EISA Pre-Election Assessment Mission Report

EISA Pre-Election Assessment Mission Report

KINGDOM OF LESOTHO08-12 December 2014

EISA Pre-Election Assessment Mission Report

EISA Pre-Election Assessment Mission Report | Kingdom of Lesotho

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSAABC AllBasothoConventionACP AllianceofCongressPartiesACF Areka Covenant Front for DevelopmentADC AllDemocraticCorporationAG AttorneyGeneralAUM AfricaUnityMovementBAC Basutoland African Congress BBDP BasothoBathoDemocraticPartyBCP BasutolandCongressPartyBDF Botswana Defence ForceBDNP BasothoDemocraticNationalPartyBDRP BroadcastingDisputeResolutionPanelBNP BasothoNationalPartyCCL ChristianCouncilofLesothoCSOs CivilSocietyOrganisationsDC DemocraticCongressDPE DevelopmentforPeaceEducationDPP DirectorofPublicProsecutionsEMB ElectoralManagementBodyEISA ElectoralInstituteforSustainableDemocracyinAfricaIEC Independent Electoral Commission FPTP First Past the Post (FPTP) KBP KopanangBasothoPartyLCA LesothoCommunicationsAuthorityLCD LesothoCongressforDemocracyLCN LesothoCouncilsofNon-governmentalOrganisationsLDF LesothoDefenceForceLEP LesothoEducationPartyLMPS LesothoMountedPoliceServiceLPC LesothoPeoplesCongressLMM LekhotlaLaMekhoaLeMeetloLTV LesothoTelevisionLWP LesothoWorkersPartyMFP MarematlouFreedomPartyMPLCs MultipartyLiaisonCommitteesMSA MaseruSecurityAccordMOU MemorandumofUnderstandingNDP NationalDemocraticPartyNGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisationNIP NationalIndependentPartyNLFP NewLesothoFreedomPartyNPP NationalProgressivePartyMP MemberofParliamentNUL NationalUniversityofLesothoPD Progressive Democrats PEMMO PrinciplesforElectionManagement,MonitoringandObservationPFD PopularFrontforDemocracyPR ProportionalRepresentationRCL ReformedCongressofLesothoSADC SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunitySAPS South African Police Service (SAPS) SANDF SouthAfricanNationalDefenceForceSSDLekhotlalaSenkatanaTRC TransformationResourceCentreUN UnitedNationsUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeUP UnitedPartyWHP WhiteHorseParty


CONTENTS1. Executive Summary ............................................................................................2. Historical Background And Context Of The 2015 Elections .................................. 2.1 The2012ElectionsandtheirAftermath............................................................ 2.2 TheCoalitionPoliticsandCollapseofGovernment...........................................3. The Legal Framework ......................................................................................... 1.3. TheConstitutionandElectoralframework..................................................... 3.2 TheElectoralSystem....................................................................................... 3.3 Partyandcampaignfinance........................................................................... 3.4. ElectionManagement....................................................................................4. Key Findings on the Pre-Election Phase .............................................................. 4.1 ConstituencyDelimitation.............................................................................. 4.2 VoterRegistration........................................................................................... 4.3 Politicalpartyregistrationandcandidatenomination................................... 4.4 ConflictManagement..................................................................................... 4.5 Civicandvotereducation............................................................................... 4.6 Themedia....................................................................................................... 4.7 Civilsociety..................................................................................................... 4.8 Genderandminorityrights............................................................................ 4.9 Security........................................................................................................... 4.10 ElectionCampaigns........................................................................................Appendices ..............................................................................................................Appendix 1:Listofstakeholdersconsulted................................................................

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TheElectoralInstituteforSustainableDemocracyinAfrica(EISA),deployeda twopersonPre-ElectionAssessmentMission (PAM) to Lesotho from 08 December to 12December 2014. The overall objective of the Missionwas to assess the political and electoral environmentaheadoftheforthcomingFebruary2015Parliamentaryelections.TheMissionassessedwhetherornotthereareconduciveconditionsexistingfortheconductofcredibleelections in linewith regional and international normssuchastheAfricanCharteronDemocracyElectionsandGovernance; the Principles for Election Management,MonitoringandObservation(PEMMO);SADCPrinciplesand Guidelines for Democratic Elections. The Missionalso looked at the state of readiness of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), political parties, CSOsand other stakeholders for the forthcoming election.It also looked at the progress made by the SouthernAfrican Development Community (SADC) mediation inpreparation for the elections. Findings of theMissionwillbeusedbyEISAasitpreparestodeployitsObserverMissiontoLesothofortheelections.

During itsstay inLesotho,theMissionmetwithall thekey stakeholders in theelectoral process, including theSADCMediationTeaminMaseruaswellasthetraditionalinstitution of the College of Chiefs (See Appendix 1).The main findings of the Mission and analysis of itsimplicationsfortheelectoralprocessarethatthe2015elections will take place against the background ofpolitical instability and security uncertainty. While theelections calendar had been issued already, there aredoubtsonthecredibilityofthevoters’rollandthattheIndependent Electoral Commission (IEC) had not yetreceivedfundsfortheelections.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE 2015 ELECTIONS

The history of the Kingdom of Lesotho’s politics andelections is characterised by periods of conflict with

a number of democratic gains, often followed byreversals. For instance, after organising successful pre-independencemultipartyelectionsin1965,thecountrybecameaonepartystatefiveyearslaterin1970.Thiswasfollowedbymilitarydictatorshipfrom1986to1993.Therebirthofmultipartypoliticsin1993wasshortlivedasademocraticallyelectedBasutolandCongressParty(BCP)governmentwasoverthrownin1994bytheKing,onlytobereinstatedinthesameyearthroughSouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity (SADC)mediation1. The BCP government was however overthrown for the second timein1997byitsownleaderwhoformedanewpartyinparliament,theLesothoCongressforDemocracy(LCD)and declared himself as PrimeMinister. The LCDwentontowinthe1998election,butitselectionvictorywasfiercelychallengedbyoppositionpartiesleadingtoanearcivilwar,whichwasonlyavertedaftertheinterventionofSADC armed forces2.

Afterpoliticaldialogueamongpoliticalplayers,Lesothochanged its electoral system from first-past-the-post(FPTP)toamixed-memberproportionalrepresentationsystem(MMP)in2002.Thenewelectoralsystemwasintroducedtoaddresselectionrelatedconflicts,whichhad plagued the country since independence. Forthefirsttimethecountryenjoyedrelativepeaceandpoliticalstabilityafterthe2002electionswithamoreinclusiveparliament as a result of the compensatorynatureof theMMPsystem.However, thebenefitsofthe electoral reform were reversed during the 2007 elections when the two main political parties – theLCD and the newly formed All Basotho Convention(ABC) - modified the MMP system into a mixedmemberparallelmodelsystemtherebygainingunfairadvantage in the allocation of seats. These systemswill be explained in the next chapter of this report.Thismodification of the electoral system resulted ina five-year political stalemate over the allocation ofparliamentary seats. After an unsuccessful inventionby SADC, the then ruling LCD and opposition partiesagreedtoacivilsociety-ledmediationthatculminatedinthereformsaheadofthe2012elections3.

