Dr William J. Nuttall University Senior Lecturer Technology Policy [email protected]Copyright: It is believed by this author that all images are used with permission or consistent with published terms of use. Any errors or omissions are regretted and are unintentional. This presentation has been prepared for a non–profit educational presentation and is not to be circulated or reproduced. Masterclass in Energy Supply and Demand, BP Institute, Cambridge, December 2008 Nuclear Energy: technology and policy issues
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Masterclass in Energy Supply and Demand, BP Institute, Cambridge, December 2008
• History of Nuclear Energy in the UK• Policy I - Environment• Policy II - Economics• Policy III – Security of Supply• Policy IV – Public Acceptance• Concluding remarks
Science and Technology
Nuclear fission – the basics
Nucleus, comprising neutrons and protons
Electrons, in reality more of a cloud of electrons than the rigid orbits shown here.
The target nucleus will be either ‘fissile’ uranium-235 or plutonium-239. An incoming ‘thermal’ neutron causes the target to split into two fission products (such as barium-141 or krypton-92) and new neutrons. Each U-235 fission yields on average 2.59 fast neutrons. Of these 23% are ‘lost’, 38% are absorbed by the fuel, and 39% produce new fissions. Thermal neutrons are 1,000 more efficient in fissioning fissile material than ‘fast’ neutrons. The reactor need 38.6% of emitted neutrons to cause new fissions for it to be critical.
What is a Nuclear Reactor?
[Hewitt & Collier, 2000]
The Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor the UK’s preferred design during the 1970s and 1980s
(Source: World Nuclear Association)
The Pressurized Light Water Reactor (PWR) pioneered by the United States
Simplified schematic of a Pressurised Light Water Reactor [Original Source Tennessee Valley Authority] Note also the development of the Boiling Water Reactor in the US
UK Nuclear Power History: 1956 Calder Hall – Britain’s first nuclear power station
1955 to 1971 the ‘Magnox’ Programme
1960s through the 1980’s - the ‘AGR’ years
1980s to mid 1990s - Sizewell B PWR, the only new station ordered in the 1980’s
1989 Public Inquiry supports construction of Hinckley Point C PWR, but too expensive for the newly liberalised electricity market.
2000s Magnox shutdown and decommissioning
2006 “Nuclear Power … back on the agenda with a vengeance” Tony Blair
Position of UK Civil Nuclear Power 2008
Reactor units
Power Stations
4
2
14
7
1
1
Type of Reactor
Magnox AGRThese plants continue to be unreliable - see following slides
PWR
Installed Capacity
1414 MWe 8380 MWe 1188 MWe
WNA UK Country Briefing October 2008:
“UK electricity production is about 400 TWh gross, from 74 GWe capacity. Net imports are about 8 TWh. Annual consumption is 355 TWh, or about 5750 kWh/person.
In 2006 UK nuclear plants generated 19% of UK electricity (69 billion kWh of some 380 billion kWh net), compared with 36% from gas and 38% from coal. In 2007 this dropped to 15% (57.5 TWh) and in 2008 it dropped further to 19.2 TWh for the six months to 28 September. There are 19 UK reactors totalling 11 GWe capacity. In addition, about 3% of UK electricity demand is met by imports of nuclear power from France, so overall nuclear total in UK consumption is about 22%.”
The British Nuclear Fleet 2008
Data: WNA Country Report UK October 2008
Reactors Type Net capacity each Start Operation Expected shutdown
Oldbury 1 & 2 Magnox 217 MWe 1968 Dec 2008
Wylfa 1 & 2 Magnox 490 MWe 1971-72 Dec 2010**
Dungeness B 1 & 2 AGR 545 MWe 1985-86 2018
Hartlepool 1 & 2 AGR 595 MWe 1984-85 2014
Heysham 1 & 2 AGR 615 MWe 1985-86 2014
Heysham 3 & 4 AGR 615 MWe 1988-89 2023
Hinkley Point B 1 & 2 AGR 620 & 600 MWe* 1976-78 2016
* running at 70% power indefinitely. ** NDA is examining possible life extension.
