Effecting a Transition: How to Fill the Gap in Kant's System of Critical Philosophy

Effecting a Transition: How to Fill the Gap in Kant’s System of Critical Philosophy 187

Effecting a Transition:How to Fill the Gap in Kant’s System of Critical Philosophy

by Bryan Hall, New Albany

Abstract: In a 1798 letter to Christian Garve, Kant claims that without a transition [Übergang]from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics there will be a ‘gap’ in theCritical philosophy. He does not make clear, however, exactly what this gap is or how thetransition is supposed to fill the gap. The Übergang section of Kant’s Opus postumum (OP)has received considerable attention of late due to the many drafts it contains of Kant’s EtherDeduction. Commentators have also hoped to find a solution there to the gap problem. Littleattention has been paid, however, to Kant’s project in Convolut 10 of the OP which he beganin August 1799 immediately after completing the Übergang section. Assuming that the EtherDeduction is sound and proves a priori the existence of a transcendental material condition forexperience, Convolut 10 discusses what changes would have to be made to the transcendentalformal conditions of experience (space, time, categories, and apperception) in their empiricalfunction given the addition of this transcendental material condition. Kant claims in Convolut10 that these changes are necessary to finally effect a transition from the metaphysical foun-dations of natural science to physics and, as I will argue, such a transition will be tantamountto bridging the gap in the Critical philosophy mentioned in the letter to Garve.

Key words: Opus postumum, ether, transition, gap

Although I am conscious of the solubility of this problem: the pain of Tantalus, it is not yethopeless. – The problem with which I am now occupied, concerns the ‘transition from themetaphysical foundations of natural science to physics.’ It must be solved, or there will be agap in the system of critical philosophy.

Br, AA 12: 2571

In the above letter to Christian Garve from September 21st, 1798 Kant claims thathe feels the ‘pain of Tantalus’ given the problem of effecting a transition [Übergang]from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics, without which

1 “[…] obwohl ich mir der Thunlichkeit dieser Aufgabe bewust bin: ein Tantalischer Schmertz,der indessen doch nicht hofnungslos ist. – Die Aufgabe, mit der ich mich jetzt beschäftige,betrifft den ‘Übergang von den metaphys. Anf. Gr. d. N. W. zur Physik’. Sie will aufgelösetseyn; weil sonst im System der crit. Philos. eine Lücke seyn würde.” All translations aremy own unless otherwise noted. As it is here, Kant’s original German can also be foundin the footnote corresponding to the translated passage. Although I give the titles of citedworks in English, abbreviations refer to the German titles. In all of my translations, I amtrying to emphasize the difference between three terms: 1) Ding/Sache = thing in general,2) Objekt = any intentional object, 3) Gegenstand = actual object/thing. This last termtypically denotes a stronger empirical reference relation than the other two terms, i. e. a ref-erence to actual objects of experience. Kant’s use of the term Gegenstand should be noted bythe reader.

Kant-Studien 100. Jahrg., S. 187–211 DOI 10.1515/KANT.2009.012© Walter de Gruyter 2009ISSN 0022-8877

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there will be a ‘gap’ in the Critical philosophy. He does not make clear, however,exactly what this gap is or how the transition is supposed to fill the gap. Kantscholars have spent the intervening years speculating on what the gap might be, andwhat role the transition project might have in filling this gap. The Übergang sectionof Kant’s Opus postumum (OP) has received considerable attention in recent yearsdue to the many drafts it contains of Kant’s Ether Deduction. Commentators gen-erally agree, however, that this section of the OP cannot achieve the goals for whichit was intended. This paper, in contrast, focuses on Convolut 10 which Kant startedwriting in August 1799 as soon as he had completed the Übergang section. Con-volut 10 assumes the conclusion of the Ether Deduction as its starting point, andprovides unique insight into the gap problem as well as the role of Kant’s transitionproject in bridging this gap.

The paper is divided into four sections. I first discuss the reception of the OP inthe secondary literature by evaluating three approaches philosophers have taken tothe gap problem and its relation to Kant’s transition project. Although these phi-losophers appear to have very different approaches, I argue that they can find com-mon ground in Convolut 10. Kant saw a need in Convolut 10 to revise the way thatthe transcendental formal conditions of experience (viz. space, time, categories, andapperception) function empirically given the addition of a transcendental materialcondition of experience in the Ether Deduction. Section two examines the revisionsKant makes to the Transcendental Aesthetic (space and time) and the Transcenden-tal Analytic (categories) of the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV), while the third sec-tion discusses the new role that apperception plays in Convolut 10 and how it helpsto solve some important problems with the Critical philosophy that still resonatetoday. I argue that these revisions are necessary for Kant to effect a transition fromthe metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics and that this transition istantamount to bridging the gap in his Critical philosophy. The final section antici-pates a major objection to my analysis and attempts a response.

Section One: Reception of the OP in the Secondary Literature

Eckart Förster argues that the gap in Kant’s Critical philosophy has to do withfinding a way of constructing the object of outer sense in general given the failure ofthe Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MAN) to successfully constructthis object and the limited application of the Schematism section of KrV to the time-determinations of inner sense.2

2 For the limited function of the Schematism see Förster, Eckart: Kant’s Final Synthesis: AnEssay on the Opus postumum. Harvard 2000, 59. Förster evaluates the above mentionedletter to Christian Garve in light of a letter written to Johann Kiesewetter a month lateras well as another letter Kiesewetter wrote to Kant a few years earlier. In the latter, Kiese-wetter inquires as to progress of the transition from the metaphysical foundations of naturalscience to physics, a work Kant had promised “for some years now [schon seit einigen


It is important to realize that Kant rejected most aspects of the MAN by 1798 andthat when Kant mentions the ‘metaphysical foundations of natural science’ in theÜbergang section, he is no longer referring to the book of 1786. Kant came to rec-ognize soon after the publication of the MAN that it was doomed to failure. Thevery first loose leaf of the OP contains a very critical anonymous review of theMAN from the Göttingische Anzeigen copied out in Kant’s own hand. The reviewercriticizes Kant’s attempt in the MAN to ascribe basic moving forces to mattersimply on the basis of matter’s phoronomic character. The reviewer also wonderswhy Kant feels he must explain the impenetrability of matter by appeal to movingforces: “Must one conceive a moving force in a wall, because one cannot proceedpast the wall? It is not at all clear how Phoronomy, which looks at mere motionwithout considering force (from which motion arises) could lead to moving force.”3

Has Kant given the reader any reason to prefer a dynamical conception of matterover a mechanical conception? According to the mechanical philosophy, a funda-mental characteristic of any object is its motion or rest. This does not at all entail,however, that matter must consist of moving forces. Matter can be in motion in ac-cordance with natural law, without matter filling space through moving forces. Thisis just one of many failures that plague the MAN.4 Taking into account these fail-ures, Förster holds that the MAN is incapable of constructing the object of outer

Jahren]”. This leads Förster to divorce the project of transition from the gap problem perse. Förster claims, however, that Kant’s views on transition changed several times overthe years, and that when Kant is writing the letters of 1798 his work on the transition pro-ject had led him to recognize a gap in the Critical philosophy. I certainly agree with Försteron this latter point. Returning to the former point, however, if the gap in Kant’s Criticalphilosophy can be separated from the transition project what exactly is the gap problem?I will focus on the latter question when discussing Förster’s position. See also Kant’s FinalSynthesis, 51 and 73. For the Kiesewetter correspondence see Br, AA 12: 23 and 12:258.

3 OP, AA 21: 415.13–17. “Muß man sich in einer Mauer eine bewegende Kraft denken weilman an der Mauer nicht weiter fortgehen kann? Es ist nicht einmal deutlich wie Phoronomiedie blos Bewegung betrachtet ohne an Kraft zu denken davon die Bewegung herrührt aufbewegende Kraft führen könne.”

4 Kant discusses another problem with the MAN in remarks written on a September 8th 1792letter from J. S. Beck as well as in his October 16th reply to Beck. See Br, AA 11: 359–360and 375–376. In these letters, he admits that his theory of matter is circular. Kant attemptsin the MAN to explain gravity as a basic attractive force of matter. The attractive forceof gravity depends upon the density of physical bodies. According to the MAN, however,the density of a physical body is determined by the attractive/repulsive forces of matter.If the same attractive force is meant to account for gravity and density, then Kant’s theoryis circular. Attractive force (gravity) is dependent on density which is in turn dependenton attractive force. A solution is to hold that gravity is a derivative attractive force,but then gravity fails to be a basic moving force of matter. For excellent discussions ofthe myriad problems with the MAN including the two I mention see Tuschling, Burkhard:Metaphysische und Transzendentale Dynamik in Kants Opus Postumum. Berlin 1971,90f. and Westphal, Kenneth: Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism. Cambridge 2004,173f.

