Ecstasy Between Divine and Human: Re-assessing Agency … · Re-assessing Agency in Iamblichean Divination and Theurgy 11 According to Iamblichus, possession is emphatically not a

Re-assessing Agency in Iamblichean Divination and Theurgy 7

Crystal Addey

Ecstasy Between Divine and Human: Re-assessing Agency in Iamblichean Divination and Theurgy

Others attribute the goal of the descent to the demonstra-tion of divine life. For this is the will of the gods: to show themselves as gods through the souls. For the gods come forth in the open and show themselves through the pure and immaculate lives of souls.

Iamblichus, De Anima, 379.23-261

Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis provides a thorough exploration of a range of ecstatic experiences including various states of divine possession such as those associated with divination and theurgy. In Book 3, which comprises an exposition of different types of divine possession and divination, Iambli-chus discusses his theory of the operation of divine possession (3.4-8), dream divination (3.2-3), states of divine possession experienced during the rites of Cybele and the Korybantes (3.9-10) and oracles (3.11).2 At the end of Book 3, Iamblichus speaks of the role of divination in theurgic ritual.3 Although recent work has been undertaken in this area, theurgic ritual and related practices remain complex phenomena, not readily or easily categori-

-------------------------------------------- 1 Iamblichus, De Anima, 379.23-26: Ὁί δὲ εἰς θείας ζωῆς ἐπίδειξιν τὸ τέλος ἀωαφέροντες

τῆς καθόδου. Ταύτην γάρ εἶναι τὴν βοὺλησιν τῶν τεῶν, θεοὺς ἐκφαίνεσθαι διὰ τῶν ψυχῶν· προέρχονται γὰρ εἰς τοὐμαφὲς οἱ θεοὶ καὶ ἐπιδείκνυνται διὰ τῶν ψυχῶν καθαρᾶσ καὶ ἀχράντου ζωῆς. J.F. Finamore – J.M. Dillon (2002). All quotations and translations from this work are from this edition.

2 Iamblichus, De Mysteriis, E.C. Clarke - J.M. Dillon - J.P. Hershbell (2003). All quotations and translations of this work are from this edition, unless otherwise specified. Henceforth, this work will be referred to using the abbreviation DM.

3 Iamblichus, DM, 3.31 (178.13-14; 179.3-8). Cf. also DM, 10.4 (289.3-13); 10.7 (293.4-10); 10.8 (293.11-12).

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zed by most traditional historical and anthropological approaches towards ritual.4 There have been some very important and admirable contributions towards understanding Iamblichus’ notion of soul and its relationship to theurgic ritual, particularly the research of Gregory Shaw and John Finamo-re.5 However, notions of “agency” are often left unexplored and are fre-quently applied unreflectively to ancient ritual theories and practices, despi-te the fact that Neoplatonist conceptions of the “soul” often differ radically from modern, post-Enlightenment notions of the “self.”6 Radically different notions of the “self” may well imply differing notions of agency. In this paper, I will begin an initial re-assessment of Iamblichean notions of “self” and “agency” and their relationship to his description of certain ritual prac-tices.

1. Divine Possession and Notions of Agency

In Iamblichus’ discussion of the divine inspiration experienced by the Pythia at Delphi, which causes her to utter the oracles of Apollo, the philo-sopher describes the ritual undertaken by the priestess:

...πανταχῆ οὕτω δίδωσιν ἑαυτὴν τῷ θείῳ πνεύματι, ἀπό τε τῆς τοῦ θείοθ πυρὸς ἀκτῖνος καταυγάζεται. Καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἀθρόον καὶ πολὺ τὸ ἀναφερόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ στομίου πῦρ κύκλῳ πανταχόθεν αὐτήν περιέχῃ, πληροῦται ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ θείας αὐγῆς…ὅλη γιγωεται τοῦ θεοῦ. ...she thus gives herself absolutely to the divine spirit, and is illuminated by the ray of divine fire. And when the fiery spirit coming up from the aperture, dense and abundant, envelops her entirely in a circle, she is filled by it with a divine brightness...she becomes wholly the god’s possession.7

Such ancient formulations have led Classicists such as E.R. Dodds to characterise prophetesses such as the Pythia as possessed “victims” who are --------------------------------------------

4 J. Bussanich (2005, 483): “It seems to me doubtful that the social and collective function of ritual, as it is generally understood by historians and anthropologists, really fits Iamblichus or any of the later Neoplatonists.” Cf. J. Bussanich (2002, 39-61).

5 J. Finamore (1985); G. Shaw (1993, 1995, 2005). 6 For example, G. Gurtler (2005, 113) has highlighted the limitations of a Cartesian model

of the self for understanding Plotinus’ views of the self: “If one attempted to fit this into a Cartesian model, where the ego is self-constituted and the relation to the other suspect, much of what Plotinus describes does not make sense or becomes distorted.”

7 Iamblichus, DM, 3.11 (126.7-11; 13).

Re-assessing Agency in Iamblichean Divination and Theurgy 9

totally overcome by the descent of the gods.8 In this sense, modern Classi-cal scholarship on the phenomenon of divine possession in Antiquity has tended to follow the predominant anthropological model of spirit possession in diverse cultures. A common conception of possession in anthropological scholarship is that all cases of possession necessitate the complete expulsion of the host individual out of their own body, and its replacement by a whol-ly other, alien agency.9 The religious studies scholar Mary Keller has high-lighted the way in which such interpretations of possession are dependant upon modern, post-Enlightenment notions of agency and the “agent”; such notions tend to construe the “agent” as a wholly autonomous, independent subject.10 Keller’s work primarily focuses on the role of women in posses-sion cults in postcolonial contexts, but many of her theoretical observations on conceptions of agency are relevant to scholarship on divine possession, divination and other types of ritual in ancient religious contexts. The idea that possession involves the complete expulsion of the host individual and the replacement of it by a completely alien agency is clearly based upon post-Enlightenment conceptions of “self” and the “agent,” where the “self” is seen as a wholly autonomous subject who is independent and whose boundaries are clearly and rigidly defined. Such a view construes the role of agency as based on a range of clear-cut dichotomies: subject/object and active agent/passive victim. These dichotomies and the view of agency they imply have often been widely applied to ritual praxis in a diverse range of cultural and religious contexts, including to ancient accounts of ritual and related phenomena.

