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Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR2630

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H2360 IDA-H2560 IDA-H5050)

ON A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR37.1 MILLION (US$54.7 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA

FOR AN

EMERGENCY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT

June 26, 2013

Transport Sector Country Department AFCW1 Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2012)

Currency Unit = Liberian Dollars (LRD) SDR1.00 = US$1.5369 US$l.00 = 72.50 LRD

FISCAL YEAR July 1 – June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB African Development Bank AGO Automotive Gas Oil AIDP Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project BTC Barclay Training Center CAS Country Assistance Strategy CMT Central Materials Testing CRN Country Re-engagement Note DAC Development Assistance Committee DBMOT Design Build, Maintain, Operate and Transfer DO Development Objectives EC European Commission EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EIP Emergency Infrastructure Project EIPAF Emergency Infrastructure Project Additional Financing EIPSC Emergency Infrastructure Project Supplemental Component EMP Environmental Management Plan EMUS Emergency Monrovia Urban Sanitation EPP Emergency Power Plants ERL Emergency Reconstruction Loan ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan FM Financial Management FMRs Financial Management Reports GDP Gross Domestic Product GOL Government of Liberia GEMAP Governance and Economic Management and Assistance Program IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICB International Competitive Bidding ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Agency IEG Independent Evaluation Group IFIs International Financial Institutions IIU Infrastructure Implementation Unit IMF International Monetary Fund

IP Implementation Progress ISR Implementation Status Reports KM Kilometer KPI Key Performance Indicators LIBRAMP Liberia Road Asset Management Project LLP Limited Liability Partnership LRDC Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee LWSC Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation MCC Monrovia City Council Mgd Million Gallons per day MoF Ministry of Finance MPW Ministry of Public Works NGOs Non-governmental Organizations NPA National Ports Authority OPRC Operational Procurement Review Committee PDO Project Development Objectives PFMU Project Financial Management Unit PHP Public Health Pump PIU Project Implementation Unit PPF Project Preparation Facility PPP Public Private Partnership QEA Quality at Entry QSA Quality of Supervision RAP Resettlement Action Plan RFNF Results Focused National Framework RFTF Results Focused Transitional Framework RVP Regional Vice President SIU Special Implementation Unit TA Technical Assistance TF Trust Fund (s) TFLIB Trust Fund for Liberia TOR Terms of Reference TST Technical Support Team TTLs Task Team Leaders UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia URIRP Urban Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project USAID United States Agency for International Development USD United States Dollars WBG World Bank Group XDR Special Drawing Rights

Vice President: Makhtar Diop

Country Director: Yusupha Crookes

Country Manager Inguna Dobraja

Sector Director Jamal Saghir

Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn

Project Team Leader: Kulwinder Singh Rao

ICR Team Leader: John Kobina Richardson

ICR Primary Author John Kobina Richardson/Ephrem Asebe

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA Emergency Infrastructure Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 53. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 104. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 165. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 176. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 197. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 20Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 21Annex 2 Outputs by Component .................................................................................. 22Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 29Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 30Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 32Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 33Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 34Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 39Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 40MAP

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DATA SHEET

A. Basic Information

Country: Liberia Project Name: Emergency Infrastructure Project

Project ID: P100160 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H2360,IDA-H2560,IDA-H5050

ICR Date: 14/30/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA

Original Total Commitment:

XDR 20.60M Disbursed Amount: XDR 37.10M

Revised Amount: XDR 37.10M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies: Infrastructure Implementation Unit, Ministry of Public Works Liberia

Co-financiers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 03/23/2006 Effectiveness: 10/31/2006 10/31/2006

Appraisal: 04/25/2006 Restructuring:

09/29/2006 06/30/2009 06/24/2011 04/04/2012

Approval: 06/20/2006 Mid-term Review: 10/01/2008 10/17/2008

Closing: 06/30/2010 12/31/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Significant

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Moderately Satisfactory

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Overall Bank Performance:

Moderately SatisfactoryOverall Borrower Performance:

Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance

Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Central government administration 12 12

Other Renewable Energy 9 9

Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 69 69

Water supply 10 10

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 29 29

Regional integration 14 14

Rural services and infrastructure 29 29

Trade facilitation and market access 14 14

Urban services and housing for the poor 14 14 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Gobind T. Nankani

Country Director: Yusupha Crookes Mats Karlsson

Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn C. Sanjivi Rajasingham

Project Team Leader: Kulwinder Singh Rao Petrus Benjamin Gericke

ICR Team Leader: John Kobina Richardson

ICR Primary Author: John Kobina Richardson/Ephrem Asebe

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F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Financing Agreement)The objective of the Project was to provide the Recipient with emergency support to restore priority infrastructure through: (a) rehabilitation, repair and reconstruction of critical road and potable water supply infrastructure; and (b) strengthening the capacity of the Recipient’s Ministry of Public Works and the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The objective of the Project was amended as follows: “The objective of the Project is to provide the Recipient with emergency support to restore priority infrastructure through: (a) rehabilitation, repair and reconstruction of critical infrastructure; and (b) strengthening the capacity of the Recipient’s Ministry of Public Works, the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation, and the Monrovia City Corporation.” (a) PDO Indicator(s)1

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target

Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years2

Outcome indicators Indicator 1: Percentage average reduction in travel time on Monrovia-Buchanan corridor. Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 20% 20%

Date achieved 05/19/2006 06/30/2010 12/31/2012 Comments (Inc % achievement)

Original target was achieved 100%

Indicator 2: Increase in annual Revenue of LWSC (US$ * Thousands) Value (quantitative or qualitative)

350 650 2,457


Original target exceeded; revenue at the end of the project had exceeded the target by 280%.

1 These are the final list of indicators approved after all project restructuring. 2 Achievements of some indicators are significantly higher than the set targets due to additional contributions from complementary investments.

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Indicator 3:* Number of Skilled and Unskilled Labor Employed (thousands of man months) Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 7 9


Original target exceeded; employment generation was 28% more than targeted

Indicator 4:* Number of on-site sanitation facilities rehabilitated Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 10 19


Original target was exceeded by 90%.

Indicator 5:* Total volume of Solid Waste Removed from Monrovia (m3) Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 130,000 609,000


Original target was exceeded by 370%. By the end of 2009, solid waste collection target had been exceeded, and funding was continued under another IDA financed project, Emergency Monrovia Urban Sanitation (EMUS) Project

Indicator 6:** Container Stacking area and connecting roads rehabilitated Value (quantitative or qualitative)

Not done Constructed Constructed


Original target was achieved 100%

Output Indicators Indicator 7: Number of kilometer of primary roads repaired Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 400 83 83

Date achieved 05/19/2006 06/30/2010 12/31/2010 12/31/2012 Comments (Inc % achievement)

Original target was not achieved (20.75% of original target achieved). Revised target was achieved 100%.

Indicator 8: Number of bridges repaired or constructed Value (quantitative or qualitative)

0 65 14

Date achieved 05/19/2006 06/30/2010 12/31/2012 Comments Original target was not achieved. (25.5% achieved)

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(Inc % achievement)

Indicator 9: Daily production of potable water at White Plains in Million gallons per day (Mgd)

Value (quantitative or qualitative)

1.2 2.8 5.0


Original target was exceeded by 78%

* - These indicators were introduced during the first restructuring of September 26, 2006 ** - This indicator was introduced during the second restructuring of June 30, 2009

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 10/19/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 03/13/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.33 3 11/29/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.82 4 05/28/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 30.41 5 12/16/2008 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 40.25 6 06/24/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 44.68 7 12/22/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 46.78 8 06/10/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 49.66 9 03/27/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 56.60

10 04/06/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 57.48 11 08/16/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 57.48

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

09/29/2006 Yes n/a n/a -

Additional financing for a Supplemental Component, revision of performance indicators, and amendment of the PDO to cover a broader scope

06/30/2009 No S MS 44.68 Additional financing,

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Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

reallocation of grant to match limited financial resources to changing Government priorities, update the performance indicators and extension of the project closing date.

06/24/2011 No S MS 56.79 Extension of project closing date

04/04/2012 No S MS 57.48 Extension of project closing date

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. Country context. This was an emergency project for Liberia, a country rich in natural resources with abundance of iron ore, timber, diamonds, gold, vast hydropower potential, offshore oil fields, and climate favorable for agriculture. Fifteen years of brutal conflict devastated the country’s economy, its physical infrastructure and human assets. By the end of the war, the country had become one of the least developed countries with per capita income of about US$100, and a population disillusioned by years of corruption and mismanagement of public funds. The country was in arrears of its international obligations. External debts were to the tune of US$3.7 million. Since 1987, Liberia was ineligible to borrow and by April 30, 2006, Liberia, a non-accrual member of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), was nearly US$1,419 million in arrears on IFIs of which US$402 million was International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (IBRD), US$47 million International Development Association’s (IDA), US$750 million International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) and African Development Bank’s (AfDB) US$220 million. 2. Government strategy. In August 2003, Liberia’s warring parties ended hostilities with the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement and a National Transition Government was established to administer a two-year interim period leading to national elections in October 2005. The United Nations Mission in Liberia had been given the mandate to secure the peace and to support implementation. 3. To aid the process of emergency reconstruction, a Results Focused National Framework (RFNF) was prepared, based on rapid needs assessment carried out by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank in December 2003. This served as the strategic framework for the transitional government, as well as a tool for engagement with donor partners at the time on the basis of their comparative advantage in delivering emergency services. 4. Rationale for Bank involvement. On that basis the World Bank also prepared a Country Re-engagement Note (CRN) which was organized around three priority areas: (i) economic management; (ii) infrastructure rehabilitation; and (iii) community based development. The Bank took the leadership role in the macroeconomic management and infrastructure sectors. 5. Higher level objective in which the project contributed. The Bank’s US$30 million initial grant for the Emergency Infrastructure Project (EIP), the first World Bank Group (WBG) project after the conflict, was made to provide timely assistance to Liberia in the critical period before arrears were cleared, leading to regular IDA financing became available. The EIP was therefore significant in that it served as primary vehicle to work out the legal basis for assistance to a non-accrual member. Thus, the operation made significant contributions to consolidate the then window of opportunity into a

