Effects of centralization and decentralization of electoral administration by adebayo a.s 2010

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EFFECTS OF CENTRALIZATION AND

DECENTRALIZATION OF ELECTORAL

ADMINISTRATION ON THE CONDUCT OF CREDIBLE

GENERAL ELECTIONS:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NIGERIAN AND

US ELECTORAL PROCESSES.

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BY

ADEBAYO, ADEBUKOLA SHEHU

MATRIC. NO. 960903002

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT

OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES,

UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS

AKOKA.

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

AWARD OF

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MASTER OF SCIENCE (M Sc) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

MARCH, 2010.

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CERTIFICATION

Certified that this research project titled: Effects of Centralization and

Decentralization of Electoral Administration on the Conduct of

Credible general Elections: A Comparative analysis of the Nigerian and

US Electoral Processes, was written by Adebayo, Adebukola Shehu with

Matric. No. 960903002 under my supervision.

I hereby recommend the work to the Board of Examiners for evaluation.

…………………………………………………………………………………………

Dr. Samuel C. Ugoh Date

Project Supervisor

…………………………………………………………………………………………

Prof. S. Akinboye Date

Head of Department.

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DEDICATION

I strongly dedicate this project to Almighty Allah (SWT) for making my

hopes of an MSc degree a successful reality.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I express my deep appreciation of the intellectual and moral

contributions of my amiable supervisor, Dr. S. C. Ugoh. Sir, your

thoroughness, wisdom and cooperation made this work a huge

success.

I am most appreciative of the contributions of Mr. abdulHakeem

Babatunde Abolade, a friend, brother and senior colleague (now

based in the UK), Dr. Adediji, The Chief Librarian, University of

Lagos, my older brothers, Engineer J.O. Adebayo and Barrister K.O.

Adebayo, my sister, Mrs. Rita Boyo and all members of the extended

Adebayo family; especially my Mother, Alhaja Munirat Adebayo and

my Father, late Alahaji Said Aremu Adebayo, not forgetting Mr.

Opeoluwa Akinola, a friend, brother and senior colleague. I thank you

all for your financial, material and moral contributions which made my

MSc programme a reality.

I strongly acknowledge the support of friends and well wishers

especially the entire management and staff of Christia (C&T)

Consultancy Services Limited, Ojodu, Lagos under the able

leadership of Mr. C. O. Tiamiyu. I thank Alhaji Lukman AbdulAlwal,

AbdulGaniyu Abdulalwal, AbdulFatah AbdulAlwal and the entire

AbdulAlwal family, Edward Adesina, AbdulLateef Abas, Funmilayo

Ogunsipe, Martins Akerele, Peter Opuboh, Tunrayo Falabake, Tope

Olaiwola, Vera Madubuogor AbdulGaniyu Olaniyi and Dr. M. J.

Isonguyoh, for their support.

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I deeply appreciate the support of my friends and colleagues:

Habeeb belo, Hassan Olapade, Hon. Kamardeen Basua and Hon.

Garba.

I sincerely appreciate the management and staff of Political and

Administrative Resource Center (PARC), Ogba, Lagos as well as Mr.

AbdulFatah Raji for allowing me make extensive use of their libraries

for the conduct of this research. I thank the academic and non-

academic members of staff of the Department of Political Science,

University of Lagos for their love cooperation and understanding

during my MSC programme.

I thank my darling wife, Mrs. Mulikat Oluwabunmi Adebayo and my

three children: Hafsoh, AbdulMalik and Hassan for their

understanding and encouragement.

Finally, I appreciate the fatherly guidance and motivation of the

following intellectual icons: Prof. Jinadu, Prof. Ogunsanwo, Prof.

Oyebode, Prof. Anifowose, Prof. Babawale, Dr. Oluwajuyitan, Dr.

Akinyemi and Late Dr. Akinbobola.

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ABSTRACT

There are increasing debates over the centralization and

decentralization of the administration of general elections especially

in large countries mostly known as federations. General elections are

conducted to elect national leaders like the president and members

of a national parliament. It is often argued that since this category of

election leads to the establishment of national government, its

administration should be centralized and left to the control of the

national government. On the other hand, some argue that since the

core activities (voting) in every election are carried out at the local

level, its administration should be decentralized and transferred to

regional and local governments.

Accordingly, the concern of this research has been to investigate the fundamental effects of centralizing and decentralizing the administration of general elections; drawing a comparative analysis of the Nigerian and US experiences respectively. To achieve this task, the study relied substantially on facts drawn from relevant literatures.

This study reveals that where and when there is total centralization or decentralization in the administration of general elections, such problems as: poor logistics management, overbearing political and financial control, poor supervision, process disuniformity as well as inadequate concerns for local inputs and needs will prevail; thus reducing the credibility of such elections. While recommending that countries especially federations should avoid the extremes of centralization or decentralization in their administration of general elections, the study concludes that the need to develop a more liberal, hybrid and workable model of national electoral administration for federal systems has become imperative.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page

Certification . . . . . . . . i

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Dedication . . . . . . . . ii

Acknowledgment . . . . . . . iii-iv

Abstract . . . . . . . . v

Table of Contents . . . . . . . vi

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of Problem . . . . . 1-9

1.2 Statement of Research Questions . . . 9

1.3 Purpose of the Research . . . . . 9-10

1.4 Significance of the Study . . . . . 10-11

1.5 Scope of the Research . . . . . 11

1.6 Research Methodology . . . . . 12

1.7 Research Chapterization . . . . . 12-13

1.8 Major Terms and Concepts . . . . 13-14

1.9 References . . . . . . . 15

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Review of Literature on Election . . . 16-39

2.2 Theoretical Framework . . . . . 39-48

2.3 References . . . . . . . 49-52

CHAPTER THREE

DESCRIPTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL

FRAMEWORKS OF THE NIGERIAN AND US ELECTORAL PROCESS

3.1 The Nigerian Electoral Process . . . . 53-56

3.2 The US Electoral Process . . . . . 57-63

3.3 Elements of Comparison . . . . . 63-67

3.4 References . . . . . . . 67-68

CHAPTER FOUR

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EFFECTS OF CENTRALIZATION AND EECENTRALIZATION OF

ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION ON PROCESS AND OUTCOME

CREDIBILITY IN NIGERIA AND THE US

4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . 69-70

4.2 The Effects of Centralized Electoral Administration

in Nigeria . . . . . . . 70-79

4.3 Effects of a Decentralized Electoral Administration

in the US . . . . . . . 79-93

4.4 References . . . . . . . 94-97

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND

CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary of Findings . . . . . 98-99

5.2 Recommendations . . . . . . 99-101

53 Findings . . . . . . . 101-102

5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . 102-103

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . 104-111

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Since 1999 and 2000, matters arising from the conduct of elections in

Nigeria and the US have generated serious intellectual debates and political

conflicts among scholars and politicians respectively. In the case of

Nigeria, we observed that the return to democratic governance in 1999 was

kick-started by and electoral process similar in character to those of

previous democratic dispensations. (Adebayo, 2000) Cases of electoral

malpractices like rigging and falsification of election results, violence and

other acts of corruption like bribing of voters and electoral officials freely

occurred and this resulted in popular dissatisfaction with election outcomes,

rejection of election outcomes by defeated parties and numerous protracted

post-election litigations which have had various forms of destabilizing

effects on government. In addition, the centralized structure and process of

the administration of election through one institution; the Independent

National Electoral Commission (INEC) also seem to have reasonable

influences on electoral credibility and crises in Nigeria. The

recommendation for the unbundling of INEC by the Justice Ways Electoral

Reforms Committee (ERIC), in its report submitted to the Maraud

administration emphasizes the problems arising from the issues of

centralization and concentration of electoral administrative powers in INEC.

(www.answers.com)

In the case of US, until the 2000 presidential elections, the country had a

fairly stable and crises-free electoral history. Just before the 2008

presidential elections, Mayer, (2007) acknowledged that "The last 7 years

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demonstrate that from the standpoint of international standards, or even

common sense, election administration here appears to fall short of basic

procedural fairness." Mayer observes that "The three main features (which

are considered here as the fundamental problems) of US election

administration are a radical degree of decentralization, the partisanship of

election officials and its largely privatized nature.

Mayer explains that because of the complexity and decentralization, the

machinery of elections – the voting systems and equipment used to

complete and tabulate ballots – is driven by private contractors, who

exercise considerable influence over the types of equipment available."

According to Ernest Partridge, Co-Editor of The Crisis Papers, while

commenting on the crisis of the 2000 and 2004 US presidential elections,

"The grounds for suspicion about the integrity of our elections are simple,

straightforward, and undisputed. In federal elections, thirty percent of the

votes are cast, and eighty percent of the votes are regionally compiled, in

machines: (a) utilizing secret software, (b) producing no independent record

of the votes (e.g. Paper trails‖), and (c) manufactured by active members

and supporters of the Republican Party. In sum, the system in place is

effectively designed, either deliberately or accidentally, to facilitate fraud."

www.crisispapers.org

One prominent element identified in the electoral defects in Nigeria and the

US as stated above is the notion of centralization and decentralization of the

administration and process of electioneering which this research intends to

highlight as a fundamental and influential factor in the determination of the

credibility of election outcomes. The centralization and decentralization of

the electoral process possess both political and administrative dimensions.

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While the former relates with implications arising from the issues

surrounding the evolution of the nation state on one hand, as well as the

nature and objectives of political relationship between electorates, election

candidates and the government on the other hand, the latter relates with the

legitimacy and efficacy of institutions and processes established for the

administration or conduct of elections. Accordingly, in discussing the

nature, scope and effects of centralization and decentralization of election

administration and processes in both countries, these two dimensions which

logically represents the two sides of the same coin will be duly considered.

From the Nigerian and US experiences, it is observed that the notion of

centralization and decentralization evolves, first, from the realm of politics.

Both countries operate two varieties of federalism with each reflecting

contrasting degree of tolerance for centralization and decentralization. For

instance, while Nigeria operates a federal system with high tolerance for

political and economic power centralization, the US operates an exact

opposite of this.

According to Assisi Asobie, "Centralizing trends in Nigerian federalism

have manifested themselves in the following ways since the Nigerian

federal system was established in 1954. First, the federal government has,

beginning from 1963, but especially since 1976, demonstrated an increased

capacity to alter unilaterally and in its own favor, the existing distribution of

power between it and the regional governments and, indeed, among the

various levels of government. Second, there has been an increasing

accretion to the federal governments of functions previously allocated to the

regional (or state) governments. Third, the resources - coercive,

bureaucratic, ideological and financial - directly available to the component

units (regions or states) for carrying out their constitutional functions have

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steadily diminished in range and quantum while those at the disposal of the

federal government have increased." (Tunde Babawale et al, 1998)

These trends were borne out of the centralist legacies laid down during the

period of colonialism when political and administrative power centralization

was established since 1914 (when the northern and southern regions of

Nigerian were amalgamated) for the purpose of sustaining convenience for

the colonial government. The division of the country into three regions

(east, north and west) in 1939 was to pave the way for the adoption of the

federal system in the 1954 Littleton Constitution. This development

introduced some element of: first, power deconcentration before 1954 and

second, power decentralization after 1954 when the three regions were

granted autonomy.

However, the reversal to mere political and administrative power

deconcentration as against an autonomy-based power decentralization was

consequential, first, to the intervention of the military in 1966 and the

conversion of the three (and later four) regions into 12 states in 1967 for the

purpose of withdrawing the hitherto granted regional autonomy and

preventing secession by Biafra. The major implication of this was the

conversion of the federating units in Nigeria to mere administrative

appendage of the federal government as almost all government functions

and responsibilities were initiated from the central government. States were

simply empowered to implement the directives of the federal government.

The second rationale for the centralization of political and administrative

powers in Nigeria's federal system stems from the need to also centralize the

gathering and redistribution of the nation's economic resources. Arguments

in this direction suggest the need to protect minority interest in the process

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of resource redistribution especially as the nation moved towards a single-

commodity-based (petroleum) economy.

Accordingly, all state structures and institutions were centrally located and

managed. All hitherto decentralized functions in the areas of resource

management, health, infrastructure, education etc were centralized. The

various attempts at democratization and the corresponding institutions

established to administer its processes including the electoral process were

all centrally initiated and managed.

Unfortunately, as can be observed in the almost fifty year history of Nigeria,

the centralization of political and economic powers made governance at the

centre the major focus in the nation's political process. (Anifowose and

Babawale, 2006) The enormous powers and resources at the centre made

federal political offices too attractive that the military and politicians

employed several unethical strategies to secure, occupy and retain them.

These helped to fuel, expand and sustain chronic corruption in the

administration of these political institutions thereby rendering them

dysfunctional and ineffective in the discharge of their constitutional roles.

The crises bedeviling the administration of the electoral process in Nigeria

can not be divorced from this trend of institutional dysfunctional and

ineffectiveness due to over-centralization. The management of the electoral

process suffers from overbearing political power influence and pressures as

well as administrative structural defects due to the over-centralization and

over-concentration of political powers and administrative functions in one

single central body.

Samuel Ugoh (in the UNILAG Journal of Politics, 2004) and several other

scholars regularly point out both the political and administrative lapses of an

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over-centralized electoral body. Ugoh's identification of such electoral

problems as "limited autonomy of various electoral bodies, particularly their

lack of financial empowerment" implies the extent of political power

centralization as manifested in the Nigerian executive arm of government

which is in turn used in the manipulation of the nation's EMB. Similarly,

Ugoh identifies "weak human resources as well as unreliable voters'

registers nationwide" (and other poor administrative logistics) as the bane of

credible, free and fair elections in Nigeria. the inefficient management of

electoral administrative logistics since 1999 manifest mostly in the late

production and delivery of election/voting materials to polling units on

election days. This gives room for easy manipulations by politicians in

collaboration with corrupt election officials. The primary source of this

administrative problem is traceable to the over-centralization of the process

which causes inability of states and/or local governments to develop and

operate electoral administrative machineries.

The US federal system is built strictly on the principle of subsidiarity which

holds that "Tasks should never be allocated to a body higher up in a political

hierarchy if they can be effectively carried out by a body lower down."

(www.politicsprofessor.com). Accordingly, the tenth amendment to the US

constitution (and other subsequent amendments and federal legislations)

specifies the areas that fall under the legislative jurisdiction of both the

central and state governments. (www.wikipedia.org)

The US federation started on a rather loose form with autonomous states

coming together to establish a confederation. However, the threat of a civil

war exposed the young nation to the harsh realities of a weak central

government thus prompting the need for a federal system with a much

stronger central government.

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Specifically, the US federal constitution specifies the areas of legislative

jurisdiction of the federal government to cover those areas which apply

commonly to the entire country such as: foreign policy, defense, customs,

commerce (especially those which span interstate boundaries) and national

currency. It is assumed that areas not specified by the constitution fall

within the legislative jurisdiction of the states.

However, a careful examination of historical developments in the US

federal system indicate a sustained trend of gradual expansion of federal

legislative jurisdiction into areas which hitherto fall within the powers of the

states. Proponents of this trend have variously argued against what they

termed unregulated, radical and dysfunctional decentralization which,

according to them, facilitates too much of disuniformity and disparities in

the socio-political and economic processes of the nation consequence of

which is likely to lead to disunity, disintegration and disproportional

development among the states particularly among those termed as rich and

poor states.

As can be observed, the electoral process falls under the exclusive list of the

states. (www.wikipedia.org) As we shall see in chapter three, even elections

into federal political offices are all conducted by the states. The states

equally have the constitutional powers to operate, organize or manage the

electoral process in ways preferred by them so-long as such preferences fall

within the confines of constitutional prescriptions on the conduct of federal

(or general) elections. the tolerance for this degree of decentralization has

made the conduct of general elections in the US so disuniformly and

unregulatedly organized that since the 2000 general elections fundamental

problems associated with this degree of electoral decentralization began to

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show-up. Samuel Ugoh (in the UNILAG Journal of Politics, 2004)

acknowledges in particular, the controversy which surrounded the "Florida

state" conduct of the 2000 presidential elections. Ugoh observes that such

negative electoral trends as "inflation of the election results and bribing of

the polling agents" (as well as massive disenfranchisement of voters through

failing voting machines and other electoral technologies) had occurred in

the past; citing the "Watergate scandal in 1974." We demonstrate in chapter

four that the persistence in the occurrence of some of these trends in the

2000 and subsequent general elections is substantially consequential to the

radical decentralization of the US electoral process.

Essentially, this research shall critically consider the rationale for and nature

of centralization and decentralization of the Nigerian and US electoral

processes with a view to determining their degree of tolerance for electoral

malpractices, and by extension, the credibility of election outcomes. The

research shall situate its subject matter within the analytical framework of

the theories of federalism for the purpose of providing logical explanations

for the political dimensions of electoral process centralization and/or

decentralization. However, pure administrative theories of centralization

and decentralization shall be used with a view to providing explanations for

their degree of efficacy or otherwise. Meanwhile, some historical

perspectives of electioneering in both countries will be presented in order to

lay a proper foundation for the understanding of the subject matter.