2. Divine Possession and the “One of the Soul”

Turning to Iamblichus’ exposition of divine possession and the central role it plays in his views of divination and theurgic ritual, it becomes clear that the philosopher has a very different view of soul and thus the “self” which implies a more complex conception of “agency.” In his initial dis-

-------------------------------------------- 8 E.R. Dodds (1951, 140; 1965, 72). 9 L. De Heusch (1962, 129-133); I.M. Lewis (1971, 40). 10 M. Keller (2002, 59-61). Cf. also Talal Asad’s (1993, 1-19) critique of Western construc-

tions of the agent and their application to Western notions of history, particularly his comments on post-Enlightenment notions of the autonomous human agent.

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cussion of divine possession, Iamblichus claims that there are many diffe-rent kinds of divine possession, maintaining that this is because the deities who inspire human beings are different and therefore produce diverse kinds of inspiration.11 Iamblichus asserts very strongly that those who are truly possessed by the gods do not act according to sense-perception, and they are not conscious of themselves in the sense of using their personal knowledge or experience.12 To prove his point, Iamblichus gives a list of “characte-ristic signs” which demonstrate that those who are possessed do not utilise normal human consciousness or sensation. These signs involve anaesthesia and resistance to injury.13 Iamblichus ends his list of examples of these characteristic signs by stating:

Ἀπο δὲ τούτων δείκνυται ὡς οὐ παρακολοθοῦσιν ἑαθτοῖς ἐνθουσιῶντες, καὶ ὅτι οὔτε τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην οὔτε τὴν τοῦ ζῴου ζωὴν ζῶσι, κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν ἥ ὁρμήν, ἄλλην δέ τινα θειοτέραν ζωὴν ἀνταλλάσσονται, ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἐπιπνέονται καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἧς τελέως κατέχονται. From these examples it is clear that those who are inspired have no conscious-ness of themselves, and they lead neither the life of a human being nor of a li-ving animal so far as concerns sensation or appetite, but they exchange their life for another more divine life, by which they are inspired, and by which they are completely possessed.14

Iamblichus’ conception of divine possession rests on two points. Firstly, the recipient is wholly possessed by the gods. Secondly, as a conse-quence of the first point, he or she does not act or experience in a human manner using sense perception. However, it is not the case that the reci-pient has no consciousness at all though: the central point is that the posses-sed individual is not conscious of anything else except the gods. Emma Clarke has noted in this regard, “the human individual is eclipsed, not anni-hilated, by the divine force.”15 Iamblichus emphasises the fact that those who are possessed exchange their human life for a divine life.16

-------------------------------------------- 11 Iamblichus, DM, 3.5 (111.3-7); A. Sheppard (1993, 140). 12 Iamblichus, DM, 3.4 (109.10-110.3). 13 Iamblichus, DM, 3.4 (110.4-12). Cf. A. Sheppard (1993, 139). 14 Iamblichus, DM, 3.4 (110.12-111.2). 15 E.C. Clarke (2001, 83). 16 Iamblichus, DM, 3.4 (109.10-13).

Re-assessing Agency in Iamblichean Divination and Theurgy 11

According to Iamblichus, possession is emphatically not a transport of the mind, for the mind is not carried or swept away during the experience of true possession.17 Rather, the human individual consciousness is enhanced by a kind of super-consciousness. Such a process is only possible in I-amblichus’ view because he conceptualises the soul as intrinsically and constantly connected with the divine in an ontological sense. The soul is viewed as bearing an imprint or principle of divinity: in the De Mysteriis Iamblichus refers to “that element in us which is divine and intellectual and one” (τὸ γὰρ θεῖον ἐν ἡμιν και νοερὸν καὶ ἕν).18 In his commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus, Iamblichus refers to the same principle, the “One of the soul” (τὸ ἕν τῆς ψυχῆς), which he identifies with the helmsman of the Phaedrus who unites the soul with the Intelligibles in his circuit of the hea-vens. Citing from Iamblichus’ commentary, Hermeias states:

Ὁ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος κυβερνήτην το ἕν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκούει· ἡνίοχον δὲ τὸν νοῦν αύτῆς· τὸ δὲ ‘θεατῇ’ οὐχ ὅτι καθ᾽ ἑτερότητα ἐπιβάλλει τούτῳ τῷ νοητῷ ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἑνοῦται αὐτῷ καὶ ὅυτως αὐτῆς ἀπολαύει· τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸν κυβερνήτην τελειότερόν τι τοῦ ἡνιόχου καὶ τῶν ἵππων· τὸ γὰρ ἕν τῆς ψυχῆς ἑνοῦσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς πέφυκεν. The divine Iamblichus takes the ‘helmsman’ as being the One of the soul; its In-tellect is the charioteer; the term ‘spectator’ is used not to signify that it directs its gaze on this object of intellection as being other than it, but that it is united with it and appreciates it on that level; for this shows that the ‘helmsman’ is a more perfect entity than the charioteer and the horses; for it is the essential na-ture of the One of the soul to be united with the gods.19

Commenting on this passage, John Dillon has remarked that “a special faculty of the soul was required, to be the receptacle of mystical inspiration from the gods, and to answer in the microsom of the individual to the realm

-------------------------------------------- 17 Iamblichus, DM, 3.8 (116.1-3). 18 Iamblichus, DM, 1.15 (46.9). Cf. also DM, 5.26 (239.6), where Iamblichus refers to “the

divine element in the soul” (τὸ θεῖον τῆς ψυχῆς). 19 Iamblichus, In Phaedrum, Fragment 6, ed. and trs. J.M. Dillon (1973). Cf. also DM, 8.7

(269.11-13): “...for the soul contains its own principle of conversion to the intelligible, and of detachment from the realm of generation, and also of union with true being and the divine” [my italics] (ἔχει γὰρ ἀρχὴν οἰκείαν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς εἰς τὸ νοητὸν περιαγωγῆς καὶ τῆς ἀποστάτεως μὲν ἀπο τῶν γιγνομένων ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ θεῖον συναφῆς). For a detailed discussion of Iamblichus’ conception of the “One of the Soul” cf. G. Shaw (1995, 118-126).

