Trias v. Araneta15 SCRA 241
DOCTRINE: Sellers of land may validly impose reasonable
easements and restrictions as conditions for contracts of sales;
the same may not be overturned by courts merely on the ground that
it impacts dominical rights. FACTS:JM Tuason and Co. owned a piece
of land that was part of a subdivision. Thru broker Araneta Inc (of
Araneta Coliseum fame), this civic-minded company sold the land to
Mr Lopez with the condition that said lot should never be used to
erect a factory. This imposition was annotated to the TCT.A series
of transfers and conveyances later, the lot ended up in the hands
of the gorgeous Ms. Rafael Trias. She was dismayed with the
annotation that stated 5. That no factories be permitted in this
section.
Ms. Trias felt that the annotation impaired her dominical rights
and therefore illegal and existed as mere surplusage since existing
zoning regulations already prevented the erection of factories in
the vicinity. Worse, the annotation possibly hindered her plans to
obtain a loan. She accordingly raised the issue to the court and
received relief.
Later on, Gregorio Araneta moved for reconsideration stating
that the imposition resulted from a valid sales transaction between
her predecessors in interest. He alleged that the court held no
authority to overrule such valid easement and impaired the right to
contract. ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition was valid. HELD:The
imposition was valid. The prohibition is an easement validly
imposed under art 594 which provides that every owner of a piece of
land may establish easements he deems suitable xxx and not in
contravention to the law, public policy and public order
The court ruled that the easement existed to safeguard the peace
and quiet of neighboring residents. The intention is noble and the
objectives benign. In the absence of a clash with public policy,
the easement may not be eroded.
The contention of surplusage is also immaterial. Zoning
regulations may be repealed anytime, allowing the erection of
factories. With the annotation, at the very least, the original
intent to bar factories remains binding.
ORTIGAS v. FEATI BANK
Facts:Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing
and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills
Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong, Rizal.On March 4, 1952,
plaintiff entered into separate agreements of sale with Augusto
Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles over 2 parcels of land
(Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision). On
July 19, 1962 the vendees transferred their rights and interests
over the said lots to Emma Chavez. The plaintiff executed the
corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez upon payment of
the purchase price. Both the agreements and the deeds of sale
thereafter executed contained the stipulation that the parcels of
land subject of the deeds of sale shall be used by the Buyer
exclusively for residential purposes. The restrictions were later
annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Titles covering the said
lots issued in the name of Chavez.Eventually, defendant-appellee
acquired Lots No. 5 and 6 with the building restrictions also
annotated in their corresponding TCTs. Lot No.5 was bought directly
from Chavez free from all liens and encumbrances while Lot No.6 was
acquired through a Deed of Exchange from Republic Flour
Mills.Plaintiff claims that the restrictions were imposed as part
of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and
development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of
its big landed estate where commercial and industrial sites are
also designated or established.Defendant maintains that the area
along the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig
River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per
ResolutionNo.27of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong. It alleges
that plaintiff completely sold and transferred to third persons all
lots in said subdivision facing EDSA and the subject lots
thereunder were acquired by it only on June 23, 1962 or more than 2
years after the area xxx had been declared a commercial and
industrial zone.On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began
construction of a building devoted to banking purposes but which it
claims could also be used exclusively for residential purposes. The
following day, the plaintiff demanded in writing that the
construction of the commercial building be stopped but the
defendant refused to comply contending that the construction was in
accordance with the zoning regulations.Issues:1. Whether Resolution
No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.2. Whether the
said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual
obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.Held:1. Yes. The validity
of ResolutionNo.27was never questioned. In fact, it was impliedly
admitted in the stipulation of facts, when plaintiff-appellant did
not dispute the same. Having admitted the validity of the subject
resolution, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its position on
appeal.However, assuming that it is not yet too late to question
the validity of the said resolution, the posture is
unsustainable.Municipalities are empowered by law through Sec.3 of
RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) to to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations for the municipality. The law does not
restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore,
granting that ResolutionNo.27is not an ordinance, it certainly is a
regulatory measure within the intendment of the word regulation
under the provision.An examination ofSec.12of the same law reveals
that the implied power of a municipality should be liberally
construed in its favor and that any fair and reasonable doubt as to
the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the
local government and it shall be presumed to exist. An exception to
the general welfare powers delegated to municipalities is when the
exercise of its powers will conflict with vested rights arising
from contracts. The exception does not apply to the case at bar.2.
While non-impairment of contacts is constitutionally guaranteed,
the rule is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power. Invariably described as the
most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers and the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government, the exercise of
police power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if
it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having
been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee.ResolutionNo.27, S-1960 declaring the
western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an
industrial or commercial zone was passed by the Municipal Council
of Mandaluyong in the exercise of police power to safeguard/promote
the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the
conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and
6 are located. EDSA supports an endless stream of traffic and the
resulting activity, noise and pollution which are hardly conducive
to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. The
Municipality of Mandaluyong was reasonably justified under the
circumstances in passing the subject resolution.Thus, the state, in
order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
may be subjected to all kinds of restraint and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state, and
to this fundamental aim of the Government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC.,petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and
CRISPIN E. LAT,respondents.francisD E C I S I O
NBELLOSILLO,J.:REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. (REMMAN), and CRISPIN E.
LAT are adjoining landowners inBarangay Bugtong Na Pulo,Lipa City.
