IntroductionTechnology has made its mark in every aspect of
human life, to say the least, from day to day activities to
communication, arts, education, and so forth. But maybe nowhere
else has technology advanced so quickly as in the military field,
changing the face of war as well as its scale and impact, and most
notably techniques. War has never been the same from the first gun
onwards. In this context, technology with its volatility fits in
quite nicely as it offers faster and more efficient solutions to
threats belonging to the areas mentioned above. In particular, what
military advancement has drawn attention and debate in the media,
in international law, in the public sphere, are drones. Named as
such because of their once disposable nature, drones have emerged
as the 21st century innovation in military, providing with a very
wide scope of action, a tactical solution to asymmetric warfare and
even changing strategies of war, but little has been done to define
them much more than Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, which is a concept in
itself and not a definition. The wide variety of options which are
now available on drones make them the perfect weapon but as easily
targetable, so there is a double sidedness to them. Either way the
way in which we use them makes for visible changes in the way in
which a war is carried out, how strategies which were once specific
to some conventional weaponry or military formation have a wider
scope of action.Seeing as the United States has passed through
quite a change of positioning in the international relations
theater, the emergence and growing use of UAVs have made for a
multi-faceted weapon which helped the U.S. carry out its national
strategy overseas. Since the 9/11 attacks the U.S. has been
involved in several wars under the War on Terror and others, and I
believe that the use of new technology has facilitated its ongoing
efforts.In this paper I will try to explain how drones fit in the
U.S. Grand Strategy starting from 2001 and continuing until today.
Its drone program has seen a major makeover and investments in the
last almost 15 years due to the nature of the threats that had to
be fought. Besides their functional role, I will try to see how
drones fit with the ideology at the basis of U.S. Grand Strategy in
the aforementioned timeframe and how such technology was to some
level expected to be used seeing the conditions. For this I will
first look at the history of drones in order to best identify their
main traits, then look at the approach at an international level.
The chapter regarding the legal framework helps define the
functionality of drones and thus acts as an instrument in order to
receive public support for war efforts. In a certain sense, drones,
besides their military functionality, serve as a strategic
instrument at policy and government level, which actually enables
their usage, which in turn is another function of drones because of
the way they are thought.then try to encompass them and see if they
fit in the theoretical framework of the current U.S. Grand
Strategy.
History of UAVsAs with the debate on any new technology, drones
have had their fair share of opposition in time. Since the
beginning of plane use in wars and with their tactical solutions
and faults, the idea of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle wasnt far
behind. As early as the end of the 19th century, it was predicted
that aerial power, if indeed implemented, was going to change the
face of war and the tactical advantage for whomever possesses such
technology.[footnoteRef:1] At least these were the predictions. So
it is common that at first any new technology be disregarded. This
whoever does not impede human ingenuity and imagination, such that
even as soon as that very period explosives were being sent to
remote locations by balloon, which can hardly fit in the concept of
UAV since its not a proper vehicle, but does demonstrate the idea
very clearly.[footnoteRef:2] [1: David MacIsaac, Voices from the
Central Blue-The Air Power Theorists, Makers of Modern
Strategy--From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Peter
Paret,Princeton Univ.Press,1986,pp.624-647] [2: Thomas
Ehrhard,Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the United States Armed
Services:A Comparative Study of Weapon System Innovation, Johns
Hopkins University,USA, 2000,pp. 656-702]
Of course the abovementioned concept translated more likely into
flying bomb instead of an automated vehicle carrying bombs, so the
first evolution from there were the missiles. This is due to the
fact that in order to decrease mortality of pilots in the First and
Second World War bombs had to be delivered pilotless. Also, as with
airplanes, the military usage of such a concept was not very clear
so it had to be explored. At first the idea was simple, get a bomb
from point A to point B without a pilot or even a plane, since
those were expensive too, which also opened up the mindset more
towards remote attacks. At the brink of WWI the United States were
researching just that, the idea of an automatically controlled
missiles, which would be sent long distances to a precise location.
Of course, precision wasnt a fortitude of drones or bombings for
that matter at the time. This mentality was due to the
domino-effect mindset at the time, which continued and actually
expanded later on in WWII, meaning there was a belief that one
strategic point in a country could be hit, say a very important
factory or very important human hub, which would have the
consequence of, if not halting all together, crippling the attacked
countrys economy, thus regressing the war effort and giving the
attacker an advantage.[footnoteRef:3] However again accuracy was
difficult to obtain because technology was lacking since all the
war effort was redirected from research and development towards
materials and resources, but also because there was actually little
information on such locations, there were no eyes in enemy
territory. Since research and development was lacking in tangible
results, efforts were abandoned soon and retaken when the
possibility of incorporating a gyroscope and an altimeter was
present. Thus the predecessor of the cruise missile technology was
born, and allowed the bomb to reach the target more effectively,
more precisely than the previous missile, which only flew a
straight line of a determined distance and when the distance was
reached it would collapse from the sky onto the target. With the
advancement of using a gyroscope and an altimeter, the bomb could
determine its height and speed and sustain it until its
destination. But again, after the war, the research was cancelled.
[3: David MacIsaac, Voices from the Central Blue-The Air Power
Theorists, Makers of Modern Strategy--From Machiavelli to the
Nuclear Age, Peter Paret,Princeton Univ.Press,1986,pp.624-647]
By 1944, a few years after the research was rekindled, armies
were able to use a remote control in order to better guide the
so-called UAVs, which by now are approaching the meaning of the
concept, but are not quite there yet because the carrier itself was
also the bomb. Until this concept changed, UAVs were considered of
disposable nature and thus of one-use only. Germany had high
success in using this type of weapons, especially in the bombing of
British cities, including London in repeated rounds.[footnoteRef:4]
The Germans, perhaps for the very first time, demonstrated the
extended use of such technology and its promise. Of course soon
after the U.S. started its own use of such technology following the
German model. [footnoteRef:5]Even since then it could be predicted
that a shift will be made in emphasis from airplanes being
controlled by humans to airplanes being controlled by scientists
and engineers. More authors than one speculated the replacement of
at least some parts of human control over weapons in war, by
machines.[footnoteRef:6] [4: Richard K. Barnhart, Eric Shappee,
Douglas M. Marshall,Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, CRS
Press,USA, 2012,pp. 5-14] [5: Claus Reuter,The V2, and the Russian
and American Rocket Program, S.R. Research & Publishing,
USA,2002, p.163] [6: Brian Holden Reid, J.F.C. Fullers theory of
mechanized warfare, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol I,is.3, 1978,
p.301]
As early as the 1930s cameras could be attached to these flying
bombs. Perhaps Americans used it first, in order to more precisely
locate the target. However the mindset and the doctrine did not
change much in military, and although this tactical solution was to
be used as preparing the entering of troops, thus preparing
battleground, destroying cities, economy, etc, its complete
potential was reduced by the same thinking that accompanied the use
of planes in war for the first time: that UAV had the role of
support much rather than a role in itself, for the core army, and
that in a war it only served as accompanying the main army body,
meaning the infantry, cavalry, tank commands and so on. This
hindered much the development of multi-use capability of drones and
the expansion of their scope, therefore even if such advancements
as a gyroscope, altimeter and even camera were mounted, they were
pinned only to support role. Following that, strategists realizing
the importance of the ability to attach cameras to UAVs, assault
drones, much slower and of smaller range than the missile, were
brought in first attention. They were re-delegated towards
information and intelligence gathering during the Cold War because
other, more effective, fast and which packed more power, types of
flying weapons were in first sight at the time. The idea of
separating man from weapon became more obvious with this line of
technological evolution. Also, the increasing of strike capability,
which always was and always will be an essential element of UAVs,
was closer since information could be gathered first handedly now
and intelligence was more available.Still despite this drones were
associated strongly with the idea of flying bombs and since the
finality of these bombs was destruction, drones were seen as
disposable and it was a difficult idea to change at the
time.[footnoteRef:7] [7: Jeffrey M Sullivan, Evolution or
Revolution? Rise of UAVs,IEEE Technology and Science Magazine,
is.25,vol3, 2006, pp.43-49]
The Vietnam War followed after that, which allowed this concept
to be put in a new light and redefine the use of drones. A new role
was assigned to drone usage, which was that of reconnaissance
flights because of pilots being taken down during such flights,
thus drones acquiring a role higher than support during combat. New
functionalities were assigned to drones because of this, apart from
the obvious camera feature, a drone was now jet powered and could
launch missiles and bombs, and a variety of other
weaponry.[footnoteRef:8]Now drones had the ability of doing damage
assessment and also with this, a new role had been discovered, that
of unmasking the enemys available anti-aircraft devices, their
position and type, in order to develop countermeasures. This period
also marked the beginning of CIA usage of drones in order to gather
intelligence, a role which has stuck with drones for the most part
of the late 20th century.[footnoteRef:9] [8: Thomas
Mahnken,Technology and the War in Vietnam 1963-1975, Columbia
University Press, USA,2008, p. 113] [9: Idem.]
With these developments the shift was starting to occur in drone
role, and made a significant gap between man and weapon, as
predicted earlier on, which gave rise to questions on whether man
will be separated from war by technology, and drones received the
appellative of remotely piloted aircrafts, or RPAs.
