Ecomanagerialism K - DDI 2014 MS

Eco-Managerialism KSimon Dalby, Professor at Carleton University, PhD from Simon Fraser University, 2007, “Anthropocene geopolitics: globalisation, empire, environment and critique,” Geography Compass 1 103–18

TIMOTHY W. LUKE 2003, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg. “Eco-Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation.”http://web.archive.org/web/20030802005346/http://aurora.icaap.org/2003Interviews/luke.html

James, Simon Paul (2001) Heidegger and Environmental Ethics, Durham theses, Durham Univeristy. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3958/

1NC Shell

Eco-Mangerialism K

The affirmative is a fish out of water – it displaces agency in favor of ecological managerialismWilberg 4 – MA in Philosophy and Politics from Oxford University(Peter, “The Dialectical Phenomenology of Michael Kosok”, http://www.heidegger.org.uk/uniting_hhh.htm)//krishnik

A fish is a part of the oceanic ‘field’ in which it lives and at the same time an individualised self-expression of that field — a fishly form of the ocean as a whole. The fish is also distinct from the

oceanic environment around it and from the other fishes within it. All oceanic life forms perceive both the ocean as a whole and other organisms within it in their own unique way, for their own unique organising field-patterns of awareness each create a uniquely patterned field of sensory-perceptual awareness – their ‘ocean’. Sharks, for example, perceive electrical fields of other organisms and experience the ocean itself as an electrical field and not merely a tactile, visual or

auditory one. The ocean , in this analogy, can be compared to the universal ground state of

awareness or Being which gives rise to a multiplicity of foreground ‘figures’ in the shape of fish and other life forms. Yet each of these figures in turn shapes its own ‘background’ field – constitutes its own patterned

environment field of awareness or ‘ocean’. The ocean as such, as a ground state of awareness, is not reducible to a singular environmental or ‘background’ field common to all the life forms that ‘figure’ within it, but is a field of fields or ocean of oceans. What the ocean as such or any other oceanic

life form within it essentially is, cannot be reduced to the way it is perceived as foreground figure or background field by other life forms – each of which perceives both the ocean as a whole and all the life forms within it in a way configured by their own organising field-patterns of awareness. If Being is a ground state of awareness then the relation of Being and ‘beings’ can be compared to the ocean’s

awareness of itself as ocean, and its awareness of itself in the individualised form of each of the life-forms that it gives rise to. The self-awareness of these life forms is their awareness of themselves and each other as a part of the ocean as a whole and as self-expressions of it - both distinct but inseparable from it. Only a fish with a human-like ego awareness would experience itself as a being separate and apart

from the ocean as a whole and other life forms within it, and regard its own uniquely patterned perception

of the ocean and its life forms as more ‘real’ or ‘objective’ than those of a fish or shark.

This tecne of ocean management turns the world into the standing reserve – controlling people and environments which profligates the panopticon mentalityLuke 95 — University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Timothy, “On Environmentality: Geo-Power and Eco-Knowledge in the Discourses of Contemporary Environmentalism”, JSTOR, Cultural Critique 31, Autumn 1995)//krishnik

Not surprisingly, then, the various power/knowledge systems of instituting a Worldwatch environmentality appear to be a practi-cal materialization of panoptic power. The Worldwatch

Institute continually couches its narratives in visual terms, alluding to its mission as outlining "an ecologically defined vision" of "how an environmentally sustainable society would look" in a new "vision of a global economy." As Foucault claims, "whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on

whom a particular form of behavior must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used" (Discipline and Punish 205)

because it enables a knowing center to reorganize the disposition of things and redirect the convenient ends of individuals in environmentalized spaces. As organisms op-erating in the energy exchanges of photosynthesis, human beings can become environed on all sides by the cybernetic system of bio-physical systems

composing Nature. Worldwatching, in turn, refixes the moral specification of human roles and responsibilities in the enclosed spaces and seg-mented places of ecosystemic niches. And, in

generating this knowledge of environmental impact by applying such powers of ecological observation, the institutions of Worldwatch operate as a green panopticon, enclosing Nature in rings of centered normaliz-ing super-vision where an eco-knowledge system identifies Nature as "the environment." The notational calculus of bioeconomic ac-counting not only can, but in fact must reequilibrate individuals and species, energy and matter, inefficiencies and inequities in an integrated panel of globalized observation. The supervisory gaze of normalizing control, embedded in the Worldwatch Institute's

panoptic practices, adduces "the environmental," or enclosed, seg-mented spaces, "observed at every point, in which the individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all events are recorded, in which an uninter-rupted work of writing links the centre and periphery, in which power is exercised without division, according to a continuous hi-erarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located, examined, and distributed among the living beings, the sick and the dead" (Foucault, Discipline and

Punish 197). To save the planet, it becomes necessary to environmentalize it, enveloping its system of systems in new disciplinary discourses to regulate population growth, economic development, and resource exploitation on a global scale with continual managerial intervention.

The alternative is a reconceptualization of international politics in terms of interenvironmental relations – only this can investigate the questions of inequality and control that are at the root cause of our environmental and political problemsLuke 3 — University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute(Timothy, “International or Interenvironmental Relations: Reassessing Nations and Niches in Global Ecosystems”, Sage Journals, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 28:3, 7/2013)//krishnik

Such sociotechnical formations have real, material significance. For example, one decisively significant way in which our fossil-fuel-burning, automobile-building, commodity-buying culture has become "a veritable second nature" in the Group of Eight can be traced through the planet's atmosphere, oceans, soils, and climate. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported in Shanghai in January 2001,

"most of the global warming of the last 50 years is attributable to human activities."37 Not

surprisingly, the people most involved in such activity reside in niches occupied by Group of Eight states: the effluence of their affluence is the major destructive influence on Earth's atmosphere (though it may be noted that in 2002 China was recognized as the world's fastest-growing automobile market) . First nature, or the planet's environments before or apart from human activities, has not seen our current levels of CO2

concentration (increases that have occurred over the 250 years of the απ ' industrial revolution) in 420,000 years. Second nature, or the planet's environments with all of their current human activities, is putting that first nature away for good and creating an entirely new ecological order with its own energy flows, material exchanges, and habitat niches. The United States, for example, with not quite 5 percent of the world's population, produces one-quarter of the greenhouse gases. While the

United States is the most powerful nation in the international system, this national power simultaneously

reveals and occludes something more profound about its occupation of the prime niche in the global ecosystems of fossilfuel use, which is much more expansive and destructive than that found in its bordered

national space. On the one hand, many collectives (people and things) in the United States are powerful enough and wealthy enough to generate tremendous production and use of oil, gas, and coal; on the other hand, the production-and-consumption inequalities registered in the ledgers of other nations permit the United States to off-load its greenhouse-gas by-production onto terrains, spaces, and niches worldwide. Second nature now has so many builtenvironmental niches nested within it that the modernization process has mostly ended: nature has gone for good. Much of what appears to be international relations is, in fact, also an elaborate network of interenvironmental relations as the occupants and beneficiaries of one small cluster of niches

occupied by very successful political economies (like the Group of Eight and other major OECD countries)

compete with the residents and refugees of other, much-less-high-tech blocs of humans and nonhumans (like those occupying the Group of Seventy-seven countries) . We cannot understand inequality in the so-called new world order without reexamining how international relations express complex interenvironmental relations between divergent, differing assemblies of humanity and nonhumanity, recognizing that these relations are largely omnipolitan in their depth and direction. Who controls the creation of new environmental conditions? Who and what suffers from this capability of control? How do such inequalities express themselves? These are essential questions that must be explored more fully.

Links

Link – Arctic

The affirmative is a reductionist denomination of the Arctic to geographic numeration – the alternative is a precondition to explorationGraham and Wilson 97 - *Professor of English at the Univerity of Ottawa AND **PhD of English Literature from University of Ottawa; English Professor at the University of Ottawa(Lorrie and Tim, “Questions of Being: An Exploration of Enduring Dreams,” Echoing Silence: Essays on Arctic Narrative)//krishnik

Just as, for Heidegger, in the culmination of modern metaphysics in the will to power, existence becomes defined as a function of forces or perspectives (for example, the definition of the

willing self as a function of perspectives posited by that self), so, too, Moss argues the culmination of the geographical relation to existence means the revealing of being as a function of forces or "conditions." For instance, he writes, "Geography is a discipline, of course; and location—in a proscriptive sense, patterns deter- mined by rule." Moss continues, "Geography is conditions, meant almost as metaphor. Arctic geography; conditions of climate, of will To endure, be endured" [our emphasis] (2). In a like manner, Moss notes, The Arctic, [is] reduced by geographic

explication to ciphers, digits, points that occupy no space, lines with no dimension; words shatter, become facts" (9); finally, he states, "Perception and notation are functions of experience; not being itself [our emphasis] (17).¶ For Heidegger, then, the metaphysical relation to beings means their functionalization and the loss of the things themselves; that is, the culmination of this metaphysical relation to beings means the withdrawal of Being itself. Simply put, things arise within modern metaphysics with- out limits; for Heidegger, beings only are within certain limits; in this way, in as much as modern metaphysics dissolves the things themselves into forces, the things themselves lack Being or the limits of what is proper to them. Similarly, Moss argues that

geography forces the landscape to arise as a functional set of relations—that is, as a function of "ciphers," "digits," or "lines with no dimension." To the extent that geography abstracts the landscape into lines without dimension, geography loses the landscape by erasing the horizons of landscape as the limits of what is proper to it. In this way, then, just as Being has withdrawn for Heidegger, so too, for Moss, geography subsumes landscape. Moss refers to landscape

as "the antithesis of geography" (5); in addition, he states that "[g]eography has displaced the landscape; misplaced it perhaps ..." (17).

