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DOCTRINE
Contact Intelligence in the Kingdom of Insolence>> Lessons
learned
2006
# 09
general military reviewgeneral military review
DOCTRINE
Ground Intelligence
Future and Stakes
FOREIGN STUDIES
Intelligence Lessons Learned
Leveraging the Practical Experience
of Operation Iraqi Freedom
Operation Enduring Freedom
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Terrorism and
Ground Intelligence
INTELLIGENCE
for Land Forces
INTELLIGENCE
for Land Forces
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DoctrineThe New Conditions of Military Efficiency p. 4
Ground Intelligence Future and Stakes p. 9
New Techniques, New Threats p. 13
The Threat Continuity - From National Territory to Theaters of
Operations p. 16
The Land Forces Synthetic OPFOR p. 20
GLAISE Army p. 24
The New Threats: the Challenge for Military-Oriented
Intelligence p. 26
Collecting Intelligence - Adapting our Capabilities p. 30
Future Intelligence: Stakes and Digitization p. 35
Collective Training for Intelligence - A New Organisation
Framework p. 38
Training for intelligence - Evolutions to be Expected for Army
Officers p. 41
Main Abbreviations and Acronyms in the intelligence Area p.
44
Bibliography p. 49
Foreign studiesIntelligence Lessons-learned - Leveraging the
Practical Experience
of Operation Iraqi Freedeom/Operation Enduring Freedom p. 45
Intelligence in Iraq within the Spanish Brigade Plus Ultra p.
59
The ISTAR Capability of the Canadian Forces p. 63
The Dutch Approach of ISTAR concept during NRF-4 p. 65
Freedom of speech
Additional opinions on the topic dealt with in this 09 issue
Terrorism and Ground Intelligence p. 70
Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Expectations and Problems p. 74
Asymmetrical Threat and Ground Intelligence p. 78
The All sources Analysis Cell: An improved Way to Process
Information p. 82
Other contributions to doctrinal thought
Doctrine and Command in the British Army an Historical Overview
p. 86
French Practice in Getting Prepared to Overseas Operations p.
95
Lessons learned
Intelligence in Indochina p.100Contact Intelligence in the
Kingdom of Insolence p.103
A Battalion Intelligence Officer in Afghanistan p.107
LICORNE or the Challenge to Reality p. 111
The First Computerized Application for Intelligence: the
Ideliance Project p. 115
Directeur de la publication :
Gnral (2s) Jean-Marie Veyrat
Rdacteur en chef :
Capitaine Stphane Carms
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Traductions :
Colonel (CR) Robert Travaillot
LCL(CR) Jean-Claude Laloire
LCL(CR) Daniel Sillon
LCL(CR) Jacques de Vasselot
LCL(CR) Alain Prignon
LCL(CR) Donatien Lebastard
Relecture des traductions :
Colonel (ER) Philippe Jolly
Maquette : Christine Villey
Tl. : 01 44 42 59 86
Schmas - PAO :
Nathalie Dujardin
Anne Laporte
Cration : amarena
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Summary #09Summary #09
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CDEF
editorial
Realities shatter; today they bring us backfrom virtual warfare
and its perfect vision ofthe transparent space of battles on scopes
toterrain requirements. A new awareness istaking place.
Because the end result of armed engagementchanges, their
conditions transformthemselves: from the simple obviousness of
theknown enemy, material targets, strategic
visions, military objectives and open spaces, weare switching to
the uncertainties of thepermanently changing chameleon opponent,
ofthe human environment, of combat occurring inimmaterial
battlefields, of low level tacticalmicro-actions and partitioned
spaces. Today, itis no longer the case of organizing the successof
the common action of a limited number ofunits acting against an
identified opponentcarrying out a finalized action, but of seeing
to itthat the combination of the actions of a greatnumber of small
teams concurs to the successof the whole, although they are acting
in a very
decentralized manner, facing a badly knownenemy, in a
discontinued area of operation. Thecontested areas1 where land
engagementstake place today are marked by a great physicala nd
human heterog enei ty; wh ere th einformation superiority is of
less importance,where communication systems show theirlimits,
whilst the physical and human roughnessof the environments renders
observation andinterpretation difficult. For a great part and in
away, intelligence has switched from an objectivenature to a
subjective one. Yesterday, focus wasplaced on collecting concrete
information and
the intelligence general picture could fairlyeasily present
itself under the format of tables,organization charts and sketches;
now, the realobjective of intelligence is intentions that
cannoteasily anymore be derived from situations.
