Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2011 Lecture 6
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HW2 (Property Law) online, due 5 p.m. Thurs Feb 24
Midterms will be Wed March 2 and Wed March 30
Logistics
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Coase: in the absence of transaction costs, if property rights are complete and tradable, voluntary negotiations will lead to efficiency We can solve externalities by expanding property rights and allowing
trade
Demsetz: property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains from internalization become larger than the cost of internalization Fur trade increased overhunting and therefore value of private
property rights Domestication of the dog decreased the cost of maintaining private
property
Our story so far on property law…
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Two normative approaches to the law: Normative Coase: aim to minimize transaction costs Normative Hobbes: aim to allocate rights efficiently (or minimize
the need for bargaining/trade)
How to choose between two normative approaches? When transaction costs are low and information costs high, design
law to minimize transaction costs What transaction costs are high and information costs are low,
design law to allocate rights efficiently
Our story so far on property law…
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Injunctive relief: court clarifies right, bars future violation (punishable as a crime)
Damages: court determines how much harm was done by violation, awards payment to injuree
Coase: should be equally efficient if there are no transaction costs
But in “real world”, which is more efficient?
One application of this: choosing a remedy for property rights violations
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Calabresi and Melamed
Transaction costs high…
difficult for parties to reassign rights through negotiations
injunction would force injurer to prevent harm himself
damages rule allows injurer to prevent harm or pay for it, whichever is cheaper
when transaction costs are high, damages rule is typically more efficient “liability rule”
Transaction costs low…
easy for parties to reassign rights
injunctions cheaper for court to implement (doesn’t need to calculate damage done)
when transaction costs are low, injunctive relief is typically more efficient “property rule”
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what can be privately owned?
what can an owner do?
how are property rights established?
what remedies are given?
How do we design an efficient property law system?
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Public versus Private Goods
Private Goods
rivalrous – one’s consumption precludes another
excludable – technologically possible to prevent consumption
example: apple
Public Goods
non-rivalrous
non-excludable
examples: defense against nuclear attack
infrastructure (roads, bridges)
parks, clean air, large fireworks displays
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When private goods are owned publicly, they tend to be overutilized/overexploited
Public versus Private Goods
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When private goods are owned publicly, they tend to be overutilized/overexploited
When public goods are privately owned, they tend to be underprovided/undersupplied
Public versus Private Goods
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When private goods are owned publicly, they tend to be overutilized/overexploited
When public goods are privately owned, they tend to be underprovided/undersupplied
Efficiency suggests private goods should be privately owned, and public goods should be publicly provided/regulated
Public versus Private Goods
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When private goods are owned publicly, they tend to be overutilized/overexploited
When public goods are privately owned, they tend to be underprovided/undersupplied
Efficiency suggests private goods should be privately owned, and public goods should be publicly provided/regulated
Public versus Private Goods
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Clean air Large number of people affected transaction costs high
injunctive relief unlikely to work well Still two options One: give property owners right to clean air, protected by damages Two: public regulation
Argue for one or the other by comparing costs of each Damages: costs are legal cost of lawsuits or pretrial negotiations Regulation: administrative costs, error costs if level is not chosen
correctly
A different view: transaction costs
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what can be privately owned?
what can an owner do?
how are property rights established?
what remedies are given?
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Principle of maximum liberty
Owners can do whatever they like with their property, provided it does not interfere with other’ property or rights
That is, you can do anything you like so long as it doesn’t impose an externality (nuisance) on anyone else
What can an owner do with his property?
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What things can be privately owned? Private goods are privately owned, public goods are publicly
provided
What can owners do with their property? Maximum liberty
How are property rights established? (Examples to come)
What remedies are given? Injunctions when transaction costs are low; damages when
transaction costs are high
So, what does an efficient property law system look like?
