Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: Their Linkage in Russia Under Putin

Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: Their Linkage in Russia under Putin

Dr. Raj Kumar Kothari Reader in Political Science

Vidyasagar University, West BengalE-mail ID: [email protected]

It is an established hypothesis that there exists a closer

linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy of any

country. But for a long time almost till the late 1950s, no

serious effect was made to study this linkage. The initial

contribution to this field was made by James Rosenau in his

well-known article entitled, “Pre-theories and Theories of

Foreign Policy”. (Rosenau, 1966: 27-92) Pointing to the vast

amount of work that had been undertaken on the subject of

foreign policy since 1945, Rosenau argued that although the

effect of internal and external factors had been noted,

there was hardly any book/article that contained ‘if then’

hypotheses in which ‘if’ was a particular form of internal

factor and ‘then’ was a particular type of foreign policy.

The reason for this lack of progress, according to Rosenau,

was that foreign policy analysis was devoid of general

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theory. Foreign relations were limited to a very few issues

and conducted by a handful members of the ruling elite. This

apart, states which enjoyed natural security by virtue of

their unique geographical location namely, the United

Kingdom and the United States, were able to conduct foreign

policies independently of their domestic policies.

Therefore, even though the field of international relations

had many frameworks, concepts and approaches that offered

partial insights into foreign policy, hardly there was any

study to ‘link up these components of external behavior in

causal sequences’. Rosenau argued that by stressing the

historical and cultural/ideological factors, which

underlined foreign policy of any state, the analysts treated

each country’s internal situation as unique and distinct

from others. Therefore, a systematic study of foreign policy

was lacking.

Things however began to change only in the post second world

war years. With the emergence of many newly independent

states in Asia and Africa, and with the growth of democracy,

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the public interest in foreign affairs had increased

considerably. The revolution in the means of transport and

communication had enabled the people to be familiar about

developments in other parts of the globe. The increasing

interdependence of sovereign states in economic, social,

educational and cultural affairs had made understanding

about other cultures and people inevitable. Because of these

factors, slowly but steadily, domestic politics had come to

influence foreign policy and vice-versa in a very

significant way. Starting from James Rosenau, a number of

scholars including Joseph Frankel conducted their study on

the subject of linkage between domestic politics and foreign

policy, though from different dimensions. It is in this

theoretical setting, based on some empirical findings,

Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin is to be studied

and reviewed. To establish the linkage between domestic

politics and foreign policy, it would be necessary to focus

on domestic constraints/politics in Russia first and then to

assess their importance / impact in the formulation of

Russian foreign policy during Putin years.

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Domestic Constraints

Although Russia is geographically vast and rich in natural

resources along with a strong economy and a relatively open

political system in the post-Soviet years, certain related

domestic factors (discussed below) have put constraints in

the formulation of its foreign policy in international

relations.

Demographic Catastrophe: Great power ambitions of Moscow could

not be realized without having highly skilled human

resources in sufficient numbers. Since the 1980s, Russia has

been experiencing dramatic declining trend in population,

fertility, and life expectancy combined with increase in

mortality and disease rates, including a rise in the rates

of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis infection. Russia had the

world's ninth largest population but that had been projected

to drop to 128.5 million by 2025 and 109.4 million by 2050.

From 1995 to mid-2007, Russia's total population dropped by

6.5 million people, a decline of about 4.4 percent. Such a

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drop had mainly been the result of second world war in which

millions of Russians were killed and mass emigration from

the country. Despite the fact that Russian economy under

President Putin had been growing at a faster pace, it could

not put a pause on population decline. (Russian Federal

State Statistics Service, at www.gks.ru/free_doc/2007/b07_11/05-

01.htm also refer, 2007 World Population Data Sheet, at

www.prb.org/pdf07/07WPDS_Eng.pdf )

Because of low birthrate and high mortality rate, Russia had

been losing an average of 700,000 people per year. In 2006,

the mortality rate was 15.2 deaths per 1,000 people, and the

birthrate was just 10.4 births per 1,000 people. While the

birthrate was low compared to other industrial states, the

death rate, particularly among working-age males, was

astonishing. Life expectancy for Russian males had been only

59 years, five years below what it was 40 years ago and 13

years lower than the life expectancy of Russian women, one

of the largest gaps in the world. (‘Russian Health and

Demography’, available at

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www.economist.com/world/europe/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=7891259)

Even the strategy of stimulating births by paying over

$4,000 per baby had failed to generate much enthusiasm among

the Russians.