The land of Lat containing an area of 1.8 hectares is agricultural
and planted mostly with fruit trees while REMMAN occupies a land
area of fifteen (15) hectares six (6) hectares of which are devoted
to its piggery business. REMMAN's land is one and a half (1) meters
higher in elevation than that of respondent Lat.Sometime in July
1984 Lat noticed that REMMAN's waste disposal lagoon was already
overflowing and inundating one-fourth (1/4) of Lat's plantation. He
made several representations with REMMAN but they fell on deaf
ears. On 14 March 1985, after almost one (1) hectare of Lat's
plantation was already inundated with water containing pig manure,
as a result of which the trees growing on the flooded portion
started to wither and die, Lat filed a complaint for damages with
preliminary mandatory injunction against REMMAN. Lat alleged that
the acidity of the soil in his plantation increased because of the
overflow of the water heavy with pig manure from REMMAN's piggery
farm.REMMAN denied all the allegations of Lat and raised as an
affirmative defense that measures such as the construction of
additional lagoons were already adopted to contain the waste water
coming from its piggery to prevent any damage to the adjoining
estates.After conducting an ocular inspection and evaluating the
evidence of both parties the Regional Trial Court found that indeed
REMMANs waste disposal lagoon overflowed with the contaminated
water flooding one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation. The waste water
was ankle-deep and caused death and destruction to one (1)
jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one hundred twenty-two
(122) coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango trees,
bananas and vegetables. As a consequence, the trial court ordered
REMMAN to indemnify LatP186,975.00 for lost profits for three (3)
crop years andP30,000.00 as attorney's fees.[1]marieThe decision of
the courta quowas affirmedin totoby the Court of Appeals.[2]In
thisPetition for Review on CertiorariREMMAN prays that we pass upon
the findings of the trial court as well as of the appellate court.
REMMAN insists that factual findings of lower courts may be passed
upon, reviewed and reversed: (a) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; (f) when the conclusions of the Court of
Appeals are not supported by the evidence on record; (g) when facts
of substance were overlooked which, if correctly considered, might
have changed the outcome of the case; and, (h) when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are not in accord with what reasonable men
would readily accept are the correct inferences from the evidence
extant in the records.[3]Indeed, in the abovementioned instances,
the factual milieu of a particular case may be passed upon,
reversed or modified by this Court. But examination of the record
reveals that all the above instances are unavailing. From this
point of view alone the instant petition is dismissible.
Nevertheless, we shall discuss them hereunder to dispose finally of
the contentions of REMMAN.First,REMMAN argues that its liability
for the damages suffered by Lat was not clearly established.We
disagree. During the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court
where representatives of both parties were present, it was
established that the waste water containing pig manure was
continuously flowing from REMMAN's piggery farm to Lat's
plantation. The water was ankle-deep and flooded one (1) hectare of
Lat's plantation. The overflow of the "acidic, malodorous and
polluted water" continued from June 1984 to March 1985 thus
destroying one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one
hundred an twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified number
of mango trees, bananas and vegetables.[4]In addition, the
appellate court found that there was indeed negligence on the part
of REMMAN which directly caused the damage to the plantation of
Lat. Thus -noverox x x Negligence was clearly established. It is
uncontroverted that the land of appellee was flooded on account of
the overflow of acidic, malodorous and polluted water coming from
the adjacent piggery farm of appellant sometime in May 1984. This
resulted in the impairment of the productivity of appellee's land
as well as the eventual destruction and death of several fruit
trees, such as coconuts, coffee, jackfruits, bananas and other
plants x x x x Appellant cannot avoid liability because their
negligence was the proximate cause of the damage. Appellee's
property was practically made a catch-basin of polluted water and
other noxious substances emptying from appellant's piggery which
could have been prevented had it not been for the negligence of
appellant arising from its: (a) failure to monitor the increases in
the level of water in the lagoons before, during and after the
heavy downpours which occurred during the rainy months of 1984; (b)
failure to augment the existing lagoons prior to the incident,
notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the flooding, the
piggery had grown to a capacity of 11,000 heads, and considering
that it was reasonably forseeable that the existing waste disposal
facilities were no longer adequate to accomodate the increasing
volume of waste matters in such a big farm; and more importantly,
(c) the repeated failure to comply with their promise to
appellee.[5]Second,REMMAN argues that the trial court as well as
the Court of Appeals should not have rejected its request for the
production of Lat's income tax returns. According to REMMAN had
Lat's income tax returns been produced, the issue of the alleged
damages suffered by Lat would have been settled.This argument is
moot, if not trite. For this matter has been laid to rest when we
affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in an earlier case
involving the same parties.[6]In sustaining the trial court's
quashal of the subpoenaduces tecumpreviously issued compelling Lat
to produce his income tax returns for the years 1982-1986, the
appellate court explained that the production of the income tax
returns would not necessarily serve to prove the special and
affirmative defenses set up by REMMAN nor rebut Lat's testimony
regarding the losses he sustained due to the piggery. The tax
returnsper secould not reflect the total amount of damages suffered
by Lat, as income losses from a portion of the plantation could be
offset by any profit derived from the rest of the plantation or
from other sources of income. Conversely, losses incurred from
other sources of income would be totally unrelated to the income
from the particular portion of the plantation flooded with waste
matter coming from REMMAN's piggery.[7]Third, REMMAN contends that
the damages allegedly sustained by Lat have not been satisfactorily
established.nigelWe a not convinced. The factual findings of the
courta quorightly support its conclusions on this respect -Coming
now to the issue of damages, We find appellant's allegations not
well-taken. Appellant contends that actual and compensatory damages
require evidentiary proof, and there being no evidence presented as
to the necessity of the award for damages, it was erroneous for the
lower court to have made such award. It must be remembered that
after the ocular inspection, the court a quo rendered an inventory
of dead and rotten trees and plants found in appellee's property.
Appellee also testified on the approximate annual harvest and fair
market value thereof. Significantly, no opposition or controverting
evidence was presented by appellant on the matter. Hence, appellant
is bound thereby and cannot now be heard to complain. As correctly
held by the court a quo:An ocular inspection has been conducted by
the trial court. The inventory of the trees damaged and the
itemized valuation placed therein by private respondent after the
ocular inspection which is not rebutted by the petitioner, is the
more accurate indicator of the said amount prayed for as damages.
