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Citation: 34 Melb. U. L. Rev. 425 2010 Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)Wed Oct9 01:25:44 2013-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your HeinOnline license, please use: https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do? &operation=go&searchType=0 &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0025-8938THE DEFENCEOFJOINT ILLEGALENTERPRISEJAMESGOUDKAMP[TheHigh Court has reservedjudgmentin an appeal against thedecision of theWestern AustralianCourt ofAppealin Millerv Miller (2009) 54 MVR367.This appeal calls into question thedefence ofjoint illegal enterprise, whichis an answer toliability inthetort of negligence. It iswith this appealthat thisarticleisconcernedTwvomain arguments are presented. The first isthatthedefenceisframed inahighlyunsatisfactory iway.Itisgovernedbynonsensical rules,manyofvhichareinconsistent with fundamental principles of tort lawAccordingly, should theHigh Court retain thedefence,it issubmitted that it should reformulate it sothat it blendsin ivith thelegal environment inwvhichit resides. Thesecond and more fundamental argument isthat thedefence should be abolished.It is a stain onthelaw of torts. Notonlyare there no convincing arguments in support of it, but thereare powerful reasons against its existence.]CONTENTSIIntroduction.............. .................................426IIThe JointIllegalEnterpriseDefenceinBrief............................... 426IIIThe Distinctivenessof the JointIllegalEnterpriseDefence.................... 428IVThe FactsandDecisionalHistoryof Miller..............................429AThe Facts............................................429BTheDecisionof the TrialJudge............................. 430CTheDecisionof theCourt of Appeal........................ 431DDidthe Courtof AppealReachthe CorrectDecision?....... . .... ..431VTheSignificanceof the CourtofAppeal'sDecisionin Miller ...............................432AConvictionsandCriminalLawDefences......................432BWithdrawal...........................................433CTheIrrelevanceof the Demiseof Proximity...........................433VIDoctrinalDifficultieswiththeJoint IllegalEnterpriseDefence............................434ATheAllocationof the Onusof Proof ...................................434BTheJoint IllegalEnterpriseDefenceIsConfinedto the TortofNegligence................................................. 435CTheFirstStage of the Test........................... 436DTheSecondStage of the Test...........................4371'Impossible'or'NotFeasible'toSetaStandardof Care..............4372TheDangerousnessof the Parties'Activity.................... 4383Could the Plaintiff HaveReasonablyExpectedthe DefendanttoExerciseProper Care? . . . . . . .. . . . ............. .... .... .. 438EWithdrawal...........................................438FDoesthe JointIllegalEnterpriseDefenceDefytheSequencein WhichIssuesinan ActioninNegligenceShould Be Addressed? . . . . . ... . . .439BSc,LLB(Hons),GradDipLegPrac(Wollongong),BCL,MPhil(Oxon);ShawFoundationJuniorResearchFellow,JesusCollege,UniversityofOxford;VisitingFellow, FacultyofLaw,Universityof Wollongong.I amgratefultoBenjaminSpagnolofordiscussing thesubjectmatterofthisarticlewithme.I alsohadthebenefitofthoughtfulcommentsfromtheanonymousreferees.Theusualcaveatapplies.425Melbourne University Law ReviewGConclusion...........................................440VIICanthe JointIllegalEnterpriseDefenceBeJustified9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . 440ADeterringCriminalConduct.................................441BPunishment................................................442CPreventingWrongfulProfiting..............................442DUpholdingthe Dignityof the Courts..........................443ENot CondoningBreachesof theCriminalLaw...................444FDistributiveJustice......................................445GForfeiture...................................................445HSummary............................................445VIIITheStatutoryIllegalityDefencesandTheir Relevanceto the AppealinMiller ... 446AAnOutlineof theStatutoryIllegalityDefences.......................446BRelevanceof theStatutoryIllegalityDefences tothe AppealinMiller .... 448IXShouldaPleaof IllegalityEver Be Admittedas aDefence? . . . . . . ............ .... 449XConclusion.................................................450IINTRODUCTIONInSmithvJenkins ('Smith'),'theHighCourtrecognisedadefenceof jointillegalenterpriseto liabilityinthetortof negligence.Itaffirmedtheexistenceofthisdefenceinaseriesof cases,the most recentandimportantof whichisGala vPreston ('Gala').2 Thecorrectnessof thislineofauthority,whichhasprovedhighlyinfluentialinseveralotherjurisdictions,3 ispresentlybeingreconsideredbytheHighCourtinanappealagainstthedecisionof theWesternAustralianCourtof AppealinMillervMiller('Miller').4 Itiswiththisappealthatthisarticle isconcerned.It makestwocentralclaims.First,in theeventthat theCourtretainsthe joint illegalenterprisedefence,it shouldperformradicalsurgeryonitsoastorenderitlessoffensivetofundamentalprinciplesof tortlaw.Thesecondcontentionisthat theCourtshouldbreakwithitspreviousdecisionsrecognisingthedefence- allofwhicharecontaminatedbyseriousconfusion- andconsignthedefencetolegaloblivion.Itservesnousefulpurposeandispregnantwiththepotentialto producesignificant injustice.11THEJOINTILLEGALENTERPRISEDEFENCEINBRIEFItisconvenienttoprovideashortintroductiontothejointillegalenterprisedefenceinorder toset thescenefor theanalysis thatfollows.Thedefence,whichI(1970) 119CLR 397.2(1991)172CLR 243.TheotherauthoritiesinthisseriesareProgress and PropertiesLtd vCraft(1976)135CLR651and Jackson vHarrison(1978)138CLR 438.3ThecourtsintheUnitedKingdomandIrelandhavebroadlyacceptedthelawonthispointasstatedbytheHighCourt:AshtonvTurner[1981]1QB137;Pitts vHunt[1991]1QB24;Lindsay vPoole1984SLT269;AshcrofthCuratorBonisvStewart1988SLT163;WilsonvPrice1989SLT484;Winnik vDick1984SC48;Weir vHyper1992SLT579;Taylor vLeslie1998SLT1248;Currie v Clamp 2002SLT196; Anderson v Cooke[2005]2IR607.4MillervMiller(2009)54MVR367.SpecialleavetoappealwasgrantedinTranscriptofProceedings,Miller vMiller [2010]HCATrans130(28 May2010).Theappealwasheardon3-4November2010:seeMiller vMiller [2010] HCATrans286(3 November 2010);Miller vMiller[2010]HCATrans287(4November 2010).426 [Vol34TheDefence ofJoint Illegal Enterpriseisonlyavailableinproceedingsinnegligence,willbeenlivenedwhenthefollowingtwo-stagetestissatisfied:(i)theplaintiff suffereddamagewhile engagedina criminal5 enterprisewiththedefendant;6 and(ii)thenatureof theenterpriseissuchthatit wouldbe'impossible'or'notfeasible'toaskhowthereasonablepersoninthedefendant'spositionwouldhaveacted.If thejoint illegalenterprisedefenceisengaged,nodutyof carewill arise.ThistestdidnotemergePallas-likefromthedecisioninSmith.Rather,itevolvedgradually,andwaseventuallysettled bytheHigh Courtin Gala.ItisnecessarytosayafewwordsaboutGala sinceitistheleadingauthorityonthe defence.ThepartiesinGala andtwoother menstole a motorvehicle afterconsumingmassivequantitiesofalcohol(thedefendantdrankaround40scotchesandtheotherseachimbibedanequivalentamount of beer).Theysetoff inthevehicletowardsa cityinwhichtheyplannedtocommitbreakingandenteringoffences.Thedefendantdrove.Enroute,hefellasleepandtheuncon-trolledvehiclestrucka tree.Theplaintiff wasseriouslyinjuredinthecollision.TheHighCourtunanimouslyheldthatthedefendantdidnotowetheplaintiff adutyofcarebyvirtueoftheillegalventureinwhichtheywereengaged.ApluralityconsistinginMasonCJ,Deane,GaudronandMcHughJJ reachedthisconclusionbyapplyingthetwo-stagetestsetoutabove.'BrennanJ,DawsonJandTooheyJdeliveredseparatereasons.BrennanJheldthatnodutyshouldberecognisedonthegroundthatfindingadutywouldimpairthenormativeinfluenceof thecriminallaw.8 DawsonJ9 andTooheyJ10 thoughtthatpublicpolicy militatedagainsttheerection of a duty.5The jointcommissionof inchoateoffencescanengagethedefence:ItalianovBarbaro(1993)40FCR 303.Aninterestingissueiswhethertheventuremustbeillegal.Willsufficientlyimmoralenterprisesenliventhedefence?The19thcenturydecisioninHegarty v Shine(1878)14CoxCC145supportsanaffirmativeanswerto thisquestion.Theplaintiff inthat casesuedthedefendantin batteryforinfectingherwith avenerealdisease.TheCourt rejectedtheclaim onthebasisthatthepartieswerecohabitatingextramaritally.However,judgesandcommentatorshavelonglookedaskanceatHegarty vShine. WindeyerJdescribeditasa'miserablecase'in Smith (1970)119CLR397,413.CoryJ saidit was'anotoriousexampleof theunfairness'thattheillegalitydefencecanwreakinHall vHebert [1993]2SCR159,213.SeealsoJohnGFleming,TheLawof Torts(LBC InformationServices,9thed,1998)89.Nevertheless,thecourtshavealwaysleftthedooropentothepossibilitythatimmoralconductmayactivatethedefence,and,intworecentdecisions,theHighCourtofEnglandandWalesheldthatconductevincingmoralturpitudeissufficient:NayyarvDentonWildeSapte[2009]EWHC3218(QB)(16December2009)[92](HamblenJ);SafewayStoresLtd viTvigger[2010]3 AllER577.Ithasnotbeendecidedwhetherbreachesof foreignlawwilltriggerthedefence:seeK/S Lincoln vCB RichardEllis Hotels Ltd [2009]EWHC2344(TCC)(2 October2009)[39](CoulsonJ).6It isessentialthatthedefendantbeapartytotheenterprise.The jointillegalenterprisedefencewillbeinapplicableif theplaintiff