[footnoteRef:10]With this shift there are important notes to be
made, such as the shift of applicability of drones from support
role to replacing roles previously held by man, and from this sole
point onward, the change in strategy that was about to occur
because of that. Basically it meant that the presence of drones
could multiply forces which, if before could be organized by tasks,
so could these, making way for new modes of operation prior and
during battle. In spite of much promise, this technology was set
aside as new technology usually encounters resistance within fixed
military institutions and structures, but more than this, mindsets,
doctrine and strategy.[footnoteRef:11] [10: Idem] [11: Idem
p.114]
In the 1970s, much at the same time drone technology was being
forgotten in the U.S. for example, a fine example of its strategic
use re-brought the subject to the surface, namely the war between
Israel and the Arab coalition led by Egypt and Syria, also known as
the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In this case drones have been used in
tandem with manned aircraft in order to provide intel beforehand
and give the Israeli Defense Force an advantage over the Arab army,
thus being able to stop their advancement and finally repel them.
As drone technology has been resurfaced so was its fame so that
Israel received requests to sell the technology. The U.S. in
particular developed its own drones and used it in the same way, as
well as for damage assessment and target clearance, in the 1991
Gulf War. [footnoteRef:12] But apart from this, the main focus for
drone usage continued mostly for intelligence gathering and status
checking by a number of institutions, such as the U.N. and the CIA.
Although the role and use of drones was limited once again, this
time by the need of clarity regarding its scope, the technology has
made its way as a separate technology into the military strategy,
although even if mostly as a tactical instrument. [12: Rodman,
David, UAVs in the Service of the Israeli Air Force, Gloria Center,
(September 7, 2012),
http://www.gloria-center.org/2010/09/rodman-2010-09-07/ accessed
8.04.2015]
The need for more such UAVs was soon to follow so much so that
after the demonstration in 1991, many militaries began to acquire
and invest in research of this new technology.Following the
technological boom of the 1990s and 2000s, drones began having more
and more complex and independent features, mostly because of the
emergence of global positioning system, or GPS, the micro-chip, and
so on, which increased two main functions commonly present
throughout the evolution of drones: remote control and
precision.[footnoteRef:13] These features needed to be tested
somehow, and the best occasion was in the Afghanistan and Pakistan
wars following 9/11. It is impossible to talk about modern day
drones without talking of these conflicts. [13: Christopher A.
Jones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): An Assesment of Historical
Operations and Future Possibilities,Air Command and Staff College,
Research Department, 1997,
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/docs/97-0230D.pdf, pp. 3-5,
accessed 8.04.2015]
The emergence of a new threat, which was present throughout the
years but never as present and as in reach, terrorism, urged
research and development of new technologies to reassess tactical
and strategic use of what was already available. Thus investment in
the U.S. drone program is probably the most advanced in the world
due to motivation, during the Bush mandates and even more so during
the Obama administration, which saw the need to resolve the
international law and public debate issues stressed by drone usage.
The surveillance period, or reconnaissance role, of drones came to
an end in this period, and the new more functional high target
strike function was emphasized.Of course, in other parts of the
world in which conflict was present, such as Rwanda with its recent
genocide, Congo, even unrest in South-East Asia, prompted for more
surveillance usage of this technology, so that U.N. consistently
used it in order to gain insight into the situations at difficult
to penetrate scenes. If this technology was to be used more,
spirits had to be settled.
The legality of drones the political instrumentIn a strategic
framework for drones within battle, the need to also consider the
funder of wars is crucial. As we know governments fund wars in the
classic case with declared war between two countries. When
situations of terrorism and insurgents appear, however, which
affect interests of a foreign state, the lack of clarity on who is
fighting whom and with what increases because there is no
functional definition of all parts of the war. Since the war effort
has to be justified every step of the way a legal framework which
comprises new technologies can shed light on such matters. The
military can use it to argue for the continuation of a war, whilst
the government, against it.Also, legal frameworks define how a
state perceives a certain issue, and that framework also generally
translates into public opinion, be it for or against the framework,
but still it helps define it. In this scenario, by tying the three
elements together, namely government, which is withheld by the
people, which are influenced by the legal framework which is
created by the government, we see a vicious circle being created
around an issue. First positive aspect found in state law which
defends the ethical use of drones is the value put on human lives,
on less collateral casualties by increased strike accuracy, and the
less obvious role of being the eyes and ears of the military thus
leading to more informed and effective operations which translate
into less loss of human lives.[footnoteRef:14] The greatest debate
in this sector was again of the U.S. for its strikes in Pakistan,
and Yemen, which the latter was also was a no-war zone at the time.
The U.N. indeed declared this as problematic alongside other cases
of which Russian seek and destroy units in Chechnya were mentioned
quite largely. The main common argument here is the use of drones
or UAVs in the targeting and elimination of terrorist activities or
high profile terrorist members. While the document that analyzes
these incidents is not a law per se, it explains how existing
regulation already gives a framework for use of such weaponry.
