Economics of Migration Jan Fidrmuc Brunel University.

Economics of Migration

Jan Fidrmuc

Brunel University

Introduction

Important, and very contentious, aspect of economic integration and globalization 175mn (2.9%) int’l migrants in 2000, 190mn today

(WB Migration Database, 2007) Most (37%) from LDC to DC; 24% LDCLDC,

16% DCDC Immigrants: 8-12% of population in US, Germany,

France, UK; 18-21% Canada & Australia; 38% HK Emigrants: 5-10% of Mexico, Afghanistan,

Morocco, UK, Algeria, Italy, Germany, Bangladesh, Turkey; 0.5-0.9% China, US, India

Introduction

EU Single Market: free movement of labor Migrants (foreign born): 11.7% of EU15

population in 2005 (OECD) Approximately 1/3 EU foreigners

EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 Forecasted East-West migration 3-4 mn Temporary restrictions imposed by most EU15

countries for up to 7 years Large E-W influx to Austria, Germany, Spain, UK

and Ireland

Outline

1. Introduction2. Models of migration3. Economic Impact of migration: Theory and

evidence4. Brain Drain; Remittances5. Labor-market Performance of Migrants6. Politics of Immigration7. EU Enlargement and East-West Migration 8. Conclusions

Economics of Migration

Most common type of migration: LDC to DC Revealed preference: migrants move iff they

expect to be better off at destination Yet, migrants often suffer occupational

downgrading, end up in poorly-paid informal jobs or remain unemployed

Ex-ante vs ex-post: Harris-Todaro Model Michael P. Todaro, AER 1969; and John R. Harris

and Michael P. Todaro, AER 1970.

Harris-Todaro Model

Original focus: rural-urban migration in LDC Rural residents move to urban regions

despite already high unemployment there Puzzle: migration continues although it

makes (some) rural migrants worse off HT model: migrants motivated by expected

returns Expected returns may be different from actually

realized returns

Harris-Todaro Model

Two regions: urban and rural Rural wage: wR (farming) Urban wage: wU>wR

Full employment in rural region Involuntary urban unemployment

Fraction q of urban workers hold jobs 1-q are unemployed and have zero earnings

Urban wages downward rigid Minimum-wage rules, unionization, or b/c workers

must acquire residence/work permits

Harris-Todaro Model

Workers are risk neutral Migration continues as long as: wU*q>wR

Migration is optimal despite unemployment Migration from LDC to DC similar case

Harris-Todaro Model: Implications1. Urban job creation (government spending)

raises q migration more attractive

2. Improving education in rural areas may increase migration if educated rural worker face higher q

3. Rising rural wages reduce incentive to migrate to urban region

However, if migration costly, rising rural incomes may relieve liquidity constraints on migration

Other Models of Migration: Beyond Income Differentials Stark (The Migration of Labor, 1991) Households vulnerable to idiosyncratic

shocks that are region or sector-specific Migration household members exposed to

different regional shocks Risk diversification through pooling of

household members’ income remittances Migration optimal even without income

differentials if individuals risk averse consumption smoothing through risk sharing

Other Models of Migration: Roy-Borjas Model Roy (OEP 1951); Borjas (AER 1987) Consider two countries, A and B

Identical mean earnings Different income distributions: returns to human

capital higher in A Individual returns to migration depend on

one’s skills Skilled workers fare better in A

Other Models of Migration: Roy-Borjas Model Migration patterns:

Skilled migration to A Unskilled migration to B

Returns to human capital important also when mean earnings not identical DC – LDC migrants often highly skilled

professionals and managers

Economics of Migration: Impact Trade theory: free trade, free capital mobility

and free labor mobility should have similar effects on the economy

Yet, migration more controversial than either free trade or capital mobility

Popular view: immigrants displace native workers and/or drive down wages

Is this consistent with theory and evidence?

Economic Impact of Migration: Theory Dustmann et al., EJ 2005; Dustmann et al.,

OxRevEcPol 2008) Two countries: Home and Foreign One output good, price set at world market Two types of labor: skilled and unskilled

Labor supplied inelastically Supply of capital perfectly elastic

Interest rate set at world markets

Economic Impact of Migration: Theory If skill composition of immigration the same

as that of natives No labor-market effect of migration This is because capital supply is elastic Economy adjusts to immigration by importing

capital no change in relative endowments Migrants in DC predominantly unskilled

compete with native unskilled workers only Consider case with only unskilled immigrants

Economic Impact of Migration: Theory L and L* unskilled workers in Home and

Foreign Demand for labor given by MPL initial

wage w0 and w*0; w0>w*0

Migration equalizes wages: w1=w*1 Unskilled workers in Home worse off Migrants and unskilled workers in Foreign

better off

Economic Impact of Migration: Theory

o o*

MPL

MPL*

w0

w*0

w1

L L* L+MM

Economic Impact of Migration: Theory What about overall impact on Home? Capital supplied elastically no impact for

owners of capital Skilled labor in Home becomes scarcer

relative to unskilled labor Skilled-wage premium goes up Overall effect: average earnings go up

Immigration surplus: unskilled workers paid less than their marginal product

Net gain accrues to skilled workers

Economic Impact of Migration: Theory

o o*

MPL

MPL*

w0

w*0

w1

L L* L+MM

Immigration surplus

Economic Impact of Migration: Theory Immigration has important distributional

implications This can have important political implications Note: if labor supply flexible, migration leads to

unemployment in addition to (or instead of) lower unskilled wages

Note: reverse holds for Foreign: skilled labor becomes less abundant and skilled workers lose out

Economic Impact of Migration:

Heckscher-Ohlin Model Multiple heterogenous output goods Free and competitive trade goods prices

set at world markets All countries have access to the same

technology Skilled and unskilled labor, supplied

inelasticly Capital supply elastic All immigrants unskilled

Economic Impact of Migration:

Heckscher-Ohlin Model Output mix determined by relative factor endowments

Immigration pressure on unskilled wages to fall output of goods produced by unskilled labor goes up

Wages of skilled and unskilled labor unchanged as long as goods prices constant

Immigration absorbed through changes in output mix (Rybczinski Theorem) No labor-market impact at all

Economic Impact of Migration: Evidence Most studies: no or mildly negative impact of

migration on natives’ wages or employment Card (EJ 2005)US data, Dustmann et al. (EJ

2005; OxRevEP 2008)UK data Borjas (QJE 2003, NBER WP 2005): labor-market

impact of migration is mitigated by out-migration of natives (US data)

Card (EJ 2005): little evidence of natives’ migration being driven by immigration

Economic Impact of Migration: Evidence Dustmann et al. (OxRevEP 2008)UK data Immigrants predominantly low skilled

impact on wages different alongside natives’ wage distribution

Elasticity of natives’ wages with respect to immigration rate Low-wage earners: -0.5 at 10th percentile Positive for most: 0.6 at median, 0.35 on average Insignificant for high-wage earners (from 95th

percentile)

Economic Impact of Migration: Evidence (Dustmann et al., 2008)

Economic Impact of Migration: Evidence Impact on employment (Dustmann et al., EJ

2005) UK data: zero effect overall Positive effect for high-educated natives

(high-school diploma and higher) Negative effect for intermediate-educated,

negative but insignificant for unqualified Effects for high and intermediate educated

approximately cancel each other in aggregate

Economic Impact of Migration: Evidence from Natural Experiments Friedberg and Hunt (JEP 1995): Large-scale

immigration episodes little long-term impact on labor markets French and Portuguese decolonization Cuban immigration to the US during the

Mariel boatlift Russian-Jewish immigration to Israel in

1990s

Economic Impact of Migration: Israel 1990s: more than 1 million ethnic Jews

immigrated to Israel from the FSU Israeli population in 1989: 4.6 million Migration driven by economic hardship

and political unrest Approximately two-thirds of these

immigrants highly skilled

Economic Impact of Migration: Israel FSU immigration no long-term effect

on wages or employment of natives Friedberg (2001 QJE), Gandal, Hanson and

Slaughter (2004 EER), and Cohen and Paserman (2004 CEPR DP 4640):

Cohen and Paserman (2004): negative short-term effect (elasticity -0.1 to -0.3) on wages (but not on employment) Effect disappears in 4-7 years

