Duns Scotus on the natural Will

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI: 10.1163/156853412X629864

Vivarium 50 (2012) 33-52 brill.nl/viv

vivarium

Duns Scotus on the Natural Will1

Cruz González-AyestaUniversity of Navarra

AbstractDoes Duns Scotus identify the natural will with the affectio commodi ? This identifica-tion has become the standard view. In this paper, I will challenge this view through an analysis of some key texts. The main thesis of the paper is that Scotus allows for two scenarios related to the will’s dual affections. The first is the real situation of the created will: the will is a free potency and possesses two affections. The second is a hypothetical case; Scotus suggests the fictive case of a will that only possesses the affectio commodi. Accordingly, it can be concluded that: (i ) when considering the will in its real condi-tion, both affections belong to the will’s free appetite; (ii ) in the hypothetical case the natural will, the intellectual appetite and the affectio commodi are all identified; (iii ) in the real condition of the will, the natural will is a passive inclination to receive perfection.

KeywordsDuns Scotus, Metaphysics, Will, Nature, freedom of the will

Duns Scotus’s theory of the natural will is far from simple. There are several reasons for this difficulty; I will refer to at least two. First, Scotus does not ordinarily speak about the natural will directly, but rather touches on the topic when discussing the will’s dual affections, or in certain theological con-texts. Second, the secondary literature has adopted a view that tends to match the affection for the advantageous with the natural will and the affection for justice with free will. This is exacerbated by the fact that the relevant textual

1) Research for this paper was made possible by the financial support of the Spanish Govern-ment through its grant program: FFI 2010-15875 (subprogram FISO). I am indebted to Mark J. Barker for his help in editing this paper and the translation of the Latin texts. I also thank the two anonymous readers for Vivarium. Their valuable criticisms and suggestions have helped me to refine the argument of this article.

34 C. González-Ayesta / Vivarium 50 (2012) 33-52

evidence is often presented in a fragmentary way and from the aforemen-tioned perspective.

I had assumed the common interpretation when I first addressed the topic. I said that the affectio commodi could be considered, on the one hand, as some-thing identical with the natural appetite of will and, on the other hand, as interplaying with the affectio iustitiae. Thus, my claim had been that from the first perspective, the affection for the advantageous was the same that the nat-ural will and, consequently, an intellectual appetite. Such identification is what I call the standard interpretation of the natural will.2

The aim of this paper is to challenge this interpretation of Scotus’s theory of the natural will, first by discussing the literature on the topic (first section), and then interpreting the salient passages (second section).

A. The Standard Interpretation of the Natural Will in Scotus’s Thought: the Identification between the Natural Will and the affectio commodi

Although the literature on the will’s dual affections in Scotus is abundant, very little touches on the specific topic of the natural will. The literature has gener-ally approached Scotus’s theory of the will from an ethical standpoint. One major concern is to determine whether or not Scotus’s ethical account can be considered a divine command theory,3 and whether Scotus’s ethical approach is compatible with the Aristotelian eudaimonistic project.4 These and similar issues are linked to the well-known topic of Scotus’s voluntarism as well as contemporary discussions on libertarianism. Consequently, some scholars strongly defend that Scotus’s ethics is rational5 and not arbitrary, while others think it is in line with divine command theory and a libertarian

2) Cf. C. González-Ayesta, ‘Scotus’s interpretation of the difference between voluntas ut natura and voluntas ut voluntas’, Franciscan Studies 66 (2008), 390.3) Cf. J. E. Hare, ‘Scotus on Morality and Nature’, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 9 (2000), 15-38; and God and Morality: A Philosophical History (Malden Mass 2007), 91-97.4) Cf. J. Boler, ‘Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67 (1993), 109-126.5) Cf. Mary Beth Ingham, The Harmony of Goodness (Quincy, Illinnois, 1996), 25-45; and ‘Duns Scotus, Morality and Happiness: A Reply to Thomas Williams’, American Catholic Philosophi-cal Quarterly 74 (2000), 173-195; Mary Beth Ingham and Mechthild Dreyer, The Philosophi-cal Vision of John Duns Scotus, (Washington, D.C., 2004), 146-172; Allan B. Wolter, ‘Native Freedom of the Will as a Key to the Ethics of Scotus’, in The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, ed. M. McCord Adams (Ithaca and London, 1990), 148-162.

C. González-Ayesta / Vivarium 50 (2012) 33-52 35

account of freedom.6 This literature will not be discussed here; rather, I will focus on those studies which have significantly addressed Scotus’s concept of the natural will.

In his classic Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, A. B. Wolter draws a significant distinction from a variety of Scotistic texts.7 On the one hand, the natural will is the inclination of something toward its own perfection. On the other hand, the natural will or volition “refers to a freely elicited act whereby one deliberately seeks one’s self-perfection or self-actualization”8. In this case the will is called natural because it elicits a free act according to the affectio commodi rather than according to the affectio iustitiae, and so we must distin-guish this sense of freedom from the sense in which Scotus identifies the affec-tion for justice with the will’s innate freedom.

Wolter’s claims raise two problems. If the will’s freedom is identified with the affection for justice (as Scotus claims in Ordinatio III, d. 26) it is not easy to see how it would be possible to elicit a free act according to the affection for the advantageous. But, if the will acting according to the affectio commodi acts freely, in what sense is it a natural will?

Wolter answers that every act of will is free because it is an elicited and contingent act regardless of which of the dual affections is elicited. This basic meaning of freedom is what is called metaphysical freedom. According to Wolter there is another sense of freedom prior to metaphysical freedom, or freedom in the sense of contingent activity: this is the will’s congenital inclina-tion to the good according to its intrinsic value. This is called moral freedom. Accordingly, Wolter explains that Scotus identifies moral freedom with the affection for justice (the innate freedom of the will) but this identification does not hold for metaphysical freedom.9 The affection for justice (moral freedom) frees the will from the need to seek self-perfection. On Wolter’s interpretation, the affection for the advantageous is an inclination toward self-perfection, so it is not an elicited act but a natural tendency. When Wolter says the affectio commodi is a natural will, he is using the term ‘will’ in a generic sense, as Scotus does in some of his texts. For Wolter, ‘will’ in this context just means a tendency or appetite. However, any natural volition is in fact a free

6) Cf. Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, 2 vols. (Oxford 2007), 2: 663-678; T. Williams, ‘How Scotus Separates Morality from Happiness’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995), 425-445; and, ‘From Metaethics to Action Theory’, in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. T. Williams (Cambridge, UK, 2003), 332-351. 7) Allan B. Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, D.C., 1986), 39-45.8) Ibid., 42.9) Wolter, ‘Native Freedom of Will as a Key to the Ethics of Scotus’, 152 and note 14.


act: whenever the will chooses the agreeable good, its act is free even though it is an act according to a natural tendency or will. The will does not elicit any act in a natural way.

