E2cA (F^A c r^rvu JAN 0 4 2001 s 1,4ae_ ^f l> h i g ", (t:c ^ uazyc^ fi:r+skun jan 0 4 2007 marcia j mengel, clerk 0 supreme court of ohio jan 0 4 2001 marcia j. mengel, clerk supreme
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
(^EV«wi^iuisrL-N/Fo^ SuniN, i C^ru,^l-Y,oNra/tfl^^,u,oi^r^^ ^/Y3ca8.
^^;n^ t3Y/^^uLr^Q U.S. ^^ i, r rnLs 7^?31^CIL^t-, 7^'AtC. ^Lk.
S^^LIm G^Z,
No. 05-4583
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
In re: LEVERT K. GRIFFIN,
Movant.
ORDER eb, i
APR 2 7 200G
L11nlARA GR^wN, Clerk
Before: GUY, DAUGHTREY, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
Levert K. Griffin, an Ohio prisoner proceeding pro se, moves the Court for an order
authorizing the district court to consider a third petiflon for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Ohio Attorney General has filed a response.
On July 16,2002, Griffin pleaded guilty to trafficking in marijuana, possession of marijuana,
and the illegal use of food stamps. He was sentenced to serve seven months-incarceration for the
drug offenses and seven months for the illegal use of food stamps offense. The sentences were
ordered to be served concurrently. After failing a stipulated polygraph test, given August 12, 2002,
Griffin pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana. The trial court then sentenced Griffin to serve two
years in prison.
On August 12,2005, Griffin filed his first federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus listing
only the following single ground: "Request/Motion to Certify" with no further explanation. The
i
No. 05-4583-2-
grounds for relief. A motion for reconsideration and a motion to dismiss without prejudice were
denied on October 31, 2005. No appeal was taken from the district court's decision.
Griffin filed another habeas petition in the district court which was transferred to this Court
for pernussion to file a successive federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244. In
his second petition, Griffin raised the following two grounds for relief:
1. Denial ofEffective Assistance of Counsel.
Supporting Facts: It was a plea agreement by the parties per Crim. R. 1 i(f) whichwas under a contract in the civil Court of Common Pleas, Summit County, OH., [sic]Case No. CV 02 12 7300, and that contract was broke breached [sic] by the parties.Therefore I have two (2) pending lawsuits on the parties duly docketed and filedunder Case No. 05CV2543, L.K.Griffin, PLTF., vs. B. Walsh, ET ALPROSECUTOR and Case No. 05 11 6574, L.K. GRIFFIN PLFT., vs. L.SMITH,ESQ.
2. Malicious prosecution and malpractice. [sic].
Supporting Facts: Pending.
To obtain authorization under § 2244(b), a petitioner must make a prima facie showing that
(1) a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court applies to ttie petitioner's
case; or (2) there is a newly discovered factual predicate showing the petitioner's actual innocence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), (b)(3)(C).
Griffin has not cited to any new rule of constitutional law that applies to his case. Nor has
Griffin argued in his claims that he has new evidence showing that he is innocent. Therefore,
Griffin's motion lacks merit.
Accordingly, Griffin's motion to authorize the district court to consider a second or
successive § 2254 petition is denied.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
LEONARD GREENFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
100 EAST FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540 NANCY J. BARNESCLERK POTTER STEWART U.S. COURTHOUSE (513) 564-7022
When I returned from federal court today I found the enclosed file on my deskchair. I must decline your request for assistance and representation as I am closing downmy practice in preparation for taking the bench.
Let me suggest that you have the University of Akron's Legal Clinic look at yourfile and determine if it is one they would like to become involved in.
Federal Courts e-642,Courtrof Appeals was obligatei
,jnrisdictional iesue. of whethrs. had effectiveiy, wafved Cbio's I
endment immunity, in employeeE &&Chio under FLSA; : state, ir
Article III restriction and was,tional in aame aense as eomplete trequirement or weIl-pleaded ^complaand,. as with those' other Article IIneither'litiganta' coneent;•noi oveixiiconvenience could conatitutionalizQexercise of 111ega1 power. U.S.CAArt. 3, § 1; U.S.C.A. ConstAmendiLabor Standards Act of 1938,, § 1 etU.S.CA.•§ 201 et seq:
2. Federal Courts e^266.1 ."^ State'may eonsent to waive'its 1
Amendment immunity. U:S.C:A.Amend. li?