wasengagedintheenterprisewithathirdparty:Smith (1970)119 CLR397,416-17(WindeyerJ).Gala (1991)172CLR 243,254-5.Ibid270-3.9lbid277-80.10lbid291-2.2010] 427Melbourne University Law ReviewAsignificantfeatureof theplurality'sreasonsinGala istherecoursemadeinthemtotheconceptof proximity''(TooheyJdidnotdrawuponitwhileBren-nanJ12 andDawsonJ13 expresslydisclaimedrelianceonit).At thetime,itwasthoughtthat proximitywasatouchstonefor theexistenceof adutyof care.Thelogicembracedbythepluralitywasthatif itwasnot'possibleor feasible'14 tosetastandardof careduetotheillegalenterpriseinwhichthepartieswereengaged,therelationshipbetweenthepartieswouldlacktheproximityrequiredtogenerateaduty.Subsequently,theHighCourt,persuadedbytrenchantcriticismoftheconceptofproximity,'5 rejecteditasadeterminantfortheexistenceof aduty.16 ThisrejectionpromptedMcHughJtoremarkinJoslyn vBerryman that'itmay[nowbethattheCourt]...wouldnolongerfollowthereasoningin...Gala.'17 Thestatusof thejointillegalenterprisedefenceis,therefore,somewhatuncertain.IllTHEDISTINCTIVENESSOFTHEJOINTILLEGALENTERPRISEDEFENCEThe joint illegalenterprisedefenceisadistinct tortlawdefence.Unfortunately,however,itissometimessuggestedthatitisanalogousto,oravariantof, thepleaofvoluntaryassumptionofrisk.'8 Itistruethat,whenapplicable,bothdefencesdenytheexistenceof adutyof care.19 But theyaredifferentinnumer-ousimportantrespects.First, thedefenceof voluntaryassumptionof risk,unlikethejointillegalenterprisedefence,doesnotrequireproofthattheplaintiff1Ibid252-4.Ibid25963.13Ibid276-7.14Ibid 254.15Seeespecially JusticeMH McHugh,'Neighbourhood,ProximityandReliance'inPD Finn(ed),Essays on Torts (LawBook,1989)5;JaneStapleton,'Dutyof CareFactors:ASelectionfrom theJudicialMenus'inPeterCaneandJaneStapleton(eds),TheLawof Obligations: EssaysinCelebration ofJohn Fleming (OxfordUniversityPress,1998)59,613.16Thedemiseofproximitybegan,atthelatest,inHill vanErp (1997)188CLR159,176-8(DawsonJ),189(TooheyJ),210-11(McHughJ),237-9(Gummow J).Thecoupdegracewasdealtin SullivanvMoody(2001)207CLR562,578-9[48](GleesonCJ,Gaudron,McHugh,HayneandCallinanJJ).KirbyJhadlongattemptedtoarrestthedeclineof proximity(see,eg,Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998)192CLR330,41420[238]-[245];RomeovConservationCommissionof theNorthernTerritory(1998)192CLR431,476-7[117]-[121];CrimminsvStevedoringIndustryFinanceCommittee(1999)200CLR1,79-80[221]-[222];ModburyTriangle Shopping CentrePtyLtd vAnzil (2000)205CLR 254,274-5[59]-[61])but,followingSullivan vMoody,heconcededdefeatinGraham Barclay OystersPty Ltd vRyan(2002)211CLR540, 625-7[237]-[238].17 (2003)214CLR552,564[30].18Forexample,inhismagisterialtextbook,JohnFlemingdealtwiththejointillegalenterprisedefencewithin achapterentitled'Voluntary Assumptionof Risk':Fleming, aboven5, ch13.19Thereisanoverwhelmingcaseforthinkingthatadefendantwhoreliesonthevoluntaryassumptionof riskdefencesimplydenies,inroundaboutlanguage,theexistence of adutyof care(or,sometimes,otherelementsofthetortofnegligence):seethepenetratinganalysisinStephenD Sugarman,'AssumptionofRisk'(1997)31alparaiso UniversityLawReview833.Unfortunately,however,itisoftenthoughtthatvoluntaryassumptionofriskisanaffirmativedefence:see,eg,WinchestervSolomon,75NE2d653,655-6(Mass,1947)(DolanJ);GlanvilleL Williams,JointTortsandContributoryNegligence: AStudyof Concurrent Fault inGreat Britain, Ireland and theCommon-LawtDominions(Stevens& Sons,1951)295.428 [Vol34TheDefence ofJoint Illegal Enterprisecommittedanoffence.Secondly,theapplicationof thevoluntaryassumptionofriskdefenceisnotcontingentuponevidencethat thepartiesworkedtogethertoachievesomecommongoal.Thirdly,thevoluntaryassumptionof riskdefence,unlikethejointillegalenterprisedefence,incorporatesasubjectiveelement(relevantly,itaskswhether theplaintiff consentedto theriskof injury).Fourthly,thejointillegalenterprisedefenceissensitivetotheblameworthinessof theplaintiff'sacts(onlyrelativelyseriousoffendingenlivensit20)whereasthevoluntaryassumptionof riskdefenceisnot.Fifthly,insomejurisdictions,thevoluntaryassumptionof riskdefenceisunavailableinactionsarisingoutof theuseofamotorvehicle21 whereasmostof thecasesinwhichthejointillegalenterprisedefenceappliesaremotor vehiclecases.Itisworthquicklynoting that the joint illegalenterprisedefenceandtheprovi-sionforapportionmentforcontributorynegligencearealsodifferentlegalcreatures.Themostobviousdifferenceisthatonlythejointillegalenterprisedefencepreventsliabilityfromarising.Theapportionmentprovisionmerelyprovidesfortheplaintiff'sdamagestobereduced.22 Thetworulesalsopartcompanyinthatthejointillegalenterprisedefenceisnottriggeredunlesstheplaintiffcommitsacriminaloffencewhereastheapportionmentprovisionisnotsimilarlyconstrained.Whatmattersforthepurposesoftheapportionmentprovisionisalack of reasonablecarebytheplaintiff thatcontributestohisor herdamageratherthanparticipationincriminalconduct.23IVTHEFACTSANDDECISIONALHISTORYOFMILLERAThe FactS24In theearlyhoursof 17May1998,theplaintiff (theappellantbeforetheHighCourt)wasloiteringinacarparkoutsideanightclubwithhersisterandhercousin.Allthreewereintoxicated.Theyweretiredandwantedtogohome.Buttheyhadmissed thelasttrainandhadinsufficientmoneyto payfora taxi.Theirpredicamentpromptedthemtostealamotorvehicle.Whileleavingthecarparkinthevehicle,theyencounteredthedefendant(therespondent).Thedefendant,whowas27yearsofageatthetime,wassomethingofafatherfiguretothe20Fordiscussionoftheauthoritiesonthispoint,seeGrifin vUHYHackerYoung&Partners(a firm)[2010]EWHC146(Ch)(4February2010)[49]-[60](VosJ).SeealsoVa7nHoffenvDawison[1994]PIQR101,106-7(RussellLJ);Taylor vLeslie1998SLT1248,1250(TemporaryJudgeWheatley);Currie vClamp 2002SLT196,200-1[21]-[22](LordClarke);WokvOKeefe(2006)46SR(WA)146,152[18](MullerDCJ).21See,eg,Motor Accidents Compensation Act1999(NSW)s140;Road TrafficAct1988(UK)c 52,s149.22However,statutesinseveraljurisdictionsauthorisefindingsof100percentcontributorynegligence:see,eg,Civil Laiw(Wrongs)Act2002(ACT)s 47;Civil Liability Act2002(NSW)s 5S;Civil Liability Act2003(Qld)s 24;Wrongs Act1954 (Tas)s 4(1);Wrongs Act1958(Vic)s 63.Thesestatutesalso providethat suchfindings preventliabilityfrom arising.23SeeWestwood vPost Office[1974]AC1,17(LordKilbrandon);Froom vButcher[1976]QB286,291(LordDenning MR).24Thissummary of thefactsisdrawnfromthetrialjudge'sreasons:Miller vMiller(2008)57SR(WA)358,360-2[1]-[8](SchoombeeDCJ).2010] 429Melbourne University Law Reviewplaintiff,25 whowasthen16yearsold.Heinsistedondrivingtheplaintiff toherhomeinthevehicle.Thedefendanthadbeendrinkingandwasunlicensedandwasawarethatthevehiclehadbeenstolen.Oncethedefendantassumedthedriver'sseat,fiveof hisfriendspiledintothevehicle,therebybringing thetotalnumberof occupantstonine.Thevehicle,asedan,wasonlylicensedtocarryfivepersonsandwasconsequentlygrosslyoverloaded.Thedefendantbegandrivingtowardstheplaintiff'shouse.Initially,hedroveatoraroundthespeedlimit.Buthesoonbegandrivingatanexcessivespeedandfailedtostopatseveralredlights. Aroundthis time,theplaintiff expressedconcernfor hersafetyandaskedthedefendanttoslowdown.Thedefendantwasdismissiveofherrequest.Theplaintiffthenaskedtwicetobeletoutof thevehicle.Again,thedefendantrefusedtocomply. Ashorttimelater,thedefendantlostcontrolof thevehicleanditstruckametalpole.Theplaintiffsufferedsevereinjuriesinthecollision,includingquadriplegia. Another passengerdied.26BThe Decision of the Trial JudgeTheplaintiffcommencedproceedingsinnegligenceagainstthedefendantintheDistrictCourtof WesternAustralia.Thedefendantreliedon thejointillegalenterprisedefenceonthegroundthat,atthetimeof theaccident,theplaintiffwascomplicitinhisbreachof s 371A(1)of theCriminal Code ActCompilationAct1913(WA)('Criminal Code'). Thisprovisionprohibitstheuseof amotorvehiclewithouttheowner'sconsent.Byagreement,thepartieslimitedtheissuestobetriedtowhetherthejointillegalenterprisedefenceapplied.27 Thetrialjudge,SchoombeeDCJ,foundthatitdidnotandthatthedefendantthereforeowedtheplaintiffadutyof care.28 HerHonourpointedtoanumberof consid-erationsthatshethoughtsupportedthisconclusion.Theseconsiderationsincluded thefollowing:(i)theplaintiff expectedthedefendantto take goodcareof her;2 9(ii)thedefendantregardedhimself as responsiblefor theplaintiff'swelfare;30(iii)theplaintiffdidnotappreciatethatthejourneywouldbefraughtwithrisk;125The partieswererelatedthrough theplaintiff'smother.26Thedefendantwaschargedwith,andpleadedguiltyto,dangerousdrivingcausingdeath,dangerousdrivingcausinggrievousbodilyharm,anddrivingundertheinfluenceof alcohol.Hereceivedatotal headsentenceof fiveyears'imprisonment:Miller (2009)54 MVR367,370[15](BussJA).27Inhisstatementof defence,thedefendantpleadedthedefenceofvoluntaryassumptionofriskand(incredibly)deniedthathefailedtoexercisereasonablecare.Relianceonthesepleaswaslaterwaived:Miller vMiller (2008)57SR(WA)358,360[2](SchoombeeDC).28Ibid384-5[114]-[116].29Ibid378[77].30 Ibid.31Ibid381-3 [96]-[107].430 [Vol34TheDefence ofJoint Illegal Enterprise(iv)thedefendantdidnotdrivedangerouslybecausethevehiclewasstolen(he wasnot, for example,attemptingtoeludethepolicewhentheaccidentoccurred);32 and(v)thepartieswerenotengagedina'joy-ride'.Theyweretravellingtotheplaintiff'shome.33CTheDecision ofthe Court ofAppealTheWesternAustralianCourtof Appealunanimouslyallowedanappealbythedefendantandenteredaverdictinhisfavour.TheprincipalopinionsweredeliveredbyBussJAandNewnesJA(McLureJA