If the valuation is indeed unreasonable, petitioner should present
controverting evidence of the fair market value of the crops
involved. The trial court held that the private respondent himself
had been subjected to extensive cross and re-cross examination by
the counsel for the petitioner on the amount of
damages.[8]Finally,REMMAN complains that the damages, if any, were
due to a fortuitous event.Again cannot agree with petitioner. We
defer instead to the findings opinions expressed by the lower
courts -Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of
God, by reason of their negligence, the fortuitous event became
humanized, rendering appellants liable for the ensuing damages.
InNational Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,233 SCRA 649
(1993), the Supreme Court held:ellaAccordingly, petitioners cannot
be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape
liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents
since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. This event
then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force
majeure; a human factor - negligence or imprudence - had
intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may be
deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the
participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby
humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to
acts of God.As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon
the property of appellee, resort to pertinent provisions of
applicable law is imperative. Under the Civil Code, it is
provided:Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters
which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from
the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry
with them.The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works
which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the
higher estate make works which will increase the burden.A similar
provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D.
No.1067), which provides:Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to
receive the water which naturally and without the intervention of
man flow from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth
which they carry with them.The owner of the lower estate cannot
construct works which will impede this natural flow, unless he
provides an alternative method of drainage; neither can the owner
of the higher estate make works which will increase this natural
flow.marinellaAs worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a
natural easement upon the lower estate to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from higher
states. However, where the waters which flow from a higher state
are those which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any
damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or
servient estate to compensation.[9]On the basis of the foregoing
discussion, it is crystal clear that REMMAN is directly accountable
to Lat for the damages sustained by him. The negligence of REMMAN
in maintaining the level of waste water in its lagoons has been
satisfactorily established. The extent of damages suffered by Lat
remains unrebutted; in fact, has been proved.
RELOVA v. LAVAREZ- Easement and Servitude
The enjoyment of the plaintiff of an easement for the
maintenance of an irrigation aqueduct and a dam on the lands of
defendant for a period of more than 20 years confers title thereto
upon the plaintiff by virtue of prescription and burdens the lands
of the defendants with a corresponding servitude.
FACTS: The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of rice land which
is cultivated with the aid of water brought from a river through an
aqueduct which passes over the land of the defendants. This was by
virtue of an easement the use of which had been with the plaintiff
for more than thirty years. On the land of the defendants there was
a dam with a small gate or aperture in its face which was used to
control the flow of the water in the aqueduct, by permitting a
greater or less quantity to escape in a drainage ditch, also on the
land of the defendants.
One of the defendants completely destroyed the dam and let all
the water escape by the drainage ditch, so that none flowed on the
land of the plaintiff. At the time when the dam was destroyed the
plaintiff had some five cavanes of land prepared to plant rice, but
because of the escape of the water resulting from the destruction
of the dam he was unable to raise his crop. Defendants claim that
the plaintiff is not the owner of any lands watered by the aqueduct
of the class known as padagat (rice lands planted in May). It was
also alleged that the plaintiff suffered no damage by the
destruction of the dam, because all the lands of plaintiff which
are cultivated with the aid of water from the aqueduct are of the
class known as binanbang (rice lands planted in August or
September), and the destruction of the dam in May and the
consequent failure of water in the aqueduct at that period did not,
and could not, damage the plaintiff or interfere with the proper
cultivation of his lands.
Lastly, defendants say that that the evidence on record does not
establish the existence of the servitude in the lands of the
defendants in favor of the lands of the plaintiff landowner for the
maintenance of the aqueduct and dam in question.
ISSUE:Whether or not there was a valid servitude between the
parties.
HELD:Save for the issue on the existence of the servitude, all
other allegations of defendants were outrightly disregarded as they
were clearly unmeritorious in light of the findings of fact.
However, the Court ruled that there was a valid easement in light
of the fact that the aqueduct and the dam had been in existence for
more than 30 years, during which time the plaintif had exercised
its use. It was alleged that no benefit was granted to the
plaintiff since his (plaintiff's) land is situated higher than
defendants' land. Moreover, even if defendants had the right to
open the gates of the dam to prevent destructive overflow upon
their land, this does not give them the right to stop the flow of
water altogether.
In this case the servient estate was the higher one.
Valisno v. Adriano161 SCRA 398
DOCTRINE: Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage
ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of
land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance
FACTS: Plaintiff Valisno file against the Defendant Adriano an
action for damages. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff is the
absolute owner and actual possessor of a parcel of land in Nueva
Ecija. Plaintiff bought the land from the defendants sister,
Honorata. Both parcels of land had been inherited by defendant and
her sister from their father. At the time of the sale of the land
to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River
through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing the appellee's
land. Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that
Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from
cultivating his 57-hectare land. Plaintiff Adriano filed in the
Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for
deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff. Defendant asked for a reinvestigation of the case
and was granted. Meanwhile, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the
irrigation canal at his own expense because of urgency. He also
filed a complaint for damages in the CFI against respondent.
Defendant Adriano claims that he merely allowed his sister to use
his water rights when she still owned the adjacent land. According
to the appellant, the water right was the primary consideration for
his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property
would be unproductive. ISSUE: WON the water rights pass with the
conveyance of the land. -- YES HELD:Water rights, such as the right
to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the
land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The
purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across
the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied
by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have
qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its
permanency as property right, which survives the determination of
the necessity. As an easement of waters in favor of the plaintiff
has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from
obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference such as the
appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of
the use of water from the Pampanga River.