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sense in general from the categories which calls into question the objective validityand real applicability of the categories to the objects of physics.5

If Förster is right, the Ether Deduction of the Übergang section could be viewed asKant’s attempt to do what the MAN promised but failed to deliver. But what is theether? Förster claims that Kant’s conception of the ether is akin to a schema of rep-resentation and is successful only insofar as it is a regulative thesis.6 Förster arguesthat since the ether is non-empirical it must be transcendent, a mere ideal of reason.7

Given the regulative status of the ether, however, Förster wonders how the subjectcognizes “sensible space or the moving forces within it”8. Förster looks to the Selbst-setzungslehre section of the OP for a solution. There the subject cognizes sensiblespace and the moving forces within it through an exercise of its own moving forces.The subject inserts its own forces into the undetermined sensory manifold whichallows the subject, through this act of self-positing, to be aware of itself as affectedby moving forces in this undetermined sensory manifold.9 At the same time, the sub-ject inserts its categorically determined concepts of the ether into the sensory mani-fold in order to determine this manifold and consequently cognize the moving forcesaround it.10 Assuming that the ether is a mere ideal of reason, however, how couldthe insertion of these concepts into the sensory manifold result in genuine cognition?How can these concepts of the ether have objective validity and real applicability, ifthey are concepts of something which is itself a mere ideal? These are questions thatmust be answered. As one will see, however, Kant’s discussion of the subject’s cog-nitive activity in Convolut 10 bears a striking resemblance to his discussion in theSelbstsetzungslehre and much of what Förster describes in the latter is absolutely es-sential for the success of Kant’s transition project in the former.

5 See Förster: Kant’s Final Synthesis, 72. In contrast to Förster, Michael Friedman does notview the MAN as failing to deliver on its promises, but rather as the litmus test for one’sinterpretation of the OP. This affects the way he views the gap problem and the purpose ofKant’s transition project. According to Friedman, the central purpose of the transition is tocoordinate the different methods of the MAN and the Critique of the Power of Judgment(KU). Although both works aim to establish the highest species of empirical classification,MAN shares an approach with KrV that KU does not. Whereas MAN begins with transcen-dental principles and moves constitutively downward to the metaphysical principles of thedoctrine of body through which these transcendental principles are applied to the empiricalconcept of matter, KU relies on the regulative capacity of reflective judgment which beginswith particular empirical facts and move upwards to these transcendental principles. Fried-man claims that this problem of methodological coordination reveals a gap in the Criticalphilosophy. Given all the problems with the MAN and Kant’s own displeasure with thebook, however, it seems unlikely that Friedman’s interpretation of the OP is accurate. SeeFriedman, Michael: Kant and the Exact Sciences. Harvard 1992, 254f.

6 See Förster, “Kant’s Selbstsetzungslehre”. In: Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: The Three‘Critiques’ and the ‘Opus postumum’. Ed. by Eckart Förster Stanford 1989, 234f.

7 Ibid., 91f.8 Ibid., 100.9 Ibid., 106f.

10 Ibid., 111f.


Förster does largely ignore Kant’s efforts in Convolut 10, however, moving im-mediately to the Selbstsetzungslehre written almost a year after Kant had completedConvolut 10. Vittorio Mathieu is one of the few recent Kant scholars to discussConvolut 10 specifically and its important role in Kant’s transition project. WhatKant realizes in Convolut 10, according to Mathieu, is that a ‘Mittelbegriff ’ [inter-mediate concept] is necessary to effect a transition from the MAN to physics.Though Mathieu refers to the book of 1786 when discussing the transition, heviews the MAN simply as constituting a ‘system of concepts a priori ’ which requiresan intermediate concept to transition from physics in general (MAN) to a particularconcrete physics.11 Mathieu says that the concept of the ether is itself this intermedi-ate concept and is a transcendental concept derived from the categories.12 Theobject of this concept is, however, neither physical nor metaphysical, but is ratherwhat Kant calls ‘physiological’.13 What Kant means by this term is not entirelyclear, though Mathieu takes the ether to be a ‘Mittelmaterie’ [intermediate material]in much the same way as the concept of the ether is a Mittelbegriff.14 Given the cat-egorical basis of the concept of the ether as transcendental condition, Mathieu takesthe ether itself to be only another transcendental formal condition of experience,similar in role to the categorically based Axioms of Intuition (quantity), the Antici-pations of Perception (quality), or the Schematism (time-determination) of KrV.He claims it is a “schematism of the system of moving forces insofar as they canbe thought a priori”15. The ether is an ‘indirect appearance’ which must be thoughtas underlying the direct appearances of physical bodies, these bodies affectingreceptive subjects in sensibility.16 Even so, given the fact that the ether is only an in-termediate material or indirect appearance, it can be nothing more than a necessaryhypothesis for the unity of the subject’s experience.17 Mathieu insists upon, how-ever, the close connection between the Ether Deduction of the Übergang section andConvolut 10 given the frequent appearances of the ether as a transcendental condi-tion of experience in both sections.18 Mathieu appears to agree with Förster con-cerning to the ontological status of the ether. Although Mathieu holds that the con-cept of the ether is a transcendental formal condition of experience, he also claimsthat the ether is a mere necessary hypothesis which is required for the unity of ex-perience.

11 Mathieu, Vittorio: Kants Opus postumum. Frankfurt 1989. Transl. by G. Held (German),39f.

12 Ibid., 78 and 113. I will argue that although further concepts can be derived a priori by thecategories in their role as principles from the concept of the ether, the concept of the ether isnot itself derived from the categories.

13 Ibid., 97. See also OP, AA 22: 293.14 Mathieu: Kants Opus postumum, 119.15 Ibid., 138.16 Ibid., 144f.17 Ibid., 140 and 214.18 Ibid., 133.

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In contrast to both of these interpretations, Burkhard Tuschling argues that Kantdoes not conceive of the ether as a merely hypothetical material. The Ether Deduc-tion aims instead to establish the actuality of a material a priori. Kant’s argumentfor this material is intended to avoid the circularity charges leveled at the MANwhile the existence of this material must be assumed for the success of Kant’s tran-sition project. Most importantly, however, this material is required for the possibil-ity of experience.19 As Kant says in Übergang 11:

If it can be proven that the unity of the whole of possible experience is founded upon the exist-ence of such a material [ether] (with the properties mentioned above) so is its actuality alsoproven, not by experience but rather a priori for experience, merely from the conditions of itsbare possibility. For the moving forces of matter can only harmonize [zusammenstimmen] intoa collective/universal unity of perception in one possible experience insofar as the subject [is]affected by them externally, and united in one concept, internally affects itself.20

Given that Kant intends to establish the actuality of the ether in the Übergang sec-tion, I must disagree with Förster’s and Mathieu’s views on the ontological status ofthe ether itself. It cannot be a mere hypothetical material. It is rather a necessarytranscendental material condition for the unity of the whole of possible experience.Although the concept of the ether does have an important formal role to play inKant’s transition project, this does not entail that the ether is itself a mere transcen-dental formal condition. Kant believes the ether is actual and so must be a transcen-dental material condition of experience. Although Förster and Mathieu reject theactuality of the ether, I will argue below that affirming the actuality of the ether willin fact serve to benefit both of their approaches.

It is important to note that when Kant affirms the actuality of the ether, he isneither simply affirming those conceptions of the ether popular in his day (light-ether/heat-ether), nor is he affirming the reality of the material Michelson and Mor-ley failed to detect in the 19th century. At one point, in Übergang 2, Kant says thatthe name that one calls this material matters not, all that matters is its function.21

The ether has many functions according to Kant. It must be a material capable ofmoving collectively, expanding continuously, and constantly agitating. It must serveas the ultimate source of perceptual affection by serving as the ontological groundfor physical bodies that affect receptive subjects in sensibility. Its dynamic forces

19 See Tuschling: Metaphysische und Transzendentale Dynamik in Kants Opus Postumum, 75,100, 149, 176f. For a similar approach to the ether’s function see Edwards, Jeffrey: Sub-stance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge. California 2000, 163f.