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of the One in the macrocosm.”20 Within the De Mysteriis, Iamblichus ela-borates on this divine principle of the soul:

…ἔστι καὶ ἑτέρα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ κρείττων πάσης φύσεως καὶ γνώσεως, καθ᾽ ἥν καὶ θεοῖς ἑνοῦσθαι δυνάμεθα καὶ τῆς κοσμικῆς τάξεως ὑπερέχειν, ἀιδίου τε ζωῆς καὶ τῶν ὑπεροθρανίων θεῶν τῆς ἐνεργείας μετέχειν. Κατὰ δὴ ταύτην οἵοι τέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἑαυτοὺσ λύειν. Ὅταν γὰρ δὴ τὰ βελτίονα τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐνεργῇ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ κρείττονα ἀνάγηται αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχή, τότε χωρίζεται παντάπασι τῶν κατεχόντων αὐτὴν εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ ἀφίσταται τῶν χειρόνων, ζωήν τε ἑτέραν ἀνθ᾽ ἑτέρας ἀλλάττεται, καὶ δίδωσιν ἑαυτὴν εἰς ἄλλην διακόσμησιν τὴν προτέραν ἀφεῖσα παντελῶς. ...there is another principle of the soul superior to all nature and generation, in virtue of which we can unite ourselves to the gods and transcend the cosmic or-der, and partake in eternal life and in the activity of the supracelestial gods. It is in virtue of this principle that we are actually able to liberate ourselves. For when the better elements within us are active, and the soul is elevated towards the beings superior to it, then it separates itself fully from those things that tie it to generation, and it detaches itself from the worse, and changes one life for a-nother, and gives itself to another order of things, completely abandoning its previous one.21

Iamblichus emphasises that through the divine principle inherent within the soul, the human being has the potential to transcend the cosmic order and participate in the activity of the gods. This principle enables the human soul to liberate itself and attain union with the gods. Iamblichus’ statement “when the better elements within us are active” (Ὅταν γὰρ δὴ τὰ βελτίονα τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐνεργη) points towards activity through the role of ritual and intellectual receptivity on the part of the theurgist or ritual practitioner (see supra) which suggests a concept of agency within ritual contexts that, while clearly not envisioned as autonomous by any means, contains active ele-ments.

Iamblichus’ view of the soul as ontologically (and perhaps even pre-essentially, through its reflection of the One) connected with the divine dissolves a rigid dichotomy of active agent (the possessing entity or invoked deity) and passive victim (the possessed victim or ritual practitioner). Ra-

-------------------------------------------- 20 J.M. Dillon (1973, 253). 21 Iamblichus, DM, 8.7 (270.6-14).

Re-assessing Agency in Iamblichean Divination and Theurgy 13

ther, the possessing deity is paradoxically seen as “other” and “not-other.”22 This paradox reflects the ontological and intermediary nature of the soul and, at the same time, the paradoxical nature of the gods.23 Iamblichus’ conception of the divine underlies his conception of possession: he views the gods as simultaneously transcendent and immanent, a paradoxical view which forms the central foundation of his metaphysical and religious con-ceptions. He maintains that the divine is primarily located in the divine realm but simultaneously is manifested throughout the physical cosmos.24 According to the philosopher, the gods are transcendent in a causal and ontological sense, yet through their causal superiority and power, the gods are also immanent throughout the lower world, the physical cosmos, through their divine illumination which permeates all things, even material objects.25 The possession state, as well as theurgic union and the oracular ritual, are thus conceptualised as connecting the divine element in the soul with the transcendent divine. The human soul, while possessed, sees through the eyes of a deity and exchanges its human life for a divine life. Crucially, however, this is only possible because the soul contains a reflec-tion of the divine.26 Although I do not have time to discuss it in any depth, it is worth noting that Iamblichus uses a similar line of argument to explain the use of invocations and prayers by the theurgist and to refute the idea that the theurgist “commands” or “compels” the gods.27 This conceptualisation of a constant, ontological or pre-essential connection between the soul and the divine, a line of unbroken continuity, dissolves clear-cut notions of the

-------------------------------------------- 22 Cf. G. Shaw (2005, 147-161) for an extensive exploration of this theme approached from

the perspective of the sphere of the soul: “I will suggest that in light of his [i.e. Iamblichus’] paradoxical understanding of the soul as simultaneously mortal and immortal our return to the sphere must also express a fundamental paradox and our habit of interpreting theurgic anagogê as an ascent to the gods may, itself, need to be turned around, making the way up identical with the way down” (148).

23 Iamblichus, DM, 2.2 (68.7-9; 69.3-5); G. Shaw (1993, 116; 2005, 152). 24 Iamblichus, DM, 1.8 (27.7-29.7); 1.9 (29.13-30.2); G. Shaw (1995, 29-30, n.6); L. George

(2005, 293, n.33). 25 For a comprehensive analysis of Iamblichean and Neoplatonic views of light and divine

illumination cf. Finamore (1993, 55-64), especially 58-59 for a discussion of Iamblichean views on the role of divine illumination in divination.

26 Iamblichus, DM, 1.8 (29.1-3); 4.2 (184.1-6); 4.3 (185.9-12); De Anima, 379.23-26. 27 Cf. Iamblichus, DM, 7.4 (255.13-256.2); 1.12 (41.9-13); 1.15 (47.3-9); E.C. Clarke, J.M.

Dillon and J.P. Hershbell (2003, 59, n.86).