Case Digest on NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)Plaintiff
National Power Corporation (Napocor), for the construction of its
230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, its lines have to pass the
lands belonging to respondents Matias Cruz, heirs of Natalie Paule
and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Recardo Malit. Unsuccessful
with its negotiations for the acquisition of the right of way
easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain
proceedings. Trial courts ordered that the defendant spouses were
authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in
the sum of P973.00 deposited by the plaintiff to cover the
provisional value of the land to proceed their construction and for
the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due the
defendants, the court appointed three commissioners, comprised of
one representative of the plaintiff, one for the defendants and the
other from the court, who then were empowered to receive evidence,
conduct ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare
their appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to be paid to
the owners of the lots. The lower court rendered judgement ordered
Napocor to pay defendant spouses the sum of P10.00 per square meter
as the fair and reasonable compensation for the right-of-way
easement of the affected area and P800.00 as attorney's fees'.
Napocor filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
Court of Appeals committed gross error by adjudging the petitioner
liable for the payment of the full market value of the land
traversed by its transmission lines, and that it overlooks the
undeniable fact that a simple right-of-way easemen transmits no
rights, except that of the easement. ISSUE: Whether or not
petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full
compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines.
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the power of
eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of the title
to, and possession of, the expropriated property, but no cogent
reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only
a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of
title or possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of
way." In this case, the easement is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation of the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by
the NPC against the use of the land (that no plant higher than 3
meters is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period
deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these
reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a
just compensation which should neither be more nor less, whenever
it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of
said property. Just equivalent has always been understood to be the
just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the
thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.
The price or value of the land and its character at the time of
taking by the Govt. are the criteria for determining just
compensation.
Costabella Corp. v. CA193 SCRA 333
DOCTRINE:An easement of right of way is discontinuous and as
such cannot be acquired by prescription. Convenience of the
dominant estate is not a gauge for the grant of compulsary right of
way.
While a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the
dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary
choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon
two criteria: (1) at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and (2) where the distance to a public highway may be the
shortest.
FACTS: Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing
their beach hotel. Before such construction, the private
respondent, in going to and from their respective properties and
the provincial road, passed through a passageway, which traversed
the petitioners property. As a result of the construction, this
passageway, including the alternative route, was obstructed.
Private respondent filed for injunction plus damages. In the same
complaint the private respondents also alleged that the petitioner
had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latters property
without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the
residents and local fishermen, and trapping debris of flotsam on
the beach. The private respondent also claim that they have
acquired the right of way through prescription. They prayed for the
re-opening of the ancient road right of way (what they called the
supposed easement in this case) and the destruction of the dike.
Petitioner answered by saying that their predecessor in interests
act of allowing them to pass was gratuitous and in fact, they were
just tolerating the use of the private respondents. CA ruled in
favor of the private respondents.
ISSUES:1. Whether or not easement of right and way can be
acquired through prescription? -- NO2. Whether or not the private
respondents had acquired an easement of right of way in the form of
a passageway, on the petitioners property? -- NO HELD:1. Easement
of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to
acquisitive prescription.
2. One may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has
proven the: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2)
proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to
acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way
claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The
private respondent failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet
from their respective properties to a public highway; in fact the
lower court confirmed that there is another outlet for the private
respondents to the main road (yet they ruled in favor of the
private respondents).
Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience
of the dominant estate was never a gauge for the grant of
compulsory right of way. There must be a real necessity and not
mere convenience for the dominant estate to acquire such easement.
Also, the private respondents made no mention of their intention to
indemnify the petitioners. The SC also clarified that least
prejudicial prevails over shortest distance (so shortest distance
isnt necessarily the best choice).
EDWIN CASE,petitioner-appellant,vs.THE HEIRS OF TUASON Y
SANTIBAEZ,opponents-appellees.Hartigan and Rohde, and Roman Lacson
for appellant.Rosado, Sanz and Opisso for appellees.TORRES,J.:On
the 7th of December, 1906, the attorneys for Edwin Case filed a
petition with the Court of Land Registration requesting that the
property owned by the applicant, described in the petition, be
registered in accordance with the provisions of Land Registration
Act. After a written opposition was presented by Felipe R.
Caballero on the 6th of June, 1907, on behalf of the heirs of late
Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibaez, counsel for the applicant,
Case, on August 2, 1907, amended the original petition and set
forth: that said property, situated in Calle Escolta, district of
Binondo, consists of a parcel of land and the building erected
thereon bearing Nos. 142 and 152; it is bounded on the northwest,
approximately, by the estero of Santa Cruz and the property of
Carmen de Ayala de Roxas; on the southeast by the River Pasig; on
the southwest by the property of the heirs of Tuason and Santibaez;
and on the northwest by Calle Escolta and the aforesaid property of
Carmen de Ayala de Roxas; that the total area is 3,251.84 square
meters, its description and boundaries being detailed in the plan
attached to the petition; that according to the last assessment
made for the purposes of taxation the land was valued at P170,231
and the buildings thereon at P30,000; that the property is free
from all incumbrance, and no one has any interest therein or right
thereto; that on the northeast side the property has in its favor
the right of easement over some 234.20 square meters of land owned
by the said Ayala de Roxas, and that the applicant acquired the
property by succession from Doa Clotilde Romree.In the written
opposition above alluded to, counsel for the heirs of Pablo Tuason
and Leocadia Santibaez alleged that the parties whom he represents
are owners in common of the property adjoining that of the
petitioner on the southwest; that the latter, in making the plan
attached to his petition, extended his southwest boundary line to a
portion of the lot of the said heirs of Tuason and Santibaez in the
form indicated by the red line in the annexed plan; that the true
dividing line between the property of the petitioner and that of
the said heirs is the walls indicated in black ink on the
accompanying plan; that said walls belong to the opponents, and
that about two years ago, when the applicant made alterations in
the buildings erected on his land, he improperly caused a portion
of them to rest on the wall owned by the parties whom he
represents, at point 12, 13, and 14 of said plan; for which reason
the opponent prayed the court to direct the applicant to amend the
line marked in his plan with the letters Y, X, U, T, S, and R, so
that it may agree with the wall indicated by the numbers 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 on the plan which
accompanies the written opposition, reducing the area to whatever
it may be after the amendment has been made; that the applicant be
compelled to remove the supports that he placed for his buildings
on the wall of the representatives of the petitioner, and that he
be sentenced to pay the costs.The case was brought to trial, both
parties adduced evidence, and their exhibits were made of record.