20 OP, AA 21: 572.16–24. “Wenn bewiesen werden kann daß die Einheit des Gantzen mög-licher Erfahrung auf der Existenz eines solchen Stoffs (mit den genannten Eigenschaften des-selben) beruhe so ist auch die Wirklichkeit desselben zwar nicht durch Erfahrung sonderna priori, blos aus Bedingungen der bloßen Möglichkeit derselben für die Erfahrung be-wiesen. Denn die bewegende Kräfte der Materie können zur collectiv//allgemeinen Einheitder Warnehmungen in einer möglichen Erfahrung nur zusammenstimmen in sofern das Sub-ject durch sie äußerlich und innerlich in Einen Begriff vereinigt sich selbst afficirt.”

21 See OP, AA 21: 218.


must act as the qualitative ground for the relations of mechanical force betweenphysical bodies. I believe that one can summarize Kant’s conception of the ether incontemporary terms by saying it is a compositionally plastic, intrinsically struc-tural, substrate of dynamic (attractive and repulsive) forces. In more Kantian terms,it is the systematic unity of the moving forces of matter.

A brief overview of Kant’s proof strategy might give some guide as to how he goesabout establishing both the actuality of the ether as well as the a priori status of theether concept.22 As in the above quote from Übergang 11, Kant begins with theunity of the whole of possible experience. He then argues that the subject’s conceptof the unity of the whole of possible experience must contain the concept of someactual object a priori. Assuming that there is a unity of the whole of possible ex-perience, whatever concept of an actual object that is contained in the concept ofthe former would establish the actuality of the latter. After analyzing the concept ofthe unity of the whole of possible experience, he determines that there are only twooptions for such a concept: either a) a mechanical whole of physical bodies contain-ing or separated by empty space (mechanism’s view), or b) the ether (Kant’s dynamicview). If one assumes (a), empty space would be an object of possible experiencesince it is an analytic consequence of the subject’s concept of the unity of the wholeof possible experience. This would violate Kant’s view on affection, however, whereany object of possible experience must be capable of affecting the subject in sensi-bility. Empty space is not an object capable of affecting the subject and is conse-quently incapable of being an object of possible experience. By disjunctive syllo-gism, this leads Kant to affirm the concept of the ether as the concept of the actualobject that is analytic consequence of the subject’s concept of the unity of the wholeof possible experience. Since there is a unity of the whole of possible experience,and its concept contains the concept of the ether a priori, the ether itself also exists.If there is a unity of the whole of possible experience, then the ether must exist.23

As Kant says in the quote from Übergang 11, the existence of the ether is not provenby experience, but rather a priori as a necessary condition for experience. Conse-quently, the ether should be considered a transcendental material condition for ex-perience.

Tuschling would be quick to point out, however, the great irony of this con-clusion. Kant’s intention in the Ether Deduction is to effect a transition between themetaphysical foundations of natural science to physics. This requires showing that

22 For a formal reconstruction of Kant’s Ether Deduction, see my article: A Reconstruction ofKant’s Ether Deduction in Übergang 11. In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy14, Nr. 4, 2006, 719–746.

23 One might worry that Kant’s Ether Deduction runs afoul of his critique of the OntologicalArgument in KrV. In the latter, Kant claims that the existence of an object can never beproven analytically from mere concepts. Existence can only be established syntheticallythrough experience. Kant, however, does not begin the Ether Deduction with the mere con-cept of the unity of the whole of possible experience, but rather with the actuality of theunity of the whole of possible experience.

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the ether is the ultimate object of physics. Even if Kant is able to prove the existenceof the ether, he is unable to prove that it is an object of physics on pain of under-mining the very transcendental proof strategy of the Ether Deduction. If the etherwere an object of physics, it could in principle be cognized a posteriori. If the ethercould be cognized a posteriori, however, it could not serve as the transcendentalmaterial condition of experience, since the transcendental conditions of experiencemust be ascertained a priori. According to Tuschling, this leaves Kant with no wayto effect a transition.24

I agree with Förster’s diagnosis of the gap in Kant’s Critical philosophy. Given theweaknesses of the MAN, Kant must find another way of showing the objectivevalidity and real applicability of the categories. Following Mathieu, however, I be-lieve the solution to this problem can be found in Convolut 10. What is needed issome a priori concept of transition such that the ‘system of a priori concepts’ foundin the MAN can be shown to be objectively valid and have real application to theobjects of physics. This is consistent with Förster’s diagnosis of the gap in Kant’sCritical philosophy. Once one rejects Kant’s a priori determined though ‘empirical’concept of matter in the MAN as unable to successfully construct the object of outersense in general, what a priori concepts remain within the system?25 Insofar as thecategories themselves are contained in this system of a priori concepts, the success-ful implementation of the a priori concept of the ether in accordance with the cat-egories will be tantamount to effecting a transition from the metaphysical foun-dations of natural science to physics understood as a transition from the categoriesto the objects of physics. Such a transition would bridge the gap that Förster diag-noses within Kant’s Critical philosophy by demonstrating the objective validity andreal applicability of the categories to the objects of physics. In this way, one can seehow Kant’s transition project is essential for bridging the gap in his Critical philos-ophy.

Following Tuschling, however, Kant does not conceive of the ether merely as ahypothetical material but rather as an actual material proven a priori. I will arguethat the assumption of the ether’s actuality is essential to the success of Kant’s tran-sition project in Convolut 10. As I said at the outset, Kant recognized, in Convolut10, that the transcendental formal conditions of experience (space, time, cat-egories, and apperception) must be revised in their empirical function given the ad-dition of the ether as a transcendental material condition of experience in the EtherDeduction. The rest of this paper is dedicated to showing how these revisionsare necessary for Kant to effect a transition similar in form to the one that Mathieudescribes and which, if successful, will bridge the gap diagnosed by Förster. In theprocess, I hope not only to avoid Tuschling’s worry with Kant’s transition project,

24 See Tuschling: Metaphysische und Transzendentale Dynamik in Kants Opus Postumum,175f.

25 In the Preface of the MAN, Kant describes his concept of matter as determined a priorithough nevertheless empirical. See especially MAN, AA 04: 470.


but also to demonstrate how the success of Kant’s project in Convolut 10 serves todispel other problems with the Critical philosophy, problems that remain relevanttoday.

Section Two: Space, Time, and Categories in Convolut 10

Kant argues that space and time are only subjective forms of intuition a priori inKrV. They are neither things in themselves (Newton) nor properties of or relationsbetween things in themselves (Leibniz). Even so, Kant claims that space and time areboth transcendentally ideal and empirically real. Space and time are transcenden-tally ideal since they are simply a priori forms of the subject’s sensibility and are no-thing once one abandons the conditions of sensibility. The purity of space is directlyrelated to its transcendental ideality. This pure representation of space is, further-more, presented in its formal aspect as an “infinite given magnitude”26. This aspectcan be represented to the mind prior to sensation (viz. geometrical space). Nonethe-less, space and time are also empirically real with regard to all empirical objects thatcan present themselves to sensibility.27 Although the formal transcendental char-acter of space and time remain unchanged in the OP, the conditions of their empiri-cal reality are modified by the conclusion of the Ether Deduction. As Kant sayswhen discussing space in Convolut 10:

The system of the moving forces of matter is to be thought somewhat as presented to sense as(empirically determined) space not as derived from or out of experience rather thought for thepossibility of experience.28

Focusing on the phrase ‘empirically determined’, I suggest that Kant is relying ona distinction, central to the Transcendental Aesthetic, between the transcendentalideality and the empirical reality of space. Kant holds that the ether is a necessarycondition for the existence of any empirical object in space and as such is a neces-sary condition for the empirical reality of space since the ether is necessary for anyempirical object to present itself to sensibility.29 Even so, this does not change thetranscendental ideality of space as an a priori form of intuition. The above passagesuggests that the relationship between the ether and space must be thought a priorias necessary. If this is correct, then the ether as material condition and space as for-

26 KrV: A 25/B 39–40: “unendliche gegebene Größe”.27 KrV: A 28/B 44.28 OP, AA 22: 316.11–15: “[…] das System der bewegenden Kräfte der Materie wird in diesem

gleich als den Sinnen vorliegenden (empirisch bestimmten) Raum nicht als von oder aus derErfahrung abgeleitetes sondern für die Moglichkeit der Erfahrung gedachtes Ganze […]”.See also 22: 293 and 22: 312–313.

29 Mathieu also discusses the ether as the realization of space, though not as a material real-ization but rather only as the realization of space’s unity. See Mathieu: Kants Opus post-umum, 54 and 120f.