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role of “agency” such as the dichotomy of active agent-passive victim, and points towards a more complex conception of agency which implies at least a partial dissolution of the subject-object relationship. This view suggests a conceptualisation of agency as a continuum of agent, instrument and patient. A caveat needs to be mentioned here: Iamblichus’ view of the total descent of the soul means that he conceptualises a firmer demarcation of divine and human than Plotinus did, with his view of the undescended soul and its unconscious connection with the divine.28 Yet the notion of the “One of the soul” still points towards a paradoxical conception of agency whereby the human is viewed as able to abandon their human life for a divine life through ritual activity.

3. The role of receptivity (ἐπιτηδειότης) in Divination and Theurgic ritual

Furthermore, Iamblichus’ notion of the “receptivity” (ἐπιτηδειότης) of the possessed again points towards the necessity of refining our notions of agency, moving beyond dichotomies of active agent-passive victim and subject-object, when examining his theories of ritual, particularly divine possession.29 Leonard George identifies four semantic domains of the term ἐπιτηδειότης, all of which seem to have influenced Iamblichus’ formation of ritual receptivity: potential, sympathy, receptivity and aptitude.30 Speaking of the divinatory power of the gods, Iamblichus specifies that “existing itself prior to the totality of things, it is sufficient, by its own separateness, to fill all things to the extent that each is able to share in it.” (αὐτὴ μέντοι πρὸ τῶν ὅλων προϋπάρχουσα αὐτῷ τῷ χωριστῷ ἑαυτῆς ἱκανὴ γέγονεν

-------------------------------------------- 28 A point noted explicitly by G. Shaw (1993, 116-117; 1995, 122-123; 2005, 151-152),

who argues that Iamblichus’ view of the complete descent of the soul explains his emphasis on the necessity and superiority of theurgy: the soul must reach the gods through the All, thus the soul must use material objects to evoke the divine.

29 On Iamblichus’ notion of “theurgical fitness” cf. the excellent article by L. George (2005, 287-303).

30 L. George (2005, 290-293). Cf. E.R. Dodds (1963, 344-345), who divides the semantic connotations of the term into three descriptive statements: “Inherent capacity for acting or being acted upon in a specific way”; “Inherent affinity of one substance for another” and “Inherent or induced capacity for the reception of a divine influence.” It is of course the latter description which most closely matches Iamblichus’ notion of the term within ritual contexts.

Re-assessing Agency in Iamblichean Divination and Theurgy 15

ἀποπληρῶσαι πάντα, καθ’ ὅσον ἕκαστα δύναται αὐτῆς μετέχειν).31 The first part of this statement emphasises the ontological and causal superiority and power of the gods, while the latter part (“...the extent that each is able to share in it”) refers to the receptivity or “suitability” (ἐπιτηδειότης) which enables the theurgist or prophet(ess) to share in divine illumination and power. Elsewhere, Iamblichus refers to the receptivity or readiness which enables participation in the divine:

τὰ δ’ ἐπι γῆς ἐν τοῖς πληρώμασι τῶν θεῶν ἔχοντα τὸ εἶναι, ὁπόταν ἐπιτήδεια πρὸσ τὴν θείαν μετοχὴν γένηται, εὐθὺς ἔχει προ τῆς οἰκείας ἑαυτῶν οὐσίας προϋπάρχοντας ἐν αὐτῇ τοὺς θεούς. …earthly things, possessing their being in virtue of the totalities of the gods, whenever they come to be ready for participation in the divine, straight away find the gods pre-existing in it prior to their own proper essence. 32

This statement makes it clear that divine illumination is constantly avai-lable and omnipresent in the mortal world, yet the ritual practitioner’s re-ceptivity must have been properly cultivated so that they are ready to fully receive these divine illuminations. When receptivity is attained, the soul instantly unites with the divine. As Leonard George has noted, “Similar to the actualization of a potential, the gods pre-essentially dwell within the soul and manifest as soon as conditions are suitable.”33 Iamblichus is clear that through ritual, intellectual and moral means, the human being can inc-rease and cultivate the receptivity of their soul to these illuminations so that they can become possessed by a deity; as noted above, this process is only possible because of the presence of the divine within the human soul. Re-ceptivity is thus construed as a kind of instrumental power for the human ritual practitioner, since it is seen as the active cultivation of qualities or aptitudes (affinity with and receptivity to the divine) which enable contact with the divine and enable the human soul to act as an appropriate instru-ment for the divine.

Iamblichus’ discussion of oracles and other forms of divination is parti-cularly imbued with notions of the significance of the receptivity (ἐπιτηδειότης) of the ritual practitioner. Iamblichus’ account of oracles

-------------------------------------------- 31 Iamblichus, DM, 3.12 (129.9-11). 32 Iamblichus, DM, 1.8 (29.1-3). 33 L. George (2005, 293).

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focuses particularly on the ritual preparations and procedures which the prophet(ess) undergoes in order to increase their receptivity to illumination so that they can become possessed and utter the oracles of the god.34 The prophet at the Oracle of Claros purifies himself through withdrawal to soli-tary places, meditation and fasting. He also drinks from the water of the oracular spring: Iamblichus states that it is thus obvious that the water has oracular power, but denies that this is because the prophetic spirit passes through the water; rather, he asserts, “…but this [i.e. the water] only bestows the receptivity and purification of the luminous spirit in us, through which we are able to receive the god.” (...ἀλλ’ ἅυτη μὲν ἐπιτηδειότητα μόνου καὶ ἀποκάθαρσιν τοῦ ἐν ἡμιν αὐγεοιδοῦς πνεύματος ἐμποιεῖ, δι’ ἥν δυνατοὶ γιγνόμεθα χωρεῖν τὸν θεόν).35 The water from the oracular spring has a purifying capacity which helps to increase the receptivity of the hu-man prophet. Meanwhile the prophetess at the Oracle of Didyma undergoes ritual bathing, fasting for three days and withdrawal and meditation in the innermost sanctuaries of the temple.36 Ritual fasting, imbibing sacred wa-ter, meditation and bathing were all viewed as ways of increasing receptivi-ty. These ritual procedures were conceived of by Iamblichus as increasing affinity and sympathy with the divine realm and thus enabling the human prophet(ess) to increase and cultivate their receptivity. In light of DM 8.7 (cited above), presumably ritual procedures such as fasting and bathing were conceptualised as purification from the processes of generation (e-nabling the ritual practitioner to become more like the gods who were cha-racterised as eternal and thus free from generation), while meditation and contemplation were conceived as enabling direct connection with the gods

-------------------------------------------- 34 L. George (2005, 293) states: “…for Iamblichus, the gods are not more readily available

at oracle sites than elsewhere; seeming variations in the divine presence do not depend on accidents of geography, but on the receptive fitness (epitedeiotes) of the souls that congregate there and on the assemblages of sunthemata to which these fit souls are attuned.” In my dis-cussion of oracles, I use the term with capitalisation to refer to an oracle site and without capitalisation to refer to an oracular response.

