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Reconstruction and regional diplomacy in the Persian Gulf ROOSHAKG AMIRAIIMADI Edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar London and New York
10

Edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessaramirahmadi.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/... · 2017. 2. 12. · Introduction Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar The Persian

Jan 30, 2021

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  • Reco

    nstru

    ctio

    n an

    d re

    gion

    al d

    iplo

    mac

    y in

    the

    Pers

    ian

    Gul

    f

    ROOS

    HAKG

    AMIR

    AIIM

    ADI

    Edite

    d by

    Ho

    osha

    ng A

    mira

    hmad

    i an

    d Na

    der E

    ntes

    sar

    Lon

    don

    and

    New

    Yor

    k

  • Part

    I

    Pers

    ian

    Gulf

    in tu

    rmoi

    l: po

    litic

    al a

    nd e

    cono

    mic

    di

    men

    sion

    s

  • Intro

    duct

    ion

    Hoos

    hang

    Am

    irahm

    adi a

    nd N

    ader

    Ent

    essa

    r

    The

    Pers

    ian

    Gul

    f is

    argu

    ably

    the

    mos

    t vol

    atile

    and

    mili

    tariz

    ed

    regi

    on in

    the

    Third

    Wor

    ld. T

    he c

    ombi

    natio

    n of

    pol

    itica

    l vol

    atili

    ty

    and

    mili

    tariz

    atio

    n ha

    s mad

    e th

    e G

    ulf s

    usce

    ptib

    le to

    out

    side

    inte

    r-ve

    ntio

    n an

    d re

    gion

    al p

    ower

    pla

    ys. T

    he e

    ight

    -yea

    r war

    bet

    wee

    n Ir

    an a

    nd Ir

    aq, I

    raq'

    s in

    vasi

    on a

    nd o

    ccup

    atio

    n of

    Kuw

    ait o

    n 2

    Aug

    ust 1

    990

    and

    the

    US-

    led

    war

    aga

    inst

    Iraq

    in d

    efen

    ce o

    f Am

    eri-

    can

    inte

    rest

    s, th

    e Sa

    udi m

    onar

    chy

    and

    the

    al-S

    abah

    rule

    in K

    uwai

    t ar

    e co

    ncre

    te e

    xam

    ples

    of t

    he a

    fore

    men

    tione

    d re

    ality

    . T

    he c

    risi

    s in

    the

    Pers

    ian

    Gul

    f gen

    erat

    ed b

    y Ir

    aqi P

    resi

    dent

    Sa

    ddam

    Hus

    sein

    's ga

    mbl

    e on

    Kuw

    ait h

    as p

    rovi

    ded

    the

    Uni

    ted

    Stat

    es w

    ith a

    win

    dow

    of o

    ppor

    tuni

    ty to

    est

    ablis

    h, in

    the

    wor

    ds o

    f on

    e an

    alys

    t, `s

    trate

    gic

    brid

    gehe

    ads,

    sec

    ure

    the

    Gul

    f, an

    d en

    sure

    th

    at it

    reta

    ins

    a vi

    rtual

    mon

    opol

    y on

    glo

    bal v

    iole

    nce'.

    ' US

    troop

    de

    ploy

    men

    t in

    the

    regi

    on u

    nder

    the

    rubr

    ic o

    f Ope

    ratio

    n D

    eser

    t Sh

    ield

    , and

    thei

    r suc

    cess

    ful u

    se a

    gain

    st Ir

    aq in

    Ope

    ratio

    n D

    eser

    t St

    orm

    , will

    test

    the

    prin

    cipl

    es o

    f the

    em

    ergi

    ng B

    ush

    Doc

    trine

    . Thi

    s do

    ctrin

    e en

    visio

    ns a

    pos

    t-Col

    d W

    ar g

    loba

    l arra

    ngem

    ent d

    omin

    ated

    by

    the

    Uni

    ted

    Stat

    es, w

    ith w

    este

    rn E

    urop

    e, Ja

    pan

    and

    the

    form

    er

    Sovi

    et U

    nion

    act

    ing

    as ju

    nior

    par

    tner

    s. A

    s sta

    ted

    mor

    e bl

    untly

    by

    Mic

    hael

    Vla

    hos,

    dire

    ctor

    of t

    he U

    S St

    ate

    Dep

    artm

    ent's

    Cen

    ter f

    or

    the

    Stud

    y of

    For

    eign

    Affa

    irs:

    If w

    e m

    arch

    ed ri

    ght i

    nto

    Bag

    hdad

    , bro

    ught

    Sad

    dam

    Hus

    sein

    ba

    ck in

    a c

    age

    and

    para

    ded

    him

    dow

    n Pe

    nnsy

    lvan

    ia A

    venu

    e,

    the

    wor

    ld w

    ould

    take

    not

    ice.

    We

    wou

    ld h

    ave

    grea

    t fre

    edom

    of

    actio

    n in

    the

    wor

    ld fo

    r the

    nex

    t 10

    to 2

    0 ye

    ars,

    ... P

    eopl

    e w

    ould

    tru

    ly re

    spec

    t us,

    and

    if w

    e sa

    id th

    at w

    e di

    dn't

    like

    wha

    t the

    y di

    d, th

    ey'd

    sit

    up a

    nd ta

    ke n

    otic

    e.'

    Far f

    rom

    cre

    atin

    g a

    wor

    ld su

    bmis

    sive

    to th

    e w

    ill o

    f Was

    hing

    ton,

  • 4 Pe

    rsia

    n G

    ulf i

    n tu

    rmoi

    l In

    trod

    ucti

    on 5

    this

    hege

    mon

    ic c

    once

    ptio

    n of

    the

    USA

    's re

    -em

    ergi

    ng g

    loba

    l rol

    e co

    uld,

    in th

    e lo

    ng ru

    n, le

    ad to

    law

    less

    ness

    , cha

    os a

    nd in

    stabi

    lity.

    Th

    is is

    esp

    ecia

    lly tr

    ue in

    the

    vola

    tile

    regi

    on o

    f the

    Mid

    dle

    East

    . Th

    eref

    ore,

    it is

    impe

    rativ

    e th

    at th

    e lit

    tora

    l sta

    tes o

    f the

    Per

    sian

    G

    ulf t

    ake

    serio

    us st

    eps t

    o fo

    rm re

    gion

    al se

    curit

    y ar

    rang

    emen

    ts to

    gu

    aran

    tee

    the

    secu

    rity

    and

    terri

    toria

    l int

    egrit

    y of

    all

    state

    s in

    the

    area

    , and

    to o

    bvia

    te th

    e ne

    ed fo

    r any

    futu

    re o

    utsi

    de m

    ilita

    ry

    inte

    rven

    tion

    whi

    ch in

    varia

    bly

    will

    lead

    to d

    isastr

    ous c

    onsq

    uenc

    es

    for t

    he re

    gion

    . W

    hen

    Pres

    iden

    t Geo

    rge

    Bus

    h di

    spat

    ched

    US

    troop

    s to

    Saud

    i A

    rabi

    a in

    Aug

    ust 1

    990,

    he

    iden

    tifie

    d fo

    ur g

    oals

    for U

    S po

    licy

    in

    the r

    egio

    n:

    1 un

    cond

    ition

    al w

    ithdr

    awal

    of I

    raqi

    forc

    es fr

    om K

    uwai

    t 2

    resto

    ratio

    n of

    the

    al-S

    abah

    fam

    ily a

    s the

    legi

    timat

    e go

    vern

    men

    t of

    Kuw

    ait

    3 pr

    otec

    tion

    of th

    e liv

    es o

    f Am

    eric

    an c

    itize

    ns in

    Kuw

    ait a

    nd Ir

    aq

    4 de

    fenc

    e of

    Sau

    di A

    rabi

    a an

    d a

    com

    mitm

    ent t

    o th

    e se

    curit

    y an

    d sta

    bilit

    y of

    the

    Pers

    ian

    Gul

    f reg

    ion.

    ' A

    long

    with

    oth

    er U

    S of

    ficia

    ls, h

    e al

    so sp

    oke

    of S

    adda

    m's

    dang

    er

    to w

    orld

    pea

    ce a

    nd 'A

    mer

    ican

    way

    of l

    ife'.

    It is

    the

    Pers

    ian

    Gul

    f sec

    urity

    obj

    ectiv

    e th

    at m

    ay h

    ave

    far-

    reac

    hing

    and

    unp

    redi

    ctab

    le im

    plic

    atio

    ns fo

    r reg

    iona

    l sta

    bilit

    y. A

    s Pr

    esid

    ent B

    ush

    has m

    ade

    it cl

    ear,

    the

    Uni

    ted

    Stat

    es p

    lan

    to u

    se

    its m

    ilita

    ry v

    icto

    ry in

    the

    Pers

    ian

    Gul

    f to

    just

    ify e

    stab

    lishi

    ng a

    lo

    ng-te

    rm a

    nd p

    erm

    anen

    t mili

    tary

    pre

    senc

    e in

    the

    regi

    on. T

    hus,

    the

    first

    am

    ong

    the

    four

    obj

    ectiv

    es h

    e ou

    tline

    d fo

    r the

    pos

    t-war

    M

    iddl

    e Ea

    st w

    as 't

    o cr

    eate

    shar

    ed se

    curit

    y ar

    rang

    emen

    ts in

    the

    regi

    on', w

    hich

    in P

    resid

    ent B

    ush's

    wor

    d m

    eans

    'Am

    eric

    an p

    artic

    i-pa

    tion

    in jo

    int e

    xerc

    ises i

    nvol

    ving

    bot

    h ai

    r and

    gro

    und

    forc

    es', a

    nd

    'mai

    ntai

    ning

    a ca

    pabl

    e US

    nava

    l pre

    senc

    e in

    the r

    egio

    n'. T

    he o

    ther

    th

    ree o

    bjec

    tives

    incl

    uded

    `to

    cont

    rol t

    he p

    rolif

    erat

    ion

    of w

    eapo

    ns o

    f m

    ass d

    estru

    ctio

    n an

    d th

    e m

    issile

    s use

    d to

    del

    iver

    them

    ', `to

    cre

    ate

    new

    opp

    ortu

    nitie

    s for

    pea

    ce a

    nd st

    abili

    ty in

    the

    Mid

    dle

    East

    by

    endi

    ng th

    e A

    rab-

    Isra

    eli c

    onfli

    ct a

    nd so

    lvin

    g th

    e Pa

    lesti

    nian

    pro

    b-le

    m b

    ased

    on

    the

    Uni

    ted

    Nat

    ions

    Sec

    urity

    Cou

    ncil

    Res

    olut

    ions

    24

    2 an

    d 33

    8 an

    d th

    e pr

    inci

    ple

    of te

    rrito

    ry fo

    r pea

    ce', a

    nd to

    'fos

    ter

    econ

    omic

    dev

    elop

    men

    t for

    the

    sake

    of p

    eace

    and

    pro

    gres

    s and

    ec

    onom

    ic fr

    eedo

    m a

    nd p

    rosp

    erity

    for a

    ll pe

    ople

    of t

    he re

    gion

    ':' W

    hate

    ver t

    he fo

    rm an

    d co

    nten

    ts of

    the r

    egio

    nal s

    ecur

    ity sy

    stem

    , th

    e pl

    ayer

    s in

    the

    Pers

    ian

    Gul

    f will

    hav

    e to

    incl

    ude

    such

    cou

    ntrie

    s

    as Ir

    an, I

    raq

    and

    the

    Gul

    f Co-

    oper

    atio

    n C

    ounc

    il (G

    CC

    ) sta

    tes.