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genuine move to sustainable economic growth, security and peace, which also had a positive impact not only in Liberia but in the entire region. Due to the timely leadership provided by the Bank through its EIP grant, a total of 13 multilateral and bilateral organizations, and a large number of local and international Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) participated in support of the transitional and elected governments’ strategies over the project implementation life3. Altogether, they made available over US$4.584 billion in grants for clearing Liberia’s arrears and a total of US$946 million4 disbursement since, thereby securing peace and enhancing its capacity to borrow and finance its reconstruction. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) 6. The objective of the Project was to provide the Recipient with emergency support to restore priority infrastructure through: (a) rehabilitation, repair and reconstruction of critical road and potable water supply infrastructure; and (b) strengthening the capacity of the Recipient’s Ministry of Public Works and the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation 7. The key performance indicators that were selected to measure the project development objectives were:

Outcome indicators (i) Average reduction in travel time on Monrovia - Buchanan and Monrovia -

Ganta corridors; (ii) Increase in annual revenue of Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation.

Output Indicators

(i) Kilometer (Km) of primary roads repaired; (ii) Number of bridges or culverts repaired or constructed; (iii) Daily production of Water at White Plains in Million gallons per day (Mgd).

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 8. Project Restructuring of September 2006: Prior to effectiveness of the original grant, the project was restructured by the provision of an additional grant US$16.5 million for a supplemental component to the project with a focus on job creation to enhance EIP’s development impact. This was approved by the Board on September 29, 2006. 9. The PDO remained relevant for the restructured project, but was slightly amended to read as follows: “The objective of the Project is to provide the Recipient with

3 IEG: Liberia Country Program Evaluation 4 World Development Indicators Database (Disbursement on Long Term Debt)

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emergency support to restore priority infrastructure through: (a) rehabilitation, repair and reconstruction of critical infrastructure; and (b) strengthening the capacity of the Recipient’s Ministry of Public Works, the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation, and the Monrovia City Corporation.” 10. The amendment dropped the words “road and potable water supply” from the original PDO and added “Monrovia City Corporation” to the institutions targeted for capacity building. This was necessary from a legal perspective, to accommodate the broadened scope of the project which now had additional components for rebuilding the rural road network and rehabilitation of urban infrastructure. The project performance indicators were revised by adding four new indicators to account for the supplemental component. 11. Project restructuring of 2009: The project was restructured again in 2009 by the addition of a new component for port investments, and the modification of project components by reduction in scope, deletion of activities, and additional financing for existing activities. An additional performance indicator to measure the investment at the port was added while an existing indicator for the rehabilitation of Monrovia City Roads was dropped. The project closing date was also extended by 12 months to June 30, 2011.

12. Project restructuring in 2011 and 2012. The project was again restructured on June 24, 2011 and April 4, 2012. Both were to extend the project closing date at no additional cost, initially to March 31, 2012 and then to December 31, 2012, to allow for critical works and an audit of LWSC to be completed. Neither restructuring made any further changes to PDO or project indicators. Overall, the project was extended by 30 months from the original closing date.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries 13. The main beneficiaries of the project were the people of Liberia at large and more specifically, the population living within Monrovia city, people employed in rural roads construction and along the constructed road corridor. The planned project targeted the rehabilitation of the two main corridors of influence in road transport, which therefore, have a broader impact on the transportation of people, marketing of goods and services within Liberia, and integrating Liberia to its neighbors and the rest of the world. The project would also improve accessibility within Liberia with immediate impact on security. 14. The specific institutions targeted were the Ministry of Public Works (MPW), Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (LWSC), and Monrovia City Council (MCC). These institutions were direct beneficiaries of the funding that contributed to the improvements in infrastructure in the transport, water and sanitation sectors, as were the suppliers and service providers who ensured that the project activities were realized.

1.5 Original Components (as approved) 15. The project consisted of the following two components:

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Component 1: Emergency Rehabilitation and Repair of Critical Infrastructure (US$24.40 million, excluding contingencies) - The component was to support: (i) the repair of the following primary roads: (a) Monrovia-Buchanan, linking the two largest population centers; and (b) Monrovia-Gbarnga-Ganta- Guinea border, linking Monrovia with the interior of Liberia and with one neighboring country; (ii) the construction of at least 6 major bridges and the repair of a further 65 on the aforementioned roads (iii) Improving potable water supply to Monrovia, through the emergency rehabilitation of the White Plains surface water treatment plant and distribution network and the testing and potential development of additional groundwater resources at Paynesville; (iv) supporting emergency electricity generation for Monrovia, through the provision of fuel and managing fuel supply to Emergency Power Plants. Component 2: Strengthening Institutional Capacity (US$3.45 million, excluding contingencies) – (i) Strengthening the capacity of the Recipient’s Ministry of Public Works, the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (ii) Supporting the Recipient’s Ministry of Public Works in the re-establishment of basic management and procurement systems. (iii) Supporting the Special Implementation Unit in the management, and monitoring and evaluation of the Project, including civil works for office rehabilitation (iv) Supporting the Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) in carrying out the financial management of the Project. 1.6 Revised Components 16. Following the restructuring of the project as described in Para 8-12, the overall revised project components were as follows: Component A: Emergency Rehabilitation, Repair, and Reconstruction of Critical Infrastructure (US$23.90 million excluding contingencies) - (i) Supporting the rehabilitation, repair, and reconstruction of the Monrovia-Buchanan corridor linking the two largest population centers including bridges and culverts (ii) Improving potable water supply to Monrovia, through the emergency rehabilitation of the White Plains surface water treatment plant and distribution network ; (iii) Supporting emergency electricity generation for Monrovia, through the provision of fuel and managing fuel supply to Emergency Power Plants. Component B: Strengthening Institutional Capacity (US$4.99 million excluding contingencies) – (i) Strengthening the capacity of the Recipient’s Ministry of Public Works, the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation and the Monrovia City Corporation (ii) Supporting the Recipient’s Ministry of Public Works in the re-establishment of basic management and procurement systems. (iii) Supporting the Special Implementation Unit (SIU) in the management, and monitoring and evaluation of the Project, including civil works for office rehabilitation (iv) Supporting the PFMU in carrying out the financial management of the Project.

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Component C: Road Rehabilitation (US$7.28 million excluding contingencies) – (i) implementation of basic rehabilitation of selected rural roads sections, mostly concentrating on the construction of small temporary bridges, culverts, and improvement of critical sections in Monrovia City roads, resurfacing, and rehabilitation of selected urban streets. (ii) Carrying out of construction supervision, including periodic independent technical audits. Component D: Urban Works Rehabilitation (US$10.52 million excluding contingencies) - Carrying out of: (i) the rehabilitation and/or maintenance of urban works, including public toilets, main and secondary gravity lines in the urban sewerage network, the urban storm drainage system, the solid waste disposal system, market places and buildings; and (ii) a public awareness training program on the rehabilitation program. Component E: Port Investments (US$5.00 million excluding contingencies) - Carrying out, at the Port of Monrovia, rehabilitation and paving of: (i) the container stacking area; (ii) the passage between the sheds at the southern end of the marginal wharf; (iii) the passage connecting the main cargo corridor from the marginal wharf; and (iv) the road from the customs house to the National Port Authority office block. 1.7 Other significant changes 17. The scaling up of the project by the Supplemental Component which had a focus on maximizing job creation using labor-intensive methods was adopted for the rehabilitation works. To achieve impact in a short time, available in-country United National Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) equipment and engineering capacity were used to significantly shorten contractors' mobilization time. Consequently, the UNDP was brought on board as the project implementing agency for the Supplemental Component. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 18. Soundness of background analysis. The selected road corridors were the most critical routes for strategic, commercial and accessibility reasons. The initial basis of identification of the emergency works was the Joint Needs Exercise undertaken by the Bank and the UNDP in 2003. A more detailed assessment was undertaken by a consultant who prepared technical feasibility studies and prioritized emergency works in five infrastructure sub-sectors, under the Trust Fund for Liberia (TFLIB). This included the two main corridor road works of about 400 km. While the works selected were relevant, detailed cost estimates were difficult to generate in the absence of an active construction market, and therefore costs were based on rough orders of magnitude. Thus the basis of the costing was fairly subjective. No specific lessons from previous emergency infrastructure projects were clearly reflected in the accompanying technical annex although the major risks of operating in the environment were clearly identified. 19. Assessment of the project design. The project was designed with the objective that was relevant and responsive to the needs of Liberia in the early post-conflict era.