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1 There BCP government was overthrown mainly as a result of its refusal to reinstate King Moshoeshoe II who had been exiled by the military in 1990. The military had installed his son Letsie III as king and differences between Letsie III and the BCP government over the return of his father from exile and reinstatement to the throne was the basis for his overthrowing the government. 2 The SADC armed forces comprised of Botswana Defence Force (BDF) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)3 The CSOs mediation process was led by the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) and the Lesotho Council of Non-governmental organisations (LCN) with SADC playing a supporting role.


2.1 The 2012 Elections and their AftermathThe 2012 elections were preceded by extensiveconstitutionalandelectoralreformsaimedatpreventingdisputesaroundseatallocationduringthe2007electionsasaresultofthemodifiedelectoralsystem.Theelectionsalso tookplace shortly after the split of the ruling LCDgivingrisetotheDemocraticCongress(DC).

The LCD leader, whowas also the PrimeMinister,Mr.Pakalitha Mosisili, had left the LCD to form the DC,whichusurpedpower through thedefectionof44LCD

memberstotheDC,thusmakingtheformerrulingpartytheopposition.AlthoughtheDCwonthehighestnumberof constituencies (48 out of 80), it did not attain therequisitemajorityof50%plusoneofthetotalnumberofseats which is required to form government (see table 1 below).GovernmentwasthereforeformedbyacoalitionbetweentheABC,BasothoNationalParty(BNP)andLCDwhichwereclearly“punishing”theDCforits“hijacking”ofpowerandrelegatingtheLCDtooppositionontheeveofelections.

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Table 1: Lesotho 2012 General Election Results and Seat Allocation

Party Total party

votes

FPTP Seats won by party

Party’s Compensatory

Seats

Total Number of

Seats

% Party Votes

% Seats won

ABC 138 917 26 4 30 25 25ADC 1 933 0 0 0 0 0ACFD/BAENA 1 227 0 0 0 0 0AUM 724 0 0 0 0 0BBDP 2 440 0 1 1 0 1BCP 2 531 0 1 1 0 1BDNP 3 433 0 1 1 1 1BNP 23 788 0 5 5 4 4DC 218 366 41 7 48 40 40KHOEETSA/PFD 11 166 1 2 3 2 3LCD 121 076 12 14 26 22 22LPC 5 021 0 1 1 1 1LMM 1 691 0 0 0 0 0LWP 2 408 0 1 1 0 0MFP 3 300 0 1 1 1 1NIP 6 880 0 2 2 1 2SSD 1 081 0 0 0 0 0WHP 252 0 0 0 0 0

Independent Candidates

Party Total party

votes

FPTP Seats won by party

Party’s Compensatory

Seats

Total Number of

Seats

% Party Votes

% Seats won

Ntjatsane#5 979 0 0 0 0 0Molati#10 515 0 0 0 0 0Leoma#11 531 0 0 0 0 0Mokone#15 230 0 0 0 0 0Bopa#19 635 0 0 0 0 0Maqelepo#27 160 0 0 0 0 0Kotel-Molaoa#33 726 0 0 0 0 0Khomari#48 1 692 0 0 0 0 0Ranooe#49 34 0 0 0 0 0Total votes 551 726 80 40 120 100 100

Source:LesothoIndependentElectoralCommission2012


Failureofelectionstoproduceaclearwinnerandthesubsequent formation of a coalition government wasunprecedented in Lesotho’s electoral history. Despitea deal between the ABC, BNP and LCD to form agovernment,allwasnotwellinthecoalition.

2.2 The Coalition Politics and Collapse of GovernmentThe most notable single development which did not only lead to thecollapseof thecoalitiongovernment,but also put Lesotho’s democratic credentials to testwas the political crisis triggered by King Letsie III’sdissolutionofParliamenton10June2014ontheadviceof the Prime Minister Thomas Thabane. Dissolutionof Parliament happened at a time opposition parties,joinedby theLCD,wereplanning tocastavoteofnoconfidenceagainstPrimeMinisterThabane.Priortothisdevelopment,anumberoffactorssignaledthepotentialfailure of the ABC/BNP/LCD coalition. These include:differences in ideological orientation and politicalagenda; lack of trust between the coalition partners,particularly between theABC and LCD, aswell as thePrimeMinister’santi-corruptioncampaign.

Coalitions are, by nature a, complicated arrangementandusually encounter problems ifmemberparties donot share a similar ideology. The coalition in Lesothoexperienced this problem, as it was not based onideology but instead was bound together by otherpoliticalinterests.Consequently,thethreepartieshastilycoalescedwith theview tokeeping theDCaway frompower, but forgot to attend to equally fundamentalaspects of coalition politics, which are drawing amemorandum of understanding (MOU) between itsmembers, prior to the formation of the coalition, toprovide guiding principles for the sustainability of thecoalition and establishing a coalition managementstructure, including a dispute resolution mechanism4. Thiswasa fundamentalmistake,particularlygiven thehistory between the coalition partners. Whereas thecoalitionprovidedanopportunityfortheBNPtoreviveitfromitspoliticalabysssince1986whenitwasoverthrownbythemilitary,itinsteadcreatedachallengefortheABCandLCD,whichwere“strangebedfellows”giventhatsixyears before the coalition, theABC split from the LCD

followinganinternalleadershipconflict.From2006untiltheformationofthecoalitionin2012,theABCandLCDwere political rivals. In otherwords, the coalitionwasfrom the beginning a marriage of convenience between thesetwopoliticalrivals.Itwastobeexpectedthereforethat there would be lack of trust between them.

Decision-making within the coalition became acomplicatedprocessparticularlybetweentheABCandLCD. Most decisions made by the Prime Minister didnotgodownwellwiththeLCD,whichheldtheDeputyPremiership and lamented the lack of consultationbeforecrucialdecisionssuchastheremovalfromofficeof the Police Commissioner, the Director of PublicProsecutions, the Attorney General and other seniorgovernmentofficials.Thethreepartieshadsharedthevariousgovernmentministriesamongstthemselves,but,as indicated above,without a common understandingon how the coalition was to be managed. While theLCD expected the PrimeMinister to bemore open toconsultationwithcoalitionmembers,thePrimeMinister,ontheotherhand,wasoftheopinionthathewasactingwithin the boundaries of the law and needed no further permissiontocarryouthisconstitutionalmandate.

The other major factor, which led to the coalition’sfailure,wasthePrimeMinister’santi-corruptioncrusadeunderwhich corruptionchargeswerefiledagainst theformer ruling DC and LCD officials. Affected officialsincludedtheDCDeputyleader,Mr.MonyaneMoleleki,who was Minister of Natural Resources and, whosetrialhasbeendelayedmainlyduetohisillhealth;theMinisterofEnergy,MeteorologyandWaterAffairs,Mr.Timothy Thahane, who was appointed under the LCDin the new coalition government togetherwith someseniorgovernmentofficialshasalsobeenchargedwithembezzling state funds. All the aforesaid were removed fromofficependingtheircourtcases.Clearcracksinthecoalition government emerged when the LCD leader,Mr.MothejoaMetsing, who is also the Deputy PrimeMinister, was also charged with corruption. Similarto theotheraffectedofficials,hehasclaimed that thechargeswere a political conspiracy and he has lodgeda counter lawsuit at the High Court challenging the

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4 The MOU between these parties was actually signed after they had coalesced.


constitutionality of investigations against him. Theseconflictswerethemajorfactorthathasledtothetwopartieslaunchingamotionofno-confidenceagainstthePrimeMinister.

