An Empirical Analysis An Empirical Analysis of of Political Dynasties in the Political Dynasties in the 15 15 th th Philippine Congress Philippine Congress DEMOCRACY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH DEMOCRACY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH Ronald U. Mendoza, PhD Ronald U. Mendoza, PhD AIM Policy Center AIM Policy Center http://Policy.aim.edu http://Policy.aim.edu *Support from Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the AIM-Scientific Research Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Asian Institute of Management, AIM-SRF and KAS. This presentation is based on Mendoza, Beja, Venida and Yap (2011). “An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15 th Philippine Congress.” Asian Institute of Management Policy Center Research Paper.
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
An Empirical Analysis An Empirical Analysis of of Political Dynasties in the Political Dynasties in the
1515thth Philippine CongressPhilippine Congress
DEMOCRACY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTHDEMOCRACY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
Ronald U. Mendoza, PhDRonald U. Mendoza, PhD
AIM Policy CenterAIM Policy Center
http://Policy.aim.eduhttp://Policy.aim.edu
*Support from Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the AIM-Scientific Research Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The
views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the
Asian Institute of Management, AIM-SRF and KAS. This presentation is based on Mendoza, Beja, Venida and Yap (2011).
“An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress.” Asian Institute of Management Policy Center
Research Paper.
Voices of the Politicians
“There are some politicians who wish there were more poor people. The
poor are the bailiwick because […] if you are a moneyed politician, it’s
better to have poor people because you can buy them. Give them
P200, P300 in the elections and they will vote for you.” [A politician
interviewed and cited by Clarke and Sison (2003:221).
“I’m just vice mayor but you know I have an average of twenty to thirty
people every day in [my] house, in [my] office, asking for support. I have
no money and they need money. Even if it’s P100, I’m spending P2000 a
people every day in [my] house, in [my] office, asking for support. I have
no money and they need money. Even if it’s P100, I’m spending P2000 a
day. It’s good I have other businesses, if not you’ll be forced to steal
money from the government to give to the poor […].”
[…] Once you’re a government official, people think you are a rich
person, that you can get money from the government. That’s not
true…My salary is only P21,000 [per month].” [A local politician
interviewed and cited by Clarke and Sison (2003:221).
Motivation
In theory, democracies promote political participation and political equality—
equal voice in government decisionmaking—through various principles such as
one person one vote, equality before the law and equal rights of free speech.
Political equality, in turn, could promote stronger responsiveness and
accountability in addressing the needs of the majority of the citizenry, and in
many cases contribute to improved human capital and other investments.
With political responsiveness, accountability and social spending/investments, With political responsiveness, accountability and social spending/investments,
poverty and inequality reduction as well as higher and more inclusive growth
could ensue.
However, underdeveloped democratic institutions could also be associated with
weak political participation, leading in some cases to the phenomenon of
political dynasties.
How are political dynasties linked to the country’s prospects for inclusive
growth (i.e. high growth accompanied by poverty and inequality reduction)?
Political Dynasties and Poverty/Inequality
Empirical link between political dynasties and poverty/inequality:
•PREDATORY VIEW: Dynasties increase P/I -- If dynasties are associated with rent-
seeking and state capture, corruption and ineffective and poorly designed policies
(e.g. Proud’homme, 1995; Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003)
•STATIONARY BANDIT: Dynasties reduce P/I -- If dynasties have longer “runways” for
reform and are more firmly associated with socio-economic outcomes (e.g. Olson,
2003; Solon et al, 2009; Dal Bo and Rossi, 2009)2003; Solon et al, 2009; Dal Bo and Rossi, 2009)
Additional complexity:
•PATRONAGE: High P/I tends to increase dynastic prevalence: the poor vote for
dynasties as long as these are able to directly provide support during elections or in
times of income shocks (e.g. Coronel, 1998; Manacsa and Tan, 2005)
•SELF-PERPETUATION: Politicians are capable of developing dynasties): being in
public office affords politicians the opportunity and means to keep on winning or to
increase their heirs’ chances of winning (e.g. Dal Bo et al, 2009; Querrubin 2010)
Trend in US Legislators with Relatives in Previous
Congresses (Dynastic Legislators)11% in early 1800s
7% in 1966
Source: Dal bo et al (2009).
Clarification and Improvement of Dynasty Definitions
•Dynasty1: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links
to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th or 14th Congress;
•Dynasty2: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links
to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th or 14th Congress, or at least one
local government official elected in 2001, 2004, or 2007;
•Dynasty3: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links
to at least one legislator in the 12th, 13th,14th or 15th Congress, or at least
one local government official elected in 2001, 2004, 2007 or 2010.
•Dynasty*: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links
to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th, or 14th Congresses, and at least
one legislator from the 15th Congress, and at least one local government
official elected in 2001, 2004, or 2007, and at least one local government
official elected in 2010.
Dynastic and Non-Dynastic District Legislators by
Definition
(Total number and percent share)
Dynastic
Dynasty1 Dynasty2 Dynasty3 Dynasty*
84 (36.7% 144 (62.9% 155 (67.7% 10 (4.4% Dynastic
84 (36.7%
of
Legislators
144 (62.9%
of
Legislators
155 (67.7%
of
Legislators
10 (4.4%
of
Legislators
Rough Comparison of the Share of Dynastic Politicians in
Selected Parliaments and Congresses
33%
10%
6%
Japan
Argentina
United States
Sources: United States (Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder, 2009); Argentina (Rossi, 2009); Japan and Mexico (Asako and others, 2010); Philippines (Authors’ calculations).
68%
63%
37%
40%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Philippines (Dynasty3)
Philippines (Dynasty2)
Philippines (Dynasty1)
Mexico
Share of Dynastic Politicians in the Philippine Congress
over Time: Preliminary snapshot
50
60
70
80
90
82
73
50
68
Sources: PCIJ as cited in Clarke and Sison (2003) and authors’ calculations based on data from the Philippine Congress.
•Balisacan, A. and N.Fuwa.2004. “Going beyond cross-country averages:Inequality and poverty reduction in the
Philippines. Mimeo. South East Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture and UP
Diliman.
•Balisacan, A. and E.Pernia. 2002. “Going beyond cross-country averages: Growth, inequality and poverty reduction
in the Philippines.” World Development 32(11)1891-907.
•Clarke,G. and M.Sison. 2003. “Voices from the top of the pile: Elite perceptions of poverty and the poor in the
Philippines.” Development and Change 34(2):215-242.
•Coronel, S. 1998. Pork and Other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines. Pasig: Philippine Center
for Investigative Journalism.
•Dal Bo, E., P.Dal Bo and J.Snyder. 2009. "Political Dynasties." Review of Economic Studies 76(1):115-142.
•Dal Bo, E. and M.Rossi. 2009. “Term Length and Political Performance.” NBER Working Paper 14511. Cambridge, •Dal Bo, E. and M.Rossi. 2009. “Term Length and Political Performance.” NBER Working Paper 14511. Cambridge,
Mass.
•Hutchcroft,P. and J.Rocamora.2003. “Strong demands and weak institutions: The origins and evolution of the
democractic deficit in the Philippines.” Journal of East Asian Studies 3(2003):259-292.
•Manacsa, R. and A.Tan. 2005. “Manufacturing Parties.” Party Politics 11(6):748-765.
•Rodrik, D. 2007. One Economics Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
•Querrubin, P. 2010a. “Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines.” Mimeo. Massachusetts Institute
of Technology.
•Querrubin, P. 2010b. “Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the
Philippines.” Mimeo. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
•Rossi, M. 2009. “The Causes of Political Dynasties in Democratic Countries.” Mimeo. [Available at: