1 EAS205 Autumn Semester 2013- 2014 1 EAS205 Autumn Semester 2015- 2016 Wednesday 3 rd February 9:00-12:00 in Philadelphia Conference Centre Next week’s seminar is an exam revision session Exam
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Wednesday 3rd February
9:00-12:00 in Philadelphia Conference Centre
Next week’s seminar is an exam revision session
Exam
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UNIT 10 UNIT 10 ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY: ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY: STATE AND EMPERORSTATE AND EMPEROR 2
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Akihito actually do?
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Aim
To examine the degree to which the state and emperor continue to serve as a source for Japanese identity and nationalism in the post-1945 period.
To evaluate the Showa emperor’s wartime responsibility and his new role as a ‘symbol’ monarch.
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Objectives:
1) To analyse the difference in the political and legal position of the emperor in the pre-war and post-war Japanese state,
2) To assess the relevance of the emperor and state as a source for post-war identity and nationalism,
3) To introduce the problem of ‘war responsibility’ and its relationship with the state, emperor and the post-war ‘symbol’ monarch, and
4) To look at the debate over the succession issue.
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Position of the emperor
• Japanese law, politics and society have changed dramatically during the history of the imperial household so as the position of the emperor in Japanese society.
• At the start of the Meiji era there was a need to:• build up the nation.• make Japan strong militarily and economically
( 富国強兵 fukoku kyōhei).• ...but, first there was the necessity to create a
sense of nation.
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following the West• The leaders of the new Japan needed a
symbolic centre for a Japanese identity.• They had seen the might of the West with the
advance of the West’s military forces into East Asia.
• Stories brought back to Japan by the Iwakura Mission, which visited the centres of politicial, military, economic and industrial power from 1871-73 (the mission visited Sheffield in 1872),
• They were determined to become a modern state centred on a symbol relevant to the whole nation.
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Iwakura Mission in Britain
The principal British cities and areas they visited were: London, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Edinburgh, the Scottish Highlands, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Bradford, Halifax, Sheffield, Burton-upon-Trent, Birmingham, Coventry, Warwick, Worcester and Chester.
Cultural Enlightenment for Imperial nation building
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nationalism’s vehicle
The emperor became a vehicle for nationalism to build:
•a national consciousness•the sense of all Japanese belonging to one nation, and •a centralized, authoritarian state.
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powers• Meiji leaders placed the emperor at the centre of
the new state in order to: 1. Establish a symbol for creating a sense of the nation
and nationalism. 2. Emperor as the core of Japanese identity – vertical link
established between the ‘father’ (of the nation) and the ‘child’ (subject).
• Symbolic linkage to mobilize the people to build a prosperous country and strong military (fukoku-kyohei).
3. If necessary, the leaders used the symbol of the emperor to call on the people to...
• labour for and give their life to the state, so to ensure survival and prosperity of Japan in the midst of the Western imperial carve up of East Asia (soon J. joined).
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Creating a sense of nation
• The Meiji government tried to bind the people to the state by: • Building on the ancient concept of the nation as
a family.• This fitted in with a hierarchical relationship
between the emperor and the people. • The emperor in particular, and the imperial
family in general, were at the head of the Japanese family in a symbolic sense.
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Deification of the emperor
• The Meiji leaders constructed the new sense of nation based on the idea that Japan is an imperial family state: • A primordial consanguineous community, all
united by lineage to the emperor, who was the incarnation of kami (god): 現人神 (arahito-gami).
Art.3 of the Meiji constitution declares him to be "sacred and inviolable”.
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and post-war periods• The position of the emperor in the prewar
period was legally established by the Imperial (or Meiji) Constitution of 1889.
• The Meiji constitution was based on the sovereignty of the emperor (not people).
• Article 1 stated: • ‘The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and
governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal’.
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Japanese national identityUnbroken imperial line = Japanese identity
can be traced back historically, giving precedence to the historical basis of the imperial system.
Hence, promoted the idea of ethnicity as the basis for Japanese identity.
It suggests the idea of a homogenous nation, linked vertically back in time to other Japanese, not horizontally to other parts of East Asia, i.e., a multiethnic Japan
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Legal authority
• The Article 3 of the pre-war law: • ‘The person of the Emperor is sacred and
inviolable’—i.e. the emperor is the spiritual centre of the Japanese (head of the Shinto religion) and should not be criticized.
• The creation of a modern state by the Meiji leaders needed the trappings of a modern state. • Give symbolic representation to Japan and
Japanese identity in international society.
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The national flag
• The Hi no Maru (circle of the sun), aka Nisshoki, represents the rising sun, may be linked to the sun goddess in Japanese ancient mythology: Amaterasu Omikami.
