Top Banner
Economics Workshop Better Regulation Executive Sandeep Kapur 2006 [email protected]
48

Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Dec 31, 2015

Download

Documents

gabriel-bernard

Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive. Sandeep Kapur. 2006. [email protected]. WORKSHOP AIMS. To provide rigorous but non-mathematical training in economics, enabling BRE staff to develop a simple but reliable toolkit for economic analysis - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Welcome message from author
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Page 1: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Economics Workshop

 Better Regulation Executive

Sandeep Kapur

2006

[email protected]

Page 2: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

WORKSHOP AIMS

To provide rigorous but non-mathematical training in economics, enabling BRE staff to• develop a simple but reliable toolkit for economic

analysis• practise its application using concrete regulatory

problems• explore the application of simple economic theory

to their own work

Page 3: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Objectives: Day 1

To understand • how markets work, and their efficiency• why markets sometimes fail to be efficient and how

various regulatory instruments can improve efficiency• how regulation can improve on other aspects of market

outcomes, such as inequity• how, in practice, regulatory interventions carry the risk

of government failure

Page 4: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Objectives: Day 2

To • review the standard rationale for regulation• the basics of regulatory impact assessment• understand how good regulatory design can cope

with risk and uncertainty, informational imperfections, and minimise distortion of incentives

• rationale for and implementation of RPI-X regulation• the link between regulation and productivity growth

Page 5: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Introduction to EconomicsSome Concepts and Tools

Page 6: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Markets vs. Command

The central questions: given existing resources• what goods and service to produce?• how to produce? • for whom?

Alternative mechanisms• COMMAND ECONOMY

direct control, as in Soviet economy, or firms’ internal decisions

• FREE MARKET ECONOMYoutcome determined by private transactions in markets, based on prices, incomes, wealth

Page 7: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Degree of government intervention differs..

Hong Kong- China - Denmark - UK - USA -Cuba

Most countries have mixed economies with both• markets, which are regulated to different extent• public production and provision

Page 8: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Scale of government

1880 1930 1960 2004

Japan 11 19 18 37

USA 8 10 28 36

UK 10 24 32 43

Germany 10 31 32 47

France 15 19 35 53

Sweden 6 8 31 57

Spending as share of national income (%)

Page 9: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

The policy question

Markets are generally considered to be efficientIf so, why not leave things to the market?

Governments care about both equity and efficiency

• Free markets rarely deliver equitable outcomes, so some redistributive intervention is unavoidable

• Free markets do not always lead to efficient outcomes, so some interventions are motivated by efficiency considerations

To understand this, we must look at how markets work

Page 10: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive
Page 11: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

How Markets WorkDemand, Supply, and Price Adjustment

Page 12: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Market

• MARKET any arrangement in which prices adjust to reconcile buyers and sellers intentions

• DEMANDquantity buyers wish to buy at each price

• SUPPLYquantity producers wish to sell at each price

• EQUILIBRIUM PRICEthe price at which market clears(i.e. quantity demanded = quantity supplied)

Page 13: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Price Adjustment

Demand curve

quantity

price

EquilibriumQuantity

EquilibriumPrice

PRICE ADJUSTMENT

Equilibrium price clears market

Supply curve

Page 14: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Price Controls

Price

Quantity

Demand curve

Supply curve

Equilibrium price

excesssupply

Suppose government sets minimum price above market clearing price

Controlled price

Examples include• Minimum wages• Rent control• Common Agricultural Policy

Page 15: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

What does price controls do?

Price controls interfere with the adjustment process• minimum wages are good for equity: they boost the

income of some low-skill workers• But such interventions may not be good for efficiency: if

employers are unwilling to hire as many at regulated minimum wage, some potential workers are deprived of the chance to work

Page 16: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Economic Efficiency

An intervention is said to improve efficiency if it makes someone better off and nobody worse off

Economic efficiency: an outcome where no one can be made better off without hurting someone else

The key question: do free, unregulated markets always lead to efficient outcomes?

Page 17: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Markets and Choice

In markets

• consumers buy up to the point the marginal benefit equals price

• competitive firms sell as long as price covers ‘marginal cost’ of production (this is the opportunity cost of producing another unit of the good)

Page 18: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

The Efficiency of Markets

Thus, in competitive markets

• prices align marginal benefit with marginal cost • all possible gainful exchanges are carried out• PUNCH LINE: Free, unregulated markets lead to

efficient outcomesThis is the so-called Invisible Hand Theorem

Page 19: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

But free markets are not always efficient..

Market failure: a circumstance in which free markets fails to achieve an efficient outcome

Many interventions are designed to correct market failures, and thus to increase efficiency

Page 20: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

In sum: why intervene?

‘Economic regulation’ • Aims to correct market failures, and make the

market outcome more efficient

(when the ‘invisible hand’ does not work, the government can provide a helping hand)

‘Social regulation’• To prevent undesirable social outcomes inherent

in market outcomes

Page 21: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Group Work: Efficiency and Equity

Government intervention in the economy is pervasive. For each intervention listed below identify the possible rationale. Is it primarily

a. efficiency considerations?b. equity consideration?c. something else?

1. Income tax2. Taxation of petrol3. Regulating gas prices

Page 22: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive
Page 23: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

…Group Work

4. Regulating discharge of sewage in the Thames 5. Legislation against insider trading 6. Banning the use of cocaine 7. Making primary school compulsory 8. Regulating financial advisors9. Regulating length of the working week10. Compelling citizens to carry identity cards11. Minimum wage legislation12. Regulating taxi fares

Page 24: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive
Page 25: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Market Failures  Why intervene?

How to intervene?