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The components were simple and well aligned. While there was the need to restore critical infrastructure on an emergency basis, the long term sustenance of the rebuilding effort was pivoted on the related institutions which were to be strengthened under the project. The results indicators were simple, derived from the direct achievement of project activities, and suited to the weakened institutional environment of Liberia. However, the scope was overly ambitious when compared to the modest amount available for the project. The expectation to repair about 400 km of roads with some US$24 million (i.e. about US$0.006m/km) was over optimistic, given the distressed condition of the targeted roads. A physical contingency of 9 percent of infrastructure costs was provided, but this was woefully inadequate, considering the inadequate scope definition and likelihood of rapid change in emergency operations. 20. The design provided for the rebuilding of institutional capacity by the creation of a Special Implementation Unit as a starting point for the re-establishment of professional project management functions of the MPW, and the establishment of the relevant financial management functions in the PFMU under the Ministry of Finance (MoF). In spite of these provisions, the design also recognized that the environment of Liberia at the time could prove impossible to operate in, and therefore an exit strategy was documented in case progress towards achieving the objectives of the project was unsatisfactory. 21. Adequacy of government’s commitment. Government commitment was high at project preparation. In the early reconstruction phase, several short and medium-term development plans were being developed to provide focus and direction for the reconstruction efforts. At a broader level, steps were being taken to address the high incidences of corruption, non-transparency and financial mismanagement at all levels of Government. For the project in particular, Government took steps to establish the steering committee, the SIU and PFMU which were critical for implementation by project effectiveness. Government commitment was also reflected in its alertness to drive priorities, manage challenges and engage with donors and other key stakeholders (including NGOs) to provide solutions for the emergent demands under major financing constraints.

22. Assessment of risks. Being the first World Bank major project to be implemented by the Government since the eighties, the overall risk to the project was rated as being substantial. Identified risks included: (i) limited capacity to prepare and manage the Project within MPW; (ii) Low private sector interest in civil works contracts; (iii) difficulty in conducting dialogue with donors in a fragile environment; and (iv) corruption. 23. To address these risks: (i) a Special Implementation Unit utilizing both local and experienced international staff hired under the project was to be created to build capacity for implementation; (ii) procurement packages were to be structured and disseminated to be sufficiently attractive to generate private sector interest; and (iii) provision for tight procurement control, regular supervision by qualified supervision consultants, and technical and financial audits. Donor coordination was considered a global risk to the project, given that only the European Commission (EC) and United States Agency for

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International Development (USAID) had any active involvement in the reconstruction agenda for the water and electricity sectors.

24. Risk mitigation measures were relevant but were quite difficult to achieve. Capacity build up in the SIU was slow, aided by the inability to attract experienced and qualified individuals to bring on board the necessary expertise. In procurement, the large packages created limited interest with associated high construction costs. However, donor coordination improved significantly with a number of donors getting involved within the framework of the Liberia Reconstruction Trust Fund.

2.2 Implementation 25. The following were the main factors that affected implementation. 26. Inadequate risk assessment and provision of contingencies: The project did not consider the possibility of sudden collapse of infrastructure which had not been maintained for more than 15 years. Thus, when the rains set in and destroyed several sections of the existing roads, there was inadequate provision for construction to restore the functionality of the roads.

27. Changes in project scope: Severe rainfall over two rainy seasons made several sections of the selected road corridors impassable. The cost of the first civil works contract changed significantly, as a result of increased work quantities since the initial basic designs two years earlier for repair/rehabilitation was changed to reconstruction. A decision was made to implement only 83 km out of the original 400 km envisaged. With the entire funding for the component released for the Monrovia to Robertsville Airport and other associated roads along the Monrovia-Buchanan corridor, it was necessary to change the project scope to reflect reality.

28. Challenges in building capacity: Poor responses to requests for consultancy services for both firms and individuals to provide technical assistance for project management affected the planned capacity building effort in the SIU. The Bank had to engage in intense hands on implementation support to help build capacity of the SIU.

29. Difficulty in attracting qualified international firms to bid on large value works contracts: The ICB procurement for the initially proposed major works packages along the Monrovia-Buchanan and Monrovia-Ganta roads was unsuccessful. The Bank showed considerable flexibility in going forward with a Limited International Competitive Bid process which is not recognized in Bank procurement method which led to the selection of a contractor who was able to complete the now reduced scope of works. 30. Use of additional Implementing Agency with community based approaches: The supplemental component which was added in the first restructuring had its own implementation agency, i.e. the UNDP. The use of existing UNMIL equipment and managerial expertise with labor intensive construction of roads was strategic and

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effective for project delivery, as was the mobilization of communities for cleaning, waste disposal and other small urban works in Liberia. 31. Increased project portfolio: Several infrastructure projects emerged during the project implementation period and all these were under the management of the SIU. Therefore its limited capacity was stretched thin.

32. Mid-Term Review: The mid-term review of the EIP held from September to October of 2008 recommended the restructuring of implementation arrangements to replace the Special Implementation Unit with an autonomous Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) and with international management. This was particularly critical to achieve the needed skills mix required for managing the rapidly evolving program of donor projects being implemented by the MPW. By this time, the project was two years into implementation with 56 percent of the overall project costs disbursed, indicating reasonable progress in spite of the difficult conditions prevailing.

33. Delay in Project Execution: Delays in the completion of the corporate audit of LWSC and the construction of the access road to White Plains (inherited from the realignment of World Bank and AfDB involvement) and the construction of Whein Town Landfill resulted in extension of the project by 30 months.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 34. Design. Given the generally weak institutional capacity that existed in the implementing agencies, the project indicators selected were simple, focused and relevant. Five performance indicators (including two outcome indicators) were selected, this was later expanded to nine performance indicators (including six outcome indicators) under the restructured project. The indicators were directly derived from achievement of project activities. However, it would have been appropriate to have an indicator for the primary rural roads activity which was added during the supplemental component. Only the length of city streets was reflected in the revised indicators, and this was later dropped during the second additional financing. All the indicators were targeted at measuring the objective of emergency support to critical infrastructure; there was no indicator(s) to measure strengthened capacity of key institutions which is also part of the PDO. It was considered that the interventions were too limited to implement a representative indicator. In addition, the indicator on employment creation (labor employed) lies outside of any of the PDOs. While job creation was a specific objective of the Supplemental Component, this was not reflected by revising the PDO. The target levels were realistic, with the exception of the intermediate indicator for road component. For the job creation indicator (labor employed), it would appear that the target was too low if the entire spectrum of job creation activities in both urban works and primary roads rehabilitation is considered. 35. Implementation. The selected indicators were collected generally on a regular basis by staff of the SIU as the implementation of the project activities progressed, and were disseminated in quarterly progress reports. However, there was no mechanism for

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continuous monitoring of the project outcomes beyond the completion of project activities. 36. Utilization. Both the outcome and output indicators served as signals on how the project was progressing towards achieving its targeted outcomes. The indicators also signaled the changing implementation environment facing the project and whether progress was being made towards achieving the project objectives. The decision to continue waste disposal activities under the Bank-funded Emergency Monrovia Urban Sanitation (EMUS) Project is an example of the use of indicators to provide input to another project in the pipeline. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 37. Environmental Safeguards. The project was classified as environmental assessment category B and triggered OP/BP/GP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and OP/BP/GP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement). The following instruments were disclosed in-country and at Info Shop: Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) for water sector projects (prepared under an AfDB project); Environmental Management Plan (EMP) for roads; EMP for urban works; Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for removal of solid waste; Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for Whein Town Landfill. All the safeguards instruments were to be disclosed within six months of project effectiveness which was allowed for under this emergency operation. However, the preparation of the safeguards instruments was delayed. During implementation a case of non-compliance with OP 4.12 was recorded for sanitation works at locations along the Metsurado River where solid waste cleanup was to be done. Works were stopped and deferred until the RAP was prepared. In spite of this, it is considered that overall safeguard compliance was satisfactory. 38. Financial management compliance was moderately satisfactory. The PFMU was established under the project for the financial management function in fulfillment of effectiveness conditions. It was adequately staffed with a qualified manager, accountant, and internal auditor who received additional training. Annual audits performed by an independent auditor expressed opinion on the project’s financial statements. Quarterly Financial Management Reports (FMRs) were submitted in a timely manner. 39. Financial management of the supplemental component suffered some delays in compliance, on account of co-mingling of funds, delays in submission of withdrawal applications and difficulties in reconciliation between Bank and project records which were eventually resolved through an external audit. However, the fiduciary covenants of the project were respected by submitting all required interim unaudited financial reports on time. 40. Procurement was moderately satisfactory, even when it was guided by intense hands-on implementation support by the Bank. Under the Supplemental Component, procurement of new activities remained static during the first nine months of 2010 due to financial management difficulties aforementioned in paragraph 39, resulting in long

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delays in procurement of a contractor for landfill construction at Whein Town. By the original closing date of June 30, 2010, all activities were completed with the exception of three activities, i.e. the construction of an access road to White Plains, Corporate Audit of LWSC, and the construction of Whein Town Landfill.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 41. A number of infrastructure projects are being implemented in the transport sector and are currently managed as a coherent program. Experiences derived from this project have already been incorporated in the current transport sector projects (i.e. the Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project (AIDP), Urban and Rural Infrastructure Development Project (URIRP), and Liberia Road Asset Management Project (LIBRAMP). 42. Project activities which could not be implemented under the EIP have been better defined and taken up for financing in the current portfolio, for example, the Monrovia-Buchanan Corridor from Cotton Tree to Bokay Town to Port of Buchanan has been taken up and completed with the Bank funded URIRP. Similarly the Monrovia-Ganta corridor is the subject of the Liberia Road Assets Management Project, which is currently on-going. 43. The solid waste activities were curtailed after they exceeded the intermediate outcome and have been continued under the Bank funded EMUS Project which is a broader urban management project, building on experiences of the emergency solid waste collection program funded under EIP. 44. While capacity in Liberia remains a challenge, significant steps have been taken in the current and follow on projects to transform the SIU into an IIU and eventually transform it into a Road Agency. In this framework, a number of other initiatives have taken place, notably the recruitment of national staff to work in the now IIU in the interim, and the preparation of a road map to the creation of a Liberia National Road Authority/Agency.