    How

    ever

    , the

    initi

    al p

    ropo

    sals

    for t

    he P

    ersia

    n G

    ulf s

    ecur

    ity sy

    stem

    di

    d no

    t env

    isio

    n an

    y ro

    le fo

    r Ira

    n or

    Iraq

    . Whi

    le Ir

    aq m

    ay n

    ot

    be an

    impo

    rtant

    pla

    yer f

    or th

    e im

    med

    iate

    futu

    re, I

    ran

    has e

    mer

    ged

    stron

    ger f

    rom

    the

    crisi

    s as i

    ts ol

    d ne

    mes

    is be

    cam

    e m

    ilita

    rily

    neu-

    traliz

    ed. A

    dditi

    onal

    ly, I

    ran

    is a c

    ount

    ry w

    ith si

    gnifi

    cant

    reso

    urce

    s an

    d po

    tent

    ials,

    incl

    udin

    g a

    larg

    e po

    pula

    tion

    of 5

    7 m

    illio

    n, a

    size

    -ab

    le m

    ilita

    ry fo

    rce,

    the

    long

    est c

    oast

    line

    with

    the

    Pers

    ian

    Gul

    f th

    an a

    ny si

    ngle

    stat

    e in

    the

    area

    and

    a u

    niqu

    e ge

    ogra

    phic

    pos

    ition

    in

    the

    stra

    tegi

    c St

    rait

    of H

    orm

    uz. I

    f pas

    t exp

    erie

    nce

    is o

    f any

    in

    dica

    tion,

    Iran

    will

    con

    tinue

    to p

    rese

    rve

    its n

    atio

    nal s

    ecur

    ity

    inte

    rests

    in th

    e ar

    ea. T

    hus,

    it is

    likel

    y th

    at Ir

    an w

    ill re

    -em

    erge

    as

    a pi

    vota

    l cou

    ntry

    in sh

    apin

    g th

    e co

    ntou

    rs o

    f reg

    iona

    l pol

    itics

    in

    the

    twen

    ty-fi

    rst c

    entu

    ry. I

    t is f

    or th

    ese

    reas

    ons t

    hat t

    his b

    ook

    has

    an Ir

    an-c

    entre

    d ap

    proa

    ch to

    the

    issue

    s of r

    egio

    nal d

    iplo

    mac

    y an

    d po

    st-w

    ar ec

    onom

    ic re

    cove

    ry.

    The

    book

    focu

    ses o

    n fo

    ur m

    ajor

    them

    es: I

    slam

    and

    revo

    lutio

    n,

    econ

    omic

    des

    truct

    ion

    and

    reco

    nstru

    ctio

    n, Ir

    ania

    n-A

    rab

    rela

    tions

    an

    d th

    e su

    perp

    ower

    s and

    Iran

    . The

    con

    tribu

    tors

    hav

    e pr

    esen

    ted

    diffe

    ring

    pers

    pect

    ives

    to an

    alys

    e the

    se is

    sues

    and

    indi

    cate

    pos

    sible

    fu

    ture

    dev

    elop

    men

    ts. T

    he fo

    llow

    ing

    conc

    lusi

    ons e

    mer

    ge: f

    irst,

    influ

    ence

    of t

    he Ir

    ania

    n Re

    volu

    tion

    has g

    one

    wel

    l bey

    ond

    Iran

    to

    effe

    ct in

    tern

    al d

    evel

    opm

    ents

    in o

    ther

    nat

    ions

    in th

    e re

    gion

    ; suc

    h in

    fluen

    ce, h

    owev

    er, h

    as n

    ot p

    rodu

    ced

    any

    signi

    fican

    t per

    man

    ent

    polit

    ical

    -eco

    nom

    ic ch

    ange

    in th

    e reg

    ion.

    Sec

    ond,

    des

    pite

    its e

    con-

    omic

    dec

    line i

    n th

    e pos

    t-rev

    olut

    iona

    ry p

    erio

    d, Ir

    an m

    ay em

    erge

    as

    a re

    gion

    al e

    cono

    mic

    pow

    er in

    the

    near

    futu

    re a

    s it c

    hang

    es it

    s po

    licie

    s tow

    ard

    a m

    ore

    outw

    ard-

    look

    ing

    strat

    egy.

    Thi

    rd, I

    rani

    an

    postu

    re v

    is-à-

    vis t

    he li

    ttora

    l sta

    tes

    of th

    e Pe

    rsia

    n G

    ulf h

    as h

    ad

    little

    con

    siste

    ncy

    in th

    e pa

    st; m

    ore

    rece

    ntly

    , how

    ever

    , ele

    men

    ts of

    pr

    agm

    atis

    m h

    ave

    begu

    n to

    dom

    inat

    e Ir

    ania

    n re

    gion

    al p

    olic

    y.

    Four

    th, t

    he Ir

    ania

    n fo

    reig

    n po

    licy

    prin

    cipl

    e of

    'Nei

    ther

    Eas

    t Nor

    W

    est'

    had

    the

    effe

    ct o

    f ant

    agon

    izin

    g bo

    th su

    perp

    ower

    s, al

    thou

    gh

    in p

    ract

    ical

    term

    s it h

    ad a

    lim

    ited

    appl

    icat

    ion.

    In sh

    ort,

    gaps

    hav

    e ex

    iste

    d be

    twee

    n th

    e ac

    tual

    per

    form

    ance

    and

    the

    pote

    ntia

    l in

    the

    real

    m o

    f eco

    nom

    ics a

    s wel

    l as b

    etw

    een

    polic

    y pr

    onou

    ncem

    ents

    and

    the

    prac

    tice

    of re

    gion

    al d

    iplo

    mac

    y in

    the

    Isla

    mic

    Rep

    ublic

    . The

    re

    sulti

    ng c

    ontra

    dict

    ions

    hav

    e be

    com

    e m

    ajor

    cau

    ses f

    or th

    e re

    cent

    ch

    ange

    s in

    Iran

    tow

    ard

    mor

    e pr

    agm

    atism

    and

    con

    vent

    iona

    lism

    in

    both

    econ

    omic

    and

    fore

    ign

    polic

    y ar

    enas

    . In

    Par

    t II o

    f the

    boo

    k, th

    e ro

    le o

    f Isla

    m a

    nd th

    e sig

    nific

    ance

    of

  • 6 Pe

    rsia

    n G

    ulf i

    n tu

    rmoi

    l In

    trod

    uctio

    n 7

    Iran

    's Is

    lam

    ic R

    evol

    utio

    n ar

    e exa

    min

    ed. N

    ikki

    Ked

    die i

    dent

    ifies

    hi

    storic

    al re

    ason

    s for

    the e

    mer

    genc

    e and

    cont

    inua

    tion

    of re

    volu

    tion-

    ary

    thou

    ght a

    nd a

    ctio

    n in

    mod

    ern

    Iran

    and

    trea

    ts Ir

    ania

    n R

    evo-

    lutio

    n in

    hist

    oric

    al p

    ersp

    ectiv

    e. K

    eddi

    e's c

    hapt

    er a

    lso p

    rovi

    des a

    su

    ccin

    ct o

    verv

    iew

    of t

    he h

    istor

    ical

    role

    of t

    he u

    lama

    (Mus

    lim cl

    eri-

    cal s

    chol

    ars)

    in o

    ppos

    ing

    fore

    ign

    dom

    inat

    ion

    of th

    e cou

    ntry

    . The

    18

    90-2

    Tob

    acco

    Rev

    olt i

    s illu

    stra

    tive

    of h

    ow th

    e Sh

    i'a c

    leri

    cs

    led

    a m

    ass-

    base

    d re

    belli

    on a

    gain

    st N

    asse

    r ed-

    din

    Shah

    's to

    bacc

    o co

    nces

    sions

    to th

    e Bri

    tish.

    The

    197

    8-9

    Isla

    mic

    Rev

    olut

    ion

    agai

    nst

    the

    Pahl

    avi m

    onar

    chy

    shou

    ld p

    ot b

    e in

    terp

    rete

    d as

    an

    isola

    ted

    case

    but

    as t

    he lo

    gica

    l con

    tinua

    tion

    of m

    ass-

    base

    d re

    volts

    aga

    inst

    op

    pres

    sion

    and

    the

    fore

    ign

    dom

    inat

    ion

    of Ir

    an fo

    r m

    uch

    of th

    e tw

    entie

    th ce

    ntur

    y.

    Amon

    g th

    e pol

    itica

    l ulam

    a in

    cont

    empo

    rary

    Iran

    , Aya

    tolla

    h K

    ho-

    mei

    ni o

    ccup

    ies a

    ver

    y sp

    ecia

    l pla

    ce: h

    e was

    not

    onl

    y th

    e lea

    der o

    f th

    e Isla

    mic

    Rev

    olut

    ion

    in Ir

    an b

    ut a

    lso th

    e ide

    olog

    ue o

    f the

    Isla

    mic

    R

    epub

    lic. G

    eorg

    e Lin

    abur

    y's c

    hapt

    er ex

    amin

    es A

    yato

    llah

    Kho

    m-

    eini

    's le

    gacy

    and

    the i

    mpa

    ct o

    f his

    teac

    hing

    s on

    Isla

    mic

    resu

    rgen

    ce

    thro

    ugho

    ut th

    e Mid

    dle E

    ast.