The EISA Pre-election Assessment Mission gatheredfrom its consultations that as a resultof the stalematebetweenthecoalitionpartners,particularlybetweenthePrimeMinisterandhisDeputy,theruleoflawinLesothowas fast being eroded. There were cases where some governmentofficialsincludingcabinetministersrefusedtheir dismissal claiming it was unlawful5. For the LCD,the actions of the PrimeMinister were interpreted asarbitrarydecisions,whilethePrimeMinisterviewedhisactions regardingappointments,dismissals andcabinetreshuffleaspartofhisconstitutionalmandate.Withinthecontextofapolarisedcoalitiongovernment,the security crisesprecipitatedbyclashesbetween theLesothoDefenceForce(LDF)andtheLesothoMountedPoliceService(LMPS)dealtthelastblowtothecoalitiongovernment. The two institutions had taken sides inthepoliticaldivide,withtheLDFseenassupportingtheLCD,DCand their allies,while thePolicewere seenassupportiveofthePrimeMinisterandABCaswellastheBNP.Thispoliticaldividemanifesteditselfon27January2014when the residencesof thePoliceCommissioner,Mr.KhothatsoTšoana(whohadjustbeenappointed)andthePrimeMinister’spartnerwerebombed.Aspartofthepoliceinvestigations,eightmembersoftheDefenceForceweretobequestioned,howevertheyrefusedtoattend.The LDF Commander, Lieutenant General Tlali Kamoliwas reported to have refused to hand over the soldiers whenrequestedtodosobythePoliceCommissionerinaformalletterofrequestdated14April2014.

Around the same time, the army was holding a trialagainstoneofitsseniorofficers,BrigadierMaaparankoeMahao,onchargesofbehavinginamannerunbecomingofanarmyofficer.TheBrigadierwas suspendedon15January 2014 for reprimanding an army commander,CaptainTefoHashatsi,forholdingameetingwithsoldiersunder his command informing them of a rumour about

the Prime Minister’s intention to remove the ArmyCommander,LieutenantGeneralTlaliKamoli,fromoffice.Thiscaptainhad,accordingtoBrigadierMahao,declaredthat hewould defend the army general and sought toinfluence his subordinates to pledge the same. In hiscapacityastheMinisterofDefence,thePrimeMinisterhad attempted to stop the CourtMarshall against theBrigadier on 27 February 2014, but was defied by theArmyCommander.TheseandotherfactorscontributedtothebreakinrelationsbetweenthePrimeMinisterandtheArmyCommander.

On29August2014theKing,ontheadviceofthePrimeMinister, dismissed the LDF Commander replacing himwith Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao, who was at thesame time promoted to the position of LieutenantGeneral,despitethefactthathewasstillfacingchargesintheCourtMarshall.Thearmycommanderrefusedtostepdownandvowedtofighthisremovalashedeemedit unconstitutional. An armed group suspected to bemembers of the LDF Special Forces, also attacked thenewly appointedCommander’s house the night beforehe assumed his new job. The rise in tensions between the LDF and LMPS reachedboilingpoint,when the formerstormed the LMPS Headquarters on 30 August 2014,killingonepoliceofficerduringagunfireexchange,andinvadedtheMaseruCentralandMaboteMabotepolicestationsandseizeddocumentsandsomepoliceweapons.Allradiostationsinthecountrywerefrozenduringtheseattacks.

The Prime Minister, the Minister of Gender and theleader of the BNP fled the country to seek refuge inSouthAfricaclaimingtherewasamilitarycoupattempt.They returned to Lesotho after the intervention ofSADC ledby the SouthAfrican President Jacob Zuma.OnreturntoLesotho,andaspartoftheguaranteesofthe safety and the securityof thePrimeMinister, thesecurityoftheBNPleaderandthePoliceCommissionerwere taken over by the South African Police Service(SAPS)VIPprotectionunit.

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5 The Army Commander, Lieutenant General Kamoli refused to vacate his office claiming that his dismissal was illegal. The Minister of Communications also refused to vacate his office, further compounding tensions between the Prime Minister and the LCD. The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Mr. Leaba Thetsane and the Attorney General (AG) Mr. Tšokolo Makhethe were also dismissed but refused to vacate their office. Some of these officials were later forcibly removed but returned back to office after lodging successful court injunctions to set aside their dismissal.


TheSouthAfricanDeputyPresident,CyrilRamaphosa,wasappointedbySADCinSeptember2014tomediatebetween the two conflicting groups, namely the ABCand BNP, on the one hand, and the opposition ledby the DC and LCD. His mandate was to facilitate adialogue between the parties involved in the conflict.FollowingthecommencementoftheSADCmediation,the planned vote of no confidence by the oppositionagainstthePrimeMinisterwasaverted.Thebelligerentssigned the Maseru Declaration6 on 2 October 2014,which committed the Prime Minister to re-openingparliament for two purposes, namely to debate andpass the budget and to plan for the elections7. Afterthis, parliament would be dissolved. Parliament wasdulyre-openedon17October2014.However,noneofthe agreed parliament agenda items were discussed,asonesideofthepoliticalspectrumtriedtosneakina

motionofnoconfidence.TheMPsalsogotboggeddownin discussions about their benefits. The unintendedconsequenceoftheeminentdissolutionofparliamentwas that the MPs term of office and therefore theirbenefitswould be cut short bymore than two years.Inviewoftheeminentresponsibilitytopaybackloansoveralimitedperiodoftime,MPsrequestedanexgratiasalaryawardtocovertheremainderoftheirtenure8. This requestwasnotgrantedandindividualMPshadtobearsole responsibility topayback the loans9. Parliament wasdissolvedon5December2014andelectionswereannouncedtobeheldon28February2014.

3. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

1.3. The Constitution and Electoral framework: The Constitution of Lesotho enshrines civil liberties

6 http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/403cc60045b002779bf49b90ca3f4715/Maseru-Declaration-to-take-the-country-forward:-Ramaphosa-20140210 (accessed 15-1-2014)7 During the initial stages of the negotiations, the “government” (ABC and BNP minus LCD) proposed a five month period for the preparation of the elections but the LCD, DC and their allies rebutted that insisting on holding of elections as soon as possible. They preferred the elections to be in January 2015.8 The MPs are entitled to interest free loans of up to M500,000.00 which they repay over the period of 5 years when they are in parliament. Realising that they would be left to service the loans without earning a salary, the MPs requested government to give them an exgratia salary award for the remaining period they were to serve as MPs.9 The law in Lesotho provides for an exgratia which is a payment given to people (including some civil servants) who do not qualify for the normal benefits which are usually enjoyed by civil servants. Civil servants may get this in recognition of their outstanding performance or if they retire early and government realises that they may not qualify for the full benefits under the public service. The MPs earn about M350,000 per annum.