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mal condition must be combined if there is to be a unity of the whole of possible ex-perience.30 Kant says as much:

The unity of space is a foundation of the unity of all outer experience if it is the topic of matterin general and it is particularly not experience rather only the outer perceptions which all be-long to one possible experience.31

One might wonder after all this talk of space, how the ether and time relate to oneanother. Kant does not say much about time specifically in Convolut 10. He merelygeneralizes his discussion of the one form of intuition to the other. Both Förster andMathieu may give us a reason for this apparent oversight. They compare Kant’sconception of the ether in the Übergang section of the OP to the Schematism sectionof KrV. Whereas in the latter Kant is providing a schema for time-determination, inthe former Kant is providing a schema for space-determination. Kant may havethought he had already established the empirical reality of time in the Schematismand this would account for why when Kant does mention time in Convolut 10, hesimply places it into the same context as when he describes space alone:

All the moving forces of matter constitute through the unity and collective relations in spaceand time a whole under principles of the motion of matter and also their affection of sense. –The coming together of elementary concepts into a system of physics.32

Assuming that Kant’s discussion of space extends to time, however, one ought tosay that the material condition for the empirical reality of time is the same as that ofspace. The addition of this material condition, however, marks a major differencebetween the account of space and time in KrV and the account provided in Con-volut 10. What is most important to note is that the systematic unity of the movingforces of matter (ether) as well as the forms of intuition are necessary conditionsfor the unity of the whole of possible experience. As the quote above suggests, how-ever, Kant hopes to achieve more than this. He also wants to establish a system ofphysics by bringing together the transcendental material condition for experiencewith the transcendental formal conditions for experience. This is an important partof Kant’s attempt to effect a transition from the metaphysical foundations of natu-

30 One might worry whether the combination of these transcendental material and formalconditions is sufficient or merely necessary for the unity of the whole of possible experi-ence? It seems ludicrous to think that the conditions of possible experience, either in theKrV or the OP might be sufficient to justify the details of that experience. I do not want toclaim that the transcendental conditions of experience are sufficient to establish the detailsof the whole of possible experience, though they are sufficient to establish the general con-ditions under which such a whole of possible experience would be unified.

31 OP, AA 22: 287.1–4: “Die Einheit des Raumes ist ein Grund der Einheit aller äußerenErfahrung wenn von Materie überhaupt die Rede ist und es giebt eigentlich nicht Erfahrun-gen sondern nur äußere Wahrnehmungen welche alle zu Einer möglichen Erfahrung gehö-ren […].”

32 OP, AA 22: 293.16–20: “Alle bewegende Kräfte der Materie machen durch die Einheit unddas Gesammtverhältnis im Raum und der Zeit ein Ganzes aus unter Bewegungsgesetzen derMaterie und auch den der Affection der Sinne. – Die Zusammenstellung der Elementar-begriffe zu einem System der Physik […].”


ral science to physics which, if successful, should bridge the gap in Kant’s Criticalphilosophy.

The addition of a transcendental material condition of experience in the EtherDeduction requires dramatic revisions to the way that the transcendental formalconditions of experience function empirically. Although I have dealt with the formsof intuition, Kant goes on to explain how the transcendental formal conditions ofexperience from the Transcendental Analytic must also be revised in their empiricalfunction.

As mentioned above, it is important to note that the concept of the ether must bea priori since the proof of the ether is itself a priori. It is no easy task, however, in-corporating the a priori concept of the transcendental material condition of experi-ence into the framework of KrV. This concept cannot be a category. Categories areconcepts of an object in general which take intuitions of actual objects and deter-mine them into cognitions with fully determined contents.33 The ether is, however,neither an actual object in any normal sense, nor does the subject have intuitions ofthe ether. The ether cannot be an object of experience on pain of undermining thea priori proof strategy of the Ether Deduction.

Likewise, the concept of the ether cannot be an empirical concept. Since the sub-ject has no sensible intuitions of the ether, there are no empirical marks which couldconstitute the concept. There seems to be an immediate problem with Kant’s pro-ject. Although the subject perceives physical objects a posteriori insofar as the sub-ject is affected by these objects in sensibility, the subject cannot perceive the etherthis way.34 This leaves unexplained how the ether concept can be applied objectivelyfor experience.

Kant’s solution in Convolut 10 is to say that the objective application of this con-cept for experience is effected through the principles of pure understanding. Unlikein KrV, where the principles have direct objective application to experience, in Con-volut 10, Kant sees the principles as effecting a transition from subjectivity to ob-jectivity. Objectivity is achieved only when the concept of the ether has been appliedthrough the principles of pure understanding resulting in the unity of the whole ofpossible experience. This reveals the formal role that the concept has as the a prioriconcept for transition. As Kant says in Convolut 10:

Transition to the concept: 1) Axioms of Intuition. 2) From the intuition to perception, percep-tion to experience Analogies. 3) subjective – 4) Transition to the unity of experience in one sys-tem of forces objective.35

33 See KrV: B XVI–XVIII, B 128, and B 137.34 See KrV: B 1, A 51/B 75, and A 35/B 5.35 OP, AA 22: 289.20–23: “Uberschritt zum Begriffe: 1) Axiome der Anschauung 2) Von

der Anschauung zur Warnehmung, Warnehmung zur Erfahrung Analogien 3) subiectiv –4) Uberschritt zur Einheit der Erfahrung in einem System der Krafte objective.” See also 22:292–293.

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Within the context of KrV, the principles are rules for the objective application ofthe categories.36 The ether concept is not, however, a category or an empirical con-cept. In contrast to what Förster and Mathieu claim but in accordance with Tusch-ling’s claim, it cannot be a mere idea of reason either since the object of this concept(ether) is meant to be actual given the conclusion of the Ether Deduction. Hence,this concept has a totally unique position within Kant’s now post-Critical system.37

It is not subservient to the categories, but rather the categories are subservient tothis concept via principles. With regard to the principles, in Convolut 10, Kant dis-cusses the Axioms of Intuition (quantity), Anticipations of Perception (quality), andthe Analogies of Experience (relation).38 Kant’s crucial point in Convolut 10 is thata subjective progression from intuition (Axioms) to perception (Anticipations) toexperience (Analogies) is required for the objective application of the ether conceptfor experience. The objective application of this concept is tantamount to establish-ing the objective validity and real applicability of the categories to the objects ofphysics given the role of the principles in the transition. Considering the above pro-gression beginning in intuition and ending in the unity of the whole of possible ex-perience, the principles are rules of synthesis.39

36 See KrV: A 161/B 200.37 This phrase was coined by Eckart Förster in Förster, Eckart: Kant’s Notion of Philosophy.

In: The Monist 72, 1989, 285. By labeling Kant’s moves in the OP “post-Critical”, I do notmean to imply that Kant’s views in the OP are necessarily inconsistent with his views fromthe Critical period, but rather that Kant both presupposes the latter while at the same timedeveloping it post-Critically.

38 Although Kant does not explicitly mention the Postulates of Empirical Thought in Convolut10, the way in which the ether concept is applied for experience follows the lessons of thePostulates. In the Principles section of KrV, Kant discusses the Second Postulate’s appli-cation to the case of ‘magnetic matter’ which though non-sensible is nevertheless actualin accordance with natural law. In this way, Kant says that one can “before the perceptionof a thing, and therefore comparatively a priori, cognize the existence of this thing [vor derWahrnehmung des Dinges, und also comparative a priori das Dasein desselben erkennen]”.See KrV: A 225–226/B 273–274. Kant’s Ether Deduction in the Übergang section and histransition project in Convolut 10 proceed in much the same way.

39 Although this is the general form of Kant’s transition project in Convolut 10, Förster dis-cusses further details. Specifically, the categories play a role in further determining thea priori ether concept. Although Kant sketches what such an Elementarsystem would looklike before beginning the Übergang section, he never seems fully satisfied with his con-clusions, continually abandoning drafts and beginning anew. Förster discusses Kant’sstruggles with the Elementarsystem in Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis, 13f. I believe whatmight be considered Kant’s considered position comes in Convolut 10 and is used by Försterlater in his discussion of the Selbstsetzungslehre. Following Kant (see OP, AA 22: 337),Förster says that the attributes of the moving forces of matter can be determined analyti-cally in accordance with the categories. Förster believes that the insertion of these categori-cally determined concepts by the subject in the Selbstsetzungslehre is tantamount to bridg-ing the gap he diagnoses in the Critical philosophy. I would go on to claim that thesecategorically determined concepts take on the role of principles in Kant’s post-Critical sys-tem. Since everything Förster says here is consistent with my discussion of Kant’s transitionproject in Convolut 10, one might wonder why Förster goes to such lengths in order to sep-


In KrV, the principles determine the form of experience since they serve as themeans by which apperception establishes the “synthetic unity of the manifold of ap-pearance in a possible experience”40. According to Kant, every object of experiencestands under the condition of this synthetic unity. In other words, the principles arethemselves objectively valid for every actual object. If Kant’s Ether Deduction issound, he has proven the existence of a dynamical material of which mechanicallyrelated empirical objects are mere second order determinations. Since the conceptof the systematic unity of the moving forces of matter simply is the a priori conceptof the ether, if the subjective transition to this concept is successful, then the unityof the whole of possible experience would be firmly grounded in both respects (ma-terially and formally).