In Wolter’s explanation, the key point is the distinction between two kinds of freedom (metaphysical and moral). This difference allows him to account for Scotus’s claims in a consistent way. However, Wolter’s distinction between moral and metaphysical freedom has led to considerable debate. Some years later, Boler maintained a disconnection between the so-called metaphysical account of freedom (freedom as contingency) and moral freedom (affection for justice). Boler explicitly states that, although his interpretation diverges from Wolter’s, he is indebted to him.10 In fact, Boler argues that the dual affection theory presupposes the metaphysical account of freedom but does not contribute to its explanation: having dual affections is neither necessary nor sufficient for the ability to do otherwise (the indetermination of super-abundant sufficiency).11 Boler’s view regarding freedom received strong criti-cism, which tried to show the unity between the metaphysical and moral accounts of freedom.12

Once Boler divorces metaphysical from moral freedom, he considers how the dual affection works.13 He identifies the natural will and the affection for the advantageous.14 The affectio commodi is the will’s inclination toward the perfection of its intellectual nature (happiness). Since this inclination is natural and necessary it manifests the will as a specific nature. Boler admits

10) Boler, ‘Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will’, 110, note 4.11) Ibid., 115-116.12) Cf. Christophe Cervellon, ‘L’affection de justice chez Duns Scot. Justice et luxure dans le péché de l’ange’, in Duns Scot à Paris. Actes du Colloque de Paris, 2-4 septembre 2002, eds. O. Boulnois et al. (Turnhout 2004), 425-468; and S. Lee, ‘Scotus on the Will: the Rational Power and the Dual Affections’, Vivarium 38 (1998), 40-54.13) Cf. Boler, “Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will”, 109-112, and “An Image for the Unity of Will in Duns Scotus”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (1994), 23-44.14) Rudi te Velde also reads Scotus on the natural will in keeping with the so-called standard view. He gives the following features of natural will: it is just the will’s inclination toward its optimal realization; it does not elicit any act; it corresponds to the intellectual nature’s appetite; and, therefore, it is connected with the affectio commodi, that is, the natural desire for happiness. Te Velde identifies the natural will with the will’s inclination as an intellectual nature and this in turn with the affectio commodi. Cf. Rudi te Velde, “Natura In Seipsa Recurva Est: Duns Scotus and Aquinas on the Relationship between Nature and Will”, in John Duns Scotus (1265-1308): Renewal of Philosophy. Acts of the third symposium organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Phi-losophy Medium Aevum, May 23-24 1996, ed. E. P. Bos (Amsterdam-Atlanta 1998), 155-169.


that Scotus does not explicitly identify the affectio commodi with the natural will, but he thinks the connection is clear enough since in both cases the idea of pursuing happiness and perfecting one’s nature are central.15 This author seems to identify two dimensions of the natural will that Wolter had distin-guished following Ordinatio III 17, namely: the will’s passive tendency to receive its own perfection (the will’s natural appetite) and the active tendency toward the beneficial (affection for the advantageous). However, in connecting these he falls into inconsistency. Indeed, Boler states at the same time both that the natural will acts,16 yet the natural will does not possess any elicited act.17

Although grounded in a different textual basis, G. Sondag18 and A. Vos19 share a common interpretation of the relationship between natural and free will. Both of them admit the distinction between the will as a mere inclination to receive the perfection and the will as a potency capable of eliciting acts. The first is the natural will, the latter is the free will. Their interpretation of the natural will is not far from Boler’s in that they also identify the passive inclination to receive perfection with the inclination of the affectio commodi. Sondag’s account—following Ordinatio IV, d. 49, qq. 9-10—attributes to the natural will a necessary inclination toward happiness, but without eliciting any act, and he attributes to the free will the ability to elicit acts.20 On the other hand, according to Vos, it is possible to distinguish two kinds of velle corresponding to the natural and the free will: to want, in the sense of being disposed toward (velle1) and to choose between the alternatives on the basis of contingency (velle2).

21 Vos explains that this natural disposition of the will to its advantage (velle1) is what Scotus calls the affectio commodi, while the the affectio iustitiae (the capacity to choose what it right) corresponds to the sec-ond meaning of willing (velle2). Since the will is a unitary potency, the will’s free act (velle2) assumes or rejects the natural inclination toward what is convenient and suitable for oneself (velle1) in such a way that the natural will is only a layer in the whole of the one and only will. In fact, on Vos’s reading

15) Boler, “An Image for the Unity of will in Duns Scotus”, 26, note 13.16) “Acts of a rational agent that are in accord with the affectio commodi alone may be called natural willings or acts of natural will” (Boler, “Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will”, 11).17) “Not only is natural will not an elicited act, it is not even the cause of any elicited act, for only the will as free [i.e. with dual affections] is the cause of elicited acts” (Ibid., 112).18) Gerard Sondag, Duns Scot. La Métaphysique de la singularité (Paris 2005), 208-223.19) Antonie Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (Edinburgh 2007), 431-464.20) Cf. Sondag, Duns Scot, 213.21) Cf. Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, 461.


the natural will is inclined (wants or wishes in a broad sense) but without eliciting any act. Vos, in contrast to Wolter and Boler, fully identifies freedom as contingency with the affectio iustitiae or moral freedom. He does not hold the distinction between metaphysical and moral freedom. In doing so, he keeps himself closer to Scotus’s texts but does not provide any solution to the question of the relationship between the affectio commodi and freedom. Con-sequently, he does not fully answer how the natural will can elicit any act, or whether it should be considered natural or free in acting in accordance with the affectio commodi.