35 Iamblichus, DM, 3.11 (125.4-6). E.C. Clarke, J.M. Dillon and J.P. Hershbell (2003, 147, n.200) note that Iamblichus’ description of “the luminous spirit within us” refers to the soul-vehicle, the pneumatic mediating entity between soul and body. On Iamblichus’ conception of this soul-vehicle cf. Finamore (1993, 125-155), especially 128-129 for a discussion of this passage.

36 Iamblichus, DM, 3.11 (125.11-126.3; 127.10-13).

Re-assessing Agency in Iamblichean Divination and Theurgy 17

through an understanding and “sympathetic” resonance with the noetic and divine realms.37

In his discussion of the dream divination practised by the theurgist, I-amblichus also refers to states which are “fit for reception of the gods” (πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τῶν θεῶν ἐπιτήδεια): these states include dream-sleep, a fixing of attentiveness, a state between sleep and wakefulness and a torpo-rous seizure (stillness).38 These states show a liminality: the soul is positio-ned “in between”. The soul is conceived of as aware, focused, calm and vigilant; as Leonard George notes, this is an apt description of mediation.39 Meditation and contemplation are seen as engendering an affinity of the human soul with the gods: through stillness and vigilant, focused awareness the theurgist seeks to imitate the ontological status of the gods and their eternal nature. Iamblichus also maintains that these states are “sent by the gods themselves” (ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τε ἐπιπέμπεται τῶν θεῶν); in other words, they are conceptualised as ultimately caused by the divine.40 Therefore, while human beings have an important instrumental power through their cultivation of ritual receptivity, it is important to remember that this should not be seen as entailing a completely autonomous, active agency, since even this receptivity or capacity is considered to be ultimately caused by and sent from the gods.41

The receptivity of the ritual practitioner is the main means by which Iamblichus distinguishes the theurgist from the γόης, the magician who practises antagonistic magic. In his discussion of ritual practitioners who “stand on characters,” a clear reference to the γόης,42 Iamblichus maintains that:

-------------------------------------------- 37 Iamblichus, DM, 1.11 (38.8-10). 38 Iamblichus, DM, 3.2 (104.11-105.2). 39 L. George (2005, 294-295). 40 Iamblichus, DM, 3.2 (105.1-2); L. George (2005, 294). 41 Iamblichus, DM, 1.12 (41.3-8; 42.5-13); 3.20 (149.10-150.2); 4.3 (184.14-185.3). 42 The practice of “standing on characters” is clearly attested in the PGM, one of our main

documentary sources for magical practices, those delineated by the rubric γονήτεια. Cf. PGM III.292-303; VII.586; XIII.1003; Clarke, Dillon and Hershbell (2003, 151, n.206). It is impor-tant to note that Iamblichus is not condemning the practice of “standing on characters” in itself (as his comment at 3.13 (129.14-15) makes clear), but rather the characteristic lack of ritual preparation and endurance exhibited by the γόης with whom this practice seems to have been most frequently associated in Antiquity.

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Εἰσι γάρ τινες οἵ τὴν ὅλην πραγματείαν τῆς τελεσιουργοῦ θεωρίας παριδόντες περί τε τὸν καλοῦντα καὶ περὶ τον ἐπόπτην, τάξιν τε τῆς θρησκείας καὶ τὴν ὁσιωτάτην ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πόνων ἁγιστείας παρωσάμενοι, ἀποχρῶσαν νοίζουσι τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν χαρακτήρων μόνην στάσιν, καὶ ταύτην ἐν μιᾷ ὥρᾳ ποιησάμενοι, εἰσκρίνειν νομίζουσί τι πνεῦμα· καίτοι τί ἄν γένοιτο ἀπὸ τούτων καλὸν ἥ τέλειον; ἤ π[ῶς ἔνεστι τὴν ἀίδιον καὶ τῷ ὄντι τῶν θεῶν ὀυσίαν ἐφημέροις ἔργοις σθνάπτεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς πράξεσι; διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὖν οἱ τοιοῦτοι προπετεῖς ἄνδρες τοῦ παντὸς ἁμαρτάνουσιν, οὐδ’ ἄξιον αὐτοὺς ἐν μάντεσι καταριθμεῖσθαι. For there are some who overlook the whole procedure of effective contemplati-on, both in regard to the one who makes an invocation and the one who enjoys the vision; and they disdain the order of the sacred observance, its holiness and long-protracted endurance of toils, and, rejecting the customs, prayers and other rituals, they believe the simple standing on the characters to be sufficient, and when they have done this for a mere hour, they believe that they have caused some spirit to enter. And yet how could anything noble or perfect result from this? Or how can the eternal and truly existing essence of the gods be united with ephemeral acts in sacred procedures? Hence, because of these things, such rash men go wholly astray, and are not worthy to be counted among diviners.43

The ephemerality of magical practices is contrasted with the extensive ritual procedures of the theurgist employed to increase his or her receptivity. Iamblichus first mentions “effective contemplation” and then sustained effort and endurance of toils, long prayers and other rituals.44 The longevi-ty, endurance and sustained effort of the theurgist are clearly seen as imita-ting the eternal and ontological nature of the gods, thus engendering an