    Exte

    rnal

    ly, K

    hom

    eini

    's le

    gacy

    con-

    tinue

    s to

    be fe

    lt in

    the

    Isla

    mic

    wor

    ld th

    roug

    h w

    ord

    of m

    outh

    , jo

    urna

    ls an

    d pe

    riod

    ical

    s, an

    d Is

    lam

    ic g

    roup

    s of d

    iver

    se p

    oliti

    cal

    mak

    e-up

    and

    ideo

    logi

    cal o

    rien

    tatio

    n. A

    s Lin

    abur

    y no

    tes,

    Kho

    m-

    eini

    's Sh

    i'ism

    did

    not

    dim

    inish

    the r

    elev

    ance

    of t

    he Ir

    ania

    n R

    evo-

    lutio

    n fo

    r th

    e Su

    nni A

    rabs

    . Thi

    s was

    so b

    ecau

    se th

    e sig

    nific

    ance

    of

    Iran

    's Is

    lam

    ic R

    evol

    utio

    n di

    d no

    t lie

    in

    Kho

    mei

    ni's

    relig

    ious

    ex

    eges

    is bu

    t in

    the

    polit

    ical

    mes

    sage

    of t

    he R

    evol

    utio

    n co

    nvey

    ed

    to th

    e A

    rab

    mas

    ses:

    that

    Isla

    m c

    an b

    e us

    ed a

    s an

    effe

    ctiv

    e to

    ol

    by th

    e mo

    staza

    ftn

    (the

    opp

    ress

    ed) a

    gain

    st th

    e mo

    stakb

    arin

    (th

    e op

    pres

    sors

    ). H

    owev

    er, t

    he p

    oten

    cy o

    f thi

    s mes

    sage

    may

    be d

    imin

    -ish

    ing

    as h

    is su

    cces

    sors

    in Ir

    an m

    ove i

    ncre

    asin

    gly

    away

    from

    the

    ideo

    logy

    tow

    ard

    conv

    entio

    nal p

    olic

    ies a

    nd a

    ttem

    pt to

    rein

    tegr

    ate

    Iran

    into

    wes

    tern

    capi

    talis

    m.

    A se

    cond

    impo

    rtan

    t leg

    acy

    of A

    yato

    llah

    Kho

    mei

    ni h

    as b

    een

    the

    inst

    itutio

    naliz

    atio

    n of

    vela

    yat-e

    faqi

    h (g

    over

    nmen

    t of j

    ust j

    urisp

    ru-

    denc

    e). T

    his i

    nstit

    utio

    n, ei

    ther

    in it

    s one

    -man

    dom

    inan

    t for

    mat

    or

    in a

    ny fu

    ture

    colle

    ctiv

    e for

    mat

    , has

    till

    now

    def

    ined

    the

    raiso

    n d'êt

    re

    of th

    e Is

    lam

    ic R

    epub

    lic. I

    ts m

    ajor

    eff

    ect i

    s to

    subo

    rdin

    ate

    the

    wisd

    om o

    f a w

    hole

    nat

    ion

    to th

    e w

    isdom

    of a

    sing

    le p

    erso

    n or

    a

    smal

    l col

    lect

    ive.

    Even

    whe

    n th

    e Aya

    tolla

    h w

    as a

    live,

    som

    e rel

    igio

    us

    auth

    oriti

    es to

    ok is

    sue

    with

    the

    inst

    itutio

    n an

    d qu

    estio

    ned

    its v

    al-

    idity

    in Is

    lam

    . Eve

    n its

    def

    ende

    rs h

    ad a

    t tim

    es d

    efin

    ed it

    diff

    eren

    tly

    from

    the

    Aya

    tolla

    h. W

    heth

    er th

    e in

    stitu

    tion

    will

    surv

    ive

    in it

    s pr

    esen

    t for

    m fo

    r an

    y lo

    ng p

    erio

    d of

    tim

    e re

    mai

    ns to

    be

    seen

    ; as

    the

    gove

    rnm

    ent c

    lose

    s its

    gap

    s with

    the

    wes

    t and

    the

    secu

    lar

    Iran

    ians

    , pre

    ssur

    e for

    som

    e kin

    d of

    mod

    ifica

    tion

    in th

    e ins

    titut

    ion

    has i

    ncre

    ased

    . Pe

    rhap

    s no

    singl

    e A

    rab

    coun

    try

    has b

    een

    mor

    e in

    fluen

    ced

    by

    Aya

    tolla

    h K

    hom

    eini

    's te

    achi

    ng a

    nd th

    e Isla

    mic

    Rev

    olut

    ion

    than

    Le

    bano

    n. A

    ugus

    tus R

    icha

    rd N

    orto

    n's c

    hapt

    er a

    naly

    ses t

    he im

    pact

    of

    Iran

    's Is

    lam

    ic re

    viva

    l on

    the S

    hi'a

    com

    mun

    ity o

    f Leb

    anon

    . As

    Nor

    ton

    argu

    es, t

    he S

    hi'a

    com

    mun

    ity, t

    he si

    ngle

    larg

    est g

    roup

    in

    Leba

    non,

    had

    bee

    n ig

    nore

    d. b

    y m

    ost w

    este

    rn o

    bser

    vers

    of t

    hat

    coun

    try

    until

    the v

    ictor

    y of

    the I

    rani

    an R

    evol

    utio

    n. T

    he a

    wake

    ning

    of

    Leb

    anon

    's Sh

    i'a c

    omm

    unity

    cat

    apul

    ted

    its m

    embe

    rs fr

    om a

    n ig

    nore

    d re

    ligio

    us a

    nd et

    hnic

    min

    ority

    into

    an

    obje

    ct o

    f sen

    satio

    nal

    repo

    rtin

    g. In

    the

    wes

    t, th

    e Sh

    i'a a

    lso b

    ecam

    e sy

    nony

    mou

    s with

    te

    rror

    ism. N

    orto

    n se

    ts ou

    t to

    rebu

    ke a

    num

    ber o

    f myt

    hs a

    ssoc

    iate

    d w

    ith p

    opul

    ar r

    epor

    ting

    abou

    t and

    per

    cept

    ion

    of th

    e Sh

    i'a in

    the

    west.

    He t

    race

    s the

    dev

    elopm

    ent o

    f the

    pol

    itica

    l ide

    olog

    y of

    Shi

    'ism

    in

    its L

    eban

    ese c

    onte

    xt. T

    he ro

    le of

    the t

    radi

    tiona

    l zu

    'am

    a (p

    oliti

    cal

    boss

    es) a

    nd th

    e su

    bseq

    uent

    dec

    line

    of th

    eir

    influ

    ence

    am

    ong

    the

    Shi'a

    mas

    ses p

    aved

    the

    way

    for

    the

    esta

    blis

    hmen

    t of t

    wo

    non-

    trad

    ition

    al S

    hi'a

    pol

    itica

    l gro

    upin

    gs —

    AM

    AL

    and

    Hiz

    b A

    llah

    (P

    arty

    o

    f G

    od

    ). •

    Both

    of t

    hese

    org

    aniz

    atio

    ns st

    arte

    d w

    ith Ir

    ania

    n as

    sista

    nce a

    nd

    lead

    ersh

    ip, b

    ut H

    izb

    Alla

    h is

    toda

    y m

    ore

    clos

    ely

    alig

    ned

    than

    A

    MA

    L w

    ith Ir

    an's

    fore

    ign

    polic

    y ob

    ject

    ives

    in th

    e M

    iddl

    e Ea

    st.

    Alth

    ough

    the I

    rani

    an R

    evol

    utio

    n ga

    lvan

    ized

    the S

    hi'a

    com

    mun

    ity,

    Isra

    el's

    inva

    sion

    of L

    eban

    on in

    198

    2 ha

    d a

    grea

    t im

    pact

    on

    the

    polit

    iciz

    atio

    n an

    d ra

    dica

    lizat

    ion

    of L

    eban

    ese S

    hi'a

    s. Th

    is w

    as p

    ar-

    ticul

    arly

    true

    in th

    e cas

    e of t

    he S

    hi'a

    s of S

    outh

    ern

    Leba

    non

    whe

    re

    thei

    r liv

    elih

    ood

    and

    com

    mun

    al li

    fe w

    ere t

    otal

    ly d

    isrup

    ted

    by th

    e Is

    rael

    i atta

    cks a

    nd p

    erio

    dic

    raid

    s on

    the

    Shi'a

    vill

    ages

    . Des

    pite

    sa

    crifi

    ces,

    the L

    eban

    ese S

    hi'a

    s are

    no

    bette

    r off

    in th

    e ear

    ly 1

    990s

    th

    an th

    ey w

    ere

    back

    in, s

    ay, 1

    980;

    as I

    ran

    chan

    ges i

    ts fo

    reig

    n po

    licy

    dire

    ctio

    n, th

    ey w

    ill b

    ecom

    e inc

    reas

    ingl

    y iso

    late

    d in

    Leb

    anon

    an

    d in

    the

    Mid

    dle

    East

    . A

    maj

    or co

    nseq

    uenc

    e of t

    he Is

    lam

    ic R

    evol

    utio

    n in

    Iran

    was

    the

    Iran

    -Iraq

    War

    , whi

    ch le

    ft a

    deva

    statin

    g im

    pact

    on

    the I

    rani

    an a

    nd

    Iraq

    i eco

    nom

    ies.

    In P

    art I

    II Ir

    an's

    econ

    omic

    pro

    blem

    s, im

    pact

    of

    the

    Iran

    -Ira

    q w

    ar, a

    nd th

    e co

    untr

    y's r

    econ

    stru

    ctio

    n pl

    an a

    re •

    exam

    ined

    . Inc

    lusio

    n of

    sim

    ilar c

    hapt

    ers o

    n Ir

    aq b

    ecam

    e und

    esir

    -

  • 8 Pe

    rsia

    n G

    ulf i

    n tu

    rmoi

    l

    able

    as t

    he im

    pact

    of t

    he su

    bseq

    uent

    US-

    led

    war

    aga

    inst

    Iraq

    m

    akes

    the

    Iraqi

    loss

    es fr

    om th

    e pr

    evio

    us w

    ar lo

    ok in

    signi

    fican

    t. A

    ccor

    ding

    to a

    Uni

    ted

    Nat

    ions

    ' rep

    ort p

    repa

    red

    by M

    artti

    A

    htisa

    ari,

    the U

    nder

    -Sec

    reta

    ry-G

    ener

    al:

    The

    rece

    nt c

    onfli

    ct h

    as w

    roug

    ht n

    ear a

    poca

    lypt

    ic re

    sults

    upo

    n th

    e ec

    onom

    ic in

    fras

    truct

    ure

    of w

    hat h

    ad b

    een,

    unt

    il Ja

    nuar

    y 19

    91, a

    rath

    er u

    rban

    ized

    and

    mec

    hani

    zed

    soci

    ety.

    Now

    , mos

    t m

    eans

    of m

    oder

    n lif

    e su

    ppor

    t hav

    e be

    en d

    estro

    yed

    or re

    nder

    ed

    tenu

    ous.