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Each person given a personal value for a poker chip Amount you can sell it back to me for (real money) Purple chip is worth your number, red chip is worth 2 x your number Each person can only sell back one chip
Take 1: buyer’s and seller’s values are common knowledge (nametags)
Take 2: private information(each player knows his threat point, but not his opponent’s)
Experiment: Coasian bargaining
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Take 3: uncertainty If seller keeps chip, it’s worth 2 x die roll ($2-$12, EV $7) If buyer gets chip, it’s worth 3 x die roll ($3-$18, EV $10.50) Can’t sell for conditional price – deal must be done before die roll is
revealed
Take 4: asymmetric information Values are same as above… …but seller knows value of die roll, buyer doesn’t
Experiment: Coasian bargaining
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Coase relies on parties being able to negotiate privately if the right is not assigned efficiently Low-TC case: injunctions more efficient, assuming bargaining works
if “wrong” party is awarded the right
How well does this work? Monday: paper by Farnsworth showing no bargaining after 20
nuisance cases Just saw examples of various transaction costs: private information,
uncertainty, asymmetric information
Why did we do this?
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Game theory we’ve seen so far: static games “everything happens at once” (nobody observes another player’s move before deciding how to act)
Dynamic games one player moves first second player learns what first player did, and then moves
Dynamic games and sequential rationality
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Dynamic games
FIRM 1 (entrant)
Enter Don’t EnterFIRM 2(incumbent)
Accommodate Fight
(10, 10) (-10, -10)
(0, 30)
A strategy is one player’s plan for what to do at each decision point he/she acts at
In this case: player 1’s possible strategies are “enter” and “don’t”, player 2’s are “accommodate” and “fight”
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We can look for equilibria like before we find two: (Enter, Accommodate), and (Don’t Enter, Fight) question: are both equilibria plausible? sequential rationality
We can put payoffs from this game into a payoff matrix…
10, 10 -10, -10
0, 30 0, 30
Accommodate Fight
Enter
Don’t Enter
Firm 2’s ActionF
irm 1
’s A
ctio
n
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Dynamic games
FIRM 1 (entrant)
Enter Don’t EnterFIRM 2(incumbent)
Accommodate Fight
(10, 10) (-10, -10)
(0, 30)
In dynamic games, we look for Subgame Perfect Equilibria players play best-responses in the game as a whole, but also in every branch
of the game tree
We find Subgame Perfect Equilibria by backward induction start at the bottom of the game tree and work our way up
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Firm 1 knows firm 2 is rational
So he knows that if he enters, firm 2 will do the rational thing – accommodate
So we enters, counting on firm 2 to accommodate
This is the idea of sequential rationality – the assumption that, whatever I do, I can count on the players moving after me to behave rationally in their own best interest
The key assumption behind subgame perfect equilibrium: common knowledge of rationality
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Intellectual property: broad term for ways that an individual, or a firm, can claim ownership of information
Patents – cover products, commercial processes
Copyrights – written ideas (books, music, computer programs)
Trademarks – brand names, logos
Trade Secrets
Intellectual Property
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Example: new drug
Requires investment of $1,000 to discover
Monopoly profits would be $2,500
Once drug has been discovered, another firm could also begin to sell it
Duopoly profits would be $250 each
Information: costly to generate, easy to imitate
up-front investment: 1,000monopoly profits: 2,500duopoly profits: 250 each
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Solve the game by backward induction: Subgame perfect equilibrium: firm 2 plays Imitate, firm 1 plays
Don’t Innovate, drug is never discovered (Both firms earn 0 profits, consumers don’t get the drug)
Information: costly to generate,easy to imitate
FIRM 1 (innovator)
Innovate Don’t
FIRM 2 (imitator)
Imitate Don’t
(-750, 250) (1500, 0)
(0, 0)
up-front investment: 1,000monopoly profits: 2,500duopoly profits: 250 each
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Patent: legal monopoly Other firms prohibited from imitating Firm 1’s discovery
Subgame perfect equilibrium: firm 2 does not imitate; firm 1 innovates, drug gets developed
Patents: one way to solvethe problem
FIRM 1 (innovator)
Innovate Don’t
FIRM 2 (imitator)
Imitate Don’t
(-750, 250 – P) (1500, 0)
(0, 0)
up-front investment: 1,000monopoly profits: 2,500duopoly profits: 250 each
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Without patents, inefficient outcome: drug not developed With patents, different inefficiency: monopoly!
Once the drug has been found, the original incentive problem is solved, but the new inefficiency remains…
BUT… patents solve one inefficiency by introducing another
CS
Profit
P* = 50
P = 100 – Q
Q* = 50
DWL