• Used on Tokugawa vessels. • Officially designated as the Japanese flag in 1870
for ships. • Used on government buildings from 1872.
The proportions of the two elements, theWhite background and the red circle, areofficially defined in the Law Concerning the National Flag and Anthem (1999)
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Kimigayo
• Music: originally written in 1869 by the British navy band instructor, John William Fenton, who encouraged Japan to adopt a ceremonial music or a national anthem.
• The melody was“too western” Yoshiisa Oku of the Imperial House Music Office recomposed.
• Oku’s version was adopted and played on the emperor’s birthday in 1880.
• Lyrics: a poem figuring in Kokin-waka-shû ( 古今和歌集 , 905 or 912 AD)
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Kimigayo
Kimi ga yo wa,
Chiyo ni,
Yachiyo ni,
Sazare ishi no,
Iwao to narite,
Koke no musu made.
May the Emperor’s reign,
Continue for a thousand,
Eight thousand generations;
Until the pebbles,
Grow into boulders,
Lush with moss.
*kimi: an honorific form of ‘you’. cf. ‘vous’.
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Legislated: imposed?
• The emperor, the national flag and anthem, were used to construct and consolidate Japanese identity.
• They were also used to promote Japanese nationalism.
• Unlike being custom as with the Union Jack as the national flag of the United Kingdom, the Hinomaru was recently legislated.
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014The emperor’s position
within the polity: Central • The government was subordinate to the emperor.
He was:• The supreme commander of Japanese military
forces.• The final arbiter of the national will.
• The emperor enjoying these enormous powers, the idea of kokutai developed:• National polity, in which the emperor, the people,
and the land of the gods were allegedly united in both time and space.
• This kokutai ideology was central in viewing the nation as having consanguineous unity, where all are linked together through the imperial blood.
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014Emperor as the centre of
Japanese national identity• With these changes in the position of the emperor
following the Meiji Restoration, he became the equivalent of a powerful European ruler.
• The attempt to build a sense of being tied to the emperor and Japanese national identity was also promoted in Okinawa.• ...as symbolized by the introduction of portraits of
the Meiji emperor and empress in 1887 (earlier than in other prefectures).
• An attempt to ensure loyalty to Japan, not to China.
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After return, assimilation
• Certain forces in Okinawa still sympathetic to the idea of being a tributary state of China, although:• Okinawa was annexed in 1879 to Japan as one of its
prefectures.• Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5.
• The policy of assimilation from both the Japanese state and some local political and social forces in Okinawa, meant that:• Over time, Okinawa was incorporated into Japanese
national identity.• Okinawans were discriminated and not fully
integrated into the Japanese national identity.
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nationalism • Under the postwar Constitution,
• The position of the emperor was changed to become the ‘symbol of the Japanese nation’,
• Emperor was no longer sovereign.
• Interestingly, the present emperor, Akihito, has challenged the very foundation of Japanese ethnic identity:• He declared that there was a blood link with
Korea, not of pure blood lineage going back time immemorial.
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Little public response
• Little debate in the wake of the emperor’s statement in the Japanese media reflects:• Recognition of the Japanese people that they and the
imperial household have historical link and ethnic links with the Korean peninsula.
• On the other hand, it may reflect: • A reluctance to think about Japanese identity outside
the context of ethnicity. • The persistence of the myth of Japanese exclusivity• For many, ethnocentric nationalism still centres on the
emperor, but... the new emperor was, in effect, suggesting the potential for a new national identity.
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014Symbols of Japanese
national identity• Japan had established a national flag and anthem
during the Meiji period.
• 1893 Children’s Songbook for the High-Holy-Days issued by the Ministry of Education (Shukujitsu-taisaijitsu-shôka)
• The flag (hinomaru) & anthem ((kimigayo) represented militarized, imperialist-expansionist Japan during WWII.
• Popular rejection of their use after WW II domestically / internationally (esp. In Asia).
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014Teachers’ opposition
to the flag• The flag used to represent the wartime Japan,
hence the flag does not deserve the respect of the people.
• However, the parliament, dominated by the conservative political forces of the LDP, insisted to fly the flag as a symbol of Japan in order to build up respect for the state and to nurture patriotism.
• With the gradual erosion of political opposition to the flag, LDP legislated Hinomaru recognized officially as the national flag by the passage of government legislation in 1999.
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Opposition to Kimigayo
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Official explanation
• PM Obuchi explained that:• Kimi in ‘Kimigayo’, under the current Constitution of
Japan, indicates the Emperor.
• ‘Kimigayo’ as a whole depicts the state of being of our country, with the Emperor. • Symbol of the country and of the unity of the people.• Deriving his position from the will of the people, with
whom resides sovereign power.• It is appropriate to interpret the words as praying for
the lasting prosperity and peace of the country.