Ethnic Changes: Central Asia was an important source of Muslim

migrants into Russia. Since early 1990s, while the number of

Russia's ethnic Slavs and Orthodox Christians continued to

decline, Russia's Muslim population had been growing rapidly

and thus transforming the ethnic composition of Russian

society. Fertility and birth rates were much higher among

Muslim ethnic groups than among ethnic Slavs. In 2006,

predominantly Muslim regions had the highest population

growth rate, which was 1.79 percent in Chechnya, 1.16

percent in Ingushetia and 0.65 percent in Dagestan, while

the national average was -0.37 percent. (‘Demographic

results of 2006’, available at

http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2007/0279/barom01.php) Since 1989,

Russia's Muslim population had increased by 40 percent.

Muslim populations in Moscow were around 2.5 million which

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was the largest of all European cities. It had been

estimated that by 2020, about one fifth of the total Russian

population would be Muslims, which would radically alter

Russia’s present ethnic equation. (Mainville, ‘Russia Has a

Muslim Dilemma’ at

http://sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/11/19/MNGJGMFUVG1.DTL)

This might have drastic political, cultural, and ideological

implications for Russia. Ethnic Russians feel uneasy as the

prevailing ethnically based notion of the Russian national

identity was being challenged. Such ethnic changes along

with growing radicalization of Islam might generate tension

among the Russians in the long run.

Deadly Epidemics: Russia is suffering from epidemics of

HIV/AIDS, other sexually transmitted diseases, and

tuberculosis. The HIV infection rate is growing faster in

Russia than in any other country outside of Sub-Saharan

Africa. An estimated 1.3 million that is about 1.1 percent

Russian adults are already HIV infected. (UNAIDS, ‘2006

Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic’, at

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www.unaids.org/en/HIV_data/2006GlobalReport/default.asp also see,

Faulconbridge, ‘Russia Warns of AIDS Epidemic, 1.3 million

with HIV’, at

www.reuters.com/article/healthNews/idUSL1546187520070515}

Rise of Bureaucracy and Red Tape: Critics argue that many long-

overdue administrative reforms have not been implemented

under the Putin administration and that the quality of

governance has deteriorated over the years. As one veteran

critic puts it, ‘Russia remains one of the most

criminalized, corrupt, and bureaucratic countries in the

world.’ (‘Russia Under Putin’, The Economist, August 23, 2007,

at www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9682621)

The remarkable intertwining of Russia's bureaucratic and

business elites illustrates the ruling elite's unsurpassed

economic power. For example, The Financial Times (June 19, 2006)

reported that 11 members of the presidential administration

chaired six state companies and held 12 state directorships

and that 15 senior government officials held six

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chairmanships and 24 other board seats. (Buckley and

Ostrovsky, ‘Back in Business’, at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d776a916-

ff2f-11da-84f3-0000779e2340.html)

Under Putin, A number of senior officials had occupied the

key positions of majour companies. For example, first Deputy

Prime Minister Dmitry Medvidev served as chairman of

Gazprom. Sergey Ivanov lookedafter the military-industrial

complex and state holdings in aircraft, shipbuilding, and

nuclear industries. Igor Sechin, Putin's Deputy Chief of

Staff, chaired Rosneft, Russia's largest state-run oil

company. Viktor Ivanov, Putin's top aide, headed the board

of directors of Almaz-Antei, the country's key defense

producer, and the board of directors of Aeroflot, the

national airline. Alexey Gromov, the President's Press

Secretary, was on the board of Channel One, Russia's main

television channel. (Buckley and Ostrovsky, ibid.) These

people had influenced Russia’s foreign policy making process

in a very significant way.

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Economy and State Intervention: Banking on its energy revenues,

Russia had managed to avoid painful economic restructuring

and diversification beyond the natural resource sectors.