    Iraq

    has,

    for s

    ome

    time

    to c

    ome,

    bee

    n re

    lega

    ted

    to a

    pr

    e-in

    dustr

    ial a

    ge, b

    ut w

    ith 'a

    ll th

    e disa

    bilit

    ies o

    f pos

    t-ind

    ustri

    al

    depe

    nden

    cy o

    n an

    inte

    nsiv

    e use

    of e

    nerg

    y an

    d te

    chno

    logy

    . 3

    The

    Iran

    -Ira

    q W

    ar w

    as 'd

    emon

    stra

    bly

    diff

    eren

    t fro

    m o

    ther

    in

    tra-T

    hird

    Wor

    ld w

    ars i

    n te

    rms o

    f its

    des

    truct

    iven

    ess a

    nd it

    s un

    ique

    alli

    ance

    form

    atio

    ns'.°

    Iraq

    , sup

    porte

    d by

    the

    pro-

    wes

    tern

    A

    rab

    stat

    es, p

    artic

    ular

    ly S

    audi

    Ara

    bia,

    Egy

    pt a

    nd K

    uwai

    t, po

    r-tra

    yed

    its w

    ar a

    gain

    st Ir

    an a

    s a 'h

    isto

    ric d

    efen

    se o

    f Ara

    b so

    ve-

    reig

    nty

    and

    right

    s aga

    inst

    the

    mar

    audi

    ng P

    ersia

    ns'.?

    Iran

    , on

    the

    othe

    r han

    d, ju

    stifie

    d th

    e con

    tinua

    tion

    of th

    e war

    in te

    rms o

    f def

    end-

    ing

    the

    hom

    elan

    d, p

    unis

    hing

    the

    aggr

    esso

    r, an

    d re

    plac

    ing

    the

    Ba'a

    thi r

    egim

    e of

    Sad

    dam

    Hus

    sein

    . Whe

    n th

    e gu

    ns fi

    nally

    fell

    sile

    nt, n

    eith

    er c

    ount

    ry w

    as a

    ble

    to a

    chie

    ve it

    s st

    ated

    goa

    ls. I

    n hu

    man

    term

    s, m

    ore

    than

    600

    ,000

    peo

    ple

    died

    or w

    ere

    seve

    rely

    in

    jure

    d an

    d m

    aim

    ed a

    s a re

    sult

    of th

    e w

    ar. M

    illio

    ns w

    ere

    also

    di

    spla

    ced,

    mad

    e ho

    mel

    ess o

    r los

    t the

    ir jo

    bs a

    nd so

    urce

    s of l

    ivel

    i-ho

    od. I

    n ec

    onom

    ic te

    rms,

    dam

    age

    to e

    ach

    coun

    try's

    infra

    struc

    -tu

    res,

    plan

    ts, an

    d ot

    her m

    eans

    of p

    rodu

    ctio

    n ha

    ve b

    een

    stagg

    erin

    g.8

    The

    war

    , whi

    ch st

    arte

    d w

    ith Ir

    aq's

    sim

    ulta

    neou

    s air

    and

    land

    at

    tack

    s aga

    inst

    Irani

    an e

    cono

    mic

    and

    mili

    tary

    targ

    ets o

    n 22

    Sep

    -te

    mbe

    r 198

    0, e

    nded

    on

    20 A

    ugus

    t 198

    8 w

    ith Ir

    an's

    acce

    ptan

    ce o

    f a

    UN

    spon

    sore

    d ce

    ase-

    fire

    (Sec

    urity

    Cou

    ncil

    Res

    olut

    ion

    598)

    . W

    hile

    a fo

    rmal

    pea

    ce tr

    eaty

    has

    not

    bee

    n sig

    ned

    betw

    een

    the

    two

    coun

    tries

    , ten

    sion

    betw

    een

    them

    has

    dec

    lined

    des

    pite

    a re

    surg

    ence

    of

    hos

    tility

    at t

    he e

    nd o

    f the

    US-

    led

    war

    aga

    inst

    Iraq

    and

    the

    subs

    eque

    nt sh

    ort-l

    ived

    Iraq

    i civ

    il w

    ar. T

    hey

    esta

    blish

    ed d

    iplo

    mat

    ic

    ties i

    n O

    ctob

    er 1

    990

    follo

    win

    g Ira

    q's ac

    cept

    ance

    of I

    ran's

    prin

    cipa

    l de

    man

    ds, i

    nclu

    ding

    the

    prin

    cipl

    e of

    a

    thal

    weg

    line

    for S

    hatt

    al-A

    rab

    (mid

    -cha

    nnel

    of t

    he ri

    ver a

    s the

    bou

    ndar

    y de

    mar

    catio

    n be

    twee

    n th

    e tw

    o co

    untr

    ies)

    . Thi

    s ch

    ange

    in Ir

    aq's

    posi

    tion

    occu

    rred

    afte

    r Sad

    dam

    inva

    ded

    and

    then

    ann

    exed

    Kuw

    ait a

    nd

    deci

    ded

    to se

    cure

    Iraq

    's bo

    rder

    s with

    Iran

    . 9

    Intro

    duct

    ion

    9

    Hoo

    shan

    g A

    mira

    hmad

    i's ch

    apte

    r on

    the I

    rani

    an ec

    onom

    y be

    gins

    w

    ith an

    anal

    ysis

    of th

    e war

    des

    truct

    ion

    whi

    ch al

    so h

    ad fa

    r-rea

    chin

    g im

    plic

    atio

    ns fo

    r the

    cou

    ntry

    's oi

    l rev

    enue

    , Ira

    n's e

    cono

    mic

    life

    bl

    ood.

    The

    offi

    cial

    ly es

    timat

    ed to

    tal e

    cono

    mic

    dam

    age (

    dire

    ct an

    d in

    dire

    ct) i

    s giv

    en a

    t abo

    ut $

    870,

    000

    mill

    ion

    (at o

    ffici

    al e

    xcha

    nge

    rate

    of R

    ls 7

    5/U

    K fr

    ee m

    arke

    t rat

    es fo

    r mos

    t of t

    he p

    ost-r

    evol

    -ut

    iona

    ry p

    erio

    d ha

    s bee

    n ab

    ove R

    ls 1,

    000/

    US$

    ). To

    com

    pare

    , ove

    r th

    e 19

    79-8

    9 pe

    riod,

    Iran

    mad

    e le

    ss th

    an $

    145,

    000

    mill

    ion

    in o

    il re

    venu

    es. A

    mira

    hmad

    i also

    pro

    vide

    s a p

    relim

    inar

    y as

    sess

    men

    t of

    the d

    amag

    e wre

    cked

    on

    the e

    cono

    my

    by th

    e Jun

    e 199

    0 ea

    rthqu

    ake.

    In th

    e fin

    al p

    art h

    e foc

    uses

    on

    eigh

    t set

    s of i

    mba

    lanc

    es fr

    om w

    hich

    th

    e ec

    onom

    y su

    ffers

    the

    mos

    t. A

    s Am

    irahm

    adi d

    emon

    strat

    es, t

    he

    post-

    revo

    lutio

    nary

    Iran

    ian

    econ

    omy

    has e

    xper

    ienc

    ed si

    gnifi

    cant

    tu

    rbul

    ence

    and

    decl

    ine a

    nd n

    eeds

    a co

    nsid

    erab

    le in

    ject

    ion

    of m

    oney

    an

    d m

    ater

    ial t

    o re

    turn

    to n

    orm

    al a

    nd th

    en st

    art t

    o gr

    ow a

    gain

    . In

    addi

    tion

    to th

    e war

    , he b

    lam

    es fl

    uctu

    atio

    ns in

    oil

    reve

    nue,

    wes

    tern

    ec

    onom

    ic em

    barg

    oes,

    the S

    hah's

    econ

    omic

    lega

    cy, d

    omes

    tic p

    oliti

    -ca

    l fac

    tiona

    lism

    , and

    erra

    tic ec

    onom

    ic p

    olic

    ies f

    or th

    e per

    form

    ance

    of

    the e

    cono

    my.

    In

    Cha

    pter

    5 A

    mira

    hmad

    i foc

    uses

    on

    the F

    irst F

    ive-

    Yea

    r Eco

    n-om

    ic, S

    ocia

    l and

    Cul

    tura

    l Dev

    elop

    men

    t Pla

    n of

    the I

    slam

    ic R

    epub

    -lic

    of I

    ran

    (198

    9-93

    ). Th

    e pl

    an in

    tend

    s to

    stabi

    lize

    the

    econ

    omy

    and

    struc

    tura

    lly a

    djus

    t its

    imba

    lanc

    es in

    the

    hope

    of n

    orm

    aliz

    ing

    the

    war

    eco

    nom

    y an

    d th

    en le

    adin

    g it

    tow

    ard

    a gr

    owth

    pat

    h. A

    n ac

    coun

    t of p

    olic

    y ch

    ange

    s in

    the w

    ake o

    f the

    Per

    sian

    Gul

    f cris

    is is

    also

    giv

    en. I

    nitia

    lly, t

    he p

    lan

    had

    envi

    sion

    ed a

    n im

    port-

    subs

    ti-tu

    tion

    indu

    stria

    lizat

    ion

    base

    d on

    max

    imum

    util

    izat

    ion

    of th

    e exi

    st-in

    g ca

    paci

    ties

    and

    com

    plet

    ion

    of u

    nfin

    ishe

    d pr

    ojec

    ts. T

    his w

    as

    chan

    ged

    into

    an

    expo

    rt-pr

    omot

    ion

    indu

    stria

    lizat

    ion

    base

    d on

    ex

    tend

    ed c

    o-op

    erat

    ion

    with

    the

    wes

    t and

    the

    state

    s in

    the

    regi

    on.

    The

    chap

    ter i

    s con

    clud

    ed w

    ith a

    n as

    sess

    men

    t of p

    rosp

    ects

    for

    econ

    omic

    gro

    wth

    in Ir

    an. W

    hile

    Iran

    is a

    reso

    urce

    -ric

    h co

    untry

    w

    ith p

    rove

    n po

    tent

    ial f

    or g

    row

    th a

    nd e

    cono

    mic

    lead

    ersh

    ip in

    the

    Mid

    dle

    East,

    the

    succ

    ess o

    f the

    pra

    gmat

    ists w

    ill d

    epen

    d on

    a se

    t of

    con

    ditio

    ns in

    fore

    ign

    polic

    y, fo

    reig

    n ex

    chan

    ge, h

    uman

    cap

    ital,

    dom

    estic

    pol

    itics

    and

    struc

    tura

    l bot

    tlene

    cks.

    The

    Isla

    mic

    Rev

    olut

    ion

    and

    the

    Iran

    -Ira

    q W

    ar a

    lso

    led

    to a

    co

    mpl

    ete

    rest

    ruct

    urin

    g of

    Iran

    's re

    gion

    al d

    iplo

    mac

    y an

    d of

    its

    rela

    tions

    with

    Ara

    b co

    untri

    es.'°

    Thu

    s, Pa

    rt IV

    focu

    ses o

    n re

    gion

    al

    dipl

    omac

    y an

    d ex

    plor

    es v

    ario

    us se

    curit

    y di

    men

    sions

    of I

    rani

    an-

    Ara

    b an

    d in

    ter-A

    rab

    regi

    onal

    rela

    tions

    . Ano

    ushi

    rava

    n Eh

    tesh

    ami's

  • 10 P

    ersi

    an G

    ulf

    in tur

    moil

    Chap

    ter 6

    det

    ails

    Iran's

    fore

    ign

    polic

    y to

    war

    ds th

    e Ara

    b sta

    tes.