To sum up, the questions of whether the natural will can be identified with the affectio commodi, and the precise relationship between freedom and the affectio commodi, are in fact fundamental to our understanding of Scotus’s theory of the natural will.

Undoubtedly, some of these perplexities we have discovered in analyzing the literature on the natural will stem from to the fact that Scotus’s texts con-tain divergent statements for which Scotus does not explicitly provide a unify-ing interpretation. The second section of this paper seeks to provide a detailed and consistent reading of the relevant passages on natural will.

B. A New Interpretation of Scotus’s Theory: The Natural Will and affectio commodi under the Will’s Real and Hypothetical Conditions

There are several places where Duns Scotus deals with the concept of natural will. Most of them are in a theological context. Amidst these theological dis-cussions, a rich theory of will is presented to solve different problems of Chris-tian theology. It is not the theological framework but the ideas about the will which are of interest for our present purposes.

In this section five passages will be addressed: Ordinatio II, d. 6, q. 2 (Whether the first sin of the angel was pride); Ordinatio II, d. 39, qq. 1-2 (Whether synderesis is in the will); Ordinatio III, d. 15, q. un (Whether in Christ’s soul, according to its higher part, there was sadness and pain); Ordinatio III, d. 17, q. un22 (Whether there were two wills in Christ); and Ordinatio IV, d. 49, q. 10 (Whether every man necessarily wills beatitude).23

22) These texts are quoted according to the Vatican critical edition: Ioannis Duns Scoti, Opera Omnia, vols. 8 and 9 (Civitas Vaticana 2001 and 2006).23) This text is quoted according to Wolter’s edition in Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 182-196.


Instead of a detailed analysis of these five relevant texts, a systematic view of the account of natural will contained in them will be offered. Thus, the appar-ent contradiction among different statements will be clarified and the subse-quent distinctions made by Scotus justified.

Scotus’s theory of natural will can be summarized in three statements whose consistency is to be proven:

(1) The natural will does not elicit any act whatsoever. It is a mere inclination or first perfection.

(2) The natural will is the will acting only with the affection for the advantageous and not with the affection for justice: it refers to an intellectual appetite.

(3) There are two natural inclinations, one for the advantageous and one for justice, and both of them are perfections of the free will.

1. The natural will does not elicit any act whatsoever. It is a mere inclination or first perfection

Scotus distinguishes the natural will from the free will precisely because the former is like a first perfection. This means that it is a certain inclination in a specific nature toward the perfection most appropriate to it: to follow or not to follow such an inclination falls within the free will’s power. Scotus seems to suggest that the natural will in this sense is identified with the affection for the advantageous. He denies that this affection can elicit acts unless it cooperates with the affection for justice which is the will’s liberty itself. Scotus writes:

The natural will is not of itself immoderate; rather it inclines only after the manner of nature —and in this there is no lack of moderation, for it inclines as it was made to do, nor has it power to do otherwise. But to be so inclined or less inclined is in the power of the will as free, through an elicited act. Thus, when the natural will is taken to be oriented toward happiness, I grant this. But this will is not actually immoderate through an elicited act. For the inclination of a natural appetite is not some elicited act, but is like a first perfection. And this is not immoderate, just as the nature to which it belongs is not immoderate either. However, that nature is so inclined toward its object by the affection for the advantageous that if it had of itself an elicited act, it could not moderate it, rather it would elicit it to the greatest degree possible. But the will, as having only the natural affection for the advantageous, is not the cause of any elicited act, but only the will as free; and therefore, as eliciting an act, the will possesses what is required to moderate passion.24

24) “Voluntas naturalis non est de se immoderata, sed tantum inclinat per modum naturae—et in hoc non est immoderatio, quia inclinat sicut accepit inclinari, nec est in potestate sua aliud; in potestate autem voluntatis ut libera est actu elicito, est tantum inclinari, vel minus. Quando ergo


This passage is from Ordinatio II, 6, where Scotus is discussing the well-known question of the devil’s fall. He divides the question into two articles, the first being on whether the devil’s act was sinful (nn. 34-63). Within this article, between numbers 40 and 62, he introduces a sub-article, as it were, addressing whether the devil wished for happiness in a disordered way.25 The quoted passage begins the answer to the arguments to the contrary. He draws the distinction between natural and free will to explain that the latter can be immoderate while the former cannot. The quoted text delves deeper into this idea. Why is it that the natural will cannot sin? Because it only tends to its object without eliciting any act. At the end of the argument, Scotus adds that in the hypothetical case of the will tending toward an object only according to the affection for the advantageous, it would act out of necessity. He concludes that the will affected by the affection for the advantageous does not elicit acts, but only the will as free. This last statement suggests that the natural will is the will affected by the affection for the advantageous and that, considered inas-much as it is only affected by one affection, it is not free and is not capable of eliciting acts.

In keeping with this explanation, there are other texts where Scotus states that the natural will is not a will in the proper meaning of the term, and that “natural” is an alienans adjective.26 So ‘will’ in this context means ‘appetite’ in a general sense and does not involve the ability to act and to refrain from act-ing but only the inclination toward an object. According to Scotus, the will has two appetites, the natural and the free. Natural appetite seems to be the will in the general sense mentioned above; the will absolutely considered in as much as it has an inclination toward its own good or perfection:

accipit quod voluntas naturalis est respectu beatitudinis, concedo—sed non actualiter immoder-ata actu elicito: non enim est inclinatio appetitus naturalis aliquis actus elicitus, sed est sicut perfectio prima—et haec non est immoderata, sicut nec natura cuius est. Tamen ita inclinatur affectione commodi in obiectum suum, quod—si ex se haberet actum elicitum—non posset illum moderari quin eliceretur summe, quantum posset elici; sed voluntas ut habens solam affectionem commodi natu-ralem, non est causa alicuius actus eliciti, sed tantum ut libera, et ideo ut eliciens actum habet unde moderetur passionem (Ordinatio, II, d. 6, q. 2, nn. 55-56; Vatican 8, 53). Wolter’s translation [with modifications] (Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 473). My emphasis.25) The idea of a sub-article inside an article is mine. In my view, Scotus gives arguments in favour of the statement (40-45) and arguments to the contrary (46-48), solves the question drawing a magistral distinction (49-54), and replies to the arguments to the contrary (55-62).26) “Tunc dico, quod sic est de voluntate, quia voluntas naturalis non est voluntas, nec velle naturale est velle: sed ly ‘naturalis’ distrahit ab utroque et nihil est nisi relatio consequens poten-tiam respectu propriae perfectionis” (Ordinatio, III, d. 17, q. un., n. 13, Vatican 9, 566-67).