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Table 2: Lesotho 2014 Political crisis: Important Dates

Date Event10June DissolutionofParliament29 August RemovalofLieutenantGeneralTlaliKamoliasArmyCommanderandhisreplacement

withnewlypromotedLieutenantGeneralMaaparankoeMahao30 August LDFattackonLMPSstationsresultinginthedeathofapoliceman30 August PrimeMinisterTomThabane,theBNPLeaderandMinisterofGender,TheseleMaser-

ibaeaswellassomeseniorgovernmentofficialsfleeLesothotoSouthAfrica01 September PresidentZuma’smeetingwithcoalitionleadersinPretoria02 September PrimeMinisterThabanereturnedtoLesothowithsomeofthegovernmentofficialswho

hadfledwithhim.HewasescortedbytheSouthAfricanPoliceService18 September DeputyPresidentCyrilRamphosa’sfirstvisittoLesothoasSADCappointedmediator02October SigningoftheMaseruDeclarationwhichcommittedconflictingpartiestoreopeningof

parliamenttodiscussbudgetandprepareforelectionsinFebruary201517October Parliamentre-opened24October SigningoftheMaseruSecurityAccordwhichmarkedanendtohostilitiesbetweenthe

securityagencies05 December Parliament dissolved09 December ElectionCalendarissuedbytheIEC11 December ArmyandthePolicesignanMOUtoworktogetherandrebuildtrust11 December PoliticalpartiessignapledgeunderSADCfacilitationtogoodconductandpromotionof

peaceintherunupto,duringandafterpollingday.


and places the people of Lesotho as the cardinalsourceofpower.TheConstitutionalsoprovidesfortheestablishment of a statutory body, the IndependentElectoralCommission (IEC), tomanage theconductofdemocraticelections.Inthisregardandinkeepingwiththe provisions of the Constitution, and in conformitywith international best practices, Lesotho has alsoenacted a number of laws and regulations guidingelectionmanagementandadministration.Theseare:

• The National Assembly Electoral Act 2011: for the conduct of elections for Members of Parliament • Local Government Elections Amendment Act 2011: for the conduct of elections for local councillors

The Constitution of Lesotho gives the ElectoralCommissionthefollowingfunctions:(a)toensurethatelectionsareheldregularlyandthat everyelectionorreferendumheldisfreeandfair;(b)toorganise,conductandsuperviseelectionsinan impartialandindependentmanner;(c)todelimittheboundariesofconstituencies;(d)tosuperviseandcontroltheregistrationofelectors;(e) to compile a general register of electors and constituencyregistersofelectorsfortheseveral constituenciesandtomaintainthemuptodate;(f) topromoteknowledgeofsounddemocraticelectoral processes;(g)toregisterpoliticalparties;(h)toascertain,publishanddeclaretheresultsof electionsandreferenda;(i) toadjudicatecomplaintsofallegedirregularitiesin anyaspectoftheelectoralorreferendaprocessat anystageotherthaninanelectionpetition.

The IEC was established in 1997 and has three Commissioners supported by a Directorate. TheCommissionersaremainlyresponsibleforpolicy-makingandoversight.EachCommissioner isappointedbytheKing to serveamaximumof two three-year terms. InappointingtheIEC,theKingisadvisedbytheStateCouncilandselectstheprospectivecommissionersfromalistofnofewerthanfivenames.ThecurrentCommissionerswere recruited through an intensive public interview processpresidedoverbyan independent recruitment

agency. Thecurrentmembersof theCommissionareshownintable3below:

Table 3: IEC Lesotho Commissioners

Commissioners PositionJusticeMahapelaLehohla ChairpersonMrs.MamosebiPholo CommissionerDr.MakaseNyepetsi Commissioner

The IEC Directorate comprises civil servants and is headed by the Director Elections who is also a civilservant. Although the staff are legally under theemploy of the Ministry of Public Service, they aretechnically appointed by the IEC because it conductsan open recruitment process and submits names of selected candidates to the Ministry of Public Servicefor formal appointment. The IEC has been without a substantiveDirectorofElections since2009when theDirector retired.Hisdeputyacted in thatpositionandsuccessfully presided over the 2012 elections. He hashowever recently been suspended following the lossof voter registration kits, including laptops, throughtheft. An Acting Director of Elections has since beenappointed.TheIEChadalsoadvertisedavacancyforthepositionofDirectorofElectionspriortothesuspensionoftheActingDirector.

3.2 The electoral system Lesotho uses a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)electoral system for the parliamentary elections andfirst-past-the-post electoral system (FPTP) for localgovernmentelections.UndertheMMPsystem,whichisacombinationofaproportionalrepresentationelectoralsystem(PR)andtheFirst-Past-The-Post(FPTP),the120National Assembly (NA) seats are allocated along an80:40 ratio, where 80 seats are contested on a FPTPbasiswithinconstituencies,while40seatsareallocatedtopoliticalpartiesinproportiontothenumberofvotestheyreceive.Thus,Lesotho’selectoralsystemtranslatesvotes into 80 constituency seats (Constituency vote)and 40 party-based seats (party vote). When voting,votersuseonlyoneballotpaperwhichisthenfirstusedtodeterminethewinnerinaconstituencyandsecondlytodeterminethePRseats.

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The seats are allocated as per the formula in table 4 below.

Table 4: The MMP seat allocation formula

Step One Totalvalidvotescastisdividedbytotalnumberoflegislativeseats=Quota of votes

Step two PartyvotesdividedbyQuotaofvotes=PartyQuota

Step three SubtractthesummationofPartyQuotas from the total number of legislativeseats

Step four Anyremainingvacantseatsareallocatedintheorderofthepartieswithhighestdecimalfractionarisingfromthecalculationdoneinstep three above

Step five Subtractconstituencyseatswonbyeachpartyfromthetotalnumberofseatswonbythepartytogettheparty’scompensatoryseats.

Step six Summationofthecompensatoryseats to ensure that the total tallieswiththestipulatednumberofPRseats.

Source:IEC2001

3.3 Party and campaign finance: The legal framework in Lesotho allows for privateandpublic fundingofpartiesand their campaigns.Allparties registered contesting an election are eligiblefor public campaign funding. In termsof theNationalAssembly Electoral Act 2011, any funds received by apoliticalpartyregisteredwiththeCommissionintermsofSection71forcontestingelections-

May be used only to defray expenses incurred incontesting elections, including the propagation ofthe political parties or candidates’ views and electoreducation.Maynotbeusedto-(i) Defraypersonalexpenditurenotrelatedto contestingelections;(ii) Payafee,reward,benefitorremunerationtoany candidateorofficerofapoliticalparty;(iii) Rewardanyelectorinordertovoteortovotein acertainmanner;and

(iv) Directlyorindirectlyinvestinanybusinessor property.

Politicalpartiesarelegallyrequiredtoopenaseparatebank account for the consolidated fund and report annuallyontheadministrationandmanagementofthefund.ThisrequiresfinancialstatementstobesubmittedforauditbytheIndependentElectoralCommissionforthefinancialyear.

The Electoral Act also allows for private funding of partieswhichcould includefunding,whichthepartiesgetfromtheirrankandfilemembershipfees,corporatecontributions and donations from members in andoutside the country, including foreign funding, butrequires thatamountsexceedingM200,000shouldbedisclosed.Thisprovisionislimitedtofundingofpartiesduringelections.Thelawdoesnotplaceanyceilingsontheamountofmoneypartiesmayreceivefromdonors.Therearealsonospendinglimitsforparties’campaigns.Lack of regulation of funding of parties beyond theelection period creates a risk of undue influence ofmoneyinthecountry’spolitics.