    As

    he n

    otes

    , tw

    o m

    ajor

    inte

    rrela

    ted

    them

    es d

    omin

    ated

    Ara

    b-Ira

    nian

    re

    latio

    ns d

    urin

    g th

    e Sh

    ah's

    reig

    n: th

    e Sh

    ah's

    de fa

    cto r

    ecog

    nitio

    n of

    the n

    ewly

    -cre

    ated

    stat

    e of I

    srae

    l, an

    d th

    e int

    ense

    riva

    lry b

    etw

    een

    the P

    ahla

    vi m

    onar

    ch an

    d Eg

    yptia

    n Pr

    esid

    ent G

    amal

    Abd

    ul N

    asse

    r fo

    r inf

    luen

    ce in

    the

    Mid

    dle

    East,

    in g

    ener

    al, a

    nd th

    e Pe

    rsia

    n G

    ulf,

    in p

    artic

    ular

    ." A

    crim

    onio

    us ti

    es b

    etw

    een

    Tehr

    an a

    nd C

    airo

    gav

    e w

    ay to

    the d

    evel

    opm

    ent o

    f clo

    ser r

    elat

    ions

    bet

    wee

    n Ira

    n an

    d Eg

    ypt

    afte

    r Anw

    ar a

    l-Sad

    at's

    acce

    ssio

    n to

    pow

    er in

    197

    0. S

    adat

    's ab

    an-

    donm

    ent o

    f Nas

    ser's

    pol

    icie

    s of p

    an-A

    rabi

    sm a

    nd n

    on-a

    lignm

    ent

    in fa

    vour

    of a

    n A

    mer

    ican

    -Orie

    nted

    and

    acco

    mm

    odat

    ioni

    st fo

    reig

    n po

    licy

    even

    tual

    ly le

    d to

    the

    esta

    blish

    men

    t of a

    Teh

    ran-

    Cairo

    -Tel

    Av

    iv ax

    is.

    The

    foun

    datio

    n of

    this

    wes

    tern

    'pill

    ar o

    f sta

    bilit

    y' w

    as sh

    atte

    red

    whe

    n th

    e Sh

    ah w

    as o

    verth

    row

    n in

    197

    9. N

    otw

    ithsta

    ndin

    g th

    e str

    i-de

    nt rh

    etor

    ic o

    f the

    Isla

    mic

    Rep

    ublic

    's fo

    reig

    n po

    licy,

    pos

    t-rev

    ol-

    utio

    nary

    Iran

    ian

    fore

    ign

    polic

    y ha

    s disp

    laye

    d bo

    th p

    ragm

    atic

    and

    id

    eolo

    gica

    l dim

    ensi

    ons.

    For e

    xam

    ple,

    Iran

    's ac

    com

    mod

    atio

    nist

    po

    licie

    s tow

    ards

    Tur

    key,

    Pak

    istan

    and

    the l

    ower

    Gul

    f sta

    tes r

    efle

    ct

    Tehr

    an's

    prag

    mat

    ism

    in d

    ealin

    g w

    ith so

    me

    of it

    s nei

    ghbo

    urs.

    12 However, Iran's opposition to Saudi Arabia and Egypt until re

    cent

    ly h

    ighl

    ight

    ed th

    e id

    eolo

    gica

    l asp

    ects

    of th

    e Is

    lam

    ic R

    epub

    -lic

    's fo

    reig

    n po

    licy.

    Th

    e ba

    lanc

    e be

    twee

    n th

    e pr

    agm

    atic

    and

    ideo

    logi

    cal d

    imen

    sions

    of

    Iran

    's fo

    reig

    n po

    licy

    has b

    een

    atta

    ined

    thro

    ugh

    the

    com

    plex

    in

    terp

    lay

    of ex

    tern

    al an

    d in

    tern

    al fa

    ctor

    s tha

    t hav

    e sha

    ped

    polit

    ical

    dy

    nam

    ics i

    n po

    st-r

    evol

    utio

    nary

    Iran

    . With

    the

    stre

    ngth

    enin

    g of

    Pr

    esid

    ent H

    ashe

    mi R

    afsa

    njan

    i's c

    oalit

    ion

    and

    the

    re-e

    stabl

    ishm

    ent

    of d

    iplo

    mat

    ic re

    latio

    ns b

    etw

    een

    Tehr

    an a

    nd m

    any

    of it

    s ers

    twhi

    le

    enem

    ies,

    prag

    mat

    ism

    seem

    s to

    have

    bec

    ome

    a m

    ore

    impo

    rtant

    fa

    ctor

    than

    ideo

    logi

    cal c

    onsid

    erat

    ions

    in sh

    apin

    g th

    e co

    ntou

    rs o

    f Ir

    an's

    emer

    ging

    fore

    ign

    polic

    y. T

    he K

    uwai

    ti cr

    isis

    was

    with

    out

    doub

    t a m

    ajor

    turn

    ing-

    poin

    t: as

    Am

    irahm

    adi h

    as s

    how

    n, th

    e le

    ader

    ship

    in T

    ehra

    n us

    ed th

    e cr

    isis

    as a

    n op

    portu

    nity

    to c

    lose

    ga

    ps n

    ot o

    nly

    with

    its A

    rab

    neig

    hbou

    rs • b

    ut a

    lso

    with

    the

    wes

    t. Th

    is w

    as a

    ccom

    plis

    hed

    by a

    pol

    icy

    larg

    ely

    in a

    ccor

    d w

    ith th

    at

    of th

    e an

    ti-Ir

    aq c

    oalit

    ion.

    In p

    artic

    ular

    , Ira

    n su

    ppor

    ted

    all U

    N

    reso

    lutio

    ns a

    gain

    st Ira

    q in

    clud

    ing

    the

    one

    auth

    oriz

    ing

    the

    poss

    ible

    us

    e of

    mili

    tary

    forc

    e, d

    eman

    ded

    Iraq

    's to

    tal a

    nd u

    ncon

    ditio

    nal

    with

    draw

    al fr

    om K

    uwai

    t and

    cont

    inue

    d to

    reco

    gniz

    e the

    legi

    timac

    y of

    the

    al-S

    abah

    fam

    ily ru

    le in

    Kuw

    ait.

    Iran

    also

    rem

    aine

    d ne

    utra

    l

    Intro

    duct

    ion

    11

    durin

    g th

    e w

    ar a

    nd re

    ject

    ed th

    e ca

    ll by

    the

    radi

    cal I

    slam

    ic m

    ove-

    men

    ts fo

    r a 'h

    oly

    war

    '. At t

    he e

    nd o

    f the

    war

    , Ira

    n al

    so su

    ppor

    ted

    the

    anti-

    Sadd

    am u

    prisi

    ngs b

    y th

    e Ira

    qi S

    hi'as

    and

    the

    Kur

    ds.'

    3 M

    . E. A

    hrar

    i's C

    hapt

    er 7

    exa

    min

    es th

    e ro

    le o

    f the

    Gul

    f Co-

    oper

    atio

    n Co

    unci

    l (G

    CC) i

    n G

    ulf s

    ecur

    ity. T

    he G

    CC, w

    hich

    was

    es

    tabl

    ished

    in 1

    981

    by th

    e pr

    o-w

    este

    rn c

    onse

    rvat

    ive

    regi

    mes

    of

    Saud

    i Ara

    bia,

    Kuw

    ait,

    the

    Uni

    ted

    Ara

    b Em

    irate

    s, O

    man

    , Bah

    rain

    an

    d Q

    atar

    , was

    inte

    nded

    inte

    r alia

    to sh

    ield

    its m

    embe

    r sta

    tes f

    rom

    th

    e spi

    ll-ov

    er ef

    fect

    s of t

    he Ir

    an-Ir

    aq W

    ar."

    Beca

    use o

    f the

    GCC

    's he

    avy

    relia

    nce

    on th

    e w

    est i

    n ge

    nera

    l and

    the

    Uni

    ted

    Stat

    es in

    pa

    rticu

    lar,

    the

    orga

    niza

    tion

    was

    vie

    wed

    by

    Tehr

    an a

    s a sc

    hem

    e to

    is

    olat

    e an

    d co

    ntai

    n th

    e Is

    lam

    ic R

    epub

    lic. T

    he G

    CC

    's pr

    o-Ir

    aqi

    post

    ure

    thro

    ugho

    ut th

    e Ir

    an-I

    raq

    War

    furth

    er e

    nhan

    ced

    Iran

    's su

    spic

    ion

    of t

    he u

    ltim

    ate

    polic

    y ob

    ject

    ives

    of t

    his o

    rgan

    izat

    ion.

    Fr

    om th

    e ou

    tset,

    Saud

    i Ara

    bi's

    dom

    inat

    ion

    of th

    e G

    CC a

    nd R

    iya-

    dh's

    hege

    mon

    ic a

    mbi

    tions

    turn

    ed th

    is or

    gani

    zatio

    n in

    to a

    n ex

    ten-

    sion

    of S

    audi

    Ara

    bia's

    fore

    ign

    polic

    y in

    the r

    egio

    n, th

    ereb

    y ex

    acer

    -ba

    ting

    grow

    ing

    tens

    ions

    bet

    wee

    n Te

    hran

    and

    Riy

    adh.

    The

    GCC

    's in

    abili

    ty to

    def

    end

    the

    mem

    ber s

    tate

    s bec

    ame

    appa

    rent

    whe

    n Ira

    q in

    vade

    d K

    uwai

    t. W

    hile

    the

    orga

    niza

    tion

    has s

    urvi

    ved

    the

    cris

    is

    beca

    use

    of th

    e A

    llied

    inte

    rven

    tion

    on it

    s beh

    alf,

    its v

    iabi

    lity

    as a

    de

    fens

    ive

    syste

    m is

    now

    uni

    vers

    ally

    que

    stion

    ed. T

    he G

    CC n

    ow

    look

    s on

    to th

    e w

    est a

    nd Ir

    an fo

    r a sh

    ared

    secu

    rity

    arra

    ngem

    ent

    for t

    he P

    ersia

    n G

    ulf,

    a de

    velo

    pmen

    t Ira

    n ha

    s wid

    ely

    wel

    com

    ed.

    Nad

    er E

    ntes

    sar's

    Cha

    pter

    8 a

    naly

    ses t

    he d

    esta

    biliz

    ing

    effe

    cts o

    f th

    e m

    ilita

    ry a

    sym

    met

    ry b

    etw

    een

    Iran

    and

    the

    Ara

    b co

    untri

    es o

    f th

    e Pe

    rsia

    n G

    ulf.