;F.ederat Courts 0-266.1 ...Cbio's . Eleventh Amendment i
may be waived only by its Iegielatm+ ^attorney ia a parEimilar action.Conat.Amend.11. "+
4. Federal Courts e++265Power;of Congress to abrogat
press statement a state's Eleventhment immunity is not unllmited,:.buton the particulsr pnrfase for w}iie}i iattempts to talie• away the state's 'vU.S.CA: Conat.Amena' 11.
6. FederalCourteep266,1Regulation of interatate coname
McGESHIC% v. CHOUCAIRCitees72 F3d 62 (7thCir. 1995)
63
set forth in the following opinion, we deny in that case would be adopted by the Su-the motion to recall the mandate and dismiss preme Court of Wisconsin. See McGeshick,
the petition for rehearing as moot. 9 F.3d at 123244.
BACKGROUND
The underlying appeal, a medical malprartice ease within the diversity jurisdiction ofthe district eourt„ was decided on the meritsby this court on November 15, 1998. SeeMcGeshick v. Choueair, 9 F.3d 1229 (7tfiCir.1993). In that decision, we affirmed ajury verdict adverse to W. McGeshick alid infavor of Dr. Choucair. Mr. McGeshick hadclaimed that Dr. Choucair was negligent infai)ing to advise Mr. McGeshick about thepossible causes of his myelopathy (a diseaseof.the spinal cord) and the possibility ofah}singrnplly ru n lin( nnatic mc.asuro to ox^chrde nne ol' uovmral pmu+iblo f'allHoa of hhrcondition. S,peci(icaliy, the drstrict court, re-firsed, over objection of Mr. McGeshick'scounsel, to give an instruction that placed adnty on Dr. Choucair to make such a diecio-sm'e and instead gave a general negBgenceinstiuc4ion.
While the appeal was pending before us,the Wisconsin Court of Appeals issued adecision in Martin v. Richards, 176 Wis2d339; 500 N.W.2d 691(CtApp.1993). The dayafter oral. argument in this appeal, this courton its own motiQn invited the partaes' atten-tion to the Martiae decision and ordered sup-plenrental briefing on how Martin mighthave changed the law of informed consent inWisconsin. Both parties fded supplementalbriefs. We considered these submissions.Tfie Supreme Court of Wisconsin subae-4uently granted review of the Martin case.iLlartin v. Richards, 505 N.W.2d 137 (Wis.1993), Yet by the Fall of 1993, it becameapPM'ent that there wonld be a significantdelay in the issuance of a decision in MartinbY the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Wetherefore aonctuded that we could not esti-nrate when the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Cn May Q; 1995, the Supreme Court ofWisconsin decided Martin. See Martin v.Richards, 192 Wis.2d 156, 531 N.WZd 70(1995). Contrary to our prediction, it af-firmed the state appellate eourt. Mr.MeGeshiek now asks that we reealY our man-date and further asks that we then reconsid-er our earlier decision in light of the holdingof the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
3 '^^ ^' 'DISCUSSIONT! 1/U1.i Lw .I ,. .
[17 It is well settled that, asa general ""proposition, oom'ts possess inherent power to L}; ^;`recall a rnandate in exeeptional ciraum- ^rrtamtca Aittaradi+;ii.ZSarr`TT Jr0^F2d3f7^,1180 (7th Cir.1940). A supervening change f3^in governing law that calls into serious ques-tion the crorrectness of the court's judgmentmay justify recaR of the mandate: UnitedStates v. Hot(a.nd 1 F.3d 4b4, 456 (7th Cir.1993) (Ripple, J., in chambers) (citing Zip,fedv. Halti6urton Co., 861 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.1988)). In any such caee, the primary coun-tervailu3g consideration is the importance offmality in judieial proceedings. When ad-dressing the need for finall^r in different butpaiallel eircumatances, upremestated:
Public poliey dictates at there beend of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the re-sult of the contest, and that matters oncetried shaIl be considered forever settled asbetween the parties.
Baldwin v. Iowa State Pra+voding Men's As-soc, 283 U.S. 622, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 518, 75L.E& 1244 (1931). As the Third Ciretdtrecognized in American Irom & Steel It ti-
tute n EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 592 (3d Cir,1977),this overarching judicial policy concern issalutary because of the need for part,y r-eli-^P ir t.ha finaHtv of judgments Emd the