The court, assisted by the interested parties and their respective
experts, made an inspection of the two properties, in view of which
it entered judgment on the 31st of July, 1908, sustaining the
opposition offered by the representative of the heirs of Pablo
Tuason Leocadia Santibaez, and after declaring a general default
granted the registration of the property described in the
application filed by Edwin Case, with the exclusion of the wall
claimed by the opponents and shown on their plan by the lines
numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14; and in
view of the fact that the lines drawn on the plan offered in
evidence by the applicant under letter G are not correctly drawn,
once this decision shall have become final, let the dividing line
of both properties be fixed by common accord between the two
parties and their experts, taking as a base for the same the
amended line of walls drawn on the plan of the opponents, but
should they not reach an agreement a surveyor of the Court of Land
Registration shall be detailed to fix the same at the expense of
the parties; the court also ordered the cancellation of the
registration entries of the property entered in the name of
Clotilde Romree, principal of the petitioner, at page 142 and those
following of volume 15, section of Binondo and 52 of the register,
property No. 828, first entry.On the 12th of August, 1908, the
petitioner moved for a new trial on the ground that the evidence
was not sufficient to justify the decision of the court in
excluding the wall claimed by the opponents; that said decision was
contrary to the law, in so far as it excludes the said wall, and
that the conclusions of fact therein are openly and manifestly
contrary to the weight of the evidence in so far as they referred
to the exclusion of said wall. The said motion was overruled on the
15th of same month, to which overruling the applicant excepted and
announced his intention to perfect the corresponding bill of
exceptions which was filed, approved, and submitted to this court
together with the proper assignment of errors.In the appeal
interposed by the applicant against the decision of the Court of
Land Registration, now before this court, the questions set up are
merely of fact.The question is whether the wall that with slight
interruption runs from Calle Escolta to the River Pasig, and which
divides the adjoining properties of the applicant, Edwin Case, and
of the opponents, belongs to the former, as he claimed in the first
instance, or is a dividing wall as affirmed in his brief in this
second instance, or is the property of the said opponents, the
heirs of the late Tuason and Santibaez.lawphi1.netThe trial court
after considering the evidence adduced by both parties to the suit,
found that the wall in controversy belongs to the opponents for the
reason, among others, that in the public document by which one of
their original ancestors acquired on the 19th of April, 1796, the
property now possessed by them, it appears that property was then
already inclosed by a stone wall. This document, which was offered
in evidence by the opponents, has not been impugned by the
applicant. On the contrary, it was acknowledge as the title deed of
the property adjoining that of the applicant by the witness Juan B.
Tuason, who knows the one and the other.It is fully proven that two
walls extend from Calle Escolta to the interior of both properties,
the one backing the other, and which respectively support the
edifices of the petitioner and of the opponents from points 36, 35,
34, 33, 32, 31, and 30 on the plan of the petitioner corresponding
to points 1 to 6 on that of the opponents.This section of the wall
of the opponents embraced within the points mentioned in the plans
offered in evidence by the parties, for very reason that it
supports only the property of the opponents and not that of the
petitioner, can not be a party wall, one-half of which along its
entire length would belong to the adjoining building owned by Mr.
Case. There is not sufficient proof to sustain such claim, and
besides, the building erected thereon disproves the pretension of
the petitioner.It should, however, be noted that the portion of the
wall between the numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6 on the plan of the
opponents, which corresponds to numbers 33, 32, 31, and 30 of that
of the petitioner, and which constitutes the cesspool on the
property of the latter, belongs to him, and it has so been admitted
by counsel for the opponents, for the reason that the petitioner
had acquired it by prescription, the opponents having lost control
over the area of land covered by the said cesspool together with
the walls that inclose it.Under article 572 of the Civil Code the
easement of party walls is presumed, unless there is a title or
exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among others, in dividing
walls adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation.The
legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three cases
dealt with in the said article of the code, and is that ofjuris
tantumunless the contrary appear from the title of ownership of the
adjoining properties, that is to say, that the entire wall in
controversy belongs to one of the property owners, or where there
is no exterior sign to destroy such presumption and support a
presumption against the party wall.lawphi1.net(Art. 573, Civil
Code.)The intermediate portion of the walls in question, lying
between numbers 6 and 13 on the defendants' plan, equivalent to a
little more than numbers 30 to 25 on the plan of the petitioner, is
the portion against which no other wall appears to have been
erected on the land owned by Mr. Case. In spite of this it can not
be presumed that the aforesaid portion was a party wall, and that
it was not exclusively owned by the defendants, inasmuch as the
latter have proven by means of a good title that has not been
impugned by the petitioner, that when one of their ancestors and
principals acquired the property the lot was already inclosed by
the wall on which the building was erected; it must therefore be
understood that in the purchase of the property the wall by which
the land was inclosed was necessarily included.The above
documentary evidence has not been overcome by any other presented
by the petitioner, but apart from that record discloses the
existence of certain unquestionable signs. These consist of
constructions made by the petitioner himself on his own property
which entirely destroy any presumption that it is a party wall, and
indeed gives rise to a presumption against it.Three openings have
been made in the wall , undoubtedly to allow the passage of air and
light. Two of them are beveled on the side toward the land of the
objectors, and the third has recently been beveled on the other. A
rafter or lintel was found imbedded in the wall on the side of the
property of the opponents. These things constitute exterior signs
and were recorded as the result of personal inspection by the trial
court in company with the experts of both parties. These signs
positively and conclusively prove that the said wall is not a party
wall, but the exclusive property of the defendant. This is further
confirmed by the testimony of the witnesses at the trial.The fact
that the petitioner built a wall and backed it against the one in
question to support the edifice he had constructed between points
21 and 13 of the corrected plan is a further indication that the
neighboring wall is not a party one. He knew perfectly well that he
had no right to rest his building on the latter. That he built a
terrace about four years previously over the wall between points
30, 29, 28, and 27 does not prove that the whole of the wall, from
the Escolta to the River Pasig, is a party wall, but it does show
that he usurped a portion thereof to the prejudice of the real
owner.Neither can it be presumed that that part of the wall
bordering on the River Pasig comprised between points 13 and 14 is
a party wall. It was shown in the proceedings as resulting from the
above-mentioned ocular inspection that the side of the said wall,
which is rather a low one, there is another, a higher one erected
on the petitioner's land and backed against the one in question.