Economic Impact of Migration: Israel Gandal et al.: global technology changes

increased demand for skilled labor This helped Israeli economy absorb

immigrant influx Cohen and Hsieh (2000 mimeo):

immigration followed by large influx of capital (borrowing) Consistent with standard neoclassical growth

model

Economic Impact of Migration: Israel Eckstein and Weiss (2003 IZA DP 710):

substantial initial occupational downgrading of FSU immigrants but wages increase rapidly

No return on their imported skills in short run Lower return to education, same return to

experience and higher return to unobserved skills, than native Israelis, in long run

Because of lower return to imported skills, immigrants’ wages never catch up with natives’ wages

Economic Impact of Migration: Germany Re-unification of Germany large

migration flow from East to West Frank (2007 mimeo): no overall effect on

wages or unemployment in West Germany But: important distributional effects Employment of less educated workers,

blue-collar workers and foreign nationals declined

Wages of workers in non-traded-goods and service sectors increased

Immigration and Crime

Immigrants often associated with high crime rates

Theory: ambiguous relationship Immigrants fare poorly in labor market, but: face higher detection probability (prejudice) and stricter punishment (sentence & deportation)

Immigration and Crime

Bianchi, Buonanno & Pinotti (2009 BI wp) Immigration & crime in IT provinces, 1990-2003

OLS: elasticity of crime to immigration: 0.1 Especially for property crime (theft and robbery)

Result may be driven by endogeneity Eg immigrants more to high-crime areas because

of low cost of housing IV: no significant effect on total crime or

property crime, significant effect on robberies Robberies 1.5% of total crime only

Brain Drain

Migration of skilled workers from LDC to DC Docquier et al. (IZA DP 2005): brain drain

estimates, 1990-2000 World weighted-average skilled migration rate

5.3% vs unskilled rate 1.1% LDC: 7% vs 0.3% Latin America 11%, Africa 10.4%, Asia 5.5%

Traditional view: brain drain reduces stock of human capital lower potential for growth

Brain Drain

Skilled immigrants often subject to occupational downgrading

But face better employment prospects than unskilled immigrants

Liquidity constraints Migration is costly Skilled migrants better able to afford the cost

Brain Drain: Reassessment

Mountford (1997 JDE), Fan and Stark Individuals under-invest in education

because they ignore social returns Education raises probability of emigration

Higher expected private return to education Greater incentive to invest in education

Emigration uncertain some skilled workers remain in LDC

Brain drain may raise LDC stock of human capital better prospects for growth

Remittances

Large inflows, esp. for developing countries: Remittances one third of exports and greater than

FDI (Barajas et al., 2009, IMF WP09/153) Top recipients in 2008: Mexico, China and

India: $25-27bn Mexico: remittances 1/3 of formal wage

income in 2006 (Vargas-Silva, RDE 2009) US: 18mn people of Mexican origin

Poland: 2mn Poles abroad $6bn in 2007 (NBP report)

Remittances

China: remittances of rural migrants large 15% of agricultural income of selected provinces

in 1992 (Wu & Zhou 2005) 1995 survey in Jinan and Shandong (Liu &

Reilley, Apllied Economics 2004) Rural migrants remit RMB 2110 p.a. 36% of

earnings 85% of rural migrants transfer remittances

Remittances: Impact

Remittances increase household disposable income

Rozelle, Taylor and deBrauw (AER P&P 1999): remittances increase agricultural productivity in rural China (Hebei and Liaoning)

Adams and Page (WB WPS3179): remittances reduce poverty in LDC Elasticity: -0.19 with respect to emigration rate

and -0.16 with respect to remittances-to-GDP ratio

Remittances: Impact

Barajas et al. (2009, IMF WP09/153): Remittances to 84 countries over 1970-2004 Effect on growth is insignificant or even negative Interpretation: remittances alleviate poverty and

increase consumption but not investment

Remittances and the Dutch Disease DD typically associated with revenue from

export of natural resources (origin: North-Sea natural gas exports in the Netherlands)

Large receipts of foreign currency XR appreciates loss of competitiveness manufacturing exports fall while imports rise

Vargas-Silva (RDE 2009): remittances cause appreciation of real exchange rate in Mexico

Politics of Immigration

Migration (and trade) winners and losers among natives

If immigrants predominantly unskilled, unskilled natives lose out and skilled workers gain

Losers may need to be compensated (redistribution of gains from winners)