There is a twofold appetite or will, namely, the natural and the free. For the will can be considered a certain nature insofar as it has an inclination and natural appetite for its own perfection, just as any other nature does. The first thing to consider about the will, then, has to do with its natural volition, and insofar as it is a certain kind of nature; secondly, we have to consider the will as regards its free volition, insofar as it is a free appetite. As for the initial article, we must first consider what a natural appetite is. And I say it is not an elicited act, because the natural appetite of the will is related to the will as the natural appetite of the intellect is related to intellection. If the natural appetite is not an elicited act in the intellect, then neither is that the case in the will. (. . .). Hence the natural appetite is no more an elicited act of the will than is the natural appetite in a stone. What, then is it? I say that it is the will’s inclination to its own perfection, just as in the case of other things that lack a free appetite. In Book I of the Physics, the Philosopher speaks of this appetite when he says that matter desires form as the imperfect desires its perfection.27

The natural appetite of will (or natural will) is identified in the passage with the ‘desire’ for self-fulfillment of any being, which is present also in the will. It does not require previous knowledge; it is only a tendency without any act of willing.

This meaning of “natural will” matches perfectly with the first of the three meanings that Scotus offers in Ordinatio III, 17 when discussing Christ’s two wills (human and divine):

Thus, I say that the same holds for the will, because the natural will is not a will, nor is natural willing a kind of willing, but ‘natural’ is separate from both and it [natural willing] is nothing but the relation that is consequent to a power with respect to its proper perfec-tion. Hence, the same power is called [1] ‘natural will’ as regards the necessary relationship it has to its perfection and it is called ‘free’ according to the proper and intrinsic notion that is specifically the will. [2] In another way the will can be called ‘natural,’ as it is distin-guished from a supernatural power or will; and thus the will itself as it exists in a purely

27) “Duplex est appetitus sive voluntas, naturalis scilicet et liber. Potest enim voluntas considerari quandam naturam in quantum habet inclinationem et appetitum naturalem ad suam propriam perfectionem, sicut quaecumque alia natura. Primo ergo videndum est de voluntate quantum ad eius velle naturale et inquantum natura quaedam; secundo, quantum ad eius velle liberum in quantum est appetitus liber. Quantum ad primum, primo videndum est quid est appetitus naturalis, et dico quod non est actus elicitus, quia appetitus naturalis voluntatis se habet ad vol-untatem sicut appetitus naturalis intellectus se habet ad intellectionem. Si in intellectu appetitus naturalis non est actus elicitus, ergo nec in voluntate (. . .). Non ergo appetitus naturalis est magis actus elicitus in voluntate quam appetitus naturalis in lapide. Quid ergo? Dico quod est inclinatio ad ipsam perfectionem, sicut in aliis non habentibus appetitum liberum; et de isto appetito loquitur Philosophus 1 Physicorum, quod materia appetit formam sicut imperfectum appetit suam perfectionem” (Ordinatio, IV, suppl. d. 49, qq. 9-10; Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, pp. 182-184). Wolter’s translation [with modifications] (Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 183-185).


natural state is distinguished from the same will as informed by gifts of grace. [3] In yet a third way one speaks of ‘natural will’ insofar as the will elicits an act in conformity with its natural inclination which is always aimed at the advantageous. And thus the will is free in eliciting an act in keeping with as well as an act opposed to [this inclination], for it lies in its power to elicit or not elicit an act in conformity with [this inclination] or not to do so.28

In the passage three meanings are distinguished. The second meaning is not relevant for purposes of this paper: the natural as opposed to the supernatural. In the first, the natural will is the counterpoint of the free will in the precise sense explained previously: the natural will is the potency absolutely consid-ered (as a mere appetite) and free will is the potency specifically considered (as affected by a free appetite). The third sense considers that the natural will is the will which acts according to the affectio commodi. Although this sense will be discussed below, it is important to point out that in this passage Scotus clearly distinguishes the will’s natural appetite (‘natural will’ in the sense of the passive tendency of will to receive its own perfection) from the affectio commodi (natural tendency toward the beneficial).

So Scotus has drawn a distinction between two meanings of the expression ‘natural will’. On the one hand, ‘natural will’ is a first perfection, a mere incli-nation, the will’s structure or nature without considering its operations. In this sense Scotus says that the natural will does not elicit any act whatsoever. This is the meaning explained above. On the other hand, ‘natural will’ can also denote the will acting according to the affection for the advantageous. Let us now turn to this distinction.

2. The natural will is the will acting only with the affection for the advantageous and not with the affection for justice: it refers to an intellectual appetite

As seen in the passage quoted above, ‘natural will’ can mean the will acting according to the affectio commodi. This expression raises certain puzzles. Which

28) “Tunc dico quod sic est de voluntate, quia voluntas naturalis non est voluntas, nec velle natu-rale est velle, sed ly ‘naturalis’ distrahit ab utroque et nihil est nisi relatio consequens potentiam respecti propriae perfectionis: unde eadem potentia dicitur [1] ‘naturalis voluntas’ cum respectu tali necessario consequente ipsam ad perfectionem et dicitur ‘libera’ secundum rationem pro-priam et intrinsecam, quae est voluntas specifice. [2] Aliter potest voluntas dici ‘naturalis’, ut distinguitur contra potentiam sive voluntatem supernaturale; et sic ipsa in puris naturalibus suis existens distinguitur contra se ipsam ut informata donis gratuitis. [3] Adhuc modo tertio dicitur ‘voluntas naturalis’ ut elicit actum conformem inclinationi naturali, quae semper est ad com-modum; et sic est libera <in> elicendo actum conformem sicut in elicendo actum oppositum quia in potestate eius est elicere actum conformem vel non elicere” (Ordinatio, III, d. 17, q. un., nn. 13-15, Vatican 9, 568). I thank Mark J. Barker for the translation.