Russia’s economic growth had taken place chiefly due to

exports of raw materials (oil, natural gas, and metals).

Even after several years of economic growth, Russia remained

heavily dependent on energy exports and became vulnerable to

fluctuations in global commodity prices. According to the

International Monetary Fund and World Bank estimate, in 2005

the oil and gas sector represented around 20 percent of the

country's GDP, which generated more than 60 percent of its

export revenues. This figure rose to 64 percent in 2007,

which accounted for 30 percent of all foreign direct

investment (FDI) in the country. (U.S. Department of Energy,

‘Country Analysis Briefs: Russia’, available at

www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Background.html)

President Putin had offered an action plan for Russia to

diversify away from reliance on energy and natural resources

and to become one of the world's leading economies. His

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vision of Russian economic development included growing

high-tech industries, a strong service sector, and a state

boost for state-owned or state-controlled global companies

capable of competing with foreign corporations. Despite such

majour initiatives, Russia under Putting could do little to

diversify its economy as desired and anticipated.

Putin’s government had steadily increased the state-con-

trolled share of the economy.1 The European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development reported that the public

sector's share of the economy increased from 30 percent to

35 percent in 2005. The state's share of major blue chip

companies had quadrupled between 2004 and 2007. The state

played a very significant role in mergers and acquisitions.

For instance, the increase in the state share of Gazprom

from 38 percent to 51 percent and Gazprom's purchase of

Sibneft totaled $20.21 billion that accounted for half of

the value of all Russian mergers and acquisitions in 2005.

(Buckley and Ostrovsky, "Back in Business’, Financial Times,

June 19, 2006 available at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d776a916-ff2f-11da-

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84f3-0000779e2340.html) naturally, State’s role in the economic

field had become very crucial.

The foreign policy of Russia under Putin had largely been

shaped by all these internal factors, theoretically

described as ‘domestic constraints’/‘domestic politics’.

These constraints had restricted Moscow from pursuing a very

offensive foreign policy in international affairs. However,

this apart it must be mentioned that that international

situation had also been a majour determinant of foreign

policy of any given country. Russian foreign policy under

Putin was therefore also to be viewed and analysed in the

overall strategic environment of the international system.

In other words, the proposed theoretical framework

emphasizes that foreign policy of Russia under Putin had

been broadly shaped by its domestic politics on the one hand

and international situation on the other. Therefore, it

would be necessary to give a broad outline of the present

international system/environment that had emerged in the

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post cold war years in which Russia operated its foreign

policy.

International Scenario

International situation has been in a state of flux since

the end of the cold war in the late 1980s. One of the chief

characteristics of the international situation in the post

cold war years was its utter complexity. There had been the

absence of a single paradigm of world order or even a

coherent pattern of coalitions. Sovereign states had formed

alliances of convenience that taken together had no

consistent direction. The world had been facing newer

challenges while the old ones - that of peace, human

development and prosperity - still continued to dominate the

international scenario. The newer challenges like

transnational terrorism driven by ethno-religious extremism

and political separatism, increased risks of nuclear

proliferation (existing non-proliferation regimes in a state

of crisis) and of course the question of environmental

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security, all had posed real danger which threatened the

very survival of the international system.

These multidimensional challenges were to be viewed in the

context of some major changes affecting the global strategic

landscape in numerous ways. A global power shift from West

to East along with a new strategic balance had been emerging

among Asian powers without necessarily being in conflict

with those outside the region. The rise of China and India

as emerging economic and military powers had tilted the

strategic balance infavour of Asia. The global centre of

gravity of political, economic and military activities and

capabilities had shifted to Asia. Although the US remained

the sole superpower, it was no longer in a position to check

this shift. (For details refer Jasjit Singh, 2006) These

apart, rising demand on energy and security of its supplies

had added a new dimension to international politics.

Russia’s foreign policy under Vladimir Putin is to be viewed

and analyzed in the context of these parameters of

international system.