Otherwise, economic integration may not be politically feasible


Wages reflect relative abundance of each factor of production

Consider again skilled vs unskilled labor DC: skilled labor relatively abundant

Immigrants predominantly unskilled Skilled workers likely to emigrate

LDC: unskilled labor relatively abundant Immigrants predominantly skilled Unskilled labor likely to emigrate


Attitudes depend on relative factor endowments and redistributional impact of immigration

DC: immigrants predominantly unskilled Skilled wage goes up Unskilled wage falls

Skilled workers should favor immigration Unskilled workers should oppose immigration


LDC: immigrants predominantly skilled Skilled workers should oppose immigration Unskilled workers should be in favor Attitudes on free trade determined similarly


O’Rourke and Sinnott (2005 EJPE), Mayda and Rodrik (2005 EER) and Mayda (2005) use large multi-country individual-level survey dataset to investigate individual attitudes on trade and migration

Skilled individuals more in favor of immigration (free trade) More so in rich countries

Politics of Emigration: Home Country Emigration experience may affect one’s

political opinion and attitudes Spilimbergo (CEPR DP 5934):

UNESCO database on international student flows: 1950-2003

Share of students studying abroad increases democracy in home country

But only if students study in democratic countries

Politics of Emigration: Home Country Fidrmuc and Doyle (CEPR DP 4619):Voting

behavior of Czech and Polish emigrants in home-country elections

Emigrant votes differ from home country votes and also across host countries

Votes for pro-reform and left-wing parties depend on host-country characteristics

Migrants adapt to institutional environment Level and tradition of democracy Extent of economic freedom

Political Impact of Immigration Living in economically liberal and democratic

countries should have a favourable impact on migrants from less developed countries Migrants espouse liberal attitudes while living

abroad Autocratic regimes often restrict their citizens’

freedom to travel North Korea, Turkmenistan, Zimbabwe

Autocracies that tolerate free travel often more liberal former Yugoslavia

Migrant’s Labor-market Performance Migrants typically subject to substantial

occupational downgrading Human capital poorly portable

Eastern European Jews in Israel: low return on imported education and experience (Friedberg JLE 2000; Eckstein and Weiss, 2003 IZA DP710)

Destination-country education raises return also to home-country education (Friedberg 2000)

Immigrants catch up slowly and imperfectly

Occupational Downgrading: UK (Dustmann et al., 2008)

Migrant’s Labor-market Performance US/UK: immigrants from Latin American and

Eastern Europe suffer more downgrading than immigrants from industrialized countries UK: Drinkwater et al. (2006 IZA DP2410) US: Mattoo et al. (JDE 2008)

Language skills important Immigrants who speak destination-country

language earn up to 20% more (Chiswick and Miller, 2002 JPopE; 2007 IZA DP 2664)

EU Enlargement and East-West Migration EU enlargements in May 2004 and Jan 2007 Pre-enlargement debate in academia, policy-

making and popular press: fear of mass migration, welfare shopping and displacement effects in labor market

Result: transitional restrictions on free movement of workers (2+3+2 formula) Exceptions in 2004: UK, Ireland and Sweden More countries removed restrictions later

EU Enlargement and East-West Migration (Zaiceva & Zimmerman, OxRevEP 2008) Fear of mass migration: high unemployment:

Harmonised unemployment rate, 2000-2006

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

EU15 AC8 Cyprus, Malta Bulgaria, Romania

EU Enlargement and East-West Migration (Zaiceva & Zimmerman, OxRevEP 2008) Fear of mass migration: low wages:

Gross monthly wages in the AC10, Bulgaria and Romania, 2004

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

CZ EST HU LV LT PL SK SL BG RO

in % of the EU15 wages in % of German wages

East-West Migration: Predictions (Zaiceva & Zimmerman, OxRevEP 2008) Since early 1990s – more than 30 studies

forecasting East-West migration

1. Predictions based on intentions to move to the West using surveys

2. Econometric models using historical data for countries other than CEECs (“double out-of-sample extrapolations”) Migration experience after the Southern EU

enlargement or other countries (e.g. immigration to Germany from a broad sample of countries)

East-West Migration: Predictions

Boeri and Bruecker (2000) Estimate model of immigration to Germany over

1968-98 Use it to predict East-West migration to the EU

Total net immigration 335 ths to the EU15 Most predicted to go to Germany and Austria:

218 ths and 40.5 ths, respectively; UK to receive some 15 ths.