Link – Aquaculture

The aff polarizes the relationship between marine ecosystems and human interest, abandoning our responsibility for oceanic relationalityHeine 90 – Professor of Religion and History & Director of the Institute for Asian Studies(Steven, "Philosophy for an 'Age of Death': The Critique of Science and Technology in Heidegger and Nishitani," JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdfplus/1399227.pdf?acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true)//krishnik

It is important to go back and see the methodological importance of discussing marine ecology and the introduction of fish as party to the problem beyond the considerations of stock management. This will constitute a way of concluding in terms of the empirical study while demonstrating the limits of its approach. It is also a gesture to the fact that empirical/existential questioning, a

question about being, is a necessary condition of thinking, thinking differently from what is given as the norm. The conventional analysis of the South Pacific fisheries regime has shown that the institutional innovations and the efficiency of cooperation among member states reliect a success story. In

this success story, however, the ecological context (that is, the relationship between what is considered to be the stocks and between stocks and human beings beyond their market value for the party states) remains hidden. The indifference to ecological relations creates another aspect of the problem, but this aspect goes beyond the concerns articulated as efficiency and sustainability of resources for global markets under the label of environmental concerns, hence

politics. In intemational environmental politics the natural components of the ecological equation are political considerations insofar as human interest can be established in terms of resources. The "˜political' of international environmental politics is more about human beings and the way they incorporate nature as resources than the political that may be seen in the larger context oft he ecological." It rather represents a large depoliticisation of ecological relations where the components of the system are transformed into things without rights, existential relations and prospects. The methodological style of the study may be seen as a way of questioning, thinking, wondering about an existential relationality implied in the initial question about the ecological call and responsibility. The structure of questioning represents a transgressive7 methodological move. The limits to understanding what the environmental issues involve in oceans and how they may be thought of are reached, in the empirical study, by introducing those beings/ "˜agents' that are excluded from the formal method of thinking in IR, Emilio Urunnus, mare .... This move disrupts the limits of understanding the environment within the given framework of IR. The discussion may he considered as a process of unconcealment which recovers those identities -fish, Thunnus alolunga, ecological human being . . _ and spaces, oceans, ecosystems, habitats - which are disqualified from being the subject of ethical consideration, even that of "˜ethics of exclusion' (Walker 1 993 ). The impact of this study on nature in general and the ocean ecology in particular may he seen in its politicisation of the members of an ecosystem as they become party to the political contestation in which their rights to life should be considered as

worthwhile as those of human beings. Furthermore, the domain of the political is expanded from IW as the social life of human beings abstracted from nature, where the codes of moral relationality are located, to an existential space where life means existence and moral relations are based on ecological ethics of existential responsibility. In discussing the aspects of marine ecology as a salient location of environmental politics, fish are transformed from merely a material resource to a IW which exists in a system of relations. Elaboration ofthe ecological context and exposition of it from the

perspective of ocean life reveals that the life of fish is interactive and dynamic. Besides, fish are not necessarily or merely a material source for human sustenance. By introducing the perspective of marine ecology in which individual fish species and their larger ecological relations are considered, (1) the constitution of fish (nature) as IW, and (2) the reversal of depoliticisation are accomplished. As I argued in relation to IW/mere IW as the representation of the political, the ecological context of nature first has to be conceptualised as a form of IW hefore it appears as a political agency. The way I approach this may be observed in the introduction of ash and its ecological location. The claim for IW is represented in the existential condition of species by the fact of their living. This step is a political one, both on a methodological level as it disrupts the

conventional analysis, and on a practical level as the aspects of an ecological system become political agents with claims deriving

from their existential position in the ecological system. This politicisation is furthered by discussion of the specific ecological condition of different species, Thunnus in particular. It has revealed that the ocean ecosystems present interactive and Huid relations. Each species has a different way of life and these lives present many different dimensions.

Link – Biodiversity

Preserving biodiversity leads to eco-colonialism wherein we declare ourselves to be managers of the entire world, reimagined as an ecological investment fund – the aff views biodiversity solely in terms of its benefit to humanity – turns the caseLuke 97 — University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Timothy, “The (Un)Wise (Ab)Use of Nature: Environmentalism as Globalized Consumerism?”, International Studies Association Meeting, 3/22/1997, http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim528.PDF)//krishnik

The WWF-US chapter in league with the WWF's global offices in Switzerland are intent upon preserving some segments of the Earth's biodiversity through planned giving and high-powered finance, which aim to reconstruct certain natural environments around the world as a green endowment from the past to provide sustainable income streams of natural resources to present and future generations. As an endowment system, the WWF-US is generating its own unique discourses of green governmentality for managing Nature and its resources, as if its many campaigns to protect the rainforest, save tigers, preserve rhinos were an interdependent family of mutual funds poised to capture continuously the charitable dollars of green investors. Like most

preservationist-minded ecology groups first inspired by IUCN habitat protection agendas, then, the WWF essentially is devoted to "Nature preservation," or creating small reservations of select real estate populated by rare wildlife species in expanses of undeveloped habitat. The ethos of its aristocratic founders with their experiences as hunters of trophy animals on game preserves remains alive in the WWF's approach to Africa, Asia and Latin America as the best sites to preserve big game animals. As WWF-US President Kathryn S. Fuller indicates, the WWF has helped "establish, fund or manage nearly 450 parks and reserves world wide, from the Wolong Panda Reserve in China to Peru's spectacular Manu National Park. The protected areas WWF-US has supported cover more than 260 million acres of wildlife habitat--

an area twice the size of California."92 This achievement is highly touted in WWF literature, underscoring how thoroughly the organization has reimagined Nature as a bioresources trust, an ecomutual fund, or an environmental endowment to be kept under its diligent surveillance as loosely held inventories of land. The work of the WWF as a result is often ironically seen by its American managers as a kind of "green man's burden" spreading the advances made by conservationists in the United States abroad because, as Train notes, "there has been almost total neglect of the problems outside our borders until the WWF came along."93 Under the presidencies of Russell E. Train, Bill Reilly and Kathryn Fuller, the WWF grew from 25,000 members with an annual budget of about $2 million in 1978 to a membership

of 1.2 million and an annual budget of $79 million in the mid-1990s by pushing this ecocolonialist agenda.94 The WWF has specialized in propagating its peculiar global vision in which experts from advanced industrial regions, like the United States, Great Britain, or Switzerland, take gentle custody of biological diversity in less advanced regions, like Third World nations, as benevolent scientific guardians by retraining the locals to be reliable trustees of Earth's common endowments in their weak Third World nation-states. In many ways, the WWF is one of the world's most systematic practitioners of eco-colonialism to reshape Nature consumption. From its initial efforts to protect Africa's

big fame trophy animals in the 1960s to the ivory ban campaigns of the 1990s, WWF wildlife protection programs have been concocted by small committees composed mostly of white, Western experts, using insights culled from analyses conducted by white, Western scientists that were paid for by affluent, white, Western suburbanites. At the end of the day, many Africans and Asians, living near those WWF parks

where the endangered wildlife actually roam wild, are not entirely pleased by such ecological solitude. Indeed, these Third World peoples see the WWF quite clearly for what it is: "white people are making rules to protect animals that white people want to see in parks that white people visit."95 At some sites, the WWF also promotes sustainably harvesting animals for hides, meat, or other byproducts, but then again these goods are mostly for markets in affluent, white, Western countries. As Train argues, these ecocolonial practices are an unavoidable imperative. The WWF came to understand that "the great conservation challenges of today and of the future mostly lie in the tropics where the overwhelming preponderance of the Earth's biological diversity is found, particularly in the moist tropical forests and primarily in the developing world. Although the problems may often seem distance from our own shores and our own circumstances, we increasingly understand that the biological riches of this planet are part of a seamless web of life where a threat to any part

threatens the whole."96 In mobilizing such discursive understandings to legitimize its actions, the WWF has empowered itself over the past thirty-five years to act as a transnational Environmental Protection Agency for Wildlife Consumption to safeguard "the Earth's biological diversity," internationalizing its management of "the biological riches of this planet" where they are threatened in territorialities with very weak sovereignty to protect their sustainable productivity for territories with quite strong sovereignty as parts of "a seamless web of life where a threat to any part threatens the whole."97 On one level, the American WWF frets over biodiversity, but many of its high Madison Avenue activities actually aim at developing systems of "biocelebrity." From the adoption of the panda bear as its official logo to its ceaseless fascination with high-profile, heavily symbolic animals, or those which are most commonly on display in zoos

or hunter's trophy rooms, the WWF-US has turned a small handful of mediagenic mammals, sea creatures, and birds into zoological celebrities as part and parcel of defending Nature. Whether it is giraffes, elephants, rhinos or kangaroos, ostriches, koalas or dolphins, humpbacks, seals, only a select cross-section of wild animals with potent mediagenic properties anchor its defense of Nature. Special campaigns are always aimed at saving the whales, rhinos or elephants, and not more obscure, but equally endangered fish, rodents, or insects. This mobilization of biodiversity, then, all too often comes off like a stalking horse for its more entrenched vocations of defining, supplying, and defending biocelebrity. On a

second level, however, the WWF is increasingly devoted to defending biodiversity, because it is, as Edward O. Wilson asserts, "a priceless product of millions of years of evolution, and it should be cherished and protected for its own sake."98 Even though it should be saved for its own sake, it is not. Wilson provides the key additional justification, indicating implicitly how the World Wildlife Fund actually presumes to be the long-term worldwide fund of Nature as the unassayed stock of biodiversity is saved "for other reasons," including "we need the genetic diversity of wild plants to make our crops grow better and to provide new foods for the future. We also need biodiversity to develop new medicines....a newly discovered insect or plant might hold the cure for cancer or AIDS."99 Wilson argues, "you can think of biodiversity as a safety net that keeps ecosystems functioning and maintaining life on Earth."100 But, as the organization operating as the green bank with the biggest deposits from a worldwide fund of Nature, the WWF aspires to hold many of these bioplasmic assets in ecological banks as an enduring trust for all mankind. Fuller, is quite explicit on this critical side of the association's mission. Because "the biological riches of the planet are part of a seamless web of life in which a threat to any part weakens the whole," the WWF must ensure the integrity and well-being of the Earth's "web of life," giving it a most vital mission: Because so much of the current biodiversity crisis is rooted in human need and desire for economic advancement, it is essential that we work to bring human enterprise into greater harmony with nature. Short-sighted efforts at economic development that come at the expense of biodiversity will impoverish everyone in the long run. That is why, in addition to establishing protected areas and preserving critical wildlife populations, WWF uses field and policy work to

promote more rational, efficient use of the world's precious natural resources."101 Faced by an extinction wave of greater pervasiveness than any confronted during recorded history, the WWF-US mobilizes the assets of biocelebrity to leverage its limited guardianship over the planet's biodiversity, because we may see as much as one quarter of the Earth's biodiversity going extinct in twenty or thirty years. Even so, the WWF fails to realize how closely its defense of the rational, efficient use of precious natural resources as third wave environmentalism may contribute to the extinction of biodiversity. And, the conspicuous consternation of the WWF permits a focused fixation upon biocelebrities to occlude this fact for those who truly care about Nature--as long as it is equated with rhinos, tigers, and elephants.