As of 04 December 2008: declared plans for six new Areva European Pressurised Water Reactors totalling 9600MW of new UK nuclear capacity. Four plants from EDF/BE on BE sites and two from EOn on NDA sites. Plants to be running by 2020 at the latest.
Data: WNA Country Report UK October 2008
Proponent Site Type MWe start-up
EdF / BE Sizewell, Suffolk EPR x 2 3200 2017
EdF / BE Hinkley Point, Somerset EPR x 2 3200 2017
EdF Wylfa, Wales EPR 1600 2018?
EOn Oldbury EPR x 21600 (sic)
?
New Build in the UK?
Policy
Energy Policy: The Triangle
Economics
EnergySecurity Environment
EnergyPolicy
EnergyPolicy
1. Environment & Nuclear Power: The issues change …
From 1950s urban air quality and 1970s acid rain
To radioactive waste in the 1980s
To climate change today
1. EnvironmentWhat about the waste?
Radioactive waste has been described as the Achilles’ Heel of the nuclear industry.
< Demonstration against nuclear shipments Dannenberg Germany March 2001
The UK in 2006 had the CoRWM report:http://www.corwm.org.uk/content-1092
A more consensus-based approach than previously
1. EnvironmentWhat about CO2?
359
247
217
279
216
181
215
195
121
157
99
90
7
14
11
79
48
25
31
24
28
31
21
16
76.4
27.3
64.6
8.2
6.3
4.4
1.1
16.6
8.4
13.1
9.8
7.6
2.5
2.5
5.7
2.5
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
1990s technology (high)
1990s technology (low)
2005-2020 technology
LIGNITE
1990s technology (high)
1990s technology (low)
2005-2020 technology
COAL
1990s technology (high)
1990s technology (low)
2005-2020 technology
OIL
1990s technology (high)
1990s technology (low)
2005-2020 technology
NATURAL GAS
1990s technology (high)
1990s technology (low)
2010-2020 technology
SOLAR PV
Reservoir (theoretical, Brazil)
Reservoir (high value, Germany)
Reservoir (Canada)
Run-of-river reservoir (Swiss)
HYDROELECTRICITY
high
low
BIOMASS
25% capacity; heavy foundation; Japan
Inland;; <10% capacity;Swiss
Inland; 10% capacity; Belgium
Coast; 35%capacity; Belgium
Coast; 30%capacity; UK
WIND
high
low
NUCLEAR
gCeq/KWh
Stack emissions Other chain steps
Source:
Spadaro et al. (2000), “Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Electricity Generation Chains” IAEA bulletin, vol. 42, No. 2, Vienna, Austria.
Nuclear Power is low carbon
1. EU 20:20:20 by 2020
Binding EU targets affecting electricity:
20% of total energy consumed to be supplied from renewables by 2020
20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.
In addition there is a non-binding target to reduce primary energy use by 20%
See: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/80 and http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/
2. Energy Security – the basics
Source: MSN
Diversity is the key
Energy security is best assured by those energy systems that make use of:
• a wide diversity of fuel types
• drawn from a wide diversity of sources
• via diverse transit routes
and
• open to a diverse set of trading opportunities.
It is easily transported and stored – for energy policy it is regarded as ‘domestic’.
Pro-nuclear advocates frequently point to the risk of of gas supply interruption and price volatility in 2020
They also point to the impact of future primary fuel imports on “balance of payments” [Nuclear Task Force 2003].
2. Energy Security – nuclear fuel supply
Yellowcake has an energy density [GJ/tonne] 17,400 times greater than export steaming coal
[see http://www.ior.com.au/ecflist.html]
Source: MSN
2. Energy Security – uranium resources
Source: MSN
Source: Uranium 2001: Resources, Production and Demand, OECD/IAEA. Based on known conventional resources which consist of reasonably assured resources plus category 1 estimated additional resources at costs less than $80(US) per kilogram U, as at January 1, 2001.