This research dwells on some arguments that centralization and/or

decentralization of the electoral process as demonstrated in Nigeria and the

US poses substantial influence on the degree of credibility of both the

electoral process itself and its outcome. the experiences of both countries in

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this regard manifest not only the two extremes of electioneering, but also, its

peculiarities in both countries.

However, this research recognize the need to attempt a reconciliation of

divergent aspects of both centralization and decentralization, or the

harnessing of their merits in order to reduce electoral malpractices and

increasing its credibility.

1.2 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. How does the practice of federalism influence the centralization or

decentralization of the electoral process?

2. What are the merits and demerits of a centralized and decentralized

electoral process?

3. How does centralization and decentralization influence the credibility

of conduct and outcomes of elections?

4. what points of convergence between centralization and

decentralization are required for the conduct of credible elections in a

federal state?

1.3 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH

This research intends to serve the following purposes:

1. To compare and contrast the process of electoral administration in

Nigeria and the US with a view to identifying areas of divergence and

convergence.

2. To critically examine the nature, scope and implications of

centralization and decentralization on the administration of credible

elections in Nigeria and the US.

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3. To examine the influences of federalism as a political system on the

determination of the degree of centralization and decentralization of

the electoral process in Nigeria and the US.

4. To determine the relationship between the efficacy of electoral

administration and the credibility of the electoral process in Nigeria

and the US.

5. To harness the merits of centralization and decentralization in the

conduct and administration of elections with a view to developing an

ideal and credible electoral process.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study provides an uncommon basis for comparison between the

electoral processes of two distinctly different countries; (Nigeria and US)

considering the notions of centralization and decentralization of both the

process and administration of their electoral systems as well as their

political foundations.

This study does not only identifies the fundamental influences of

centralization and decentralization on the conduct of credible elections, it

also provides thoughts on the rationale for their adoption, the limitations

posed particularly for the attainment of credibility of the electoral process as

well as the modalities for adjusting either of a centralized or decentralized

electoral process with a view to producing credible outcomes.

This research is a timely reaction to one of the most prominently significant

contemporary developments in Nigeria and the US. As noted in the

introductory section of this chapter, the electoral process in both countries

have generated serious intellectual and political controversies, the root

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cause of which is traced to the centralization and decentralization of its

process and administration.

The findings and recommendations of this research will serve a dual

purpose of contributing to intellectual knowledge and providing policy

guides not only to EMBs, but also to law and policy makers tinkering or

attempting to reform their electoral process as it is currently the case in

Nigeria.

1.5 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

The focus of this research is limited to issues related to election

administration such as the legal frameworks of election administration,

design and structure of Election Management Bodies (EMBs), process of

administration, human resources, logistics and the political environment.

The research will be assessing the efficacy of these elements of election

administration within the prevailing political environment and their

corresponding implication.

However the scope of comparison will deal with the political and legal

rationale for centralization and decentralization of the electoral process in

Nigeria and the US, describe their administrative processes and then present

their credibility implications.

The study period covers only all general elections held in Nigeria and the

US between 1999 and 2008. The limitation of this study within the period is

because of time and financial positions. This research does not encounter

any serious limitations in terms of data availability and gathering.

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1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research is designed as a case study content analysis research. It

adopts the comparative approach in the analysis of its two case studies:

Nigeria and the US.

The research does not require any survey questionnaires. However,

unstructured interviews were administered on selected but relevant

personalities comprising of intellectuals and professionals.

The research relies mainly on secondary data gathered from relevant

literature. Statistical data required especially for the testing of the three

hypotheses were also sourced through such literature.

1.7 RESEARCH CHAPTERIZATION

Chapter one focuses on statement of problems, research objectives,

significance of the study and the research methodology.

The second chapter of this research constitutes the intellectual domain of the

study which is situated in the analysis of the theories of centralization,

decentralization, and federalism as well as their application to the

administration and organization of credible elections. chapter two is the

review of literatures which extensively discuss the operational relationships

between core concepts like federalism and election administration.

The third chapter deals with legal and political frameworks guiding the

establishment, structure and operation of election Management Bodies

(EMBs) as well as the conduct of general elections in Nigeria and the US.

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The fourth chapter presents a comparative analysis of issues arising from the

centralization and decentralization of the electoral processes in Nigeria and

the US.

The fifth chapter presents the findings made on some fundamental causes of

problems associated with the structure of election administration in Nigeria

and the US. Conclusions are drawn and recommendations provided as

remedy to identified problems.

1.8 MAJOR TERMS AND CONCEPTS

(A) Election: An election is a decision-making process by which a

population chooses an individual to hold formal office. This is the usual

mechanism by which modern democracy fills offices in the legislature,

sometimes in the executive and judiciary, and for regional and local

government. This process is also used in many other private and business

organizations, from clubs to voluntary associations and corporations.

(www.wikipedia.org)

(B) Election Administration: Election Administration is the term used

to denote the steps which are undertaken when organizing an election.

These steps include: legal framework development; election management;

constituency and polling district demarcation; voter education; voter

registration; access to, and design of, the ballot; nomination and registration

of parties and candidates; campaign regulation; polling; counting and

tabulating the vote; resolving election-related disputes and complaints;

verification and certification of final results; election result implementation;

post-election procedures. (www.wikipedia.org)

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(C) Election Management Bodies: Election Management Bodies

(EMBs) are organizations/institutions which are tasked with the

administration of all aspects of the election process. (www.wikipedia.org)

(D) Centralization: In the institutional sense centralization implies the

constitutional concentration of powers in the hands of a few people or

institutions at the national level of government and the marginalization of

some other levels of government such as the state and/or local governments

and/or other such governmental institutions as the courts, parliaments and

sub-national governments. They define economic centralization as the

situation whereby the government spends a relative, large proportion, of a

country's gross national product compared to the private sector. With respect

to financial centralization, it is taken to exist under situations where the

government raises or appropriates the balk of state revenues.

(E) Decentralization: This refers to the transfer of some power and

resources from the central, to local level governments and organizations.

(Anifowose and Enemuo, 1999) There are different forms of

decentralization: deconcentration, devolution, delegation and privatization

(Anifowose and Enemuo, 1999) respectively. However, for the purpose of

this research, devolution, as a form of decentralization will be adopted.

(F) Federalism: This concept is used in defining the political structure

or organization of a country wherein there is a constitutionally authorized

sharing of political power and control of economic resources between the

government at the centre and those of sub national units commonly referred

to as region, province, state etc. Federalism also applies to the structure and

organization of both governmental and nongovernmental institutions whose

operations cover a considerably large area.

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1.9 REFERENCES

Adebayo, A. S., (2000); The Electoral Process and the Development of the

Nigerian Politics; 1979-1999. Unpublished Thesis, Department of Political

Science, University of Lagos.

Anifowose R and Enemuo F., (eds) (1999); Elements of Politics.

Anifowose R. and Babawale T., (eds) (2006); An agenda for a New Nigeria;

The Imperative of Transformation. Concept Publications Limited, Lagos.

Babawale T. et al., (1998); Re-Inventing Federalism in Nigeria; Issues and

Perspectives. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Lagos, Nigeria.

Mayer, K. R., (2007); Comparative Election Administration: Can We Learn

Anything From the Australian Electoral Commission? Department of

Political Science University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Partridge, E., (April 26, 2005), What Can We the People Do About Election

Fraud? The Crisis Papers, www.crisispapers.org

The Theory of Subsidiarity. www.politicsprofessor.com

Ugoh, S. C. (2004); "Electoral Malpractice and Violence in the 2003

General elections in Nigeria" in the UNILAG Journal of Politics Vol. 1 No.

1, December, 2004.

Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, (2009); Election. (www.wikipedia.org)

Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, (2009); Federalism in the US.

(www.wikipedia.org)

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON ELECTION

Elections are institutionalized procedures for the choice of office holders by

the members of an organization or society. Elections broadly conceived,

refer to the process of elite election by the mass population in a given

political system. Elections are among the most ubiquitous of contemporary

political issues, while voting forms the single act of political participation

undertaken By a majority of adults in a majority of the world's states. . For a

wide variety of Political systems competitive and non competitive,

developed and developing Afro-Asian, communist and western, there seems

to be a genial recognition that elections are means by which popular

commitment to the regime may be mobilized.

According to the Wikipedia Encyclopedia (2009), ―Elections first took a

central place in politics in the Greek city state of the Eastern Mediterranean

in the fifth and sixth centuries BC.‖ There has been no systematic study of

elections in societies independent of this western tradition. Certainly, traces

are to be found else where but it does not seem that elections have played a

central part in other society. On the contrary, let us attempt a historical but

practical survey of electoral procedures in terms of the diffusion of a social

political pattern from single source and its modification in a great variety of

situations.

Meanwhile, it is assumed that these procedures correspond functionally to

certain general social needs which are particularly marked in literate

technological and mobile societies hence they periodically reappeared after

set backs in new forms in new corners of western society. However it is

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assumed that where these procedures meet no social needs they may be

retained as forms but are filled with a new content.

W. J. M. Mackenzie in an article functions of election (encyclopedia of

social science volume 5 pp.1-6). Presents a brief but precise historical

development of the concept of electoral process at various developmental

stages of man's society beginning from the heroic age up to the

revolutionary years of the seventeenth, eighteenth and to nineteenth century.

In the heroic age he explain that the poem of homer reflects a state of

society in which rule was by large whose position was conspicuously unlike

that of the "oriental despots" of the river valley civilization with which they

came in contact". The evidence of the mythological and epic narratives is

difficult to use but it suggests situation roughly parallel to cases found in

mobile African Societies where the king although drawn from a royal

lineage emerges as leader by a process which may include competition,

concilise election and acclamation by the people.

The next development stage identified by Mackenzie is the period of the

Greek democracies. During this period, the epic period of tribal mobility

was succeeded by one of peasant agriculture tempered by growing

commercial activities and emigration to colonies overseas.

"From this situation emerged the strife between the well born and the people

which affected Greek ideas and practice about political institutions almost

everywhere" where this strife was intense Greek elections assumed new

forms either through complete popular victory or through attempts at

compromise we are primarily concerned not with voting on measures in

popular assembles but with the choice of authority.

27

However, elections under the Greek democracies posses two notable

features; first in voting on proportions in the assembly of the citizens. The

role was apparently made of written votes in the procedure of ostracism and

of ballot in the form of pebbles.

Meanwhile, holders of certain legally recognized offices in particular

archons Generals were elected by non legal constituencies known as tribes

which were held to have been instituted deliberately so as to cut across local

divisions of interest within Africa.

Secondly, the principle of election was accepted grudgingly in Athenian

democracy theory. It infringe the principles of equality among citizen and it

was dangerous because it opened way to power for ambitions attractive and

well trained young men of the old families and equally for ambitious men of

the people who were prepared to perpetuate their electoral victory by force

(the common pattern of Greek "tyranny") The orthodox principle was that

citizens should hold offices of authority in rotation while the order would be

determined by lot. (Those features are described in detail by Aristotle

politela Athenian -63-66). However it is notable that in general the Athenian

used voting for election to offices requiring special skills such as military

leadership whereas in western countries voting is now used to fill offices of

a representative character for which the Athenians used. The lots, offices

requiring special skills are now generally filled by appointment from a field

determined by specified professional qualifications.

The third stage identified by Mackenzie is the period of Roman Republic

even of the republic the Romans never accepted the principles of one man

one vote. Decision in legislation end in the choice of the principal officials

28

which was by a plurality of Counties by a plurality of tribes within each of

these constituencies, one man one vote prevailed but the units varied in size.

However during the medieval church period Mackenzie maintained that the

tradition of ancient elections was preserved in the church rather than in the

state. It continued unbroken in the Roman catholic churches but many

national and non conformist church also developed the use of elections as

the basis of a legitimate claim to hold office (it is an interesting coincidence

that election has in protestant theology has different meaning: that of the

granting of spiritual grace to God's elect)". The most ancient and continuous

tradition has been that of the election of superiors (Popes, Bishops, Deans,

Priors and so on) by a relatively small electorate consisting of this next in

rank up to a point the procedure is deliberative tending toward a conclusion

by "sense of the meeting" But there are also ancient and complex roles

about voting procedures these rights of election were defended strongly but

not always with success against hierarchical and secular attempts to

substitute appointment. Like the Athenian political system elections in the

church medieval period also posses features such as the use of majority vote

and rotational method.

During the feudal stages of political system Mackenzie believes "elections"

become permanent socio-political phenomena such that it defines the pattern

of interactions among key political actors. According to him "the position of

the feudal emperor king or over lord was deemed to be limited by law and

custom and to some extent by the consent of his vassals. The relation

between king and lord and between lord and man was in principal one of

consent leading to binding initial obligation. The vassal chose to do homage,

the lord choose whether or not to accept. It was not a long step from this to

an elected emperor and (in a few instance) an elected king. The social

29

situation greatly limited the application of the principles of consent and

election in practice but the idea of binding legal right of succession to office

emerged slowly along with the growth of other nations of private and

heritable property".

Consequently there arose the need for consultation, first with a feudal

council then with assemblies representing" others beside immediate vassals.

These assemblies were the basis of the parliamentary tradition national

government but without any national enactment about electoral procedures.

In the revolutionary years of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries a radical change had occurred in western political systems and as

such the idea and practice of electoral processes inevitably assumed

different dimension.

According to Mackenzie "In most of Europe the assemblies of estates were

displaced by autocratic, modernizing monarchies for the diffusion of

elections the only important survival was in England (the parliament of

Scotland and Sweden survived but had little or no influence outside their

own countries and in colonial assemblies based on the English model.

During the struggle for survival certain basis principle of consent franchise

and representation were hammered out although these practice were never

fully applied in practice they were recognized as the ideological basis of a

system of democratic election. The classic statement are those of English

popular leaders in the 1640s and 1650s their language recalls both that of

non conformist congregation and that of Athenian democracy. The principle

in brief is that all government aids their just powers to the consent of the

governed and that in numerous societies this consent may be expressed by

representative freely elected on a basis of universal adult suffrage".

30

This provided the basis upon which further modification of the electoral

process was established especially from the nineteenth century to this

contemporary period. In the 19th century global political system had not

only been polarized into the communist and capitalist democracies

respectively, there were also new states which were being nurtured into

existence through colonialism. Based on these three distinct geopolitical

settings we shall draw the concept of electoral process. It is however worthy

of mentioning that one common features which characterized the idea and

practice of election (especially communist and capitalist states) was the

emergence of political parties (party system of various forms (one party,

two party and multi party system) which serves as intermediaries between

elected and electorates but we shall not go into in depth analysis of this

aspect as our focus in this study is to explain the institutional and

organizational aspects of the electoral process which simply emphasis on

political parties and party systems (as another interactive structure) within

the political system.

Nonetheless, we must admit that the most important of this new

phenomenon are political parties as intermediaries between voter and

assembly. Clear recognition of this situation comes first in American

presidential elections but it spread rapidly with the extension of the

franchise in large states in the nineteenth century. By the last quarters of that

century parties and elections had become interdependent and electoral

parties were no longer limited to national politics, but had extended to trade

unions and large cooperative societies. But national elections are hence forth

intelligible only in terms of parties the traditional principles demand the

scrutiny of procedures within parties since they control the first stage of

national elections. Stein Ronkein in his article ' Electoral systems'

31

(international Encyclopedia of social Sciences, 1972-vol. 4 and 5) provides

further analysis on parties in electoral process.

It is pertinent at this point to present some electoral models constructed by

Prof. Remi Anifowose (Unpublished Thesis, 1970) which were in

contemporary use in communist capitalist as well as under developed

political systems. According to Anifowose, elections as "a game" guided by

specific rules and regulations. From this assertion, Anifowose established

two characteristics which electoral roles possess. The first is the constitutive

character while the second is the regulative character. The constitutive rules

determine what is the form or structure of the game and the regulative rules

specify what are to count as legitimate moves in the game. Anifowose

therefore regard any electoral institution as consisting of constitutive and

regulative roles for its successful operations. And for the stability of any

electoral system, there must be congruence between form and process that is

between the constitutive and regulative roles of the game. In addition, the

major competing groups must be in fundamental agreement on these roles

and the latter must be regarded as worthy of conformity. Added to these, is

the need to preserve the domestic norms necessary for the successful

operation of either the ratification or competitive electoral models. To

attempt to impose the norms and regulative rules of the former on the latter

and vice versa is to create the conditions for stress, violence and instability

on the political system. This has been the case in most old and emerging

democracies where and when electoral crises occur.