Link – Energy

Energy production refines the will to master and control the earth – this renders people and places as standing, making all forms of violence inevitableCallister 7 – JD from Cornell University; MSLIS from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; UMKC’s Law Library Director; Professor of Cyberlaw and Infosphere and Advanced Legal Research(Paul,“Law and Heidegger’s Question Concerning Technology: Prolegomenon to Future Law Librarianship”, Fall 2007)//krishnik

Following World War II, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger offered one of the most potent criticisms of technology and

modern life. His nightmare is a world whose essence has been reduced to the functional equivalent of “a giant gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry. This relation of man to the world [is] in principle a technical one. . . . [It is] altogether alien to former ages and histories.”2 For

Heidegger, the problem is not technology itself, but the technical mode of thinking that has accompanied it. Such a viewpoint of the world is a useful paradigm to consider humanity’s relationship to law in the current information environment, which is increasingly technical in Heidegger’s sense of the term. 2 Heidegger’s warning that a technical approach to thinking about the world obscures its true essence is directly applicable to the effects of the current (as well as former) information technologies that provide access to law. The thesis of this article is that

Heidegger provides an escape, not only for libraries threatened by obsolescence by emerging technologies, but for the law itself, which is under the same risk of subjugation. This article explains the nature of Heidegger’s criticisms of technology and modern life, and explores the threat specifically identified by such criticism, including an illustration based upon systematic revision of law in Nazi Germany. It applies Heidegger’s criticisms to the current legal information environment and contrasts developing technologies and current attitudes and practices with earlier Anglo-American traditions. Finally, the article considers the implications for law librarianship in the current information environment. Heidegger’s Nightmare: Understanding the Beast Calculative Thinking and the Danger of Subjugation to a Single Will 3 The threat is not technology itself; it is rather a danger based in

the essence of thinking, which Heidegger describes as “enframing”3 or “calculative thinking.”4 For Heidegger, the problem is that mankind misconstrues the nature of technology as simply “a means to an end.”5 4 Heidegger’s articulation of the common conception of technology as a “means” applies equally well to information technologies,

including legal databases. True, it is hard to think of technology in any other way, but what Heidegger argues is that this failure to consider the essence of technology is a threat to humanity.6 5 He defines the threat in two ways. First, humans become incapable of seeing anything around them as but things to be brought into readiness to serve some end (a concept he refers to as “standing reserve”).7 They are thereby cut off from understanding the essence of things and, consequently, their surrounding world.8 Second, man is reduced to the role of “order-er” of things, specifically to some purpose or end, and, as a result, risks becoming something to be ordered as well.9 Heidegger illustrates these concerns as follows: The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather is today commanded by profitmaking in the lumber industry, whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand.10 In other words, the trees, the wood, the paper, and even the forester (whose ancestors once understood the sanctity of the woods) are ultimately subordinated

to the will to establish orderly public opinion. The forester, in proverbial fashion, “cannot see the forest for the trees.” Instead of appreciating the majesty and mystery of the living forest, he sees only fodder for the paper mill, which will pay for his next meal. 6 The same cynicism might be applied to legal

publishing. Whole forests have given their lives to the publication of legal information in order to provide a stable basis for society—after all, the “law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still,”11 or as our comrades from Critical Legal Studies might put it, law is simply a tool “to perpetuate the existing socioeconomic status quo.”12 Cadres of West editors (commonly referred to in generic fashion as human resources, ironically making them all the less human)13 work feverishly to digest points of law and assign 55,000 cases into a taxonomy with more than 100,000 class

distinctions,14 all for the sake of a predictable legal system and stable society. 7 For Heidegger, the threat is revealed in mankind’s perpetual quest to gain mastery over technology. “Everything depends on our manipulating technology in the proper manner as a means. We will, as we say, ‘get’ technology ‘spiritually in hand.’ We will master it. The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control.”15 When Heidegger published these

words (first in 1962, but based on lectures from 1949 and 1950),16 the implications of nuclear energy and atomic warfare occupied much academic discussion. Heidegger points out that the popular question of this period did not concern how to find sufficient energy resources, but “[i]n what way can we tame and direct the unimaginably vast amounts of atomic energies, and so secure mankind against the danger that these gigantic energies suddenly—even without military actions— break out somewhere, ‘run away’ and destroy everything?”17 The modern question is about our mastery over technology, not about sufficiency of resources. 8 Similar concerns are apparent with respect to information technologies, where the primary problem is not lack of access, but too much access: for example, illegal music file swapping,18 the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),19 and trends to use licensing to control and preserve the economic value of information (and to prohibit otherwise lawfully competitive practices, such as reverse engineering).20 With respect to law and government, we see such examples as retraction of government documents,21 the Patriot Act,22 the furor over unpublished electronic precedent,23 and the recent frenzy of e-discovery.24 Some stakeholders seem to have liked things better when information resources were scarce.25 Universal access is destabilizing—hence, the considerable interest in getting a “handle” on technology through legal sanction and yet additional technological innovation (the so-called “access control” technologies). 26 9 Heidegger’s genius is in recognizing that all the fuss about mastering technologies, although close to the mark,

concerns the wrong issue. The more insidious threat is not nuclear fallout or economic devaluation

of intellectual property, but the worldview of “calculative” thinking that accompanies rapid

technological change: “The world now appears as an object open to attacks of calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist.”27 For Heidegger, calculative thought is not limited to the manipulation of machine code or numbers. Rather, the concept is grounded in “Machiavellian scheming” and the pursuit of power. “Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next.”28 The threat Heidegger envisions to human thought is even more dangerous than nuclear warfare.29 10 Heidegger’s

threat is based on the separation of man from his or her nature. By pursuing economic calculation, man is cut off from the transformative powers of his or her environment. In such a world, law does not have the capacity to educate or to provide the basis for social harmony;30 rather, like any resource, law must be employed to more economic ends. The implication is that calculative thinking mandates that everything (including law) be subjected to a single will. While Heidegger recognized the danger of subjecting everything to a single will, the issue of whether, and when, he equated the danger with Nazi totalitarianism, which he had originally supported, would require a line of historical inquiry far beyond the scope of this article.31 Regardless of

Heidegger’s own political and moral journey, Nazism effectively illustrates Heidegger’s philosophical fear—that technological thinking risks the “ordering” of all the world, including humanity, as resources subject to a singular will.

Link – Environment

Ocean policy inherently separates humans from nature through artificial borders – only the alternative can break down this dualism Ásgeirsdóttir 7 – Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Missouri(Áslaug, “The Environment and International Politics. International Fisheries, Heidegger and Social Method (review)”, Project Muse, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/gep/summary/v007/7.3asgeirsdottir.html)//krishnik

The Environment and International Politics seeks to challenge the prevailing dichotomy that separates humans from animals, in a quest to encourage us to enter a new era of ecological thinking.

The theoretical part of the book situates the debate about the human-animal dichotomy in the teachings of Kant and Descartes. It proposes Heidegger´s discussion of Dasein or 'Being' as a way to overcome this dichotomy

and move humankind toward a more encompassing view of nature and its complexity.¶

Seckinelgin argues that in order to take an ecological approach to managing the environment we

must move away both from viewing humans as separate from nature and also from our

reliance on the sovereign nation-state as the key institution to tackle environmental crises. But

Seckinelgin stops short of advocating a solution to foster global approaches to ecological problems; his goal is primarily to challenge

us to think about nature as a whole rather than as humans versus the environment.¶ He defines ecology as "an awareness of the interrelation and interconnectedness among the species in nature themselves (including human beings); and between species and the physical components of nature where species are located and on which their existence depends" (p. 5). This understanding of ecology presents an important discursive problem for international relations. When ecological challenges arise, the response within international relations is always through the nation-state and its interest, not from the perspective of how the ecological challenge can best be solved from the perspective of the entire

planet and its people.¶ In developing his theoretical argument, Seckinelgin uses the Third United Nations Law of the Sea

Convention (UNCLOS III) as an empirical study to illustrate his argument, with a concentrated focus on the shortcomings of the Convention to adequately protect highly-migratory tuna fisheries in the South Pacific. UNCLOS III allowed states to create 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones ( EEZs ),

which created artificial borders in the ocean that violate the ecological realities of the complex ecosystem the tuna inhabit. Tuna, and other migratory stocks, present an interesting challenge to the system of sovereign states in that they do not respect the artificial 200-mile boundary imposed by states and hence the only way to manage the stock is through international cooperation.¶

Link – Fisheries/MPA

Fisheries and MPAs posit fish as a resource to satiate human ends – this places marine life in standing reserve, shattering our intimate ontology with the oceanKennedy 7 – PhD in philosophy from Murdoch University(Deborah, “Ocean Views: An investigation into human-ocean relations,” http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/123/2/02Whole.pdf)//krishnik

In Chapter 5 I discuss two influential scientific conceptions of oceans: the production model view of oceans championed by conventional fisheries science and. second, an enclosed sanctuary, or reserve view, promulgated in marine protected area science (hereafter MPA science).¶ Conventional

fisheries science receives considerable attention because it has dominated the more general developments in the ocean sciences and management in the twentieth century (Norse & Crowder

2005a; Preikshot & Pauly 2005; Rozwadowski 2002). I argue that the production model view of ocean dwelling life in conventional fisheries science pursues a narrow and highly instrumental agenda for the development and production of fish for consumption. In this model, fish are conceptualised as

resources with the sole purpose of meeting human ends ; ocean dwellers and their ecosystems are without needs and agency of their own. The intimate relationship between human and ocean wellbeing is denied in the production model.¶ The production model conception of the relationship between ocean dwelling life and humans is often posited by fisheries science as the result of objective inquiries. My observation is. however, that the theories and practices of fisheries science are tied up with industry values and specific cultural

beliefs and attitudes. That fisheries science is tied up with specific values and beliefs is an important matter to address in this dissertation because of the great store attached to the widely held conviction that science produces objective knowledge. The influence of fisheries science in determining actual and possible human-ocean relations is a compelling reason to scrutinise its main cultural characteristics. In undertaking this task I draw on Plumwood's (1993) analysis of dualistic conceptual

frameworks that structure thinking and relations with non-human nature in Western societies. This analysis discloses that nature

is conceived in instrumental terms , as a resource or a standing reserve . My focus on the

instrumentalist mind-set helps to demonstrate that enterprises such as conventional fisheries science are predisposed to collaboration and capture by industry and the rationalist economy. I illustrate this point with a discussion of the types of research models used in conventional fisheries science.¶ Conventional fisheries science is widely contested from within the scientific community and from without. Following my discussion of fisheries science. MPA science is contextualised as being, in part, a strategic response to the over- exploitation of oceans that the theories and practices of conventional fisheries science have legitimated throughout the twentieth century. MPA science is far more inclusive than fisheries science in the range of factors utilised in its approach to the production of knowledge about oceans and ocean dwellers. MPA science is not delimited by so close a connection to industry and resource management agendas but is fashioned from a different set

of concerns and values. Having said this, there is reason to be wary at the present time of attempts to define oceans through the frameworks of MPA science. My discussion demonstrates that MPA science tends towards a protective and authoritarian scientific approach—with the effect of excluding certain 'others'—and that this approach has been gathering momentum . I argue that

understandings of oceans and resulting oceans policies should properly consider and act in concert with understanding of a range of cultural, social, political and economic dimensions.¶

Chapter 5 continues to focus on that part of my thesis concerned with some of the major Western discourses that structure

contemporary human-ocean relations. Fisheries science and MPA science demonstrate how the most widely accepted variants of ocean-related science constrain our understandings and possibilities for interacting with oceans in Western societies.¶ The shortfalls of science point to the need to open up assessment and debate through processes that allow a broader range of

communities, human and non-human, to contribute to questions related to the use, protection and well being of ocean environments.