kind of acts can the will elicit according to this affection? Are these acts free or not? An analysis of Ordinatio III, 15 will shed light on these questions:

In another way the will is called a nature when one understands it as wholly ordered toward whatever follows from the will’s nature; and this, not as properly free, but as it is merely an intellectual appetite, or as possessing the affection for the advantageous, not that for justice.29

In this text, Scotus says that the natural will is what follows the will’s nature inasmuch as it is an intellectual appetite moved by the affection for the advan-tageous. The idea seems to be that when the will acts seeking the goods pre-sented by the intellect as the best option (the most beneficial) after deliberation, it acts in a natural way (and not in a free way).

This passage supports the identification between natural will, affection for the advantageous and intellectual appetite. Such an identification is explicitly stated by Scotus in other texts, e.g. in Ordinatio II, 39, when discussing whether synderesis is in the will. The objection quotes St. Anselm’s De Con-cordia 4: “It cannot not will the advantageous” (“Commoda non velle nequit”) and argues that it is necessary to will both the beneficial and justice; since synderesis is the inclination for justice, synderesis should be identified with the will. Scotus’s reply rejects this interpretation and solves the objection by introducing a distinction between the two affections:

To the other, I say that the will, which is a power to act freely, by its elicited act does not will necessarily what is advantageous any more than it necessarily wills what is just. Yet if this same power be considered insofar as it possesses an inclination for the advantageous and lacks the affection for justice (that is, insofar as it is an appetite that is not free), then it would not lie in its power to refrain from willing the advantageous, for then it would be exclusively only the natural appetite of an intellectual nature just as the brute’s is the natu-ral appetite of a sensory nature.30

29) “Alio modo dicitur voluntas ut natura, intelligendo omnem ordinem eius ad quodcumque consequens naturam voluntatis,—et hoc proprie non ut libera, sed ut est tantum appetitus intel-lectivus, sive ut habens affectionem commodi, non iustitiae” (Ordinatio, III, d. 15, q. un, n. 90, Vatican 9, 516). Barker’s translation.30) “Ad aliud dico quod voluntas, quae est potentia libere agens, non necessario vult com-modum, sicut nec necessario vult iustum, actu elicito; tamen si ista una potentia consideretur ut habet affectionem commodi et non habet affectionem iustitiae, id est in quantum appetitus non liber,—non esset in potestate eius sic non velle commoda, quia sic praecise esse tantum appetitus naturalis naturae intellectualis, sicut appetitus bruti est appetitus naturalis naturae sensitivae” (Ordinatio, II, d. 39, q. 1-2, n. 22; Vatican, 8, 463). Wolter’s translation [with modifications] (Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 203).


The key point of this passage is that Scotus is considering the particular case of a will affected only by a unique affection (the affectio commodi) and not pos-sessing the affection for justice. In this particular case the will becomes a mere intellectual appetite and not free. For Scotus, freedom is rooted in the ability to follow or to restrain the inclination toward the object presented by the intellect. This ability is possible because the will considers not only the benefi-cial (affectio commodi) but also the good in itself (affectio iustitiae). Once you withdraw the affection for justice from the will, freedom disappears. The will affected exclusively by the affection for the advantageous moves to the best option presented by the intellect. The only difference between instinct (appeti-tus naturalis naturae sensitivae) and this intellectual appetite (appetitus natu-ralis naturae intellectualis) is intellect’s previous deliberation before it presents the best option to follow. But in both cases there is no place for freedom.31

A similar case is presented in the well-known text of the devil’s fall (Ordi-natio II, 6, q. 2). Above, I had referred to this interesting section (nn. 49-54) as the solution of a ‘sub-article’ within the whole question.32 In paragraph 40, Scotus had quoted Anselm’s De Casu Diaboli, 4: given that every act results either from the affection for justice or from the affection for the advantageous and, given that a sinful act cannot come from the affection for justice, the sin-ful act necessarily follows the affection for the advantageous. Scotus disagrees with this interpretation of Anselm’s affections and provides a new one. He draws the distinction between three kinds of justice: infused (supernatural grace), acquired (moral virtue) and innate (freedom of the will).33 In this way Scotus considers that the affection for justice constitutes the freedom of the will, and begins to explain the interplay of both affections in the will:

31) Scotus strongly insists that the deliberation of reason is not enough to sustain freedom of will: “Secundum Anselmum De casu diaboli cap. 12, si esset angelus habens instrumentum cum affectione commodi, posset ratiocinare, et non esset libertas nec peccatum in eo (secundum Anselmum), sed tantum esset ibi inclinatio (sicut appetitus sensitivus inclinatur), et tamen intel-lectus esset indifferens ad cognoscendum alia; igitur per istam indifferentiam ad cognoscendum a qua non salvatur libertas in voluntate (nec appetitus sensitivus), quia tantum inclinaretur ad intelligibilia (ita tamen naturaliter ad intelligibilia sicut appetitus sensitivus ad sensibilia), non-dum esset liber. Igitur non quia potentia intellectualis, ideo est libera” (Lectura, II, d. 25, q. un., n. 33). Ioannis Duns Scoti, Opera Omnia, vol. 19 (Civitas Vaticana 1993), 231.32) See above, note 25.33) “Ad videndum solutionem istarum rationum, distinguo quid possit intelligi per istas affec-tiones ‘iustitiae’ et ‘commodi’, de quibus loquitur Anselmus De casu diaboli cap. 4. Iustitia potest intelligi vel infusa (quae dicitur ‘gratuita’) vel acquisita (quae dicitur ‘moralis’) vel innata (quae est ipsamet libertas voluntatis)” (Ordinatio, II, d. 6, q. 2, n. 49, Vatican 8, 48).