The first one, as has been said, forms part of that which has
surrounded the property from the date of its acquisition, more than
a century ago, until the present date. It is absolutely independent
of that built by the petitioner, and that it is the exclusive
property of the objectors and is not a party wall can not be
denied.It therefore appears from the proceedings that, with the
exception of the small portion of the wall in question occupied by
the latrine on the property of the petitioner, and which the
opponents admit that he has acquired by prescription, the whole of
said wall from the Escolta to the River Pasig can not be presumed
to be a party wall; the evidence to the contrary conclusively
proves that it belonged exclusively to the defendants, and it has
been further shown in the case that at one time an old building
belonging to the opponents used to rest on a portion of the wall
near the river.lawphi1.netIn view of the foregoing, and considering
that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law and
the merits of the case, it is our opinion that the same should be
affirmed in full, as we do hereby affirm it, with the costs against
the petitioner. So ordered.VALENZUELA VS UNSON32 PHIL 19 OCTOBER
20, 1915
PONENTE: Johnson, J.:
FACTS: On December 11, 1912, the plaintiffs presented a petition
in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of 34
parcels of land in Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna. With such,
respondents Pedro Unson and Felix Unson presented their opposition
to the registration of a portion of lot No. 1 which portion is
known as lot No. 1-A, representing a stone wall, simply,
constructed between lot No. 1 and the lot belonging to the said
objectors. This wall extends from the street running in front of
the lots owned by the plaintiffs and defendants, between said lots,
for a distance of about thirty meters. It is about 38 centimeters
wide and separates the lots claimed by the parties. At intervals
along the wall, there are buttresses, which are constructed on both
sides of the wall. About midway between the street and the rear end
of the lots, resting on the wall, there is a kitchen belonging to
the defendants which is about forty years old. About 8 meters from
the street there is a cross wall, on the property of the plaintiff,
which is joined to the wall in question. Along the street and in
front of the lots, there is a sidewalk which is in front of the
properties wherein it divides on the plaintiffs side of the wall.
The wall appears to have been built as one wall. The plaintiffs
attempt to show, in support of their claim of ownership of the wall
that the kitchen referred to above was built so as to rest upon the
wall, by the express permission given by them to the objectors, or
their predecessors. That fact is strongly denied by the objectors.
They claim that the kitchen was built without permission and
without the objection on the part of the plaintiffs. Later a motion
for a rehearing was made by the petitioners. Upon a consideration
of said motion, the lower court, on the 15th day of December, 1913,
modified that part of its first decision relating to lot No. 1-A,
and declared that the same was a party wall. The lower court did
not decree the registration of the wall. From the decision the
objectors appealed to this court. The petitioners did not
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said wall belongs to the petitioners
and registrable in their name.
HELD: No. Article 572 of the civil code states that When there
is no title or exterior marks or proofs to the contrary, there is a
presumption that a dividing wall between two adjoining properties
is a party wall. Considering the fact that both parties have used
the wall for the purpose of supporting the structures on their
respective lots, that the plaintiffs have a wall joined to the wall
in question and that they and the defendants have used as a partial
support for the kitchen, and considering the conflicting character
of the testimony with respect to ownership of the wall, we are of
opinion that the said wall is a party wall that it belongs to the
petitioners and objectors jointly. One of two or more joint owners
of land cannot have the same registered against the opposition of
the other joint owners.
DECISION: The judgment of lower court be affirmed without any
finding as to costs, so ordered.
Cortes v. Yu-Tibo2 Phil. 24
DOCTRINE: An easement of light and view is a negative easement.
When easement is negative, there should be a formal act of
opposition for prescription to run. FACTS:Cortes wife owns a house
(No. 65) in which certain windows open on the adjacent property
(No. 63), a neighboring house on the same street. This setting has
been in existent since 1843. The tenant of the adjacent property
raised the roof of house No. 63 in such a manner that half of the
windows of house No. 65 has been covered, thus depriving it of a
large part of air and light. Plaintiff contends that by the
constant and uninterrupted use of the windows for 59 years, he
acquired from prescription an easement of light in favor of house
No. 65, and as a servitude upon house No. 63. Consequently, he has
acquired the right to restrain the making of any improvement in the
latter house which may be prejudicial to the enjoyment of the
easement. Further, he contends that the easement of light is
positive; and that therefore the period of possession for the
purposes of the acquisition of a prescriptive title is to begin
from the date on which the enjoyment of the same commenced, or, in
other words, from the time that said windows were opened with the
knowledge of the owner of the house No. 63, and without opposition
on this part. Defendant contends that the easement is negative, and
therefore the time for the prescriptive acquisition must begin from
the date on which the owner of the dominant estate may have
prohibited, by a formal act, the owner of the servient estate from
doing something which would be lawful but for the existence of the
easement. Lower court ruled in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff
appealed the case. ISSUE:WON the easement is positive/negative
HELD:Easement is negative. The easement of light which is the
object of this litigation is of a negative character, and therefore
pertains to the class which cannot be acquired by prescription as
provided by article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting the
time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant
estate has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient
estate to do an act which would be lawful were it not for the
easement. In consequence, the plaintiff, not having executed any
formal act of opposition to the right of the owner of house No. 63
to make improvements which might obstruct the light of house No.