gavebriefreasonsinwhichherHonourbroadlyconcurredwithBussJAandNewnesJA34).BussJA31 andNewnesJA36 foundthatthetwo-stagetestarticulatedinGala fordeterminingwhenthejointillegalenterprisedefenceappliessurvivedthedemiseof prox-imity.TheirHonoursconcludedthatthistestwassatisfied.Insoholding,theyemphasised,amongotherconsiderations:(i)that theoffenceof unlawfullyusingamotorvehicleisaseriousone37 (itisanindictableoffencepunishablebyseven years'imprisonment38);(ii)thatthedefendantwas,totheplaintiff'sknowledge,intoxicatedandunlicensed;39(iii)thatthevehicle wasgrosslyoverloaded;40 and(iv)thatthereasonablepersonintheplaintiff'spositionwouldhaverealisedthat the journeywouldbeextremelyhazardous.41DDid the Court ofAppeal Reach the Correct Decision?Considerthefollowingparadigmcase.PandD,bothadultsandheavilyintoxi-cated,stealamotorvehicle.DdrivesthevehicleandPaccompanieshiminit.P isinjuredduetoD'snegligentdriving.PlaintiffssuchasPhaveconsistentlyfailedtorecovercompensationduetothejointillegalenterprisedefence.Is Miller analogoustotheparadigmcase?Onemight thinkthat themostsignifi-cantfeatureinMilleristhefactthatthepartieswereusingamotorvehicleunlawfullywhentheplaintiff wasinjured.If thisiscorrect,Miller ismateriallyidenticaltotheparadigmcaseandtheCourtof Appealwas,consequently,right32lbid380-1[89]-[94].3lbid379-80[85]-[87],381[95],382[98],[101].34Miller (2009)54MVR367,368[1].35Ibid383[67]-[68].36Ibid399[143].3lbid384[78](BussJA),400[148](NewnesJA).38Criminal Codes 378,asitwasinforceatthematerialtime.Themaximumpenaltywaslaterincreasedto eight years'imprisonment.39Miller (2009)54MVR 367,384[78](Buss JA),400[149]-[150] (Newnes JA).40lbid384[78](BussJA),400[151](NewnesJA).41lbid384-5[79]-[81],[83],386-7[90](BussJA),400-1[149],[152]-[153](NewnesJA).2010] 431Melbourne University Law Reviewtoholdthat thedefenceapplied. Conversely,one mightsaythat thenatureof therelationshipbetweentheparties,specifically,thatthedefendantwasanadultwhereastheplaintiffwasinhermid-teensandthatthepartiesregardedthedefendanttoberesponsiblefortheplaintiff'swellbeing,meansthatMillerisdistinguishablefromtheparadigmcase.If thisisso,itisdoubtfulthat theCourtof Appealreachedthecorrectconclusion.Towhichfactshouldemphasisbegiven?Itisstronglyarguablethattherelationshipof dependencyinMiller isasufficientlysignificantcircumstancetotakeMilleroutsideoftheparadigmscenario.Tortlaw, afterall,paysspecialattentiontothefact thatthepartieswereinsucharelationship.42VTHESIGNIFICANCEOFTHECOURTOFAPPEAL'SDECISIONINMILLERBeforeconsideringtheappealto theHighCourtitisworthbrieflynoting threepreviouslyuncertainaspectsofthejointillegalenterprisedefencethatwereclarifiedbytheCourtof Appeal'sdecision.AConvictions and CriminalLaw DefencesTheplaintiffinMiller hasnot,apparently,beenchargedwiththeoffenceins 371Aof theCriminalCode orwithanyothercrimethat shemayhavecommit-tedthatwasassociatedwiththeaccident.43 TheCourtof Appeal'sdecisionis,therefore,authorityforthepropositionthattheapplicationofthejointillegalenterprisedefencedoes notdependupontheplaintiff beingconvictedof acrime.Inthisrespect,theCourt'sdecisionisuncontroversial.Severalothercasessupportthisposition.44 Somewhatmorecontentiously,however,theCourt'sdecisionsuggeststhatthejointillegalenterprisedefenceiscontingentontheplaintifflackingacriminallawdefence,oratleastcertaintypesof criminallawdefences.BussJAsaidthatoneof the'criticalfactsandcircumstances'of thecasewasthat theplaintiff'hadattainedtheageof criminalresponsibility'.45 Thisimpliesthatthe jointillegalenterprisedefencewouldnothavebeenengagediftheplaintiffcouldhavereliedonthedefenceofinfancytoavoidbeingheldcriminallyliable.46 HisHonouralsoobservedthattheplaintiff wouldnothavebeenabletoavailherselfofthedefenceofduresstoescapefromcriminalliability.47 Again,theimplicationisthathadthisdefencebeenavailabletotheplaintiffincriminalproceedings,thejointillegalenterprisedefencewouldnothavebeentriggered.AssumingthatBussJAintendedtheseimplicationsof hisremarks,washecorrecttocommithimselftothem?Astrongcasecan bemade42See,eg,Perre v ApandPty Ltd (1999)198CLR180,228[124](McHughJ).43Miller v Miller (2008)57SR (WA)358,361[5](SchoombeeDCJ).44See,eg,Ashcroft5Curator Bonis vStewart1988SLT163;Italiano vBarbaro (1993)40FCR303.45Miller (2009)54MVR 367,384[78].46Theageof criminalresponsibilityin WesternAustralia,asinallAustralian jurisdictions,is10:Criminal Code s 29.47Miller (2009)54MVR367,384[78].432 [Vol34TheDefence ofJoint Illegal Enterpriseforansweringthisquestionintheaffirmative.48 Thejointillegalenterprisedefenceissupposedtobesensitivetotheblameworthinessof theplaintiff'sillegalconduct.49 Sincethosewhocommitcrimesunderduressor whilebelowtheageof criminalresponsibilityaretypicallymorallyinnocent,the jointillegalenterprisedefenceshouldbeexcludediftheplaintiffcouldavoidbeingheldcriminallyliableonthebasisof thedefencesof duressorinfancy.Indeed,thejointillegalenterprisedefenceoughtto beinapplicableif theplaintiffenjoysanysubstantivecriminallawdefence.Incontrast,possessionof proceduralcriminallawdefences- suchasimmunities,limitationbarsandthedoctrineof abuseofprocess- shouldhavenobearingonwhether thejoint illegalenterprisedefenceapplies.Thisisbecauseproceduralcriminallawdefencesmaybeavailableevenif anoffenderisfully responsiblefor his orher criminalacts.BWithdrawalInthecriminallaw,withdrawalfromajointillegalventureisananswertoliabilityforcomplicity.50 Whatistheimpactof withdrawalonthejointillegalenterprisedefence?If a personentersinto a joint illegalenterprisebut, duringitsprosecution,hasachangeof heartandremoveshimself orherselffromitandcounteractshisor herpriorassistance,willthedefencestillapplyif heorsheissubsequentlyinjuredbythenegligenceof hisorhererstwhileconfederate?TheCourtofAppeal'sdecisioninMillersuggeststhatthisquestionshouldbeansweredintheaffirmativesincetheplaintiff failedeventhoughsheaskedtwicetobeletoutof thevehicle.Admittedly,though,theCourt'sdecisioncannotbetakenasconclusiveonthispoint.Thisisbecausetheplaintiff'sactsinthisrespectwerearguablyinsufficienttocounteractherearliercontributiontotheillegal jaunt.CThe Irrelevance of the Demise ofProximityUntilMiller wasdecided,nosuperiorcourthadconsideredwhetherthetwo-stagetestenunciatedinGala stillappliesdespitethedownfallof proximity.51 ItisunsurprisingthattheCourtof Appealconfirmedthetest'scontinuingapplica-bility.Foronething,Gala moreorlessmerelyapprovedof Smithandthelineofcasesthatfollowedinits wake.Itsimplysuperimposedtheproximityanalysisontheexistinglaw.Secondly,BrennanJ, DawsonJ andTooheyJ reachedthesameconclusionasthepluralityinGala withoutmakinguseoftheconceptofproximity.Thirdly,intherecentcaseof Imbree vMcNeilly,theHighCourtsaid48MydiscussionherehasbeeninfluencedbyPaulRobinson'sclassictaxonomicanalysisofcriminallawdefences:PaulHRobinson,'CriminalLawDefenses:ASystematicAnalysis'(1982)82Columbia Law, Review199.49Seeaboven 20andaccompanyingtext.50See,eg,Criminal Code s 8(2).51InWills vBell [2004]1 QdR296,304-5[11]-[18](McMurdoP),313-14[57](MackenzieJ),3212[91](WhiteJ),theQueenslandCourtof Appealsimplyassumedthatthetwo-stageteststillapplied.Itdidnotdiscussthedemiseofproximity.Inferiorcourtshaveappliedthetestonseveraloccasions:see,eg,NewtonvHill[2000]SADC53(28April2000);WokvO'Keefe(2006)46SR(WA)146,150-2[15]-[18](MullerDCJ).2010] 433Melbourne University Law Reviewthatthedemiseoftheconceptofproximitydidnotnecessarilymeanthatdecisionswhichhad recourse tothatconceptarenolonger binding. 5 2VIDOCTRINALDIFFICULTIESWITHTHEJOINTILLEGALENTERPRISEDEFENCEThisPartof thearticleidentifiesseveralwaysinwhichthejoint illegalenter-prisedefenceclasheswithotherpartsof tortlaw.Twopointsshouldbeborneinmindthroughout.First,thissurveyisnotexhaustive.Itmerelyhighlightsaselectionof waysinwhichthedefenceisunprincipled.Secondly,theconcernhereisnotwiththemeritsof denyingclaimsonthegroundthattheplaintiff wasinjuredwhileinvolvedina jointillegalenterprisewiththedefendant(thisissuewill beaddressedlater 53). Thepurposeof thisPartistopointout whythis jointillegal enterprisedefenceispoorlyconstructed.AThe Allocation of the Onus ofProofThepleaof jointillegalenterpriseisroutinelydescribedasa'defence'.54Becausethisterminologyisentrenched,it hasbeenused in thisarticle.However,itisnotwithoutdifficulty.Theproblemisthat itdoesnotmakeitclearthatthepleaisadenialof oneof theelementsof thecauseof actioninnegligence(thedutyof care)ratherthanarulethatexemptsthedefendantfromliabilityevenifallof theelementsof negligencearepresent(an'affirmativedefence').Itwouldbebettertorefertothepleaasan'absentelementdefence'.55 Thiswoulddistinguishitfromaffirmativedefences.Onereasonwhyitisimportanttorememberthat thejoint illegalenterprisedefenceisanabsentelementdefenceisthatthewayinwhichdefencesarecategorisedhasimportantconsequences.Considertheallocationof theonusof proof. Itisafundamentalruleof civilprocedurethattheplaintiffbearstheonusof provingallof theelementsof thewrongthatheorsheallegesthedefendantcommittedandthatitfallstothedefendanttomakeoutanyaffirmativedefences.Becausethejointillegalenterprisedefenceisanabsentelementdefence,itoughttobeup tothe plaintifftoshowthatitdoesnotapply.Butthisisnotthecase.Indisregardof theestablishedruleregardingtheallocationof theonusof proof,thecourtshaveconsistentlyheldthatthedefendantmustprove56 thatthe jointillegalenterprise52(2008)236CLR510,526-7[46]-[47](Gummow,HayneandKiefelJJ).GleesonCJandCrennanJ agreedwiththeplurality'sreasons:at513[1](GleesonCJ),565-6[193](CrennanJ).53SeebelowPartVII.54See,eg, Joslyn vBerryman (2003)214CLR552,573[63](Gummowand CallinanJJ);Brown vHarding[2008]NSWCA51(31March2008)[5](HodgsonJA,Hidden andHislop JJ); Sangha vBaxter [2007]NSWCA264(28September2007)[82](YoungCJin Eq).55ThelanguageistakenfromPaulHRobinson,StructureandFunctioninCriminal Law(ClarendonPress,1997)12.56Tothecivilstandard:HanesvTheWaianesa Mutual InsuranceCo[1963]SCR154,164(RitchieJforKerwinCJ,Taschereau,MartlandandRitchieJJ);Tomlinson vHarrison [1972]1OR670,675(AddyJ);Lindsay vPoole1984SLT269,269(LordMayfield);Sloan vTriplett1985SLT294,296(LordAllanbridge);Wilson v Price 1989SLT484,486(LordMilligan).434 [Vol34TheDefence ofJoint Illegal Enterprisedefenceapplies.5 7 Thecourtshavesoughtto justifythisstateofaffairsonthebasisthatthedefenceisrarelyenlivened.However,thisattemptfallsshortof themark.Themerefact that anexceptionto therulethattheplaintiff mustprove theelementsof thetortinwhichheorshesuesisinfrequentlyenliveneddoesnotjustify thatexception.5 8BThe Joint Illegal EnterpriseDefence IsConfined to the Tort of NegligenceIllegalityisadefencethroughoutthetortlawuniverse.59 Itisagenerallyapplicableanswertoliability.However,negligenceistheonlyactioninwhichthetwo-stagetestestablishedinGala isusedtodeterminetheimpactof thefactthattheplaintiffwasinjuredwhilecommittinganillegalact.Thissituationisobjectionable.60 Thereisnoobviousreasonfor approachingtheissueof illegalityfromadifferentdirectioninthenegligencecontextthaninthesettingof othertorts.Moreover,itisincongruousthatthemethodfordeterminingtheconse-quencesoftheplaintiff'sillegalconductdependsuponthetortwhichthedefendantisallegedtohavecommitted.Thisisbecause,incasesthataretaintedwithillegalconductonthepartof theplaintiff,itisthefactthattheplaintiffactedillegallythatisimportant.Anotherproblemwithusingaseparateruletodeterminetheeffectoftheplaintiff'sunlawfulconductinproceedingsinnegligenceisthatitcanintroduceunnecessarycomplexityincasesinwhichtheplaintiffsuesbothinnegligenceandinanothertort.Ifthedefendantinsuchacasepleadsillegalityinanswertobothcausesof action,stockof theplaintiff'sillegal conductmust betakenindifferentwaysin eachaction. ItissurprisingthatthecourtswerenotrequiredtodothisinMiller. TheplaintiffinMillersued,apparently,onlyinnegligence.Itdoesnotseemtohaveoccurredtotheplain-tiff'slawyersthattheplaintiffmayhavehadagoodcauseofactioninfalseimprisonment.61 Recallthat theplaintiff askedtwiceto beallowedtoalightfrom57Gala (1991)172CLR 243,254(MasonCJ, Deane,GaudronandMcHugh JJ); Brown v Harding[2008]NSWCA51(31March2008)[40](HodgsonJA,HiddenandHislopJJ);WillsvBell[2004]1 QdR296,304[12](McMurdoP);Miller (2009)54MVR367,383[74] (BussJA).58Arguably,therealreasonwhythecourtsrequirethedefendanttobeartheonusof proofinrespectofthe jointillegalenterprisedefenceisthattheyareawarethatitispregnantwiththepotentialto inflict graveinjustice(regarding thispotential,seebelow PartVII(B)).Allocatingtheburdenofprooftothedefendantisalowvisibilitydeviceforminimisingthenumberofoccasionsonwhichit applies.However,itis abundantlyclear that thisisnota sufficientbasisfordepartingfromthenormalrulesregardingtheassignmentof theonusof proof. RichardEpsteinrightly pointsoutthat thecourtsshould notuseproceduralrulesto hobbledisfavoureddefences:seeRichardAEpstein,'PleadingsandPresumptions'(1973)40University of Chicago LawReviewv556,579.If thedrawbacksof agivendefenceoutweightheupsides,thepropercourseofactionistoabolishit.59See,eg,Cross vKirkby[2000]EWCACiv426(18February2000)[53]-[68](BeldamU)(trespass);Thackwell v Barclays Bank plc[1986]1 AllER 676(conversion);Thomas Brovn andSonsLtdvDeen(1962)108CLR391(detinue);EmanuelevHedley(1997)137FLR339(malicious prosecutionand misfeasancein a publicoffice).60TheargumentthatfollowshasbeeninfluencedbythereasonsofMcLachlinJ inHall vHebert[1993]2SCR159,183-5(McLachlinJforLaForest,L'Heureux-Dube,McLachlinandlacobucciJJ).61Admittedly,therewouldhavebeenproblemswithsuchanactiongiventhatwhentheplaintiffenteredthevehicle,shemusthaveknown, orshould haveknown,that thedefendantmightrefusetoallowher to alight fromit.2010] 435Melbourne University Law Reviewthevehicleandthatthedefendantrefusedthoserequests.Hadtheplaintiffsuedinfalseimprisonment,thedefendantcouldnothavereliedonthejointillegalenterprisedefencetoavoidliabilitysinceadutyof careisnotanelementof thataction.Instead,hewouldhavehad toarguethattheplaintiff'sillegalactshouldbeconsideredin another way(forexample,viaanaffirmativedefence).CThe FirstStage of the TestThefirststageof thetwo-stagetestaskswhetherthepartieswereengagedinajointillegalenterprisewhentheplaintiffsuffereddamage.If theywerenot,thedefencewouldnotapply.Thisrequirementisimpossibletojustify.ErnestWeinribmadethispointwellwhenheaskedrhetorically:'ifthefocusof thedefenceis theactof illegalityonthepartof theplaintiff,of whatrelevancecanitbe thatthedefendantratherthanathirdpartyisanaccompliceintheillegalityorindeed that thereisanyaccompliceat all?'62 Noconvincing reasonhaseverbeenidentifiedfortreatingcasesinwhichtheplaintiffwasinjuredwhileactingillegallywiththedefendantdifferentlyfromcasesinwhichtheplaintiffwasinjuredwhilecommittinganoffencein whichthedefendantwasnotimplicated.Itiscertainlynotadequatetosaythatjointillegalenterprisecasescallforaseparateapproachbecausethepartieschosetoactoutsidethelaw.Thissimplyrestatesthefactualdifferencebetweensuchactionsandcasesinwhichtheplaintiff wasinjured whilecommittinganoffenceinwhichthedefendantwasnotcomplicit.Itdoesnot explainwhythisdifferenceisimportant.Anexamplemayhelp toilluminatetheabsurdityof thisrequirementif itisnotalreadyapparent.SupposethatPstealsacar. Whiledrivingit,heseesD, afriendof his,walkingonafootpath.PoffersDaride.Dacceptsandasksifhecandrive.Pacquiesces.DdoesnotknowthecarisstolenandhasnoreasontobelievethatPdoesnotownit.PandDareinvolvedinanaccidentduetoD'snegligentdriving.Pisinjured.Thejoint illegalenterprisedefencewouldbeinapplicableinproceedingsbroughtbyPagainstDsincetheywerenot jointlyinvolvedinthecommissionofanoffence.Matterswould(presumably)beotherwise,however,if Dknewthat Pwasusingthecarillegally.But whyshouldD'sknowledgeinthisrespectmatterintheslightest?PisinthesamepositionmorallynomatterwhatknowledgeDpossesses.WhatDknowsordoesnotknowisirrelevanttoP's culpability. Notealsothat, ridiculously,thefactthattheapplicationof thejointillegalenterprisedefenceisconditionaluponthepartiesbeingcomplicitinthecommissionof anoffencemeansthatDwouldpotentiallystandinabetterpositioninrelationto hisliabilitytoP hadheknownthatthecarwasstolen.HadD beenawarethatP hadtakenthecar unlawfully,D wouldhavebeencomplicitwithP inusingitillegallyandwould thusprobablynothavebeenliabletoP.62ErnestJ Weinrib,'IllegalityasaTort Defence'(1976)26University of Toronto LawJournal 28,34.ConsideralsotheremarksinAndrewsvTheNominal Defendant (1965)66SR(NSW)85,95(WalshJ); Hughesv AtlantaSteel Co,71SE728,729(EvansPJ)(Ga,1911).436 [Vol34TheDefence ofJoint Illegal EnterpriseDThe Second Stage of theTestIf thefirststageof thetestissatisfied,oneproceedsto thesecondstage.Thispartof thetestinquireswhetherthenatureof theillegalenterpriserendersit'impossible'or'notfeasible'todeterminehowthereasonablepersoninthedefendant'spositionwouldhaveacted.Ifitisimpossibleornotfeasibletoascertain howthereasonableperson wouldhave behaved,thedefencewill apply.I'Impossible' or'Not Feasible' to Set a Standardof CareThesecondstageof thetestisconstitutedby two alternativeconditions.Itwillbesatisfiedif itisimpossibletoset astandardof careor if itisnot feasibletodoso.Letusinspecteachconditionmoreclosely.Byincludingtheimpossibilityconditionwithinthesecondstageof thetest,theHighCourtmusthavebeenoftheopinionthatitcannotalwaysbedeterminedhowthereasonablepersonwouldbehaveinagivensituation.Thisviewshouldberejected.63 Beingreasonable,thereasonablepersonalwaysdoeswhatthereisthemostreasontodo.If thebalanceof reasonssupportsx-ing, thereasonablepersonwill x.If y-ingissupportedbyanundefeatedreason,thereasonablepersonwill y.Sincethereare always reasonstoactinonewayor another,it isalways possibletogiveananswertothequestion:whatwouldthereasonablepersonhavedoneinthecircumstances?