3. Assessment of Outcomes 45. The project outcomes are highly relevant and satisfactory. Assessment of the project outcomes is based on the revised project components and their associated target achievements. 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 46. The project was highly relevant to Liberia’s post-conflict situation. The project helped to mitigate the crisis in Liberia which in turn prevented fear from the engulfing the region. First, the project objectives supported the priorities set out by the transition and the elected Governments of Liberia. Second, the World Bank’s Country Re-engagement Note for Liberia which was organized around three priority areas: economic

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management, infrastructure rehabilitation and community based development was aligned with the government priorities. Third, the projects helped identify, through the process of Bank-Government interactions, key priority projects that are subsequently financed under IDA. The objectives continue to be relevant as the new Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) focuses, among others, on reviving the economy and reintegrating the country. 47. The design of the project is highly relevant, combining institutional capacity strengthening with the implementation of infrastructure investments. As the project evolved, infrastructure delivery was matched with capacity of implementing institutions and relevant partnerships, e.g. the use of existing engineering and management capacity of UNMIL, labor based approaches and community participation in rural roads and small urban works. Institutional responsibilities were also assessed and delineated clearly e.g. the separation of financial management (PFMU) and technical/engineering functions (SIU/IIU). 48. Following changes in Government priorities, or when a willing donor is ready to take over an ongoing EIP subproject, the Bank was willing to cooperate and pass on implementation or financing responsibilities as needed. As a result, the implementation of the project has led to changes in the implementing agencies or funding sources for specific project activities. The current development priorities build on the objective of the project, and seek to sustain the momentum gained in the efficient provision of infrastructure.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 49. Achievement is rated as satisfactory on the basis of the achievement of the major outcomes targeted under the restructured project. The outcome indicators have either been met or exceeded as indicated in the table below. Program outcomes noted here are also attributable to complementary investments from other Bank projects as well as donors and are not solely to the Bank’s support.

Table 1: Achievement of Project Development Objectives

PDO Indicator Original Project Target

Revised Project Target

Achievement

Indicator 1: Average reduction in travel time on (a) Monrovia - Buchanan corridor (%) (b) Monrovia - Ganta corridor (%)

20% 20%

20%

dropped

20%

dropped Indicator 2: Increase in annual revenue of Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (US$ * Thousands)

650 650 2,457

Indicator 3: Number of skilled and unskilled labor employed (thousands man-months of employment)

n/a 7 9

Indicator 4: Number of on-site sanitation facilities rehabilitated (No.)

n/a 12 19

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Indicator 5: Total volume of solid waste removed from Liberia (thousand m3)

n/a 130 609

50. Two objectives can be identified from the amended PDO statement and the key outcomes under these are discussed in the following paragraphs. Some of the outcomes indicated are actually project outputs, and per the ICR guidelines, the intended objectives have been inferred. Achievement of project development objective is rated as satisfactory. Objective 1: Provision of emergency support to restore priority infrastructure through rehabilitation, repair and reconstruction of critical infrastructure Outcome 1: Average Reduction in travel time on Monrovia Buchanan Corridor. 51. Along the Monrovia-Buchanan corridor, 83 km of selected roads were repaired or reconstructed: (1) Freeport of Monrovia-ELWA Junction (16.20 km) (2) Freeport of Monrovia-Red Light Junction (13.25 km) (3) Freeport of Monrovia–Careysburg (3.56 km) (4). ELWA Junction to Robertsfield Airport (44.3 km) (5). ELWA Junction to Gate 15 (4.5 km) (6) SD Cooper Road (1.3 km). This system of roads has improved access to Monrovia, particularly from the Robertsfield International Airport into Monrovia which was rehabilitated under the Liberia Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project to ensure the resumption of international flights to Liberia. Thus with the construction of the Elwa Junction to Robertsfield Road, access to Liberia from the airport has improved tremendously. An average reduction in travel time reduced by at least 20 percent, improving the flow of traffic significantly. Outcome 2: Increase in annual revenue of Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation 52. Annual revenue generation of LWSC has increased from US$0.35 million in 2006 to US$2.46 million, well beyond the targeted US$0.65 million in 2012, an increase of about 280 percent. Achievement of this outcome is a result of a combination of factors. Under the project a Duetz pump was procured for the White Plains water treatment facility, and the laboratory rehabilitated to assure quality of water production. Leak detectors for water mains and distribution lines, supply of various water meters (8,395 No.) and fabrication of valve meters were procured and installed. The volume of potable water supply to Monrovia has increased from 1.2mg/d to 5mg/d by the end of the project, exceeding the 2.8mg/d target by 78%. Training of LWSC staff in the installation of water meters has resulted in recovery of “lost water revenue” and increased the revenue generation of LWSC to the level observed. The high achievement is also attributable to rehabilitation of the White Plains Treatment Plant under the AfDB funded Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project. Outcome 3: Job creation through and improved rural connectivity 53. This is measured by the number of man months of skilled and unskilled labor created through labor intensive methods. Implementation status reports indicate that

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9,000 man-months of labor were generated as compared to the 7,000 man months targeted5. This was achieved by rehabilitation of major rural gravel road sections along the Gbarnga-Foya Corridor and the Ganta-Fishtown corridor (implemented by UNDP through UNMIL), as well as the critical Pleebo-Barclayville road corridor (implemented by MPW). These are key corridors for UN peacekeeping forces operations and general access from Liberia to neighboring Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone. Overall, the rehabilitation of the 641 km length of primary rural roads maximized job creation for both skilled and unskilled labor.

Outcome 4: Improved urban sanitation in Monrovia 54. This outcome encompasses two of the approved outcome indicators: Number of on-site sanitation facilities rehabilitated, and total volume of solid waste removed from Liberia. 19 public toilets were rehabilitated in high density areas of Monrovia, nine more than was targeted. The volume of solid waste removed was a result of improved use of the Fiamah landfill site under the project which contributed to the short term final waste disposal needs of Monrovia. A landfill at Whein Town for the medium term needs was also financed by the project to about 80 percent of works; leachate treatment system with series of ponds and a reeds bed is yet to be completed. The landfill has served as a final waste disposal site for communal cleaning works that have improved the ambience of Monrovia to become a live able city. A rudimentary solid waste collection system which comprises 120 collection sites and regular collection and disposal has been developed, estimated to cover 25-30 percent of the city needs. By 2009, the volume of waste collected was 609,000 m3 which was far in excess of the 130,000 m3 targeted. Overall, these labor intensive urban activities generated about 38,600 man-months. The waste collection activity continues under the EMUS project which now caters for about 60 percent of waste disposal needs of Monrovia. Objective 2: Provision of emergency support to restore priority infrastructure through strengthening the capacity of the Recipient’s Ministry of Public Works, the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation, and the Monrovia City Corporation. 55. There were no specific indicators for the institutional strengthening objective because it was considered that the planned interventions were too limited and relatively modest. The institutional capacity building in MPW, LWSC, MCC, SIU, and PFMU was carried mainly by on-the-job training. Mid-level professionals were recruited to gain experience under international consultants. Challenges in attracting a reasonable number of such professionals have limited the impact of the capacity building effort. However, even though assessment has been done to date, the outcomes may be regarded as positive.

5 As per project completion reports, about 57,000 man-months of labor of which 4% skilled and 96% unskilled jobs were generated in the vicinity of the roads constructed

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56. Within the SIU, positive outcome of institutional strengthening is manifested in capacity the training of two local staff in procurement, Contract Management and Road Sector Management. The trained staffs are now contributing as key local managers, serving the IIU as Procurement Officer and Deputy Program Director respectively. Staff of MPW were also trained in testing of highway materials for the manning of the Central Materials Laboratory of MPW.

57. LWSC was provided with survey equipment, leak detectors for water mains and distribution lines, supply of various water meters (8,395 No.) and fabrication of valve meters. Employees were trained in the installation of water meters and other ancillary equipment of preventing loss of water.

58. Within MCC a short term technical assistance to carry out a quick assessment of the institutional, financial and organizational set up of MCC was financed by the project and executed successfully. Following this, a rudimentary waste collection system has been developed which now accounts for 60 percent of waste collection within the city. 59. A financial management manual has also been put in place at the PFMU, with an integrated software system (SUN systems) for project accounting.

3.3 Efficiency 60. There were no assessments at entry on expected rates of return. Under the Liberia macroeconomic condition and price distortions, such indicators of efficiency at entry relative to post-construction estimate would have had little efficacy. However, at ICR, an attempt is made to discover whether the project outcomes were achieved at reasonable costs. The results of such estimates, both for the physical and institutional components (Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis) appear reasonable relative to regional costs for similar activities taking into consideration the post –conflict nature of Liberia. 61. Despite the changing priorities, the costs of civil works completed under the project were reasonable (see Annex 3). For example, the 83 km road corridor which represents about 50 percent of the total grant of US$54.7 million was constructed at US$0.32m/km. Similar standard of road in Ghana, under similar terrain and climatic condition would cost about US$0.58/km, indicating that despite the adverse circumstance, the use of resources were relatively cost-effective. 62. In gauging the cost effectiveness of the institutional component at closing, the ratio of total costs of consultancy services to total civil works expenditure is taken. It should be noted however, that the estimates do not include the expenses that the Bank incurred on supervision. Clearly at 14.57 percent of the cost of the works, the supervision costs at restructuring are on the high side compared to most countries in the region; but can be considered reasonable when seen in perspective of initial conditions of operation in Liberia.