-------------------------------------------- 43 Iamblichus, DM, 3.13 (131.4-132.2). 44 Cf. DM, 5.26 (238.12-239.4; 239.6; 239.9-10) for Iamblichus’ comments on the efficacy

of prayer for increasing receptivity to the divine: “Extended practice of prayer nurtures our intellect, enlarges very greatly our soul’s receptivity to the gods, reveals to men the life of the gods, accustoms their eyes to the brightness of divine light, and gradually brings to perfection the capacity of our faculties for contact with the gods, until it leads us up to the highest level of consciousness (of which we are capable)…kindles the divine element in the soul…and, in a word, it renders those who employ prayers, if we may so express it, the familiar consorts of the gods” (Ἡ δ’ ἐν αὐταῖς ἐγχρονίζουσα διατριβὴ τρέφει μὲν τὸν ἡμέτερον νοῦν, τὴν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποδοχὴν τῶν θεῶν ποιεῖ λίαν εὐρυτέραν, ἀνοίγει δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰ τῶν θεῶν, συνήθειαν δὲ παρέχει πρὸς τὰς τοῦ φωτὸς μαρμαρυγάς, κατὰ βραχὺ δὲ τελειοῖ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρός τὰς τὼν θεῶν συναφάς, ἕως ἂν επὶ τὸ ἀκρότατον ἡμᾶς ἐπαναγάγῃ...τόν τε θεῖον ἔρωτα συναύξει, καὶ τὸ θεῖον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνάπτει...καὶ τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, ὁμιλητὰς τῶν θεῶν, ἵνα οὔτως εἴπωμεν, τοὺς χρωμένους αὐταῖς ἀπεργάζεται).

Re-assessing Agency in Iamblichean Divination and Theurgy 19

affinity and receptivity to their presence. Meanwhile the ephemerality which characterises the γόης, and his or her ritual practices, is considered to be ineffectual in increasing receptivity to the divine, presumably because ephemerality is a chief characteristic of generation and the realm of beco-ming.

Elsewhere, Iamblichus seems to suggest that different levels of ascent to the divine are involved in different cases of divine possession:

Ἤ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχει, ἤ ἡμεῖς ὅλοι τοῦ θεοῦ γιγνόμεθα, ἤ κοινὴν ποιούμεθα πρὸς αὐτὸν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· καὶ ποτὲ μὲν τῆς ἐσχάτης δυνάμεως τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχομεν, ποτὲ δ’ αὖ τῆς μέσης, ἐνίοτε δὲ τῆς πρώτης· καὶ ποτὲ μὲν μετουσία ψιλὴ γίγνεται, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ κοινωνία, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἕνωσις... For either the god possesses us, or we become wholly the god’s property, or we exercise our activity in common with him. And sometimes we share in the god’s lowest power, sometimes in his intermediate, and sometimes in his prima-ry power. And sometimes there is a mere participation, sometimes a communi-on and sometimes even a union...45

According to Iamblichus’ schema, different states of possession can in-volve: participation sharing in the god’s lowest power, communion sharing in the god’s intermediate power and union sharing in the god’s primary power. The level of ascent involved in these types of possession seems to be dependant upon the receptivity of the possessed human being: the greater the capacity or receptivity of the human being, the greater the level of as-cent is. In participation, the soul’s lower powers is seen as being brought into sympathetic relation to the possessing god, so that they do not distort the expression of the divine within the sphere of the soul. The next level involves the soul discovering its intellectual essence in order to commune with the divine, and the highest level involves the soul’s concentration upon its highest divine principle, the “One of the Soul,” so that its essence and energies find union with their source. These three levels match the three level of prayer set out by Iamblichus elsewhere in the De Mysteriis: the first leads to contact with the divine, the second leads to union with the divine through sympathetic association and the third leads to “ineffable unificati-on” (ἡ ἄρρητος ἕνωσις).46 As John Finamore has observed, the difference

-------------------------------------------- 45 Iamblichus, DM, 3.5 (111.7-11). 46 Iamblichus, DM, 5.26 (237.12-238.5); J.M. Dillon (1973, 407-411).

20 Crystal Addey

between a prophet(ess) of an Oracle and a dreamer that utilises their intel-lect is located specifically in the person.47 The theurgist is highly trained and completely purified – the best kind of receptacle for the god’s illumina-tion. The prophet(ess) is also purified but the training of their intellect is not similar to that of the theurgist.48 Such a view seems to be implied in Iamblichus’ comment during the course of his discussion of dream divinati-on: “But if the soul weaves together its intellectual and its divine part with higher powers, then its own visions will be purer, whether of the gods, or of essentially incorporeal beings, or...of whatever contributes to the truth about intelligible things” (Ἀλλ’ ἐὰν μὲν τὸ νοερὸν ἑαυτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ θεῖον συνυφαίνῃ τοῖς κρείττοσι, τότε καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα αὐτῆς ἔσται καθαρώτερα, ἤτοι περὶ θεῶν ἤ τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὰς ἀσωμάτων οὐσιῶν ἢ...περὶ τῶν εἰς ἀλήθειαν συμβαλλομένων τὴν περὶ τῶν νοητῶν).49 However, parti-cipation, communion and union are all conceived of as types of ascent to the divine within a continuum of ascent, conceptualised philosophically as reversion to the causal origins of the human being.

The soul is seen as the receptacle of the gods, a conception which seems similar to Mary Keller’s notion of the instrumental agency of the possessed. Keller maintains that instrumentality refers to the power of re-ceptivity, comparable metaphorically to a hammer, flute or other instrument that is wielded or played, while agency implies action and a place where exchanges occur.50 Keller argues that “...the concept of instrumental agency serves to highlight the way that receptivity has often been evaluated as an extremely powerful capacity among possession traditions. Rather than coding receptivity negatively as a type of passivity, instrumental agency accounts for this revaluation; one’s receptivity marks a developable sacred

-------------------------------------------- 47 In personal communication (January 2009). 48 It should be noted that this statement is made with great caution: after all, textual and epi-

graphical evidence regarding the potential range of activity and intellectual training (or possi-ble lack thereof) of the prophet(ess) at oracle sites is scarce, to say the least. As we have seen above, according to Iamblichus, the prophet(ess) often engaged in “withdrawal to solitary places”, i.e. meditation, showing their cultivation of intellect and mental awareness and alert-ness. However, even given this fact, it seems unlikely that Iamblichus conceived of their philosophical and intellectual training as matching that of the theurgist, the ritual practitioner par excellence.

