Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 27 May 2004 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency Biological Countermeasures NDIA Homeland Security Symposium Dr Steven Buchsbaum Program Manager, HSARPA [email protected]
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Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 27 May 2004 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency.
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Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium
27 May 2004
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 2
Biological Countermeasures Thrust Areas System Architecture Studies
End-to-End Studies Provide Quantitative Basis for Countermeasures Strategy
Define Future Directions and Requirements for Systems
Detection Systems RA03-01, BAND & RABIS Future Directions
Assays Development BAA04-03, Bioinformatics and Assays Development
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 3
BW Architecture Studies Architecture Study of Urban Outdoor Threat Scenarios
Exam both Reference Scenarios and Capabilities Based Threats
Preliminary Study of Indoor Threat Scenarios Inclusive of Homeland Security Specific Challenges
Evaluate Threats to Food and Agriculture
Evaluate CBRN Threats to Water
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 4
Bio-Aerosol Defense Architecture Study Objective
Develop biosensing and medical response architecture for large scale bioaerosol attacks
Approach Characterize performance of environmental
sensing networks Evaluate benefit of traditional and non-traditional
medical surveillance options Use epidemiological models to determine
response requirements Assess cost and benefit of different architecture
options Recommend near-, mid-, and far-term solutions
AnthraxAttack
NationalPharmaceutical
Stockpile
BioSensors
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 5
Detection Systems for Biological Countermeasures RA03-01
Bioagent Autonomous Networked Detectors (BAND) Upgrade and Expand BioWatch Reduce Costs While Expanding Coverage Support other Bioaerosol Surveillance Missions Enable “Detect to Treat” Response to Attacks
Rapid Automated Biological Identification System (RABIS) Real-time Monitor for Buildings and Selected
Outdoor Locations and Events Enable “Detect to Protect” Response to Attacks
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 6
Detect-to-Treat Biological Surveillance Sensor System Build on Current BioWatch Architecture
Current Biowatch System Exploits Distributed Collector Systems with Centralized Evaluation of Samples
Current Approach Limits Timeliness of Response Current Approach Limits Spatial-Temporal Coverage Granularity Current Approach Driven by Large Logistical and Labor Costs
BAND Will Permit Extending Breadth of Coverage in Threat Space and Increasing Spatial-Temporal Coverage
Must Significantly Reduce Total System Operating Costs
BW Architecture Studies Will Update Strategy and Requirements
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 7
Intervals and 1 Hour Latency (2920 Samples per Year) Broad Agent Coverage > 20 Agents
Spore, Vegetative Cell, Toxin, DNA Virus, RNA Virus
High Sensitivity – Limit of Detection (LOD) of 100 Organisms Assumes 3 Hour, 100 Liter/Minute, 90% Efficient Collection
• Performers Free to Scale to Alternative Approaches
LOD of 10 nanograms for Toxins
Single Agent False Positive Rate of 10-7 with a goal of 10-8
BAND TTA-1
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 8
TTA-1 Goals – Cost & System Requirements
Cost of Ownership BAND Unit Acquisition Cost of $25K per Unit or Less
• Assume Quantities of 1,000s
BAND Operating Costs per Unit of $10K per Year or Less• Inclusive of all Costs: Consumables, Maintenance, Spare Parts, etc.