But if some appetitive power were [1] exclusively appetitive [namely, without freedom], following its inclination in acting as the visual appetite follows the inclination of sight and follows vision (though I admit it could only seek what is intelligible, as the visual appetite can only seek what is visible), that power still could not sin in that case, for it would not be in its power to seek anything other than what the cognitive power would show it or incline it to. Once this same power [2] has been made free (because there is nothing other here than one thing which includes virtually several perfectional aspects, which it would not include if it lacked the aspect of liberty), this power, I say, through its freedom can moder-ate itself in willing. It could do so as regards that volition toward which the affection for the advantageous inclines it, even though it might be most inclined to will the advantageous. And from the fact that it could moderate this, it is bound to do so according to the rule of justice it receives from a higher will.34

He considers two possible scenarios. The first one is a hypothetical case; the second one is the real case of the created will. In the first case, the will is obliged to accept the object presented by the intellect. Such an appetitive power will be an intellectual appetite (in the sense explained above), yet it will not be free. The second case discussed in the passage is that of free will. This seems to be the will that possesses both affections, since Scotus had identified freedom with the affection for justice. Therefore, the affection for justice allows the will to regulate the inclination for the advantageous.35

Let us focus first in more detail on the hypothetical case. Scotus called it a “fictio”; we would call it a thought experiment. He takes the following case from Anselm:

34) “Potentia autem appetitiva aliqua, [1] si fuisset appetitiva praecise [scil. absque libertate], sequens in actu suo inclinationem eius sicut appetitus visivus sequitur inclinationem visus et visum, licet—inquam—illa non posset appetere nisi intelligibile (sicut nec appetitus visivus potest appetere nisi visibili), tamen non posset tunc peccare, quia non esset in potestate eius aliud nec aliter appetere quam cognitiva ostenderet et inclinaret. Ipsa eadem [2] facta iam libera (quia nihil aliud est nisi quod una res includit virtualiter plures rationes perfectionales quas non includeret si esset sine ratione libertatis), ipsa—inquam—per libertatem suam potest se mod-erari in volendo, et quantum ad hoc quod est ‘velle’ ad quod inclinat affectio commodi, et licet inclinet summe ad velle commodum; et ex quo potest moderari, tenetur moderari secundum regulam iustitiae, quae accipitur ex voluntate superiore” (Ordinatio II, d. 6, q. 2, n. 51, Vatican 8, 50-51). Wolter’s translation [slightly corrected] (Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 471).35) Scotus explicitly states the identification between freedom and affectio iustitiae and the regu-lating function of the affection for justice over the affection for the advantageous: “Illa igitur affectio iustitiae, quae est prima moderatrix affectionis commodi et quantum ad hoc quod non oportet voluntatem actu appetere illud ad quod inclinat affectio commodi, et quantum ad hoc quod non oportet eam summe appetere (quantum scilicet ad illud ad quod inclinat affectio com-modi) illa—inquam—affectio iustitiae est libertas innata voluntati: quia ipsa est prima moderatrix affectionis talis” (Ordinatio, II, d. 6, q. 2, n. 49; Vatican 8, 49).


For if one were to conceive —according to that case invented by Anselm in his work On the Devil’s Fall— that there were an angel who ‘possessed the affection for the advantageous and not that for justice’ (that is, who possessed the intellectual appetite purely as such an appetite and not as free), such an angel could not not will the advantageous, nor could it even refrain from willing it to the utmost; and this would not be imputed to it as a sin, because that appetite would be related to its cognitive power as the visual appetite is now related to vision, as necessarily resulting from what that cognitive power reveals and its inclination to the best thing shown by such a power, because it would have nothing whereby it could restrain itself.36

It describes the will of an angel created only with the affection for the advanta-geous and without the affection for justice, and it deduces how it would work. Scotus says that this ‘will’ would be an intellectual appetite but not a free will. It would possess the appetite to follow what the intellect had presented as agreeable, but it could not act otherwise. This fictional case presents a coun-terfactual situation which, however, sheds light on the structure of the will, because it proves that a free will is something other than an intellectual appe-tite. In what way is the free will different? Free will has the ability to grasp and to choose the good in itself and so can rein in the affection for the advanta-geous. The affection for justice allows the will to act or to reject or to refrain from acting according to the affectio commodi.

Before going on, it is necessary to clarify why it is said that Scotus’s fictio is a thought experiment. Although there is considerable debate about this category, some scholars have pointed out that the modern usage of thought experiments in science and philosophy is preceded or even made possible by certain logical and metaphysical views that arise at the beginning of fourteenth century.37 In different ways, both P. King and S. Knuuttila have argued that changes in modal theory introduced new elements, such as a different idea of logical possibility, alternative state of affairs, compossibility, and the

36) “Si enim intelligeretur—secundum illam fictionem Anselmi De casu Diaboli—quod esset angelus ‘habens affectionem commodi et non iustitiae’ (hoc est, habens appetitum intellectivum mere ut appetitum talem et non ut liberum), talis angelus non posset non velle commoda, nec etiam non summe velle talia; nec imputaretur sibi ad peccatum, quia ille appetitus se haberet ad suam cognitivam sicut modo appetitus visivus ad visum, in necessario consequendo ostensionem illius cognitivae et inclinationem ad optimum ostensum a tali potentia, quia non haberet unde se refrenaret” (Ordinatio II, d. 6, q. 2, n. 49; Vatican 8, 48-49). Barker’s translation.37) Cf. Simo Knuuttila–Taneli Kukkonen, ‘Thought experiments and indirect proofs in Aver-roes, Aquinas, and Buridan’, in Thoughts experiments in methodological and historical contexts, eds. K. Ierodiakonou–S. Roux (Leiden-Boston 2011), 98.