[footnoteRef:15] [14: International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976, art. 6 (ICCPR); UN General Assembly, Resolution on
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
Countering Terrorism, A/Res/51/191, 10 Mar. 2005, para. 1] [15:
U.N. General Assembly 28th May 2010, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Philip Alston,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf
accessed 8.04.2015]
The debate reaches also negative aspects when self-determination
and intervention in domestic affairs of other states come into
play, principles which are thoroughly described in the U.N. charter
for example, as well as in international law generally, being also
present in the sources of law. The debate arises from its
counterbalance to the right to protect principle in international
law, which is highly volatile as a principle, serving as the main
argument in actions such as the war on terror, justifying U.S.A.s
right to intervene in Afghanistan and later on Iraq and
legitimizing its actions. On the other hand there is the Rwandan
case where this principle, albeit highly applicable, was
counterbalanced against the principle of non-intervention,
resulting in the Rwandan genocide with no reaction from the
international community. Many more examples of this exist, proving
indeed that as in the case of conflict situations with intervention
of regular military, drones find their place at the borderline
between justified and legitimate actions involving such technology,
and a violation of international law. One of the most outstanding
cases in this regard was always regarded the drone strikes in
Pakistan, which were held as illegal but then regarded as legal
because the Pakistan Army recognized the strikes as approved
beforehand. [footnoteRef:16] [16: Jack Serle, PODCAST Pakistan Army
increasing cooperation with CIA on drone strikes after Peshawar
massacre,
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-pakistan/
accessed 8.04.2015]
In the legal debate of drones there is to be identified two
aspects which resound, drone characteristics which make the
difference between its morality/legality. This aspect is the type
of drone, armed or not. Drones which do not possess the capability
to strike are regarded more friendly as those which are armed, but
even the ones that do not have arms raise the question of the
destinations of the information that they collect. An example of
this is the 2013 Congo drone surveillance carried out by the U.N.
in order to gather data for risk assessment in the area, which
sparked an opposition from the Congo government. It was settled in
the end but the issue raised is still of debate regarding
regulation. [footnoteRef:17] [17: UN Starts Drone Surveillance in
DR Congo, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25197754
accessed 8.04.2015]
Another type of debate regarding drones relates to collateral
damage. The U.S.A. is cited as an example here again because their
drone program is the most outstanding and while other countries are
only yet to acquire drones or have acquired them recently U.S.A.
holds the lead in this technology. Even though the use of drones
has given troops an increased tactical advantage and allowed them
to act on more intelligence than before, collateral damage is
inevitable, as drone strike precision is still an aim which has not
yet been reached. The best example would be the case of the Yemen
strikes, in which many attempts have been made to kill al-Qaeda
member Salim Sinan al-Harethi, as many as around 250, with success
in the end, but with little civilian casualties in comparison to
the overall success rate if drone strikes in this particular
case,[footnoteRef:18][24] making drones recognized as efficient but
still debated. In this regard the obvious defense of drone use in
conflict situations can act as a political instrument at home,
providing people in general with reasons a war is to be supported,
besides the initial motivation. [18: Drone Strikes Yemen:Analysis;
http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/yemen/analysis.html ,
accessed 8.04.2015]
In order to sum up this chapter, in the legal framework there
already are general provisions which apply to UAVs and which offer
a general legal framework under which they can operate, such as
article 51 of the U.N. charter on the use of force within a state
if the state has consented to it or if there is a threat coming
from within its borders, towards the outside, or the Treaty of Open
Skies. What distinguishes drones from other more conventional
weapons is their very wide scope of operation, but also maybe their
biggest feature in any role, be it surveillance or strikes, is that
it puts military out of harms way. Again the argument of cutting
down on human loss is risen, while other weapons have efficiency in
battle and are measured by kill rate and, in some cases, there is
even possibility of remote attack, such as with several types of
arms, drones offer the unique capability to transfer some of the
human components which werent possible before, onto them, such as
sight, visibility, and even precision, ruling out what before was
human error. This can give the army that holds this technology a
great advantage. While conventional arms need troops to locate to
the conflict area, drones remove this possibility.The legal
framework then does not provide with a framework which regulates
the risk of expansion of the conflict area because of that, nor
does it cover the risk of civilians living in the area from where
drones are operated, be it the case. In situations of great need on
the battlefield, drones can prove to be a valuable asset, while as
a political instrument in war they are regarded as dangerous
because of the power they posses for a countrys goal. The ability
to strike at a distance, with more precision, gives leaders and
army men the possibility to follow their own set of ideas in which
targets to select and when to strike, making for a whole new level
of the political game. This aspect is the one that international
law is trying to control, alongside collateral casualties and
breaching of international law principles which, as we have seen
above, have been resolved one way or another. In this sense, drones
give a political strategic edge to goals pursued.
U.S. and its dronesEven though the U.S.A. had a drone program
underway in their research and development sector of the Army, it
has seen a very quick growth under the two presidencies covering
the period from 2001 9/11 attacks until today, namely the Bush
administration and the Obama administration. Under the Bush
administration drones were mainly used in the War on Terror to
target high-profile suspects pertaining to terrorist organizations.