Although perceptions are multitudinous and multifarious, there is only one unityof the whole of possible experience. Furthermore, the singularity of experience can-not be achieved without the concept of the systematic unity of the moving forcesof matter, i. e. the ether concept. Kant believes that without the absolute unity ofconsciousness that this concept makes possible, there would be only a fragmentarydistributive collection of perceptions which is itself insufficient for experience:

It is namely a particular territory (or if one wants a bridge) through which the borders of meta-physics must be brought into continuous connection [Zusammenhang] with physics and it is aperilous step (salto mortale) of which there is, between one shore and the other, a great gap thatis daring to jump. In order to be able to walk upon the ground of experience, involves makingnatural research for experience not from experience, according to principles of the possibilityof experience; because without having in hand principles a priori to this end we could notknow how to begin to make experience which does not come from a mere aggregate of percep-tions, because this lacks the form of uniting the outer manifold in a whole (the outer sensibleworld) as that which must be contained a priori in the understanding (the cogitabile) whenmatter is to be thought as an object of outer sense (the dabilie) in one doctrinal system ofphysics, of which the elementary system of the moving forces of matter can correspond […].Experience is absolute unity of the consciousness of the reality of a sensible object and thereis only one experience. When experiences are spoken of so one understands thereby only per-ceptions (empirical representations so far as they are aggregated with one another) which lackmuch to be raised to the validity of one experience and to be established as belonging to physicsbecause this should be a system, which can expect its truth only from the harmonization[Zusammenstimmung] of all perceptions united in one whole of the same which cannot occurfragmentarily.41

arate the gap problem from the transition project given the fact that the solution to theformer can be found in the latter. See Förster: Kant’s Final Synthesis, 111f.

40 KrV: A 158/B 197: “[…] der synthetischen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung ineiner möglichen Erfahrung […].”

41 OP, AA 22: 279.21–280.12, and 22: 280.21–28: “Es ist nämlich ein besonderes Territorium(oder wenn man will eine Brücke) wodurch die Grentzen der Metaphysik mit der Physik ineinen stetigen Zusammenhang gebracht werden müssen und es ist ein gefährlicher Schritt(salto mortale) von dem einen Ufer zu dem anderen wozwischen eine weite Kluft ist denSprung zu wagen, um auf den Boden der Erfahrung wandeln zu können, wozu aber nichtgehört aus Erfahrung sondern für die Erfahrung nach Principien der Möglichkeit derselbendie Naturforschung anzustellen; denn ohne zu diesem Behuf Grundsatze a priori bey Handzu haben wüßten wir nicht einmal wie wir es anfangen sollten eine Erfahrung zu machen

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This passage suggests that the application of the ether concept to perception hasthree purposes: (1) to effect the transition from the metaphysical foundations ofnatural science to physics which should establish the objective validity and realapplicability of the categories to the objects of physics (physics as a system a priori),(2) it is necessary for the unity of the whole of possible experience (one experience),and (3) it is required for the experience of any actual object [Gegenstand]. Funda-mentally, there is only one object and that is the ether. Individual perceptions orwhat one calls ‘experiences’ refer ultimately to this single object. The ontology ofthis strange claim has already been explained. Assuming that the Ether Deduction issound, individual objects of experience, of which the subject has multifarious per-ceptions, are simply second order determinations of the ether insofar as the etherserves as the material condition for the objects of experience. Kant emphasizes thispoint from the Übergang section here again in Convolut 10 saying the ether is the“raw material forming into bodies of determined regularity”42.

Although Kant’s objective ontology might be clear, how this ontology can be in-corporated into his theory of subjective consciousness is less so. In KrV, the mostthat can be expected of the understanding is a distributive unity of perceptions.43 InConvolut 10, however, Kant insists upon an absolute unity of consciousness. Kantexplains the move to absolute unity by suggesting that in order for the transition tobe effected distributive unity must have a priori a collective form:

This system of the principles of natural science is no propadeutic existing for itself as a pre-liminary doctrine, rather collective universality of principles, to make experience combinedwith distributive universality. – It is the transition itself from an empirical aggregate to a systemwhereof the form is given a priori.44

welche aus einem bloßen Aggregat von Warnehmungen nicht hervorgeht*, weil ihm dieForm der Vereinigung des äußeren Mannigfaltigen in einem Ganzen (der äußeren Sinnen-welt) abgeht als welche a priori im Verstande (das cogitabile) angetroffen werden muß wenndie Materie als Gegenstand der äußeren Sinne (das dabile) in einem Lehrsystem der Physikgedacht werden soll, welchem das Elementarsystem der bewegenden Kräfte der Materie cor-respondiren könne. […] *Erfahrung ist absolute Einheit des Bewustseyns der Wirklichkeiteines Sinnenobjects und es giebt nur eine Erfahrung. Wenn von Erfahrungen gesprochenwird so versteht man darunter nur Warnehmungen (empirische Vorstellungen so fern sieeinander aggregirt sind) denen noch viel fehlt um sie zur Gültigkeit einer Erfahrung zuerheben und als zur Physik gehörend aufzustellen weil diese ein System seyn soll, welchesseine Warheit nur von der Zusammenstimmung aller vereinigten Warnehmungen zu einemGanzen derselben erwartet welches nicht fragmentarisch geschehen kann.”

42 OP, AA 22: 315.5–6: “rohen Stoff in Korper von bestimmter Regelmaßigkeit bilden”.43 Although this is generally true in KrV, at one tantalizing point, Kant does claim the under-

standing is an “absolute unity” [absoluter Einheit] (A 67/B 92). Kant’s philosophical sup-port for this claim, however, comes only in the OP.

44 OP, AA 22: 288.1–6: “Dieses System der Grundsätze der NW. ist keine Propädeutik als fürsich bestehende PräliminarLehre sondern collective Allgemeinheit der Principien, Erfahrunganzustellen mit distributiver Allgemeinheit verbunden. – Es ist der Ubergang selbst voneinem empirischen Aggregat zu einem System wozu die Form a priori gegeben ist.”


In Convolut 10, the subject still has multitudinous perceptions of individual em-pirical objects. These perceptions and their aggregated distributive unity, however,must involve the ether concept as the collective and universal form of unity, conse-quentially bringing about the harmonization [Zusammenstimmung] of this dis-tributive unity within an absolute unity of consciousness. The distributive unity ofperceptions is itself insufficient to establish: 1) physics as a system a priori, 2) theunity of the whole of possible experience, or 3) the experience of any actual object[Gegenstand].

Just as there is an absolute unity of matter (ether), so must there be an absoluteunity of consciousness for there to be a unity of the whole of possible experience.The unity of the whole of possible experience requires that the absolute unity ofconsciousness (subjective) correspond necessarily with the totality of mind-inde-pendent empirical objects conditioned materially by the ether (objective). Thisnecessary correspondence is at least possible, since the concept of the systematicunity of the moving forces of matter is the a priori concept of the ether which is thetranscendental material condition of experience.

Although the progress to absolute unity begins empirically in intuition, the uni-versal and transcendental aspect of consciousness is a necessary formal conditionfor the particular and empirically directed aspect of consciousness. What accounts,however, for the necessary correspondence between the subjective and the objec-tive? Establishing this correspondence is a task that Kant saw for himself in Über-gang 12:

Nevertheless, the idea of this [physics as a system of perceptions] is subjective, given inevitablyas a necessary task [Aufgabe], namely the particular combination [Verknüpfung] of percep-tions as effects of moving forces on the subject in one experience. What can now belong toexperience, of which there can be only one, as determining ground of the same, is also givenobjectively, i. e. actual. Therefore, a matter exists with these attributes as basis of the movingforces of the same insofar as they are moving as an absolute whole.45

As mentioned earlier, Kant’s answer in Convolut 10 is that the principles of thepure understanding, in their role of objectively applying the ether concept to experi-ence, must be inserted [hineinlegen] into perception by a spontaneous act of con-sciousness.46 This systematic concept of unity is not derived from experience, butis ascertained a priori in the Ether Deduction, and is now inserted via principles forexperience in Convolut 10.47 It is important to note, however, that the concept itselfis insufficient to bring about an absolute unity for consciousness, but must be in-

45 OP, AA 21: 601.15–22: “Gleichwohl ist die Idee von diesem subjectiv, als nothwendige Auf-gabe unumgänglich gegeben nämlich die der Verknüpfung der Warnehmungen als Wir-kungen der bewegenden Kräfte auf das Subject in Einer Erfahrung Was nun zur Erfahrungdie nur Eine seyn kann als Bestimmungsgrund derselben gehört ist auch objektiv gegebend. i. wirklich. Also existirt eine Materie mit jenen Attributen als Basis der bewegendenKräfte derselben in so fern sie bewegend sind als ein absolutes Gantze.”