EU Enlargement and East-West Migration (Zaiceva & Zimmerman, OxRevEP 2008)

Selected studies on migration potential after the EU enlargement: Actual and predicted number of foreign residents from AC in Germany

0

200.000

400.000

600.000

800.000

1.000.000

1.200.000

1.400.000

1.600.000

1.800.000

2.000.000

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Actual number of residents from AC8

Sinn et al. (2001)

Dustmann (2003)"Economic 04" scenario

Dustmann (2003)"Economic 01" scenario

Dustmann (2003)"Baseline 01" scenario

Boeri and Brücker (2000)

Zaiceva (2006)

East-West Migration: Predictions

Surveys of willingness to migrate (WTM) Drinkwater (2003): WTM to the EU highest

among the young and those with high skills and foreign-language skills

Expected impact: mainly positive impact for destination countries potentially adverse impact on source countries

(brain drain)

EU Enlargement and East-West Migration (Zaiceva & Zimmerman, OxRevEP 2008) Actual migration flows difficult to estimate

UK and Ireland: no restrictions, large influx (Gilpin et al., 2006, Blanchflower et al., 2007, UK Home Office Accession Monitoring Reports; Doyle et al., 2006)

Sweden: no restrictions, little immigration Austria, Germany: restrictions, large influx

Why? Push and pull factors: Economic factors, geographic proximity, language, networks, demand-driven (IE), re-directed from other countries…


Proportion of immigrants of different nationalities from the ten new member states,2005

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Germany Sweden Spain Finland

other Romanians Polish Estonians

EU Enlargement and East-West Migration (Zaiceva & Zimmerman, OxRevEP 2008) Main sending countries:

UK: Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Ireland: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia Sweden: Poland, Lithuania, Estonia

Sectoral distribution of immigrants: UK: hotels/catering, manufacturing,

agriculture/construction Ireland: construction, manufacturing,

hotels/catering Sweden: health care, trade, manufacturing


Harmonised unemployment rate, monthly data, seasonally adjusted: 2004 January-2007 March

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2004Jan 2004May 2005Jan 2005May 2006Jan 2006May 2007Jan 2007May

Ireland Sweden UK


Wages and salaries: Labour Cost Index: 2000=100.Industry and services (excl. public administation)

95

100

105

110

115

120

125

2004Q1 2005Q1 2006Q1 2007Q1

Ireland Sweden UK


Wages and salaries: Labour Cost Index: 2000=100.Manufacturing

95

100

105

110

115

120

125

2004Q1 2005Q1 2006Q1 2007Q1

Ireland Sweden UK

East-West Migration: Impact (Zaiceva & Zimmerman, OxRevEP 2008) No negative impact on receiving countries’

economies Occupational downgrading common No evidence of an impact on unemployment If displacement of natives (Ireland) no rise

in aggregate unemployment but “upgrade” jobs for nationals

No wage pressure, not even in manufacturing sector highest share of new immigrants

East-West Migration: Impact (Zaiceva & Zimmerman, OxRevEP 2008) Reduced or falling wage growth rates mainly

follow pre-enlargement trends UK: immigration has increased supply by

more than it has increased demand Lower inflationary pressures and lower natural

rate of unemployment.

East-West Migration: Public Perceptions (Zaiceva & Zimmerman, OxRevEP 2008)

Attitudes: Was migration between old and new EU members important or limited after the EU enlargement? (1=very important, 4=very limited)

2006. Means

1,54

1,86

1,98

2,05

2,12

2,17

2,19

2,24

2,24

2,25

2,52

2,56

2,6

2,65

2,76

IE

GB

GR

ES

PT

IT

LU

FR

BE

DE

NL

AT

DK

FI

SE

East-West Migration: Public Perceptions (Blanchflower, EJ 2009)

1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006

Unemployment expectations over the next 12 months: EU15

(3 month average - advanced 12 months - LHS)

Unemployment

rate (RHS)--- 1985-2007 average

BalancePer cent

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

East-West Migration: Public Perceptions

1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60Unemployment expectations over the next 12 months: Germany