(Ofcourse,differentpeoplemaygivedifferentanswerstothisquestion,butthisisbesidethepoint.)Accordingly,sincetheimpossibilityconditioncanneverbesatisfied,itshouldbe jettisoned.Inanyevent,itdoesnotaddanythingtothefeasibilitycondition.64 Ifitisimpossibletodosomethingitwillalsobe unfeasible todoit.Thefeasibilityconditionisalsoproblematic.Whatpreciselymakesitunfeasi-bletosetastandardof careincasesinwhichthepartieswereinvolvedinthecommissionofaseriousjointcriminalenterprise?Wehavenotbeentold.Perhapsit isthought tobeunfeasibletoidentifyastandardin suchcasesbecauseevidenceofhow(forexample)thereasonablebankrobber,thereasonablegetawaydriverandsoonwouldhaveactedwillbehardtocomeby.Suchevidenceislikely,forobviousreasons,tobeverydifficultorimpossibletoobtain.Butthisdoesnotrenderitunfeasibleforthecourttoaskhowthereasonablepersoninthepositionof aparticipantinajointcriminalenterprisewouldhaveacted.Thecourt'staskisoftenmadedifficult,inthemostmundaneof cases,byapaucityof evidence.If thecourtsrefusetodecidedisputeswhen-evertheyareconfrontedbyawantof evidence,fewcaseswouldberesolved.Anotherpossibilityisthatthecourtsbelievethatitisunfeasibletosetastandardof careincasesinwhichthepartieswereinvolvedinaseriousjointcriminalenterprisebecausedoingsowouldbeembarrassing.65 If thisiswhatthecourts63Forcommentssympatheticto thisproposition,seeWVH Rogers,Winfield and Jolowicz onTort(Sweet&Maxwell, 18thed,2010)1157;FrancisTrindade,PeterCaneandMarkLunney,TheLawof Torts in Australia (Oxford UniversityPress,4"'ed, 2007)702.64Italiano v Barbaro(1993)40FCR 303,329(Neaves,Burchettand WhitlamJJ).65See,eg,thecommentsinJacksonvHarrison (1978)138CLR438,457-8(JacobsJ);Gala(1991)172CLR 243,275-6,278(DawsonJ).2010] 437Melbourne University Law Reviewhaveinmind,theywoulddo wellto jettison thetag'unfeasible'.Itisunhelpful.Thecourtsshouldinsteadsaythatastandardofcarewillnotbesetwhenitwouldbedemeaningforthecourtstoaskhowthereasonablepersoninthedefendant'spositionwould haveacted.2The Dangerousnessof the Parties'ActivityIthasoftenbeenstressedthatapivotalfactortoconsiderinrelationtothesecondstageof the testisthedangerousnessof theparties'activity.66 However,lookingtothedangerousnessof theparties'activitytodecidewhetherthe jointillegalenterprisedefenceappliesdoesnotmakesense.67 Inthefirstplace,thefactthattheplaintiff puthimself orherself inharm'swayistakenintoaccountthroughvariousotherrules,especiallytheprovisionforapportionmentforcontributorynegligence.Theapportionment provisionisa muchmoresubtleandsophisticatedwayof takingstockof unjustifiedrisk-takingbytheplaintiff thanthejointillegalenterprisedefence,whichoperatesinanallornothingway.Secondly,if thepartieswere jointlyengagedinarelativelydanger-freebutveryseriouscriminalenterprise,thesmallriskof injurywouldmilitateagainstthedefenceapplying.Thisresultiscounterintuitive.Thirdly,ifitisthedangerous-nessof theventurethatmatters,whyisitnotalsothelawthatallindividualswhoarejointlyengagedinhighriskbutlawfulactivitiesdonotowereciprocaldutiesof care?Forthesereasons,the jointillegalenterprisedefenceshouldbeinsensitiveto thedangerousnessof theparties'activity.3Could thePlaintiff HaveReasonablyExpectedtheDefendant toExerciseProperCare?Thecourtshavesaidthatanimportantconsiderationtotakeintoaccountinapplying thesecondstageof thetwo-stagetestiswhetherthe plaintiff couldhavereasonablyexpectedthedefendanttoexercisereasonablecare.ThisfactorwasgivenconsiderableweightinGala68 andby theCourtof Appealin Miller.69 Itisdoubtful,however,whetherthisfactorshouldberelevantinthisconnection.Ithasnotbeenexplainedwhyitshouldnotalsobeimportantincasesthatdonotraisethejointillegalenterprisedefence.Apassengertravellinginamotorvehiclethatisbeingcontrolledbyapersonwhohasneverdrivenacarbeforeobviouslycannotreasonablyexpectthatthedriverwillachievethestandardofthereasonablycompetentdriver.Butthelearnerdriverneverthelessowesadutyof care tothepassenger.EWithdrawalItwasnotedearlierthattheCourtof Appeal'sdecisioninMillerarguablysupportsthepropositionthatwithdrawalbytheplaintifffromajointcriminal66See,eg,Gala (1991)172CLR243,254 (MasonCJ,Deane,GaudronandMcHughJJ).67OnthispointseetheusefuldiscussioninItaliano vBarbaro (1993)40FCR303,309-10(Black CJand BeazleyJ),330(Neaves,Burchettand Whitlam JJ).68(1991)172CLR243,254 (Mason CJ, Deane,Gaudronand McHughJJ).69(2009)54MVR367,384-7[79]-[81],[83],[90](BussJA),400-1[149],[152]-[153](NewnesJA).438 [Vol34TheDefence ofJoint Illegal Enterpriseenterprisewill notexcludethejointillegalenterprisedefence.70 Isthispositionsound?I donotthinkthat itisfor tworeasons.First,acceptingthatwithdrawalcanoustthejointillegalenterprisedefencegivesthosewhosignuptojointcriminalenterprisesanincentivetowithdraw.Admittedly,thisargumentisoffairlylimitedforce.Foronething,therearealreadypowerful reasonstoabandonjointcriminalenterprises.Withdrawalpreventscriminalliabilityfromarising.Moreover,bywithdrawingfromsuchanenterpriseonewillalsooftenextricateoneselffromasituationofphysicaldanger.Finally,thisargumentassumes,surelyunrealistically,thatwerethedefencequalifiedbythedoctrineof with-drawal,thisfact wouldbecomeknowntothepublic.Thesecondargumenthastodowiththeconsistencywithwhichtortlawhasrecoursetothecriminallaw'sdoctrines.Thecivilcourtsseemtomakeuseofcriminallawprinciplestodeterminewhatconstitutesajointcriminalenterpriseforthepurposesof thejointillegalenterprisedefence.'Doesitnotfollowthattortlawshouldalsoaccept thecriminal law'spositionin relation to theeffectof withdrawal?FDoes the Joint Illegal EnterpriseDefence Defythe Sequence inWhich Issuesinan Actionin Negligence Should Be Addressed?Thissectiondiscussesafeatureof thejointillegalenterprisedefencethatIinitiallythoughtwasobjectionableondoctrinalgrounds.I previouslybelievedthatthedefencecouldbeimpugnedonthebasisthatitfloutsthesequenceinwhichtheelementsintheactioninnegligenceshouldbeaddressed.Myreason-ingwasasfollows.Twoof theelementsthatconstitutethetortof negligenceareadutyof careandabreachof thatduty.Inaskingwhethertheplaintiffcansucceedinproceedingsforthistort,oneshouldbeginbyinquiringwhetherthedefendantowedtheplaintiff adutyof care.If nodutywasowed,that istheendof theprocess.Theplaintiff will fail.If, however,adutywasowed, thenextstepistoaskwhetherthedefendantbreachedthatduty.Themainreasonwhytheinquiryintothedutyelementlogicallyprecedesthat intothebreachelement72isthatitisnonsensicaltotalkof abreachwithoutfirstdecidingthatadutywasowed.Withoutaduty,thereisnothingthatcanbebreached?3 Thejointillegalenterprisedefencedefiesthissequence.Itsapplicationisconditionalonitbeingpossibleorfeasibletoascertainhowthereasonablepersoninthepositionof thedefendantwouldhavebehaved.Thisisanissuethatgoestothebreachelement.Accordingly, thequestionof whetherthedefenceappliesshouldonlybeencoun-teredafteradutyhasbeenfoundtoexist.Yet,illogically,whenthedefenceapplies,it preventsadutyfrombeingerected.Thegistof thisreasoningcanbe70SeeabovePartV(B).71Consider theremarksinPitts vHunt [1991]1 QB24,49(BeldamU).72Forauthoritythat thedutyandbreachelementsshouldbe analysedinthissequence,seeRomeo vConservation Commission(NT)(1998)192CLR431,475[115](KirbyJ);ModburyTriangleShopping Centre PtyLtd v Anzil (2000)205CLR 254, 274[59](Kirby J).7Forelaboration,seeJohnCPGoldbergandBenjaminCZipursky,'TheRestatement (Third)andthePlaceof DutyinNegligenceLaw'(2001)54Vanderbilt LawReview657,684-5.2010] 439Melbourne University Law Reviewcapturedbysaying that thedefence,whenengaged,deniesthatwhichmustexistin orderfor itto bealiveissue.Iamnolongerconvincedthatthiscriticismofthejointillegalenterprisedefenceholdswater. Themaindifficultywithitisthat itseemedto commitmetotheview thatit ispossiblefor adutyto exist thatdoesnot haveanycontent.I amnoteagertoembracethisunattractivepropositionsincetheexistenceof adutysurelypresupposesthatitcanbedeterminedwhatitdemandsof thosewhooweit.74 Where,then,doesmyargumentgo wrong?I amtentativelyof theviewthattheproblemiswithmyclaimabouttheserialorderofthedutyandbreachelements.Thispropositionmaybeinneedof revision.I stillbelievethatadutymustexistbeforetherecanbeabreachand,consequently,thatoneshouldaddressthedutyissuebeforethatofbreach.However,itmaybepossibletoprovisionally holdthatadutyof careexistsand then,onceonegets tothebreachstageandfindsthatitisimpossibleornotfeasibletosetastandardof care,toreopenthedutyissueandconcludethat,becauseastandardcannotbeset,nodutywasactuallyowed.Ifsuchprovisionalfindingsarepermissible,thejointillegalenterprisedefenceisconsistentwiththesequentialorderingof thedutyandbreachelements.GConclusionFortheforegoingreasons,thetwo-stagetestthatgovernsthejointillegalenterprisedefencesitsuncomfortablywithimportantprinciplesofthelawoftort. Accordingly,if theHighCourtconcludesthat jointillegalenterpriseshouldremainatort defence,itissubmittedthat thetwo-stagetestthatgovernsitshouldbe reformulated.VIICANTHEJOINTILLEGALENTERPRISEDEFENCEBEJUSTIFIED?In thepreviousPart,somedoctrinaldifficultieswith the jointillegal enterprisedefencewerediscussed.Theanalysisnowshiftsgear.Thefocushereisonwhetheritisdefensibletodenyclaimson thebasis thattheplaintiff wasinjuredwhilecommittingaseriouscriminaloffencewiththedefendant.Adisturbingfeatureof thejurisprudenceonthejointillegalenterprisedefenceisthatmostjudgesandcommentatorswho haveconsidered thedefencehavesimplyassumedthatit isdefensible.Take,for instance,WalshJ's remarkin Smith:I thinkitisasufficientexplanationandjustificationof sucharesult[namely,denyingaremedytoa plaintiffinjuredinthecourseof a joint illegalenterprisewiththedefendant]tosaythattherelationshipinwhichthepartieshaveplacedthemselvesisnotonetowhichthelawattachesarightofactionfornegli-gence.75Thisisnoexplanationorjustificationatall,letaloneasufficientone.Itismerelyadescriptionof what happenswhenthe joint illegalenterprisedefenceis74Seeespecially Jackson vHarrison (1978)138CLR438,457(JacobsJ).75(1970)119CLR 397,433.440 [Vol34TheDefence ofJoint Illegal Enterpriseenlivened. Itidentifiesno reasonfor recognisingit. Likewise,considerJacobsJ'scomment in Jackson vHarrison:Beforethecourtswillsaythattheappropriatestandardof careisnotpermittedtobeestablishedtheremustbesucharelationshipbetweentheactof negli-genceandthenatureof theillegalactivitythatastandardof careowedintheparticularcircumstancescouldonlybedeterminedbybringingintoconsidera-tionthenatureof theactivityinwhichthepartieswereengaged....Thecourtswillnotengagein[such an]invidiousinquiry.Thereasonisnodoubtbasedonpublicpolicy.76NoticethatJacobsJdidnotsaywhypublicpolicydemandsthatadutyof careshouldnotbeerectedasbetweenco-offenders.Hesaidnothingatallonthiscrucialissue. Theseexamplescouldbe