46 See OP, AA 22: 281, 297, 312, 316, and 337.47 See OP, AA 22: 291.

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serted into perception which changes the very nature of perception. The result is anecessary correspondence between the ether (objective) which is not itself an objectof experience and the absolute unity of consciousness conditioned by the insertionof the ether concept via principles (subjective).48 The objective application of thisconcept is tantamount to establishing the objective validity and real applicability ofthe categories to the objects of physics given the role of the principles in the objec-tive application of this concept. While bridging the gap that Förster diagnoses, Con-volut 10 also responds to Tuschling’s objection. Although the ether is not itself anobject of experience and perceptions are not themselves of the ether, Kant requiresneither in order to effect a transition.

As I will argue below, bridging this gap helps to solve some very deep problemswith the Critical philosophy, ones which Förster himself does not discuss, but whichare still of great importance today. At the heart of this discussion, will be an exam-ination of the subject’s activity of insertion which I attribute to apperception. I con-tend that post-Critical apperception serves not only to explain the subject’s activityin Convolut 10, but also to obviate those problems which attend Kant’s conceptionof apperception in the Critical period.

Section Three: Mind, World, and Apperception in Convolut 10

Kant’s desire to establish the necessary correspondence between consciousnessand the world is not new to the OP, nor is it unique to Kant. Establishing this har-mony between mind and world is of utmost importance for the Critical philosophythough I will argue the latter fails ultimately to establish such a harmony. Contem-porary philosophers inspired by Kant have themselves struggled with the sameissue. Wilfrid Sellars’ efforts to harmonize the ‘manifest’ and ‘scientific’ images ofthe world, Hilary Putnam’s theory of internal realism, as well as John McDowell’sattempt at bringing ‘friction’ to the conceptual sphere all illustrate the continuingrelevance of Kant’s project and the added importance of Convolut 10 if the Criticalphilosophy fails to complete this project itself.49 I mention these philosophers onlyin passing, though I will return briefly to Sellars’ case again below.

Although Kant’s stated goal in Convolut 10 is to establish matter in a system ofphysics a priori, Kant faced the very similar task of establishing the systematic unityof nature in KrV and in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (KU). In the A edi-tion of the Transcendental Analytic, Kant claims that the order and regularity of ap-pearances is a result of the subject actively inserting this order and regularity intoappearances a priori. The product is the unity of nature:

48 See OP, AA 22: 306–307.49 See Sellars, Wilfrid: Science, Perception, and Reality. New York 1963 and Science and

Metaphysics. New York 1968, Putnam, Hilary: Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge1981 and McDowell, John: Mind and World. Harvard 1996.


Thus we bring ourselves the order and regularity into the appearances, that we call nature,and could also find nothing there had we not, or the nature of our mind, originally inserted itthere. For this unity of nature should be a necessary, i. e. a priori certain unity of the combi-nation of the appearances. But how should we be able to establish a priori a synthetic unity, ifsubjective grounds of such unity were not contained a priori in the original sources of cognitionof our mind, and if these subjective conditions were not simultaneously objectively valid,in that they are the grounds of the possibility, to recognize in general an object [Objekt] in theexperience.50

Kant makes related claims throughout KrV. In the preface to the B edition of KrV,Kant says that “we cognize things a priori, only what we ourselves put into them”51.One example of this, which I discussed earlier, is the categories. The categoriesare the concept of an object in general, or in other words cognitions of an objecta priori.52 This cognition requires a certain activity on the part of the subject whichKant attributes to transcendental apperception. When describing the role of tran-scendental apperception as transcendental ground in the A edition of the Transcen-dental Analytic, Kant says:

Every necessity has a transcendental condition as its ground. Therefore, there must be a tran-scendental ground found for the unity of the consciousness, in the synthesis of the manifold ofall our intuitions, hence also of the concepts of objects [Objekte] in general, consequently alsoof all the objects [Gegenstände] of experience, without which it would be impossible to thinkof any object [Gegenstand] for our intuition.53

While serving as ground for the unity of consciousness, transcendental appercep-tion simultaneously produces the unity of nature.54 Whereas transcendental apper-ception governs the understanding, the understanding governs sensibility. Althoughtranscendental apperception can determine any given manifold into the cognition ofan object as well as provide cognition of the unity of nature in general, it cannotguarantee the unity of all possible manifolds. In other words, although transcenden-tal apperception brings about cognition of the unity of nature, it can neither bring

50 KrV, A 125: “Die Ordnung und Regelmäßigkeit also an den Erscheinungen, die wir Naturnennen, bringen wir selbst hinein und würden sie auch nicht darin finden können, hättenwir sie nicht, order die Natur unseres Gemüths ursprünglich hineingelegt. Denn diese Na-tureinheit soll eine notwendige, d. i. a priori gewisse Einheit der Verknüpfung der Erschei-nungen sein. Wie sollten wir aber wohl a priori eine synthetische Einheit auf die Bahnbringen können, wären nicht in den ursprünglichen Erkenntnißquellen unseres Gemüthssubjective Gründe solcher Einheit a priori enthalten, und wären diese subjective Bedin-gungen nicht zugleich objectiv gültig, indem sie die Gründe der Möglichkeit sein, überhauptein Object in der Erfahrung zu erkennen.” Emphasis added.

51 KrV, B XVIII: “[…] wir nämlich von den Dingen nur das a priori erkennen, was wir selbst insie legen.”

52 See KrV, B 128.53 KrV, A 106: “Aller Nothwendigkeit liegt jederzeit eine transscendentale Bedingung zum

Grunde. Also muß ein transscendentaler Grund der Einheit des Bewußtseins in der Synthesisdes Mannigfaltigen aller unserer Anschauungen, mithin auch der Begriffe der Objecte über-haupt, folglich auch aller Gegenstände der Erfahrung, angetroffen werden, ohne welchen esunmöglich wäre, zu unsern Anschauungen irgend einen Gegenstand zu denken […].”

54 See KrV, A 114.

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about the systematic unity of cognitions nor the corresponding systematic unity ofnature.

Kant discusses the systematic unity of cognitions in the appendix to the Transcen-dental Dialectic. Kant says there that the systematic unity of the understanding’scognitions can only be a projected unity, i. e. a mere idea of reason which cannot beproduced by the understanding itself. Reason must attempt, nevertheless, system-atically to unite its findings with understanding’s cognition of nature.55 Just as tran-scendental apperception produces the unity of nature qua cognition, the systematicunity of cognitions would produce a systematic unity of nature. There is no meansby which the subject can produce such a systematic unity of nature, so reason cansimply presuppose such a unity as objectively valid and necessary. This presupposi-tion is necessary, however, since without it there would be no coherent use of theunderstanding:

For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no reason, andwithout that no coherent use of the understanding, and because of this no sufficient mark ofempirical truth, and we must therefore in view of the latter presuppose the systematic unity ofnature as objectively valid and necessary.56

Kant’s claim here should give the reader pause. If there is “no sufficient mark ofempirical truth”, i. e. no guarantee of the “agreement of cognition with its object”,Kant’s whole theory of cognition might be undermined including the theory as de-veloped in the A edition of the Transcendental Analytic.57 This general worry can beexpressed through two closely related problems. 1) There is a ‘top-down’ problemfor Kant’s theory of experience. There may be a gap between the categories and ap-pearances insofar as there could be sets of appearances that cannot be fully deter-mined by means of the categories into cognitions of objects. 2) There is a ‘bot-tom-up’ problem for Kant’s theory of experience. There could be rogue objectswhich are capable of affecting the subject, producing appearances in sensibility,though these appearances are not fully determinable by means of the categories intocognitions.58 The general worry articulated through these two problems echoesFörster’s diagnosis of the gap in Kant’s Critical philosophy. Since the MAN fails toestablish the objective validity and real applicability of the categories to the objects

55 See KrV, B 675.56 KrV, B 679: “Denn das Gesetz der Vernunft, sie zu suchen, ist nothwendig, weil wir ohne

dasselbe gar keine Vernunft, ohne diese aber keinen zusammenhängenden Verstandes-gebrauch und in dessen Ermangelung kein zureichendes Merkmal empirischer Wahrheithaben würden, und wir also in Ansehung des letzteren die systematische Einheit der Naturdurchaus als objectiv gültig und nothwendig voraussetzen müssen.”