2. Energy Security – uranium resources
Source: MSN
Resource category by cost of production
< $40/kg < $ 80/kg < $130/kg Total*
Reasonably assured 1 947 000 2 643 000 3 297 000
Inferred 799 000 1 161 000 1 446 000
Prognosticated n.a. 1 700 000 2 519 000
Speculative n.a. n.a. 4 557 000
Total 2 716 000 5 504 000 11 819 000 14 798 000
*Total across all categories includes 2 979 000 tU of speculative resources with no recovery cost estimate assigned. Table 3. Total World Uranium Resources (as of 1 Jan 2005), Source: NEA/IAEA (2006)
Units: tonnes uranium
Uranium Resources versus Cumulative Uranium Demand
Identified conventional uranium resources are sufficient for several decades of operation at current usage rates, but what about global renaissance?
0
2 000
4 000
6 000
8 000
10 000
12 000
14 000
16 000
< $40/kg < $80/kg < $130/kg demand to2030
demand to2100
thou
sand
tonn
es o
f ura
nium
Proven (RAR) resources Inferred resources Undiscovered resourcesSpeculative resources Cumulative demand in RS Additional demand in APS
Source: OECD-IEA World Energy Outlook 2006.
Available at: http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/2006.asp
1012 Btus
1970 80 90 00
US Energy Production (National Energy Policy NEPD 2001)
Nuclear’s contribution to energy generation in Europe and North America grew in the 1990s despite the relative absence of power plant construction.
The key was improved reliability
2. Real energy security also includes simple reliability
“The day I hear that Britain is really to build seven large new nuclear power plants is the day I know that cheap British electricity will not return in my lifetime”
Bill Nuttall
Breakdown of lifetime costs of a nuclear power plant. Capital investment is the most significant factor in the economics of nuclear power. Source: DTI Energy Review – A Report, chart A1, page 175, cm6887, (July 2006). Available at: http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file39525.pdf Discount Rate assumption 10% real post tax
20%Operations and
Maintenance
14%Fuel costs
66%Capital
investment
Capital costs dominate
20%Operations and
Maintenance
14%Fuel costs
66%Capital
investment
Notes typically decommissioning costs are less than 1% of ongoing operating costs (10% discount rate assumed). Ref: Nuclear Power in the OECD, IEA (2001) Raw uranium costs are only a minor part (about 5%) of the total costs
32%
57%
11%
Uranium
Fuel Preparation
Waste (spent fuel)
The fuel 14%:
Uranium: only a minor role in total costs
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 50 100 150 200
Carbon Tax ($/tC)
Re
al L
ev
elis
ed
Ce
nts
/kW
e-h
r
Coal
Gas (low )
Gas (high)
Nuclear
Nuclear (25% reducedconstruction costs)
Nuclear (Reduced cost ofcapital)
Nuclear Power economics with carbon charging
Fabien Roques – linearised data from MIT report: Future of Nuclear power
Nuclear in 2003:
But, so much has changed since 2003
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 50 100 150 200
Carbon Tax ($/tC)
Re
al L
ev
elis
ed
Ce
nts
/kW
e-h
r
Coal
Gas (low )
Gas (high)
Nuclear
Nuclear (25% reducedconstruction costs)
Nuclear (Reduced cost ofcapital)
$3.50/MBTU
$4.50/MBTU
Gas electricity 2008?
But 2008 is not 2003
2003:
?Nuclear 2008?
Coal electricity 2008?
2008 Gas:
above $8.00/MBTU
EU-ETS price: €25/ tCO2
2003 data from MIT report: Future of Nuclear Power
2008 is not 2003!
Economic assessments undertaken for nuclear energy in the early part of the current decade were by the summer of 2008 badly out of date in almost every respect.
5 years ago almost no public consideration was given to a world with oil prices at more than $100 a barrel. What little work was done didn’t extend to nuclear power. In 2006 the EU published European Energy and Transport – scenarios on high oil and gas prices. That document considered an ‘oil soaring’ worst case. That worst case had oil at $65 a barrel in 2010! $100 would be reached in 2030!
High fossil fuel prices surely make nuclear relatively more competitive, but all the old detailed numbers become basically useless for strategy. There is an urgent need for some new numbers.