    He

    prop

    oses

    thre

    e sp

    ecifi

    c w

    ays t

    hrou

    gh w

    hich

    re

    gion

    al st

    abili

    ty c

    an b

    e en

    hanc

    ed:

    1 bu

    ildin

    g a c

    ompr

    ehen

    sive r

    egio

    nal c

    omm

    on se

    curit

    y sy

    stem

    2

    redu

    cing

    off

    ensi

    ve c

    apab

    ilitie

    s of t

    he c

    ount

    ries o

    f the

    regi

    on

    whi

    le en

    hanc

    ing

    thei

    r def

    ensiv

    e cap

    abili

    ties

    3 en

    hanc

    ing

    the

    peac

    ekee

    ping

    role

    of t

    he U

    nite

    d N

    atio

    ns

    Clea

    rly, r

    egar

    dles

    s of w

    hich

    form

    is se

    lect

    ed an

    d fo

    llow

    ed, r

    egio

    nal

    secu

    rity

    wou

    ld h

    ave

    to b

    e ul

    timat

    ely

    tied

    to d

    omes

    tic c

    ondi

    tions

    in

    the

    stat

    es o

    f the

    regi

    on. O

    ften,

    regi

    onal

    con

    flict

    s hav

    e be

    en

    root

    ed in

    dom

    estic

    inad

    equa

    cies

    and

    diff

    icul

    ties o

    f the

    regi

    mes

    to

    cope

    with

    them

    . Int

    ra- a

    nd in

    ter-

    stat

    e in

    equa

    litie

    s an

    d la

    ck o

    f po

    litic

    al d

    emoc

    racy

    hav

    e of

    ten

    play

    ed a

    maj

    or d

    esta

    biliz

    ing

    role

    in

    the

    Mid

    dle

    East

    . Su

    perp

    ower

    s an

    d ex

    tern

    al in

    terv

    entio

    ns h

    ave

    also

    pla

    yed

  • 12 P

    ersia

    n G

    ulf i

    n tu

    rmoi

    l In

    trod

    uctio

    n 13

    signi

    fican

    t rol

    es in

    regi

    onal

    conf

    licts

    and

    insta

    bilit

    y. P

    art V

    disc

    usse

    s th

    e po

    licie

    s of t

    he tw

    o su

    perp

    ower

    s tow

    ards

    Iran

    and

    exa

    min

    es

    the i

    mpa

    ct o

    f the

    se p

    olic

    ies o

    n re

    gion

    al st

    abili

    ty. M

    ohse

    n M

    ilani

    's C

    hapt

    er 9

    ana

    lyse

    s the

    USA

    's co

    nfro

    ntat

    ion

    with

    Iran

    's Is

    lam

    ic

    Revo

    lutio

    n. A

    s Mila

    ni c

    onte

    nds,

    activ

    e an

    imos

    ity to

    war

    ds re

    vo-

    lutio

    ns h

    as b

    een

    one

    of th

    e m

    ost e

    ndur

    ing

    char

    acte

    ristic

    s of U

    S fo

    reig

    n po

    licy

    in th

    e Th

    ird W

    orld

    . Was

    hing

    ton'

    s obs

    essio

    n w

    ith

    reve

    rsin

    g th

    e co

    urse

    of e

    vent

    s in

    Iran

    was

    in li

    ne w

    ith th

    e an

    ti-re

    volu

    tiona

    ry a

    nd st

    atus

    quo

    orie

    ntat

    ion

    of U

    S fo

    reig

    n po

    licy.

    '' Iro

    nica

    lly, t

    his p

    olic

    y, M

    ilani

    indi

    cate

    s, le

    d to

    insti

    tutio

    naliz

    atio

    n of

    radi

    calis

    m in

    the

    coun

    try; a

    diff

    eren

    t cou

    rse,

    he

    impl

    ies,

    wou

    ld

    have

    bee

    n m

    ore

    help

    ful t

    o th

    e m

    oder

    ates

    and

    the

    liber

    als.

    In a

    bro

    ader

    sens

    e, W

    ashi

    ngto

    n's s

    abre

    -rat

    tling

    and

    con

    fron

    -ta

    tiona

    l pol

    icie

    s tow

    ards

    Iran

    refle

    cted

    a 'n

    ew m

    ood

    of a

    larm

    and

    an

    ger'

    tow

    ards

    Thi

    rd W

    orld

    revo

    lutio

    nary

    regi

    mes

    .' 6 T

    he c

    oncr

    ete

    man

    ifesta

    tion

    of th

    is be

    llico

    se m

    ood

    has b

    een

    the a

    larm

    ing

    negl

    ect

    of th

    e ar

    t of d

    iplo

    mac

    y in

    favo

    ur o

    f 'qu

    ick

    fix' m

    ilita

    ry so

    lutio

    ns

    to T

    hird

    Wor

    ld c

    rises

    . The

    USA

    's co

    mbi

    ned

    strat

    egy

    of m

    ilita

    ry

    stren

    gth

    and

    polit

    ical

    wea

    knes

    s has

    led

    to W

    ashi

    ngto

    n's '

    regu

    lar

    need

    to re

    sort

    to v

    iole

    nce'

    whe

    n it

    inte

    rven

    es in

    Thi

    rd W

    orld

    ar

    eas."

    As M

    ilani

    stat

    es, s

    hort

    of m

    ilita

    ry so

    lutio

    ns, t

    he U

    SA's

    fore

    ign

    polic

    y in

    stitu

    tions

    hav

    e yet

    to d

    evel

    op an

    y co

    here

    nt m

    ech-

    anism

    s for

    dea

    ling

    with

    revo

    lutio

    nary

    soci

    etie

    s. U

    S-Ir

    ania

    n re

    latio

    ns c

    ontin

    ue to

    be

    susp

    ende

    d at

    the

    star

    t of

    1992

    . Tw

    elve

    yea

    rs af

    ter t

    he h

    osta

    ge cr

    isis a

    nd th

    ree y

    ears

    afte

    r the

    `ta

    nker

    s war

    ' in

    the P

    ersia

    n G

    ulf,

    the t

    wo

    gove

    rnm

    ents

    cont

    inue

    to

    susp

    ect e

    ach

    othe

    r. Th

    e U

    S ho

    stag

    es in

    Leb

    anon

    (eve

    ntua

    lly

    rele

    ased

    in D

    ecem

    ber 1

    991)

    and

    the

    Irani

    an fr

    ozen

    ass

    ets i

    n th

    e U

    SA w

    ere

    the

    rem

    aini

    ng st

    icky

    issu

    es. O

    n ba

    lanc

    e, h

    owev

    er, a

    nd

    as A

    mira

    hmad

    i writ

    es in

    Cha

    pter

    5 o

    n re

    cons

    truct

    ion,

    'rel

    atio

    ns

    impr

    oved

    as t

    he tw

    o go

    vern

    men

    ts' v

    iew

    s con

    verg

    ed d

    urin

    g th

    e K

    uwai

    ti cr

    isis'.

    Som

    e Ira

    nian

    gov

    ernm

    ent o

    ffici

    als h

    ave e

    ven

    calle

    d fo

    r a 'm

    arria

    ge o

    f con

    veni

    ence

    ' bet

    wee

    n th

    e tw

    o co

    untri

    es. 1

    9 Whi

    le

    the

    USA

    has

    rem

    aine

    d co

    ol to

    such

    invi

    tatio

    ns, t

    he B

    ush

    adm

    inis-

    tratio

    n is

    exp

    ecte

    d to

    be

    mor

    e re

    spon

    sive

    in th

    e fu

    ture

    as

    the

    lead

    ersh

    ip in

    Teh

    ran

    repu

    diat

    es m

    any

    of it

    s pa

    st a

    nti-U

    nite

    d St

    ates

    pol

    icie

    s and

    dev

    elop

    s a fr

    ee m

    arke

    t eco

    nom

    y op

    en to

    the

    capi

    talis

    t wor

    ld m

    arke

    t. In

    the

    final

    cha

    pter

    , Moh

    iadd

    in M

    esba

    hi e

    xam

    ines

    cha

    nge

    and

    cont

    inui

    ty in

    Sov

    iet-I

    rani

    an re

    latio

    ns w

    ithin

    the

    cont

    ext o

    f the

    So

    viet

    Uni

    on's

    dive

    rse

    inte

    rests

    in th

    e Pe

    rsia

    n G

    ulf a

    nd th

    e In

    dian

    Oce

    an. H

    istor

    ical

    ly, S

    ovie

    t-Ira

    nian

    rela

    tions

    hav

    e bee

    n in

    fluen

    ced

    by a

    set o

    f com

    plex

    fact

    ors t

    hat h

    ave i

    nclu

    ded

    'Rus

    sian

    prox

    imity

    to

    Iran

    , gre

    at p

    ower

    pol

    itics

    , the

    stat

    e of

    inte

    rnat

    iona

    l pol

    itics

    , an

    d do

    mes

    tic c

    ondi

    tions

    in b

    oth

    Russ

    ia a

    nd Ir

    an'.'