Discussing further on Anifowose electoral models, we briefly explain the

methods used in the adoption of this models. As earlier remarked, elections

serve different purposes and function for different political systems thus in

essence elections have different meaning for both western and communist

32

countries. This provides the framework for Anifowose's analysis. in his

view: the result of electing the soviet union are largely a forgone conclusion

it is therefore legitimate to ask why the authorities should consider it

worthwhile to incur such tremendous expense in money and man power to

achieve it. Totalitarian regimes exert tremendous pressure to drive their

people to the polls to satisfy foreordained choices. Are not elections

therefore a superfluous and dispensable luxury in totalitarian system?

Again Anifowose Opines "Elections in Ratificatory model as exemplified

by the soviet electoral system must be viewed as serving some essential

functions other than the selection of representative which in a parliamentary

system of government is regarded as its actual main function". First it is a

public demonstration of the legitimacy of the regime. It provides a setting

for the continued demonstration of popular support.

For the regime ratificatory electoral system serves to demonstrate to the

outside world that the people are solidly aligned with the regime. Elections

based on this model serve as a form of national mobilization by manipulated

unanimity; totalitarian regimes strive to create an impression of mono ethic

support aid unshakeable strength. Anifowose quotes Howard sweater (1961)

that "In the Soviet Union the formal act of voting is comparable in purpose

to such civil rituals as singing the national anthem or selecting a country's

flag. It is a public display of personal re-affirmation of the soviet way of life

and the party leadership. The function of soviet elections is not only to

legitimize the leadership in the mind of the mass and to help identify the

people with its politics but also to reassure the leader itself of its popularity

and infallibility quoting Richard M. Scammer, Anifowose observed that

soviet elections reflect "the need felt by every regime for popular

endorsement and consent to its program no matter how unreal the conditions

33

under which that endorsement be produced'. Citing Mole (1965-77), in his

study an election in Leningrad, Anifowose suggests that the very idea of an

election as a choice between alternatives is not comprehended by the

average soviet citizen who thinks of voting as both a patriotic and social

activity invested with the diverse pleasures which most people derive from

performing a commendable regime"

Soviet elections provide the citizens with a sense of participation. The

millions who administer the elections and the millions of votes have a

feeling of political participation. Allison (1968-814) What this means is

that even though the millions of voters do not make valid decision on the

operations of their government, yet they are allowed to feel that they are

consulted and to feel that they have at least participated.

Thus, an election in soviet condition is an invaluable educational and

propaganda exercise. It provides a good opportunity to stress the wisdom

and achievements of the party in the past and to disseminate its promise for

the future. Finally soviet elections provide proof that the system of control is

compared. This emphasizes the percentage of voting turn out rather than

competition. Consequently Anifowose concludes, "This incredibly high

percentage of soviet voters are used by soviet leaders to validate the claim

that there is a greater degree of democracy in the Soviet Union than in the

Anglo-American system where percentage of voting turnouts is

comparatively low".

That soviet election is essentially participatory, legitimizing, demonstrative,

educational and patriotic acts, elections here are expressions of the

pervading beauty of soviet society.

34

Ratificatory elections can then be seen as what Jerzy wiatr calls consent

elections, Which he defines as those in which the voter do not make any

choice between parties competing for power but he can influence the

selection of the member of representative bodies in both a negative and a

positive way by voting against some and or for some other candidates.

However, in the competitive model as Anifowose opines, "The chief

characteristics which distinguish it from the satisfactory model a party

competition" the concept of competitive elections and the criteria for such

elections are stated in the study by Janowitz and Marwick (1966-5 to 6)

"At each stage in the electoral process the electorate is involved and each

plays its own role in the resolution of political conflicts within a divided

society indeed it is safe to say that a competitive party system is the essence

of western democracy and that parties are the brokers that convert the

elections process into a coherent system.‖

The party nominates, comparing and divides the electorate on Election Day.

Indeed in the norm of the democratic system, the whole election process is

geared toward the construction of voters‘ coalition based on crude behavior.

These group of voters form sub-system of the electorate to which a party

must appeal and the electoral process normally substantially influenced by

the necessity to appeal to these group of voters.

In Anifowose's view, Elections based on the competitive model are seen as a

ritual of choice. A British general election or a Presidential election in the

United States of America, for example, serves to choose a governing party

and thus a government unlike the soviet system where no alternative choice

is presented to the electorate Anifowose argues that:

35

"The touch-stone of competitive elections and Western democracy is 'free'

election. The actual clause being whether the opposition has had an

adequate chance to organize, chooses its candidates and presents its case.

Where it is assumed that the government to provide themselves with funds,

win over supporters, hustle their opponents and make it worth every one's

while to vote for them".

However it is believed that full freedom does not exist. Mackenzie (1958-

14) believes that election under the competitive model can be free and fair if

four conditions are met:

"Firstly, an independent judiciary to interpret electoral law, secondly, an

honest competent, non-Partisan administration to run elections, thirdly, a

developed system of Political parties well enough organized to put their

policies, tradition and teams of candidates before the elections as

alternatives between which to choose, fourthly, a general acceptance

through the political community of certain rather vague rules of the "game"

which limits the struggle for power because of unspoken sentiment that if

the rules are not observed more or less faithfully the "game" itself will

disappear amidst the wreckage of the whole system". These conditions are

no doubt ideal and therefore nowhere do these exist undisturbed and

unmodified.

But Mackenzie argued further that "free election depends more on the

attitude of candidate, voters and government then on the drafting of

electoral laws. Similarly Anifowose quotes Aron (1966-420 to 422) "What

is necessary for competition between parties is that the different parties

should accept the roles of the "game" that they should have the feeling that

the unity of the nation is good itself."

36

By implication, we can submit that the competitive model such as the West

Minister with its peaceful exchange of government control, works because

the competition is carried on under rules which all the contestants recognize

more or less explicitly. Western democracy has proved difficult to practice

in developing countries unless same code of this sort is generally accepted.

It requires certain forbearance, a toleration of opposition and a willingness

to play by the rules of the game.

Describing elections in underdeveloped new states, Anifowose argues that

―elections in general deviated from those generally recognized functions and

features of the ratificatory and competitive model which operated in the

communist (Eastern) and capitalist (Western) nations‖ as described above.

Anifowose identified Two major reasons for this deviation.

First the concept of political institutionalization which according to

Huntington (1965-386 to 411) can be defined as.

"The process through which organization and procedures acquire values and

stability where there is the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and

adherence of its organizations and procedures" is absent in the political

systems in many new States. This according to Anifowose is unlikely that

this model will work effectively in a polity with this level of political

institutionalization such as we have in most of the new states. Samuel

Huntington remarked that ―institutional decay has become a common

phenomenon of the modernizing countries; coup-de‘tat and military

intervention in politics is one index of low levels of institutionalization.‖

They occur where political institutions lack autonomy and coherence.

37

Given this definition by Huntington, we are not likely to have a high level of

political institutionalization where there is lack of agreement among the

political elite on what constitutes the rules underlying the system. And

coherence and autonomy of institutions largely depend on the prior

acceptance of these politicians; ethnic consciousness and corruption are

prevalent norms in the new states. Such institutional decay only breeds

instability in the form of coup de'tat and military intervention in politics,

protracted civil wars, autocratic and unpopular leaders etc; as the events of

the post-independent decade in Africa had demonstrated.

Secondly, the concept of the civic culture as defined by Almond and verba

is an allegiant participant culture in which the political culture and political

structure are congruent. It is a balanced political culture in which political

activity; involvement and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity in

traditional commitment to parochial values. Again, Anifowose argues that

―it is the non-existence of the notion of a high and developed political

culture) that renders the ratificatory and competitive electoral models highly

unworkable in under developed new states.‖ He states that

"What we witnessed in the elections (of most African States) is that the

ratificatory model's rules and norms were applied to an electoral system

modeled on the competitive model. Their was no gentlemanly confrontation

between the parties. Party politics was a zero sum affair in which the

"winner takes all" This attempt to graft the regulative rules of the

ratificatory, model on to the constitutive roles of a competitive model with

which they are incompatible inevitable led the people to reject through

outcome of the election and the rejection was infested in terms of the wave

of violence that followed virtually every election".

38

Consequently, the evidences of this abnormal fusion of electoral models and

methodology in African states as reported by Anifowose indicates that since

independence very few African states have legitimately as well as

democratically changed their government.

This shows that instances where ruling government have seen changes by

means of the ballot box in a competitive situation are indeed very rear.

Furthermore, political experience of new states within the past decades has

tended to further the proposition that, a model can be unreservedly exported

to the new states and that it is unwise to suppose that we can graft on to any

colony a political institution which could retain, its familiar shape in

complete unresponsiveness to entirely different social realities. These

electoral models are exported to new states only for the exporter to discover

that they do not function exactly the way they had expected. Still within the

context of our central argument we can as well say of the new state that

politics and election in particular are viewed as fulfilling purposes and

function differently from those that may be predicated of the models

discussed above. What is observed in the new states, is the situation where

the leaders show preference for either the ratificatory or Competitive model.

In most cases states which base their electoral system on the competitive

model with its emphasis on free elections and competition for choice of

leader and governments have invariably made such elections a farce. While

they conduct elections within a legal and social structure which permit

possible goal of election (that is change of government) the ruling party

makes sure that it employs governmental and administrative machinery to

rig elections in order to hold tenaciously to power to the disadvantage of the

opposition parties. In General, elections in these states places emphasis on

39

the commitment and integrative functions of election rather than on the

possibility of change of government already in power.

The general understanding that can be drawn from this is that the forms and

functions of Western or communist type elections change considerably

when transferred to the new states.

But the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s triggered-off new

electoral trends. The global spread of capitalism and liberal democracy into

hitherto communist states, the transition by most third world states from

military to democratic government, the emergence of several international

electoral assistance organizations and the shift of intellectual attention to

studies and researches on election administration and management

contributed significantly to the modification of old election ideas and

practices as well as the development of new ones.

In view of the shift in intellectual attention from the theories and models of

voting or election systems, voter behavior and functions of elections, vast

scholastic works are beginning to emerge on issues concerning the

administration and management of elections. The trend of issues are

shifting away from normative issues and turning towards scientific

structuralism which emphasizes institutional efficiency in the administration

and management of elections. Studies now focus on the nature and structure

of election management bodies (EMBs) and the attendant effects of this on

the conduct of free and fair elections. Essentially, the central concept here

is election administration and management.

According to Jinadu, (1997) "electoral administration is the organization

and conduct of elections to elective public (political) office by an electoral

body." Jinadu used his definition to subsume both "structure and process."

40

By structure, he meant the bureaucracy that is set up or established to

organize and conduct elections. This is usually an electoral body, like the

Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) of Nigeria. But apart

from this specific bureaucracy, whose primary function is the administration

of elections, Jinadu acknowledged that "there are agencies or institutions of

the state, like the civil service, the police and security agencies and civil

society groups whose support and cooperation through the provision of

logistical support is vital to the operation of the electoral body." Also

important for their oversight functions, according to Jinadu, are "the

legislature and the judiciary". However, Jinadu points out that in much of

Africa, this oversight function has for obvious historical reasons been

impaired, vitiated or in limbo.

By process, Jinadu refers to the rules, procedures and activities relating to,

among others, the establishment of electoral bodies, the appointment of their

members, the registration of voters, the nomination of candidates, balloting,

counting of the ballots, the declaration of results, the selection and training

of electoral officials, constituency delimitation, voter education and, in

some cases, registration of political parties and supervision of party

nomination congresses.

Theorists and model builders on election administration and management

have attempted to harmonize the structure and process of electoral

administration in to uniquely identical systems which serve or operate in

different political systems. These theories and models of electoral

administration establish ethics, principles, methods and structures of

electoral administration as well as their legal and political frameworks.

Basically, they discuss the modes of appointment and removal of EMB

members; the tenures of both EMB members and the EMB itself; the level

41

of financial, political and other forms of independence granted to the EMB;

and, the scope and running of the administrative institutions and structures

of the EMB.

According to Jinadu (1997), Charles Lasham (2005) and the official website

of the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (www.aceproject.org), three

broad models have been developed for the description of the constitution,

composition, control and operation of EMBs. They are the independent

EMB, the governmental EMB and the mixed (independent and

governmental) EMB models respectively. EMB theories and models also

describe their tenures (whether they are permanent or temporary EMBs) and

their organizational structures (the centralized and the decentralized EMB)

models.

The Independent Model of electoral management exists in those countries

where elections are organized and managed by an EMB which is

institutionally independent and autonomous from the executive branch of

government, and which has and manages its own budget. Under the

Independent Model, an EMB is not accountable to a government ministry or

department. It may be accountable to the legislature, the judiciary, or the

head of state. EMBs under the Independent Model may enjoy varying

degrees of financial autonomy and accountability, as well as varying levels

of performance accountability. They are composed of members who are

outside the executive while in EMB office. Many new and emerging

democracies have chosen the Independent Model of electoral management.

In some countries, two bodies are established for the management of

elections, both of which are independent of the executive and can be

considered as independent EMBs. One of these bodies is likely to have

responsibility for policy decisions relating to the electoral process, and the

42

other to be responsible for conducting and implementing the electoral

process. Provisions may exist which insulate the implementation EMB from

interference by the policy EMB in staffing and operational matters.

The Governmental Model of electoral management exists in those countries

where elections are organized and managed by the executive branch through

a ministry (such as the Ministry of the Interior) and/or through local

authorities. Where EMBs under the Governmental Model exist at national

level, they are led by a minister or civil servant and are answerable to a

Cabinet minister. With very few exceptions they have no ‗members‘. Their

budget falls within a government ministry and/or under local authorities.

Mixed Model EMBs have dual structures, with a policy, monitoring or

supervisory component that is independent of the executive branch of

government (as for the Independent Model) and an implementation

component located within a department of state and/or local government (as

for the Governmental Model). Under this model elections are organized by

the governmental implementation component of the EMB, with some level

of oversight provided by the independent component of the EMB.

The powers, functions and strength of the independent component in

relation to the governmental component vary in different examples of this

model, and the classification of a particular EMB as a mixed model is

sometimes not very clear. In some cases, the independent component is little

more than a formalized observation operation, although this version is dying

out. In other cases, the independent component has a role to supervise and

verify the implementation of electoral events by the governmental

component, and sometimes also to tabulate and transmit results. In some

other cases, a Constitutional Council is established to engage in the

processes of tabulation and declaration of results and can be considered as

43

an independent component of the EMB. In few countries, (especially where

an independent EMB exists) the Independent National Election Commission

and the Constitutional Council undertake their own tabulation of results: the

EMB may therefore be said to have three components, one which is

governmental and two which are independent.

The relationship between the components of a mixed model EMB is not

always clearly defined in legislation or interpreted by stakeholders, and

friction can result. Its effectiveness is therefore usually heavily disputed.

In determining whether a permanent or temporary EMB is appropriate,

electoral workloads throughout the electoral cycle need to be considered and

compared to the expense of maintaining a permanent institution versus the

expenses and time required to establish a new body for each election. In

situations where electoral events are regularly occurring – such as regular

partial or by-elections and continuous voter registration – or there are needs

for continuing electoral development work, such as on-going voter

education, or advocacy of electoral law reforms, a permanent electoral

institution is justifiable.

Some countries have EMBs which exist during the election period only.

Such EMBs may follow the Independent, Governmental, or Mixed Models.

In some cases, the Governmental Model EMB needs to be temporary,

because the public servants who run elections have other full-time duties

and are redeployed to the EMB during election periods only. However,

some countries with a Governmental Model EMB, maintain a small skeleton

staff to take care of electoral issues between elections, including updating

the electoral register. In some Mixed Model EMBs, the governmental

44

component is permanent to preserve institutional memory, while the

Independent Model component is temporary during election periods.

Some countries whose EMBs follow the Independent Model have

permanent central EMBs which coexist with temporary subordinate EMBs

at the district or local levels; depending on their responsibilities and on the

logistics required, the latter structures are appointed anywhere from two to

six months before elections.

There are many phases to the electoral process: in an election, for example,

these include the design and drafting of legislation, the recruitment and

training of electoral staff, electoral planning, voter registration, the

registration of political parties, the nomination of parties and candidates, the

electoral campaign, polling, counting, the tabulation of results, the

declaration of results, the resolution of electoral disputes, reporting, auditing

and archiving. After the end of one electoral process, it is desirable for work

on the next to begin: the whole process can be described as the electoral

cycle.

The nature of the EMB, in terms of power concentration or devolution,

depends very much on the system of government in the country and will

usually be defined in the electoral law. The legal framework may

distinguish between powers and functions given to a central or national

EMB and those given to regional or lower-level EMBs. Such vertical

divisions of powers and functions may be between different branch levels of

the one national EMB, between a national EMB and separate provincial

EMBs, or between national and local EMBs.

45

It is common in a unitary system to have one central EMB that is

responsible for all elections but with subordinate offices at both provincial

and local levels. Countries whose laws define separate, hierarchically

accountable EMBs at national, regional, administrative district, and even

village level often assign devolved or different powers and responsibilities

to each level. Electoral legal frameworks that are modeled on central EMBs

devolving responsibilities for implementing some electoral functions are in

place in many countries.