multipliedmanytimesover.77Thetruthof thematteristhatitisdoubtfulthatthereisasoundrationaleforthejointillegalenterprisedefence.78 Itwillnowbedemonstratedthatthemainrationalesthathavebeenofferedinsupportof itareunconvincing.ADeterringCriminalConductItisutterlyimplausibletosuggestthatthejoint illegalenterprisedefencecanbeupheldon thebasis thatitdetersoffending.79Foronething, thegeneral publicisunlikelytobeawareofthedefence'sexistence.Moreimportantly,anydeterrentimpactmadebythedefencesurelypalesincomparisonwithotherdisincentivestocommitcriminalacts,suchasthethreatofincurringcriminalpenaltiesandtheriskof sufferingseriouspersonalinjury(thecriminalconducttypicallyinissueinjointillegalenterprisecases- usingamotorvehiclewithout theowner'sconsent- is usuallyfraught withdanger).76(1978)138CLR 438,457-8.7Initsrecentreport on thedefenceof illegality, theLawCommissionof EnglandandWalesalsobemoanedthat'itwasrareforthecourttoreferexplicitlytoanyof thepolicyreasonsthatjustifiedtheapplicationofthedefence':LawCommission,TheIllegality Defence,LawComNo 320(2010)43[3.9].78Ihavepreviouslyarguedthatclaimsintortshouldnot,in theordinarycourseof things,failonthegroundsofillegality:JamesGoudkamp,'ARevivaloftheDoctrineofAttainder?TheStatutoryIllegalityDefencestoLiabilityinTort'(2007)29SydneyLawReview445,451-5;JamesGoudkamp,'TheDefenceof Illegality:Gray vThamesTrains Ltd'(2009)17Torts LawJournal 205,21213;JamesGoudkamp,'Self-DefenceandIllegalityundertheCivil LiabilityAct2002(NSW)(2010)18TortsLawJournal 61,67-8.Inthisarticle,Ifocusonthejustifiabilityof thejointillegalenterprisedefence.Thisexamination,likemypreviouswork,buildsonthegroundbreakingandhighlypersuasivetreatmentofferedinWeinrib,aboven62.ConsideralsotheconvincinganalysisinRobertAPrentice,'OfTortReformandMillionaireMuggers:ShouldanObscureEquitableDoctrineBeRevivedtoDenttheLitigationCrisis?'(1995)32San Diego LawReview53.79JohnFlemingperceptivelynotedthatthedefencemayactuallybecounterproductiveinthisrespect sinceit makesjoint illegalenterprisescheaperfor defendants:Fleming,above n5, 342.2010] 441Melbourne University Law ReviewBPunishmentThejointillegalenterprisedefencecannotbejustifiedonthebasisthatitpunishesoffenders.80 ThisisobviousfromMiller. Aswasalreadynoted,8'theplaintiffin Miller wasnotconvictedof unlawfullyusingamotorvehicleoranyother offenceasaresultof heractsin connectionwiththeaccident.Presumably,shewasnot prosecuted.Itcanbeinferred,therefore,thattheauthoritiesdecidedthatpunishmentwasnotwarranted.YettheCourtof Appealheldthatthedefenceapplied.Evenif aplaintiffdeservespunishment,thedefenceisaspectacularlyinappropriatemechanismfor dispensingit.Thisisprimarilybecausethepenaltythatitimposesdependsontheextentof thelosssufferedbytheplaintiff ratherthanonhisorher culpability.Itisalsobecausethedefencemayresultindoublepunishmentsinceitisnotexcludedbythefactthattheplaintiffhasbeenorislikelytobepunishedunderthecriminallaw. 8 2 Inshort,farfrompromotingthegoalof achievingretributivejustice,thejointillegalenterprisedefenceunder-minesit.TheforegoingwasrealisedlongagobytheSupremeCourtof theUnitedStatesinThePhiladelphia, Wilmington,andBaltimoreRailroad CovThePhiladelphiaand Havre deGrace SteamTowboat Co.83 Thiscaseconcernedaclaimarisingoutof damagethatthedefendantstortiouslycausedtotheplain-tiffs'ship.Atthetimethedamagewassustained,whichamountedto$7000,theshipwasbeingusedforcommercialpurposesbytheplaintiffs'servantsonaSunday,contrarytoaMarylandstatute.GrierJ, whodeliveredthereasonsof theCourtupholdingaverdictintheplaintiffs'favour,remarked:'Wedonotfeeljustified...ininflictinganadditionalpenaltyof seventhousanddollarsonthe[plaintiffs]...becausetheirservantsmayhavebeensubjecttoapenaltyoftwentyshillingseachfor breachof thestatute.'84CPreventing Wrongful ProfitingWhatabout theideathatthelawshouldnotcountenancewrongfulprofiting?Itiscertainlyageneralprincipleof thelawthatwrongdoersshouldnotprofitfromtheirtransgressions.Doesthis policysupportthe jointillegalenterprisedefence?Clearlyitdoesnot.Contrarytowhatonereadsinnewspapers,plaintiffsdonot80AllenLindenattemptedtodefendthejointillegalenterprisedefenceonthisbasis:AllenMLinden, CanadianTort Law(Butterworths,5"' ed,1993)473.81Seeabove PartV(A).82Aninterestingcontrastcanbedrawnherebetweenthejointillegalenterprisedefenceandtheprinciplesthatgoverntheavailabilityof exemplarydamages.Exemplarydamageswillnotbeawardedwheretheplaintiff hasbeen punishedfor hisorher conductin questionbythecriminallaw:Archer vBroivn[1985]QB401,423(PeterPainJ);ABvSouthWestWater ServicesLtd[1993]QB507,527(Stuart-SmithLJ);Gray vMotor Accident Commission (1998)196CLR1,13-17[38]-[56](GleesonCJ,McHugh,GummowandHayneJJ),31-4[92]-[98](KirbyJ),51[144](CallinanJ).CfMessengerNewspapersGroupLtdvNational Graphical Association[1984]IRLR397,407[79](CaulfieldJ).The joint illegalenterprisedefenceisnot subjectto anysuch requirement.8364US209(1859).84lbid218-19.442 [Vol34TheDefence ofJoint Illegal Enterprisestandtoprofitfromdamagesawardsintort.8 5 Theymerelyseektoundotheirloss. Hadtheplaintiff in Miller beenawardedcompensation,shewouldnothavebeenplacedinabettereconomicpositionthan thatwhichshewouldhavebeenin priorto theaccident.Shesimplywouldhavebeenreturned,toanextent,8 6 tothepositionthatshe wouldhaveoccupiedbutfor thedefendant'stort.DUpholding the Dignity of the CourtsOnemightseektosupportthejointillegalenterprisedefenceonthegroundthatitpreservesthedignityof thecourts.Itis,ofcourse,abasicprincipleofjusticethattheintegrityof the judicialsystemmust beupheld.Itisalsotrue thatif thecourtscometotheaidof wrongdoers,theirstandingmaybediminishedintheeyesofthepublic(evenifindoingsotheyarenotfacilitatingwrongfulprofiting).Allof thisisreadilyaccepted.Buttheneedtoupholdthedignityofthecourtsdoesnot justifythedefence.Thisisbecauseawrongdoerisbenefitedwhetheror notthedefenceapplies.Foreverywrongdoing plaintiff thatisdeniedaremedyin tortvia the joint illegalenterprisedefence,adefendantwhoengagedinthesamecriminalactivityisbenefited.Millerexemplifiesthispoint.Inholdingthat thedefenceapplied,theCourtof Appealconferredabenefitonthedefendant(ofcourse,therealbeneficiarywasalmostcertainlythethird-partyliabilityinsurerof theownerof thestolenvehiclebut,nominallyatleast,thedefendantwasassisted).Whatismore,thedefencebenefitedthemoreculpablepartysincethedefendant'swrongdoingwasfarmoreseriousthantheplaintiff's(recallthatthedefendantwassentencedtofiveyears'imprisonment7 whereastheplaintiff wasnot (apparently)even prosecuted").Theargumentherecanbetakenfurther.Publicconfidenceinthecourtsandtortlawshouldactuallybeincreasedif thedefencedidnotexist.Atpresent,ifthedefenceapplies,thedefendantwillbeabsolvedof civilliability.Thereisnothingthat thecourtscandothroughthemediumof tortlawtoreflectthefactthatthedefendantisawrongdoer.89 Nowimagineasystemof tortlawidenticalinallrespectstoourownsaveforthefactthatitdoesnotrecognisethejointillegalenterprisedefence.Insuchasystem,adefendantwhocommitsatortagainsthisorherco-offenderwillbeheldcivillyaccountable(unlessanotherdefenceapplies)andthelatter'sdamageswillinvariablybereducedinpropor-tiontohisorherculpabilitypursuanttotheapportionmentprovision.Whichsystemdeservesmorerespect?Oursystemof tortlawismanifestlyinferior.Itletswrongdoingdefendantsgetoff scot-free.Incontrast,thehypotheticalsystem85Therearesomeminorandpresentlyirrelevantexceptionstothisposition.Forexample,thepotentialfor profitingexistsif exemplarydamagesareawarded.86Thepartiesagreedthattheplaintiff wasguiltyof contributorynegligenceintheorderof50 percent:Miller vMiller (2008)57SR(WA)358,360[2](SchoombeeDCJ).Accordingly,hadthejointillegalenterprisedefencenotapplied,theplaintiff wouldonlyhaverecoveredhalf her loss(atbest).87Seeabove n 26.88SeeabovePartV(A).89Ofcourse,thedefendantmaybepunishedunderthecriminallaw,butthisisbynomeansguaranteed.2010] 443Melbourne University Law Reviewthatisnotburdenedbythedefenceisabletoreflect thefactthat bothpartiesinjoint illegalitycasescommitteda wrong.90ENot Condoning Breaches of the CriminalLawWhatabouttheideathattortlawshouldnotcondonebreachesof thecriminallaw?NewnesJAmentioneditasapossiblerationaleforthejointillegalenter-prisedefenceinMiller.91 Butitrequireslittlethoughttoseethatthisideadoesnotsustainthedefence.Byawardingaplaintiffdamagesintort,thecourtdoesnotnecessarilyapproveof hisorher behaviour. Considerthefollowingcases:(i)InReevesvCommissioner of Police of the Metropolis,92 policeofficersnegligentlyfailedtopreventamanwhowasintheircustodyfromcom-mittingsuicide.TheHouseofLordsupheldactionsunderLordCamp-bell'sAct93 bythedeceased'sdependants.ArewereallytoinferthattheHouse therebycondonedsuicide?(ii)In Revillv Newbery,94 theplaintiff wasshot byanoccupierof apropertythathewasattemptingtoburglarise.TheEnglishCourtof Appealupheldanactionforcompensation.Canitreallybeinferredthat,insoholding,theCourtapprovedof burglaries?