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It is also to be pointed out that Russia, in the post cold

war years, emerged as a majour power and lost its erstwhile

superpower status. Hence it did not have the capacity to

influence/shape directions of global politics in the way it

used to have during the Soviet days. But undoubtedly, Russia

has all the potentials of becoming a superpower, though not

in the short run. (Kothari, 1994: 145-151) As discussed

earlier, the multidimensional domestic problems Moscow faced

during Putin years were intricate in nature and a long term

strategy would be required to rectify them.

Interplay of Domestic Politics & Foreign Policy

In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union,

the region witnessed serious political and economic

upheavals. Negotiations to form a federation, consisting of

the former Soviet republics, prior to the demise of the USSR

were broken off in the fall of 1991. In its place there

emerged a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to which

all the former Soviet republics minus the three Baltics,

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namely Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, became active members,

with Russia playing the central coordinating role. (For more

detail see, Kothari, ibid.)

Right from its inception, the CIS had to confront various

intricate problems in the political, economic and military

and administrative fields. The unified economic structure

promoted during Soviet days, growing ethnic tensions, rising

ideologies of nationalism - all presented new challenges

before the Commonwealth. Russia being one of the leading

members of CIS had to engage itself actively to deal with

these emerging problems. At the same time, she had to face

the burnt of declining economic growth and growing political

and social unrest in the country itself. While the earlier

economic system ceased to exist, market mechanism had yet to

take deep roots. The transition to a fundamentally new type

of economic mechanism could not be made effective in a very

short span of time. Thus Moscow had little time to devote

its energy in conducting foreign policy. Consequently, she

became increasingly dependent upon the West for economic aid

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and technical support to switch over from unified socialist

economic structure into a market economy, particularly

during the tenure of President Boris Yelstin. During the

period, Moscow’s overdependence upon the West had been

reflected through its pro-Western tilt in foreign affairs.

Promoting better relations with the US in particular and

west in general became the core foreign policy objective

before Russia during the early part of 1990s. Further

problems with in the country were accentuated due to lack of

political will and lethargy shown by the first Russian

President Boris Yelstin who took over rein from Mikhail

Gorbachev in 1991.

Trends indicated that Russian foreign policy in the

immediate post-Soviet years had been marked by both

continuity and change. Continuity in the sense that the

broad foreign policy framework of the Soviet era under

Mikhail Gorbachev had been more or less approved by the

Russian govt. whereas, change implies that the broad foreign

policy parameters drawn during the tenure of Stalin and his

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followers, largely shaped by socialist ideology, were no

longer relevant. Pragmatism and national interests became

the prime determinants of Russian foreign policy after

Yelstin years. In this context, it may be pointed out that

theoretically speaking domestic constraints have a direct

bearing upon national interest of any country and Russia is

no exception. The point is that in the light of economic

development in Russia under Putin, the nature of domestic

constraints had undergone through significant changes, which

had significantly impacted upon its foreign policy. As a

result, there has been a marked difference in the Russian

foreign policy directions under Boris Yelstin and his

successor Vladimir Putin.

Apart from the declining economic growth and growing social

and political unrest, Yelstin years had been characterized

by (a) failure to pursue economic reforms in the desired

direction; (b) lack of experience about functioning of

market economy; (c) over dependence upon the West for moral

and material support to carry out economic reforms; and (d)

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divergent perceptions among the Russian foreign policy

elites resulting in lack of consistency in foreign affairs.

Under President Putin, Russia had been able to surmount its

internal difficulties and challenges faced by his

predecessor to a large extent. Russia had emerged militarily

strong, economically powerful and politically stable and

consequently assertive in foreign affairs. These

developments have been nicely summed up by Jayanta Kumar

Dutt in his article entitled ‘The Resurgence of Russia’.

(The Statesman, September 25, 2007) According to him, Russia’s

problem in the initial years had been exacerbated through

two successive inefficient Presidents. First was Mikhail

Gorbachev whose policies led to the collapse of the Soviet

Union itself and then Boris Yelstin who never took domestic

problems seriously. A dynamic person, Putin had firmly set

his sights on two aspects of Russia’s resurgence: (a) to

positively address its faltering economy and (b) to regain

its place as an appreciable power centre in the arena of

world politics. Dutt further argued that Putin had been on

the right course for both his objectives. While the economy

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took its own path to betterment, President Putin then tried

to uplift Russia in global politics with the sole aim to

have a better stake in world political affairs. In the words

of Salman Haider: Russia has finally put behind it the

problems of its collapsed Soviet legacy, now on a path of

rapid growth which has helped restore a good part of its

international influence.’ (The Statesman, November 1, 2007.)