Countries with Governmental or Mixed Model EMBs may rely on local

authorities to conduct all or part of electoral activities. Devolving electoral

powers and responsibilities to local authorities without appropriate oversight

may make it more difficult to maintain electoral consistency, service,

quality, and ultimately the freedom and fairness of elections.

Decentralized EMB structures can ensure continuity in the EMBs work,

especially where the EMB has responsibility for recurring tasks such as

continuous voter registration. Decentralized EMBs, even if only temporary

at lower levels, can enhance inclusiveness and transparency in electoral

management.

The sustainability and relative costs of permanent over temporary EMBs at

regional and/or lower levels needs to be considered, as well as the

advantages.

In federal countries, separate EMBs may exist at the national level and in

each state/province, often operating under different legal frameworks and

possibly implementing different electoral systems. Both the national-level

and provincial-level EMBs may each have separate devolved structures. The

nature of the relationship between such EMBs and the powers and

46

responsibilities of each EMB depend on the provisions of the law. The

prevalence of diverse forms of federalism is responsible for the variety of

approaches to the relationship between national and local EMBs in federal

states.

In Australia and Canada, the national EMB is responsible for national

(federal) elections, while provincial EMBs are responsible for provincial

and local elections. In Brazil, the state EMBs are generally responsible for

running all elections, with the national EMB involved in the tabulation and

declaration of the results for national offices. In India, the national EMB

exercises overall superintendence, control and direction over state elections.

The conduct of these elections is the direct responsibility of the state chief

electoral officer, a senior civil servant appointed by the national EMB. In

Nigeria, the national EMB assumes responsibility for federal and state

elections while the provincial EMBs are only responsible for local elections.

In the Russian Federation a central EMB at the national level is responsible

for all federal elections; regional EMBs are responsible for elections in the

89 regions that make up the federation; and lower-level EMBs are

responsible to the central EMB for federal elections and to the regional

EMB for republic, regional and local elections. In Switzerland a national

EMB is responsible for policy coordination, while local authorities manage

elections. In the US, states have constitutional jurisdiction and responsibility

over the conduct of all (local, state and federal) elections. However,

recently, legislations have resulted in the emergence of federal election

bodies but whose functions are strictly limited to policy formulation only on

federal (or general) elections).

While there are often rivalries between EMBs at national and provincial

levels in federal systems, there are examples of cooperation. For example, in

47

Australia, state electoral laws specifically provide that the electoral registers

for provincial and local elections are to be jointly maintained with the

national EMB, rather than the provinces also maintaining their own

registers. Such coordination in electoral laws has significant cost-savings

benefits.

Finally, scholars are unanimous on the fact that no single model of election

administration and/or EMB can be applied in all countries. They agree that

the prevailing political social, cultural, economic and legal environment

determines to a large extent the model to be adopted by each country.

Nonetheless, they set common standards which a workable electoral

administration and/or EMB must meet. The ACE Electoral Knowledge

Network (www.aceproject.org) refers to this as "The Guiding Principles of

Electoral Management." Fundamentals of these principles are:

independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, and service

orientation. These principles form the basis of electoral administration and

are essential to ensure both the appearance and the actual integrity of the

electoral process. The principles are not developed in a vacuum; instead

they have emerged in the context of international electoral standards and

norms and are guided by national legal frameworks and good practices

based on country-specific and global innovations. The guiding principles

should be considered the ethical framework for conducting elections and for

the operations of EMBs. These principles are a guide for meeting the needs

of the management of elections.

In sum, the wealth of literature reviewed so far: from W. J. M. Mackenzie,

Remi Anifowose, Adele Jinadu, Charles Lasham, to the ACE Electoral

Knowledge Network, provides, at a glance, dynamic facts on the evolution

of the concept of election as well as the operation and administration of the

48

electoral process across civilizations (from ancient to contemporary times)

and nationalities. While we admit that each author has been constrained by

the targeted period and place of their studies, we argue that this research

provide an uncommon platform for the synthesization of these vast

literatures; with each succeeding literature complementing and/or extending

on the scope of the previous; thereby providing a more comprehensive

knowledge on the subject.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To determine the rationale for as well as the efficacy and credibility of

centralized and decentralized election systems conducted in federal states,

it is important to establish the relationship between the idea of federalism

and the structure and organization of governmental institutions. Our point

of departure is hinged on the assumption that the adoption of federalism is

premised on the need to structure and organize political power in the society

using such social institutions as government. The structuring of power

could be differentiated according to certain existing or established

geographical levels of social group, while the organization of same is done

through the creation and sustenance of relevant governmental institutions

whose responsibility is to use power to guarantee the preservation and

continuity of society.

For the purpose of clarity, the attention of this study is directed towards the

processes of creating and sustaining the institutions of government through

the electoral process. We only seek to examine certain political and

administrative factors (the federal process of centralization and

decentralization) which impose considerable influence on the electoral

process. Accordingly, in view of the significance of the concept of

49

federalism to our analysis, it will be pertinent to begin with its proper

conceptualization.

Scholars are skeptical about giving the definition of federalism because it is

difficult to achieve a universally accepted definition. The word federalism

is so loose that it fits virtually all forms of government even those

considered as unitary systems. For instance, it finds a common tie in South

American federations such as Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela with those

of North America such as USA and Canada or Europe such as Germany,

Russia and former Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, former Yugoslavia, and

also in Asia such as India and Malaysia and in Africa such as Nigeria and

Tanzania. (Wikipedia Encyclopedia, 2009)

The nature of federalism is a form of government designed to get the best of

two worlds: the advantages of a unified state and the benefits of the

diversity which is inherent in the peoples and the regions which make up the

state. (Johnson, 1998 cited in http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-

2005/Verrelli.pdf.) Is it sufficed to say that federalism is one way to solve

the problem of enlarging government? (Riker, 2009 cited in

http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Verrelli.pdf.) Or, that it is the division

of jurisdiction and authority between at least two levels of government?

(Jackson and Jackson, Where cited in http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-

2005/Verrelli.pdf.) Or, as Lazar and Watts point out, federalism is the

combination of self-rule and shared rule? (http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-

2005/Verrelli.pdf.)

We need to acknowledge that federalism, as a theory, goes beyond the

simple division of legislative powers or arrangement of institutions. That is,

in our understanding of federalism, we need to take into consideration the

50

ideas of other theorists, who incorporate the socio-political element into

their conceptualization of federalism.

Denis de Regiment argues that federalism is ‗essentially an attitude, which

comprises four basic principles: diversity, interdependence, responsibility

and efficiency‘. (http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Verrelli.pdf.)

Burgess and Gagnon point out that federalism is the accommodation of

human associations in which unity and diversity are balanced and

maintained. (http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Verrelli.pdf.) For

Stevenson, federalism protects minorities. LaForest argues that federalism is

a form of partnership and friendship. Tully, also contributing to the

discussion, points out that federalism is an expression of democratic

practices, which encourages autonomy within regions. According to

Robinson and Simeon, ‗federalism is about the co-existence of multiple

loyalties and identities and about shared and divided authority‘. Finally,

Covell points out that federalism manage and deals with conflict. Others,

however, would argue that it produces conflict, as it enables the growth and

empowerment of regional identities. (http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-

2005/Verrelli.pdf.)

Upon this quick rendition of these definitions of federalism, the question

that begs to be asked is, do these definitions capture the true essence of

federalism?

The simple answer is no. It would be obvious to any student of federalism

that these definitions are too simplistic and vague in form, to offer any

concise or concrete understanding of federalism, either as a theory, an

ideology, or a form of government. As such, a deeper look at federalism, as

a value concept, is needed.

51

In a federation, a particular theory, or theories of federalism underpin its

constitutional politics. According to Kindle Amoco (in Tuned Abatable et

al, 1998) ostensibly, one‘s conceptualization of federalism almost always

informs his/her constitutional position. Similarly, one‘s constitutional

position is a strong indication of his/her conception of federalism. That is,

the way in which one, an individual, a government, or an institution,

conceptualizes federalism and subsequently federation, has an impact on

constitutional politics in that one‘s position on federalism translates into a

constitutional position. For this reason, understanding the various

conceptualization and types of federalism and federation becomes important

in understanding constitutionalism.

Despite this seemingly simple task, federalism, what it is and how it ought

to operate vis-à-vis constitutional politics is a highly contested and

convoluted concept. For years theorists have tried in vain to come to grips

with an all-encompassing meaning of federalism. Though this Endeavour

has proven fruitless, there is a consensus amongst academics that

federalism is a political system in which there are at least two levels of

government, where responsibilities, powers and jurisdiction are outlined,

divided, and entrenched in a constitution. Furthermore, there is a ‗set of

ideas‘ and prioritization of federal principles underpinning federal

institutions; however, these sets of ideas and accentuation of principles vary

from academic to academic. Scholars differ on how power ought to be

shared, the degree of autonomy to be allocated to the regional/constituent

units, the degree of centralization and decentralization and finally, why

country chooses a federal form of governance over other forms.

We need not dwell too extensively on why countries prefer one type of

federation over others. As we know, multiplicity of factors: historical,

52

economic, political, social and geographical among several others may be

responsible. Rather, in line with the intent of this study, we shift attention to

examining issues arising from the centralization/decentralization dichotomy

in the discussion of federalism.

Many authors have noted the large and growing trend across the world

towards decentralization. Campbell (2001), Manor (1997), Piriou-Sall

(1998), Smoke (2001), World Bank (1994), and UNDP (1993), to name just

a few, document the efforts of literally scores of countries in Africa, Asia

and Latin America to devolve power and resources to lower tiers of

government and/or deconcentrate their administrations in various ways.

Enthusiasm is predicated on claims that decentralization can make

government more responsive to citizens‘ needs by ―tailoring levels of

consumption to the preferences of smaller, more homogeneous groups‖

(Wallis and Oates 1988, 5); by ―bringing government closer to the

governed‖, decentralization should make government work better (Ostrom

et al. 1993, Putnam 1993). The existence of such a broad, international

fashion for potentially far-reaching reform begs two obvious questions: (i)

Is there empirical evidence that decentralization works? and (ii) Why is

there so much centralization in the first place?

Curiously, the answer to the first question appears to be "no". The vast

majority of scholarly studies on decentralization‘s effects have yielded

ambiguous results: in country after country, decentralization improved some

aspects of public services, worsened others, and left the remainder largely

unchanged. Rondinelli, et al. (1983) conducts an exhaustive review of three

decades worth of decentralization studies. More recently, Smoke and Piriou-

Sall provide updating surveys of the literature, with quite similar

conclusions. Theoretical claims based on inductive reasoning from

53

particular instances (i.e. cities, regions) of success are not supported across

larger samples – often from the same countries. Such evidence is not

encouraging, and does not support reformers‘ continuing efforts. Hence we

re-frame our question: Why does a reform with such strong arguments in its

favor so rarely succeed?

Firstly, Manor (1999) states that ―over 80 percent of developing and

transition countries… are experimenting with decentralization.‖

Secondly, in order for so many countries to be experimenting with

decentralization – quite apart from the wisdom of doing so – they must have

first developed relatively centralized governmental-administrative

structures. Why did this happen? Until quite recently economic theory

provided few answers to this question, and other disciplines have taken the

lead. Historical analysis has emphasized the role of nationalism and the

construction of the nation-state. In a context of overt national competition,

such as Europe since the Renaissance, there were clear advantages to

countries that could articulate a distinct identity and project military power

beyond their borders. Centralizing power and resources aided governments

in the achievement of both goals. Social, cultural and religious trends

contributed to making the state seem the natural and best form of civic

society, hence facilitating the growth of its powers, Kennedy (1988) admits.

But it was the military, economic and organizational demands of war that

really drove this process.

To this, Horsham (1987) adds social and ideological reasons natural to the

late-nineteenth century. Worried by socialist agitation and outbreaks of civil

unrest, political elites first in Germany, and then Austria, Britain and

France enacted broad programs of social reform and welfare which

54

undercut support for radical politics, but also undermined liberal notions of

limited government, private enterprise and self-help. Once these boundaries

were crossed, the state embarked on a path of steady expansion. Lastly, the

intellectual currents of the 19th and 20th centuries also played a role. For

different reasons and in different ways, real socialism, social democracy,

developmentally, import substitution, and even structural adjustment led to

increasingly powerful central states that intervened at all levels of the

economy and society.

Such theories provide historically rich explanations of how centralization

arose in particular groups of countries, especially in Western Europe. But

they are too particularistic and path-dependent to provide a general

explanation of centralization across the globe. As indicated above, highly

centralized states arose across six continents and four centuries, in countries

rich and poor, industrial and agrarian, tropical and temperate alike.

Explaining so broad a phenomenon would seem to require a simple,

incentives-based theory.

The 21 centuries that separate Plato‘s Republic from Rousseau‘s Social

Contract saw little discussion of issues of (de)centralization by political

theorists. Summarizing heroically, this is because the idea of democracy

changed little throughout Platonic, Medieval and Renaissance times, and

featuring assemblies of free men who represented themselves directly.

Democracy was fit for city-states whose populations numbered in the tens of

thousands, not millions. Larger populations and expanses of territories

required monarchical rule (Rousseau 1968 [1762]). As decentralizing

political authority was unnecessary in a city-state, and nonsensical in a

monarchy, the question of decentralization did not arise.

55

The transformation of the democratic ideal from city-state to federal

democracy, where the many are represented in a legislature by the few,

allowed new conceptions of individual rights and freedoms to flourish (Dahl

1989). Larger nations could internalize large problems that eluded city-

states, and the capacity of citizens to govern themselves was significantly

enhanced. Centralization vs. decentralization of power was now relevant.

Hence Hegel‘s (1967 [1821]) treatment of scale, arguing that bigger states

would have more impartial civil servants more concerned with the public

good, as authority became impersonal and the social ties and passions that

distort public decision-making in smaller realms were diluted.

But it was political theorists concerned with the new United States that

treated the question in greatest depth. Indeed in the Federalist Papers, the

classic statement of American political thought, Madison, Hamilton and Jay

sought to discredit the loose union between the states under the Articles of

Confederation, with its feeble executive and weak federal powers, in favor

of the new Constitution. The Federalists sought a stronger, more centralized

national government, arguing that this would decrease the risk of war, both

external and internal, and improve defenses against a hostile world; boost

commerce and the national economy; improve the ability of government to

finance itself; decrease the ―explanations and compensations‖ that powerful

foreign powers might be able to extract; and – like Hegel – improve the

quality of political leaders.

Such arguments notwithstanding, theirs was not a fundamentally

centralizing project, but rather an attempt to re-balance the distribution of

powers in the young nation towards a less extreme, but still highly

decentralized federation of states. Indeed, the Federalists dismissed the

threat of centralization in the US with something akin to scorn. This view

56

proved prescient, as Tocqueville (1967 [1835, 1840]) chronicled four

decades later, describing an American system of government that was far

more decentralized than any in Europe. Indeed, as late as the early twentieth

century the federal government‘s responsibilities were limited to managing

the currency, limited taxes, tariffs and bond emissions, and partial

regulation of interstate carriers (Carleton 1960), with other functions the

preserve of the states.

Tocqueville admired this decentralization and decried its opposite as leading

to tyranny. But even in countries such as the US, he warned, power has a

natural tendency to grow more centralized over time, as individuals seek to

enlist the efforts of public authorities to their own benefit, so gradually

extending state authority over previously private affairs. Unlike Hegel and

the Federalists, here at last was a theory of centralization based not on

appeals to the good, but rather micro-level incentives of individuals and

policy-makers.

While the concept of federalism simply provides us with the directions of

how legislative and political powers are shared between two levels of

government and their governing institutions, by implication, the federal

views of power centralization and decentralization suggests that there are

both political and administrative consequences of expressing preference for

one over the other. First, we infer that the extremes of centralization and

decentralization are incongruent with the ideals of true federalism.

Subscription to either extreme will, according to Tocqueville, lead to

tyranny or a vulnerably weak federation respectively. Second, that even a

moderately centralized or decentralized federal system may, also according

to Tocqueville, by the natural growth of power, gradually evolve into a

more centralized system. Third, that the decentralization of federal powers

57

and functions to states, according to Jean-Paul Faguetdoes, does not

absolutely guarantee satisfactory delivery of public services or good

governance. Lastly, that sustenance of moderacy in the adoption of

centralization and decentralization in federal systems may, according to

Hegel and the Federalists, promote appreciable democratic development.

The realities of these variations in power sharing and their corresponding

consequences are manifested in the Nigerian and US experiences of

federalism and this is equally transmitted to the manner in which both

countries operate their electoral management bodies.

58

2.3 REFERENCES

ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Election

Management Bodies. www.aceproject.org

André B., Louis M. and Antoine Y. (2004); Establishing the Rules of the

Game: Election Laws in Democracies. University of Toronto Press.

