to demand more, and challenge the system.18 Foreign countries should attempt to accelerate the process by creating economic ties. Once there are economic ties, North Korea will be more prone to negotiations. Responsible individuals should not take anything that he or she hears, sees, or reads at face value, but instead examine all sides of any issue. Responsible citizens of all nations should continually educate his or herself to personally conclude what is truth and what is propaganda.

18 The Economist, “North Korea: Rumblings from below,” February 9, 2013.

19ALEXiS SuH

BEyONd BiLATERAL SECuRiTy: THE

NEEd FOR A TRuLy REgiONAL SOLuTiON iN

AFgHANiSTAN

Emory Journal of International Affairs, Issue 2, May 2014, 22-24

After more than ten years of military campaigns, tens of thousands deployed soldiers, and billions in dispersed aid money, the United States will complete the withdrawal of nearly all of its forces from Afghanistan in 2014, as will most other member countries of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Although a loya jirga blessed the agreement on November 24, 2014, President Hamid Karzai refused to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) or its accompanying Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the U.S. The agreement would have permitted approximately 10,000- 15,000 international soldiers (approximately two-thirds of whom would have been American) to continue training and advising members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after 2014.1 Without a signed agreement, the U.S. has said it will not leave any troops and Congress may refuse to issue any additional military aid to Afghanistan.2 Even if troops remain, the dramatic decrease in the number of international troops is likely to threaten regional security in the near term, as Afghanistan and its neighbors will lose their largest sources of financial support to address regional security. Each state in the region will continue to face the challenges of insurgency, drug trafficking, and economic hardship. Although these challenges may be solved in the long term, doing so will require increased and genuine regional cooperation and continued international support, two conditions which are far from guaranteed. In preparation for the drawdown, the ANA and ANSF were gradually put in charge of missions with ISAF forces in a supporting role. Although illiteracy, corruption, and troop retention remain serious

1 Masoud Popolzai and Ben Brumfield, “Loya Jirga Approves U.S.-Afghan Security Deal; Asks Karzai to Sign,” CNN, November 24, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/24/world/asia/us-afghanistan-security-agreement/index.html.

2 Ankit Panda, “U.S. Considering Leaving Fewer Than 10,000 Troops in Afghanistan Post-2014,” The Diplomat, April 23, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/u-s-considering-leaving-fewer-than-10000-troops-in-afghanistan-post-2014/.

LAUREN WEBB

problems, Afghan forces now successfully lead over 90% of missions.3 Tragically, less has been done to improve Afghanistan’s governing capacity. The Karzai government exerts little influence outside of the cities. Many provincial and national government positions are held by former warlords or criminals. To prevent infighting and further decentralization, Afghanistan’s run-off election to the April 2014 presidential election must avoid the corruption associated with Karzai’s “re-election” In 2009. While it is promising for national unity that most presidential tickets include running mates from different ethnic groups, the legitimacy of the nomination process has already been damaged by voter card sales. Along with its security transition, Afghanistan’s next leaders must grapple with serious economic issues. Between 2006 and 2011, international donors provided the funding needed for roughly 90% of Afghanistan’s public expenditures—64% of which came from the U.S.4 International donors pledged $16 billion in aid to Afghanistan for 2012-2015 at the Tokyo Conference in 2012. However, donor states never provided the total amount pledged between 2002 and 2013. This is likely to continue as the same countries recover from the economic crisis, face donor fatigue, and withdraw their forces. Even if current pledges are met, they will fall short of Afghanistan’s needs: the amount pledged to maintain the desired ANSF troop levels falls $6 billion short, which will significantly impact the ANSF’s ability to fight militant groups.5