Page 26: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Sources of Market Failure

• Externalities

• Public goods

• Imperfect competition

• Imperfect information

• Coordination problems

We will look at each of these in turn

Page 27: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

MARKET FAILURE: Externalities

EXTERNALITY

• A circumstance in which an individual's choices affects others' utility or productivity

• the effect is direct (not through market or prices)

Page 28: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Examples

• Adverse externalities: smoking, pollution

Since costs are partly borne by others, self-interested decision-making might lead to excess

• Beneficial externalities: bees and orchards, personal hygiene

Since benefits partly accrue to others, self-interested choices lead to sub-optimal quantities

Page 29: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Adverse Production Externality

For social optimum, we wantmarginal social cost = marginal social benefitAt free market equilibrium E, output Q is higher than social

optimum Q*

Quantity

Demand

MPC

MSC

E

FG

QQ*

Page 30: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Why Externalities Matter

THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM• Market mechanism aligns private costs and benefits • Externalities imply divergence between social and

private costs (or social and private benefit)• If divergences exist, should not expect socially efficient

allocations

Page 31: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Correcting externalities

1. Quantitative regulation or direct government action: e.g. pollution quota

2. [Pigou] Taxes or subsidies to correct prices e.g. pollution tax

3. [Coase] Create markets: assign property rights and enable trade in pseudo-marketse.g. carbon trading

Page 32: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Coasean Solution

• Assign property rights and let people trade these rights in specially-created market

• Initial assignment of rights affects distribution but get an efficient outcome regardless

• This solution does not work if there are high transactions costs Quantity

MC (for you)

QQ*

MB (to me)

Efficient quantity is Q*

Page 33: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

MARKET FAILURE: Public Goods

Examples: defence, broadcast TV signal

Characteristics• Non-rival consumption: my consumption does not

diminish what is available for you• Non-excludability: impossible or too costly to prevent

people from consuming it

Page 34: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Public goods: the problem and solutions

• If you cannot exclude, people will ‘free ride’. But if no one pays, there is nothing to free-ride on (this is the paradox of free riding)

• In fact, exclusion is not efficient either In general, markets cannot provide public goods

SOLUTIONS

• public provision• compulsion Government needs to ensure right quantity, but need

not produce itself

Page 35: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

MARKET FAILURE: Imperfect competition

The essential problem of monopoly• Firms with market power can charge prices that exceed

marginal cost • which restrains consumption below efficient level• other problems: resources wasted in securing monopoly

power (‘rent-seeking’), and in maintaining it

Page 36: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Solutions to monopoly problem

Solution 1. Nationalize and finance losses through taxes politically not very feasible

Solution 2. Break monopoly e.g. anti-trust legislation in US

However, no good for ‘natural monopolies’Industries with severe economies of scale, so having one producer avoids duplication of costs

And in some sectors monopoly is good for R&D, or for internal coordination

Page 37: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

More solutions to the monopoly problem

Solution 3. Regulate Prevent abuse of monopoly power through price and non-price controlsPractical issues: when is regulation necessary? What form? How frequently?

Solution 4. Nurture competition Encourage new entrants, (but will they enter and will it only lead to cream skimming?)

Important to get the right mix of remedies

Page 38: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive
Page 39: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

MARKET FAILURE: Imperfect information

Information in markets is imperfect. Often there is asymmetry of information between buyer and seller leading to problems of

• ‘adverse selection’: people who know themselves to be risk-prone are more likely to buy insurance

• ‘moral hazard’: once you have insurance, incentive to be careful is weakened

• these distortions may result in ‘incomplete markets’ or even ‘missing markets’: e.g. low-risk people may not find appropriate insurance

Page 40: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

SOLUTIONS: Imperfect information

1. mitigate informational problems• mandating provision of information

(regulate financial advisors)• providing information directly

(publish league tables)

2. reduce the possibility of opportunistic behaviour • consumer protection

3. government provision of the good or service

Page 41: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Inefficiency due to strategic interaction

No nukes Nukes

No nukes 8, 8 1, 12

Nukes 12, 1 2, 2

SOLUTION: coordinate individual choices through agreements or regulation

Country 1

Country 2

Individual choices do not always result in the best collective outcomes

Page 42: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Regulating technological standards

Problem: uncertainty about new technological standards may slow down adoption

• VHS vs Betamax• Blu-Ray vs HD-DVD

Should regulation aim to guide technological choices?

• GSM in mobile telephony

Page 43: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Lessons for Policy Makers

• Market failures makes a potential case for corrective intervention

• However, we must beware of the possibility of government failure. If so, the net effect may be to replace market failure with government failure

Page 44: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Well-intentioned regulation may• end up being ineffective• have perverse, unintended consequences• persist beyond its purpose• be vulnerable to regulatory creep, with high cumulative

burden

The scope for successful regulatory intervention is limited by • informational constraints• agency problems• lack of correction

Page 45: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Group Work: Pollution control

As the National Rivers Regulator, you must tackle the problem of a chemical firm that is polluting the Thames

a. If everything could be quantified and valued, show in a diagram how a pollution tax can induce the firm to behave in a socially efficient manner.

Page 46: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Group Work: Pollution control

b. Instead of the tax you offer the firm a pollution quota (specifying the maximum pollution it can discharge in any year). Show the size of the quota in the diagram. What difference does it make to the efficient quantity of pollution?

Page 47: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Group Work: Pollution control

c. Now suppose information is harder to come by. As the regulator, you are not entirely certain about the firm's cost curve. Does this affect your choice between tax and quotas?

Page 48: Economics Workshop  Better Regulation Executive

Group Work: Pollution control

d. Lastly, suppose there are two chemical firms discharging into the river, one cleaner than the other. Is it better to • set a pollution tax? (same rate per unit polluted for

both?) • auction pollution quotas?