Anifowose, R. (1970); "PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN NEW

STATES: A CASE STUDY OF THE OCTOBER 1965 ELECTIONS IN

WESTERN NIGERIA." (UNPUBLISHED THESIS) THE VICTORIA

UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER.

ARBOR, A.M., (1966); "COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND

DEMOCRATIC CONSENT: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE 1952

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS" (UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS

ARON, R., (24 MARCH 1966); THE PROSPECT OF DEMOCRACY.

THE LISTENER

ASTER, H., (1961); THE FUNCTION OF SOVIET LOCAL ELECTION.

MIDWEST JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Babawale T. et al., (1998); Re-Inventing Federalism in Nigeria; Issues and

Perspectives. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Lagos, Nigeria.

Campbell, T. 2001. The Quiet Revolution: The Rise of Political

Participation and Leading Cities with Decentralization in Latin America and

the Caribbean. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Dahl, R. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale.

Ellis A. and Legge A., (2004); Comparative Election Administration in the

Pacific. Port Vila, Vanuatu

Faguet JP., (2004); WHY SO MUCH CENTRALIZATION? A Model of

Primitive Centripetal Accumulation. The Suntory Centre, London School of

Economics and Political Science.

General definitions of federalism. http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-

2005/Verrelli.pdf.

59

GILISON, J., (1968); SOVIET ELECTIONS AS A MEASURE OF

DISSENT: THE MISSING ONE PER CENT. AMERICA POLITICAL

SCIENCE REVIEW VOL LXLL

Hegel, G.W.F. 1967 [1821]. Philosophy of Right. Trans. T.M. Knox. New

York: Oxford University Press.

HUNTINGTON, S. P., (April, 1965); W. E I D POLITICS VOL XLLL NO.

3.

Jinadu, L. A., (1997); Matters Arising: African Elections and the Problem of

Electoral Administration.

http//www.archive.lib.msu.edu/dmc/african%20Journals/.../ajps002001002.

pdf

Lasham, C., (2005); TRANSPARENCY AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE

ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION ON ELECTION DAY: THE

IMPORTANCE OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE ELECTIONS AND

THE ROLE OF THE ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATOR. Report presented

at the UNIDEM SEMINAR on ―ORGANIZATION OF ELECTIONS BY

AN IMPARTIAL BODY‖, Belgrade, 24-25 June, 2005

www.venice.coe.int/docs/2005/CDL-UD (2005)005-e.pdf

MACKENZIE, W. J. M. (1972); THE FUNCTION OF ELECTIONS.

INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE VOL

V & VI (ED) DAVID L. SILL

MACKENZIE, W. J. N. (1958); FREE ELECTIONS. LONDON.

Madison, J., A. Hamilton and J. Jay. 1961. The Federalist Papers. New

York: New American Library.

Manor, J. 1997. Lecture given at ―Technical Consultation on

Decentralization for Rural Development.‖ Rome, 16-18 December 1997.

Manor, J. 1999. ―Relative Capture of Local and Central Governments: An

Essay in the Political Economy of Decentralization.‖ Berkeley: Manuscript.

60

MOTE, M. E., (1965); SOVIET LOCAL AND REPUBLIC ELECTION.

HOWEVER INSTITUTE NO 10

Ostrom, E., L. Schroeder and S. Wynne. 1993. Institutional Incentives and

Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective. Boulder:

Westview Press.

Piriou-Sall, S. 1998. ―Decentralization and Rural Development: A Review

of Evidence.‖ Washington, DC: Manuscript.

Putnam, R. D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern

Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

RANDY, A., (1973); THE GOVERNING OF MEN 4T" EDITION,

HINSDALE; THE DRYAD

PRESS

RENNEY, A., (ED) (1962); ESSAYS ON THE BEHAVIORAL STUDY

OF POLITICS: ELECTIONS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN POLAND.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS, URBANE.

Rondinelli, D. A., G. S. Cheema and J. Nellis. 1983. ―Decentralization in

Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience.‖ World Bank Staff

Working Paper No. 581. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Rousseau, J.J. 1968 [1762]. The Social Contract. Trans. M. Cranston. New

York: Penguin Books.

Smoke, P., 2001. ―Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: A

Review of Current Concepts and Practice.‖ Democracy, Governance and

Human Rights Programmed Paper No. 2. Geneva: UNRISD.

The League of Women Voters of California, (2000); Election Systems.

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINES (APRIL 6 1959); WHY THE

RUSSIANS BOTHER WITH ELECTIONS.

Tocqueville, A. de. 1994 [1835, 1840]. Democracy in America. P. Bradley

(ed.). Trans. H. Reeve. London: Everyman‘s Library.

61

United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 1993. Informed Sobre

Desarrollo Humano 1993. Madrid: CIDEAL.

Wallis, J. J. and W. E. Oates. 1988. ―Decentralization in the Public Sector:

An Empirical Study of State and Local Government.‖ In H.S. Rosen (ed).

Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press.

World Bank. 1994. World Development Report: Infrastructure for

Development. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia (2009), Federalism. www.wikipedia.org

YOUNG, O., (1968); SYSTEM OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. PRENTICE

HALL"

62

CHAPTER THREE

DESCRIPTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL

FRAMEWORKS OF THE NIGERIAN AND US

ELECTORAL PROCESSES

3.1 THE NIGERIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS

Nigeria operates a highly centralized electoral process with virtually all

elections (except for local elections) centrally managed by one single body;

the Independent National Electoral commission (INEC). The organization

and structures of INEC provides the sole platform for the conduct of general

elections in Nigeria. Elections which fall under this term include:

presidential election, national assembly elections, state governorship

elections and the state assemblies elections respectively. (Electoral Act,

2006) and (Constitution of Nigeria, 1999)

Within the one decade of its existence, the legal framework establishing and

guiding the operations of INEC and the electoral process in Nigeria has

witnessed frequent alterations at rather close intervals. The INEC was

established by the Independent National Electoral Commission Decree No

17 of 1998. The decree was amended by Decree No. 33 of the same year.

The INEC decree was complemented by an Electoral Act of 2002 while the

INEC Decree was replaced by an INEC Act of 2004. In 2006, the INEC

Act of 2004 and the Electoral Act of 2002 were harmonized in to the new

(and currently operational) Electoral Act of 2006. (www.INECnigeria.org)

At the moment, while the INEC is making frantic efforts to reform its

administrative and management procedures, (Morris Iowa, 2009) the

Maraud led government has submitted seven bills to the national assembly

on proposed amendments to the 1999 constitution as well as the Electoral

Act of 2006 with a view to reform the Nigerian electoral process.

63

Section 153 and the third schedule (part I) of the 1999 constitution as well

as part (I) of the 2006 Electoral Act explicitly provides for the

establishment, composition, powers and functions of INEC.

The laws vests the powers of appointment and removal of INEC members

including:

1. The chairman, who is the chief executive officer and chief electoral

officer of INEC;

2. twelve commissioners (two each from the six geopolitical zones);

and,

3. thirty-seven Resident Electoral Commissioners (REC) (one each for

the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory)

in the executive through the president but with confirmation by the

senate. However, proposals for the reversal of this provision are

being included in the electoral reform bills.

Although the 2006 Electoral Act (unlike previous electoral laws) provides

for an INEC Fund, the budget for this fund is integrated with the annual

executive budget. However, the quest to obtain financial independence for

INEC is currently being incorporated in the proposals for electoral reforms.

Administratively, both the 1999 constitution and the 2006 Electoral Act

simply provides for the existence of state INEC offices headed by the

Resident Electoral Commissioner as well as a local government office

headed by an Electoral Officer respectively. The laws specify that the

functions and powers of the state and local government offices of INEC are

to be solely determined by the commission.

64

Meanwhile, by way of interpretation, sections under parts (ii & iii) of the

2006 Electoral Act imply that the actual task of conducting voters

registration, updating voters register, conducting voting activities on

election day, counting, collation, tabulation and in some cases return of

election results are functions vested in both the state resident electoral

commissioner and the local electoral officer respectively. In fact Prof.

Moris Iwu (2009) pointed out that the Commission is not empowered to

over-rule or reject an election result returned by a state resident electoral

commissioner and that such result can only be voided by an election tribunal

or any court of competent jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, it is clear from the available laws that all administrative

powers and control of over all general elections are vested in the INEC. The

administration of all financial, material and human resources of the INEC at

federal, state and local government levels are centrally controlled. The

procurement and distribution of election materials such as voter‘s

registration materials, ballot boxes and papers, forms and documents as well

as other logistics used in the conduct of elections are all managed centrally

by the commission.

The state and local offices of INEC operate within the bureaucratic

structures of the commission. They do not have any administrative powers

and functions except those delegated to them by the commission. Although

the 2006 Electoral Act assigns the tasks of conducting core electoral events

like voters registration and voting activities to the state and local offices of

the INEC, the powers to acquire and disburse administrative logistics

required to perform those tasks are reserved by the commission.

65

Basically, Nigeria may be classified as operating the independent model of

EMB in view of the fact that the 1999 constitution and the 2006 Electoral

Act asserts the independence of the INEC; stating that no authorities shall

interfere in its activities except through a court of competent jurisdiction.

This is because the INEC is not constitutionally and/or administratively

placed under the supervision and/or control of any executive department.

However, some analysts argue that "the constitutional role of the executive

in the appointment and removal of members of the commission as well as

the integration of the commission's budget into that of the executive and not

as a first-line or direct charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the

Federation largely erodes its independence status." (Jinadu, 1997) this, in

essence, may tilt the Nigerian EMB towards the mixed model.

In sum, the Nigerian electoral process is one which is managed by a single,

fairly independent EMB, the Independent National Electoral Commission

(INEC). By implication, the INEC, through the relevant enabling laws,

currently operates under the political and financial control of the executive.

The INEC itself operates a centralized administrative structure with very

limited administrative powers delegated to offices in all states and local

governments in the country.

It is hypothesized here that the current status and structure of the INEC and

the electoral process especially with particular regard to general elections

influences the credibility of the process and outcome of the elections as

conducted between 1999 and 2007. The realities of these implications will

be discussed in chapter four.

66

3.2 THE US ELECTORAL PROCESS

The US has no national or central EMB that regulates, monitors, administers

and organizes general elections either as an independent body or

governmental entity (IDEA 2006:9). Instead, the country has two federal

agencies: the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) and the Elections

Assistance Commission (EAC) both of which are involved in peripheral

aspects of elections such as party finance regulation and information

dissemination. They are not involved in the core of electoral administration.

Rather, the US employs 13,000 localities and jurisdictions, which range

widely in effectiveness and capacity, to manage elections. In the 2000

elections, 100 million people voted in 200,000 polling districts. 1.4 million

Election workers were required (the majority with little training) to run the

elections, supervised by 20,000 election administrators (IDEA 2006:275).

Variations in professionalism were almost inevitable.

The three main features of US general election administration are a radical

degree of decentralization, the partisanship of election officials, and its

largely privatized nature; due to the privatization of the production and

procurement of machinery of elections – the voting systems and equipment

used to complete and tabulate ballots – is driven by private contractors, who

exercise considerable influence over the types of equipment available.

(Mayer, 2007)

Going by the nature of the US federal system, issues of election fall strictly

within the exclusive list of state governments. This means that all elections

including general elections are actually conducted by states and local

governments over 10,000 different jurisdictions. (Mayer, 2007) the

country's constitution does not provide for a central EMB to administer

general elections. However, Article One and Article Two and various

67

amendments to the constitution defines (to a basic extent) how federal

elections are held; particularly with respect to the composition and conduct

of the electoral college per state. (www.wikipedia.org)

Due to the absence of specific constitutional interest in the administration of

elections, the policy and legislative involvement and influences of the

federal government in the conduct of general elections had been peripheral.

(Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes 2002, 223) In addition, federal legislative

interventions have been persuasive instruments; requiring "the carrot of

federal funding" (Mayer, 2007) to induce compliance among states which

possess the primary jurisdiction to administer general elections.

Prominent federal legislative attempts to reform the conduct of general

elections resulted in the establishment of the Federal Elections Commission

(FEC) in 1975 through an amendment to the Federal Election Campaign

Act. (www.wikipedia.org)

The role of the FEC remained peripheral as it is not involved in the

administration and/or conduct of general elections. It merely has the

responsibility to regulate issues on campaign finance specifically during

presidential elections. The FEC is to disclose campaign finance information,

to enforce the provisions of the law such as the limits and prohibitions on

contributions, and to oversee the public funding of US presidential

elections. (www.wikipedia.org)

In 1993, The National Voter Registration Act (the "Motor Voter" law) was

passed. It required state governments that receive certain types of federal

funding to make the voter registration process easier by providing uniform

registration services through drivers' license registration centers, disability

68

centers, schools, libraries, and mail-in registration. States with same-day

registration are exempt from Motor Voter; namely: Idaho, Minnesota, New

Hampshire, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. (www.wikipedia.org)

The object of the Motor Voter law was to make registering easier by

attempting to decentralize the process of voter registration in states which

hitherto traditionally, required voters to register at state offices to vote.

Ultimately, this law was intended to address the persistent low voter turn out

during elections in the US.

The most recent prominent federal legislative intervention in the

administration of general elections was the Help America Vote Act

(HAVA) 2002 enacted with a view to addressing the obvious administrative

lapses which bedeviled the 2000 presidential elections. (Shambone,

Leonard, and Keith Abouchar, 2006) The HAVA, Instead of mandating

specific voting systems or procedures, set standards for voting systems used

in federal elections, and used the carrot of federal funding to induce states

to implement a series of reforms. These included a set of grants to

modernize voting equipment and replace punch card systems, create

statewide voter registration lists, make polling places accessible to the

disabled, train poll workers, and improve voter education programs.

(Shambone, Leonard, and Keith Abouchar, 2006)

The HAVA also established a second federal EMB, (besides the Federal

Elections Commission FEC) the Election Assistance Commission (EAC).

The EAC, just as the FEC does not conduct or administer general elections.

Also, it does not have any administrative or political control over state

EMBs in the conduct of general elections. Rather, it is expirational, offering

69

guidelines and suggestions; it has no authority to issue binding regulations.

(Mayer, 2007)

The HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission as a ―national

clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and review

of procedures with respect to the administration of Federal elections‖

(section 202), and a system of disseminating voluntary guidelines and best

practices to states. The standards for voting mandate the ability to vote in

private verify and correct ballots, and the use of systems that produce audit

trails (although there was no requirement for an actual physical record of

each vote, as produced with Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail systems).

In practice, the most noticeable effect of HAVA, at least to voters, was the

widespread adoption of electronic voting systems (including DREs and

optically scanned ballots). The percentage of registered voters in

jurisdictions with DREs jumped from 12 % in 2000 to 38% in 2006; the

percentage of voters using scanned ballots increased from 30% to 49% over

the same period (Mayer, K. R., 2007)

State law regulates most aspects of electoral law, including primaries, the

eligibility of voters (beyond the basic constitutional definition), the running

of each state's Electoral College, and the running of state and local elections.

Basically, the powers to manage and administer all election logistics for US

general elections resides in the states with significant administrative

involvement of local government authorities. In fact, state EMBs

deconcentrates substantial aspects of their administrative powers to local

EMBs; covering such areas as registering voters, designing ballots,

purchasing voting machines and training polling officials. (Guess and

Gueorguieva, 2009)

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Despite recent federal legislative interventions targeted at promoting

uniformity of electoral administration across the country, states still

maintain a visible degree of diversity in the composition and operation of

their EMBs. Even within the same state, obvious variations exist between

local EMBs and their methods of electoral administration. (Mayer, 2007)

Similarly, the nature and scope of logistic requirements (in terms of

personnel, voter registration and voting materials and the requisite electoral

technology) for general elections vary from state to state. The organization

of electoral administrative bureaucracies with particular reference to

relationships between the administrative structures of states and counties in

such areas as: personnel; procurements, disbursements and distribution of

electoral materials; decision-making powers on validation and invalidation

of voters registers and votes/ballots as well as return/declaration of election

results also vary from one state to the other. Accordingly, Guess and

Gueorguieva, (2009) acknowledge that "instead of a single election for

president, 13,000 counties and local governments conduct elections with

different standards, ballots and machines."

This radical degree of decentralization and disuniformity is also reflected in

the composition of most state and local EMBs which is mostly guided by

partisan considerations. (Mayer, 2007) In most states and counties, the

official (or officials) who administer the election process belongs to one of

the major political parties. Even states with a formally neutral administrative

structure, like Wisconsin, (Mayer, 2007) typically have a bipartisan board

with overall responsibility.

According to a survey prepared by Daniel Tokaji, (2009) "33 states have a

chief election official who is elected through a partisan election process.

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Other states have an appointment process but, in many of those states, the

chief election official is appointed by the state‘s governor (who is of course

elected through a partisan process). At the local level, about two-thirds of

jurisdictions elect their election officials, and party-affiliated officials run

elections in almost half of local jurisdictions."