The decline in total aid also will hurt the livelihood of Afghanistan’s people. As the relative “boom” times of foreign deployments and expenditures end, many Afghans, particularly urban service workers and those who administered development programs, will lose large portions—if not all—of their incomes. This mirrors an unfortunate trend across South and Central Asia, where high youth unemployment deprives economies of human capital that could otherwise promote growth in the region. Increasing poverty and unemployment could fuel the insurgency and drug cultivation and, at a minimum, will worsen the public’s distrust of both the Afghan government and international community. Opium cultivation increased 36% in 2013 over 2012, which demonstrates how fleeting most farmers consider the improvements made in providing security and economic alternatives over the past decade. Two more provinces were removed in 2013 from the list of “poppy-free” provinces, which now number 14, down from 20 in 2010.6 That the major hotbeds of opium cultivation are located in the south—particularly the Helmand, Farah, and Kandahar provinces—demonstrates the close inverse relationship between the government’s ability to provide security and the proliferation of drug trafficking. The resurgence of opium production has important implications for security, as the industry provides an estimated $70- $100 million each year to the insurgency and contributes to drug-related problems for Afghanistan and its neighbors, particularly in Central Asia.7

Militant attacks on ISAF, ANA, and ANSF units were over 50% higher in the first half of 2013 than

3 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Media Backgrounder (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 2013), http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_06/20130604_130604-mb-ansf.pdf.

4 Government Accountability Office. Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues. Rep. no. GAO-13-218SP.

5 Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress (Department of Defense, November 2013), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf.

6 UNODC and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, 2013 Afghanistan Opium Survey (Kabul: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, November 2013), http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_report_Summary_Findings_2013.pdf.

7 Ibid.

21LAuREN wEBB

22 LAuREN wEBB

the same period in prior years, indicating a likely trend for the first few years after the withdrawal.8 The consequences of increased violence and the growth of the opium trade will likely reverberate throughout the region, and Afghanistan neither can nor should face these problems alone. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan have already experienced increasing levels of insurgency over the past decade as militants fled Afghanistan. As international priorities—and funding—move elsewhere, the development of a regional solution is vital. Afghanistan has found areas of convergence with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan in preparation for a shared railway to link Central Asia and South Asia, providing the first major sign of progress on the New Silk Road Initiative. Similarly, India has bolstered its relationship with Afghanistan with $2 billion in developmental assistance and a strategic partnership that Afghanistan hopes will result in arms and other materiel. Other ties, however, remain strained and pose serious challenges to any regional solution. Within Central Asia, there is competition over electricity sales to energy-starved Afghanistan, further complicated by a history of distrust between Central Asia’s leaders. The Central Asian states are also plagued by the same economic, corruption, and drug trafficking problems that Afghanistan faces, impeding each country’s ability to successfully counter the problems together. Within South Asia, Afghanistan has always been a point of contention between India and Pakistan, who both wish to ensure an Afghan government both amicable to their own interests and with minimal ties to the other. Pakistan often supports insurgents in Afghanistan in pursuit of a favorable regime that will provide strategic depth against India, while also accusing Afghanistan of harboring insurgents who attack Pakistan. Although President Karzai’s visit to Islamabad indicates progress in the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) will likely continue to support the Haqqani network and other militant groups in an attempt to exert influence in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s development has been hurt by its own significance. With such a large number of actors—each with their own goals, resources, and backgrounds—it is difficult to foresee a positive outcome. The reduction in foreign resources and loss of ISAF will threaten regional security in the short term, but hope remains in the long term. Despite recent upticks, violence and drug trafficking are at lower levels than ten years ago. Women and girls have seen tremendous gains in education and health. However, if such gains are to be maintained and evince further progress, the international community cannot use a “regional solution” as a euphemism for an absolute withdrawal of resources. They must, instead, prove wrong everyone who views this as analogous to 1980s post-Soviet abandonment, and help the Afghans and their neighbors fight these challenges to the end.

8 Louise Arbour, “An Uncertain Future - International Crisis Group,” The Mark News, October 17, 2013, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/op-eds/arbour-an-uncertain-future.aspx.

Lauren Webb is the current Editor-in-Chief of the Emory Journal of International Affairs and a senior at Emory University. Her research interests include foreign relations, South Asia, and economic inequality in the United States. In August, she will begin to pursue a J.D. at New York University School of Law as an AnBryce Scholar.