57 Agreement of cognition with its object is Kant’s nominal definition of truth. See KrV, A 58/B 82.

58 These problems were pointed out to me by Robert Hanna and should not be confused withwhat Friedman says in Kant and the Exact Sciences. Whereas Friedman’s worries have to dowith coordinating the different procedures of KrV/MAN and KU, the top-down and bot-tom-up problems under discussion here are internal to Kant’s theory of experience as pres-ented in KrV itself.


of physics, there is no guarantee that our concepts of what it is to be a physical ob-ject (the categories) can fully determine the appearances of these objects into cog-nitions. Without the agreement of cognition with its object, there is no sufficientmark of empirical truth. More troubling, perhaps, Kant says explicitly that thereare such undetermined manifolds of appearances in KU:

But there is such a manifold of forms in nature, likewise so many modifications of the univer-sal transcendental concepts of nature, that through those laws, which the pure understandinggives a priori, since these pertain only to the possibility of nature (as object of the senses) ingeneral, would be left undetermined, that there must also be laws for nature, as empirical,may seem to be accidental according to the insight of our understanding, but which, if theyshould be called principles (as is also required by the concept of nature), must be regardedas necessary from a principle of the unity of the manifold, even if the principle is unknownto us.59

Although Kant admits that there are undetermined manifolds in KU, he alsounderstands that establishing the systematic unity of nature is essential for his the-ory of cognition. Kant’s solution is to deploy the reflective power of judgment as thefaculty that stipulates a priori a transcendental principle for nature in order to bringabout the unity of nature’s empirical laws.60 Even so, the unity is merely presup-posed here, just as the systematic unity of nature was presupposed in the appendixto the Transcendental Dialectic.61

Kant’s project changes in Convolut 10 insofar as he believes that he need notmerely presuppose but can actually establish the necessary correspondence or har-mony of the subject’s cognitions with the systematic unity of nature a priori. Thesystematic unity of nature is itself deduced a priori in the Ether Deduction. The sys-tematic unity of the subject’s cognitions via the absolute unity of consciousness isestablished in Convolut 10 as is the harmonization of this absolute unity of con-sciousness with the systematic unity of nature. Kant’s project, if successful, wouldconsequently dispel the top-down/bottom up problems since there is no in principlediscontinuity between the systematic unity of nature and the subject’s cognition ofthis systematic unity. Dispelling this problem would safeguard Kant’s theory of cog-nition in the Transcendental Analytic by establishing the ‘sufficient mark of empiri-

59 KU, AA 05: 179.31–180.5: “Allein es sind so mannigfaltige Formen der Natur, gleichsam soviele Modificationen der allgemeinen transscendentalen Naturbegriffe, die durch jene Ge-setze, welche der reine Verstand a priori giebt, weil dieselben nur auf die Möglichkeit einerNatur (als Gegenstandes der Sinne) überhaupt gehen, unbestimmt gelassen werden, daßdafür doch auch Gesetze sein müssen, die zwar als empirische nach unserer Verstandesein-sicht zufällig sein mögen, die aber doch, wenn sie Gesetze heißen sollen (wie es auch der Be-griff einer Natur erfordert), aus einem, wenn gleich uns unbekannten, Princip der Einheitdes Mannigfaltigen als nothwendig angesehen werden müssen.”

60 KU, AA 05: 180. The transcendental principle required in KU is that of purposiveness[Zweckmäßigkeit]. Kant’s discussion of purposiveness in the KU and the OP, however, isquite complicated and is beyond the scope of this paper.

61 Kant says this at several points throughout the introduction to KU. See sections V, VII, andIX in particular. Mathieu points out the problems with this procedure in Mathieu: KantsOpus postumum, 43 and 242f.

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cal truth’ which Kant seems to lack in the appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic.This would, in turn, be tantamount to bridging the gap that Förster diagnoses in theCritical philosophy. There is a serious systematic problem for the Critical philos-ophy, however, if Kant is not successful in Convolut 10.

This is a problem not only for Kant, but also for Sellars’ own undertaking. Just asduring the Critical period Kant could only presuppose the systematic unity of na-ture as a regulative ideal, Sellars can only presuppose the possibility of some finalphysics through which the scientific image of the world might replace the manifestimage.62 Much as Kant, however, Sellars has no way of establishing the possibilityof such a final physics.63 Two questions might be raised for Sellars, one epistemo-logical, one metaphysical. Insofar as the theoretical entities of the scientific imageare supposed to explain away the common sense objects of the manifest image, howdo we know when we have the right explanations? Furthermore, wouldn’t such ex-planations presuppose a final physical theory or scientific image that could do theexplaining? This image could explain away the manifest image since it would notitself be susceptible to being explained away by some future physical theory. Al-though Kant’s project is one of harmonization instead of elimination, the success ofhis undertaking in Convolut 10 could have important implications for the viabilityof Sellars’ own project. Kant now believes he need not merely presuppose but canactually establish the systematic unity of nature (physics as a system) a priori. Thiswould be tantamount to establishing the framework of a final physics or final scien-tific image where the epistemological concerns outlined above might be obviated byKant’s a priori method. This method, however, is still far from clear. Exactly how isKant going to bridge the gap in the Critical philosophy, consequently harmonizingthe subject’s cognitions with nature a priori?

Just as apperception plays a large role in every phase of the Critical project, somust apperception continue to serve an important role post-Critically insofar as it isrequired to bridge this gap in the Critical philosophy. Although it has already beenestablished that apperception is the transcendental ground for the activity of inser-tion a priori, apperception is, within the context of the Critical project, capable ofbringing about only a distributive unity of perceptions. Kant claims post-Critically,however, that this distributive unity of perceptions is by itself insufficient to meetthe goals of transition in Convolut 10. There apperception must perform two taskssimultaneously: 1) it must insert the principles into perception, and 2) combinethese perceptions into the absolute unity of consciousness. This is a much strongersense of unity than the distributive unity of perceptions in KrV. Although Kant does

62 See Sellars: Science, Perception, and Reality, 20. Whereas the scientific image of the world isone of theoretical entities postulated by scientific theories, the manifest image is one of per-sons and their common sense objects of experience. Although Sellars believes that the lattercan be explained away by the theoretical entities of the scientific image, he does not hold thesame eliminative view for the former especially when it comes to the network of rights andduties within which persons are bound together in a community. See ibid., 39.

63 See ibid., 37.


not discuss apperception by name in Convolut 10, its role is exposed through Kant’suse of the term ‘spontaneity’:

Physics is the principle containing the subjective aspect of the perception of moving forces atthe same time as the objective aspect of connecting these perceptions to ground experience andthe spontaneity of this combination, the form accordingly precedes the receptivity of movingforces a priori and this serves as a law which is possible only though the relation to a system ofthe empirical of cognition, not however an empirical system (contrad. in adjecto).64

Apperception is the cognitive faculty that spontaneously brings about the unity ofperceptions in consciousness while at the same time conditioning perceptions them-selves a priori. In Convolut 10, perceptions are conditioned ultimately by the apriori ether concept. When the distributive unity of perceptions is harmonizedwithin this concept, an absolute unity of consciousness is generated which is itselfharmonized with the systematic unity of the moving forces of matter. There is no inprinciple discontinuity between the external world and the subject’s conscious rep-resentation of it, since the ultimate conceptual condition of consciousness is simplythe concept of the ultimate material condition of the external world.