Tokaji cites David Kimball and Martha Kropf as having identified over

4500 local jurisdictions in the US, and reported the following selection

methods:

TABLE 3.2.1 Selection Method for Local Election Authority

Selection Method Share of

Jurisdictions

Voter Representation

Individual Elected by Voters 61% 45%

Elected Board of Elections 2% 1%

Appointed Board of Elections 22% 31%

Appointed Individual 15% 22%

Source, Daniel Tokaji, (2009)

About 46% of local election jurisdictions had party-affiliated election

authorities (20% Republican, 26% Democratic, and 0.1% other), while 14%

had bipartisan and 29% nonpartisan local election authorities. (Daniel

Tokaji, 2009)

The finances of general elections in the US are largely the responsibility of

both state and local authorities. (Guess and Gueorguieva, 2009) This often

goes side by side with federal funding used as incentives to stimulate

compliance by states to certain administrative and technological standards

set by FEC and EAC as well as any such legislations and/or policies such as

the HAVA. "The financial independence of both state and local EMBs are

72

not guaranteed because there are no first-line charge funds constitutionally

appropriated for the purpose of running the EMBs at all levels. (Guess and

Gueorguieva, 2009)

Another characteristic of the election administration process in the US is

that it is, in crucial respects, privatized. (Mayer, 2007) While state and local

authorities oversee and conduct the actual election, they do not create voting

equipment; instead, they typically contract with private companies, who

develop and produce the equipment used to cast and count ballots. There is

very limited administrative and technical control which EMBs can exercise

over these highly complex machines.

While the HAVA sets specific performance standards which such machines

must meet, states are also enacting laws and policies which attempt to

reduce the relationship between EMB officials and manufacturers of such

machines in order to reduce easy manipulation of the machines by the

former.

Accordingly, this high degree of radical decentralization and disuniformity

in the administration of the electoral process across the US (Mayer, 2007)

makes it a difficult task to homogenously describe the US model of

electoral management and administration beyond its decentralized and

disuniformed nature. Nonetheless, these characteristics of the US electoral

process have had tremendous effects on the conduct and outcome of

general elections since 2000. Fundamentals of these effects will be

discussed in the next chapter.

3.3 ELEMENTS OF COMPARISON

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3.3.1 NATURE AND INFLUENCE OF FEDERALISM

It is widely acknowledged that Nigeria and the US operate two different

varieties of federalism. Nigeria's federal system centralizes and concentrates

governmental powers at the centre; establishing relevant federal ministries,

departments and agencies (MDAs) to administer such powers and functions.

Also, the legislative jurisdiction of the federal government spread over

virtually all major sectors including the control of all natural resources, the

conduct of major elections except local elections among others. These

issues have remained the major sources of controversy threatening the

survival of the Nigerian federalism. In the US, the radically decentralized

nature of federalism in the country places more issues within the legislative

jurisdiction of the states. Such issues as resource control and conduct of

elections are exclusively under the jurisdiction of states.

3.3.2 NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF EMB

Accordingly, with regard to election administration and management,

Nigeria and the US both have central (national) electoral bodies. However,

while the Nigerian EMB has the sole responsibility to conduct all federal

and state elections; as well as manage all aspects of the electoral process

like political party and election campaign financing, party registration, voter

registration, voter and civic education etc, the national EMB in the US is

more involved in the regulation of party finances and campaign funding in

general elections than in the actual conduct of elections. Its policy and

regulative influences cover only federal elections. States are solely

responsible for regulating most aspects of federal as well as state and local

elections. The federal EMB is simply an advisory body which uses financial

incentives to stimulate states adherence to its regulations.

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3.3.3 INDEPENDENCE OF EMB

The structure of electoral administration in Nigeria and the US provides for

the establishment of independent electoral bodies at the state and local

levels respectively. In both countries, electoral bodies at the state level are

completely independent of the national electoral bodies. However, in

Nigeria, at the state level there are two separate electoral bodies: one being

an administrative extension of the national body (headed by a Resident

Electoral Commissioner) and the other being an independent state electoral

body. While the former is tasked with conducting general elections as

directed by the national body, the state body, which is completely

independent of the national body, is charged with conducting local

elections. However, even the conduct of local elections by the state

electoral bodies is regulated by a national legislation, the electoral Act of

2006. The national EMB in Nigeria also has its administrative offices

extended to all local government councils which are directly supervised by

the Resident Electoral Commissioner. In the US, since there is no

centralized administrative body saddled with the conduct of general

elections, states simply establish independent EMBs with administrative

offices in the counties for the purpose of conducting all federal, state and

local elections.

3.3.4 APPOINTMENT OF EMB MEMBERS

The modes of appointment and removal of EMB members vary in both

countries. In Nigeria, the executive, at the federal and state levels, (with the

consent of the Senate; in the case of the national EMB, and the state house

of assembly; in the case of the state EMB) are saddled with this task. In the

US, no single method of appointment of EMB members prevails in view of

the diverse approaches adopted by different states in the constitution of their

75

EMBs. While some states provide that EMB members be elected; some

states allow the executive with the consent of the legislature to appoint

EMB members. Only few states make use of public servants as temporary

electoral officials.

3.3.5 PARTISAN ADMINISTRATION OF EMB

The toleration of partisan EMB membership also varies in both countries.

In Nigeria, this is not permitted by law. All EMB members are not expected

to be card-carrying members of any political party. They are not supposed

to express sympathy for any political party. However, in the US, most

states permit partisan EMB membership; with major political parties having

equal representation on the boards of EMBs.

3.3.6 FINANCING OF EMB

The notions of independence and permanence of EMBs are substantially

acknowledged and accepted in both countries. However, in Nigeria, the

independence of the EMBs at both federal and state levels is still

controversial in view of the significant level of financial and political

affiliation of EMBs with the executive. In the US, the controversy

surrounding the independence of EMBs manifests both in the significant

level of political party influences on the operations of EMBs, and, in the

virtual absence of financial independence.

Finally, it is clear from the above that there are more areas of divergence

than convergence between the Nigerian and US electoral administration

processes. The fundamental point is that while Nigeria show evidences of a

centralized system, the US serves the case of a highly decentralized system.

Nonetheless, the experiences of the two countries provide two prominent

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alternatives or dimensions of electoral administration and management

which inherently possess significant short-comings. These short-comings

have posed substantial challenges to the conduct of credible general

elections in both countries since 1999 and 2000 in Nigeria and the US

respectively. In what follows, we identify some of these short-comings and

the corresponding challenges they create for the administration and

management of credible elections.

3.4 REFERENCES

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, (1999); Times Press

Limited, Lagos.

Electoral Act, (2006);

www.afrilegstudies.com/calsreview/PDF/ELECTORAL_ACTreal.pdf

Iwu, M.M. (2009): THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND THE

IMPERATIVES OF ELECTORAL REFORM IN NIGERIA.

WWW.INECNIGERIA.ORG

Iwu, M.M. (2009): UNBUNDLING OF INEC UNNECESSARY.

WWW.INECNIGERIA.ORG

Jinadu, L.A., (1997); Matters Arising: African Elections and the Problem of

Electoral Administration.

archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/.../ajps002001002.pdf

Leonard, S. and Abouchar. K., (2006); Trapped by Precincts? The Help

American Vote Act‘s Provisional Ballots and the Problem of Precincts. New

York University Journal of Legislation and Social Policy.

Mayer, K. R., (2007); Comparative Election Administration: Can We Learn

Anything From the Australian Electoral Commission? Department of

Political Science University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Samuel, I., et al., 2002. The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the

Political Process. New York: Foundation Press.

77

Wikipedia, The Free encyclopedia, (2009); Elections in the US.

www.wikipedia.org.

Wikipedia, The Free encyclopedia, (2009); The Constitution of the United

States of America. www.wikipedia.org.

78

CHAPTER FOUR

EFFECTS OF CENTRALIZATION AND

DECENTRALIZATION OF ELECTORAL

ADMINISTRATION ON PROCESS AND OUTCOME

CREDIBILITY OF GENERAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA

AND THE US

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Within the last decade, electioneering in Nigeria and the US has generated

so much controversy. Specifically, the credibility of the processes and

outcomes of general elections in both countries have attracted serious

criticisms; with analysts unanimously identifying the nature and structure of

managing national elections in both countries as the fundamental cause of

the process and outcome credibility crises.

As observed in the previous chapter, Nigeria operates a highly centralized,

politically and financially dependent structure of national electoral

administration. On the other hand, the US operates a radically decentralized

and largely politicized system of managing national elections. The models

of electoral administration adopted by the two countries are greatly

influenced by the nature and operation of their federal systems. The inherent

short-comings in the models of their electoral administration are broadly

constitutional and are often linked to the demerits associated with their

federal systems. These short-comings manifested in the crises generated

during and after general elections held in both countries since 1999 and

2000 respectively.

Jinadu, (1997) Adebayo, (2000) Ugoh, (2004) Mayer, (2007) Guess and

Gueorguieva (2009) and several other scholars have acknowledged the fact

that the crises of electoral administration have long threatened the conduct

79

of credible elections in both countries. However, the prominence and

significance gained by the electoral controversies of the last one decade in

both countries and the level of local and international attention given

suggests both the magnitude of the crises and the severity of their effects.

While acknowledging that it is usually difficult isolating the effects of

deficient electoral administration from those created by the general political

CRISES of democratization, we shall, in what follows attempt a case-by-

case analyses of the situation in both countries; identifying core issues on

the administration of national (general) elections; areas of deficiencies and

their effects.

Meanwhile, considering the elements of comparisons presented in the

previous chapter, we acknowledge the fact that centralization in Nigeria and

decentralization in the US may not necessarily generate the same

consequences. As such, in our analysis of their effects below, we identify

two broad problem areas created by the situation of electoral administration

in both countries. Within these broad areas, other micro problems are

highlighted.

In Nigeria, we identify the problems of political and financial control and

poor management of administrative logistics. In the US, the broad problems

are the disuniformed and dysfunctional character of electoral administration,

technology and finance, as well as the excessive partisan and private sector

influences.

4.2 THE EFFECTS OF CENTRALIZED ELECTORAL

ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA

The crises of Nigeria‘s centralized system of electoral administration begin

with its lack of political and financial independence. To this, analysts have

80

added the over-concentration of all electoral administrative powers and

functions in one central body, the absence of truly independent regional or

state electoral bodies and the poor management and administration of

election logistics.

Since Nigeria returned to democratic government in 1999, three general

elections (1999, 2003 and 2007) have been held. The processes of

conducting each of these general elections and their outcomes have suffered

from the negative effects of the four factors mentioned above.

4.2.1 POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL CONTROL

Since 1999, the leadership of Nigeria's EMBs (at federal and state levels)

has constantly blamed their poor performances on the over-baring political

influences of the executive over the electoral bodies and its obvious

financial dependence on the executive. (Guobadia, 2005), (Iwu, 2008) and

(Iwu, 2009 A & B) This view has been echoed by scholars, analysts and

stakeholders in the Nigerian electoral process. (Mobolaji Aluko, 2006)

Specifically, the lack of INEC independence has its roots in the legal

framework which established and operates the national election

management body. As shown in the previous chapter, the 1999 constitution

and the 2006 Electoral Act largely erodes the financial and political

independence of INEC; first, by placing the appointment and removal of

INEC members principally in the hands of the president, and, second, by

attaching the INEC funding to the budget prepared and managed by the

executive.

Before the 2003 and 2007 general elections, INEC severally complained of

late release of its funds by the executive. In its 2007 post-election analyses,

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INEC associated most of its logistics problems to the late release of funds.

(www.INECnigeria.org) Similarly, opposition parties, election observers

and political analysts have variously argued that the steady expansion in the

victories of the ruling party; PDP in the 2003 and 2007 general elections at

all levels of government is not unconnected with the sustained patronage it

receives from INEC members and officials; mostly in return for the latter's

material benefits or job security, and largely due to its financial dependence.

(www.tmgnigeria.org/images/an_election_programmed_to_fail.pdf) This,

according to the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), has called to question

the freeness and fairness, and, indeed, the credibility of both the process and

outcomes of general elections in Nigeria.

In 1999, a joint post-election report issued by the Carter Centre and the

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) indicted INEC

officials for collaborating with political parties to generally rig elections.

(www.cartercenter.org/documents/1152.pdf) Ugoh, (2004) while analyzing

the 2003 elections observed the apparent lack of popular confidence in

INEC due to its perceived partiality and sentiments in favor of the ruling

party as one of the major factors that promoted violence and other electoral

malpractices in that election. The 2007 elections did not fair any better as

the manipulations of Intec by the executive and the PDP was more visible.

The opposition and civil societies in Nigeria constantly accused the

executive of appointing party loyalists as Resident Electoral Commissioners

in the states. This, as argued by many, facilitated easy collaboration

between INEC officials and party (mostly PDP) agents in the perpetuation

of electoral malpractices during the last general elections.

(www.tmgnigeria.org/images/an_election_programmed_to_fail.pdf)

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The compromising of INEC's independence by the laws has created room

for easy political and financial manipulation of the commission for selfish

objectives especially by the ruling party. This has also created and justified

reasons for questioning the credibility of elections conducted by the

commission since 1999. Doubts over the impartial status of the commission

are also connected with its obvious lack of real independence. The current

legal framework within which INEC operates encourages the politicization

of electoral administration which according to Jinadu (1997) deliberately

creates administrative loop-holes through which malpractices are

perpetuated.

4.2.2 POOR MANAGEMENT OF ELECTION LOGISTICS

Poor management of electoral logistics is another core problem of electoral

administration in Nigeria. This is tied, first, according to opposition parties,

civil societies and election management analysts, to the over-centralized

structure of INEC's management and administrative systems, as well as the

lack of professionalism in and politicization of its staff and management;

and, second, according to INEC, to its lack of financial independence. To

these, analysts have also added the concentration of all aspects of electoral

administration in one single body as suggested in the report of the Justice

Uwais Election Reform Committee (ERC). It is also a common view

expressed by INEC and other stakeholders that the poor state of social and

economic infrastructure in the country poses strong challenges to the

effective and efficient administration of election logistics in a vast country

like Nigeria. Again, the roots of these factors lie within the legal framework

of the electoral process. (www.aceproject.org), (Jinadu, 1997), (Iwu, 2009

A, B and C) and (www.cartercenter.org)

83

Issues of election logistics deals with the timing of elections, procurement,

storage and distribution of election and voting materials, designation and

deployment of election and voting staff and officials, transportation and

communication systems, and, voting procedures including: voter

accreditation, ballot system, counting of ballots, tabulation of results and

declaration of winners. (www.aceproject.org)

The joint report of the Carter Center and NDI on the 1999 general elections;

Samuel Ugoh's critique of the 2003 general elections and the report of the

Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) on the 2007 general elections reveals

that the credibility of the last three general elections (1999, 2003 and 2007)

have been controversial due to the poor administration and management of

virtually all these aspects of election logistics.

In a review of relevant provisions of the 1999 constitution and the 2006

Electoral Act on the timing of general elections, Mobolaji Aluko (2006)

observes the inadequacy in the 30-60 day window stipulated in the

constitution before the May 29th hand-over date. Aluko argues that in the

case where a presidential election stretches into the maximum of three run-

offs as stipulated in the constitution, and where the main election and each

run-off is petitioned, the 30-60 day window will be inadequate. Aluko also

notes that the 30 day window within which elections should be filed, the

open-ended window period provided for the announcement of election

results and the hearing and determination of election petitions are

inconsistent even with the stipulated 30-60 day window before hand-over

date provided in the constitution.

Aluko's time analysis acknowledges the fact that the inadequacy and

inconsistency in the 30-60 day window with other probable events such as

84

petitions and run-offs throws up serious logistical challenges for INEC

considering cost, manpower and other aspects of logistics highlighted above

Vis avis the size and socio-economic conditions of Nigeria. Although no

run-offs have occurred since 1999, the closest test for INEC's logistical

capabilities occurred in 2007 when a late court decision cleared former vice

president, Atiku Abubaka to contest the presidential election and INEC

contended with the uphill task of reprinting and distributing over 60 million

ballot papers in less than a week to the Election Day. The short time which

INEC had to do this had serious implications for the credibility of the

elections as relevant information on some contestants and their parties were

missing on the ballot. This time constraints also caused serious stampede in

the distribution of voting materials which also had its negative

consequences on the conduct of the elections.

The centralization of electoral administration in Nigeria as provided in the

constitution and the electoral act has been linked to some of the logistical

challenges faced by INEC in the conduct of credible elections since 1999.