3.4. Election ManagementIn October 2014 the IEC was directed to prepare forelectionstobeheldinFebruary2014.Inthisregard,theIEC drew a list of urgent needs and areas of support in order for it to fulfil the required task.Critical areas inwhichitrequiredurgenttechnicalandfinancialsupportare:• Electionlogistics• Votereducation• Communicationsystems• ElectionRiskManagementsystems• ResultsManagementsystems• ITsupportincludingauditofthevotersregisterand;• Coordinationofelectionobservation

ThefirstchallengefacingtheIECisfinancial.PreviouselectionswerefundedbytheGovernmentofLesotho(GoL) with support from development partners.Given that the elections being planned for February2014 are a snap election, none of the developmentpartners were ready to make financial contributions

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to the election budget. SADC had indicated that itwill contribute to the election budget but there hasnot been a formal meeting between SADC and theIEC inthisregardatthetimeoftheMission’svisit toLesotho. In the meantime, the IEC has prepared abudgetamountingtoM220,000,000.00andsubmittedit toGovernment,andalsoappliedforagovernmentwaiverinordertofast-tracktheprocurementprocess.This governmentwaiver is critical given thatmostoftherequiredelectionmaterialssuchasballotpapers,arenotproducedlocallybuthavetobeorderedfromSouthAfrica.Ballotpaperswillonlybeorderedafterthecompletionofthenominationprocess.

The other challenge with the IEC is in regard to its capacity, both in terms of personnel and technicalexpertise. The IEC reported that it had about 200permanentstaffacrossthecountry,whereasitneededto have more than 4,000 staff to run a successfulelectionandthechallengefortheIECisthattemporarystaff will only be hired and trained when funds areavailable.Thesecondcapacityproblemisthefactthatall the three Commissioners are new and have never manageda full-scaleelectionbefore. Theyhaveonlypresided over the parliamentary by-elections in 2constituencies aswell as about 27 local governmentby-elections. Consulted stakeholders, particularlypoliticalleaders,indicatedthatpreviouslythecontractperiod of the Commissioners were such that theywere staggered to ensure that one of the serving Commissioners was retained.

The consulted stakeholders expressed cautiousoptimism about the ability of the IEC to successfullyrun the February 2015 elections, following thesuspension of the ActingDirector of Elections on 20November2014. TheHeadofOutreach,Mrs. PontšoMatate, has been appointed as Acting Director ofElections. Despite the above-mentioned challenges,the Pre-Election Assessment Team found that at thetimeoftheMission,theIEChadcompliedwithallthelegal and procedural requirements in preparing for the elections.

In termsof financial support to the electoral process,the United Nations (UN) and other internationalagencieswill not bemaking financial contributions totheIECbudgetgiventhattheywerenotreadytosupportelections before 2017, the time the next electionswerescheduledtotakeplace.TheUNDPhashoweverindicated that it will provide technical support to the IEC onthefollowingspecificareas:• Publicoutreach• Votereducation• Electionlogistics• Coordinationofobservers

TheUNDPassignedaLogisticsExpertandanElectionsExpert to the IEC and will be appointing an ElectionExpert.Bothwillwork fulltimewiththe IECuntilaftertheelections.TheCommonwealthhasindicatedthatitwill support the IECwithexpertiseoncommunicationsystems and IT. The IEC also indicated that it willreceive technical support from the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa on IT and results management.TheEU isexpectedtocontributetothesupportforvotereducation,whileSADCisexpectedtoprovidesupportonelectoralriskmanagement.

4. KEY FINDINGS ON THE PRE-ELECTION PHASE

AssessmentoftheLesotho’sreadinessfortheelectionswas carried out in the following areas: constituencydelimitation, voter registration, political partyregistration,conflictmanagementandnominationsandvoter education. These are looked at in the followingsection.

4.1. Constituency delimitation BoundariesdelimitationinLesothoisguidedbySection67oftheConstitutionandSection153oftheNationalAssemblyElectoralActof2011TheElectoralActprovidesthat the delimitation exercise should be participatorywhere the IEC should invite representations from thevarious sectorsof thepublic andpoliticalparties. TheIECisboundbylawtopublishanyproposedchangestotheboundaries in thegovernmentgazette togive thepublicanopportunitytoinspectandobjectifnecessary.

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TheIECissupposedtoconsiderobjectionsand,whereitdisagreeswithsuchobjections,hastofurnishreasonstotheobjector/s.TheIEC’sdecisionsarereviewablebytheHighCourtofLesothointhecaseofadisputebetweenthe IEC and members of the public on the proposed boundaries.

The IEC informed the Pre-election Assessment Teamthat the constituency boundaries will remain thesameforthe2015elections.Thelawprovidesthattheboundariesmaybechangedafter10yearsandwithina12-monthperiodfollowingapopulationcensus.Theboundaries were last reviewed in 2010. None of theconsulted stakeholders had concerns over the current constituencyboundaries.

4.2 Voter registrationRegistration of voters in Lesotho is continuous. Themethodofregistrationisbiometric,usingcomputerisedvoter registration kits to capture biometric details ofvoters. The registration kits compriseof afingerprintscanner, a digital camera and a laptop computer. Thelaw provides that voter registration should only besuspended by the IEC during elections. The NationalAssembly Electoral Act of 2011 indicates that such asuspension shall be effective from the 8th day of thecommencement of the election period and shall end90daysafterthelastdayoftheelectionperiodunlesstheIECdecidestoendthesuspensionearlier.AnynewapplicationsforregistrationduringtheelectionperiodarekeptbytheIEC,whichwillonlyprocessthemaftertheliftingofthesuspensionperiod.

Thevoterregistrationforthe2015electionswillbe inlinewiththelegalprovision,itwillendon14December2014. The IEC also indicated that it commenced with the cleaning of the voter register in October 2014to remove the names of deceased persons and anyduplicate registrations. Both were a major problemsduring the2012electionsdueto the fact that the IECintroduced new cameras thus many voters discardedtheir voters’ cards and registered afresh in order tohavenewcolouredphotographs.ThepoorcivilregistrysystemresultedinlargenumbersofdeceasedpersonsremainingontheIECvoters’roll.

TheNationalAssembly Electoral Act of 2011providesthat the IEC, through the office of the Director ofElections,shallprepareanddisplaythelistofregisteredvoters30daysinadvanceofthevotingday.Thepublicdisplayofthevoters’rollisdoneintwophasesnamelythe provisional list and the final list. The former issubjectedtopublicscrutinysothatanyobjectionscanbe raisedwith the IEC ingoodtime forcorrection.Allsections of the population, including political parties,areentitledtoaccessthevoters’rollforinspection.Thefinallistisproducedaftercorrectionsontheprovisionallist.AtthetimeofthePre-electionAssessment,theIECwasstillregisteringpeopleandthedisplayofnameshasnotyetbeendone.Thefirstpublicationofthevoters’rollwillbeon22to28December2014.Thefinalpublicationwillbeon05to06January2015.