(iii)InFontin vKatapodis,95 theplaintiffstruckthedefendantseveraltimeswithapieceof wood.Thedefendantretaliatedbythrowingapieceofglassat theplaintiff.Theglassstrucktheplaintiff causinghimseriousin-jury. TheHighCourtheldthattheplaintiff wasentitledtocompensation.Canit reallybeinferredfromthis holdingthattheHighCourtapprovedofviolenceof thekindinwhichtheplaintiff engaged?90Against theforegoing,onemaypoint outthat publicoutcrytypicallyensueswheneveraplaintiffwhoisinjuredwhilecommittinganoffencerecoverscompensation.Thisadmittedlyrevealsadilemma.ForthereasonsthatIhavegiven,weshouldrespecttortlawmoreif theillegalitydefencedidnotexist.Thelayperson,however,plainlydoesnotholdthisview.Doesthismeanthatthelawshouldbeframedsoastopromoteconfidenceinitamongtheminoritywhothinkdeeplyaboutit,orshoulditpandertotheirrationalviewsandprejudicesofthemajority?Unfortunately,itisnotpracticaltoofferacomprehensiveanswertothisquestionwithintheconfinesof thisarticle.Itisworthobservingthatananalogousproblemarisesinrelationtothelawgoverningjudicialbias.Settingasidedecisionsthatareinfectedwithbias(actualorapparent)should instilpublicconfidencein thelawsinceitpublicly demonstratesthatmeasuresfor detectinganderadicatingbiasexistand areeffective.Unfortunately, however,thepublicmaynotappreciatethisfactandillogicallyconcludethatfindingsof biasrevealaseriousproblemwiththelegalsystem'sintegrity.Giventhispossibility,howshouldthecourtswieldtheruleagainstbias?I discussedthisconundrumin JamesGoudkamp,'Facingupto ActualBias'(2008)27Civil Justice Quarterly 32;JamesGoudkamp,'ApparentBias:Helow vSecretary of State forthe Home Department' (2009)28Civil Justice Quarterly 183.91(2009)54MVR367,400[147].SeealsoGala (1991)172CLR243,270-3(BrennanJ),277-9(DawsonJ); Hohn vKing [2004]2QdR508,521[54](ChestermanJ).92[2000]1 AC360.93FatalAccidentsAct 1976(UK)c 30.94[1996]QB567.95(1962)108CLR177.444 [Vol34TheDefence ofJoint Illegal EnterpriseTheseexamplesdemonstratethatshortshriftshouldbegiventothesuggestionthatthejoint illegalenterprisedefenceisneededtoensurethattortlawdoesnotcondonebreachesof thecriminallaw.FDistributive JusticeJudgeshavesoughtto justifythe jointillegalenterprisedefenceby pointingtoperceiveddistributiveinjusticesthatwouldoccurinitsabsence.Forinstance,inGray vThamesTrains LtdLordHoffmannwrotethatthedefence'hastobejustifiedonthegroundthatitisoffensiveto public notionsof thefairdistributionof resourcesthataclaimantshouldbecompensated(usuallyout of publicfunds)for theconsequencesof hisowncriminalconduct.'96 Thislineof reasoningfacesanumberof formidableobstacles.Itwillsufficetomentionthreeof them.First,itdoesnotexplainwhythejointillegalenterprisedefencerequiresproofofcomplicitybetweenthepartiesinacriminalact.Whyshouldthis beaprecondi-tiontotheavailabilityof thedefenceif theconcernistowithholdcompensationfromthoseunworthyof receivingit?Secondly,itmyopicallyfocusesonplain-tiffs.Itignoresthefactthatthejointillegalenterprisedefencemightenabledefendantstoundeservedlyacquireagreatershareof society'sresourcesattheplaintiff'sexpense.Thirdly,it assumesthat tortlawisconcernedwith ameliorat-ingdistributiveinjustices.Plainly, thisisnotontortlaw'sagenda.If itwere,tortlaw wouldnot,for example,awardearnings-linkedcompensation.GForfeitureAnattemptmightbemadetosupport the joint illegalenterprisedefenceonthebasisof atheoryof forfeiture,thatis,thenotionthatonewhobreaksthelawtherebyforfeitshisorherlegalrights.Thistheorywasimportanttothelawinearliertimes.Itwasexemplifiedbythedoctrineof attainder.97 Pursuanttothisdoctrine,outlawsandthoseconvictedof capitaloffencesweredeclareddeadintheeyesof thelawinanticipationof theirexecution.Theyhad nolegalrights.Ithardlyneedsto besaid that thelaw nolongerembracesthenotion of forfeiture.98Thisbeingthecase,itcannotbeusedtosustainthejointillegalenterprisedefence.HSummaryTosummarise,theargumentsthathavebeenofferedinsupportofthejointillegalenterprisedefenceareunsatisfying.Theyallquicklydescendintoconfusion.Itisdoubtfulthataconvincingrationaleforthedefenceexists.Even96[2009]AC1339,1376[51].Seealso Cusack vStayt (2000) 31MVR517,522[26](HeydonJA).97Fordiscussionofthedoctrine,seeSirWilliamBlackstone,CommentariesontheLawsofEngland (9thed,1783)volIV, 373-82.98See,eg,Heniood vTheMunicipal Tranways Trust (South Australia) (1938)60CLR438,446(LathamCJ):'thereisnogeneralprincipleof Englishlawthat aperson whois engagedinsomeunlawfulactisdisabledfromcomplainingofinjurydonetohimbyotherpersons,eitherdeliberatelyor accidentally.Hedoesnot becomecaput lupinum.'2010] 445Melbourne University Law Reviewif adecent justificationforit isidentified,thefactremainsthatthedefencehasthepotentialtoinflictseriousinjusticeonplaintiffsbypunishingthemindis-criminatelyanddisproportionately.Anoverwhelmingcaseexists,therefore,foritsabolition.ThisstepwastakenbytheSupremeCourtof Canadainitsland-markdecisionin Hall v Hebert.99 Thiscaseinvolvedaclaimbyapassengerwhowasinjuredinamotorvehicleaccidentthat wascausedbythenegligenceof thevehicle'sdriver.Thedrivercontestedliabilityonthegroundthatbothheandtheplaintiffhadconsumedlargequantitiesofalcoholinthehoursbeforetheaccidentandhaddonesoinapublicplace(whichwasunlawful).TheSupremeCourtheldthatthedefencedoesnotapplyinthetortcontextsaveinveryexceptionalcircumstances.00 ItissubmittedthattheHighCourtshouldreachthesameconclusion.101VIIITHESTATUTORYILLEGALITYDEFENCESANDTHEIRRELEVANCETOTHEAPPEALINMILLERSinceGala wasdecided,thelegislaturesinseveral jurisdictionshaveenactedstatutoryillegalitydefences.102 Theaimof thisPartof thearticleistodeterminetherelevanceof thesestatutorydefencestotheappealinMiller. Beforecomingtothisissue,however,itisnecessarytoprovideanoutlineof thedefences.AAnOutline of the Statutory Illegality DefencesItisunnecessaryformetoreviewthestatutoryillegalitydefencesingreatdetailsinceIexploredthematsomelengthinothercontributions.103Iwillsimplyprovideasketchofthem.Thefollowingpointscapturetheirmainfeatures:(i)Statutoryillegalitydefencesof generalapplicationexistinalljurisdic-tionsexceptforWesternAustraliaandVictoria.ItistruethattheVicto-rianlegislaturehasprovidedforaprovision,uniqueinAustralia,whichstatesthatthefactthatthe plaintiff wascommittinganoffenceatthetimeofsufferingdamageisafactortotakeintoaccountinconsideringwhetherthedefendantactednegligently.104 However,thisprovisiondoes99[1993]2SCR159.Seealso British Columbia v Zastoiwny[2008]1 SCR 27.100Fordiscussionofexceptionalsituationsinwhichthedefencemayserveausefulfunction,seebelowPartIX.101The jointillegalenterprisedefenceis notrecognisedintheUnitedStates.Itisnotmentionedintheleadingtreatisein theUnitedStatesontort:WPageKeetonetal(eds),Prosserand Keetonon Torts (5" ed,1984).102Civil La,(Wrongs)Act2002 (ACT)s 94;Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)ss54-54A; PersonalInjuries (Liabilities andDamages)Act 2003(NT)s10;Criminal Code Act1899(Qld)s6(asinsertedbyCriminalLawAmendment Act1997(Qld)s 4(2));Civil Liability Act 2003(Qld)s 45;Civil Liability Act1936 (SA)s 43;Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas)s6.103SeeGoudkamp,'ARevivaloftheDoctrineofAttainderT,aboven78;Goudkamp,'Self-Defenceand Illegality',aboven78.104WrongsAct 1958(Vic)s14G(2)(b).446 [Vol34TheDefence ofJoint Illegal Enterprisenotalter thecommonlaw,atleastnotin anysignificantway.'IoItisafarcryfrom thestatutorydefencesthatexist in other jurisdictions.106(ii)Mostof thestatutoryillegality defenceswerecreatedinthewakeof the2001-02insurancecrisis.107However,somewereenactedearlier. Forex-ample,theQueenslandlegislatureprovided for anextremelypotentstatu-torydefencein1997.108Thisdefence,whichissuperblyconcealedin theActthatpromulgatesQueensland'scriminalcode,hasgoneunnoticedinallquarters.109 TheQueenslandlegislaturepromptlyforgotthatithaden-actedit.NohintcanbefoundthatitrealisedthatithadalreadycreatedastatutoryillegalitydefencewhenitenactedasecondstatutorydefenceintheCivil Liability Act 2003(Qld).110(iii)Thestatutoryillegalitydefencesvarywildlyfromeachother.Conse-quently,itisextremelydifficulttomakegeneralstatementsaboutthemwithout glossingoversomenotinsignificantwaysin whichtheydiffer.(iv)Thestatutoryillegalitydefencesallrequireproof thattheplaintiffcom-mittedanoffenceatthetimeof sufferingdamage.Exceptin thecaseofoneoftheQueenslanddefences,itisnotnecessary,however,fortheplaintiff to havebeen chargedwith orconvictedof anoffence."(v)Incontrastwiththe joint illegal enterprisedefence,thestatutoryillegalitydefencesaregenerallycapableof beingtriggeredbythecommissionofrelativelytrivialoffences.(vi)ExceptinSouthAustralia, thedefendantneedonlyshowthat theplaintiffcommittedanoffencetothecivilstandardtoengagethestatutoryillegal-itydefences.InSouthAustralia,thedefendantmust adduceevidencethatsatisfies thecriminalstandard.''2(vii)Generallyspeaking,thestatutoryillegalitydefencesdonotapplyunlesstheplaintiff'scriminalconductmateriallycontributedtohisorherdam-105Marshall vOsmond[1983]QB1034,1038(SirJohnDonaldsonMR)suggeststhat thecommonlaw ismateriallyidentical.106I noteinpassingthattheVictorianlegislaturehasalsoprovidedforastatutoryillegalitydefencethatappliesinthecontextofitsmotorvehicleaccidentscompensationscheme:seeTransportAccident Act1986(Vic)s 40.107Manyof thestatutory'reforms'madeto thelawof torts followingtheinsurancecrisishavetheirprovenanceinrecommendationsmadebyPanelofEminentPersons,ReviewvoftheLawvofNegligence:Final Report(2002).Thisisnottrueofthestatutoryillegalitydefences.Thesedefencesaretheproductof legislativeexperimentation.Thecaseforandagainstenactingthemwasnot evenconsideredbythePanel.108CriminalLaw AmendmentAct1997(Qld)s 4,amendingCriminal Code Act 1899(Qld)s 6.109It is not mentionedin anyof theleading tortstextbooks.110TheNorthernTerritorylegislaturecreatedastatutoryillegalitydefenceinLawReform(Miscellaneous Provisions)Act2001 (NT)sI OA.Thissection wasrepealedbyPersonalInjuries(LiabilitiesandDamages) (ConsequentialAmendments) Act 2003(NT)s 3.111Thedefenceins6of theCriminal Code Act1899(Qld)isonlyenlivenedif theplaintiffwasfound guiltyof anindictableoffencecommittedat thetimeof thetort.112Civil Liability Act1936 (SA)s 43(1)(a).2010] 447Melbourne University Law Reviewage. 