49 Iamblichus, DM, 3.3 (107.7-11). Cf. also DM, 3.3 (106.11-107.2); 3.2 (104.5-9). 50 M. Keller (2002, 9-10).

Re-assessing Agency in Iamblichean Divination and Theurgy 21

space.”51 We have already seen that for Iamblichus, divine possession is not a matter of a totally alien agency overcoming its human victim, but a transcendent and simultaneously immanent deity working through the soul of the possessed, to which it is already linked causally, and so enhances.52 Thus, receptivity to the divine is seen as enhancing the human being and is a source of power. Receptivity is viewed by Iamblichus as the sacred space where the ritual practitioner can develop his or her discipline, contemplation and thus capability to receive the divine.

The fact the role of receptivity within ritual praxis has often been “co-ded negatively” as a type of passivity by much modern scholarship is direct-ly related to predominant, post-Enlightenment views of ‘ritual,’ where ritual is often seen as a type of action in a dichotomous relationship to thought and belief.53 This clear, post-Enlightenment dichotomy between thought and action means that ritual has often been evaluated negatively as a type of meaningless action, involving little or no thought, and therefore lacking in any kind of real power. The postcolonial theorist Talal Asad has highligh-ted the way in which the contemporary study of religion is based on a model of subjectivity that reflects only contemporary Western configurations of religion. According to Asad’s analysis, religion has been seen primarily as a matter of beliefs rather than practices: one’s religiousness is compartmen-talised as a distinct symbolic entity for personal reflection, separate from other practical forms of everyday life.54 Iamblichus’ conception of recepti-vity suggests a view of religious practices where thought and contemplation mutually co-exist with action in ritual practice. Ritual practices are seen as a constituting activity which discipline thought (to use Asad’s terminology) and imply a view of human beings as instruments that, through a process of

-------------------------------------------- 51 M. Keller (2002, 82). 52 Iamblichus, DM, 1.8 (29.1-3); 1.12 (41.9-13); 4.2 (184.1-6); 4.3 (185.9-12); De Anima,

379.23-26; Finamore (1985, 99-100). K. Corrigan (2005, 323) makes a similar point within a much broader discussion of ideas of the self within Neoplatonism: “Neoplatonism…tends to see the self as radically contingent – a vanishing point of psychological association – unless the ego-self is enlarged by or dynamically connected to the larger realities of which it is but a part or a fragment, namely, all-soul, all-intellect, and the One” [my italics].

53 Cf. the compelling analyses and discussions of post-Enlightenment conceptions of ritual in C. Bell (1992, 19, 47-8); T. Asad (1993, 79); M. Keller (2002, 65-6); J.Z. Smith (2002, 73-91); Z. Mazur (2004, 42-43).

54 T. Asad (1993, 40-43; 47-8). Cf. also M. Keller (2002, 56-9)

22 Crystal Addey

ritual discipline, could be purified and cultivated to allow the appropriate conditions for the experience of religious truth and connection with the divine to occur.

4. Conclusion

To conclude, the observations offered here are based on an initial ex-ploration of agency in relation to Iamblichus’ discussions of ritual practices such as divine possession and divination and are therefore somewhat provi-sional, offering some suggestions for future research in this area. Iambli-chus’ notion of the “One of the Soul,” the divine principle which underlies the soul, partially dissolves rigid dichotomies between subject-object and active agent-passive victim and implies a nuanced and complex constructi-on of agency in rituals involving divine possession, divination and theurgy. This construction of agency needs to be evaluated in terms of a continuum of agent – instrument – patient: this scale of agency operates according to the view of an ontological (and pre-essential) and causal connection bet-ween the gods and the human soul.

Moreover, Iamblichus’ conception of the “receptivity” of the possessed individual or the ritual practitioner points to a complex notion of agency whereby the individual is seen as exercising a type of instrumental agency which is neither wholly autonomous nor wholly passive. In this view, the divine is primarily and ultimately responsible for the possession state or oracular vision, yet the human ritual practitioner must prepare themselves in order to become a fitting instrument of the gods. Iamblichus’ view of ulti-mate divine causation acts as an indicator that the human ritual practitioner does not exercise a purely active, autonomous agency; yet, his notion of the cultivation of ritual receptivity and the presence of the divine in the human soul suggests that neither are they conceived as completely passive victims. Rather, their agency is conceptualised as instrumental, allowing the gods to manifest in the physical cosmos through human souls; this divine manifes-tation is seen as enhancing and transforming the power and perception of the ritual practitioner, allowing them access to superhuman knowledge and a “divine life.” Further exploration of notions of agency and their relation to ancient ritual theories and practices could well draw out many of the subtleties and nuances of ancient philosophical views of ritual and divine possession.

Re-assessing Agency in Iamblichean Divination and Theurgy 23

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E.G. Clark (1993), 55-64. Finamore, J.F. – Dillon, J.M. (eds.) (2002), Iamblichus, De Anima. Leiden.

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ège.

Soul’s Desire and the Origin of Time in the Philosophy of Plotinus 25

José Baracat

Soul’s Desire and the Origin of Time in the Philosophy of Plotinus

ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is to search for a ground for our under-standing of time which is intrinsic to the Plotinian conception of soul. To that end, I shall propose, by means of a relatively free exegesis of Plotinus’ texts, a possible connection between soul’s desire and the origin of time (or temporality) in the phi-losophy of Plotinus. I will try to demonstrate that an act of desire lies at the very bottom of Plotinus’ definition of time as the life of soul; and that it is the specific modus of desiring and attaining proper to soul, by its ontological structure, that brings forth the experience of temporality for soul. Differently from intellect, which is always desiring and always attaining, soul experiences a rupture or lapse in the desiring-attaining process. Such a lapse, which is not temporal itself, is the most internal intuition of a certain temporality – in the sense that it is not eternity –, and is itself prior to the succession of activities that are the life of soul.