non-necessity of the present.38 All these elements, in combination with an emphasis on God’s omnipotence, allow philosophers to give a new account of Aristotle’s arguments ‘ex impossibile’, arguments in which an impossible state-ment is claimed to be possible in order to discover whether or not a contradic-tion follows from it. According to this new view of modalities, some ‘impossibilia’ can be considered possible in an alternative state of affairs. A new conceptualization of the ‘counterfactual’ emerges in this context in the notion of compossibility. Duns Scotus is one of the first thinkers who holds this new view about modalities. Thus, it is not strange that in several places he con-ceives counterfactual situations which draw on a possible, although not actual, scenario in order to illustrate some of his metaphysical views. The angel that exists in a single instant is one such case.39 I suggest that the fictional case of the angel created with a will that possesses just one affection is another. The reason is that it fulfills the elements which define a thought experiment: a counterfactual and a concrete scenario is described (if there were an angel having only one affection) and something follows from it (he would not be free but would only have an intellectual appetite). As a consequence of this, something can be said about the real world (the freedom of the will in its real condition is something else than an intellectual appetite and is not rooted in deliberation).40

Now, going back to the distinction between the real and hypothetical (or counterfactual) scenarios, it can be said that the will with a single affection (i.e. the affectio commodi) necessarily moves toward the objects presented by intellect. Such a will is an intellectual appetite that naturally ‘wills’ its objects after intellectual deliberation in the same way that the sensitive appetite moves naturally toward its objects subsequent to a sensory judgment. To ‘will’ in a natural way is thus the opposite of willing freely. Scotus speaks of a ‘natural will’ to refer to this particular, entirely hypothetical, case. It is in fact not the

38) Cf. Peter King, ‘Mediaeval thought experiments’, in Thought experiments in science and philosophy, eds. T. Horowitz–G. J. Massey (Pittsburgh 1991), 49-56; and Knuuttila–Kukkonen, ‘Thought experiments and indirect proofs in Averroes, Aquinas, and Buridan’, 95-99.39) Cf(r). King, ‘Mediaeval thought experiments’, 50.40) According to S. Roux, thought experiments can be characterized by three elements: “[they] are counterfactual, they involve a concrete scenario and they have a well delimited cognitive intention” (Sophie Roux, ‘Introduction’, in Thoughts experiments in methodological and historical contexts, 4). According to P. King, they should be described as “a set of sentences which describes a situation and what happens in it, and some other sentence or sentences that is said to follow from the previous one” (King, ‘Mediaeval thought experiments’, 51). Scotus’s ‘fictio’ fulfills both descriptions.


case that the will possesses only a single affection (the affectio commodi), but if this were the case (as in the thought experiment of the angel created with a single affection), that will would be a natural will or an intellectual appetite. My contention is that the identification between the natural will, the affectio commodi, and the intellectual appetite only holds in the hypothetical scenario.

Let us now return to the real case to explain, briefly, how the two affections interplay. What does the moderation of the affection for the advantageous by the affection for justice mean? It first involves the ability to refrain from action and, second, the possibility of submitting the inclination toward the beneficial to the rule of a higher will, which means to subordinate it to justice (moral or supernatural virtue). The possibility of a lack of moderation in the affectio commodi appears when the love of friendship with respect to oneself brings with it an immoderate desire for the highest good, insofar as it is one’s proper happiness. This is the case in the devil’s sin discussed by Scotus in Ordinatio II, 6, q. 2. Although in real conditions we attach the love of concupiscence to the affection for the advantageous and the love of friendship to the affection for justice, both are free acts of the will. It is just because the will possesses the affection for justice that it is free to accept, reject or refrain from acting regard-ing the inclination of the affection for the advantageous. For Scotus, the inter-action between the two affections is the space in which ethics takes place.41

* * *

Thus, the distinction between the hypothetical and the real orders is key in understanding Scotus’s different statements in the texts being analyzed. With-out considering this double level, his account of this topic could seem contra-dictory. Indeed, as we will see below, he states that both affections belong to the free appetite. But it is difficult to see how such an assertion is consistent with his statements that the affection for the advantageous constitutes the natural will and that the natural will does not elicit free acts.

3. There are two natural inclinations, one for the advantageous and one for justice, and both are perfections of the free will

Scotus makes this statement about the two affections belonging to free will in the broad context of a theological discussion regarding whether there was

41) I have discussed in detail the interplay between the dual affections in some other place: Cf. González-Ayesta, ‘Scotus’ interpretation of the difference between voluntas ut natura and volun-tas ut voluntas’, 381-394.


sadness in Christ’s soul in its higher part (Ordinatio, III 15). In order to solve this question, Scotus explains what pain and sadness are (nn. 27-60). While pain has to do with the sense appetite, sadness has to do with the will, the cause of both being a lack of fittingness between the power, the object and the perception thereof. Sadness is necessarily caused by an object which is con-trary to the will’s natural inclination, e.g. to happiness, even in the case where an elicited act is not carried out. Scotus plays out a possible objection to this idea: if an object is naturally unsuitable for the power but suitable from the point of view of virtue, the object would not cause sadness, even if it were opposed to the will’s natural inclination. To solve this difficulty, Scotus invokes the distinction between the will’s dual affections, saying that both are natural and belong to free will, although the affection for the advantageous is related to the will’s natural inclination in a way that the affection for justice is not. He concludes that an object contrary to the natural inclination to happi-ness (an object which opposes the affectio commodi) suffices to cause sadness, while an object contrary to the natural inclination for justice does not. Let us quote the passage that refers to the affections:

There is a double natural inclination: one to what is advantageous, the other to what is just. Both of these are a perfection of free will. Yet one of these inclinations is better called ‘natural’ than the other because what is advantageous follows more immediately upon nature as it is distinguished from freedom than what is just does. Therefore, there cannot be a natural inclination to the advantageous which does not suffice to reject also the sadness opposed to it.42

The text says that there are two natural affections that belong to free will. This is the passage’s relevant point. ‘Natural’ is used here in a weak sense. It means that both affections belong to the will’s structure or nature. Scotus immedi-ately adds a nuance: the affection for the advantageous is natural in a way in which the other is not. He is presupposing his strong distinction between nature and will (free will) regarding the way that both principles elicit acts.43 In line with this distinction he says that both affections belong to free will.