From 2001 to 2008 drones were used in Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan
and Iraq, all with the same feature of targeting terrorists. Bush
was often criticized on the intervention in Iraq since 2004 because
of the high number of American troops casualties and unclear and
unverified motives for doing so, but also because troops and
resources were growing thin from the war in
Afghanistan.[footnoteRef:19] Nevertheless drones provided a two-way
solution to both problems, being a weapon to be used remotely it
could salvage lives of soldiers, and being reusable and highly
adaptable, they could be reused in the new conflict. A total of
around 75 drone strikes[footnoteRef:20] were reported between
2001-2008, but with a significant increase in their usage towards
the end of the Bush administration, 37 of the total some 75 drone
strikes occurring then.[footnoteRef:21] The drone program itself in
this period was controversial because of the increasing need for a
legal framework for them, but also because the idea of UAVs have
expanded in other sectors such as commercial, or for homeland
surveillance, which raised concerns at home about privacy. [19:
Leila Hudson, Matt Flannes, Colin Owens, Drone Warfare: Blowback
from the New American Way of War,Middle East Policy, vol 3,is.18,
Fall 2011] [20:
https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/testimony-drone-wars/
accessed 9.04.2015] [21: Leila Hudson, Matt Flannes, Colin Owens,
Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War,Middle
East Policy, vol 3,is.18, Fall 2011]
In 2008 the Obama administrations turn came to administer
U.S.A.s wars and approach towards the international environment. In
this period the drone program saw a significant growth and so did
drone strikes.[footnoteRef:22] However this was not the only change
occurring. Under the Obama administration the drone target list has
been expanded to contain also other suspects, considered by the
administration as potentially dangerous for its national security,
and also the frequency of attacks, so much so that in total more
than 370 drone strikes are known to have been approved.
[footnoteRef:23] The countries in which drone strikes by the U.S.A.
have occurred have expanded in number, for instance strikes have
occurred in Libya and Somalia in addition to the three mentioned
earlier. [22: http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/ accessed
9.04.2015] [23: New America Foundation, Year of the
Drone,Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative,
http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones accessed
9.04.2015]
A common trait of both administrations is that strikes have not
only been approved for war declared zones but also in non-combat
zones, which raised issues on an international level of legality.
Somalia and Yemen both were not declared combat zones by the U.S.,
although Yemen did publicly say that it had approved of the strikes
on its territory, and in Somalia the motivation was that of strikes
against terrorist leaders.[footnoteRef:24] [24:
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/?view=all
accessed 9.04.2015]
USGS since 2001 to the presentSince the 9/11 attacks the U.S.
has been confronted with a number of changes in its external
policies and actions. During the Bush administration the most
noticeable event is the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center
buildings, as well as the start of the War on Terror. Characterized
by an expansion from fighting only al Qaeda to fighting all
terrorism, the Bush administration was able to pursue the war not
only in Afghanistan, but also to Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and so on,
wherever there was the threat of terrorism. But in order to start
from the beginning, lets understand a bit the main approaches
present in the Bush administrations foreign policy. It is well
known that the biggest influence in the carrying out of the war on
terrorism was that of the neo-conservatories. Far from being a very
visible group before this event, the neo-cons surely have made
their way up the decision-making ladder with their argument of the
powerful United States in the period of the 9/11 attacks. The main
theme of the neo-conservative train of thought is the placing of
the U.S. into the centre of the international relations arena
because of its status as the unchallenged super-power, in what is
so-called the American Unipolar Moment[footnoteRef:25]. Following
the neo-con discourse the United States was losing ground in terms
of military and power, with reduced spending and interest, thus was
beginning to see the end of its unipolarity and had to rebuild its
status and image. The neo-cons reacted to the 9/11 attacks
precisely as a consequence of this laissez faire attitude and
demanded that the U.S. react in this situation in order to
re-establish its position in world affairs and recommit to its
ideals. Also, the neo-cons, much as Wilsonianism, were in favor of
spreading American ideals overseas as a peace to solution. The
active involvement in world affairs was required in order to keep
the U.S. safe, and because it was the only state capable of
sustaining such an effort overseas in any location in the world it
chooses to do so. By these characteristics, it was also the U.S.s
job and duty to act as an international policeman, assisted by its
allies. [footnoteRef:26] [25: Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar
Moment, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1990/91, pp. 23-33] [26:
Maria Ryan, Neo conservatives and the American public, The US
Public and American Foreign Policy, ed.Andrew Johnstone, Helen
Laville, Routlege,U.S.A., 2009, pp.150-155]
This train of thought continued through most of Bushs
administration, even if such elements were not visible at first,
they soon became so because of this event and because there was a
consensus from both the political elite and the public to pursue
American interests overseas and defend its right to security at
home, as they saw it at the moment.[footnoteRef:27] This concluded
in another principle visible within U.S. foreign policy at the
moment, namely the unilateralism with which U.S. followed its
interests. By this logic any matter that threatened the U.S.
national security and interests was to be treated directly an
assertively by the U.S. In this regard, intellectuals were aware
that the unipolarity of the international arena would not last, but
were heading their arguments towards a benevolent hegemon.