Link – Geoengineering

Geoengineering is the final calculative solution – abdicates individual being in the face of a technological demand for controlHamilton 13 – Professor of Public Ethics at the Centre for Applied Philosophy(Clive, “What Would Heidegger Say About Geoengineering?”, 11/7/2013, http://clivehamilton.com/what-would-heidegger-say-about-geoengineering/)//krishnik

Proposals to respond to climate change by geoengineering the Earth’s climate system, ¶ such as by regulating the amount of sunlight

reaching the planet, may be seen as a radical ¶ fulfillment of Heidegger’s understanding of technology as destiny. Before ¶ geoengineering was conceivable, the Earth as a whole had to be representable as a total ¶ object, an object captured in climate models that form the epistemological basis for ¶ climate engineering. Geoengineering is thinkable because of the ever-tightening grip of ¶ Enframing, Heidegger’s term for the modern

epoch of Being. ¶ Yet, by objectifying the world as a whole, geoengineering goes beyond the mere ¶ representation of nature as ‘standing reserve’; it requires us to think Heidegger further, to ¶ see technology as a response to disorder breaking through. If in the climate crisis nature ¶ reveals itself to be a sovereign force then we need a phenomenology from nature’s point ¶ of view. If ‘world grounds itself on earth, and earth juts

through world’, then the climate ¶ crisis is the jutting through, and geoengineering is a last attempt to deny it, a vain attempt ¶ to take control of destiny rather than enter a free relation with technology. In that lies the ¶ danger. ¶ I. Introduction ¶ The question of technology dominated Heidegger’s thinking after his ‘turn’ in the 1930s, ¶ although it has been argued that the sequence of his works can be read as ‘the gradual emergence of the problem of technology’.1 Grasping the role of technology in the history ¶ of Being was the path to his most penetrating insights into

the modern condition. For ¶ him, the modern world is technological, but not in the way commonly imagined. ¶

Technology does not simply transform the physical world; it reveals the world in a ¶ particular way, and thereby defines what is. So technologization is the key to Heidegger’s ¶ ontology, at least the later development of it. ¶ I

would like to suggest that geoengineering or climate engineering represents a radical ¶ fulfillment of Heidegger’s understanding of technology as destiny and that, because it ¶ takes technological thinking to its most extreme point, climate engineering also contains ¶ the seeds of a rupture with that destiny and so represents what might be called ‘the last ¶ technology’. ¶ Geoengineering is a catch-all term for technologies aimed at countering or offsetting the effects of global warming.2 They are being developed because, for a number of reasons, ¶ the world has failed to respond to scientific warnings by reducing greenhouse gas emissions.3 Here I focus on those geoengineering technologies that seek to regulate the ¶ amount of solar radiation reaching the Earth. The cheapest and most likely intervention is ¶ a proposal to shroud the Earth with a layer of sulphate aerosols in the upper atmosphere. ¶ A fleet of high-flying aircraft or a 20 kilometre hose held aloft by balloons could be used ¶ to inject the aerosols to achieve more-or-less permanent dimming of the globe.¶ Sulphate aerosol spraying aims to regulate the climate of the planet as a whole by ¶ manipulating the chemical composition of the atmosphere. It would require elaborate ¶ control mechanisms operated from some kind of central

office for climate management. ¶ Heidegger would probably view geoengineering as the final surge of the will-to-power ¶ and a desperate gambit to defend modern subjectivity. ‘The will to mastery’, he wrote, ‘becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control.’4 ¶ To foreshadow a later discussion, he would perhaps also see within the extreme danger of ¶ climate engineering and the peril it seeks to forestall, the gleam of a saving power. ¶ In the spirit of Heidegger my focus is not on the technologies themselves but on what ¶ their proposed deployment reveals about the world and human destiny. Echoing ¶

Heidegger, we might say: The essence of geoengineering is nothing technological. ¶ Geoengineering represents a qualitative leap in human use of technology not because it ¶ reaches a new level of sophistication (indeed, spraying sulphuric acid into the upper ¶ atmosphere or spreading iron filings on the oceans are crude methods ), but because it ¶ comprises the first technology of intentional planetary control. It may be viewed as a ¶ desperate response to human failing or as monstrous hubris, but beneath all emotional ¶ and ethical judgments lies an unexamined conception of the Earth that makes ¶ geoengineering imaginable.

Geoengineering is domination of both nature and society in order to try to undo our own exploitation of Nature – this means-ends solution will only end in more destructionLuke 9 —University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute(Timothy, “An Emergent Mangle of Practice: Global Climate Change as Vernacular Geoengineering”, 9/2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450783)//krishnik

To discuss more expert/formal/ordered geoengineering in some future conditional sense, however, expresses a disturbing ideological blindness (Cascio, 2009). The technofixes being discussed in that geoengineering schema are responses to a concerted, distributed, and intensive use of fossil fuels to advance economic development. Perhaps it would be more correct to regard

vernacular geoengineering as “ecotinkering,” or “geoputtering,” or “enviromeddling,” but this vernacular geoengineering effort has been at work, and understood as having the effects it is creating since the nineteenth century, the sixteenth century or even the Neolithic Age, depending upon who one relies upon for scientific support. This on-going DIY experiment in terraformative change should neither be dismissed nor ignored. Nevertheless, today‟s would-be expert geoengineers ignore what is, in fact, at stake. It is not to geoengineer the Earth or not; it is instead how it could, should or would be moved out of its current unfocused vernacular registers of execution into some more formal mode of planned implementation? All of the elaborate discussion of implementing this or that technological approach at some unknown moment of ecological crisis or emergency consensus is a ruse for the rationalization of either continued inaction or immediate intervention. Yet, there is little consideration of the actual politics of such action. Instead one is too often left dangling in these debates about geoengineering with the usual default settings in policy- making more commonly drive by ordinary technological momentum: a)it might need to be done, b) it can be done, so at some point, c) it probably will be done. In view of today‟s ominous climate change trends, however, there now are many experts and interests at work trying to build some consensus around what “must be done.” Much of the conflict here is no longer over “whether or not,” but rather what must be done by whom, where, when, what, and how? Individuals and/or groups; states and/or societies; bureaucratic regulators and/or market mechanisms, manufacturers plus networks of consumers, designers, users, scientific experts and/or ordinary laypersons: the complexity of the players to be

invited to address the problems further complicates the solutions. Yet, the ruse of rationality still positions the policy problematic as one of pure geoengineering in order to occlude, as capitalist systems of exchange as well as authoritarian modes of governance always have, the degree to which geoengineering implicitly but also inescapably, is much more, namely, socioengineering, ethnoengineering or archiengineering (Luke, 2005a). That is, any new twists in the modes of dominating nature necessarily imply fresh approaches to dominating men and women by reorganizing society, reconfiguring culture or reconstituting rulership. These two dynamics cannot be divided, and each presumes the other. Whether one looks at Rousseau, Smith, Marx or Polanyi, one insight about social power seems constant: a few men and women do tend to dominate most other human and nonhuman beings by perfecting the domination of nature (Luke, forthcoming 2010).

Geoengineering is a techno-fix that ensures the problem will be recreated in the future – and causes socioengineering along with it – dominates both Nature and humanityLuke 9 —University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute(Timothy, “An Emergent Mangle of Practice: Global Climate Change as Vernacular Geoengineering”, 9/2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450783)//krishnik

The problem with the techno-fix is that it rarely fixes what it was meant to improve and the technological systems deployed as the fix bring their own values, practices, and dynamics into the situation to be corrected without being always corrective (Bala, 2009). As Hughes (2004: 14)

notes, “consequently, the problems are usually not solved, but often made more intractable.” Recalling Robock‟s thoughts about these realities should be quite sobering. Petroski (1992: 62) notes that “no one wants to learn by mistakes, but we cannot learn enough from successes to go beyond the state of the art.” This insight is fruitful with regard to vernacular geoengineering inasmuch as its conduct has entailed a rich heritage of mistakes from which much can be learned. Indeed, the banal ecologism of green design, industrial ecology or cradle-2-cradle production are all efforts that systematically seek out

inefficiencies, irrationalities, and inefficacies of conventional engineering and design on many levels of reevaluation. As early as the 1970s, and clearly since the 1990s, the adverse impact of misengineering in causing climate change has been a growing concern. With regard to formal geoengineering, however, this insight from Petroski provides a stern warning. Since there are no successes yet from such experiments, there should be considerable apprehension about the mistakes that could be made. What could be learned by a formal geoengineering failure might come too late for any successes to ever be realized. Hence, enthusiasms for “the state of art” in the barely emergent fields of formal geoengineering must be contrasted to its the on-going forms of unplanned learning from its vernacular varieties, which still proceed apace in many different realms and regions of

endeavor. The human-built world is an old established fact, and today‟s touts of formal geoengineering are proposing little that is new, promising or trustworthy as such, even as they assume their project would be a wholly de novo affair. Nothing could be further from the truth, and the tacit socioengineering agenda at the play in the details of geoengineering are in nuce the most immediate ideological threat as well as the least progressive political promise for making any effective advances in combating adverse climate changes. Conditional speculations in elite policy outlets and more mass market, lay reader publications about “geoengineering: could or

should we do it?,” “the incredible economics of geoengineering,” or “re-engineering the Earth,” are, in fact, all intentional programs that imply bigger agenda, like “could or should we do socioengineering?,” “socioengineering‟s incredible economics,” and “could or should we do socioengineering?” while moving ahead to operate under a green state of emergency.

Impacts

Dehumanization

Environmental “development” is a guise for technological denaturing and dehumanizationLuke 96 (Timothy W., University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, “Liberal Society and Cyborg Subjectivity: The Politics of Environments, Bodies, and Nature”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 21:1, 1996, Sage)

Never entirely convincing, these myths of the natural condition may become utterly surrealistic at this juncture of history. Right here, right now, as Jameson argues, constitutes a place and time at which “the modernization process is complete and Nature is

gone for good.“l3 McKibben agrees, we now face “the end of Nature,” because, as Merchant claims, we have caused “the death of Nature.”*4 After two centuries of industrial revolutionization and three decades of informational revolutionization, nature, as vast expanses of untamed wildness, has vanished. For the sake of argument here, nature rarely is regarded any longer as God-created (theogenic) or

self-created (autogenic); instead, human-caused (anthropogenic) features, tendencies, and events now preoccupy individuals in civil society as transnational corporate capitalism recontours the planet to generate the endless growth of commodities. Becoming enmeshed in complex networks of scientific rationalization and commercial exploitation, nature becomes denature(d) . The entire planet now is increasin gly either a ”built environment,” a “planned habitat,” a “wilderness preserve,” an “economic development,” or an “ecological disaster.“ If nature is mostly now “denature,” then perhaps one must begin thinking about a state of denature-a process that becomes helpful, ironically, in understanding the cyborgs that evolve there. So, too, might the figure of “humanity,” once seen as the crowning center of nature, become more rightly regarded as “dehumanity,” as the death of ”the human” unfolds along with the death of ”nature.” Dehumanization coevolves with denaturalization; "dehumanized" beings inhabit the modernized global ecologies of mechanized, polluted, bioengineered denature as fragments and fusions of the machinic systems that define today's environments, bodies, and politics. Here we might jettison the traditional, moralistic baggage of anthropocentric regret about "dehumanization," which begins with Rousseau and continues into many humanistic discourses of the present, by seeing dehumanization, ironically, as an ontological constant rather than a technological aberration.

