Top Banner
Economics of Government Intervention Lynne Kiesling Cato University 2011
27

Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Aug 11, 2020

Download

Documents

dariahiddleston
Welcome message from author
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Page 1: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Economics of Government Intervention

Lynne KieslingCato University 2011

Page 2: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Economic regulation(not exhaustive)

• Occupational regulation (min wages, advertising bans) and licensing

• Health & safety

• Environmental

• Antitrust/competition policy

• Natural monopoly regulation

Page 3: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Freedom of innovation and market entry

Page 4: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Monopoly• Do markets tend toward monopoly?

• Negative effects of monopoly: high prices, deadweight loss, bad for consumers

• If monopolies do arise in markets, do they persist? If so, why?

• “Secret recipe”, some particular skill or technology, ownership of a natural resource

• Government entry barriers: patents, regulation, etc.

• If so, is there justification for government intervention?

Page 5: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Disciplining monopoly: consumer demand, competition, innovation

Page 6: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Dynamics of competition• Joseph Schumpeter

• Monopoly profits are the carrot that induces innovation: new products, new production techniques, new modes of organization

• Competition for market dominance

• Dynamism erodes the monopoly and renders it temporary

• “... the perennial gale of creative destruction”

Page 7: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

A hard case: the “natural monopoly”

Page 8: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

A whirlwind history of the electricity industry

• Whale oil?

• Edison/Tesla/Westinghouse “War of Systems”

• Late 19th c.: cities granted franchises to vertically-integrated utilities, initially rivalrous markets

• High fixed costs/capital costs, debt & equity funding

• Vertically integrated supply chain: generation, transmission, distribution, (lighting fixtures), retail

Page 9: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Tesla’s turbines, Niagara Falls, 1895

Page 10: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Why regulate?• Public interest argument

• Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential services”, Munn v. Illinois (1887)

• Populist era culture of suspicion of large companies

• Public choice theory argument

• Institutional bargaining between industry and policymakers

• Economic theory argument

• High fixed costs => economies of scale over the range of consumer demand

Page 11: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential
Page 12: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

“Standing in for competition”

Page 13: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Some critiques of regulation• Did achieve low, stable prices and universal electrification ... but at a high cost

• Static market/product definition necessary

• Stifles innovation

• Asset investment incentive problems

• Incentive to overinvest and overbuild capacity

• Incentive to invest in “iron in the ground” reinforces lack of innovation

• Lack of cost management incentive problems

• Based on a static neoclassical model in a dynamic, and increasingly complex, environment

Page 14: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

What’s next? Smart grid.

Page 15: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Smart grid technology & economics• Sensing, embedded computing capability and two-way communications in the electric power

network’ physical infrastructure

• Smart grid as a “network of networks”

• Transmission

• Distribution

• Wholesale power markets

• Distribution local area network

• Consumer’s home area network (HAN)

• Wide variety of technologies and capabilities through the network

• Digital technologies enable a paradigm shift from centralized control to decentralized coordination

Page 16: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential
Page 17: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

A smart grid is a transactive network

Page 18: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Case study: GridWise Olympic Pensinula project

Page 19: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential
Page 20: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential
Page 21: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Project summary• 2 hypotheses to test

• Does the tech/pricing combination change consumer energy use patterns (and therefore system)?

• Do consumers automate their responses?

• Participants chose among three contracts: Fixed, Time of Use (TOU), Real Time Price (RTP)

• RTP market clearing

• 5-minute intervals, with price-responsive appliances & ability to automate decisions

• Designed as a double auction

• First ever use of a double auction in a residential retail electricity market

Page 22: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Testing market-based consumer incentives in a transactive network

Page 23: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Real-time retail double auction

Page 24: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Overall project results• Automation reduced transaction costs and increased responsiveness to price

signals

• Consumers saved money: 10% on average, highest for RTP

• Reduced overall consumption

• Reduced peak demand took strain off of infrastructure

• Implied reduction in wholesale electricity prices

• If extrapolated nationally, could lead to avoided investment in “iron in the ground” of $70 billion over 20 years

Page 25: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

Competitive retail markets are more likely to create and deliver

such benefits than regulated utilities

Page 26: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

The knowledge problem and the value of retail competition

“The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate “given” resources ... it is rather a problem of how to secure the best us of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only those individuals know.”

F. A. Hayek

Page 27: Economics of Government Intervention · Why regulate? • Public interest argument • Conceptual and common law precedents: Aquinas “just price”, common-law regarding “essential

“Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking of them.”

Alfred North Whitehead