The IEC indicatedthat theregistrationwasgoingwell,albeit slowly,because itdidnothave the full capacityaftersomeofitsvoterregistrationkitswerebroken,whileothers were vandalised and some computer laptops stolen.Priortothetheft,theIECwasintheprocessofrepairingsomeofthebrokenregistrationkitswiththeviewtohavingthemoperationalasitpreparedforthe2017elections.The2015snapelectionshavethereforeplaced a lot of pressure on the IEC and overstretched its existingcapacitytoregistervotersintime.

TheIECexpressedconfidencethatthestolencomputerswillnotbeusedto illegally registervotersas theyareincomplete. In order to register, one needs to have acompleteregistrationkitincludingthefingerprintdeviceandthecamera.However,someconsultedstakeholdershaveexpressedconcernoverthestolenmachinessayingthey could be used to inflate the registration figures.They indicated that given theheightened competitionamongpoliticalparties,ifwhoeverstolethesemachinesis linked to a political party they could easily colludewith IEC IT personnel to access and manipulate the IEC voterregistrationdata.

4.3 Political party registration and candidate nomination Politicalpartiesregistrationistwo-fold;theyhavetoberegisteredwiththeRegistrarofSocietiesandthenwith

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theIECiftheyintendtocontestelections.TheSocietiesAct1966requiresallorganisationsoperatinginLesothotoberegisteredbytheRegistrarofSocieties.Howeverregistration with the Registrar of Societies is not anautomatic qualification to contest local governmentor parliamentary elections. In terms of the NationalAssembly Electoral Act of 2011, all parties intendingto contest elections have to register with the IEC.EligibilitytoregisterwiththeIECisthatapartyshouldbevoluntaryandopentoallcitizensofLesothowithoutdiscrimination. It should also have no less than 500members who are registered with the IEC as voters. A partyisalsorequiredtoprovideinformationregardingits membership requirements for its membership admission and fees, leadership selection, manner ofdecision-making, banking details and purposes forwhichitsmoneymaybeused10.

Since the signing of the Maseru Accord, the IEC hasrefused registration of one party, the ProgressiveDemocrats (PD) pending its compliance with the requirements of the law.

There are two sets of candidates for nominations:constituency and PR candidates. For most parties,individuals are nominated through party primary andconstituencyelectionstocontesttheFPTPcomponentofelections.Thepartiesalsodrawa listof individualsto be submitted to the IEC for purposes of PR seatsallocation. In terms of procedures to be followed theNationalAssemblyElectoralAct2011providesthatthenomineeswillonlybeacceptedbytheReturningOfficeronlyaccepts thenominees if theyarenominatedandseconded by persons who are accordingly registeredwith the Electoral Commission as voters. This means that thecandidateswhowouldhavewonprimaryelectionswithintheirpartiesstillneedtobeformallynominatedand seconded by duly registered voters appearing onthe voters’ roll, in order to be accepted as electioncandidates.AccordingtoSection41(3)oftheAct,suchnominationsshouldbeaccompaniedbyanamountofM200andastatementsignedbythepersonconsentingnomination. If the person is a candidate of a political

party, a certificate signed by the office-bearer of thepartycertifyingthatthepersonistheparty’scandidateforelectionsintheconstituency,andarepresentation,whichshallbeinblackandwhite,ofthepoliticalparty’ssymbol.

In the case of the nominations for the proportionalrepresentation,apoliticalpartyintendingtocontestanelectionshallnominateandsubmitalistofnominatedcandidatestotheDirectorofElections.Thislistshouldincludethenames,electors’registrationnumbers,andaddresses of at least 40 candidates but not more than 120. Parties must arrange the candidates in order ofpreference from top to bottom, with female or malecandidate immediately followedbyacandidateof theoppositesex,andincludeequalnumbersofwomenandmen.

Thelistsmayalsoincludeanycandidatewhoisnominatedforelectionsforaconstituencyseat.Theelectoral lawalsorequiresthatalllistsshouldbeaccompaniedbyanundertaking from the Secretary General of the partycommitting the party to adhere to the electoral codeof conduct. It further requires an undertaking from the SecretaryGeneralthatthenominatedindividualsinthelistarequalifiedtostandforelectionsandthereshouldbe a statement of consent from such individuals that they agree tobe in the lists. Finally, theelectoral lawrequiresthatadepositintheamountofM8000.00shallaccompanyalllists.

The law requires that the nomination process ends30 days before the elections. Political parties hadcommencedwithprimaryelectionsatthetimeofthisPre-electionAssessmentMission.

4.4 Conflict ManagementTheIEChasoptedtomaintaintheconflictmanagementstructuresitcreatedaheadofthe2012electionbecausethey yielded positive results. These structures havesincebeenrevivedandhavestartedholdingmeetingswith the Commission. The IEC had put in place various consultative structures to ensure ownership of the

10 The IEC is also empowered by the law to de-register a party if it finds out that such a party no longer complies with its terms of registration as set out in the National Assembly Electoral Act of 2011

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electoralprocessbyallstakeholdersandalsotoserveasconflictmanagementmechanisms given the country’shistory of election related conflict. These structureswere:

(a) Party Leaders Forum: a forum of leaders of all partiescontestingelectionswhichtheIECconsults onmatterswhichrequiredecision-makingon the electoral process. The Forum meets as and when necessaryin-betweenelectionsandmorefrequently duringelectiontime.(b) Party Delegates Forum: a forum similar to the MultipartyLiaisonCommittees(MPLCs). Representativesofallpartiesregisteredwiththe IECmeetonamonthlybasiswiththeCommission tobebriefedontheelectoralprocess.Theyinturn taketheinformationtotheirparties.Thishasbeen ausefulconsultativeforumasitensuresthatevery single development pertaining to the electoral processiscommunicatedtothepartiesintime.(c) Logistics Committee:inanefforttoensure transparencyduringelectiontime,theIEChas establishedtheLogisticsCommitteewhichconsists ofrepresentativesofpartiesnominatedjointlyby thepartiestoplanallelectionlogisticswiththe Commission.TheresponsibilitiesofthisCommittee include,amongothers,ensuringthatallelection materialsarebought,safelykeptanddistributed accordingtoaplanjointlyarrivedatwiththe Commission.TheCommitteealsowitnessesthe tenderingprocessandproceduresforallelection materialsanditalsoobservestheprintingofballot papersandensurestheirsecurityincollaboration withtheCommissionandtheLMPS.(d) Data Committee:theDataCommitteeisinvolved inthecompilationofthevoters’roll.Itworkswith theCommissionontheentirevoterregistration processandalsoonallvoterregistrationcomplaints thatmayariseduringthevoterregistrationprocess.e) Monitoring Committee:acommitteemadeupof representativesofthepartiescontestingelections whoseroleistoensurethatallelectionoperations arecarriedoutwithoutproblems.Thecommittee jointlywiththeIECdealswithallchallengesthat appear during the electoral process.