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3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 63. Given that the project is rated as having high relevance, substantial efficacy and moderate efficiency, the overall rating is assessed as satisfactory. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts 64. The overarching consideration facing project management was how to sequence project component priorities and implement them within time and budget constraints so that the project outcome can be optimized to achieve social stability in Liberia and thereby secure peace in the region. These global and specific concerns required flexibility both with respect to Government and Bank priorities in relation to allocation of available grant resources throughout the project life. The overarching concerns were the driving force behind the Bank’s and the other IFIs’ special efforts to end Liberian non-accrual status and support for debt forgiveness. (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 65. The project with its emphasis on infrastructure rehabilitation promoted local employment. Particularly under the Emergency Infrastructure Project Supplemental Component (EIPSC) where employment generation was a clear focus, more than 57,000 man-months of employment of local labor were generated under the roads rehabilitation component, making significant contribution to the lives of local people, especially considering that about 30 percent of the employment was generated by women. The urban project also created some 38,000 man-months, thus totaling 95,000 man-months. Rehabilitation of three markets with access to infant care has provided safe trading places, especially for women. The general amenities in Monrovia city also improved considerably, with removal of solid waste, and the increase in potable water production which assures greater regularity of supply to the people in Monrovia. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 66. This is discussed in Para. 55-59 (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) 67. The implementation of this project has led to consideration of different contracting methodologies to enhance efficiency, particularly with regard to improving certainty of project cost. This has led to the development of Output-Based Performance Contract (OPRC) methodology for project implementation. While this methodology is a departure from the traditional contracting methods for design and construction, the initial indications from the Bank financed LIBRAMP, where this methodology has been used, suggests that there could be efficiency gains from this approach.

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68. The jobs created by the rehabilitation of primary rural roads and urban work provided a temporary safety net for a reasonable section of the populace. The resulting increased income and economic activities led to alternative livelihoods for individuals previously unemployed or underemployed. The security outcome was no less important. Improved road connectivity proved critical particularly to UN peacekeeping forces operations and safety of returnees from neighboring Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops Rating: not applicable 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Significant 69. The risk to development outcome is rated as significant. In the medium term, Liberia is likely to face significant revenue mobilization challenges for infrastructure maintenance. The establishment of a road fund is at an early stage and initial receipts could be low. This poses a significant risk to the development outcomes. 70. While the revenue generated by LWSC has more than tripled, from US$0.35 million to US$2.5 million, corresponding to an increase in potable water production from 1.2mg/d to 5mg/d, the result of the recent corporate audit shows that LWSC barely covers its operating cost. 71. The Government is using reforms to mitigate its institutional capacity weaknesses. For example, National Transport Policy and Strategies with Investment Framework have been developed. Based on the study, the government has taken some actions to ensure sustainability of the investments in ports, including rapidly pursuing comprehensive port sector reforms and a public private partnership (PPP) transaction that has resulted in a container terminal concession in the Port of Monrovia. Under the 25 year agreement, the concessionaire will invest US$120 million in development of container terminal, port operations and marine services. 72. The road sector reform being pursued is expected to introduce changes in implementation arrangements of the project that could lead to conversion of the IIU into a Road Agency/Authority. 73. While the initiatives taken by Government in all these sectors are promising, the risk to development outcomes in the medium term depends to a large extent on how this vision and momentum can be sustained. Given the fragile environment of Liberia and the slow pace at which institutional capacities are established, the risks to development outcomes rating is assessed as significant.

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5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 74. Bank performance during project entry was moderately satisfactory. The process of identification of the project and preparation of this Emergency Infrastructure project is detailed in Section 2 of this Report. A special Country Re-engagement Strategy Note and the Bank’s experience in post-conflict states together with Borrower’s priorities of the transitional government as reflected in Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) served as a strategic plan, guided the identification and preparation of the Project. 75. The relevant OP/BP8.0 was employed for processing the operation. The project was prepared by a core team of specialists with extensive years of experience. The team had also a good skill mix. Such a skills mix ensured that the critical issues were handled from all relevant aspects. For example, recognizing the limited institutional capacity the monitoring indicators were limited to few intermediary outcome indicators. However, project scope was overambitious, and reasonable contingencies were not factored into project costs, despite Bank experience in emergency recovery projects. Monitoring indicators, though simple did not always reflect the intended outcomes of the project. 76. Though donor presence in Liberia at the time was limited, the Bank team coordinated with existing donors as much as possible. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory 77. The Bank's performance during implementation of the project was satisfactory. Project supervision was continuous and intense consisting of up to four missions per year. In addition, supervision was supported through intensive sector focused missions by specialists on the team. Bank safeguards specialists held training events for safeguards staff of Government of Liberia (GOL) to build their capacity for preparation and implementation of RAPs. Though the Task Team Leader was changed four times during the project, adequate focus on project objectives was maintained at all times. This approach contributed to developing a close working partnership with all project counterparts and ensured commitment to accomplishing the project objective. 78. Implementation progress was adequately reported, and implementation problems were identified early and addressed proactively. Performance ratings given in the Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) were realistic, and sufficient attention was paid to the project’s likely development impact. Supervision reports were sufficiently detailed and well written and highlighted key issues, with action plans for next steps. Monitoring indicators were sometimes not clear, for example number of bridges rehabilitated. Working relationships with the donors, whose presence increased over time, were effective.

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(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 79. The overall bank performance is rated moderately satisfactory on account of the observed shortcomings in project preparation, inadequate risk assessment of the operational phase which led to several changes in the project, even if the overall objective was maintained. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. 80. The government was proactive in adjusting priorities when the situation demands. The government was also willing to take political risks to lay sound fiscal foundation. For example, it was positive on policy reforms including measures to introduce corruption free management through improved financial management However, due to limited institutional capacity, the fact that Government at times was not able to respond on time to project issues may have adversely influenced timely implementation. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 81. The Implementing Agencies were committed to achieving the Project Development Objectives. The SIU was provided with sufficient resources to perform well, however there were challenges in achieving the required staffing levels at the SIU, due to difficulties in attracting the right quality of professionals, leading to some lapses in project administration. 82. Institutional capacity for safeguards implementation was weak, with only one Environmental Officer doubling as a Social Safeguards Specialist for an increasing portfolio of projects in the SIU. Close supervision by the Bank ultimately ensured satisfactory implementation of the civil works components.

83. Adequate financial management systems were established and maintained; the procurement function on the other hand managed to function with heavy Bank support. Components financed under EIPSC which were implemented by UNDP had a number of challenges with financial management and procurement, leading at times to serious delays in procurement of some activities. 84. Safeguards instruments were slightly delayed but adequately prepared and disclosed as per Bank procedures. Funding for resettlement was made available in a timely manner.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

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85. The overall performance is rated moderately satisfactory on account of the challenges experienced in establishing a fully resourced SIU, resulting in some lapses in procurement, safeguards and project administration, including delays in submitting withdrawal applications. 6. Lessons Learned

Capacity building after a prolonged and severe crisis phase requires a

significant and long term commitment which transcends the span of one project. Institutional capacity in Liberia was weak, compounded by overwhelming infrastructure needs and the unwillingness of the right caliber of individual international consultants to work in such a setting. Frequent, intense and sustained Bank supervision and hands-on support by all Bank specialists was therefore crucial to begin to build the implementation capacity of SIU/IIU to deliver the project.

Procurement of large contracts in post-conflict countries should be flexible, and provide the right incentives for contractors/suppliers to enter weak or risky markets. This is a reflection from the failed open competitive bidding process for both the Monrovia-Buchanan and the Monrovia-Ganta corridor works. Works contracts in post-conflict environments present a special challenge to contractors/suppliers who may not be incentivized by regular Bank bidding procedures. Consequently, the switch to Limited International Bidding yielded a reasonable outcome.

Successful implementation of emergency projects depends on the right mix of implementation arrangements. The restructuring of the project brought on board two different implementing agencies, MPW and UNDP. Appropriate strategies were applied for various sub components - labor based approaches with existing engineering capacity and equipment of UNMIL, combined with community engagement and training, in contrast to project execution for large works using equipment intensive methods. This mix created significant needed employment opportunities.

Effectiveness of projects can be enhanced by working with other donors and properly aligning donor interests. With a number of urgent activities spanning several sectors, delivery of the projects can be enhanced by clearly delineated donor interests to enable available funds to be maximized in specific sectors.

Project preparation for emergency projects in post-conflict countries must make adequate provision of contingency funds. The study prepared under the TFLIB for the estimation of the project cost was found to be inadequate in terms of detailed specifications. From a risk perspective, the contingency provision should have been much higher than the 9 percent provided and higher than the 15 percent normally provided in regular Bank projects.