Un d e r t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s , i t i s a
nunderstatement to say that the intelligencefunction has increased
its importance as well asits complexity. It is an understatement to
saythat the equipment and the systems of systems
conceived for the past conditions are now ofteninsufficient,
sometimes out of date, despite alltheir modernity and their
technology. It is arevolution and one must discuss about it.
Today,not taking its dimension into considerationwould lead our
forces to fight blindly tomorrow,only able to react against an
opponent having
the initiative and, from this standpoint, all theuseful
information for its punctual action.Obviousness imposes itself: the
mutation of themilitary action entails a parallel evolution
ofintelligence. General Fast, commanding the USArmy intelligence
school clearly states it2:The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
haveimposed a re-balancing of an approachcentered upon sensors
towards a systemfirstly aiming at providing an optimized
directsupport to those who need the mostinformation: the soldier
and the small unitcommander.
Globally, the issue is complex: what wasnecessary yesterday
remains so for a greatdeal - as one must still be prepared
forconventional warfare if one wants to push backits occurrence -
but now come in addition newrequirements for a new type of
conflicts inwhich our land forces are engaged for a longtime. The
new adversary appears as being moreand more difficult to detect,
therefore difficult tolocate, therefore much less possibly subject
toaccurate strikes. Yesterday, the essential part ofthe military
action was destruction and
intelligence consisted primarily in targetintelligence whilst,
now, the essential part liesin the situation awareness and
intelligence, theperception of micro-situations and micro-objects;
the transparency of the battlefieldappears to be a more and more
erroneous goodtheoretical idea. Yesterday, we thought wefought
thanks to information; we realize todaythat we are more and more
condemned to fightfor information.
The priority of levels swings over: strategygives precedence to
tactic and we areswitching from a top down approach to adown
towards top approach where troops atcontact give the multitude of
uncertain terrainindications from which the operative synthesiswill
be built. As a result, processes and layoutsreverse themselves, the
low tactical echelonsmust imperatively be reinforced with
acquisitionassets and analysis capabilities; as a
result,digitization must thought over again as, in thisdomain, it
had been conceived for theconventional warfare of the past and now
bringsmuch less than when we were thinking ofcarrying warfare
against material targets.
1 BG Robert E. Schmidle & LCL Franck G. Hoffman, Commanding
the Contested Zones, Proceedings, September 2004.
2 See Foreign Studiescolumns, page 52.
3JUNE 2006 DOCTRINE # 09
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CDEF
ditorial
The fog of warfare has become thickeragain on the battlefield.
The US Army,directly confronted in Iraq to the new conflictreality,
today realizes that there is an obviousrisk of knowing more and
more about friendlyforces and in proportion less and less about
theenemy; it feels the risk, at the now tacticalprevailing level,
of the impossibility of mergingcomputerized blue picture - always
exact andaccurate - with the red picture - alwaysinaccurate and out
of time. This leads it tonaturally doubt about the COP (Common
Operational Picture), which it now differentiatesfrom the ROP,
or Real Operational Picture,although the whole system is not yet
stabilized.
In the same way, the concept of precisionaction keeps its
pertinence as the efficiency ofaction within human environments to
which iscompelled the land forces soldier, requires toavoid
uncertain actions and human collateraldamages that ruin very
quickly the patient workof conquering hearts and minds. But this
sort ofprecision action can only be built uponintelligence acquired
by men and about men:
and we see there all the new and importantplace that not only
HUMINT will have but alsothe action of scout units and of the
commonsensors that all the soldiers are. Our Anglo-Saxon friends
rightly assert: Every soldier aSensor. The present operational
environmentundoubtedly underlines the soldiers role in
theintelligence process3. Inexorably also, the ideathat one can no
longer be content with thinkingabout the adversary: it is necessary
to thinkas the adversary. The adversary is not inert, heis not a
simple subject for planning; endowedwith a creative and free mind,
he has no
intention of thinking like us and to give in to ourviews. One
really has to place oneself in theadversarys shoes; facing the
Iraqi difficulties,the Anglo-Saxon have understood that and
theyhave created red cells within their operationalstaffs and
developed courses in which one istaught to think as the
adversary.