Concerning human rights the neo-cons have included it into their
agenda as one of the values to be promoted by the U.S.
[footnoteRef:28] [27: idem] [28: A.E.Campbel, Richard D.Burns,
Balance of power, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy,vol I,
ed.Alexander DeConde,Richard D.Burns,Fredrik Logevall,Charles
Scribners Sons,U.S.A.2002,pp.137-138]
In the meantime although the main threat against which the War
on Terror started was achieved, the U.S. continued to implicate
itself in different war theaters and pursue its interests overseas.
In 2008/2009 administrations changed and president Barack Obama was
elected. A general overview of the U.S. would show that its
unipolar moment has passed, with China rising as an economic power
and Russia straightening its economy, the world is becoming
multipolar. [footnoteRef:29] The role of the U.S. as the
international policeman was coming to an end because of the ability
of the world to solve its own problems. Despite this the following
of its interests offshore offered the U.S. an important role in
international affairs, also because regarding military it still has
the most advanced one in the world. [29: Fareed Zakaria, The Post
American World, Norton, Norton,2009, U.S.A.,p.215-217]
When speaking about U.S. Grand Strategy it is important to
notice the above effects because it determines the way the U.S.
positioned itself in the world afterwards. In this regard, the U.S.
sought to act as an off-shore balancer. Having still the most
expanded experience and the achievements to have credibility it can
implicate itself in matters of conflict with credibility that it
can solve it. Although the anti-American sentiment is strong
because of the secrecy of some foreign actions by the U.S. because
of which the Americans lost credibility, their capacity to
intervene in certain situations and their required presence when
things get out of hand makes them a first choice by other states.
[footnoteRef:30] The policy followed by the Obama administration
internationally makes for a number of theories related to its
behavior, the main ones are the U.S. a benevolent hegemon, which is
a view not so widely accepted; and off-shore balancer. As a
benevolent hegemon the U.S. has again the responsibility to create
collective assets which may prove detrimental to its own state,
reason for which nowadays for example the people are unsatisfied
with the way things are being run at home and have a negative
sentiment of all of U.S.s involvement abroad.[footnoteRef:31] But
as an off-shore balancer the U.S. can remain more detached and
therefore concentrate on the problems at home. Off-shore balancing
works by preventing the system to become unipolar again, meaning
that the emergence of a new hegemon is the only interest followed.
This strategy sets aside the possibility of the U.S. to act
unilaterally, mainly because it favors the lack of necessity of
such actions, and favors the development of multiple powers,
interrelating states on levels such as economic, interdependent,
cultural, political, security, and so on. The promotion of American
values overseas is still pursued but the policy isnt so aggressive
like in the case of the neo-cons. [30: Idem.] [31: Carl
Conetta,Something in the Air: "Isolationism," Defense Spending,and
the US Public Mood, Oct.2014,
http://comw.org/pda/Something_in_the_Air.html accessed
9.04.2015]
Ideologically speaking there is a tendency to go towards
isolationism because of internal disapproval and economic struggle,
which means that safeguarding immediate local pressures have to be
prioritized. With the economic crisis starting in 2008, the year
the Obama administration started, there was no doubt that keeping
the U.S.s interests safe by this method, of intervention, had to
have serious up-sides in order to continue functioning. The liberal
views which dominate American history in general are kept, meaning
that the promotion of human rights and democratic values continues
as it always has, but this time by using more effective measures.
Although the anti-American sentiment has grown in this period
because of the secrecy of objectives followed, the U.S. has always
legitimized its actions. In the spirit of spreading democracy as a
means to peace, the U.S. had to stay involved and maintain
credibility.[footnoteRef:32] [32: Daniel Deudney,John Ikenberry,
Democratic Internationalism An American Grand Strategy for a
Post-exceptionalist Era, Council on foreign relations, USA,
2012,p.15]
Multi-faceted capabilities of dronesAs the debate goes on about
how drones are used and what it actually implies for the
territories, peoples and nations in which they are used, the
practical aspects of drone capabilities are defining their role
within the military and their roles on the battlefield. If we
compare the capabilities of traditional military technology and
assets such as cruise missiles, bombers, troops with a wide array
of guns, fighter planes and so on, they all aim at fixed targets
rather than individuals or scattered organizations, which is the
case nowadays in asymmetrical threats, and have limited to no
visibility in some geographical locations for instance, which are
hard to reach.[footnoteRef:33] A concrete example of this are the
NATO air strikes in Kosovo against the national army which was
attacking villages and cities by foot, being able to stay scattered
and very mobile, not to mention lightly armed, and making a for a
very difficult target for the NATO bombers and airplanes. The
success of the campaign rose only when the Kosovo Liberation Army
assisted the bombings from the ground.[footnoteRef:34] [33:
Sherrill Lingel, et al. Methodologies for Analyzing Remotely
Piloted Aircraft in Future Roles and Missions. RAND Corporation,
Project Air Force.USAF, 2012.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2012/RAND_DB637.pdf
accessed 9.04.2015] [34: Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman,
Kosovo and the great air power debate, International Security, Vol.