113Accordingly, themerefact thattheplaintiff wascommittinganof-fenceat thetimeof thedefendant'stortisinsufficientto engagethem.(viii)Inseveraljurisdictions,thestatutoryillegalitydefencesaresubjecttoasafety-valvediscretion.114 Thisdiscretionisexercisablewhenthecir-cumstancesof thecaseareexceptionalanditwouldbeharshandunjustfor thedefenceto apply. "5(ix)Ithassometimesbeenassumedthatthestatutoryillegalitydefencesoustedthecommonlawonillegality.116 Thisassumptioniswrong.Thestatutorydefencesandthecommonlawonillegalityexistconcur-rently. '(x)Thestatutoryillegalitydefencesdo notmerelyparrot thecommonlawonthesubjectofillegality.Theydeviatedramaticallyfromit.Generallyspeaking,theyprovidesignificantlygreaterprotectiontodefendants.Theyapplyinmanysituationsinwhichthejointillegalenterprisede-fencedoes not.BRelevance of the Statutory Illegality Defences to the Appeal in MillerLetitbeassumedthatthecentralargumentsthathavebeenpresentedtothispointaresound,andthattortlawwouldbeinbettershapeifthejointillegalenterprisedefencedidnotexist.DoesthismeanthattheHighCourtshouldabolishit?Itmight bearguedthat,sinceallAustralianlegislaturessavefor thoseinWesternAustraliaandVictoriaenactedstatutoryillegalitydefences,itwouldbeinappropriatefortheHighCourttoremoveacommonlawlimitationonthecircumstancesinwhichthosewhoareinjuredwhilecommittinganoffencecanrecovercompensation.Thereareseveralfataldefectsin thisargument.However,it isunnecessarytodelveintothemallin detailsincetheHighCourthasmadeitclearthatlookingtostatutesfor guidanceindeterminingwhat thecommonlawshouldbeispossibleonlywhenthereisameasureofuniformitythroughout113Thisisnota preconditionto theapplicationof thedefencein s6of theCriminal Code Act1899(Qld).114Thisistrueofthedefenceins45oftheCivil Liability Act2003(Qld).ItisalsotrueofthedefencesinSouthAustralia, theAustralianCapitalTerritoryand theNorthernTerritory:seeCivilLiability Act1936(SA)s 43(2);Civil Law(Wrongs)Act2002 (ACT)s94(2);PersonalInjuries(Liabilitiesand Damages)Act 2003(NT)s 10(2).115Thecaseneednotbeexceptionalinordertotriggerthediscretionins45of theCivil LiabilityAct 2003(Qld).116ThisisimplicitinYoungCJinEq'sreasonsinSanghavBaxter[2007]NSWCA264(28September2007).Theplaintiff'sclaimin thiscasewascontaminatedby unlawfulconductonhispart.YoungCJinEq consideredthe NewSouth Walesstatutoryillegalitydefenceandfoundthatitwasinapplicable:at[74]-[87].Significantly,hisHonourleftmattersthereinsofarastherelevanceoftheplaintiff'sillegalconductwasconcerned.Hedidnotproceedtoconsiderwhethertheplaintiff'sillegalconductaffordedthedefendantwithananswertoliabilityatcom-mon law. Presumably, thiswas becausehe thought therelevantcommonlaw hadbeen abolished.117Thisisexpresslystatedinsome jurisdictions:see,eg,Civil Liability Act2002(NSW)s 3A(1);Civil LiabilityAct2003(Qld)s 7(2);Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas)s 3A(2).SeealsoGoudkamp,'ARevivalof theDoctrineof Attainder?',aboven78,487-90.448 [Vol34TheDefence ofJoint Illegal EnterpriseAustraliaintheapproachestakeninaparticularfield.'8 Plainly,thenecessaryconsistencyisabsenthere.As hasbeenmentioned,nostatutoryillegalitydefenceexistsinWesternAustraliaorVictoria.Moreover,thestatutoryillegalityde-fencesin those jurisdictions that sufferfromthem arefarfromuniform.TheNewSouth Walesdefence,for example,isextremelyheavy-handed.Itexemplifiestheworstexcessesof populistlegislation.Incontrast,thedefencesinSouthAustraliaand theAustralianCapitalTerritoryarefar moremoderate.ArethereanyotherreasonsfortheHighCourttoretainthedefence?Twofurther argumentsmightbemadeinthis regard:(i)Abolishing thedefencewould retrospectively create a newarea of liabil-ity.Thisargumentisweak.Inthefirstplace,thosewhowouldbenefitfrom the joint illegalenterprisedefencewereit retainedcouldhardlycom-plainaboutbeingretrospectivelysaddledwithtortliability.Thisisbe-causethecriminallaw willhaveputthemonnoticethattheirconductinquestionmightbemetwithlegalsanctions.Secondly,itisunlikelythattheremovalof thejointillegalenterprisedefencewouldincreasethenetof liabilityconsiderablysince,insome jurisdictionsatleast,thestatutoryillegalitydefencescovermuchthesameterrainasthejointillegalenter-prisedefence.'9(ii)Thecircumstances in which persons injured while committing an offenceshould be permitted to recover compensation is a politically charged issue(as is apparentfrom thecreation of the statutory illegality defences).Thisistrue.ButthisargumentcannotexplainwhytheHighCourthasmadenumerouschangestopoliticallysensitiveareasof thelawof tort(suchasabolishingtheimmunityof highwayauthoritiesfor nonfeasance'20).Insummary,if, ashasbeenarguedearlierinthisarticle,the jointillegalenter-prisedefenceisunjustifiable,theHighCourtwouldseem tobefreeto abolishit.IXSHOULDAPLEAOFILLEGALITYEVERBEADMITTEDASADEFENCE?I havearguedinthisarticlethatthejointillegalenterprisedefenceshouldbeabolished.However, I donot want tobe takenassuggestingthatillegalityshouldneverbea tortdefence.Thiswouldbegoingtoofar. Consider,for example,whatI havecalledelsewhere'sanctionshiftingactions'.'2'Asanctionshiftingactionisaproceedinginwhichtheplaintiff seeksdamagesin respectof theimpositionof acriminalsanction.Theytypicallyhavethefollowingfactualmatrix.Pis118Esso Australia Resources Ltd vFederal Commissioner of Taxation(1999)201CLR49,61-3[23]-[28](Gleeson CJ,Gaudronand GummowJJ).119ThemainexceptiontothispropositionrelatestoNewSouthWales.ThestatutoryillegalitydefenceinNewSouthWalesisinapplicableif thejointillegalenterprisedefenceisengaged:Civil Liability Act2002 (NSW)s 54(2).120Brodie vSingleton Shire Council (2001)206CLR512.121SeeJamesGoudkamp,'CanTort LawBeUsed to DeflecttheImpact of CriminalSanctions?TheRoleof theIllegalityDefence'(2006)14TortsLawJournal 20;Goudkamp,'TheDefenceofIllegality',aboven78.2010] 449Melbourne University Law ReviewinjuredbyD'stort.Asaresultof thisinjury,Pundergoesapersonalitychange.Dueto thischange,P commitsanoffencefor whichheisconvicted. Psues Dfortheconsequencesof hisconviction(forexample,lossof libertywhileingaol,lossof thecapacitytoearnanincomewhileingaol,damagetoreputationetc).Sanctionshiftingactionshaveusuallyfailedonthegroundsofillegality.22Generallyspeaking,thisishowtheyshouldbedisposedof.Thisisbecausesanctionshiftingactions,unlikeactionsbroughtinrespectof injuriessustainedduringa jointillegalenterprise,havethepotentialtostultifythecriminallawbytakingsomeof thesting outof criminalsanctions.123XCONCLUSIONThejoint illegalenterprisedefenceisunprincipled.Itsuffersfromthefollow-ing doctrinaldifficulties:(i)Thedefencederogateswithout justificationfromestablishedrulesregard-ing theallocationof theonusof proof.(ii)Thedefenceisconfined without justificationto the tortof negligence.(iii)Withoutjustification,thedefenceonlyapplieswhentheplaintiffwasengagedina jointillegalenterprisewiththedefendantatthetimeof suf-feringinjury.(iv)Thedefenceassumesthatitissometimesimpossibleornotfeasibletoinquireastohowthereasonablepersonwouldact.However,itisalwayspossibletoreachaconclusionastowhatthereasonablepersonwoulddoinaparticularsituation.Itisnotsufficientlyclearwhatthecourtsmeanwhentheysaythatitcanbeunfeasibletodeterminehowthereasonablepersonwould havebehaved.(v)Thedefencewronglytakesaccountof thedangerousnessof theparties'joint illegalenterprise.(vi)Thedefencewronglytakesaccountof whetherthereasonablepersonintheplaintiff'spositionwouldhaveexpectedthedefendanttoachievetheobjectivestandardof care.(vii)Withdrawalbytheplaintifffromajointillegalenterpriseshould,but(apparently)doesnot,prevent thedefencefromapplying.In additiontosufferingfromthis welterof doctrinaldefects,publicpolicydoesnotsustainthedefence.Argumentsthathavebeenofferedin supportof denyingliabilityonthegroundsof jointparticipationwiththedefendantinacriminal122See,eg, Adkinsonv Rossi ArmsCo, 659P2d1236(Alaska,1983);Lord vFogcutter Bar, 813P2d 660(Alaska,1991);Clunis vCamden and Islington Health Authority[1998]QB978;WorrallvBritish RailwaysBoard [1999]EWCACiv1312(29April1999);Gray vThamesTrains Ltd[2009]AC1339.123SeeHallvHebert [1993]2SCR159;GrayvThamesTrainsLtd[2009]AC1339;BritishColumbia vZastoiwny[2008]1SCR27.Cf AmericanLawInstitute,Restatement(Second) ofTorts(1979) 871A.Thisrulerelevantlyprovides:'Onewhointentionallycreates...criminalliabilityagainstanotherissubject toliabilityto theotherifhisconduct isgenerallyculpable andnot justifiable under thecircumstances.'450 [Vol34TheDefence ofJoint Illegal Enterpriseenterpriseat thetimeof sufferinginjuryare nothingmorethanaflimsyconstructoflogicalfalsehoods.Indeed,farfromsupportingthejointillegalenterprisedefence,publicpolicyactuallymilitatesstronglyagainstit.Thisisprincipallybecauseitisproneto punishindiscriminatelyanddisproportionately.TheHighCourtdugitself intoaholewhenit recognisedthejoint illegal enter-prisedefenceinSmith(intowhichthecourtsinseveralotherjurisdictions,followingblindlyintheHighCourt'sfootsteps,promptlyfell1 24).Itdugitselfdeeperinthesubsequentcases,withthedecisioninGala representingthenadir.TheCourthasbeenthrownaropebytheappealinMiller. Itishopedthatitwillgraspthisropeandliftitselfoutof thepitthatisthejointillegalenterprisedefence.124Seeabove n3.2010] 451