65, at any time prior to the complaint, has not acquired, nor could
he acquire by prescription, such easement of light, no matter how
long a time have elapsed. Because the period which the law demands
for such prescriptive acquisition could not have commenced to run,
the act with which it must necessarily commence not having been
performed.
Ruling 2 -GENERAL RULE: No part owner can, without the consent
of the other, make in a party wall a window or opening of any kind
(Art. 580) The very fact of making such opening in such a wall may
be the basis for acquisition of a prescriptive title without the
necessity of any active opposition because it always presupposes
the express or implied consent of the owner of the wall, which in
time, implies a voluntary waiver of the right to oppose.EXCEPTION:
When the windows are not opened on the neighbor's side, there is
need of a prohibition from exercising that neighbor's right to
build on his land or cover the closed window on the party wall. The
period of prescription starts to run from such prohibition if the
neighbor consents to it. Note: The law refers to all kinds of
windows, even regulation windows. According to article 528, windows
with "similar projections" include sheds. The exception applies in
this case because1) what is concerned is a party wall;2) there was
no prohibition on Yu-Tibo to build anything that would cover the
Cortes' window (Yu-Tibo wanted to raise his roof which would in
effect cover 1/2 of the window).
AMOR v. FLORENTINO- Easement
FACTS:Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse).
By a will, she transferred the house to Jose Florentino and the
warehouse to Maria Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse to Amor.
Amor then demolished the old warehouse in order to build a new
2-storey structure. The problem is it will shut off the light and
air that come in through the window of the adjacent house owned by
Jose. Hence the latter files for prohibition claiming there is a
negative easement prohibiting Amor from constructing any structure
at any height that would block the window. Amor counters that there
is no easement. Moreover, since the death of testator was before
the Civil Code took effect, the rules on easement do not apply.
ISSUE:1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor
from doing said construction.2. Whether or not the Civil Code may
be applied
RULING:1. Yes. Easement are established by law or by will of the
owners or by title. Under Art. 624, there is title by the doctrine
of apparent sign. When the estate is subsequently owned by two
different persons and the service (it cannot be an easement before
the transfer) is not revoked in the title nor removed, an easement
is established.The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor because it
involved acquisition by prescription. Art. 624 is acquisition by
title.
2. Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator occurred
before the effectivity of the Old Civil Code. The facts show that
it happened after the effectivity of the said code so the law on
easement is already applicable. In any case, even if we assume
Amors supposition, the law on easement was already integrated into
the Spanish Law and in fact, had been established by
Jurisprudence.Therefore, Amor is prohibitied from constructing the
warehouse above the level of the window.
DISSENTING OPINION OF OZAETA.1) The Majority opinio committed a
travesty on justice when it ignored the evidence produced by Amor
that the testators death occurred before the effectivity of the
Code.
2) Hence, the law on easement will not apply. Moreover, the
Spanish Law and the Partidas provided for only three ways of
acquiring easements: 1) contract 2) testament 3) prescription.
There was no provision similar to the doctrine of apparent
sign.
3) There is no doctrine established by the Spanish Tribunal
regarding the doctrine.
4) In this modern age of flourescent lights and air conditioning
devices, the easement of light and view would be obsolete and
deterrent to economic progress especially when in the cities,
buildings are side to side with each other.
Gargantos v. Tan Yanon108 Phil. 888
Doctrine: Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were
formerly owned by one person who introduced improvements on both
such that the wall of the house constructed on the first estate
extends to the wall of the warehouse on the second estate; and at
the time of the sale of the first estate, there existed on the
aforementioned wall of the house, doors, windows which serve as
passages for light and view, there being no provision in the deed
of sale that the easement of light and view will not be
established, the apparent sign of easement between the two estates
is established as a title. FACTS: The late Francisco Sanz was the
previous owner of a land which he subdivided into several lots. One
lot was sold to Guillermo Tengtio, who sold to Vicente Uy Veza.
Another lot with a house constituted thereon was sold to Tan Yanon.
A third portion with a warehouse was sold to Gargantos. The problem
arose when Gargantos asked from the Municipality for a permit to
demolish the warehouse in order to construct a higher one. Tan
Yanon opposed the application for it would block his window and
impair his right of light and view. Both the provincial fiscal and
district engineer of Romblon recommended granting of the building
permit to Gargantos. Tan Yanon then filed against Gargantos an
action to restrain him from constructing a building that would
prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view
through the window of his house, unless such building is erected at
a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line
between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the
members of Municipal Council of Romblon from issuing the
corresponding building permit to defendant. ISSUE: Whether the
property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view
against the property of petitioner Gargantos. -- YES HELD: Art. 624
provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly owned by one
person who introduced improvements on both such that the wall of
the house constructed on the first estate extends to the wall of
the warehouse on the second estate; and at the time of the sale of
the first estate, there existed on the aforementioned wall of the
house, doors, windows which serve as passages for light and view,
there being no provision in the deed of sale that the easement of
light and view will not be established, the apparent sign of
easement between the two estates is established as a title.
RONQUILLO vs. ROCO- Easement of Right of Way
Easements of right of way may not be acquired by prescription
because it is not a continuous easement.
FACTS:Petitioners parcel of land was connected to the Naga
Market Place and Igualdad St. by an easement of a right of way
through the land of the Respondents, which they have been using for
more than 20 years. On May 1953, however, respondents built a
chapel right in the middle of the road, blocking their usual path
to the marketplace. One year after, by means of force,
intimidation, and threats, the owners (respondents) of the land
where the easement was situated, planted wooden posts and fenced
with barbed wires the road, closing their right of way from their
house to Igualdad St. and Naga public market.