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Bank response to emergency situations should be as realistic as possible and sufficient flexibility and change modalities should be written into the design phase; avoiding the need that a project such as EIP be actually restructured even before effectiveness. This is a reflection from the fluid state of project activities, with several activities being dropped, scaled up or re-scoped.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies 86. Comments received on the draft ICR from the Borrower are on page 37, Annex 7 and have been fully incorporated into this finalized version of the ICR. (b) Cofinanciers Not applicable. (c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society) (To be inserted)

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Project Cost By

Component EIP EIPSC EIPAF Total

Project Cost

Actual/ Latest

Estimate

Percentage of Actual Financed

(in US$m) (in US$m) (in US$m) (in US$m)

A. Emergency Rehabilitation, Repair, and Reconstruction of Critical Infrastructure

24.40 - -0.50 23.90 28.44 119%

B. Strengthening Institutional Capacity 3.45 1.54 - 4.99 8.03 161%

C. Road Rehabilitation - 7.08 0.20 7.28 6.30 87%

D. Urban Works Rehabilitation

- 7.02 3.50 10.52 11.65 111%

E. Port Investments - - 5.00 5.00 3.06 61%

Total Baseline Costs 27.85 15.64 8.20 51.69 57.486 111%

Physical Contingencies 2.15 0.86 - 3.01

Price Contingencies - - - 0

Total Project Costs 30.00 16.50 8.20 54.70 57.48 105%

Front-end fee PPF 0 0 0 0 0

Front-end fee IBRD 0 0 0 0 0

Total Financing Required

30.00 16.50 8.20 54.70 57.48 105%

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(USS millions)

Revised Estimate

(US$ millions)

Actual/ Latest

Estimate (US$

millions)

Percentage of

Appraisal

Percentage of Revised Estimate

Borrower 0.00 0.00 0.00 IDA Grant 30.00 54.7 57.4 191% 105%

6 Increased figure due to weakened dollar/SDR exchange rate

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Annex 2: Outputs by Component

Component/Activity Description

End of Project Target Outputs/Remarks

Component A: Emergency Rehabilitation, Repair, and Reconstruction of Critical Infrastructure A1.1 Reconstruct, rehabilitate and repair primary and secondary road networks including bridges and culverts

Repair of two major corridors totaling 485 km length: Monrovia-Buchanan, linking the two largest population centers, and Monrovia-Gbarnga-Ganta-Guinea border, linking Monrovia with the interior of Liberia and with one neighboring country Scope reduced to repair/ reconstruction of 83 km of the Monrovia-Buchanan corridor only under the additional financing.

The following roads were repaired/reconstructed: 1. Free port of Monrovia-ELWA

Junction (16.20km) 2. Freeport of Monrovia-Red

Light Junction (13.25km) 3. Freeport of Monrovia –

Careysburg (3.56km) 4. ELWA Junction to

Robertsfield Airport (44.3km) 5. ELWA Junction to Gate 15

(4.5km) 6. SD Cooper Road (1.3km)

A.1.2 Reinstatement and repair of damaged bridges and culverts

Construction of at least 6 major bridges and the repair of a further 65.

Scope reduced to installation of 27 bailey bridges which had been earlier procured under the Transition Support Fund, during the additional financing. Bank responsible for transportation and installation materials only, and MPW responsible for installation with engineering assistance by UNMIL. 14 bailey bridges of length 80-200 feet have been installed at various critical river crossings.

A.2 Improve potable water supply to Monrovia

Emergency rehabilitation of the White Plains Treatment plant Transmission mains and distribution network

Scope reduced under additional financing. Design of White Plains Water Treatment Plant completed. AfDB took over implementation of works. Water treatment laboratory renovated. Laboratory equipment supplied including gas chlorinators & accessories, chemicals & reagents for treatment of water. Duetz engine for pumping of treated water supplied and installed. 16 km access road along the 36” water transmission pipeline was rehabilitated.

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Drilling and testing of 2 pilot boreholes for potential development of additional groundwater resources at Paynesville

Dropped during the additional financing

A.3 Support Emergency Power Plants (EPP) by providing fuel and managed fuel supply to the generating sets in Monrovia.

Supply of fuel for about 18 months estimated at US$2.35m

A supply contract of US$1.162m established for the delivery of fuel to Emergency Power Plants at Kru Town, Congo Town, & Paynesville and completed (equivalent of 1248MT Automotive Gas Oil (AGO) and lubricants).

Component B: Strengthening Institutional Capacity B.1 Strengthen the capacity of MPW the re-establishment of basic management and procurement systems

Study to classify the road network and determine its condition

Dropped during the additional financing

Miscellaneous support Short-Term Individual TA for Contract Management initially and then a firm provided Technical Assistance to MPW and SIU (See also B.3). About 100 man-months by 6 on call specialists (3 on contract management, 2 on materials and 1 on procurement). Training of MPW staff in highway materials testing towards the efficient use of the newly installed Central Materials Testing Laboratory of the MPW Unit rates for testing of highway construction materials developed. The CMT Laboratory now operates on a commercial basis and is manned by staff of MPW

B.2 Strengthen the capacity of LWSC

Study on optimization of operation and management of LWSC

The corporate audit of the Liberian Water and Sewer Corporation (LWSC) has been completed.

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Miscellaneous support The project financed vehicles, motor bikes, computer & accessories, office equipment, VSAT equipment, survey equipment, leak detectors for water mains and distribution lines, supply of various water meters (8,395 No.) and fabrication of valve meters. LWSC employees were trained in the installation of water meters.

B.3 Strengthen the capacity of MCC

Miscellaneous support Added under the Supplemental Component. Short term technical assistance to carry out a quick assessment of the institutional, financial and organizational set up of MCC was financed by the project and executed successfully. Master plan for solid waste management was reviewed. A letter of policy on urban water supply and sanitation was prepared.

B.2 Support SIU in the management, and monitoring and evaluation of the Project, including civil works for office rehabilitation

Miscellaneous support A Transport Economist hired provided support to SIU/MPW. A transport policy was developed. On the job training of local SIU staff to upgrade them with middle level management capabilities. Setting up record systems, computer aided design software and procurement training. Six month training course for materials engineers and technicians of SIU/MPW. Office rehabilitation was dropped.

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B.4 Support PFMU in carrying out the financial management of the Project

Miscellaneous Support Computer & accessories, stationery and office equipment and vehicles. Project also financed staff, training and operating costs of the PFMU. PFMU offices were also renovated under the project. Financial management manual has been put in place, with an integrated software system (SUN systems) for project accounting.

Component C. Road Rehabilitation

C.1 Support the rehabilitation of selected rural roads, bridges and culverts.

Basic rehabilitation of 641 km of major rural road sections

Introduced under the supplemental component. 565 km of rehabilitation of primary rural roads along the Ganta-Foya Corridor, Ganta-Fishtown corridor was implemented by UNDP through UNMIL, namely Ganta-Saclepea (41km), Saclepea-Tappita (66km), Tappita-Zwedru (56km), Zwedru-Fishtown (136km), Gbarnga-Zorzor (104km), Zorzor to Voinjama (95km), Voinjama-Foya (67km). Another corridor, Pleebo-Barclayville (76km), was implemented by MPW through private contractors. A total of 641 km of primary rural gravel roads was rehabilitated, and about 9,000 man-months of labor generated.

C.2 Support the rehabilitation of selected urban roads, bridges and culverts

Monrovia City Streets consisting of 18 km of pothole patching and 14.5 km of complete overlay of selected streets was targeted for this intervention.

Introduced under the supplemental component. But subsequently dropped. The cost estimate exceeded the available budget considerably. Now financed under URIRP.

C.3 Carry out of construction supervision, including periodic independent technical audits

Supervision services and independent auditing of the road works defined in C.1 and C2.

Introduced under the supplemental component. No technical audits were carried out. Construction supervision activities were limited to the supervision of Pleebo-Barclayville road works.

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Component D. Urban Works Rehabilitation

D1.1 Rehabilitate / maintenance of public toilets

10 public toilets in Monrovia, rehabilitated.

Introduced under the supplemental component. 19 public toilets in Monrovia, mainly pit latrines with corrugated roof, and separate shower facilities for male and female, have been rehabilitated Improved sanitation for densely populated areas of Monrovia.

D1.2 Rehabilitate/ maintain main and secondary gravity lines in the urban sewerage network

Cleaning and or replacement o sections of 15km of sewers in Monrovia

Introduced under the supplemental component. Activity refocused on design for Sewage lift stations in Monrovia which has been completed. Bidding documents were prepared in line with AfDB requirements and handed over to AfDB for implementation.

D1.3 Rehabilitate/ maintain urban storm drainage system

Miscellaneous urban drainage works involving cleaning and repair of storm drainage system in Monrovia

Introduced under the supplemental component. 15.5 km of drains were maintained, and another 0.55 km of corroded ring culverts replaced by reinforced concrete culverts in Bushrod, Central Monrovia and Sinkor.

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1.4 Rehabilitate/ maintain solid waste disposal system

Procurement of solid waste disposal equipment and labor-based disposal of 130,000m3 of urban waste in Monrovia through contracts with the private sector; upgrading of Fiamah landfill and construction of new landfill at Whein town.

Introduced under the supplemental component. 120 skips and 8 skip trucks purchased towards service provision for large scale, labor-based removal of accumulated solid waste. Solid waste management services for the city of Monrovia secured with private contractors for 18 months. 609,000m3 of waste was removed by end of 2009, with about 38,600 man-months of labor generated. Upgrade and closure of existing Fiamah landfill site completed, with additional capacity of 54,000m3. Development of a new landfill at Whein town, including landfill cells, leachate treatment system, construction of office block, access road and perimeter fence. The progress was 80% at the time of project closure, and most activities were completed, with the exception of the access road and leachate system which is partially complete. Estimated coverage now stands between 25-30% of the city needs compared to the initial situation when sewage was indiscriminately dumped within the city.