Environmental Justice [Capitalism

Their pretended environmentalism is a guise for the extension of capitalism – drives environmental destruction and worldwide inequalityLuke 97 — University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Timothy, “The (Un)Wise (Ab)Use of Nature: Environmentalism as Globalized Consumerism?”, International Studies Association Meeting, 3/22/1997, http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim528.PDF)//krishnik

All of these environmentalizing initiatives reveal different aspects of Nature's infrastructuralization in the disorganized and incomplete transnational campaigns of environmentalized capital's terraforming programs. The actions of the Worldwatch Institute, the Nature Conservancy, or the World Wildlife Fund, or the Sierra Club are frameworks within which a new habitus with its own environmentalized social relations of production and consumption can come alive by guarding habitat as the supremely perfect site of habitus. As Baudrillard observes, "the great signified, the great referent Nature is dead, replaced by environment, which simultaneously designates and designs its death and the restoration of nature as simulation model....we enter a social environment of synthesis in which a total abstract communication and an immanent manipulation no longer leave any point exterior to the

system."115 Rendering wildlife, air, water, habitat, or Nature into complex new systems of rare goods in the name of environmental protection, and then regulating the social consumption of them through ecological activism shows how mainstream environmentalists are serving as agents of social control or factors in political economy to reintegrate the intractable equations of (un)wise (ab)use along consummational rather than consumptive lines. Putting earth first only establishes ecological capital as the ultimate basis of life. Infrastructuralizing Nature renders everything on Earth, or "humanity's home," into capital--land, labor, animals, plants, air, water, genes, ecosystems. And, mainstream environmentalism often becomes a very special kind of "home eco nomics" to manage humanity's indoors and outdoors household accounts. Household consumption is always home consumption,

because human economics rests upon terrestrial ecologics. Here the roots of ecology and economics intertwine through "sustainable development," revealing its truest double significance: sustainably managing the planet is the same thing as reproducing terrestrial stocks of infrastructorialized green capital. Whether or not environmentalists prevent the unwise abuse or promote wise use of natural resources is immaterial; everything they do optimizes the sign value of green goods and serves to reproduce global capital as environmentalized sites, stocks or spaces--an outcome that every Worldwatch Institute State of the World report or Club Sierra ecotour easily confirms. Likewise, the scarcity

measures of Nature Conservancy or World Wildlife Fund scare campaigns show how everything now has a price, including wildlife preservation or ecological degradation, which global markets will mark and meet in their (un)wise (ab)use of environmentalized resources. Newer ecological discourses about total cost accounting, lifecycle management, or environmental justice may simply articulate more refined efforts to sustainably develop these bigger global processes of universal capitalization by accepting small correctives against particular

capitalist interests. Admitting that poor people have been treated unjustly in siting decisions for environmental bads lets rich people redistribute these ecological costs across more sites so that they might benefit from the material and symbolic goods created by being just so environmental. Environmental justice movements perhaps are not so much about attaining environmental justice as they are about moving injustices more freely around in the environment, assuring the birth of new consumerisms for increased efficiency at risk management and broader participation ecological degradation in our terraformed Nature.

Poverty [Capitalism]

Eco-managerialism drives reduction of nature to mere resource – it’s the root cause of environmental exploitation and worldwide wage inequalityLuke 3 —University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Timothy, “Eco-Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation”, Aurora Online, 2003, http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91)

So to conclude, each of these wrinkles in the record of eco-managerialism should give its supporters pause. The more adaptive and collaborative dimensions of eco-managerial practice suggest its advocates truly are seeking to develop some post extractive approach to ecosystem management that might respect the worth and value of the survival

of non-human life in its environments, and indeed some are. Nonetheless, it would appear that the commitments of eco-managerialism to sustainability maybe are not that far removed from older programs for sustained yield, espoused under classical industrial regimes. Even rehabilitation and restoration managerialism may not be as much post extractive in their managerial stance, as much as they are instead proving to be a more

attractive form of ecological exploitation. Therefore, the newer iterations of eco-managerialism may only kick into a new register, one in which a concern for environmental renewability or ecological restoration just opens new domains for the eco-managerialists to operate within. To even construct the problem in this fashion, however, nature still must be reduced to the encirclement of space and matter in national as well as global economies to a system of systems, where flows of material and energy can be dismantled, redesigned, and assembled anew to produce resources efficiently, when and where needed, in the modern marketplace. As an essentially self

contained system of biophysical systems, nature seen this way is energies, materials, in sites that are repositioned by eco-managerialism as stocks of manageable resources. Human beings, supposedly all human beings, can realize great material goods for sizeable numbers of people if the eco-managerialists succeed. Nonetheless,

eco-managerialism fails miserably with regard to the political. Instead, its work ensures that greater material and immaterial bads will also be inflicted upon even larger numbers of other people, who do not reside in or benefit from the advanced national economies that basically have monopolized the use of the world's resources. This continues because eco-managerialism lets those

remarkable material benefits accrue at only a handful of highly developed regional municipal and national sites. Those who do not benefit, in turn are left living on one dollar or two dollars a day, not able, of course, at that rate of pay, to pay for eco-managerialism. So I'll stop there.

Warming

The alternative solves warming – large-scale technological solutions exacerbate human damage – micro-scale solutions solveLuke 9 —University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute(Timothy, “An Emergent Mangle of Practice: Global Climate Change as Vernacular Geoengineering”, 9/2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450783)//krishnik

The best path out of this crisis at this juncture, therefore, would appear more modest, namely, sticking with the messy praxis of mangling. The negative path dependencies in the technological momentum behind fossil fueled civilization might well be only strengthened if formal geoengineering schema were put into place. In addition to not amending the mistakes already made in fabricating

the technoculture of the world since the eighteenth century, new grander ecological messes with less hope of reversal or remediation very well might arise out of emergency geoengineering measures. Finding multiple, resilient, micro-scale, and reversible solutions to greenhouse gassing is already happening apace, and these efforts should not be derailed. Holding out the hopes of some singular, brittle, macro-scale, and possibly irreversible geoengineering projects being prototyped, and then rapidly deployed, is vain. Most are still only in the talking stage, but their apparent certainty of success might well aggravate the already widespread foot dragging one sees in the struggle against global climate change.

Violence

The managerial view of the environment endlessly creates new environments for humans to control – leads to hierarchies of dominance that maintain both the environment and other people in a state of subjugationLuke 3 — University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute(Timothy, “International or Interenvironmental Relations: Reassessing Nations and Niches in Global Ecosystems”, Sage Journals, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 28:3, 7/2013)//krishnik

I want to assess the implications of this rising inequality by concentrating upon its environmental dimensions, but I also want to approach what is regarded as "the environment" quite differently by mobilizing ideas from science and technology studies. These alternative notions can help frame the outlines of this new inequality as both an object of knowledge and subject of struggle. Such moves must be made because most analytical tools in the disciplines of both international relations and environmental studies are not adequate for the tasks of interpreting what is now developing around the world in the realms of technoscience and the environment. In fact, our existing tools often occlude what needs to be analyzed, who needs to be criticized, and what must be done to oppose powerlessness and inequality. To anchor my claims, I take Fredric Jameson's point about the postmodern condition as a point of departure. That is, it is what remains "when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good." It is a more fully human world than the older one, but one in which "culture" has become a veritable "second nature."1

Ironically, as Jameson suggests, this more fully human world is one that also rests upon the creation, maintenance, and suppression of a more fully nonhuman world. As Bruno Latour suggests,

Modernity is often defined in terms of humanism, either as a way of saluting the birth of "man," or as a way of

announcing his death. But this habit itself is modern, because it remains asymmetrical. It overlooks the simultaneous birth of "nonhumanity" things, or objects, or beasts and the equally strange beginning of a crossed-out God, relegated to the sidelines. This realm of nonhumanity is, in large part, what we know as "the environment," but it increasingly is occupied by things and systems as well as plants and animals. Sitting on the sidelines, hiding amid the action, and working behind the scenes with "modern man," there are all the objects and subjects or plants, things, beasts, places, systems, and spaces that sustain

modernity and its inequalities as they now surround everybody and everything in their workings. The Enlightenment's national progressive order of human actors male and female seeking liberty, equality, and fraternity persists. Yet it unfolds amid many other asymmetrical transnational networks and unbalanced national niches for nonhumanity that materially advance or retard human struggles for national progress. In many ways, the modern world system for commodity production and consumption

generates its own artificial and natural environments. An environment is what surrounds something, and the sweep of global exchange now is "environizing" itself a terraformative power at the most fundamental level of operation by putting everything that exists in built and unbuilt environments under human control. The idea is to put life itself into conformity with commodification, subjecting

objects and subjects to exchange and forcing everyone and everything to perform within the ways of the market. Whether it is bioengineering new life forms, remixing the composition of the planet's atmosphere, or crowding out most other organisms within Earth's carrying capacity, human economic exchanges are now a key environizing power that encircles, contains, and envelopes living and nonliving things in the human nations and environmental niches that now constitute the world's ecosystems. The domination of "Nature" by "Society" creates a second nature, a processed world, or a postmodern condition in which those who own and control the material

and mental means of enforcing asymmetries between different populations of humanity and aggregations of nonhumanity are continuously forced to concretize new inequalities on this environmental scale. Far too many people and their things, in turn, become relegated to second, third, fourth, fifth, or other developing worlds, while only a few people and their things in the developed "first world" benefit from the costs incurred elsewhere by these world-making, or "terraformative," powers.