Russia’s resurgence through spectacular economic

performance, mostly due to its huge energy resources, had

spill over effects on its assertive foreign policy. It

started cooperating with the West in many spheres but at the

same time challenged US intervention in its (Russia’s)

traditional sphere of influence. Russia has huge natural

resources particularly oil and natural gas. It owned an

estimated 32 percent of world’s gas reserves – more than

what Iran holds. Around 40 percent of Europe’s gas

requirements are met by Russia. In fact, Moscow’s

reemergence had been a cause for concern to US and Europe.

The NATO had been busy incorporating many countries from

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Central and East Europe into its fold. President Putin had

strongly objected to NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s

European border. He had even warned that Russia would

respond to the US move by modernizing its military and

weapons systems to counter the deployment of American

defence system. (The Statesman, February 9, 2008)

US supremacy in the 1990s and thereafter had been challenged

due to it’s lose in Iraq war, Iranian resistance, and North

Korea’s nuclear ambition, unprecedented threat posed by

international terrorism and above all its gradual economic

decline. In contrast, Russia had been busy with regaining

control in Central Asia and the Caucasus. It took keen

interest in global affairs as well. (For detail see, Panda,

2006: 104) In the words of Salman Haider:

‘Russia has become more assertive in projecting itsinterests, especially in what it calls its “nearabroad”, so that it has higher visibility in CentralAsia and Caucasus and elsewhere along its vastperiphery. As a permanent member of the UN SecurityCouncil it has been conspicuously reluctant tofollow the US lead in both Iraq and more recentlyIran, where its individual approach has made a realdifference.’ (The Statesman, November 22, 2007.)

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Therefore, under Putin, Russia sought a very

active/assertive role as a global power and flexed its

muscles in international affairs. Signs of change in Russian

foreign policy could be noticed ever since President

Vladimir Putin delivered a confrontational speech at the

Munich Security Conference in February 2007. Putin

vehemently criticized the US ambitious plans to base some of

the anti-missile shield in central and east Europe.

(Fischer, ‘Russia Flexes its Muscles’, The Times of India,

August 31, 2007) Moscow’s relations with Washington affected

further since Russia planted its flag on the seabed below

the North Pole to demonstrate its claims to the Arctic and

its natural resources. (Fischer, ibid.) These developments

indicated that Russian foreign policy approach under Putin

has been very assertive, which was not so under President

Yelstin.

To put in other way, Russian foreign policy under Vladimir

Putin has undergone through the process of substantial

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overhauling. There had been remarkable differences in the

style and substance of Yeltsin and Putin administration's

approaches to the world outside of Russia. Putin had been a

reasonable policymaker, whose goal was to bolster Russia's

status as a world player rather than simply accept a

supplicating role in international negotiations, which

remained so under Yelstin.

However, it needs to be emphasized that Yeltsin and Putin,

however, did not vary significantly in their primary objects

of economic prosperity of Russia and international

stability. Differences could be reflected in the means they

had employed in order to realize the goal. Yeltsin believed

it best to approach the West as a ‘subordinate’ player, if

necessary, because [Russia] was a weak partner ready to

trade cooperation with the West in political and military

affairs for economic support and technical assistance. In

contrast, Putin’s policy had been that cooperation, debt

relief, and further resources from the western countries and

institutions like the IMF and World Bank were desirable but

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could not be the precondition for Russian economic growth

and prosperity. (Refer ‘Putin's Foreign Policy’ at

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?

fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=3908)

Thus, Putin's assessment of national security interests was

markedly different from that of Yeltsin. Putin has been

dealing with an economy driven by rising energy prices

through which Russia earned huge revenues. He realized that

the strength of Russian economy rested in capitalizing on

advanced technologies and exporting competitive sectors of

the defense industries. In this situation, Putin's overall

objective had been to create conducive international

environment for the potential success of the market economy

at home and then to earn hard currency through marketing its

defence and industrial products outside. Yelstin, on the

other hand, concentrated his efforts on achieving low

inflation and international creditworthiness.