Unemployment


Balance Per cent

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14


2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60 Unemployment expectations over the next 12 months: UK


Unemployment


Balance Per cent


Unemployment expectations over the next 12 months: Ireland


Unemployment


Balance Per cent

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

-40 0

5

10

15

20

1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006

East-West Migration: UK Experience Annual gross inflow of A8 nationals over 200

ths The stock of A8 migrants estimated to be

around 500 ths by the end of 2006 (Blanchflower, Saleheen and Shadforth, 2007)

65-70% of A8 immigrants are Polish Most work in low-skilled occupations and

earn low wages 80% are below 35; 60% are males

East-West Migration: UK Experience Unlike migrants from other countries,

relatively low share come to London (around 10%) Main destinations: Anglia, Midlands, London

Anecdotal evidence: some immigrants highly skilled

No welfare tourists: by 2007, less than 1,000 A8 nationals per quarter approved to receive income support and job-seekers allowance

East-West Migration: UK Experience

WRS registrations as a % of home population

WRS Registrations

(000s) U Rate (2004)

Emp Rate (2004)

GDP per head (2005)*

Czech Rep. 0.28 28.9 8.3 64.2 5,200 €

Estonia 0.47 6.2 9.7 63.0 4,000 €

Hungary 0.19 18.9 6.1 56.8 5,000 €

Latvia 1.43 32.8 10.4 62.3 3,100 €

Lithuania 1.85 62.8 11.4 61.2 2,500 €

Poland 1.02 394.2 19.0 51.7 4,200 €

Slovakia 1.13 61.2 18.2 57.0 4,200 €

Slovenia 0.03 0.6 6.3 65.3 11,400 €

Correlation 0.560 -0.257 -0.711


Life Satisfaction

2004 2006Bulgaria 2.06 1.99Czech Rep 2.82 2.92Estonia 2.74 2.74Hungary 2.44 2.50Latvia 2.52 2.62Lithuania 2.55 2.62Poland 2.81 2.80Romania 2.32 2.33Slovakia 2.59 2.70Slovenia 3.17 3.09UK 3.22 3.18


Intended length of stay

12 months ending March 2007 Per cent

Less than 3 months 126,100 55%

3 to 5 months 3,840 2%

6 to 11 months 7,605 3%

1 to 2 years 10,520 5%

More than 2 years 21,225 9%

Do not know 58,480 26%

Total 227,770 100%

WRS Applications

East-West Migration: UK Experience 1-2% (at least) of Polish, Slovak, Latvian and

Lithuanian populations lived and worked in the UK at some time between 2004 and 2007 (WRS statistics only)

East-West migration helped lower unemployment in A8 countries Some caused labor shortages, especially in

agriculture and construction Gilpin et al. (2006, DWP WP 29): relationship

between change in share of A8 migrants and change in regional unemployment

East-West Migration: UK Experience Drinkwater, Eade and Garapich (2006 IZA

DP2410): A8 migrants highly skilled but have low

returns to skills and experience Wages increase with years since migration A8 migrants earn 30% less than migrants

from other European countries (those from English-speaking countries earn 30% more) when not controlling for occupation

No evidence as to whether the extent of occupational downgrading is falling over time

East-West Migration: UK Experience If occupational downgrading persists:

Destination countries do not realize the migrants’ full contribution to their GDPs

Migrants fail to receive wages corresponding to their human capital

Occupational downgrading may become permanent and persist even upon return to the home country (scarring)

Source countries suffer brain drain Overall, everyone loses Time will show if this will be the case.

Summary

Factors underlying patterns of migration flows: Differentials in (expected) earnings Returns to human capital Risk sharing at household level

Economic impact of migration Host country: little or none aggregate labor-market

impact but important distributional implications Home country: may be harmful because of brain

drain and/or Dutch disease

Summary

Political impact Host country: distributional implications winners

and losers political backlash against labor mobility and integration

Home country: spread of liberal norms and values EU enlargement

Large and unprecedented migration flows within Europe

Little or no negative labor-market impact on host countries (so far)

Economics of Migration Jan Fidrmuc Brunel University.

Documents

migration slide

ruralurban migration

q migration

unemployment migration

migration of labor

economics of migration

models of migration

migration costly