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Tension at schools• Government attempted to incorporate the national
anthem (and the eternal nature of imperial rule) into democracy while holding people as sovereign. • Under 1999 legislation the MoE repeatedly tried to
compel schools to raise the flag and sing the anthem at school graduation ceremonies.
• representing a rise of nationalism in Japan. • creating serious friction between the School Board
requesting to follow these rules, the Head Teacher asking his teachers to implement them, and teachers, who may refuse it.
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Strong pressure in Tokyo
• Teachers and students must comply with the demands to raise the flag, stand when the flag is raised, and sing the national anthem
• Noncompliance can be punishable by pay cuts, being blacklisted, or, possibly, dismissal.
• No legal obligations to the teachers to comply, but the School Board insisted making the pupils and teachers to stand for kimigayo and hinomaru.
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Imperial nationalism?
• the 2011 Ordinance No. 83 passed by the Osaka Prefectural Assembly now obliges all school employees, including teachers, in Osaka to stand and sing when Kimi-ga-yo is played during school ceremonies.
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What for Okinawa?
• Longer period of American occupation (1945-72; while up to 1952 for the main islands)• There, the Japanese flag took on different meaning.• The flag was banned under US Occupation, except
for special holidays.• It became a symbol for Okinawans in their goal of
returning to the ‘motherland’.• A sign of resistance, a symbol of a way to bring an
end to the American occupation.• An expression of will to return to Japan, yet it was
not until 1879 that it (Ryukyu) was incorporated into Japan.
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Okinawa
• The Ministry of Education has called on schools in Okinawa (and mainland Japan) to raise the Japanese flag and sing the Japanese anthem.
• This has also caused resistance on the part of Okinawans opposing to a deeper assimilation into the Japanese state.
• As for the emperor, not only due to his role in the war, there was an opposition due to his statement on Okinawa immediately after the war.
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014The Showa emperor’s
statement• Emperor of Japan’s Opinion Concerning the
Future of the Ryukyu Islands. • ‘It will be noted that the Emperor of Japan hopes that
the United States will continue the military occupation of Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus, a hope which undoubtedly is largely based upon self-interest.
• The Emperor also envisages a continuation of United States military occupation of these islands through the medium of a long-term lease.
• In his opinion, the Japanese people would thereby be convinced that the United States has no ulterior motives and would welcome United States occupation for military purposes.’
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014War responsibility of the
Showa emperor• The Occupation of Japan by the Allied forces
brought up the question of the degree to which the emperor had responsibility for the war.• This has remained a point of controversy in
postwar Japan.• The creation of the ‘symbol’ emperor was the
product of a joint effort by SCAP General McArthur and the Japanese leadership.
• Both wished to use the power and authority inherent in the emperor for their own purposes.
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Never been tried
• While particularly on the left of the political spectrum, the Showa emperor Hirohito was regarded as ultimately responsible for the war.• His position in the Meiji Constitution as the supreme
commander of the armed forces seems to make his responsibility clear.
• But any actual trial of the emperor was opposed by both the Japanese political elite and the Americans.
• Some, such as the Australians, believed he should have been tried, but the emperor never appeared before the Military Tribunal for the Far East.
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behind
• On the one hand, the Japanese leaders wanted to preserve the imperial institution due to the importance in preserving Japanese national identity and maintaining continuity with the past.
• On the other hand, the Americans saw the emperor as useful for legitimizing the occupation reforms, and to put him on trial might have risked popular resistance.
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014The impact on the
population
• The question of the emperor’s war responsibility was not dealt with at the military tribunal.
• The impact of this has been the general unwillingness of the Japanese to acknowledge war crimes and war responsibility.
• If the emperor, the supreme commander, was not responsible, then how can ordinary Japanese be responsible for the war?
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014The US decision and its
consequences• The decision of the US not to bring the emperor to
trial for war crime made it easier for Japan’s political leaders and other Japanese not to acknowledge the responsibility for the war.
• The identity of Japan as a state is:• not of that which has come to terms with its past and
taught the young about the role of the emperor in Japan’s war of aggression.
• Rather, it is of that which simply went through a period of aberration when the Japanese Imperial Army, not the nation as a whole, was responsible for the crime.
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‘Someone’ to blame
• The military had run amock, disobeying the imperial will, and duping the Japanese people• Indeed, the judgment by the War Time Tribunal
for the Far East laying blame on PM General Tojo Hideki and the Imperial Army somewhat helped to absolve ordinary Japanese of their responsibility.
• Rather than a strong sense of responsibility as an aggressor, this interpretation of war responsibility helped to build up a sense of the emperor and ordinary Japanese people as victims of the military.
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Gokoku-jinja
• If the emperor was absolved of war crimes, why can’t they be? • In this way, the emperor and war responsibility
are intricately linked to the question of Japanese national identity and nationalism.