4.5 Civic and voter education TheIEChadnotembarkedonvotereducation(VE)bythetimeofthisPre-electionAssessmentMissionowingto lack of funds as reported above. The IEC indicated thatitisunabletoenterintocontractsuntilitreceivesfunds. However, the IEC indicated that it had alreadyinvitedcivil societyorganisations tosubmit tenders tocarry out VE. Submissions from the Lesotho Councilof Non-Government (LCN), Transformation ResourceCentre (TRC) and Development for Peace Education(DPE)werealreadybeingconsidered.TheIECindicatedthat its partnership with these organisations in 2012was successful. The CSOs carried out civic and votereducationwhiletheIECprovidedoversight.

4.6 The media Lesotho has one state television, Lesotho Television(LTV), one state radio station, Radio Lesotho andplethora of private radio stations owned by businesspeople and churches as shown in table below. There areweeklynewspapers.Whereasthebroadcastmediais regulated under the Communications Act No. 4 of2012, the print media is not regulated and is left toregulate itself.TheCommunicationsActNo.4of2012establishes a media regulating authority, the LesothoCommunicationsAuthority(LCA)whosemandateis:).• promotion,development,supervisionandprovision ofefficientlocal,national,regionalandinternational telecommunicationservicesinLesotho;• promotionofnetworkdevelopment,universal serviceandaccesstotelecommunicationservices;• ensuringtheefficientandeffectiveuseoftheradio frequencyspectrum;• promotionoftherangeandqualityof telecommunicationservicesandotherconsumer interests;• promotionofefficientmanagementandhuman resourcedevelopmentwithinthetelecommunication sector;• promotionofprivateownershipoftelecommunication operations;• promotionofsustainableandfaircompetition betweentelecommunicationserviceproviders;• collectionanddisseminationofinformationforuse bytheindustry,consumersandprospectiveinvestors;

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• promotionoftelecommunicationservicesthat willsatisfyreasonabledemandsofleastadvantaged membersofthecommunitiesfortheprovisionof servicessuchasemergencyservices,publiccallbox servicesanddirectoryinformationservices;• representingGovernment,inconsultationwiththe MinisterofCommunicationsininternationalmatters relatingtotelecommunications.

Besides the LCA, the Communications Act providesfor the establishment of the Broadcasting DisputeResolution Panel (BDRP). The BDRP is a bodyconsisting of a Chairman and four (4)memberswhohavetheresponsibilitytoprepareabroadcastingcodeof content, and to review and resolve all disputesregardingbroadcast content.At thetimeof thisPre-election Assessment Mission, the BDRP drafted theBroadcasting Regulations 2014, which provide aregulatoryframeworkfortheconductofthemediainLesotho.TheregulationswillnothoweverbeinforcebyFebruary2015duetodelaysintheirgazettingasaresultofthecurrentpoliticalsituation,whichhas ledto the dismissal of the Minister of Communicationsand subsequent disagreement over his status between thePrimeMinisterandtheDeputyPrimeMinister.

AccordingtotheLesothochapteroftheMediaInstituteofSouthernAfrica(MISA),besidestheusualtraditionalpublicorprivateprintandelectronicmedia,thesocialmedia is becoming popular and is very difficult toregulate by the LCA. The country does not yet havea law regulating social media such as Facebook andTwitter.Theseoperatefromprivateindividualaccountsandthereforedifficulttocontrol.Consequently,peoplebreach media ethics and break the law on these socialplatformswithoutanyrepercussions.Thesamechallenge applies to other online media which are also notnecessarilybasedinLesotho.

Table 3: Print and electronic media in Lesotho as at 31 December 2014

Media Name CommentTelevision LesothoTelevision StateRadio stations

CatholicRadioFMHarvestFMLesothoEvangelicalChurchFMMoAfricaFMPeople’sChoiceFMRadioLesothoUltimateFMTsenoloFMFilltheGapMinistriesFMJoyFMMafetengCommunityRadio

PrivatePrivatePrivatePrivatePrivateState StateprivatePrivatePrivatePrivate

Newspapers Business EdgeInformativeLesothoTimesMoeletsiOaBasothoSundayExpressLesothoTodayLentsoeLaBasotho

PrivatePrivate PrivatePrivatePrivateStateState

Institutes MediaInstituteofSouthern Africa (MISA)

Regional

Agencies LesothoNewsAgency(LENA)

State

ThepublicmediainLesotho,particularlyRadioLesotho,hasbeencompletelyovershadowedbytheprivateradiostationsandhasbecomelargelyineffective.Thepro-DCandLCDradiostationsarelinkedtothestatebroadcasttransmission towers and therefore have a wider reach similartoRadioLesotho.Theradiostationswhichareaffiliatedto theABCandBNPare largelyseenaseliteradiostationsandmainlyappealtolistenershipinthecityofMaseruandneighbouringtowns.Manystakeholderssuggested that freedom of the press is assured in Lesotho. They however expressed concern over thelack of professionalism by themedia, particularly theprivate partisan radio stations. Of the radio stationsmentionedintable3above,Mo-AfricaFMandTsenoloFMaresaidtobehighlypro-DC,LCDandothercongressparties.HarvestFMandPCFMareontheotherhand


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pro-ABCandBNP.Thementionedpoliticalpartieshaveacknowledged that they indeedgethugesupportandpublicityfromtheseradiostations.

Theseradiostationsoneachsideofthepoliticaldivideuseinflammatorylanguagewhichcouldtriggerviolence.Someof the journalists andpeoplewhohostpoliticaltalkshowprogrammesontheseradiostationsarenotcareerjournalistsandhaveneverundergoneanymediatraining The fact that most of the radio presenters are largelyuntrainedhas,accordingtoMISA,resultedinasignificantproportionofinformationontheradiobeingbiased,unbalancedandunverified.

All stakeholders believe that there is a need for training of journalists on responsible reporting. The LCA andMISA have previously organised workshops to trainboth reporters and editors on their role in the electoral processaswellashowtomanagereportinginconflictsituations. However, because of a high staff turnovergiven that most of the producers and editors are not realmedia professionals, the training has not yieldedmanyresults.ThemediainLesothohasasaresultfailedtosticktoethicalconductaswellasactasawatchdogtoensuredemocraticgovernance.

4.7 Civil society Civil SocietyOrganisations (CSOs) have been a criticalpillar in stabilising Lesotho’s political and electorallandscape.CSOswereat the centreof civicandvotereducation activities ahead of the 2012 elections.However, their tenders to the IEC to carry out votereducationfortheFebruary2015electionshadnotyetbeenconsideredbytheIECatthetimeofthisMission,due to funding constraints.

The above notwithstanding, CSOs have continued toplaytheirciviceducationroleonanumberoffronts.Forinstance,CSOshaveconductedpublicgatheringsaroundthecountryexplainingtothepeoplethecontentsoftheCommonwealth Report on coalition politics followinga study tour of the coalition party leaders, Collegeof Chiefs and the IEC to New Zealand from whosesystem the Lesotho MMP electoral system derives.CSOs have also organised dialogues for the people to

discusspoliticaldevelopmentsconcerningthecoalitiongovernment and dissolution of Parliament. Althoughtheywerelessinvolvedinthepoliticalmediation,theymet oncewith the SADCMediator and South AfricanDeputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa, and they wereinvitedtobesignatoriestothepoliticalparties’codeofconduct pledge as witnesses.