Alternative

Interenvironmental Pedadogy

This reconceptualization of the international sphere as interenvironmental relations is critical to address ecological devastation – current IR theories are doomed to further exploitation and extinctionLuke 3 — University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute(Timothy, “International or Interenvironmental Relations: Reassessing Nations and Niches in Global Ecosystems”, Sage Journals, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 28:3, 7/2013)//krishnik

The omnipolitan subpolis evolves in the reified dictates of industrial ecologies, whose machinic metabolisms, in turn, entail the planned and unintended destruction of nonhuman and human lives in many different national environments. Those interenvironmental relations then become

a new means to organize "the conduct of conduct" for citizens and consumers.105 International relations as a discipline is unlikely to critically and comprehensively address how all of the contradictions in the subpolis bring their disruptive influence into our public life. These concerns have not been present in its

discursive DNA for reasons going back to the ancient Greek city-states. An interenvironmental approach, however, begins to disclose how deep technology predetermines collective ends without much, if any, ethical discussion or political deliberation. This occurs because those who "know how," as well as those who "own how" in the subpolis are permitted to prejudge everyone's actions in the polis. Their expert knowledge and private ownership give them some capability to decide for all. Democracy, in turn, finds dictatorial administrative rationalities turned into collective ends in themselves without much, if any, ethical debate or political discussion. Environmentalism is one of the last remaining discourses available for us to provide some ethical consideration or political reflection about the effects of the subpolis on the overall civic life of society as privileged millions still benefit environmentally from the international misery of billions.106 As

we stand perhaps at the end of nature in the first years of the twenty-first century, we cannot continue on this track if Earth's ecologies are ever to be mended.107 To conclude, my analysis has developed two major points. First, I have argued broadly about how human nations and nonhuman niches are fabricated, but then fit into what "the environment" is by positioning this understanding in the twenty-first century a time, for many, coming at "the end" of nature by raising the specter of new environized agencies and structures: cyborgs, hybrids, machinations, the subpolis. Second, I have indicated why most

thinking about international relations does not reexamine how the uneven globalization of technoscience has created a now all-pervasive subpolitical domain beneath, beyond, and beside the sphere of politics. The imperatives of subpolitics give a broader perspective on the environmental crisis than thinking simply about how the incomplete globalization of civic activism in the political sphere, as many others have claimed, limits ecological improvements.

Ultimately, international relations cannot come to complete closure with "the environment," and what are now environized inequalities in many human societies, until or unless its practitioners carefully reconsider how the subpolitical domain constrains and confounds initiatives for change in the political sphere by running them down the box canyons of property rights and the dead ends of expertise.

The alternative is a reconceptualization of international politics in terms of interenvironmental relations – only this can investigate the questions of inequality and control that are the root cause of our environmental and political problemsLuke 3 — University Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences as well as Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute(Timothy, “International or Interenvironmental Relations: Reassessing Nations and Niches in Global Ecosystems”, Sage Journals, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 28:3, 7/2013)//krishnik

Such sociotechnical formations have real, material significance. For example, one decisively significant way in which our fossil-fuel-burning, automobile-building, commodity-buying culture has become "a veritable second nature" in the Group of Eight can be traced through the planet's atmosphere, oceans, soils, and climate. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported in Shanghai in January 2001,

"most of the global warming of the last 50 years is attributable to human activities."37 Not

surprisingly, the people most involved in such activity reside in niches occupied by Group of Eight states: the effluence of their affluence is the major destructive influence on Earth's atmosphere (though it may be noted that in 2002 China was recognized as the world's fastest-growing automobile market) . First nature, or the planet's environments before or apart from human activities, has not seen our current levels of CO2

concentration (increases that have occurred over the 250 years of the απ ' industrial revolution) in 420,000 years. Second nature, or the planet's environments with all of their current human activities, is putting that first nature away for good and creating an entirely new ecological order with its own energy flows, material exchanges, and habitat niches. The United States, for example, with not quite 5 percent of the world's population, produces one-quarter of the greenhouse gases. While the

United States is the most powerful nation in the international system, this national power simultaneously reveals and occludes something more profound about its occupation of the prime niche in the global ecosystems of fossilfuel use, which is much more expansive and destructive than that found in its bordered

national space. On the one hand, many collectives (people and things) in the United States are powerful enough and wealthy enough to generate tremendous production and use of oil, gas, and coal; on the other hand, the production-and-consumption inequalities registered in the ledgers of other nations permit the United States to off-load its greenhouse-gas by-production onto terrains, spaces, and niches worldwide. Second nature now has so many builtenvironmental niches nested within it that the modernization process has mostly ended: nature has gone for good. Much of what appears to be international relations is, in fact, also an elaborate network of interenvironmental relations as the occupants and beneficiaries of one small cluster of niches

occupied by very successful political economies (like the Group of Eight and other major OECD countries)

compete with the residents and refugees of other, much-less-high-tech blocs of humans and nonhumans (like those occupying the Group of Seventy-seven countries) . We cannot understand inequality in the so-called new world order without reexamining how international relations express complex interenvironmental relations between divergent, differing assemblies of humanity and nonhumanity, recognizing that these relations are largely omnipolitan in their depth and direction. Who controls the creation of new environmental conditions? Who and what suffers from this capability of control? How do such inequalities express themselves? These are essential questions that must be explored more fully.

Meditative Thought

The alternative is to embrace meditative thought to break open new ways of relating to the worldMcWhorter 9 (Ladelle McWhorter, Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy 2nd, expanded edition, “Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection,” p. 8-9)

Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively,

technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and

begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if

we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, in

attempting to think we will only twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling pure

frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralysed. However, as so many peoples

before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and a passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it sometimes makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities. If we read him seriously and listen

genuinely, Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, when the ice caps are melting and the bird flu is spreading and the president is selling off our national wilderness reserves to private contractors for quick private gain, Heidegger apparently calls us to do nothing. When things that matter so much are hanging in the balance, this frustration quickly turns to anger and disgust and even furor. How dare this man, who might legitimately be accused of having done nothing right himself at a crucial time in his own nation's history, elevate quietism to a philosophical principle? Responsible people have to act, surely, and to suggest anything else is to side with the forces of destruction and short-sighted greed. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that Heidegger's call may initially inspire and actually examine the

feasibility of response, we may move past the mere frustration of our moral desires and begin to undergo frustration of another kind, the philosophical frustration that is attendant on

paradox. How is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? Heidegger is not

consecrating quietism. His call places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it

points out the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, our passion for maintaining

control. What is the origin of that drive? Is that drive itself really under our control? Is it something we choose and will, or it is

something whose origins and meanings transcend us? The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate.

The alt opens us up to rethink managerialism – solves the caseMcwhorter and Stenstad 9 (Ladelle McWhorter and Gail Stenstad, Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in

Environmental Philosophy 2nd, expanded edition, Editor’s Introduction ix-x)

When we attempt to think ecological concerns within the field of thinking opened for us by Martin Heidegger, the paradoxical unfolds at the site of the question of human action. Thinking ecologically that is, thinking the earth in our time means thinking death; it means think ing catastrophe; it means thinking the possibility of utter annihilation not just for human being but for all that lives on this planet and for the living planet itself. Thinking the earth in our time means thinking what presents itself as that which must not be allowed to go on, as

that which must be controlled, as that which must be stopped. Such thinking seems to call for

immediate action. There is no time to lose. We must work for change, seek solutions, curb appetites, reduce expectations, find cures now, before the problems become greater than anyone's ability to solve them if they have not already done so.

However, in the midst of this urgency, thinking ecologically, thinking Heideggerly, means

rethink ing the very notion of human action. It means placing in question the typical Western

managerial approach to problems, our propensity for technological intervention, our belief in human cognitive power, our commitment to a metaphysics that places active human being

over and against passive nature. For it is the thoughtless deployment of these approaches

and notions that has brought us to the point of ecological catastrophe in the first place.

Thinking with and after Heidegger, thinking Heideggerly and ecologically, means, paradoxically, acting to place in question the acting subject, willing a displacement of our will to action; it means calling ourselves as selves to rethink our very selves, insofar as selfhood in the West is constituted as agent, as

actor, as calculatively controlling ego, as knowing consciousness. Heidegger's work calls us not to rush in with quick solutions, not to act decisively to put an end to deliberation, but rather to think, to tarry with thinking unfolding itself, to release ourselves to thinking without provision or predetermined aim. Such thinking moves paradoxically, within and at the edge of the tension and the play of calculation and reflection, logos and poesis, and urgency that can yet abide in stillness.

Meditative thought is key – understanding of the ever-changing and unknowable nature of Earth is a prerequisite to solvingMcwhorter and Stenstad 9 (Ladelle McWhorter and Gail Stenstad, Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy 2nd, expanded edition, Editor’s Introduction xi)

In 'Earth-Thinking and Transformation,' Kenneth Maly shows ways in which Heideggerian reflection on the fact of our being earth-dwellers can be transformative of our thinking at its very core and therefore transformative of our world. Maly believes that our culture’s insistence on a divorce between rationality and other ways of thinking and knowing has resulted in an

impoverishment of our being and a destructive distancing from the earth that gives rise to,

shelters, and sustains us. When we take ourselves and the earth as fixed entities to be

comprehended by rational observation and theoretical constructs , we lose sight of the earth

and being-human as process, as forever un-fixed, as changing, growing, outgrowing, as living and therefore dying. It is only when we begin to think human being and earth as unfixed, as always undergoing transformation in a living unfolding of our/ being, that a new, less

destructive understanding of humanity-in/on-earth can come into being, with the possibility

of a way of living that unfolds within the dynamic paradox of relatedness-as-such . And such

understanding, Maly would argue, is absolutely necessary if we are avoid destroying the

earth.

Meditative thought solves – opens itself up to infinite possibilities and the chance of being wrongMcwhorter and Stenstad 9 (Ladelle McWhorter and Gail Stenstad, Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy 2nd, expanded edition, Editor’s Introduction xvi-xvii)

In 'Down-to-Earth Mystery,' Gail Stenstad takes up the question of how we can be empowered in a situation in which our thinking and actions seem futile, compelling us to witness helplessly the destruction of earth and world. Coming to grips with the ungrounding of thinking opened up in Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy

brings an awareness of the an-archic character of thinking, in which all the traditional dualistic touchstones and fixations (such as objectivity, territoriality, and in general all theoretical aims) fall aside. This is a way to begin to open up the depths of what Heidegger means by releasement towards things, enabling the openness to mystery that embodies in us the groundless grounding from which we are then empowered to respond to the situation in which we actually find ourselves. This is no abstraction, nor yet wordplay. It is this an-archic thinking that can, for example, enable environmental philosophers and other concerned people to work or play with the best insights of any theory, fostering action without the hindrance of the useless

expectation of uniform agreement . So there is the possibility of practical empowerment. But

even if we see no clearly apparent results of that kind, going deeper yet into the matter awakens us to the magnetic quality of

genuine thinking. 'We are the pointers,' Heidegger says. Releasing the old expectations, opening to mystery without aiming to resolve it, responding to things in the ongoing ungrounded dance of dynamic relationality, enables us first of all to be who we are. Only then may we begin to imagine what it is to dwell on this earth, and act accordingly

Framework

Ontology 1 st

Ontology comes first—affects every mode of policymakingDillon 99 [Michael Dillon; Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics; 97-99]

As Heidegger—himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4

— never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other—regional—modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question

of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and

judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will con strue the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietz sche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mockinnocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making. While certain continental thinkers like Blumenberg and Lowith, for example, were prompted to interrogate or challenge the modern s claim to being distinctively “modern,” and others such as Adorno questioned its enlightened credentials, philosophers like Derrida and Levinas pursued the metaphysical implications (or rather the implications for metaphysics) of the thinking initiated by Kierkegaard, as well as by Nietzsche and Heidegger. The violence of metaphysics, together with another way of thinking about the question of the ethical, emerged as the defining theme of their work.5

Others, notably Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Bataille turned the thinking of Nietzsche and Heidegger into a novel kind of social and political critique of both the regimes and the effects of power that have come to distinguish late modern times; they concentrated, in detail, upon how the violence identified by these other thinkers manifested itself not only in the mundane practices of modern life, but also in those areas that claimed to be most free of it, especially the freedom and security of the subject as well as

its allied will to truth and knowledge. Questioning the appeal to the secure selfgrounding common to both its epistemic structures and its political imagination, and in the course of reinterrogating both the political character of the modern and the modern character of the political, this problematization of modernity has begun to prompt an ontopolitically driven reappraisal of modern political thought. This means that the ontological constitution of politics itself—its legislating categories of time, space, understanding, and action, and of what it is to be — prompted by the politics of the specific (ontological) constitutional order of political modernity, has begun to come under sustained scrutiny.