24, No. 4. Spring, 2000, pp. 5-38]
One of the main features, which is also a big plus for drones
tactically as well as ethically, is their ability to watch and wait
for the best moment to strike a target, thus to receive
confirmation of the target, allowing the operator to discriminate
between civilians and militants. Before, wars were indiscriminate
in this regard, now having the ability to discriminate more. This
impacts not only the strategy used, but also the efficiency of the
operators, which constantly contribute to the effort by their
experience.Another feature is their ability to give alternative
solutions to operations which normally would have to be carried out
by humans, ranging from surveillance to strikes, thus again
eliminating human losses on both sides, the attacker and the
target. In this way attacks are more efficient if such capabilities
are employed, making for shorter campaigns, raids, giving the
ability to use a raid strategy, or a waiting strategy, rather than
setting on to a covert operation or surprise attack with troops
which may lack coordination and is more error
prone.[footnoteRef:35] [35: Mary Kaldor, Elaborating the New War
Thesis, Rethinking the nature of war, Duyvesteyn Isabelle, ed.Frank
Cass, USA, 2005, pp.211-217]
Cost-wise, a ground attack would be in the detriment of the
attacker in human lives, military and as noted in the previous
chapter, in political and international law terms, if drones would
not be employed. Another factor to take into account here is the
unreliability of the ground forces which can increase costs also,
and as a final factor cost-related, from a summary analysis one can
conclude that building a drone, and employing it with its
advantages, not requiring hours of training and simulation for a
pilot, not to mention his/her living costs at this time, means that
drone technology is also in itself cheaper to use, allowing for
funds to be transferred towards development.As regarding
functionality, the obvious uses have already been mentioned above
to be detailed here, namely surveillance (target acquisition,
target confirmation, damage assessment, information gathering, here
may be included discovering new enemy defense technology), and
strike, but there is another functional role, that of providing
relief to mostly anyone in dire need of some supplies or others.
Drones are also capable of acting as messengers between posts
regarding food, ammo, other necessities, but also to provide relief
to civilians in war affected zones or other difficult to reach
areas, where the functionality of a drone changes from suspicious
to humanitarian. As a quick side note, here, oddly enough, the
international community isnt vocal towards a set of regulations on
humanitarian aid. From this role the multi-faceted part of drones
are revealed since it has so many capabilities. [footnoteRef:36]
Main improvements brought and continuously developed on drones
generally are the capability of longer flight periods, of carrying
heavy payloads, helicopter-like vertical take-off from ships and
other platforms, thus increasing their presence in a multitude of
environments and situations, and deployment to more areas of the
world because of advanced remote control capabilities. [36:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/whats_not_wrong_with_drones?page=full
accessed 9.04.2015]
The risks of using drones are fairly limited in the sense that
the capabilities outrun any downfall. Drones, as any air-born
vehicle, can be shot down, or if containing or transmitting
important info, their signal could be intercepted. [footnoteRef:37]
[37: Christopher Layne, The Strategy of Offshore Balancing, Cornell
Univ.Press,2006,U.S.A., pp.159-170]
MethodologyBy analyzing the reasons which made the use of drones
so preferable we can see the attributes that the world has attached
to them in terms of war, but not only. By taking the most common
uses in conflict areas an overview can be achieved. Also, their use
has also defined a new strategy, mainly targeting high profiled
criminals as the need has risen since 9/11, which is not only
effective militarily speaking, but also politically. As the
functionalities of drones have been established, it can be seen how
they have been used and where in the past 13 years in conflict
situations by the U.S. Even if drones were first used successfully
by Israel in the Yom Kippur War, the U.S.A. has the biggest drone
program and their exponential increase in use and spreading in the
last 13 years (the first strike in Yemen) should give a better
overview in which conditions drones were adopted, for what reason,
and the end result of the situation. From this data then I can
argue how drones fit in with U.S. Grand strategy.In the following
section I will try to see how drone technology has been used and
what implications this had, and see how this technology fits in the
framework promoted by the U.S. .Criteria establishmentDrones uses:
Surveillance usage: since the attachment of the first television
device on a drone, it gained the capability to gather intelligence
in an effective way, with people safely remotely controlling the
drone. Various bodies still use this feature exclusively with
drones in their operations. Strike capability: probably the most
important feature in a drone, strike capability was dominated and
still is by target precision, a feature which has always been
prioritized for improvement, alongside other features such as
travel range, carriage capacity, diversification of the weapons it
can support and ways of deploying them, etc. [footnoteRef:38] [38:
Note: surveillance and strike capability are characteristics often
used together but for the purpose of the paper I will track them as
separately and consider that strike capability will automatically
entail some kind of surveillance.]