It was not just fossil fuelled electricity that became more expensive…
Nuclear power construction costs are rising fast – see: FT 29 August 2008
OL3 FOAK EPR in Finland construction costs up from €3Bn to €4.5Bn
European carbon prices (EU-ETS) have also been falling. Latest (5 December 2008) Point Carbon EUA OTC price at €13.52 /tonne CO2
Is less than $50 oil here to stay?
Or, will we see $150 oil again soon?
“Prediction is difficult, especially about the future” Niels Bohr (and Yogi Berra)
Costs … and Risks
Red font denotes risks occurring before first operations
The fundamental economic risks of nuclear power are:
• High costs of capital (high discount rates and rates of return)
• Overrun of construction phase (lost time is lost money)
• Future electricity prices (as for any power technology)
• Changes of safety or environmental regulation during planning and construction
• Political risk and public acceptance problems
• Risk of a low carbon price
• Poor plant reliability in operational phase (low load factor)
Economic ‘Non-Risks’
For nuclear power the following factors are relatively minor:
• Decommissioning costs (40-60 years in the future)
• Fuel costs (raw U308 is only a few % of total costs)
• Geopolitical risks (fuel is easily stored and is regarded as “domestic” for energy security)
So is the energy policy triangle sufficient to understand how nuclear power relates to energy policy?…
No, Because Nuclear Power Is “Special”
Radioactive Wastes?
Public Attitudes?
Nuclear Fears?
Proliferation?
Terrorism?
Policy – Public acceptance
Risk and Risk Perception:
True risk: a quantitative probabilistic concept with roots in science, mathematics and engineering – an objective scientific reality
Perceived risk: a social construct but nevertheless a measurable reality
Risk
Some would argue that my term “True Risk” is merely one example of a perceived risk.
‘Your science is no more valid than my science….’ ‘Your science is as socially constructed as mine’ etc.
I disagree: astronomy is science, astrology is not – my preference is to defend the separation above.
- That said I respect perceived risk
Nuclear Fear and Nuclear Danger
Risks are less acceptable and more feared if they are perceived as• Involuntary• Inequitably distributed in society• Inescapable• Coming from an unfamiliar or novel source• Causing hidden or irreversible damage particularly dangerous to children or future generations• Causing dreaded illness (e.g. cancer)• Poorly understood by science• The subject of contradictory statements from scientists in authority (Jill Mehta, J. Radiol. Pro 22 79-85 (2002) building on earlier work by Paul Slovic)
For fifty years the nuclear energy industry has heard that the public is scared of the dangers of nuclear power and for fifty years the industry has worked to reduce the danger. They should have worked harder to reduce the fear
[Nuttall, Nuclear Renaissance]
Fear vs. Danger
The Swedish Experience
1970s Swedish Social Democratic party divided over prompt nuclear shutdown.
High level decision not to separate plutonium,
Decision to build an underground spent fuel store – the CLAB
Åspo underground rock laboratory – unthreatening architecture on the surface
Three Nuclear Thoughts – number 1
The British public attitude to nuclear power
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Three Nuclear Thoughts – number 2
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Three Nuclear Thoughts – number 3
Perceptions of perceptions are interesting:
Favorable to Nuclear industry (%)
Unfavorable to nuclear industry (%)
Don’t know or don’t care
UK Public opinion
28 25 47
UK MP’s Opinion
43 44 13
UK MP’s Perception of public opinion
From: Double or Quits
Grimston and Beck Chatham House (2002)
2 84 14
Three Nuclear Thoughts – number 3
The greatest problem facing nuclear power is that it is, and is perceived to be, a centralising technology when the fashion is for decentralised technologies. This matters far more than economics, safety, and environmental issues, it’s simply what people want.
Another thought inspired by Malcolm Grimston
A Personal Conclusion
• Nuclear power is not essential. Its role in future energy supply is neither obvious nor inevitable.
But equally …
• Nuclear energy is not intrinsically evil.
Nuclear energy has unique benefits and disadvantages and it should be assessed dispassionately, but not technocratically.