Discourse 1 st

It is necessary to consider environmental discourse in international relations – failure to rethink the ocean turns case through endless environmental destructionSeckinelgin 6 – Lecturer in International Social Policy at the Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science(Hakan, “The Environment and International Politics International Fisheries, Heidegger, and Social Method”, Routledge)//krishnik

This book challenges the way International Relations (IR) engages with issues of ecological nature. This is in fact a challenge to the politics towards nature justi- fied by post-Cartesian epistemology and metaphysics. The book concentrates on the oceans, their problems and the solution to those

problems prescribed by the discourse of IR. This choice of the oceans is not an arbitrary choice of an ecological disaster. The oceans and the way IR conceptualises oceans presents the disciplinary rupture very interestingly – as shown over and over again through the debates around depleted fish stocks or at times of major shipping accidents. In addition, the attempt to find solutions to the problems of the oceans has dominated traditional International Relations – that is, international diplomacy, negotiations bargaining, strategy, economic development, regime building – over a large part of the past fifty years. The final result of all this activity was/is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – UNCLOS III – that came into force in November 1994, the effect of which is demonstrated in the Rockall case. The then UN Secretary- General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his speech to the inaugural session of the Seabed Authority, described the Convention as one of the ‘greatest achievements of this century’, one of the most ‘definitive contributions of our era’ and ‘one of our most enduring legacies’. The Secretary-General is not alone in his enthusiasm. The literature of institutions and regimes, as well as the literature on environmental problems, is very positive and probably

overemphasises its role. 2 In order to substantiate the nature of the challenge I will look at two events revealing the structure of environmental politics. The presidential elections in 2000 not only installed a new President, George W. Bush, but also ushered in a new environmental politics. 3 This is reflected both in the USA domestically and in the changing attitudes of the new administration towards the global environmental initiatives. As the President-elect took office in January 2001, a new energy policy framework for the USA

reflecting Bush’s concerns was initiated. The administration initiated a simultaneous policy process whereby, domestically, the new agenda used a self-reliance rhetoric in advocating exploration and the extraction of oil from Alaskan natural reserves while, inter- nationally, the Bush administration turned its uneasiness about the potential outcomes of the Kyoto protocol of the Climate Change Treaty into a concrete policy by withdrawing from the Treaty and actively negotiating against it. The administration’s new policy in relation to the Kyoto protocol is based on Bush’s feeling that ‘the agreement is fatally flawed’ (BBC News 2001) and that it would ‘harm our economy and hurt our workers’, since it ‘failed to hold developing nations to strict emissions limits’ (Bush on CNN 2001). The emerging argument for withdrawing from the process is based primarily on protecting the USA’s economic interests, supported by claims that the process would be unfair. While strictly limiting industrialised countries’ productivity, it would give undue competi- tiveness to the developing countries that rely on the existing

non-environmental energy consumption. In other words, in order to be able to keep its economic structures, the USA would need to change its technology and alter its energy consumption to address climate change; a challenge, since some 25 per cent of all global emissions are produced by the USA. This would indeed suggest a need to initiate a process to change certain components of the American lifestyle that rely heavily on hydrocarbons. The Bush administration was not prepared to do this, since securing a particular American way of life included advocating hydrocarbon exploration and extraction from the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). This policy change to intervene in what is widely considered to be an ecologically pristine and protected environment is promoted by the President

himself. In his weekly radio address on 26 February 2002, Bush argued that ‘America is already using more energy than our domestic resources can provide, and unless we act to increase our energy inde- pendence, our reliance on foreign sources of energy will only increase’ (Planetark (2002) at

http://www.planetark.com). This is seen as a crisis in energy production threatening the US economy

and implicitly the American way of life. From this perspective the earlier reaction to the Kyoto protocol becomes more meaningful, as it is clear that in the face of such perceived threat the administration is not interested in participating in a

process which would limit its ability to deal with the impact of such a crisis on the domestic economy. The only solution to this crisis is seen in terms of a reduction in ‘America’s dependence on foreign sources of oil by encouraging safe and clean exploration at home’ (ibid.). Looking at both statements makes it clear that the international obligations are trumped by the per- ception of national security

based on sustainable energy resources . Domestically, this perception also trumps the environmental concerns that

are expressed for ANWR. Environmentalists expressed strong reservations in relation to this policy. They argued that the scheme would damage the fragile and well-balanced eco- systems in the region as well as the lives of the natives, who are dependent on local wildlife such as caribou, musk ox and wolves. It is argued that the native Gwichin people would lose their way of life if caribou herds abandoned ANWR. They argued that ‘our people as a whole ...are united in our position to protect the Arctic refuge, our way of life and caribou herds’ (BBC 2002). In addition, there were Greenpeace occupations of two American-owned oil rigs in the North Sea and demonstrations in Texas near to the President’s ranch. Some energy experts argued that there was no energy crisis, that the problem is rather related to ineffi- cient energy consumption within the USA. All of these environmental arguments based on the

interests of natives and their ecological context were discounted, as 2 Introduction the exploration and extraction of oil are presented as imperative to the maintenance of the American way of life and national security. Although certain acknowledge- ment is granted to the environmentalists in the shape of trying to initiate the process

through environmentally conscious technologies, it is clear that conservation and protection are not central to the agenda in the times of this important energy crisis in the USA. All of these new steps positioned the US administration in opposition to the prevailing environmentalist lobby both domestically and internationally. This position is further compounded by President Bush’s attitude towards the Johannesburg-2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development in the summer of 2002. His insistence on not attending the conference combined with his contin- ued refusal to participate in climate change debates influenced the outcomes of the Summit. The refusal of Bush to attend the Summit was arguably a demonstration of a particular lack of concern for the environment within the US administration. However, if we consider the trajectory of the administration it is clear that rather than having no concern for the environment, the administration seems to occupy a particular position in relation to environmental politics. In this concern environ- mental priorities are set at a different level from the expectations of environmental activists around the world. The dilemmas of environmental politics have surfaced in many other contexts, another important example of which is observed in the following. On Thursday, 12 June 1997, most British national newspapers carried cover- age of the Greenpeace occupation of Rockall, accompanied by photographic images of the barren rock, which lies 289 miles off the northwest of Scotland. 4 A Greenpeace spokesman announced that ‘[w]e have asked the Government to stop oil exploration in the Atlantic Frontier region and when they do they can have their rock back’ ( The Times ); one of the protesters added that ‘[b]y seizing Rockall we claim her seas for the planet and all its peoples. No one has the right to unleash this oil into our threatened climate’ ( Independent ). The follow-up to this coverage came on Thursday, 24 July 1997, when the Guardian reported that ‘[t]oday in London, Greenpeace moves from a symbolic to a legal challenge, and will take the Government to the High Court, arguing that Britain has acted unlawfully by issuing licences while not applying two European directives, in place since 1988’. The newspaper also reported that ‘the Government is being supported by 15 of the world’s largest oil companies’. Both the Bush administration’s attitude and the Rockall cases are examples of environmental politics. I use these cases to locate the question of the present study by the conceptual incision which they open up in international politics, in the politics of environmental politics. The following questions are the means for this incision. What is the issue at stake here? Are these important examples, or are these confrontations just examples of those radical Greenpeace actions? If they are important, why are they so? What do they say about the way the environment is brought into politics? Although in two cases the courses of action taken by the environmentalist opposition differ (for example, in the former the policy was voted out by the Introduction 3 lobbying efforts in the US Senate), the implicit arguments put forward by both parties have close similarities. The situation created by the Greenpeace protest and the claims of the ANWR natives may be analysed on the basis of two differ- ent positions. The first is the claim of the natives and Greenpeace against the government decision, and the second is the government’s response and the grounds of legitimation used in this response. I will look first at the Rockall case and then point out its relevance for the ANWR situation. The reason for the

occupation of Rockall as described above carries a very important challenge. The idea that Greenpeace was working for the benefit

of the planet and all its people indicates a relationship of a different kind between those who take the decision and the rest. Its call on the British government to stop licensing oil exploration is also a call for responsibility. In this call, a national government is asked to consider the impact of its sovereign decision on the planet and on other people living on the planet. Crucially, in this move, connections between people are not considered on the basis of their divided state identities.

Furthermore, the identities of people living on the planet are linked with the identity of the

planet; a link with other species living therein is also implied. 5 The response of the British government

may be discerned from two different sources. The first is the direct official response to the protest and occupation of Rockall by Greenpeace. It is reported that a spokesman from the Foreign Office stated that ‘Rockall is British territory. It is part of Scotland and anyone is free to go there and can stay as long as they please.’ 6 It is clear that the government is acting on a territorial claim, which

enables it to legislate within its sovereign control. Thus the concept of statehood is invoked to evade the responsibility call and to divert attention from the ambit of the call to the fact that that decision is within the state’s territory, hence authority. The second source is the Prime Minister’s declaration in relation to the British commitment to the climate change politics in the United Nations. At the very same period, during the

United Nations General Assembly session on environmental change assessment in 1997, Tony Blair declared the wish of the United Kingdom to become a world leader in climate change politics by promising a radical reduc- tions programme in carbon emissions by the early twenty-first century. Although there is a sign of responsibility in relation to a global issue area in this statement, it seems to be based on an interesting differentiation. It is a curious

question: How is it that the British government is allowing further hydrocarbon extraction while, at the same time, committing itself to climate change politics? The area under discussion, according to a British Petroleum (BP) spokesman, is supposed to replace declining production in the North Sea, and the first of these sites in the

area is expected to produce up to 95,000 barrels of oil a day. 7 It may be true to argue that the commitment to climate change is located in a different dimension than that of domestic political discourse.