    9 Fur

    ther

    mor

    e,

    Russ

    ian

    fore

    ign

    polic

    y be

    havi

    our t

    owar

    ds Ir

    an h

    as d

    ispla

    yed

    two

    char

    acte

    ristic

    s, th

    e `m

    axim

    'alist

    goa

    l of d

    omin

    atin

    g Ira

    n an

    d th

    e m

    inim

    alist

    goa

    l of p

    reve

    ntin

    g its

    dom

    inat

    ion

    by a

    riva

    l pow

    er, o

    r at

    leas

    t sec

    urin

    g a

    shar

    e fo

    r itse

    lf'.2

    0 Ira

    q's a

    ttack

    on

    Iran

    in S

    epte

    mbe

    r 198

    0 an

    d th

    e re

    sulti

    ng e

    ight

    -ye

    ar w

    ar b

    etw

    een

    thes

    e tw

    o co

    untri

    es g

    reat

    ly c

    ompl

    icat

    ed S

    ovie

    t po

    licie

    s in

    the

    regi

    on a

    s ref

    lect

    ed in

    Mos

    cow

    's sh

    iftin

    g be

    havi

    our

    durin

    g th

    e Gul

    f War

    . As M

    esba

    hi o

    bser

    ves,

    the p

    erio

    d 19

    80-2

    was

    m

    arke

    d by

    'stri

    ct n

    eutra

    lity'

    in S

    ovie

    t beh

    avio

    ur to

    war

    ds th

    e tw

    o be

    llige

    rent

    stat

    es. M

    osco

    w h

    ad h

    oped

    that

    Iran

    's su

    cces

    s in

    repe

    l-lin

    g th

    e Ir

    aqis

    from

    Iran

    ian

    terr

    itory

    wou

    ld le

    ad to

    a p

    eace

    ful

    polit

    ical

    settl

    emen

    t of t

    he c

    onfli

    ct. W

    hen

    Iran

    refu

    sed

    to a

    ccep

    t Ir

    aq's

    peac

    e of

    fers

    , the

    Sov

    iet's

    stan

    ce sh

    ifted

    to o

    ne o

    f 'ac

    tive

    neut

    ralit

    y'. F

    rom

    198

    2 to

    198

    6 th

    e So

    viet

    Uni

    on u

    rged

    bot

    h sid

    es

    to te

    rmin

    ate

    hosti

    litie

    s whi

    le a

    t the

    sam

    e tim

    e M

    osco

    w e

    mba

    rked

    up

    on a

    pol

    icy

    of st

    reng

    then

    ing

    Iraq's

    mili

    tary

    cap

    abili

    ties t

    o pr

    e-ve

    nt it

    s col

    laps

    e. F

    rom

    198

    6 to

    198

    8 th

    e So

    viet

    s tilt

    ed h

    eavi

    ly

    tow

    ards

    Iraq

    3s M

    osco

    w b

    ecam

    e con

    vinc

    ed th

    at o

    nly

    Iraqi

    vic

    tor-

    ies o

    n th

    e ba

    ttlef

    ield

    wou

    ld fo

    rce

    Iran

    to a

    ccep

    t a c

    ease

    -fire

    .' In

    the

    post-

    ceas

    e-fir

    e pe

    riod,

    the

    Sovi

    ets s

    ough

    t, al

    beit

    unsu

    c-ce

    ssfu

    lly, t

    o m

    edia

    te b

    etw

    een

    Iran

    and

    Iraq

    and

    offe

    r the

    ir go

    od

    offic

    es. T

    he S

    ovie

    t Uni

    on's

    polic

    y w

    as p

    redi

    cate

    d on

    the

    prem

    ise

    that

    Iran

    wou

    ld h

    elp

    Gor

    bach

    ev ex

    trica

    te h

    imse

    lf fro

    m th

    e Afg

    han-

    ista

    n qu

    agm

    ire. M

    oreo

    ver,

    Mos

    cow

    had

    toye

    d w

    ith th

    e id

    ea o

    f cr

    eatin

    g a

    `com

    mon

    Cen

    tral A

    sian

    hom

    e' w

    here

    by th

    e So

    viet

    U

    nion

    wou

    ld st

    reng

    then

    its p

    oliti

    cal a

    nd e

    cono

    mic

    link

    s with

    the

    Gul

    f cou

    ntrie

    s. Th

    is id

    ea se

    ems t

    o ha

    ve b

    een

    drop

    ped

    for t

    he ti

    me

    bein

    g as

    Mos

    cow

    stru

    ggle

    s with

    its m

    yria

    d of

    dom

    estic

    uph

    eava

    ls an

    d as

    the

    Gul

    f reg

    ion

    tries

    to a

    djus

    t to

    the

    vaga

    ries o

    f the

    Gul

    f cr

    isis. The

    incr

    easi

    ng ro

    le o

    f Isl

    am a

    nd Is

    lam

    ic re

    viva

    lism

    , cou

    pled

    w

    ith se

    cess

    ioni

    st m

    ovem

    ents

    in C

    entra

    l Asi

    a an

    d th

    e C

    auca

    sus

    also

    had

    an u

    nset

    tling

    impa

    ct o

    n lo

    ng-ra

    nge S

    ovie

    t pol

    icie

    s tow

    ards

    th

    e G

    ulf r

    egio

    n. A

    s the

    upr

    isin

    gs in

    Sov

    iet A

    zerb

    aija

    n de

    mon

    -str

    ated

    , Mos

    cow

    bec

    ame e

    xtre

    mel

    y un

    easy

    abou

    t the

    pro

    spec

    ts .o

    f su

    stai

    ned

    cont

    acts

    bet

    wee

    n So

    viet

    and

    Iran

    ian

    Aze

    ris. W

    hile

    it

    was

    true

    that

    bot

    h Te

    hran

    and

    Mos

    cow

    shar

    ed c

    omm

    on a

    ims i

    n

  • 14 P

    ersia

    n G

    ulf i

    n tu

    rmoi

    l

    mai

    ntai

    ning

    stab

    ility

    alo

    ng th

    eir s

    hare

    d bo

    rder

    s, th

    e se

    cess

    ioni

    st

    tend

    enci

    es a

    mon

    g th

    e So

    viet

    Aze

    ris w

    ere

    subs

    tant

    ially

    stro

    nger

    th

    an th

    ey w

    ere

    amon

    g th

    eir I

    rani

    an c

    ount

    erpa

    rts. C

    onse

    quen

    tly,

    the

    Sovi

    ets w

    ere

    relu

    ctan

    t to

    allo

    w u

    nhin

    dere

    d co

    ntac

    ts b

    etw

    een

    the

    Iran

    ian

    and

    Sovi

    et A

    zeris

    . Afte

    r tw

    o m

    onth

    s of

    neg

    otia

    tions

    w

    ith Ir

    ania

    n au

    thor

    ities

    , in

    Nov

    embe

    r 199

    0 M

    osco

    w s

    igne

    d an

    ag

    reem

    ent a

    llow

    ing

    the

    esta

    blis

    hmen

    t of p

    erm

    anen

    t bor

    der o

    pen-

    ings

    nea

    r Ast

    ara

    city

    in n

    orth

    -wes

    t Ira

    n an

    d pe

    rmitt

    ing

    visi

    ts

    last

    ing

    no m

    ore

    than

    fifte

    en d

    ays b

    etw

    een

    Iran

    and

    Sov

    iet A

    zer-

    baija

    n."

    Fina

    lly, t

    he re

    perc

    ussio

    ns o

    f Ira

    q's i

    nvas

    ion

    of K

    uwai

    t, th

    e ch

    an-

    ging

    regi

    onal

    bal

    ance

    of p

    ower

    , the

    pre

    senc

    e of

    US

    troop

    s so

    clos

    e to

    Sov

    iet b

    orde

    rs, a

    nd th

    e st

    ill-e

    volv

    ing

    post

    -Col

    d W

    ar in

    ter-

    natio

    nal o

    rder

    will

    con

    tinue

    to s

    hape

    the

    cont

    ours

    of M

    osco

    w's

    Gul

    f pol

    icie

    s. A

    lthou

    gh th

    e So

    viet

    Uni

    on s

    uppo

    rted

    the

    Uni

    ted

    Stat

    es' p

    ostu

    re to

    war

    ds S

    adda

    m H

    usse

    in, m

    any

    Sovi

    et o

    ffic

    ials

    ex

    pres

    sed

    grav

    e.. c

    once

    rn a

    bout

    the

    ultim

    ate

    aim

    of U

    S m

    ilita

    ry

    obje

    ctiv

    es in

    the

    regi

    on."

    How

    the

    Rus

    sian

    s m

    anag

    e to

    bal

    ance

    th

    eir d

    esir

    e to

    mai

    ntai

    n go

    od re

    latio

    ns w

    ith th

    e U

    nite

    d St

    ates

    w

    hile

    max

    imiz

    ing

    thei

    r lon

    g-te

    rm in

    tere

    sts i

    n th

    e G

    ulf w

    ill la

    rgel

    y de

    term

    ine

    Mos

    cow

    's fo

    reig

    n po

    licy

    post

    ure

    in th

    e re

    gion

    . To

    sum

    up,

    this

    boo

    k de

    mop

    stra

    tes

    the

    com

    plex

    intri

    caci

    es o

    f Ir

    an's

    dom

    estic

    pro

    blem

    s an

    d po

    licie

    s as

    wel

    l as

    its e

    xter

    nal

    rela

    tions

    . The

    pos

    t-rev

    olut

    iona

    ry p

    erio

    d in

    Iran

    has

    witn

    esse

    d an

    ex

    traor

    dina

    ry tu

    rn o

    f eve

    nts,

    mos

    t of t

    hem

    unf

    avou

    rabl

    e fo

    r Ira

    n's

    long

    -term

    dev

    elop

    men

    t and

    sta

    ndin

    g am

    ong

    the

    com

    mun

    ity o

    f na

    tions

    . The

    Rev

    olut

    ion

    has

    also

    had

    sig

    nific

    ant i

    mpa

    ct o

    n th

    e ne

    ighb

    ourin

    g st

    ates

    but

    suc

    h in

    fluen

    ces

    have

    not

    pro

    duce

    d an

    y la

    sting

    pos

    itive

    resu

    lts in

    the

    regi

    on. T

    he m

    ove

    away

    from

    ideo

    logy

    an

    d ra

    dica

    lism

    and

    tow

    ards

    a m

    ore

    prag

    mat

    ic a

    nd c

    onve

    ntio

    nal

    dom

    estic

    and

    fore

    ign

    polic

    y is

    hop

    ed to

    reve

    rse

    thes

    e un

    favo

    urab

    le

    resu

    lts fo

    r bet

    ter.

    Iran

    is a

    reso

    urce

    -ric

    h na

    tion

    with

    gre

    at p

    ros-

    pect

    s for

    eco

    nom

    ic g

    row

    th a

    nd p

    oten

    tial f

    or p

    oliti

    cal l

    eade

    rshi

    p in

    th

    e M

    iddl

    e Ea

    st. W

    heth

    er th

    e na

    tion

    will

    be

    able

    to fu

    lly m

    ater

    ial-

    ize

    its p

    oten

    tial u

    nder

    the

    pres

    ent p

    ragm

    atis

    t lea

    ders

    hip

    will

    la

    rgel

    y de

    pend

    on

    a co

    mpl

    ex o

    f fac

    tors

    that

    orig

    inat

    e fro

    m d

    omes

    tic

    and

    inte

    rnat

    iona

    l pol

    itics

    and

    the

    econ

    omic

    reco

    nstru

    ctio

    n pl

    an.

    Mea

    ning

    ful r

    efor

    ms i

    n bo

    th o

    f the

    se a

    reas

    are

    pre

    cond

    ition

    s for

    a

    bette

    r fut

    ure

    for I

    ran

    and,

    by

    exte

    nsio

    n, it

    s ne

    ighb

    ours

    .

    Intr

    oduc

    tion

    15

    NO

    TE

    S

    1 M

    . Wal

    ker,

    'The

    U.S

    . and

    the

    Pers

    ian

    Gul

    f Cris

    is',

    Wor

    ld P

    olicy

    Jour

    nal

    7 (4

    ) Fal

    l 199

    0: 7

    96.

    2 Q

    uote

    d in

    Insig

    ht 2

    4 D

    ecem

    ber 1

    990-

    7 Ja

    nuar

    y 19

    91: 1

    4.