42) “Inclinatio naturalis est duplex; una ad commodum, alia ad iustum, quarum utrumque est perfectio voluntatis liberae; una tamen inclinatio magis dicitur naturalis quam alia quia imme-diatius consequitur naturam, ut distinguitur contra libertatem, commodum quam iustum; non igitur potest esse inclinatio naturalis ad commodum quin sufficiat ad nolle et tristitiam de oppos-ito” (Ordinatio, III, d. 15, q. un., n. 54, Vatican 9, 502). Barker’s translation.43) Cf. Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, IX, q. 15, n. 22; Quodlibet, q. 16, nn. 56-57; Ordinatio, I, d. 1, Pars II, q. 2, n. 80 and d. 10, q. un., n. 44.


He means that the affectio commodi is not a natural principle in the sense explained in his Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle: “it cannot fail to act when not impeded from without”.44 As we can see, he is speaking of the affectio commodi in a different manner than when he considered it working independently from the affection for justice.

There is an apparent discrepancy between Scotus’s statements about the affectio commodi being an intellectual appetite and belonging the natural will and the Subtle Doctor’s saying that both affections belong to free will. Never-theless, there is no contradiction between these passages. On the one hand, when Scotus refers to the affection for the advantageous without the affection for justice, he says that it is a natural principle that cannot fail to choose the best option presented by the intellect. On the other hand, when he is consid-ering the dual affections’ interplay, he states that the affection for the advanta-geous can be refrained and that it belongs to the free appetite and not to the natural will. In the first case he is referring to a hypothetical situation, in the second case he is focusing on the real condition of the created will.

The idea of both affections belonging to free will can be better understood if one takes into account the distinction between the will’s two appetites (nat-ural and free).45 Scotus had described the will’s natural appetite as its natural inclination toward perfection which does not elicit any act whatsoever; while by its free appetite the will can will, nill or not will: it does not act in a neces-sary way.46 The free will is capable of not acting even regarding happiness, although it cannot reject it. It is not difficult to see that Scotus considers the will’s dual affections to belong to the free appetite.

Because he is referring to the created will in its real condition, he does not speak of the affectio commodi working alone as an intellectual appetite without the moderation provided by the affection for justice (the second meaning of natural will we have discussed). Scotus is very clearly suggesting that in its real condition, the created will never operates with a single affection (the affectio commodi). He says that the affection for the advantageous when not joined to the affectio iustitiae does not elicit any act:

44) Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by John Duns Scotus, trans. G. Etzkorn and A. B. Wolter, vol. 2 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1998), 608. 45) See above note 27.46) “Si dicas quod si voluntas nec necessario velit beatitudinem, nec necessario odit sive detestatur beatitudinem, qualem ergo actum habet voluntas circa beatitudinem quando sibi ab intellectu ostenditur; dico quod ut in pluribis habet actum volendi, sed non necessario aliquem actum. Unde potest suspendere ab omni actu, ostensa beatitudine” (Ordinatio, IV, d. 49, q. 10, n. 10; Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 194).


I say, then, that Anselm’s statement that one cannot not will the advantageous should be understood not of the potency as a whole, which can freely not will not only what is advan-tageous but also what is just, because it can freely not will the former and the latter. Rather it should be understood of the volitional potency insofar as it is exclusively affected by the inclination for the advantageous, i.e., as considered under the notion of such an appetite, yet not including freedom in that appetite; but in this way it elicits no act in us.47

Consequently, it cannot be said that the affection for the advantageous under the created will’s real conditions is an intellectual appetite that operates as a natural principle and could be identified with the will’s natural appetite or with the natural will.

Conclusion

After a detailed reading and analysis of the relevant texts, one can say that, on the whole, Scotus seems to consider two scenarios related to the will’s dual affections. (i ) The first is the created will’s real situation: the will is a free potency and possesses two affections. (ii) The second is the hypothetical case; by way of thought-experiment, Scotus suggests the fictive case of a will that only possesses the affection for the advantageous.

(i ) In the first case, the will’s two affections are natural in as much as they belong to the will’s “structure”, although one (the inclination for the advanta-geous) is more natural than the other (the inclination for justice), because while the first is the inclination to follow what is beneficial, the second is related to freedom. This means: because the will possesses the affection for the good in itself (affectio iustitiae), it is capable of not necessarily following the inclination for the agreeable good (affectio commodi). If, on the contrary, the will does not hold in check the inclination for the advantageous and disre-gards the good in itself, thus acting out of its first inclination, it also acts freely and therefore sins. In this scenario, the will can act according to the affection

47) “Dico ergo quod illa propositio Anselmi, ‘commoda non-velle nequit’, debet intelligi non loquendo de tota potentia, quae modo libere potest non velle non tantum commoda sed etiam iusta, quia libere potest et haec et illa non velle,—sed debet intelligi de illa in quantum praecise affecta affectione commodi, hoc est ut considerata sub ratione appetitus talis, non tamen inclu-dendo in appetitu tali libertatem: sed hoc modo nullum actum elicit in nobis” (Ordinatio, II, d. 39, qq. 1-2, n. 23; Vatican 8, 463). Wolter’s translation [with modifications] (Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 203).


for the advantageous, but only because it freely wants to. Consequently, Sco-tus says that both affections belong to free will. (ii) In the second case, Scotus consider the fictional case of a will created with a single affection, i.e. the affection for the advantageous. This created being’s will would be an intellectual appetite which would follow what the intellect presents as an object, in the same way the brute animals’ sense appetite would do. In this case the “single-affection” will is a natural, not a free, power. There-fore, in this scenario, the natural will, the intellectual appetite and the affec-tion for the advantageous are all identified with each other. It is regarding this case that Scotus calls the will acting according to the affectio commodi the ‘natural will’.

Finally, it must be explained what the natural will is for Scotus in the cre-ated will’s real situation. My claim is that the Subtle Doctor identifies the natural will with the natural appetite of the will but not with the affectio com-modi in the real condition of the will. In normal circumstances the will always acts freely and not naturally, namely, after deliberation but without control of its act. Therefore, the natural will cannot be identified with an intellectual appetite either. So, the natural will means the will’s nature independently of its action: it does not elicit any act whatsoever but rather it is an inclination to the objects that perfect the will.

Duns Scotus on the natural Will

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