ISSUE:Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be
acquired by prescription?
HELD: No.Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and
apparent easements may be acquired by prescription. The easement of
a right of way cannot be considered continuous because its use is
at intervals and is dependent on the acts of man.
Minority Opinion (including the ponente):Easements of right of
way may already be acquired by prescription, at least since the
introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law on
prescription through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190.
Said law, particularly, Section 41 thereof, makes no distinction as
to the real rights which are subject to prescription, and there
would appear to be no valid reason, at least to the writer of this
opinion, why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way
by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not
by mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use
of it, cannot give said party a vested right to such right of way
through prescription.
The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way
necessary to constitute adverse possession does not require the use
thereof every day for the statutory period, but simply the exercise
of the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the
use. (17 Am. Jur. 972)"It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even
discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by prescription, provided
it can be shown that the servitude was actual, open, public,
continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and
adverse to all other claimants'.
Valisno v. Adriano161 SCRA 398
DOCTRINE: Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage
ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of
land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not
specifically mentioned in the conveyance
FACTS: Plaintiff Valisno file against the Defendant Adriano an
action for damages. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff is the
absolute owner and actual possessor of a parcel of land in Nueva
Ecija. Plaintiff bought the land from the defendants sister,
Honorata. Both parcels of land had been inherited by defendant and
her sister from their father. At the time of the sale of the land
to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River
through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing the appellee's
land. Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that
Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from
cultivating his 57-hectare land. Plaintiff Adriano filed in the
Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for
deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff. Defendant asked for a reinvestigation of the case
and was granted. Meanwhile, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the
irrigation canal at his own expense because of urgency. He also
filed a complaint for damages in the CFI against respondent.
Defendant Adriano claims that he merely allowed his sister to use
his water rights when she still owned the adjacent land. According
to the appellant, the water right was the primary consideration for
his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property
would be unproductive. ISSUE: WON the water rights pass with the
conveyance of the land. -- YES HELD:Water rights, such as the right
to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the
land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The
purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across
the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied
by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have
qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its
permanency as property right, which survives the determination of
the necessity. As an easement of waters in favor of the plaintiff
has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from
obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference such as the
appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of
the use of water from the Pampanga River.
Benedicto v. CA25 SCRA 145
DOCTRINE: The easement is perpetual in character and was
annotated on all the transfer certificates of title issued to Heras
and to Benedicto. Absence of anything that would show mutual
agreement to extinguish the easement, the easement persists.
FACTS:Heras filed an action with the Court of First Instance to
recover a portion of land enclosed and walled by Benedicto and to
demand the reopening of an easement of way between his and
Benedictos real property. Hendrick sold portions of her property to
several personalities including Recto and Heras. When portion of
the property was sold to Herras, he closed and walled the part of
land serving as easement of way. Trial court found that the
easement of way was found entirely within Benedictos property
contrary to the stipulation in the deed of sale between Hedrick and
Recto that it should be between their properties with each
contributing an equal portion of his property. Thus, trial court
directed the parties to equally contribute to the maintenance of
the passageway between Herras and Benedicto. ISSUE:Whether or not
Benedicto may enclose his property. HELD:In this case, the easement
is perpetual in character and was annotated on all the transfer
certificates of title issued to Heras and to Benedicto. Absence of
anything that would show mutual agreement to extinguish the
easement, the easement persists.
TKDCBenedicto v. CA25 SCRA 145
DOCTRINE: Under Art. 624, an easement may continue by operation
of law. Alienation of the dominant and servient estates to
different persons is not a ground for the extinguishment of
easements, absent a statement extinguishing it. FACTS:Private
respondent Antonio Cardenas was the owner of 2 parcels of land
situated in Cebu City. An apartment building was constructed on Lot
A, while on Lot B stands a 4-door apartment, a 2-storey house, a
bodega, and a septic tank for the common use of the occupants of
Lots A and B. A small portion of the apartment building on Lot A
also stands on Lot B. Cardenas sold Lot A to petitioner Eduardo C.
Taedo. On the same day, Cardenas also mortgaged Lot B to Taedo as a
security for the payment of a loan. Cardenas agreed that he would
sell Lot B only to Taedo in case he should decide to sell it.
However, Cardenas sold Lot B to the respondent spouses Romeo and
Pacita Sim. Upon learning of the sale, Taedo offered to redeem the
property from Romeo Sim, but the latter refused. Instead, Sim
blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Taedo
built on Lot A, to the septic tank in Lot B. He also asked Taedo to
remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot B. As a
result, Taedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages
against Spouses Sim and Antonio Cardenas, invoking the provisions
of Art. 1622 of the Civil Code. Respondent judge, Juanito A.
Bernad, dismissed the complaint for legal redemption, as well as
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari. ISSUE:W/N the alienation of Lots A and B is a
ground for the extinguishment of the easement of drainage. -- NO
HELD:The finding of the trial court that Taedo's right to continue
to use the septic tank on Lot B ceased upon the subdivision of the
land and its subsequent sale to different owners who do not have
the same interest, also appears to be contrary to law. Article 631
of the Civil Code enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of
an easement. From its provisions, the alienation of the dominant
and servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds
for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the
easement is continued by operation of law. Article 624 of the Civil
Code provides: Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates, established or maintained by the
owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be
alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue
actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the
two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the
title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should
be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall
also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by
two or more persons. In the instant case, no statement abolishing
or extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed
of sale of Lot A to Taedo. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the
drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot A before he sold
said lot. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by
operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the
new owners of the servient estate (Lot B), cannot impair, in any
manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.