D1.5 Rehabilitate/ maintain market places and buildings

Rehabilitation of three large urban market buildings

Introduced under the supplemental component. Rehabilitation of three large abandoned urban market buildings was completed at Duala, (8,200m2) Waterside (4,757m2) and Rally time (1,620m2) including provision of day care centers.

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D1.6 Create jobs under small urban works

Quick impact visible works in Monrovia.

Introduced under the supplemental component. Works executed included clean-up of Fish Markets & Cedar Beaches, beautification of Warwien Community (Block A) beautification of Jallah Town Community, clean-up of West Point and Mamba Point Beaches, beautification of Soniwein “Block C” (Camp Johnson Road Area), cleaning up of 13th – 14th Street Beaches, beautification of Warwien Block “C” Community, cleaning of PHP and BTC Beaches. More than 65,000 man-days of labor was generated. The facelift improved amenity and aesthetic of targeted communities.

D.2 Create public awareness of urban rehabilitation program

Various outreach activities in areas of project intervention

Introduced under the supplemental component. Public awareness and training campaign using billboards, flyers, radio talk shows, brass band coverage and community sanitation activities were executed.

Component E. Port Investments E.1 Investments at Port of Monrovia

Rehabilitation and paving of: (a) the container stacking area; (b) the passage between the sheds at the southern end of the marginal wharf; (c) the passage connecting the main cargo corridor from the marginal wharf; and (d) the road from the customs house to the national port authority office blocks

Introduced under the second additional financing. 23,240m2 of interlocking concrete block paving) provided for container stacking rehabilitated. Existing dirt road upgraded to concrete paving totaling 650m length between the two sheds at the southern end of the Marginal Wharf which connects the main cargo corridor from the Marginal Wharf and the road from the Customs House to the NPA.

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis 1. A detailed economic analysis was not performed for the project, due to the emergency situation prevailing, which could not afford any reasonable estimates of cost. In any case, such efficiency measurement under the then poor macroeconomic economic environment of Liberia, where market prices were not yet good indicators for resource allocation, would have been of doubtful value. Nevertheless, this does not prevent designing a reasonable project program showing the activities to be done and rough cost estimate for their implementation as presented in the project documents to the Board. This was what was done at entry. A measure of cost-effectiveness of the project is comparing actual cost/per unit works done for similar types of works in neighboring countries under similar conditions. The costs associated with the completed works appear reasonable compared to similar works completed in Ghana.

Table 3.1: Cost Effectiveness of the Project

Project Unit of comparison

Cost (US$m) Value Cost/unit Comparator

Value Source

Monrovia-Buchanan Corridor

km 27.30 83 US$0.33million 0.58 Bank Projects in Ghana

Primary Rural Roads km 6.30 641 US$0.01million 0.08 Bank Projects

in Ghana Landfill construction m3 0.83 540,000 US$1.60/m3 US$2.0 Bank Projects

in Ghana Container stacking area and connecting roads

m2 2.46 27,790 US$89/m2 n/a n/a

2. Main road corridor- About 83 km from Monrovia – Cotton Tree out of the 146.7 km Monrovia-Buchanan corridor was rehabilitated. Overall, at US$0.33 million per kilometer, this subcomponent was cost effective. Comparable roads in the region, for example in Ghana costs aboutUS$0.58million/km. The impact on the whole corridor remains positive. Effective time of travel on the rehabilitated section improved by 50 percent compared to planned 20 percent decreases 3. Rural roads –Most rural roads in Liberia were unpaved, made of local lateritic materials. During the rainy season, segment of the roads were partially or completely un-passable causing not only the substantially higher transport costs of passengers and cargo, but also in total isolation of adjacent communities. Under the first additional financing , i.e. EIPSC, UNMIL rehabilitated 565 km of primary roads along the Ganta-Foya and the Ganta-Fishtown corridor, while MPW rehabilitated 76 km between Pleebo and Barclayville, totaling 641 km of primary rural roads. These unpaved lateritic roads are under the influence of heavy rainfall. Their construction reduced the travel time along the routes and in particular the isolation of communities when the roads became impassable.

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty Lending Ferdinand Tsri Apronti Consultant AFTA1

Nina Chee Senior Environmental Specialist MIGEPEnvironmental Management

Petrus Benjamin Gericke Lead Transport Specialist AFTTR Task Team Leader

Kremena M. Ionkova Senior Urban Development Specialist

ECSUW

Yitzhak A. Kamhi Consultant AFTTR

Muthoni W. Kaniaru Senior Counsel LEGFI Legal Counsel

Mbuba Mbungu Consultant AFTU1

Anne Njuguna Country Program Assistant MNCA2 Team Member

Frederick Yankey Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTMW Financial Management

Supervision/ICR Baba Imoru Abdulai Procurement Specialist AFTPE Procurement Modupe A. Adebowale Consultant AFTME Owusu Mensah Agyei Consultant AFTME Gylfi Palson Senior Transport Specialist AFTTR Task Team Leader Emmanuel A. James Program Coordinator AFTTR Team Member Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Sr Transport. Engr. AFTTR Team Member Ferdinand Tsri Apronti Consultant AFTA1 Yao Badjo Senior Infrastructure Specialist AFTU1 Eduardo Brito Senior Counsel LEGAF Legal Counsel Samuel Bruce-Smith Consultant AFTDE Thillainath Chelliah Senior Highway Specialist TWITR Callista Chen Consultant AFCS1

Maxwell Bruku Dapaah Financial Management Specialist AFTMW Financial Management

Florence Geegbae Dukuly Team Assistant AFMLR Jeremy Jay Fischer Consultant AFTTR Joseph A. Gadek Sr Sanitary Engineer TWIEA

Kremena M. Ionkova Senior Urban Development Specialist

ECSUW

Yitzhak A. Kamhi Consultant AFTTR Team Member Muthoni W. Kaniaru Senior Counsel LEGFI Legal Counsel Paul Kriss Sector Leader LCSSD Cornelis Kruk Consultant EASIS Team Member

Antoine V. Lema Senior Social Development Specialist

AFTCS Safeguards

Anthony Mensa-Bonsu Consultant AFTHE

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Anne Njuguna Country Program Assistant MNCA2 Team Member Jung Eun Oh Transport. Economist ECSTR

Chukwudi H. Okafor Senior Social Development Specialist

AFTCS Safeguards

Wycliffe Okoth Temporary AFTA1 Team Member Ntombie Z. Siwale Senior. Program Assistant Team Member Kristine Schwebach Social Development Specialist AFTCS Safeguards Thomas E. Walton Consultant AFTG1 Team Member Fang Xu Senior Economist AFTTR Team Member

Frederick Yankey Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTMW Financial Management

Kulwinder Singh Rao Sr Highway Engineer AFTTR Task Team Leader John K. Richardson Transport Specialist AFTTR ICR Team Leader Ephrem Asebe Consultant AFTTR ICR Co-Author

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY06 21.5 115.72 FY07 2.05 26.20 FY08 0.00

Total: 23.55 141.92 Supervision/ICR

FY06 0 0.00 FY07 19.76 159.12 FY08 82.45 696.90 FY09 33.69 270.57 FY10 20.44 177.73 FY11 14.19 146.02 FY12 3.32 29.85 FY13 4.32 31.34

Total: 178.17 1,511.53

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any)

Not applicable

33

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any)

Not applicable

34

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR The main elements of the Borrower’s ICR are summarized below. A. Project Context 1. Following a joint assessment between World Bank and UN in 2003, improving transport infrastructure was recognized as a top priority as accessible links are needed to facilitate security, movement of people, goods and humanitarian relief. These were regarded as essential foundation for social reintegration and economic recovery. In support Government of Liberia (GOL) strategy was organized along four pillars with Ministry of Public Works leading the Basic Services/Transport Infrastructure pillar. 2. The World Bank financed Emergency Infrastructure Project was to support the reconstruction of national roads network under the Ministry of Public Works. At the time, the road network included a substantial bridge and culvert asset with many bridges and culverts washed away, collapsed or badly damaged. Development partners helped to actually carry out emergency works and finance activities meant to create accessibility, but the rest of the country remained in need of transport infrastructure. B. Project Development Objective 3. The Project was established on an emergency basis, to assist Government to reconstruct parts of the devastated infrastructure, thus helping to re-activate the economy and reintegrate the country by restoring vital transport links and by restoring and expanding potable water supply service in Monrovia. The infrastructure to be rehabilitated was later expanded to the ports and sanitation sector. The above objective was very relevant to the needs of the country and the Infrastructure sectors namely Transportation, Water and Sanitation Sector, with institutional support provided to Ministry of Public Works, the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation, and the Monrovia City Corporation. C. Outcomes C.1 Achievement of Project Objectives 4. The all-inclusive objective was relevant for restoring the road network, ensuring water supply was available and ensuring support and ancillary activities, facilitate restoration of the economic activities of the Capital city where approximately 30% of the country’s population live. The PDOs were largely achieved through achievement of the following outcomes.

i. Travel time along Monrovia Cotton Tree Corridors was reduced by 20%. ii. Targeted roads executed through various projects (641 km) have been

rehabilitated.