This is not a popular opinion with INEC itself; as the current chairman of

the commission has variously proposed for an even more centralized body;

with more control over the state Resident Electoral Commissioners and the

state offices of the commission. (Iwu, 2009 A) Antagonists of electoral

process centralization argue that the limited administrative powers granted

to state Resident Electoral Commissioners and INEC state and local offices

especially over issues of finance, staffing, procurement and distribution of

electoral and voting materials among others slows down decisions on

logistics management. This, according to them is responsible for late or

non-arrival of voting materials to polling stations on election days, late

commencement of voting or even outright postponement of elections. They

maintain that the huge budgets expended on general elections are as a result

85

of large expenditures on transportation and communication logistics. It is

also argued that the centralization of electoral administration is responsible

for the undue focus on, and blaming of the commission's head office in

Abuja of administrative failures of state and local INEC officials. This also

encouraged gross abdication of responsibilities by state and local INEC

officials and bulk-passing to the commission's head office even on matters

that required immediate local attention and solution.

Generally, INEC itself often admits its poor administration of election

logistics. However, the commission situates its predicament in its financial

dependence on the executive which often results in inadequate and late

release of funds to it by the government. (Iwu, 2008) But election observers

also accuse INEC of mismanaging appropriated funds; arguing that the

centralization of the commission's administration and its direct involvement

in virtually all aspects of the electoral process facilitates corruption and

makes accountability and transparency very difficult. (www.tmgnigeria.org)

similarly, cross examination of the views of selected senior INEC officials

in some states revealed that the funding of the state and local units of the

commission follows a similar pattern of irregular release of funds; some

times targeted at stimulating compliance to politically motivated interests.

These situations handicaps effective and efficient administration of election

logistics.

A cross examination of post-election reports issued by observers and

analysts since 1999 indicate a regular occurrence of logistical problems such

as use of obsolete and time-consuming methods of voter registration and

voting as well as ballot counting, result computation and communication;

late or non-arrival of election and voting materials; incomplete ballot paper

information; and, insufficient and poorly trained adhoc staff. From one

86

general election to the other, these logistical problems reoccurred with out

any noticeable signs of improvement in succeeding elections over the

previous ones; creating room for manipulations by desperate politicians.

(www.cartercenter.org) and (www.tmgnigeria.org)

According to reports, these logistical problems occurred in similar

dimensions during each of the three general elections from state to state;

causing similar problems ranging from inaccurate voters register, massive

disenfranchisement of qualified voters, time wasting and discouraging of

high voter turn-out, return of controversial election results, waste of human

and material resources both in the conduct of poor elections and in the

prosecution of numerous post-election litigations as well as conduct of bye-

elections or re-run elections. (www.cartercenter.org), (Ugoh, 2004) and

(www.tmgnigeria.org) These consequences arising from poor administration

of election logistics may have been significantly reduced if a reasonably

decentralized process of electoral administration exists; with state and local

election management units constitutionally empowered to administer

relevant aspects of election logistics that will prevent further occurrence of

the highlighted problems.

The state of socio-economic infrastructure in Nigeria and the country‘s

reasonably large size has posed serious challenges to a centralized system of

electoral administration. Evidently, the already discussed logistical

problems reappear. Since 1999, reports (though isolated) of road mishaps

involving election officials and other collaborative agencies (like the

military and the police) while distributing election and voting materials

across states; with the most recent being the plane crash involving some

military personnel conveying voting materials during the 2007 general

elections. (Iwu, 2009 C) These are all empirical cases which may have been

87

avoided in the case of a decentralized electoral administration. Similarly, the

delays or outright postponement of elections in some parts of the country, as

observed by the Transition Monitoring group during the 2003 and 2007

general elections, due to the inability of poll officials to easily or quickly

access such areas due to their peculiar geographical terrain as well as poor

road and other infrastructure could have been avoided where some degree of

decentralization is maintained in the system of electoral administration.

Another infrastructural problem arises from the poor technological support

provided for the administration of the electoral process. Although steps had

been taken to develop this aspect, (www.INECnigeria.org) implementation

has been slow due to poor funding and low human capacity, and due to poor

electricity power supply and other infrastructural accessories required to run

such technologies. (Iwu, 2008) The delay in implementation is also

connected with the centralized system of electoral administration which

does not encourage local initiative in this direction; fails to consider local

needs and other local peculiarities and fails to grant state and local electoral

officials requisite administrative powers that would enhance dynamic use

and development of such technologies. (www.idea.int)

It is important to add at this point that the administrative defects in the

electoral process have been consequential and contributory to the persistent

parochial political culture exhibited by the leadership in Nigeria and its

followership. Since 1999, the fusion between a dysfunctional system of

electoral administration and the parochiality of politics has fueled the

regular incidence (at both general and local elections) of reckless rigging,

falsifications, intimidations and violence. These have significantly reduced

the standard and credibility in the process and outcomes of elections.

88

The centralization of political power and the administration of government

at the national level and the corresponding large volume of economic

resources controlled by such powers have made such powers and their

corresponding offices irresistibly attractive. This has been linked to the

increasing rate of political corruption; zero-some and winner-take-all

politics and political sit tightism. The attitude of senior electoral

administrators in Nigeria since 1999 clearly demonstrates this character of

power syndrome.

The inability of INEC and its senior officials to demonstrate outright

neutrality and transparency in the conduct of elections as shown in most of

the reports considered here, and the vehement opposition of the commission

to the need for structural decentralization and deconcentration even in the

face of obvious defects in its current centralized structure suggests that, as

Tocqueville puts it, Not only will centralized power "lead to tyranny",

possibilities are high that "power has a natural tendency to grow more

centralized over time, as individuals seek to enlist the efforts of public

authorities to their own benefit"." Accordingly, it could be suggested here

that the centralized structure of electoral administration in Nigeria does not

take cognizance of the geographical, socio-economic and political realities

of Nigeria as a federal state. Rather, as we see in the last three general

elections, INEC is so designed to serve the interest of the political elites.

4.3 EFFECTS OF A DECENTRALIZED ELECTORAL

ADMINISTRATION IN THE US

When Guess and Gueorguieva, (2009) spoke of "dysfunctional

decentralization" of the US electoral administration, they could be said to

mean what Mayer (2007) (and many other scholars) referred to as "radical

decentralization". By These descriptions, these scholars underpin the

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fundamental defects in the administration of US general elections. While not

attempting to propose centralization in its place, analysts simply identify the

extremity in the degree of decentralization and the attendant problems it

creates for electoral administration, and, by extension, the attainment of

credibility of its process and outcome.

Problems of electoral administration in the US are centered on two broad

factors: the use of technology and the tolerance for partisan system of

electoral administration. (Mayer, 2007) Technological issues arising herein

range from technology standard regulation, national uniformity in

technology of ballot systems, management of technological deficiencies,

technology finance, to issues of manpower capacity. the problem created by

partisan electoral administration manifests through attempts by opposing

parties to manipulate both the process and outcomes of elections in favor of

their political parties. There is also the controversy embedded in the lack of

uniformity in the laws and systems of administering general elections.

Combination of these problems resulted in the major electoral crises of 2000

with minor reoccurrences in the 2004 and 2008 general elections.

4.3.1 DISUNIFORMED AND DYSFUNCTIONAL ELECTORAL

ADMINISTRATION AND TECHNOLOGY

Until after the 2000 presidential elections, there were no attempts to

centrally regulate and set uniform administrative and technological

standards for US general elections. Although states derive their authority to

regulate all elections from Article I, sections 2 and 4 of the constitution, the

extreme degree of decentralization allowed by these provisions particularly

in the conduct of federal elections have appeared defective considering the

sensitivity of elections and the magnitude of stakes and interests it

generates.

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For instance, Mayer reported that "structure and design of the ballot;

registration requirements to establish voter eligibility; distribution of polling

places; oversight mechanisms and authorities; the hours of voting; the

physical process of marking and submitting a ballot; counting methods;

definition of a valid vote; standards for recounts; methods of resolving

disputes – varies (from state to state) even for national elections. Even with

the same state, there may be substantial differences in different counties or

cities." In presidential elections, there may be different candidates on the

ballot from one state to another, depending typically on whether minor party

candidates have fulfilled the requirements to obtain a spot. In their survey of

ballots in the 2000 presidential election, Niemi and Herrnson found wide

variation in even the most basic design question: how the major party

candidates were identified. Vice President Dick Cheney appeared in at least

5 different guises in the 2000 election: Richard B. Cheney, Dick Cheney,

―Dick‖ Cheney, Cheney, not listed at all, or, in Arkansas, Dick Chaney

(Niemi and Herrnson 2003). They found confusing and poorly written

voting instructions, unnecessary information, and inconsistencies between

sample and actual ballots. ―The election for president and vice-president is

far and away the most visible election in the United States, and it is the only

one held throughout the nation with (more or less) the same candidates. If

there is a case for uniformity in the administration and technology of

balloting, it is in this election‖ (Niemi and Herrnson 2003).

According to the Wikipedia Encyclopedia, (2009) and Mayer, (2007) basic

technological and administrative problems which caused the 2000

presidential election crisis included: eligible voters denied ballots; ineligible

voters casting ballots; poor ballot design that failed to accurately record

voter preferences; poor human engineering of obsolete voting systems,

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which failed to alert voters that their ballots were not properly filled out;

disputes over recount procedures; disputes over the validity of absentee

ballots; a state election official with a huge stake in the outcome;

disagreement over the meaning of state law; inconsistent standards and

methods used to manually recount ballots; a divisive judicial resolution,

with sharp dissents and a Supreme Court accused with making a nakedly-

self interested partisan decision.

The variations in the adoption and use of voting technologies as well as

decisions and judgments over errors generated by these technologies from

one state to the other underpins the controversies generated during US

elections. For instance, the different ways that states react when the

electronically stored vote totals in a direct data recording electronic (DRE)

machine are different than the paper trails that the machines produce as part

of the voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) process. Nevada state

considers the electronic totals official; in the same situation, in the state of

California, the paper results are considered. (Electionline.org 2007)

Similarly, even within one state, the proneness of the DRE machines to

errors and the fact that such errors may be manipulated by corrupt election

officials places a question on the credibility of elections. According to

Mebane, The increasing use of DRE‘s even after the 2000 elections has

prompted concern that the systems are far from secure and prone to their

own unrecoverable errors. Mebane reports that In the 2006 congressional

election in Florida‘s 13th district, 18,000 votes appear to have been, put

simply, lost; the remaining question is whether this was the result of fraud,

poor ballot design, or a failure of the DREs to store the results (Mebane and

Dill 2007; Frisina et al, 2007)).

92

Specifically, the case of malfunctioning obsolete punch-card systems stood

in the fore of the 2000 presidential elections with particular and more

prominent case in the Florida experience. According to Mayer, "The most

thorough empirical work has established, to an unusually precise degree of

statistical certainty, that Gore would have won the election if all voters had

been able to record their preferences accurately." Characterizing the 2000

election as ―the worst in American history,‖ Mebane (2004, 525) found that

the Florida election system failed to record more than 50,000 intended

votes. If these ballots were rejected because they either failed to register a

preference for the presidential election (undervote), or registered more than

1 preference (overvote) – had The Carter-Ford Commission on Electoral

Reform concluded that this failure was not rooted in underlying structural

problems with the electoral system, as previous crises were. Rather, ―the

ordinary institutions of election administration in the United States, and

specifically Florida, simply could not cope with an extremely close election

(Report of the National Commission on Electoral Reform 2002). The

Commission noted that the only reason that the problems did not occur in

other states was the sheer luck that the election was not as close anywhere

else. However, Mayer notes that "Some state election officials

acknowledged that their own procedures were worse than those at the core

of the Florida meltdown."

With more evidences of loose and dysfunctional decentralization of US

general elections which caused the major crisis of confidence in the fairness

and legitimacy of the 2000 elections emerging in recent(2004 and 2008)

elections, few would argue that voting administration problems are not

caused by a pattern of poor planning and administrative chaos. (Guess and

Gueorguieva, 2009) This pattern manifested itself again during the 2008

presidential primaries across states and localities in the US. According to

93

Guess and Gueorguieva, (2009) "Washington, D.C., for example,

underestimated voter turnout by a factor of three (42,370 in 2004 vs 123,735

in 2008). While the number of registrants was roughly the same (312,445 in

2008 vs 342,091 in 2004), the District lacked any method for translating

media predictions of high turnout into increased readiness to manage the

elections. The District had to give out 10,000 provisional ballots to cover for

the absence of sufficient paper ballots. The District‘s voting system lacks

clear voter registration criteria, leading to many declarations of ineligibility

on the spot. It lacked professional personnel able to operate electronic

voting machines (some workers actually hid them from voters)"

Guess and Gueorguieva's analysis passes an indictment of incompetence on

the ability and capacity of local EMB officials to deliver efficient electoral

administration. Although the use of early voting and absentee ballots were

often canvassed to save time on polling day, this did not overcome the

obvious problem of "ineffective service supply." (Guess and Gueorguieva,

2009).

At the foundation of these problems were the insufficiencies in: state and

federal funding, effective supervision and regulation and manpower

capacity. the transfer of virtually all aspects of the electoral administration

to poorly funded local authorities and the tolerance for administrative

diversities even at that level of electoral management meant, according to

(Guess and Gueorguieva, "instead of a single election for president, 13,000

counties and local governments which range widely in effectiveness and

capacity, conduct elections with different standards, ballots and machines."

In the 2000 elections, 100 million people voted in 200,000 polling districts.

1.4 million election workers were required (the majority with little training)

to run the elections, supervised by 20,000 election administrators

94

(www.IDEA.org 2006). Variations in professionalism were almost

inevitable (www.IDEA.org 2006) Unlike other public service areas, for all

US elections, responsibility for electoral governance is not linked to fiscal

and management authority or accountability for professional capacity.

Effective planning and execution of elections is an institutional issue. The

performance of local elections depends on three elements: (a) clear legal and

regulatory norms and rules, (b) clear intergovernmental division of election

management authority and responsibility, and (c) sufficient election

financing and staff capacity-building.

First, the legal problem is excess delegation of regulatory authority for

state/local administration of presidential elections. This creates a permanent

mismatch between legal authority and regulatory responsibility for electoral

performance at the state/local level—the legal equivalent of fiscal mandates

without money. The Constitution granted Congress broad power to directly

regulate congressional elections, less power to directly regulate selection of

presidential electors, and still less power to directly regulate state/local

elections.

The bulk of federal intervention into local electoral practices have been

driven by constitutional authority (e.g. 15th Amendment, Section 2) and the

1965 Voting rights Act (Section 5) to ensure racial neutrality. Historically,

failure of election management institutions to perform their functions

properly (administrative incompetence) have not justified intervention. But

the federal scope of authority appears to be broadening, primarily through

HAVA and its delegation of certain responsibilities to federal agencies as

well as through the provision of federal funds for elections, for the first time

in US history. As demonstrated by Mayer, (2007 and Guess and

Gueorguieva, (2009) even the enactment of the HAVA substantially focused

95

on developing electoral technology by regulating standards. It virtually

ignored issues of capacity building as well as general institutional

management methodologies.

Second, there is a mismatch of local authority, responsibility and capacity

between state, county and local levels: election officials operate locally with

little normative guidance from empirical field research on best

administrative performance practices. This almost predetermines poor

electoral administration.

Third, public funds have not been consistently available to run effective

elections. Furthermore, given the rapid decline of local revenues as the

economy moves into recession, it is clear that neither states nor counties can

respond to these problems or pay to increase electoral capacity.

Resources do not guarantee success but their absence generally leads to

failure (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1989). In the case of elections, precincts in

local jurisdictions across the US have unequal access to funds. Tax bases

and revenue mobilization capacities vary widely across US cities and some

cities, of course, finance and run elections thoroughly and effectively. But

many do not. Additionally, norms do not guide where funds should be spent

to cover improvements. Few norms or standards exist; those that do are

quite general. But electoral needs are locally specific. Response depends on

effective needs assessments according to norms and professional purchasing

of supplies and equipment as well as capacity-building.

Given its political rather than technical status, election management

becomes just one more functional area in which local official‘s trade off

budget funds in order to ensure adequate results. Electoral performance is

thus subject to highly politicized local budget processes and major

96

differences in wealth and professionalism between cities and counties.

Despite their almost unique function in the US democratic system, elections

are not protected by earmarks; reserve funds; or permanent appropriations.

In addition, continuous municipal services are delivered according to

performance standards developed by national organizations or higher-tier

governments, and must satisfy intense local demands for them. This is not

the case with election management, which lacks professional and

performance standards. .

4.3.2 PARTISAN AND PRIVATE SECTOR INFLUENCES

There are at least two problems with the argument that partisan election

officials (or bipartisan boards) are an effective model for election

administration, or that mutual vigilance among partisan‘s best protects the

public interest. The first is that it is not true. There are simply too many

cases of Democratic or Republican administrators making transparently

biased decisions designed to benefit their parties, to have much confidence

in the results of this partisan process. Legion, Alvarez and Hall (2005) cited

examples from just a few election cycles: Florida Secretary of State

Katherine Harris, (a Republican) overseeing the Florida presidential election

recount in 2000 while she was honorary Chair of George Bush‘s state

campaign organization; Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell, (A

Republican) ruling on the validity of voter registration forms, provisional

vote procedures, and polling place challenges, while serving as co-chair of

President Bush‘s Ohio organization; California Secretary of State Kevin

Shelley (A Democrat) allegedly diverting federal funding provided to

upgrade California‘s balloting process, for partisan purposes. Hasen (2005)

cites Republican Party complaints about the New Mexico Secretary of State

97

(Democrat Rebecca Virgil-Giron) in the run up to the 2004 presidential

election.