Post-Critical apperception, through spontaneity, (1) applies the form for the re-ceptivity of moving forces of matter by inserting [hineinlegen] the principles intoperception, and (2) is the vehicle for harmonizing [Zusammenstimmung] the dis-tributive unity of perceptions within an absolute unity of consciousness. The ‘form’described in (1) is the ether concept which when inserted into perception via prin-ciples harmonizes the distributive unity of perceptions within an absolute unity ofconsciousness (2). This unity corresponds necessarily with the systematic unity ofthe moving forces of matter. It is harmonized with the ether via the objects of ex-perience which affect the subject through sensibility. In this latter respect, the ether,as the systematic unity of the moving forces of matter, is the material conditionfor the absolute unity of consciousness, whereas the conceptual conditions are, ofcourse, the categories (via principles), as well as the ether concept. The absoluteunity of consciousness, as the final product of synthesis, is the result of the objectiveapplication of this latter concept. Since the concept of the systematic unity of themoving forces of matter is simply the concept of the ether and perceptions are them-selves ultimately generated by the ether, Kant can guarantee the harmony betweenthe absolute unity of consciousness (objective application of the concept of the sys-tematic unity of the moving forces of matter) and the ether, by inserting this conceptthrough an act of apperception into perceptions a priori via principles. The belowdiagram attempts to summarize Kant’s project in Convolut 10:

64 OP, AA 22: 297.17–24: “Die Physik ist das Princip das Subjective der Warnehmung derbewegenden Kräfte zugleich als das Objective der Verknüpfung derselben zur Gründung derErfahrung enthalte und die Spontaneitat der Zusammensetzung, der Form nach a priori vorder Receptivität der bewegenden Krafte vorhergehe und dieser zur Regel diene welches nurdurch Beziehung auf ein System des Empirischen der Erkentnis, nicht aber ein empirischesSystem (contrad. in adjecto) möglich ist.” See also 21: 572–573, 578, and 22: 316.

208 Bryan Hall

Section Four: A Concluding Objection

Kenneth Westphal has put forward an argument recently that is potentially dev-astating to my thesis. On pain of subjective idealism, he argues, Kant must admitthe existence of a transcendental material condition of experience. According toWestphal, however, such an admission undermines Kant’s Transcendental Idealismsince the latter allows only for transcendental formal conditions of experience con-sequently prohibiting the cognition of objects that are transcendentally real.65 Thisis an important objection to my thesis since, if Westphal is right, the addition of theether as a transcendental material condition of experience in the Ether Deduction

65 See Westphal: Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism, 68f.

Subjective

Con

cept

ual

Con

diti

on

Categories,Ether Concept

Principles:Axioms,Anticipations,Analogies ofExperience

Apperception

(Ins

erti

on)

[hin

einl

egen

]

Absolute Unity ofConsciousness for:1) Physics as System2) Unity of the Whole of

Possible Experience3) Experience of any Actual

Object [Gegenstand]

(Harmonization)

[Zusammenstimmung]

DistributiveUnity ofPerceptions

Aff

ecti

on

Objects ofExperience

Harmonization [Zusammenstimmung]Subjective/Objective“Unity of the Whole of PossibleExperience” M

ater

ial

Con

diti

on

Ether(Systematic Unityof the MovingForces of Matter) Objective


would itself undermine Kant’s Critical philosophy under the assumption that theether is transcendentally real, i. e. a thing-in-itself or noumenal object. I believe,however, that there is another way of understanding Kant’s transcendental materialcondition of experience.

Transcendental philosophy is concerned with establishing the conditions for thepossibility of experience and the unity of that experience, whereas TranscendentalRealism need not make any appeal to the experience of creatures like us when es-tablishing its conclusions. In transcendental philosophy, consciousness plays a con-stitutive role. Going back to KrV, this constitutes the heart of Kant’s critique ofTranscendental Realism (i. e. early modern Rationalism) as a philosophical posi-tion. The metaphysical speculation of Transcendental Realism has no place in tran-scendental philosophy insofar as Transcendental Realism concerns itself with estab-lishing the actuality of objects which may bear no connection “with the materialconditions of experience”, i. e. with the material conditions of conscious experiencefor creatures like us.66 In contrast to these forms of metaphysical speculation,Kant’s Ether Deduction not only establishes the actuality of an object that bears aconnection with the material conditions of experience, but also one whose connec-tion with the actual “is determined in accordance with the general conditions of ex-perience”67. Hence, the ether is not only actual, but in accordance with the ThirdPostulate of Empirical Thought, also materially necessary. There is, consequently,an important difference between the way Kant understands the actuality of theether and the way that Transcendental Realism understands actuality. Whereastranscendental philosophy must always bear in mind the limitations placed upon itby the Postulates of Empirical Thought, classic metaphysics need not recognize anysuch limitations. One can see this latter type of thinking exemplified in Descartes’theory of extension as well as Leibniz’s theory of monads.

Updating Kant’s conception of material transcendental necessity, the necessity ofthe ether can be understood in the following way: in all and only possible worldswhere there is a unity of the whole of possible experience and creatures cognitivelysimilar enough to us, the ether exists. Material transcendental necessity is bestunderstood as a kind of restricted nomological necessity. Beyond the cognitive re-striction, transcendentally possible worlds involve certain natural restrictions aswell given the fact that there is a unity of the whole of possible experience in theseworlds. What experience is must be held constant. The natural laws of transcenden-tally possible worlds must be similar enough to the actual world’s natural laws suchthat affective relations between spatiotemporal objects and receptive subjects stillobtain. The cognitive subject must be embodied so that the objects external to it caneffect it as sensible thing consequently affecting it as cognitive subject. There must

66 See the Second Postulate of Empirical Thought, KrV, A 218/B 266: “Was mit den materialenBedingungen der Erfahrung (der Empfindung) zusammenhängt, ist wirklich.”

67 See the Third Postulate of Empirical Thought, KrV, A 218/B 266: “Dessen Zusammenhangmit dem Wirklichen nach allgemeinen Bedingungen der Erfahrung bestimmt ist, ist (existirt)nothwendig.”

210 Bryan Hall

be objects in these worlds similar enough to the objects in the actual world such thatthese objects are capable of affecting the subject. As Kant says throughout KrV,outer experience of actual objects [Gegenstände] is a necessary condition for experi-ence überhaupt.68 Outer experience in Kant’s sense requires that actual objects af-fect receptive subjects in sensibility.

I have described the ether as transcendentally necessary in order to emphasizethat it enjoys the same modal status as the other transcendentally necessary formalconditions of experience, viz. space, time, categories, and apperception. As men-tioned above, however, the transcendental necessity of the ether in particular, how-ever, corresponds closely to Kant’s conception of ‘material necessity’ in the ThirdPostulate. It is important to note that Kant there also explicitly distinguishes ma-terial necessity from logical or formal necessity.69 As one should see at this point,Kant’s conception of the ether does not commit him to Transcendental Realism andits claims of metaphysical necessity. Material transcendental necessity is simply afar more circumspect modal position whose proper subject is the conditions for thepossibility of experience determined in accordance with the Postulates of EmpiricalThought. The conclusion of the Ether Deduction, a conclusion which is presup-posed for the transition project of Convolut 10, establishes only the material tran-scendental necessity of the ether. This is modally weaker than the metaphysicallynecessary transcendental realist position that Westaphal attributes to Kant.

The post-Critical theory that emerges in Convolut 10 should not be seen as anabandonment of the Critical project. On the contrary, only Kant’s post-Critical sys-tem is capable of bridging the gap within the Critical philosophy diagnosed byFörster, using a transition method similar to the one described by Mathieu, whileadopting Tuschling’s view on the ontological status of the ether. Convolut 10 alsoserves to solve other major problems within the framework of the Critical philos-ophy. With regard to the appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant is able toestablish the systematic unity of nature as well as the systematic unity of the sub-ject’s cognitions (absolute unity of consciousness) a priori. The harmonization[Zusammenstimmung] of the subjective and the objective solves the top-down/bot-tom-up problems since there is no in principle discontinuity between nature and thesubject’s cognition of nature. This coming together of the subjective systematicunity of cognitions and the objective systematic unity of nature establishes the ‘suf-ficient mark of empirical truth’ and consequently safeguards Kant’s theory of cog-nition in the Transcendental Analytic by dispelling the worries of the appendix tothe Transcendental Dialectic. Establishing the sufficient mark of empirical truth islikewise tantamount to demonstrating the objective validity and real applicabilityof the categories. The conjunction of the Ether Deduction and Convolut 10 is bestviewed then as the post-Critical culmination of Kant’s Critical project. The culmi-nation of this project should not be taken, however, as a mere footnote to history. It

68 See especially the Refutation of Idealism KrV, B 274–275 and B 1.69 See KrV, A 226/B 279.


remains relevant today insofar as other philosophers, inspired by Kant’s undertak-ing, have attempted to bring about similar results. Kant’s project, if successful,should not serve merely as inspiration, but also as a compelling model in its ownright for how mind and world might be brought into harmony.70

70 I would like to thank Robert Hanna, Walter Ott, and Burkhard Tuschling for their helpfulsuggestions on versions of this paper. Thanks also to Joe Pitt for his thoughts on Sellars. Fin-ally, thanks to the anonymous referee at this journal whose comments were of great value inrevising this paper for publication.

Effecting a Transition: How to Fill the Gap in Kant's System of Critical Philosophy

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