• This is repeatedly seen by the visit of political leaders to the Yasukuni shrine which honours the war dead, including those convicted of war crimes
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014The impact of SCAP’s
policy
• SCAP’s policy had a great impact on the level of the Japanese people’s consciousness of the Emperor’s war responsibility and their general attitude towards the imperial family.
• The aim was to shape the Japanese view on the issue of war responsibility.• Example: Publication of a series of newspaper
articles called ‘the History of the Pacific War’ by SCAP, also made into a book.
• SCAP also instructed the Japanese government to use this book as a textbook for every school.
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014Impact of kiku tabū
(chrysanthemum taboo)A wide-spread custom in Japan, especially among the
media, of avoiding criticism of the emperor and the imperial family.
Background: assaults by members of right-wing groups on individuals in the media, publishers, and political leaders etc. who have:
expressed criticism of the imperial family,printed a novel disrespectful of the imperial family, orquestioned the emperor’s war responsibility, etc.
the influential Imperial Household Agency controlling the media’s tone and expressions referring to/reporting on the imperial family.
In such atmosphere, the Japanese public has never been exposed to discussion on the issues.
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The succession issue
• The Imperial Charter article 1 stipulates that a male heir from a paternal line should succeed the throne
• The imperial paternal line has been succeeded without break* since the first emperor Kanmu until the 125th and current emperor Kinjō-Akihito
*except periods of empresses temporarily ruling to bridge the previous emperor from a paternal line and a male successor from a paternal line
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Imperial lineage
• The imperial family had practiced polygamy, which had produced many male heirs
• The number of male heirs declined significantly especially following SCAP’s policy of • Reducing the number of imperial households which
could maintain the imperial status• Also to abolish polygamy the emperor
• For a long time no birth of a male heir in the imperial family since that of Prince Fumihito, the second son of the current emperor Akihito in 1965
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014What to do if there’s no
male heir?
• The question had become increasingly a serious issue among Japanese élite.
• Moreover, the ages of the wives of the princes had exceeded the general child-bearing age.
• Birth of a male heir (Prince Hisahito) by Princess Kiko (Crown Princess Masako’s sister-in-law) in Sept. 2006, the issue turned to a back burner.
• ...however, this being the first new heir for over 40 years, succession crisis continues...
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Solutions sought
• A number of solutions had been raised in the élite’s discussion
1. To allow female heir from a paternal line to succeed the throne,
2. To allow male and female heirs from both paternal and maternal lines to succeed the throne,
3. To re-introduce the polygamy system for the emperor,4. To let some of the former imperial households to return
to the imperial status to increase the number of male heirs from paternal lines, or
5. To adopt a male heir from the former imperial households to succeed the throne.
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014Maintaining tradition
– pros & cons• Pro camp: the importance of its uniqueness and its
value• Led by some imperial family members, those close
to the imperial house, the headquarter of the 80,000 shrines, a conservative circle.
• Con camp: allow female heirs or maternal lines• Claim for gender equality or the statistical
improbability to maintain the tradition, even by bringing back some imperial households or adopting a male heir.
• Re-introducing polygamy will not gain the public support.
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Council of Intellectuals
• January 2005: the Koizumi Cabinet established a Council of the Intellectuals for the Imperial Charter and released a report in Nov. 2005.
• It concluded that it was possible to allow female heir both from paternal and maternal lines.
• The report met a criticism from the pro-traditionalists.
• But the overwhelming majority of the Japanese public welcomed the idea of including the female in the succession.
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...then came a male heir
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A (male) child was born
• In the midst of it, the wife of Prince Fuminhito, the second son of the current emperor, gave a birth to a son, Prince Hisahito, in Sept. 2006.• This relieved all the concerned circles.• However, the question still remain unsolved,
since:• It is very likely that the baby will be the only male
heir in this generation.
• There is no guarantee that he will produce a son.
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Prince Hisahito
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on
• By his birth the Council’s report (2005) was discarded.
• The government announced that issue will be reviewed all over again.
• A supra-party Diet members’ league for the purpose of maintaining the tradition was formed in October 2006, led by a leading Liberal Democratic Party member.
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014What of the imperial
family’s view?
• Simply put, their views are doomed to be ignored.
• The Japanese constitution (Art. 3 and 4) stipulates that every public conduct of the imperial family is subject to advice and approval of the cabinet who in turn is held responsible for the imperial family’s actions.
• Hence, we will never hear or read about their opinions firsthand.
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Conclusion
The extent to which Emperor is a source of the Japanese identity.
Change of the position of the Emperor before and after the war.
The relevance of the emperor as a source of Japan’s post-war identity and nationalism.
The debate concerning ‘war responsibility’.The debate over the succession issue.
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