It might be possible to dismiss these anecdotes as unrepresentative of the

broader professionalism of most chief election administrators. There is,

however, evidence that the behavior of local election officials nationwide is

influenced by their own partisanship, even on the most mundane issues.

Since 2004, HAVA has required states to allow voters who claim to be

registered, but who are not on the rolls, to cast ―provisional‖ ballots, with

the question of ultimate qualification determined after the election. If the

voter was an eligible registered voter, her ballot would count. If not, it

would be discarded. It was ―meant to deal with a serious problem that

emerged in the 2000 election – eligible voters being turned away at the polls

because their names were wrongly omitted from the voting rolls‖ (Tokaji

2004a). As state election officials began implementing the mandate, a

controversy emerged over how to deal with voters who show up in the

wrong precinct. These voters would not show up on the precinct voter lists

(since they are in the wrong place). Should they be given a provisional

ballot, or directed to the correct precinct? And if it turns out that they were

registered but simply voted at the wrong place, should their provisional vote

be counted? HAVA does not resolve this issue, as it states that voters must

be allowed to vote provisionally if they declare they are eligible in the

―jurisdiction,‖ but does not define what jurisdiction means: states have

adopted varying interpretations, and litigants are fighting over whether it

should mean precinct, or county. Daniel Tokaji (2004b) concludes that

HAVA‘s legislative history supports the narrower definition. Federal judges

have issued decisions on both sides of the question.

98

Or, perhaps, by arguing that even formally non- or bi-partisan officials are

just as likely to be biased. In the nonofficial recount of 2000 Florida ballots

conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, Democratic coders

were more likely to count an ambiguous ballot for Gore, Republicans more

likely to count them for Bush, ―even though there was nothing else on the

line and the only task of these coders was to accurately record the condition

of each ballot‖ (Hasen 2005). A federal district court in Missouri found that

the state did not have to count provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct

if the voter was directed to the correct precinct but refused to go.

Whatever view is expressed of the issue, there is clear evidence that the

implementation of provisional balloting rules depended, at least in part, on

the partisanship of local election officials, and those officials‘ estimate of

what rule would help their party: ―provisional votes were less likely to be

cast and counted in strongly Democratic jurisdictions if the local election

official was a Republican. Similarly, in heavily Republican jurisdictions

provisional votes were less likely to be cast and accepted if the local

election official was a Democrat‖ (Kimball, Kropf, and Battles 2006).

Mutual and bipartisan vigilance fares no better. In addition to the

inefficiencies of multimember boards compared to single administrators,

bipartisanship is no guarantee of perceived fairness. The formal

bipartisanship of the State Elections Board in Wisconsin has not insulated

the agency from charges that is, in fact, partisan, and members of the board

have been criticized for contributing money to partisan candidates (Walters

2006). In theory, the EAC is independent and bipartisan, supervised by a 4-

member board made up, in practice, of 2 Democrats and 2 Republicans.

This structure has not erased concerns that the commission is behaving in a

partisan manner (Goldfarb 2007).

99

The second problem is that even if it were true that partisans do the best job

of monitoring each other and preventing bias, the unique character of

elections makes it extremely difficult to conduct effective monitoring. The

partisan model requires that officials watch each other carefully, looking for

evidence of unfair procedures and decisions as election administrators use

their discretionary authority. But this is difficult to do in advance of

elections, when it might not be clear what the effects might be of any

particular decision, or when it might be too late to do anything about it.

Partisan challenges to voting procedures and administration most likely do

nothing to enhance public confidence in the process. The result is often a

tangle of lawsuits that convinces the public that both sides are trying to

manipulate the process to advance their own interests.

Scholars have suggested the adoption of neutral (professional) election

administrators as against the partisan model. however, this also has its short

comings (as can be observed in many other democracies) if not well

managed. Considering the peculiar nature of US politics, the desire for

neutrality poses a problem for accountability. To use the Center for

Democracy and Electoral Management, (CDEM) model legislation as an

example, it delegates substantial discretionary authority to the chief

elections officer and relies almost entirely on ex ante protections against

abuse. Mayer, (2007) has noted the problems of relying on elections as the

accountability mechanism, given the lack of information that US voters will

usually have about the candidates. Requiring nonpartisan elections will not

help, as the lack of party affiliation denies voters the most important

informational shortcut about a candidate, reduces turnout, and provides even

greater incumbency advantages (Shaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001). The

persistent controversy over judicial elections holds out little promise that

Draft legislation for State Independent Election Commissions, Even with all

100

of the restrictions, the CDEM rules does not address the potential problem

of ties between election officials and election equipment manufacturers.

Urbina (2007b) reported that an increasing number of election

administrators had left government to take jobs in the industry, leading to

legislation in several states that prohibited this type of move. (Center for

Democracy and Electoral Management [CDEM],

http://www.american.edu/ia/cdem/pdfs/legislation_npml.pdf

privatization of the process of acquiring equipments/materials used for the

administration of elections poses no problem with basic voting processes, as

printing and counting hand ballots is not a complicated task. But when

voting becomes more complex – even automated – then there can be

questions about the fidelity of the equipment used to record and tabulate the

results.

The election Assistance Commission (EAC) has established a certification

process for voting machines, using independent laboratories accredited by

the National Institute of Standards and Technology. This has not allayed

concerns that DRE‘s remain fundamentally insecure, or that the proprietary

nature of DRE software makes it impossible to independently evaluate the

machines. In August, 2007, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen

restricted the use of most DRE‘s to a single machine in each polling place,

because of security concerns (Rau and Bercerra 2007).

A detailed review of DRE source code, conducted as part of the Secretary of

State‘s review, found ―significant security weaknesses,‖ including basic

programming errors, poor security practices, and inadequate access control

(Blaze et al. 2007). The programming software used for DREs is proprietary

to the vendor, and therefore it is not publicly accessible. Companies argue

101

that this is commercially necessary and reduces the potential for

manipulation of the voting machines, and argument known as ‗security

through obscurity‘ among computer security professionals‖ (Moynihan

2004). As of 2004, Moynihan also noted that the certification process

usually does not analyze software line by line, but rather focuses on

functionality.

Blaze‘s et al's review of the systems is a powerful indictment of the current

state of the art of voting machine software security. They found weaknesses

that ―have the capacity to enable devastating security breaches that alter the

results of elections,‖ arising from ―pervasive structural weaknesses and

engineering failures‖ in the software. concern is that some residual votes,

especially undervotes, might be intentional. This is especially likely if a top-

ticket candidate is running unopposed, something that could happen in a

situation Like the distinction between nonpartisan and neutral

administration, concerns over excessive nationalization may come down to

the differences between national standards and uniform implementation.

Barriers to uniform election administration include some that are

insurmountable. It is difficult to see, for example, how the federal structure

of the US, or the number of state and local elections typically held on the

same day as national elections, could give way to a completely uniform

system. The wide variation in population and degree of concentration mean

that what works in a sparsely populated rural district (where manually

counted paper ballots might be sufficient) would not be appropriate in a

densely populated city.

Nearly a decade after the 2000 meltdown and a multi-billion dollar effort to

upgrade voting technology and make the process more uniformly regulated

102

and reliable, it is still routine to find elections that fail to meet even basic

standards of fairness and consistency. (Tokaji 2006). Hasen (2005, 944)

summed up the progress: "One would hope that improvements in light of the

2000 debacle would improve both the reality and the perception of fairness

of US election administration. The bad news from Election 2004, however,

is that things likely will not improve sufficiently by 2008. Indeed, many of

the steps taken in light of the Florida 2000 debacle have, at least in the short

term that includes Election 2004, made things worse."

103

4.4 REFERENCES

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Nigerian Politics; 1979-1999. Unpublished Thesis, Department of Political

Science, University of Lagos, Akoka.

Aluko, M. E., (2006); Interrogating the New Harmonized Electoral Act

2006.

http://www.nigerianmuse.com/important_documents/Electoral_%20Act_20

06_Harmonized.doc.

Alvarez, R. M. and Thad, H., (2005); Public Attitudes about Election

Governance. University of Utah Center for Public Policy and

Administration & Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project June.

Blaze, M. et al., (2007); Source Code Review of the Sequoia Voting

System. Report Prepared at the University of California, Berkeley, under

contract to the California Secretary of State.

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jul26.pdf

Center for Democracy and Electoral Management [CDEM],

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Electonline.org. (2007); Case Study: Auditing the Vote. March.

Frisina, L. et al., (2007); Ballot Formats, Touch-screens, and Undervotes: A

Study of the 2006 Midterm Elections in Florida.

(http://www.dartmouth.edu/~herron/cd13.pdf)

Goldfarb, Z. A., (2007); Panel Faces Partisanship Allegations. Washington

Post, June 27,

Guess, G. M. and Gueorguieva, V., (2009); Dysfunctional Decentralization:

Election Management in Theory and Practice

Guobadia, A. I., (2005); FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA ELECTION

ADMINISTRATION. Paper presented at A conference of Commonwealth

Chief Election Officers, on "IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF

ELECTION MANAGEMENT" organized by the Commonwealth

Secretariat in co-operation with the Election Commission of India, The

Ashok Hotel, New Delhi, 24-26 February 2005

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Hasen, R. L., (2005); Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming US

Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown. Washington and Lee

Law Review 62:937-999 (No. 3, September.

International Institute for Democratic and Election Assistance, (2003);

Democratic reform and the elections in Nigeria. Summary report of the

Workshop sponsored by International IDEA, Abuja, 23-25 July, 2003.

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Iwu, M. m. (2008); BEYOND 2007 ELECTIONS: FRAMEWORK FOR

SUSTAINING DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA. www.INECnigeria.org

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IMPERATIVES OF ELECTORAL REFORM IN NIGERIA.

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Iwu, M. M. (2009 B); Unbundling of INEC Unnecessary.

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Anything From the Australian Electoral Commission? Department of

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Mebane, W. R. and David, L. D. (2007); Factors Associated with the

Excessive CD-13 Undervote in the 2006 General Election in Sarasota

County, Florida.

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Mebane, W., (2004); The Wrong Man is President! Overvotes in the 2000

Presidential Election in Florida. PS: Political Science and Politics 2:525-35

(No. 3, September)

Moynihan, D. P. (2004); Building Secure Elections: E-Voting, Security, and

Systems Theory. Public Administration Review 64:515-528 (No. 5,

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and Confidence In the Electoral Process: Report of the National

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Niemi, R. G. and Paul, S. H. (2003); Beyond the Butterfly: The Complexity

of US Ballots. Perspectives on Politics 1:317-326 (No. 2, June).

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Elections. http//www.jmm.aaa.net.au/articles/10857.htm

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Shaffner, B. F. et al., (2001); Teams Without Uniforms: The Nonpartisan

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Tokaji, D. P. (2004a); Provisional Voting: Federal Law and Ohio Practice.

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CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, FINDINGS AND

CONCLUSION.

5.1 SUMMARY

The essence of centralizing the administration of general election is

to enhance effective regulation and supervision of the process. It also

facilitates smooth administrative coordination and process uniformity.

It reduces or avoids unnecessary duplications and saves cost of

electoral administration. The centralized model of administering

general elections is suitable for small countries like Ghana, the

United Kingdom, Sweden, Senegal etc.

On the other hand, where the administration of general election is

decentralized, the management of electoral logistics is less difficult.

It reduces the cost of electoral administration and allows for the

accommodation of peculiar local needs and conditions in the

planning of electoral logistics. Countries with larger territories like

United States of America, Canada, Brazil, Russia etc adopt the

decentralized model of electoral administration.

However, studies have shown that some countries adopt any of

these models without due consideration for its suitability for their

territorial size. Rather, other factors which are broadly historical and

political in nature influence their adoption of either the centralized or

the decentralized models. Some countries even adopt a combination

of both centralized and decentralized system of administering their

general election. Accordingly it is not out of place to find large

108

countries like Nigeria having a centralized system of electoral

administration

The above analyses of the Nigerian and US experiences of electoral

administration reveals an objective reality of extremism on the part of

the two countries in their adoption of centralized and decentralized

electoral processes respectively. Overwhelming evidences suggest

that most of the problems or crises confronting both countries in their

conduct of general elections substantially emanate from the defects

embedded in their models of electoral administration.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Avoidance of the extremes of centralization and

decentralization: It is true, as demonstrated in several studies, that

no single model of electoral administration can operate in all

countries - not even in countries with same or similar political

systems. However, we find it apt that large countries such as

federations and confederations, for the purpose of attaining and

sustaining their political stability and for administrative efficiency,

and, above all, in order to organize free, fair and credible general

elections, will need to avoid the extremes of centralization and

decentralization of institutions, structures and processes of their

electoral administration.

Adoption of the Hybrid model of electoral administration: In

conducting general elections, federations need to adopt the hybrid

model of administration. This requires a combined effort of a central

EMB solely concerned with policy-making and process regulation

and administratively independent, uniformed and active regional (or

109

state) and local EMBs concerned with the task of organizing all

elections. Already, some countries: Australia, Canada, Brazil and

Switzerland operate models similar to this.

Political and Financial independence: federations must consider

political and financial independence of their EMBs at all levels which

should make them as politically neutral as possible. The

independence of the EMBs must be constitutionally rooted to avoid

easy manipulations.

Administrative expediency: In rethinking or reforming their

administration of general elections to meet the description of the

hybrid model, the administrative expediency of their EMBs at all

levels must include financial prudence, efficient logistics mobilization,

continuous human capacity building, rules and process uniformity,

and regulative policy efficacy over and above the sentiments of

political and cultural history which usually determine the nature of

federal constitutions. In other words, legislations and rules for the

administration of general elections should be politically neutral and

administratively efficient.

Proper application of electoral technologies: While there is need

for regulation of technology standards for the purpose of maintaining

uniformity and credibility in process and outcome of general

elections, we suggest that this should take cognizance of

fundamental national and local realities and peculiarities such as

literacy level, language, population, infrastructure, etc.

Provision of adequate infrastructure: The decentralization of

electoral administration to regional and local EMBs should be backed

110

with adequate and functional infrastructure such as: electricity, roads,

communication and storage facilities among others. This will enable

regional and local EMBs to effectively and efficiently deliver on their

huge responsibilities of organizing virtually all elections in the

country.

Elimination of partisan electoral administration: While the

administration and management of elections should be left in the

hands of qualified electoral administrators, political parties should be

constitutionally empowered to closely monitor the activities of EMBs

and its officials in order to guarantee freeness and fairness.

5.3 FINDINGS

The findings are as follows:

Extreme centralization and decentralization of electoral

administration opens the electoral process to easy manipulation by

politicians and corrupt election officials; thus loosing the credibility of

its process and outcome.

Extreme centralization and decentralization of electoral

administration leads to either an overbearing executive and/or

political regulation and control or insufficiency of both. This problem

creates difficulties in decision or policy making, logistics management

and the sustenance of methodological standards, best practices,

ethics and professionalism.

Extreme centralization and decentralization of electoral

administration either destroy local creativity and input in the

development of the electoral process or lead to gross disuniformity,

111

dysfunctional and contradictory variations in rules, loss of credibility

in process and outcomes of elections.

Extreme centralization and decentralization of electoral

administration reduces individual and collective responsibility and

accountability of election officials, encourages bulk-passing and

allows indiscriminate use of discretion.

Extreme centralization and decentralization of electoral

administration creates room for maladministration; leading to

improper, wasteful and corrupt use of funds and resources allocated

for the conduct of elections.

Extreme centralization and decentralization of electoral

administration creates room for irregularities and malpractices

perpetuated by competing parties, election officials and other

stakeholders which makes it impossible to produce credible

outcomes acceptable to all.

5.4 CONCLUSION

The intention of this study is not to conclude on how an ideal or true

federal system should emerge or be managed. We admit that

variations will always occur due to historical and cultural peculiarities.

We also agree that these variations will always influence power

division between the two or more levels of government as well as the

issues that fall within the jurisdictional powers of each governmental

level. In fact, what determines each variance of federalism is the

degree at which power is centralized or decentralized. The

centralization or decentralization of powers in most federations

(including Nigeria and the US) influences not only the issues which

112

such powers control, but also, how such issues are managed. No

doubt, the conduct of general elections is the only aspect of the

electoral process which engenders national interests and requires

national participation in countries. However, considering the

peculiarities of federalism in both countries , the consequential

crises which surrounds the centralization and decentralization of the

management of their general elections suggests the need not only to

rethink electoral management and administration in both countries,

but also the need to develop a more liberal, hybrid and workable

model of national electoral administration for federal systems.

113

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