4.8 Gender and minority rightsGender and minority rights are enshrined in theconstitution of Lesotho and therefore participation ofmen and women, as well as other vulnerable groupsin the electoral process, is guaranteed. One of thesignificantreformsin2011asfarasgenderisconcernedis thattheNationalAssemblyElectoralAct introduceda requirement for political parties to ensure a 50%inclusionofwomenintheirpartylists.Thismeaningfullyincreased the number of women candidates for the 8thParliament.Thechallenge though is that this50%requirementisonlylimitedtothePRcomponentofthecandidatesandnottheconstituencyones.Nominationswere still underwayat thetimeof thisMissionand itcouldnotbeestablishedwhetherpartieshave indeedconformed to this legal requirement.

4.9 Security It has been reported above that there have been tensions between the LDF and LMPS escalated by analleged coup attempt by the LDF on 30 August 2014.Allconsultedstakeholders, includingthe IEC,citedthesoured relationsbetween these the LDF and LMPS asthe single most real threat to the holding of successful electionsinFebruary2015.BoththeLDFandLMPSarecriticaltoelectionoperationsinthatthepoliceprovidesecurity at all polling stations and centres while LDFprovideslogisticalsupportflyingelectionmaterialswithitshelicopterstoinaccessibleareas.LDFisalsoexpectedto provide operational support to LMPS in the eventthatthereisthreattosecuritybeyondLMPScapacityonthedayofelections.

Cognisant of the deteriorating relations betweenthemselves and, following the departure of thesubstantiveCommanders,theLDFandLMPSundertooka number of trust buildingmeasures. On 23 October


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2014 the LDF and LMPS signed the Maseru SecurityAccord (MSA) under the facilitation of SADC to markthe end of hostilities. The other activities included ajointmarchwhere over 800 LDF and LMPSpersonnelparticipatedinashowofunityon9December2014.ThetwoagenciesalsosignedanMOUon11December2014in thepresenceofSADCandpoliticalparties inwhichtheycommittedthemselvestoworktogether.ElectoralstakeholdersbelievethatthetwoActingCommandersof the LDF and LMPS are genuinely seeking to endhostilities.However,amajorconcern is thatmembersoftheLDFSpecialForceswhoarewantedbythepolicearestillservingandgoingaroundwitharmouredcarsinanactseenasintimidationbysomestakeholders.

ThisMissionnotedwithconcern thatasatDecember2014,thesecurityprotectionofthePrimeMinister,whoisalsotheMinisterofDefenceandofPolice,isprovidedbyneither theLDFnorLMPS.ThePrimeMinister, theMinister of Gender and other government officialsloyaltothePrimeMinisterwerestillprotectedbySAPSwhile the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministers loyaltohimwereprotectedbyLDFmembers.This securityarrangementisaclearsignofthemagnitudeofsecurityproblems in Lesotho. More importantly, it is boundto create coordination problems particularly duringcampaignsasthetwosecuritiesdonottakeordersfromthe same command.

4.10 Election Campaigns PoliticalcampaignsofficiallygotintofullswingfollowingtheproclamationofelectionsonTuesday9December2014. TheABCandBNPheld jointpublic rallieswhiletheDC,LCDandotherpartiesheldseparaterallies.TheMissionwas informedbyconcernedstakeholders thatthere was abuse of state resources, such as vehicles,forcampaigning.Inoneincident,theABCYouthLeaguewasreportedtohave lockedthePermanentSecretaryoftheMinistryofHealth,Mr.LefuManyokole,outofhisofficeafterheallegedlyrefusedtoreleasehisMinistry’scars for campaigning. The state media was also said to be manipulated by the LCD-appointed Minister, whoembargoed coverage of some of the PrimeMinister’sactivities.ThePrimeMinisterconfirmedthatTVLesothoandRadio Lesothohadbeen strictly instructednot to

cover him. The LCD on the other hand has dismissedthis informing the Mission that the only thing whichthey have barred the statemedia from doing was tobroadcastinformation,whichseekstodividethenation.For instance, they were prevented from broadcastingthedismissaloftheArmyCommanderandtheMinisterofCommunications.


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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: List of stakeholders consulted

Stakeholder Category Name Disignation Organisation

EMB AdvocateMamosebiPholo Commissioner IEC

InternationalAgencies Mr.ThaboMosoeunyane GovernanceExpert UNDP

Mr.ThabangTlalajoe Manager UNDP

Government Rt.Hon.ThomasThabane PrimeMinister

(ABCLeader) GovernmentofLesotho

Hon.MothejoaMetsing DeputyPrimeMinis-ter

(LCDLeader) GovernmentofLesotho

Hon.Thesele‘Maseribane MinisterofGender

(BNPLeader) GovernmentofLesotho

PoliticalParties Mr.SamonyaneNtsekele SecretaryGeneral ABC

Hon.JoangMolapo DeputyLeader BNP

Hon.MonyaneMoleleki DeputyLeader DC

Hon.PeleleLetsoela DeputyLeader BDNP

CSOs Mr.SeabataMotsamai ExecutiveDirector LCN

Mr.SofoneaShale Director DPE

Mr.TšoeuPetlane Director TRC

Academic Pro.NqosaMahao Vice Chancellor NUL(metataseminar)

Dr.MotlamelleKapa Lecturer NUL

Media Mr.TseboMatšasa Director MISALesotho

Chairperson BDRP


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ABOUT EISA

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUNDEISAhassinceitsinceptioninJuly1996establisheditselfasaleadinginstitutionandinfluentialplayerdealingwithelectionsanddemocracyrelatedissuesintheAfricancontinent.ItenvisionsanAfricancontinentwheredemocratic governance, human rights and citizen participation are upheld in a peaceful environment.The Institute’s vision isexecutedby striving forexcellence in thepromotionof credibleelections, citizenparticipation,andthestrengtheningofpoliticalinstitutionsforsustainabledemocracyinAfrica.

Havingsupportedand/orobservedover70electoralprocessesinAfrica,EISAhasextensiveexperienceinformulating,structuringandimplementingdemocraticandelectoralinitiatives.Ithasbuiltaninternationallyrecognisedcentreforpolicy,researchandinformationandprovidesthisservicetoelectoralmanagementbodies,politicalpartiesandcivilsocietyorganisationsinavarietyofareas,suchasvoterandciviceducationandelectoral assistanceandobservation.Besides its expandedgeographical scope, the Institutehas, forthepastseveralyears,beenincreasinglyworkinginnewin-betweenelectionareasalongtheelectoralandparliamentary cycle, including constitution and law making processes, legislative strengthening, conflictmanagementandtransformation,politicalpartydevelopment,theAfricanPeerReviewMechanism(APRM)andlocalgovernanceanddecentralisation.

EISA provides assistance to inter-governmental institutions, like the African Union, and the Pan-AfricanParliament,toreinforcetheircapacityintheelectionsanddemocracyfield.TheInstitutehasjustsignedanMOUwiththeEconomicCommunityofCentralAfricanStates(ECCAS);theEastAfricanCommunity(EAC);andtheCommonMarketforEastandSouthernAfrica(COMESA).Withintheframeworkoftheserecentlysignedmemoranda,theInstitutewillalsoprovidesimilarassistancerespectivelytheseintergovernmentalinstitutions.ItsMoUwiththeAfricanUnionwasalsorenewedin2014.

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