35

iii. Daily production of water supply in White Plains has exceeded the target by 80%.

iv. The project has achieved 100% disbursement. 5. Two activities namely Corporate Audit of Liberian Water and Sewer Corporation (LWSC) and works related to the rehabilitation and maintenance of the access road along 36 inch Water Transmission Pipeline were completed between March 2012 and December 2012. 6. Following the launch of the PFMU and SIU (now IIU), a Memorandum of Understanding was signed involving MPW and MOF empowering PFMU to provide Financial Management and Disbursement Services to the Project. All the FM objectives and targets have been met including creation of seamless partnership between IIU and PFMU which has been supported by URIRP and now LIBRAMP. Sufficient capacity now exists within both IIU and PFMU to provide Financial Management support and ensure the requirements of IDA are met. C.2 Efficiency 7. The most important efficiency gain has been experiential learning that SIU and IIU went through in improving quality and timeliness of bidding processes, developing the ability to prepare bid evaluation reports, learning how to make use of the services of Monitoring Consultants. Obviously cost escalations and revisions have been a problem due to the emergency nature of the works but overall, Government of Liberia has earned Value for Money in the process of implementing key infrastructure projects. In general costs were higher than initially estimated terminating at US$58million against US$30million. This was associated with emergent, incremental nature and maximization of the project to bring on board associated activities for Water and Solid Waste. The EIP project activities were catalytic and instrumental in launch of EMUS project, which is now one of the best performing water and sanitation projects in Africa. The problematic contracts for LWSC audit and access road, provided lessons learnt in terms of contract management, activity oversight and coordination. Even though they may have been delayed, they achieved the results following better coordination and problem solving. These are then a reference point for similar project activities in the future. C.3 Overall Project Outcome 8. Based on the achievement of the KPIs above, though at a higher cost than originally planned it is evident that the project was satisfactorily achieved. Because of delays and challenges with the Access Road and LWSC audit, the overall rating is Moderately Satisfactory.

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D. Performance D.1 Bank 9. The Bank performance was rated Satisfactory considering that the Bank committed itself to support a project whose outcome was highly uncertain considering that Liberia had come out of a conflict period. The Bank worked with UNDP and UNMIL to ensure that all the essential components were completed through partnership consultation and leadership. Four TTLs have worked on the EIP, and the changeover which would normally have affected the implementation was done seamless as there was continuity and consistency in the support and commitment available from the Bank team. D.2 Government of Liberia 10. The Government demonstrated commitment to the implementation of the various components considering that Ministry of Public Works through Infrastructure Implementation Unit was coordinating PIU, with support from beneficiary institutions such as MCC, LWSC, NPA and PFMU. Under the project the MPW retained key and experienced nationals to run key operations of the project, and beneficiating from training and capacity development. GoL also managed to bring in an international TA firm and limited number of consultants as program managers, engineers, advisors and finance experts to support the implementation and completion of core activities. The delays and challenges faced due to the complex nature of the implementation relationships were overcome enabling the Project to achieve Moderately Satisfactory status on closure.

E. Lessons Learned/Recommendations 11. Management and Coordination of Activities. The management of these components needed a Project Implementation Unit, which was set up in the form of Special Implementation Unit under a national team supported by TAs. Although the TAs were a little expensive and complex to manage, this allowed the SIU and IIU to be able to lead the implementation to restore road, water and sanitation infrastructure and services. A big lesson was that MPW engaged nationals, to take charge of Transport Projects with some level of success in achieving project objectives. Although skills were lacking, because of dedication and commitment, the objectives of EIP were largely achieved throughout with reported performance being satisfactory to moderately satisfactory for most of the project activities under the various components. 12. Component Oversight. The financing of LWSC & MCC activities under the project (until 2009) provided the various institutions the opportunity to take charge of the daily supervision and oversight of projects with IIU focusing in Procurement and Contract management and the beneficiary agencies providing operational guidance and leadership. Under the LWSC supported activities, institutional problems especially the change of MDs and management, caused some delays in decision making especially on the GBSI contract. The absence of a focal person from LWSC after the EIP was extended in March 2012, militated against progress and achievement of targets. Notwithstanding

37

the cited challenges, the components were all completed, though under revised timelines and activities. 13. Capacity Building and Institutional Strengthening. The SIU/IIU has used various approaches to build capacity:

Hiring a technical assistance firm which provides experts in areas such as pavement management, bridges and structural engineering, procurement and contract management.

Hiring nationals as has been done under the TST which is funded from LIBRAMP

Training of nationals in various capacity need areas such as was partly done under the Emergency Infrastructure Project and ;

Hiring of individual consultants to fill in specific short term and medium term positions within IIU with a provision for knowledge and skills transfer.

A major lesson is that hired advisors need to have knowledge transfer in their ToRs as a standard requirement, defining Key Performance Indicators against which their performance would be measured. Because of limited national capacity (and inability to provide qualified counterparts to Consultants) IIU has not maximized on the services of short to medium term consultants. 14. Financial Management Services and Support. Both PFMU and IIU managed to carry out Financial Management activities consisted with Bank standards and guidelines. By 2012, the PFMU and IIU had set-up targets that enabled them to disburse funds timely (based on disbursement rates) and also prepare a monthly disbursement reconciliation statement which was shared with the Bank on a regular basis. In addition sufficient FM capacity has been created with PFMU and efforts are under way to upgrade the skills of IIU national staff. The biggest lesson is that with time, structured capacity building and institutional strengthening, FM skills for nationals can be developed and retained competitively. The establishment of Liberia Institute of Certified Public Accountants supported by the Bank could be used to train nationals to become certified accountants to benefit Financial Management and disbursement for Transport Infrastructure projects. 15. Procurement of Work and Services. Although IIU managed to sustainably manage procurement activities under the various contracts, using its own staff and TA interventions, difficulties were experienced due to lack of interest by qualified and experienced local and international contractors. The IIU have taken measures to recruit Technical Support Team (TST) engineers funded under LIBRAMP to increase national capacity and ensure that procurement and contract management are adequately supported. In addition efforts to recruit a short term Contract Monitoring and Management short term advisor are under way. A major lesson is that it is feasible and possible to train qualified, experienced and competent nationals to sustainably support the procurement and contract management activities of IIU. This requires dedicated, committed and experienced nationals willing to work long hours and willing to learn from international and regional TAs.

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16. Use of Manuals and documents. The SIU/IIU has accumulated draft manuals in various areas of its operations which have been prepared by contractors and Consultants. Efforts are now needed to harmonize these drafts and use them as a baseline for running future projects. A procurement manual produced during the Sheladia contract may need to be updated to accommodate recent changes in Bank guidelines in the last 2 years. 17. Monitoring and Evaluation. In February 2010, the Bank conducted training on Monitoring and Evaluation for 4 of the IIU staff as part of the work towards supporting IIU to create an Indicator Monitoring Plan for each of the indicators on which IIU was reporting. To date IIU had not institutionalized Monitoring and Evaluation because of lack of skilled focal person. Because updating, monitoring, tracking and reporting PDO indicators is critical success factor for a project, the IIU need to appoint at least 2 young engineers as focal monitoring staff, then build the capacity of these focal people. In addition the recruitment of M & E staff will help to strengthen the ability of IIU to monitor, update and report on project indicators for LIBRAMP, AIDP and URIRP.

Comments on the draft ICR7 18. The Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) has Reviewed the Draft ICR and seeks to include the following comments: 19. Paragraphs 56 & 57 mention institutional capacity building in MPW, LWSC, MCC, SIU and PFMU under the EIP Grant. However, the only positive outcome of the institutional capacity building component is attributed to LWSC in the Report.

20. The IIU believes that it would be necessary to include in paragraph 56 that within the SIU, institutional capacity was built and yielded positive outcome in that under the EIP, two local staff were trained in procurement, Contract Management and Road Sector Management. The trained staffs are now contributing as key local managers, serving the IIU as Procurement Officer and Deputy Program Director respectively. 21. With the above inclusion made to paragraph 56, IIU is pleased that the Report adequately accounts of all issues related to the EIP and the project objectives with linkages to other ongoing projects as well.

7 The comment by IIU has been noted and incorporated in the ICR

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N/A

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

1. World Bank 2006, Technical Annex On A Proposed Pre-Arrears Clearance Grant To The Republic Of Liberia For An Emergency Infrastructure Project

2. World Bank 2006, Project Paper On A Proposed Additional Financing (Grant) To The Republic Of Liberia For The Emergency Infrastructure Project Supplemental Component (EIPSC)

3. World Bank 2009, Project Paper On A Proposed Additional Financing To The Republic Of Liberia For The Emergency Infrastructure Project And Agriculture And Infrastructure Development Project

4. World Bank 2009, Liberia - Country Re-engagement Note 5. World Bank 2009, Liberia Joint Country Assistance Strategy for FY09-FY11 6. World Bank 2010-Liberia-Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)

Debt Initiative & The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative-Presidents Memorandum & Recommendation & Completion Point Document

7. IEG 2012, Liberia country program Evaluation: 2004-2011, Washington, DC. 8. IMF 2011, World Economic Outlook 9. GOL/UNDP/World Bank 2005, Results Focused Transitional Framework,

(Revision) 10. Stanley Consultants 2006, Links Prioritization Report 11. Poyr Consulting 2006, Assessment of Emergency Repairs and Feasibility and

Design Studies for Urban Supply, Sanitation, Storm-water Drainage and Solid Waste Management in Liberia

12. Mission Aide-Memoires, Back-to-Office-Reports, and Implementation Status Reports

13. Monthly and Quarterly Reports prepared by Borrower (from March 2008 – December 2012)

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This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

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