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This stand is a prime indication of Putin's strength as a

leader who refused to be strong-armed by the U.S. for

concessions based upon U.S. foreign interests. By declaring

US terms unacceptable, President Putin had been able to

remove the single most important lever of influence that the

West had wielded over Russian foreign and security policies

in the early nineties. Cooperation with the US, therefore,

was not necessarily the precondition for Putin to achieve

his long-term goals. Based upon a realistic assessment of

Russian internal political and economic situations, Putin

had revisited Yelstin’s foreign policy approach and made

necessary changes. Putin had begun to take advantage of

Russia’s geo-strategic location, seeking a multi-polar world

in which it [Russia] was a great Eurasian power. Russia had

even diversified its foreign policy options reaching out to

countries such as China, India and so on. Promoting trade

and bilateral relations with these countries had coincided

with Russia’s domestic priorities, such as military

modernization and support for defence industries.

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Putin was credited with pulling Russia back from the brink

of a catastrophe to which it had been pushed by his

predecessor, Boris Yelstin. The December 2007 parliamentary

elections in Russia became a personal triumph for President

Vladimir Putin when United Russia Party backed by him polled

an impressive 64 percent of the votes compared to 38 percent

in the previous election in 2004. (Radyuhin, ‘Putin Power’,

Frontline: 57-59) Such massive victory had ensured necessary

support for President Putin’s domestic and foreign policies

resulting in a further deterioration in Russia’s relations

with the West.2

This apart, Putin’s energy security strategy3 also

threatened Western interests because it replaced the so-

called ‘liberal, open global oil market order’ dominated by

American companies with a network of long-term agreements

and joint ventures with other energy-producing and energy-

consuming countries in the developing world. (Radyuhin,

‘Energy War’, Frontline: 59-62.) This would have a direct

bearing upon Russia-US relations in the coming years.

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Further trends indicated that bilateral relations between

the two had reached a stalemate if not a dead end for some

time. (Desai: 65-66. Also refer Simes, ‘Losing Russia’,

Foreign Affairs: 36-52). Apart from NATO’s expansion, the two

sides had diverged on a number of international issues that

included Russian arms sales to Iran and so on.

Conclusion

The point is that Russia under Putin had not been seeking to

regain its erstwhile (Soviet days) superpower states at

least in the short run. In an interview with Israeli

television prior to his visit to the country in late April

2005, Putin was asked if Russia would seek to establish

itself as a superpower on the par with the U.S.S.R. He

replied saying that the costs associated with such status-

seeking moves will outweigh the benefits. In reality,

Russia’s former Soviet clout had been effectively replaced

by that of the United States, European Union and China in

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areas such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, South Asia,

Africa and Latin America.

Russian foreign policy under Putin is to be viewed through

the lens of its growing economic and military strength.

Because domestic factors were increasingly driving Russia's

foreign policy, Russia's internal weaknesses could not be

easily dismissed. Due to internal constraints, its

comparative economic strength had been questioned. Even if

major improvement takes place in the coming years (after

Putin), Russian economy would still lag far behind the US,

Europe and China. However, despite these shortcomings,

Russia would continue to fight for its role as a global

player in international affairs for two specific reasons:

(a) its abundant natural resources; and (b) its vast

military strength. Abundance in natural resources will

assume greater importance to the world's major developed

economies in the coming years. At the same time, research

and development in the military field have already earned

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Russia a place as one of the top producers and suppliers of

military hardware in the world.