System Requirements Preserve Samples for 5 Days
• Confirmation and Forensics
Robust Wireless, Autonomous Remote Operation Maintenance Interval Exceeding 1 Month Operation in Full Range of Outdoor Environments Modest Packaging and Logistical Requirements
• (Ex: 2 cubic feet Volume)
BAND TTA-1
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 9
Key Technical Challenges Very High Sensitivity in Cluttered Background
100 Organisms in a Backgound of > 18,000 liters of air
Extending Breadth of Threat Coverage (>20) Either Multiplexed Testing or Large Number of Tests Alternative Approach – Universal Analysis
Achieving Very Low False Alarm Rate Single BAND System Pfa in the Range of 1 per 10 to 100 Years
Proliferation of BAND Systems Requires Low Single System Pfa
Achieving Low Cost of Ownership Single Sample Cost Goal of ~ $3.50 per Test (Multiplexed) Single Sample, Single Agent Cost Goal of ~ $0.17 per Test
(Non-Multiplexed)
BAND TTA-1
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 10
Requirements – Additional Thoughts Sensitivity of 100 Organisms in 18,000 liters of air
Drives Technology Limited Exploration of Full Range of Alternative CONOPS
Same Sensitivity Required of Viruses Individual Viral Threat Particles too Small Multiple Organisms per ACPLA
• Order 10^5 in DoD Speak
Toxin Detection Drives Complexity and Cost Possibly Detectable from Residual DNA
Cost Targets Extremely Aggressive at this Performance
BAND TTA-1
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 11
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 14
MFSI Technical Approach
Air Collector
EluteNucleic Acids
Sonicate
PCR
Agitate
Add/mix 3 ml6 M GuSCN
Pillarchip
Prepare 10-ulaliquots
SampleAerosol
Archive 1 ml
EtOH
Air
Tris-Buffer
Waste
Add/mix
Collector
Sample Processing
NA Analysis
5 ml
4 ml
10-100 ul
Pillar chip with antibodies
Toxin Analysis 3 ml
1 ml
Reconstituted reagents
Add/mix
Command and control
(after 3 hours of collection)
• Flow-through process- archiving, sample preparation and
detection• Dried-down reagents and stable wet chemistries• Two-mode wireless connectivity
• Sonication lysis and pillar chip nucleic acid purification
• Flow-through PCR and immunoassay detectors• Embedded pumps and valves
Protective case that maintainsconstant internal temperature.
Aerosol collector inlet
Hardware and bulk reagents
Reusable Cartridge
Peristalticpumps
Archivedsamples
Sets ofantibodychips
PCRreactors
Dried-downreagents
Hydrated reagentsholding chambers
NA chipsSonicationchambers
Dockingstation forcartridge
BAND TTA-1
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 15
Northrop GrummanBroadband Approaches for DetectionCommon integrated weatherproof chassis containing:
• Sample aerosol collection on a dry surface
• Dry surface serves as sample archive
• Common HVAC, communications and control systems
Initial deployment of mature automated identifiers• PCR
• Immunoassay
Future insertion of advanced identifiers• Fast isothermal reactions• Microfluidics to reduce consumable costs• MEMs based transduction• Advanced amplification and
orthogonal approaches reduce FAR
BAND TTA-1
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 16
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22
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11 1
13
3 33
34
4
4
55
666
6
1 2 3 4 5 6 • •
Amplify many sites in the genome in
one reaction
De-multiplex by length, using electrophoresis
De-multiplex by sequence, using DNA microarray
Each genome yields a unique pattern
22
2
3
336
6
66 1
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1 44
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Label them with fluorescent dye
• SAIC/GHC/Ibis BAND System Exploits Many Genome Identification Sites with Two Different Technologies
A
B
6
C D
GCGC
Broadband Approach for DetectionBAND TTA-1
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 17
Rapid Automated Biological Identification
System (RABIS) TTA-2 Rapid Automated Biological Identification System (RABIS)
Detect-to-Protect Biological Surveillance Sensor System Enable New Paradigms in Biodefense
• Building Protection Architecture• Selected Outdoor Event Coverage
Detect-to-Protect Requires Very Fast Response Time (< 2 Minutes) Very Low False Alarm Rates Broad and Sensitive Threat Coverage
TTA-2 Will Require Significant Innovation Extraordinarily Challenging Technical Goals
RABIS TTA-2
27 May 2004Dr Steven Buchsbaum, NDIA Homeland Security Symposium 18
TTA-2 Goals – Performance & Cost Targets Continuous, Fully Autonomous Operation with 2 Minute or
Shorter Sample Intervals Including Latency ~250K Samples per Year