    3 Se

    e 'A

    mer

    ica'

    s St

    ake

    in th

    e Pe

    rsia

    n G

    ulf',

    U

    S D

    epar

    tmen

    t of S

    tate

    Di

    spat

    ch

    I (2)

    10

    Sept

    embe

    r 199

    0: 7

    0.

    4 Q

    uote

    d in

    New

    Yor

    k Ti

    mes

    , 7

    Mar

    ch 1

    991:

    A8.

    5

    Repo

    rt to

    the S

    ecre

    tary

    -Gen

    eral

    on

    Hum

    anita

    rian

    Need

    s in

    Kuwa

    it an

    d Ir

    aq in

    th

    e Im

    med

    iate

    Pos

    t-Cris

    is En

    viro

    nmen

    t by a

    Miss

    ion

    to th

    e Are

    a le

    d by

    Mr.

    Mar

    tti A

    htisa

    ari,

    Unde

    r-Sec

    reta

    ry-G

    ener

    al fo

    r Adm

    inist

    ratio

    n an

    d Man

    agem

    ent,

    date

    d 20

    Mar

    ch 1

    991

    (New

    Yor

    k: U

    nite

    d N

    atio

    ns S

    ecur

    ity C

    ounc

    il S/

    22

    366,

    20

    Mar

    ch 1

    991)

    . 6

    N. E

    ntes

    sar,

    'Ext

    erna

    l Inv

    olve

    men

    t in

    the

    Pers

    ian

    Gul

    f Con

    flic

    t',

    Conf

    lict Q

    uarte

    rly 4

    (4) F

    all 1

    984:

    41.

    . 7

    G. S

    ick,

    'Tria

    l by

    Erro

    r: R

    efle

    ctio

    ns o

    n th

    e Ir

    an-I

    raq

    War

    ', in

    R. K

    . Ra

    maz

    ani (

    ed.)

    Iran

    's Re

    volu

    tion:

    The

    Sea

    rch

    for C

    onse

    nsus

    , (B

    loom

    ingt

    on,

    Ind:

    Indi

    ana

    Uni

    vers

    ity P

    ress

    , 199

    0), p

    . 105

    . 8

    See

    the

    follo

    win

    g pu

    blic

    atio

    ns o

    n th

    e ec

    onom

    ic im

    pact

    of t

    he Ir

    an-I

    raq

    War

    : on

    Iraq

    and

    Iran

    see

    A. A

    l-Nas

    raw

    i, 'E

    cono

    mic

    Con

    sequ

    ence

    s of

    the

    Iran

    -Ira

    q W

    ar',

    Third

    Wor

    ld Q

    uarte

    rly

    8 (3

    ) Jul

    y 19

    86: 8

    69-9

    4; o

    n Ir

    aq s

    ee K

    . Mof

    id, '

    Econ

    omic

    Rec

    onst

    ruct

    ion

    of Ir

    aq: F

    inan

    cing

    the

    Peac

    e', T

    hird

    Wor

    ld Q

    uarte

    rly

    12 (1

    ) Jan

    uary

    199

    0: 4

    8-59

    ; on

    Iran

    (for

    ea

    rlier

    dam

    age

    estim

    ates

    and

    exp

    erie

    nces

    with

    reco

    nstru

    ctio

    n) se

    e H

    . A

    mira

    hmad

    i, 'E

    cono

    mic

    Rec

    onst

    ruct

    ion

    of Ir

    an: C

    ostin

    g th

    e W

    ar

    Dam

    age',

    Thi

    rd W

    orld

    Qua

    rterly

    12

    (1) J

    anua

    ry 1

    990:

    26-

    47; H

    . Am

    ir-ah

    mad

    i, 'D

    estru

    ctio

    n an

    d R

    econ

    stru

    ctio

    n: A

    Stra

    tegy

    for t

    he W

    ar-

    Dam

    aged

    Are

    a of

    Iran

    ', D

    isaste

    rs: T

    he In

    tern

    atio

    nal j

    ourn

    al o

    f Disa

    ster

    Stud

    ies a

    nd P

    ract

    ice 1

    1 (2

    ) 198

    7: 1

    34-4

    7; a

    nd H

    . Am

    irahm

    adi,

    'War

    D

    amag

    e an

    d R

    econ

    stru

    ctio

    n in

    the

    Isla

    mic

    Rep

    ublic

    of I

    ran'

    , in

    H.

    Am

    irah

    mad

    i and

    M. P

    arvi

    n (e

    ds)

    Post-

    Revo

    lutio

    nary

    Iran

    (B

    ould

    er,

    Col

    o: W

    estv

    iew

    Pre

    ss, 1

    988)

    , pp.

    126

    -49.

    9

    H. A

    mira

    hmad

    i, 'Ir

    an a

    nd th

    e Pe

    rsia

    n G

    ulf C

    risis

    ', in

    H. A

    mira

    hmad

    i an

    d N

    . Ent

    essa

    r (ed

    s) I

    ran

    and

    the A

    rab

    Wor

    ld

    (New

    Yor

    k: S

    t Mar

    tin's

    Pres

    s, 19

    92.

    10 F

    or a

    n an

    alys

    is o

    f rec

    ent t

    rend

    s in

    Iran

    ian

    fore

    ign

    polic

    y, s

    ee th

    e ex

    celle

    nt c

    olle

    ctio

    n of

    arti

    cles

    in N

    . R. K

    eddi

    e an

    d M

    . J. G

    asio

    row

    ski

    (eds

    ) N

    eith

    er E

    ast N

    or W

    est:

    Iran

    , the

    Sov

    iet U

    nion

    , and

    the U

    nite

    d St

    ates

    (N

    ew H

    aven

    , Con

    n: Y

    ale

    Uni

    vers

    ity P

    ress

    , 199

    0). S

    ee a

    lso

    R. K

    . R

    amaz

    ani,

    'Iran

    's Fo

    reig

    n Po

    licy:

    Con

    tend

    ing

    Orie

    ntat

    ions

    ', in

    R. K

    . R

    amaz

    ani (

    ed.)

    Iran

    's Re

    volu

    tion:

    The

    Sea

    rch

    for C

    onse

    nsus

    (B

    loom

    ingt

    on,

    Ind:

    Indi

    ana

    Uni

    vers

    ity P

    ress

    , 199

    0), p

    p. 4

    8-68

    . 11

    For

    a d

    etai

    led

    stud

    y of

    Isra

    el's

    rela

    tions

    with

    the

    Shah

    's re

    gim

    e, s

    ee

    S. S

    obha

    ni,

    The P

    ragm

    atic

    Ent

    ente

    : Isr

    aeli-

    Iran

    ian

    Rela

    tions

    , 194

    8-19

    88

    (New

    Yor

    k: P

    raeg

    er, 1

    989)

    , pp.

    1-1

    39.

    12 S

    ee A

    . Kap

    ur, 'R

    elat

    ions

    with

    Pak

    istan

    and

    Indi

    a', in

    M. R

    ezun

    (ed.

    ) Ir

    an a

    t the

    Cro

    ssro

    ads:

    Glo

    bal R

    elat

    ions

    in a

    Tur

    bule

    nt D

    ecad

    e (B

    ould

    er,

    Colo:

    Wes

    tvie

    w P

    ress

    , 199

    0), p

    p. 7

    1-9;

    F. B

    orov

    ali,

    'Iran

    and

    Tur

    key:

  • 16 P

    ersi

    an G

    ulf i

    n tu

    rmoi

    l

    Perm

    anen

    t Rev

    olut

    ion

    or Is

    lam

    ism

    in O

    ne C

    ount

    ry',

    in R

    eam

    (ed.

    ), pp

    . 81-

    93.

    13 H

    . Am

    irahm

    adi,

    'Iran

    and

    the

    Pers

    ian

    Gul

    f Cris

    is'.

    14 F

    or a

    revi

    ew o

    f var

    ious

    pol

    icy

    stat

    emen

    ts o

    f the

    GC

    C, s

    ee R

    .K.

    Ram

    azan

    i, Th

    e Gul

    f Coo

    pera

    tion

    Coun

    cil: R

    ecor

    d an

    d An

    alys

    is (C

    harlo

    ttes-

    ville

    , Va:

    Uni

    vers

    ity P

    ress

    of V

    irgin

    ia, 1

    988)

    . 15

    H. A

    mira

    hmad

    i, Re

    volu

    tion

    and E

    cono

    mic

    Tran

    sitio

    n: T

    he Ir

    ania

    n Ex

    perie

    nce

    (Alb

    any,

    NY

    : Sta

    te U

    nive

    rsity

    of N

    ew Y

    ork

    Pres

    s, 19

    90),

    pp. 2

    8-42

    . 16

    F. H

    allid

    ay,

    Beyo

    nd Ir

    anga

    te: T

    he R

    eaga

    n D

    octri

    ne a

    nd th

    e Thi

    rd

    f l'or

    ld (A

    mst

    erda

    m: T

    rans

    natio

    nal I

    nstit

    ute,

    198

    7), p

    . 12.

    17

    N. C

    hom

    sky,

    The

    Cul

    ture

    of T

    erro

    rism

    (B

    osto

    n, M

    ass:

    Sou

    th E

    nd P

    ress

    , 19

    88),

    p. 1

    31.

    18 H

    . Am

    irahm

    adi,

    'Iran

    and

    the

    Pers

    ian

    Gul

    f Cris

    is'.

    19 S

    . T. H

    unte

    r, Ir

    an a

    nd th

    e Wor

    ld: C

    ontin

    uity

    in a

    Rev

    olut

    iona

    ry D

    ecad

    e (B

    loom

    ingt

    on, I

    nd: I

    ndia

    na U

    nive

    rsity

    Pre

    ss, 1

    990)

    , p. 7

    9.

    20 Ib

    id.

    21 F

    or a

    suc

    cinc

    t rev

    iew

    of G

    orba

    chev

    's po

    licie

    s to

    war

    ds th

    e G

    ulf W

    ar,

    see

    R. 0

    . Fre

    edm

    an, '

    Gor

    bach

    ev, I

    ran,

    and

    the

    Iran

    -Ira

    q W

    ar',

    in

    Ked

    die

    and

    Gas

    ioro

    wsk

    i (ed

    s), p

    p. 1

    15-4

    1.

    22 I

    ran

    Tim

    es,

    16 N

    ovem

    ber 1

    990,

    p. 1

    6.

    23 S

    ee, f

    or e

    xam

    ple.

    , A. G

    resh

    , 'C

    ontin

    uity

    and

    Cha

    nge

    in S

    ovie

    t Pol

    icy'

    , M

    iddl

    e Eas

    t Rep

    ort

    20 (6

    ) Nov

    embe

    r/Dec

    embe

    r 199

    0: 5

    .