The USSR paid a tremendous price for maintaining its

position as one of the world's only two superpowers. Unlike

the United States, the Soviet Union saw no real economic or

military gains for its global presence, while its

international obligations extracted massive social and

economic costs on the country. Soviet attempt to counter

West’s hegemony in international affairs could not prevent

its collapse. Russia had learnt its lesson from this recent

past experience. It visualized a multipolar world as the

best opportunity to advance Moscow’s interests and safeguard

world peace. This policy was enshrined in its military

doctrine. Russian policymakers had openly stated on a number

of occasions that they sought to establish a multipolar

international environment that would diminish, at least

partially, the position of geopolitical dominance currently

held by the United States. Russia would rely on building

credible alliances to share the costs of global influence,

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instead of paying this cost alone, as the Soviet Union did

in the cold war years. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 4

is one such example. Besides, as already stated, Russia had

also been paying due attention towards strengthening

bilateral relations with emerging powers, particularly China

and India.

Finally, much is being talked about the future direction of

Russian foreign policy in the post-Putin years. Now that

Dmitry Medvedev (Putin loyalist) has assumed office, It

could be well anticipated that the broad foreign policy

outlines set by Putin are likely to continue in the years

ahead.

Notes

1. Although leading officials have explicitly rejected statecapitalism as a model for Russia, trend indicates thatKremlin has been pushing to consolidate state assets in manyindustrial fields. The military-industrial complex andcivilian nuclear sector are under state command and control.

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Energy sector is also increasingly coming under the grip ofthe state.

2. The 2007 elections have further soured Russia’s alreadystrained relations with the West. BDIHR (the Bureau forDemocratic Institutions and Human Rights), the Organisationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe refused to sendobservers to Russia to monitor the elections, citinginvitation delays and visa problems. Putin denounced themove as a provocation masterminded by the United States inan effort to de-legitimise the vote. Observers from theParliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) andthe Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe,which agreed to monitor the elections in Russia, denouncedit as ‘a clear abuse of power and a clear violation ofinternational commitments and standards’. Moscow, however,firmly rejected West’s criticisms. President Putin said thatRussia was acting in its national interests instead offollowing ‘foreign prescriptions in its domestic and foreignpolicies’.

3. Putin’s drive to regain governmental control over thecountry’s energy assets, which had been sweepinglyprivatized under Russia’s first post-Soviet President BorisYelstin, was marked with crowning success. In October 2006,the state-owned natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, dropped plansto give a 49 percent share to Western firms and decided toretain full ownership of the world’s biggest gas reserve.

In December 2006, Gazprom ousted Royal Dutch Shell from itsleading position in Asia’s biggest energy project, Sakhalin-2. Faced with multi-billion-dollar legal actions and licensewithdrawal over environmental damage, Royal Dutch Shell andits two partners, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, agreed to sell justover 50 percent of their shares to Gazprom.

With the takeover of Sakhalin-2, the core part of theRussian oil and gas sector was reverted to Russiangovernment control. The Kremlin’s grip on energy exports was

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further consolidated when in 2007 the Russian parliamentpassed a Bill that gave Gazprom monopoly rights for theexport of natural gas. Even though the privately owned oilcompanies continue to produce the bulk of crude, theyclosely coordinate their corporate decisions and strategieswith the Russian govt. This apart, Transneft, a state-ownedcompany controls all oil export pipelines.

4. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) wasestablished by China, Russia and Central Asian Republics ofKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on June14, 2001 in Shanghai. It has four observers – Mongolia,India, Pakistan and Iran. SCO is committed to fosteringfriendly relations, cooperation and promote mutual militarytrust among its members.

References

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Fischer, Joschka, ‘Russia Flexes its Muscles’, The Times ofIndia, August 31, 2007.

Haider, Salman, ‘Tripartite Connection’, The Statesman,November 1, 2007

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Haider, Salman, ‘PM in Russia: A Brisk and BusinesslikeVisit’, The Statesman, November 22, 2007.

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‘Russian Health and Demography: A Sickness of the Soul’, TheEconomist, September 7, 2006, atwww.economist.com/world/europe/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=7891259 (July 20, 2007).

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‘Russia Under Putin: The Making of a Neo-KGB State’, TheEconomist, August 23, 2007, atwww.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9682621 (September18, 2007).

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Singh, Jasjit, ‘Global Power Shift: Towards a PolycentricAsian Century’ in V. D. Chopra (ed.), India’s Foreign Policy in the21st Century (New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2006).

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