Humanitarian/aid role/carriage role: here the function of simply
carrying supplies to conflict areas will be noted. Cost/efficiency
ratio: drones as a technology stand high on this plane. Political
instrument: although their very nature makes them a good argument
in any pursuit, their unaccountability makes for great risk of
abuse.This criteria will now be put in comparison to the main
principles of the U.S. grand strategy present in the Bush and Obama
administrations to see how they have served their purpose.
Neo-conservative context: The strike capability satisfies the need
of the neo-cons to be assertive The surveillance capability in the
situation of being a hegemon of a unipolar world, it gives
legitimacy to targets killed, distinguishing from civilians, rules
out tendencies of expansion Humanitarian/aid role/carriage role the
promotion of the U.S. principles to be exported as human rights,
democratic values of liberating people from aggression
Cost/efficiency - cost was not a pressing issue at the moment and
the upside of drones was improving the war capabilities of the U.S.
Political instrument - unfounded claims for entering Iraq, even
though proven later, made for a difficult situation internally in
terms of accountability. Also, their usage was mostly in countries
which had terrorist links within its borders and being tied to U.S.
interests, it gave them leverage to use them even in undeclared
combat zones.Off-shore balancing context: The strike capability
rapid expansion of the drone program made for better technology so
more accuracy The surveillance capability suspicions of spying and
an internal debate over their use at home made this feature
controversial Humanitarian/aid role/carriage role a compelling
argument when dealt with drone legality because of the possibility
to distinguish between targets. Cost/efficiency the economic crisis
beginning in 2008 made for debate at public and Congress level to
opposing intervention in other countries Political instrument
because of secrecy of drone program and actual casualties,
accountability was diminished and drones no longer represented a
good political instrument to gain support. The theme of American
interests which transcend borders (terrorism affecting American
security) stands.
The preliminary conclusions to be drawn from here is that drones
have been used little during the Bush administration but were
emerging as a democratic weapon because of their capability to
distinguish between targets and because of the nature of the attack
(targeting particular individuals). During the Obama administration
their use has increased exponentially due to the multiplication of
war theaters and their overall increase in usage in the
world.[footnoteRef:39] Their political instrumentality has become
rather ineffective after 2008 because of the management of the
drone project but was still effective in terms of being easily
defendable because no specific legislative framework exists to the
moment, existing laws accommodating this technology for the moment.
[39: http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/
accessed 8.04.2015]
In terms of ideology, the drone encompasses features such as
being a more human weapon because it can distinguish between
targets and thus reduce civil casualties. Also it can be
effectively used for carrying aid to troops or areas in which it is
needed. Legally speaking, drones can also be seen as a means to
intervene as a peacekeeping party, because of the case in which
Yemen declared to have authorized drone strikes on its territory.
Also because the main theme of drone usage was of the War on
Terror, it allowed the U.S. to use it well as a political
instrument internationally.An interesting comparison of
characteristics is that of the drones ability to be piloted and
controlled remotely, which synchronizes with the concept of
off-shore balancing, which by its nature represents the
safe-keeping of the home base and the pursuing of interests from a
distance.ConclusionIn the overall strategy of the U.S. drones have
proved a valuable multi-faceted asset in their struggle to make the
transition from one unipolar political system to another, in which
foreign policy goals have become increasingly difficult to pursue.
By their very nature drones were never meant to be solely a weapon,
as is the case for example for tanks or machine guns, but an ally
in pursuing their interests and arguing their position
internationally.From the political level to the legal and military
one, drones give the possibility of adaptability in an array of
contexts. U.S.A.s positioning towards its pursuits on an
international level has benefited from the development of such a
technology because it can uphold the principles that the U.S. is
trying to spread in accordance to its beliefs and orientation.In
the first case of the neo-cons drones were able to provide a means
to express an assertive American stance and policy, unilaterally,
since the targets dont get to interact with a soldier in a
conflict. Furthermore the characteristic of a drone is, as shown
above, to wait and strike, which does not imply a decision from
both sides. This adapts to the modus operandi of the asymmetric
targets U.S.A. was faced with.In the second case this technology
provided with a means to appease public opinion, argue in front of
international law and give the army a clear advantage in face of
threats, thus withholding the American army superiority in the
conflicts it has engaged in, but also set standards regarding this
technology on an international level. Despite conflicts, many other
countries are adopting this technology which could translate into
an approval of what the U.S. is trying to stand for by acting in
this manner. Drone technology is a technology that can successfully
ply, more than any other, to the needs and values of the current
U.S. Grand Strategy. It is a weapon with much more than tactical
and strategic implications, but represents values and principles
which comply with the current American foreign policy approach and
U.S. general ideology. This technology can also set the pathway for
other technology, a sort of ethical code in developing new military
technology.
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