Both discussions are fundamentally related, but are dealt with through contradictory moves. The disjuncture between the ANWR natives, environmentalists and the Bush administration may be located in a similar context. The claims to the livelihood and survival of native species are based on an understanding of environment where 4 Introduction people, animals and the physical aspects of nature contribute to each other’s survival in a balanced manner. In addition, the Greenpeace occupation of two American-owned oil rigs in the North Sea was pointing to the international rami- fications of the Bush administration’s decision. The administration’s response to this in justifying its position is by pointing out an understanding of national livelihood for all Americans, represented by the economy and workers as suggested by the President. The well-being of a bounded community is given precedence over all other concerns expressed for other species domestically, and other environ- mental impacts internationally. The claim is asking for everyone to put national interest and a certain level of patriotism over other

possible concerns. Although the responses and the grounds of these responses by the US admin- istration and the British government seem to be valid, the challenge by the natives, and environmentalists such as Greenpeace, target a deeper dimension. It is clear that the language used in the governments’ defence is based on concepts of ‘state’, ‘territory’, ‘interest’, ‘the international’ and ‘international law’. 8 What is being challenged is the relevance of these concepts in understanding the ecological situation. Through the claims of ecological balance in ANWR and calls to represent the ecosystem around Rockall and the rest of the human population who would be influenced by hydrocarbon extraction, these groups allow us to attempt to think of

moral relations, ethics and politics in terms of ecology, where ‘ecology’ may be defined, tentatively, at this stage as an awareness of the inter- relation and interconnectedness among the species in nature themselves (including human beings); and between species and the physical components of nature where species are located and on which their existence depends. Hence, ecological understanding involves considering issues at stake with the awareness of existential relationality among species, and between

species and the Earth. Therefore, the politics of environmental politics becomes the call for responsibility, which is about an ecological call for a political contestation. On the one hand, the Bush administration refuses to agree on international obligations, as these do not allow the USA a justification for the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons. By using a domestic security argument the admin- istration is able to put aside a set of international obligations and also to take measures to change its environmental legislation, which would have international ramifications. On the other hand, in the context of the ocean space claimed for species by Greenpeace, one needs to see the possibility of justification

provided to the British government in International Relations and conditions on which the government’s action is justified. The authority of the government to use a section of ocean space around Rockall derives from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III), concluded in 1982, which established a new zone of sovereign rights for coastal states and islands, i.e. an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The UNCLOS III process was initiated to formulate an ocean regime which would both deal with the environmental problems and benefit coastal states. The most innovative and important change was the establishment of EEZs and the regime UNCLOS III establishes on the basis of rights given to the coastal states. These rights were expressed in relation to ‘exploration, exploitation, conserving Introduction 5 and managing the natural resources’ (Art. 56, 1a) 9 of a certain area of the ocean adjacent to the coastal state’s territory. By relating these rights to state sovereignty the convention has created national spaces out of a global common. As a conse- quence, those national jurisdictions have become legally isolated from the larger context

in which they are located. The position of both governments is based on the possibility of spatial differentiation between states and the international in the way we try to understand international relations. By this move international law also describes the content of these spaces. In the case of Rockall this means that the British government can isolate the case within its internal, ‘state’ systemic con- ceptualisation by making it part of

Scotland, and can thus respond by transforming the case into what may be discussed on the basis of national interest. In the US case, by articulating an energy crisis the administration transforms the situation into a national problem rather than its being related to an international issue. This possibility of a sharp distinction between the two spaces also means that the assimilation of the call for responsibility into national interest is mediated by

international law. It may be argued that the relationality and interconnectedness of human beings and nature suggested by the

activists’ actions is not addressed in the governments’ responses. My intention, then, is to find an intellectual orientation for the critical analysis of this juncture between the activists and the government.

The juncture may be spotted between the official response and the ecological interconnectedness of species – that is, their relationality invoked in the protest – as well as in the meaning of the non-response to the ecological call for responsibility beyond official understanding of responsibility in terms of state interest. The ‘critical’ in ‘critical analysis’ means that the

analysis will attempt to reveal the limits of knowing 10 in terms of ecology within the discourse that is framed by concepts of ‘state’, ‘terri- tory’, ‘interest’ and ‘the international’ as they are deployed by the governments. It is therefore important to conceptualise the nature of the problem between the call for responsibility and the location of the official government response within International Relations. This location between the two sides allows us to see what is at stake politically that is different from environmental politics. In the context of this book, the

discourse that limits our understanding of politics is the study of international relations under the discipline of International Relations (IR). 11 The study of International Relations is taken to be a discursive practice insofar as it produces and forms the knowledge in relation to international relations. 12 In this productive mode it applies discursive rules and categories such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘the international’, without which the discipline of International Relations cannot explain actual international relations; none the less, in the statement of ‘international relations’ these rules and categories are always already assumed. 13 The responses of the US administration and the British govern-

ment to their opponents reflect the discourse of IR, which is based on territorial sovereignty claims through the means of international law and claims of priority of national interest over international responsibility – in other words, the discourse of International Relations through its rules and categories enables spatial differ- entiation between international and national. It creates two sides of political action 6 Introduction where the basis of action is grounded on different ethical relations. Put differently, this spatial distinction also differentiates the mode of political concerns and agents. Through this structure the state becomes the agent of political discourse in ‘the international’ under the assumption of representing its territorial unity and the unified will of its citizens. In this enabling rests the question of how it is that concepts of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘the international’ create

the conditions of the discourse. 14 The ecological call as expressed in ANWR and by the Greenpeace attempt destabilises the disciplinary moves that are based on the framework of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘the international’. As R.B.J. Walker suggests, the increasing importance of the problems arising outside traditional sovereignty claims such as ‘those involving the law of the sea, space law and speculative claims about a global commons or planetary habitat’ makes traditional belief that ‘here is indeed here and there is still there’ (Walker 1993: 174) rather difficult to sustain. The poli- tics based on ecological relationality exposes the inner tensions of the concept of sovereignty. The image of sovereignty as reflected in state action becomes unstable, since these actions have larger consequences that cannot be assimilated within the boundaries of sovereign decision-making.

The ecological understanding defined as a holistic relationality between species and the Earth presents an important discursive problem to International Relations. 15 Of course, there is an attempt to locate ecological problems as an environmental problem within the discourse, as demonstrated by the British government’s

response. This prompts the question: How is it possible, in the face of an invocation of ecological

responsibility, to manage the environment in terms of ‘sovereign’ spaces? Stated differently by

Michel Foucault in his attempt to locate the con- ceptualisation of sex in relation to the general discourse of sexuality, ‘[w]hat is at issue, briefly, is the over-all “discursive fact”, the way in which sex is “put into dis- course”’ (Foucault 1990: 11). It is important to realise that the transformation of ecological problems into environmental issues is a discursive move. International Relations may explain the issue of Rockall through environmental management terms based on British sovereign rights and its international

obligations and, by bringing this explanation, imposes its own discursive structure over the issue. None the less, this precise juncture of transformation reveals the anthropocentric prejudice of the discourse. Although there are those theories, or schools, of International Relations that are receptive to the environmental problems, they remain within the anthropocentric framework. 16 The ecological call raised by these cases discussed above allows us to see the inadequacy of the rules and categories of the

discourse. Or, from a Foucauldian perspective, this inadequacy represents the internal unvoiced and unthought existential values

and norms in the discourse. In other words, to bring the concept of the ecological into perspective is an attempt to uncover power 17 reflected in the possibility of the conditions of knowledge framed in the discourse of International Relations. 18 This process also allows us to see what is political in environmental politics and how it becomes subsumed under the discursive limits of politics created by these values and norms implicit in the

discourse. The relationship between power/knowledge and discourse is an extremely interesting and important one. In considering discourse as the reflection of deeper, internal values and norms, and the relationship between them, it is possible to dissect the knowledge claim of a discourse in relation to the underlying conditions of its production. In the privileged norms and values, those norms and values that are silenced may be observed as well. The silenced relations in the production of certain truth claims within a discourse

represent where the resistance may be located. In terms of the juncture between ecology and International Relations, the location of this resistance can be the discussions of environmental management within the discourse of International Relations (insofar as this location allows us to see the power relations and ethical values deployed in the disciplinary parameters of sovereignty and the international). 19 Through this understanding one can analyse the discursive production of ‘environment’ as well as its inclusion in politics. What are the power relations reflected in this knowledge? It does

not mean that the challenge is external to the discourse. The location of resistance is clearly within the discourse as an oppositional power relation that is silenced, which may be mobilised to reflect the contingent power relations underpinning the possibility of discourse. By showing the contingency of the discourse not only to what is being confidently expressed but also to the silenced power relations, the knowledge claim becomes disrupted, and the possibility of a new space is opened up. With this move, the explanatory power of the discourse of International Relations based on spatial differentiation between ‘sovereignty’ and ‘the international’ and the very legitimacy of this expla- nation are questioned. 20 The ecological call, of which ANWR and Rockall are only two manifestations, presents International Relations with a fundamental challenge. What we see in these examples is very important. The governments’ responses to these

issues revolve around the disciplinary matrix of International Relations. However, one of the main arguments in the discussion, namely the ecological claim, urges us to stretch our vision provided by the discourse. The claim that the state, and hence the domestic government, has a responsibility to people beyond its boundaries attempts to disintegrate the image of responsibility based only on state relations in the international, which is not concerned

necessarily about people. Moreover, by bringing in a concern for species that are not able to vocalise their dissent from the practices threatening their existential space, and therefore their being, this ecological politics of contestation points to a discursive anomaly in International Relations. The knowledge produced within the discourse in terms of ‘the interna- tional’ does not reflect what it is that we perceive to be international, and the larger context implicated in the concept becomes obscured. Its knowledge claim remains

restricted through state behaviour and interests. Thus environmental politics becomes isolated from the politics of ecological contexts and agents. This book claims that the discourse of International Relations is paralysed by ecological problems. As it tries to overcome this state of affairs through its traditional discourse, the situation becomes worse. In other words, one can observe a rupture in the discipline through which power relations behind it may be dissected. The internal constitution of the concept of sovereignty and the power relations implicit in it create the rupture insofar as the ecological issues at hand are 8 Introduction always already discounted internally in the discipline. Therefore, the allure of theories of regimes and institutions structured on the basis of established concepts such as state, sovereignty and the international, used as analytical tools of engage- ment, seems outdated. They obscure the possibility of understanding the ecological

call and the implied responsibility therein. The question of this study, then, is: Can IR understand and address the ecological call? This question will be expanded and located at a deeper philosophical level as I present the way in which I engage with the question through this study. A reminder, before I continue further, is required. The concept of ‘international’ in this study will be used to present a space of social relations that is not captured by International Relations. In other words, I will use the term to mean a space which is beyond, and more dynamic/fluid than, what is indicated in ‘the international’ as relations among states. The definite article ‘the’ will only be used to indicate the limitedness of this term within IR. In this way, the attempt is to disrupt the natural- ness of the international space within International Relations, and to always pose it in relation to a larger context of dynamic relations. 2