I. Two critiques against the Platonic-Plotinian deduction of time

Plotinus’ vigorous reflection on eternity and time is a fine instance of how easily his efforts and concerns can be misunderstood. Presented as an exegesis of Plato’s formula – time is “the moving image of eternity” (Ti-maeus 37D) –, it is sometimes regarded as secondary and susceptible to the same objections that are directed against Plato. The great Argentine writer Jorge Luiz Borges, a notable example, confesses his uneasiness regarding Plotinus at the beginning of his History of Eternity.1 He complains that Plot-

-------------------------------------------- 1 “In that passage of the Enneads which intends to inquire and define the nature of time, it is

stated that it is indispensable to know previously eternity, which – as everybody knows – is the model and archetype of time. This preliminary warning, so more worrisome if we judge it sincere, seems to annihilate all the hope of concordance with the man who wrote it. Time is a problem to us, an enormous and demanding problem, perhaps the most vital problem of meta-physics; eternity, a game or a fatigued hope. We read in Plato’s Timaeus that time is a moving image of eternity; and this is a register that distracts no one from the conviction that eternity is an image made with substance of time…Inverting Plotinus’ method (the only way to make it

26 José Baracat

inus, accepting eternity as the model from which time will be deduced, does not take into account that time is the real human problem, being necessarily prior to eternity; and that we imagine eternity deriving it from the substance of time, so that eternity is nothing more than an unreal image, a mere pro-jection of human hope, man’s creation.

Well, perhaps Borges is right. However, if Plotinus could reply to him, I am sure he would behave like a perfect gentleman, as Stephen MacKenna already cogitated (1936, 213), and would probably class Borges as a “phi-lologus, but not philosophus”.2 It seems that the Argentine writer does not realize that in this case, “as so often in Plotinus, theory is rooted in and serves experience” (Smith 1996, 214).

It happens however that Borges’ critique was anticipated in its main features by Martin Heidegger, and I think Plotinus wouldn’t deny him the honor of being a philosopher. Says Heidegger in his The Concept of Time:

“If time finds its meaning in eternity, then it must be understood start-ing from eternity. The point of departure and path of this inquiry are there by indicated in advance: from eternity to time. This way of posing the ques-tion is fine, provided that we have the aforementioned point of depart at our disposal, that is, that we are acquainted with eternity and adequately under-stand it.”3

Perhaps also Heidegger is right. His objection is perfectly just: to un-derstand time, we need an accessible point of departure, one that is know-able to us, human beings, and eternity cannot be such a point of departure, for it not accessible to us. He will state death, Dasein’s finitude, as the point of departure; and Blanchot, Lévinas, and Derrida will object to him for reasons similar to the one he has objected to the conception of time that assumes eternity as paradigm.4

Be as it may, even Heidegger seems not to realize that our philosopher struggles – in the words of Pierre Aubenque, who speaks of Plotinus with Heideggerean vocabulary – to “pass beyond traditional ontology…, not only because he has radically questioned the being of entity (the esse of ens),

-------------------------------------------- useful), I will begin remembering the obscurities inherent to time: metaphysical, natural mys-tery that must precede eternity, which is daughter of men” (Borges 2006, 5, my translation).

2 As he said of Longinus: Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 14. 20. 3 Heidegger, The Concept of Time: McNeil 1992, 1E. 4 On Heidegger’s concept of time and the critiques he has received, cf. Alweiss 2002.

Soul’s Desire and the Origin of Time in the Philosophy of Plotinus 27

[but also] because he foresaw that the Platonic-Aristotelic ontology was implicitly dominated by a conception of time that arbitrarily gave privilege to the moment of presence [and conceived] eternity itself through the form of time, [since it was understood] as perpetual present, as the permanence of a presence” (1973, 209).5

But we, Plotinian, could argue that eternity is not unfamiliar, strange to us. If we accept Plotinus’ theoretical frame, eternity is present to us every time we look at the world, perceive, or think, because we are souls and we are also νοῦς: one part of soul is always linked to νοῦς, and our knowledge is possible only because we participate in νοῦς.6 “We, human beings, state at each and every moment, and concretely, the relation between eternity and time, and we effectively experience it in the act of knowing” (Trotta 1997, 35),7 for the incorporeity, the unity, and the eternity of soul are conditions of the possibility of knowledge.

Returning to Heidegger, we could, with the naivety of the unlearned, cast on him an annoying distrust: can one believe that the Dasein does not presuppose an unvarying and universal (in the sense that it is the same for everyone or everything that is a Dasein) cognitive or perceptive condition? And, as such, wouldn’t this structure also be eternal (in a quasi-Plotinian sense, as we shall see)?

II. General features of the Plotinian eternity and time

i. Eternity

For Plotinus, as for anybody else, the most incipient perception of time we may have lies in the succession and in the becoming of things; our age-ing, the sun rising and setting, and rising again and setting again, the phases of the moon: these phenomena make manifest a first, and probably insuper-able, notion of time.8 We can measure these phenomena, but time itself --------------------------------------------

5 Several studies compare Heidegger and Plotinus in order to show their similarities as well as to denounce Heidegger’s ignorance or unconcern towards Neoplatonism; cf., for instance, Moreau 1958, 152-156; Hadot 1959; Beierwaltes 1991, 371ff.; Narbonne, 2001, 271ff.

6 Cf. e.g. Plotinus, Enn. I. 1 [51] 10-11; IV. 7 [2] 13. 12-13; IV. 8 [6] 8. 2-3. 7 Cf also pages 53-71, in which Trotta analyses the soul as the center of the eternity-time

dialectics, which are highly valuable for my purposes. 8 Cf. III. 7 [45] 12. 25ff.; 13. 1 and 20ff.