Conflicts of today, conflicts of tomorrow, willbe better
conducted if they are reallyconceived as intelligence and
informationoperations and not as maneuvers or processesof
destruction... Therefore, an intellectual, butalso human and
material effort has to be madein favor of intelligence, and this
will imply re-balances between the contact/destructionfunctions and
the intelligence function, withmost probably the availability of
significantintelligence organic assets at brigade level4.Beyond
unfruitful debates about the respectiveroles of specialists and of
non-specialists,beyond the purely technical visions focused
onequipments and networks, an in-depth thinking
has to be carried out about our capabilities aswell as about our
methods and our courses ofaction in order to place our objectives
andavailable assets in sync.
If our ambition in future engagements is toemploy limited force
able to set the basis forthe accomplishment of the strategic
goal,undoubtedly we probably have to accept to havea limited action
capability of rethought force forthe benefit of a more complete and
re-orientedreconnaissance and intelligence capabilitywarranting an
efficient, targeted and mastered
employment of the armed force, necessary forthe new military
efficiency.
Brigadier General Vincent DESPORTESCommander, Forces Employment
Doctrine Center
3 On this subject see Lessons Learned article (RETEX) bygenerals
Fastand Le Botas well as the article bygeneral Fleury.
4 Simple example, but meaningful example. The future new
structure of the FCS brigades (US Army) is now known; there will be
one scouts
cavalry troop, in addition to one intelligence company and one
recon and acquisition battalion organic to each of the three
combined arms
battalions task forces.
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EADSAstrium
doctrinedoctrine
5JUNE 2006 DOCTRINE # 09
The New Conditionsof Military Efficiency
Yesterday, facing the state controlled uniformity of the threat
corresponded a model of forcesstill recently consolidated by the
characteristics of blocks confrontation. Today, although it
isimperative to keep the capability to conduct conventional warfare
in order to reduce its occurrence
thanks to the preservation of superiority and the production, as
much as needed, of constraining
and deterring violence, it is all the more so necessary to adapt
the defense capabilities to the new
commitment conditions of forces.
To a world marked by the coexistence of several conflicting
logics must correspond renewedmodels of forces, without any
homothetic link with those that prevailed before.
BYBRIGADIERGENERALVINCENTDESPORTES, COMMANDER OF
THEFORCESEMPLOYMENTDOCTRINECENTER
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6DOCTRINE # 09 JUNE 2006
The new relativity
of the destruction capability
A reshaped role
For the systems of force, the destruction capabilityremains high
in itself, even if it is significantly less inproportion. In most
cases destruction remains essentialto win the battle of
intervention, which isthe indispensable phase although now
intermediarytowards the accomplishment of the strategic
objective.The stabilization phases are now decisive as they arethe
ones that will enable or not to reach the requiredpolitical effect;
during these phases, the coercioncapability must still support
other forms of actionand power and be able to face the
unavoidableresurgences of violence.Besides, although the sole
destruction will,
in the future much less than in the past, be able to leadto the
political solutions for the crises justifyingthe employment of
armed force, it keeps a fundamentalreinsurance role. In fact there
is no doubt that, facinga new enemy, protean and having few
moderncapabilities, the technological power - displayed,
forexample, by the air force or the navy - plays an
ultimateinsurance role for troops in contact. Thanks to
theinsurance it provides, it increases their own capabilitiesand,
to a certain extent, deters the opponent, by denyinghim to carry
out aggressions of a certain level or againstcertain objectives.
The rustic army of a great power
having real joint capabilities is in no way comparable,even with
equivalent specific capabilities, to a rusticarmy that would be
lacking them. Indeed, the projectionof an army at contact
necessarily supposes a multiformjoint capability that itself
requires tremendous financialand technological investments.
Operational limits
However, the fading out of the state control uponwarfare
depreciates nowadays the destructioncapability that, effective or
potential, has traditionallyup till now represented the central
course of actionof the armed force facing its peer.The
technological superiority no longer deters the non-conventional
adversary and the capability logic,opposing capabilities to
capabilities, does not impresshim; he no longer looks for
superiority as he knows thatmilitary victory - in the classic
meaning and with classicassets -is no longer the condition of
political victory.Facing him, striking at security range, along the
fire andforget principle is often vain. In fact, it is no longerthe
case of reaching conventional objectives, but ofattaining results
of another nature, falling under
cognitive and psychological aspects. Giving way tosimplicity by
acting in using classic assets within thetraditional physical space
in order to materially destroythe non-conventional adversary rarely
leads tothe achievement of the political goal.
As long as it is no longer the case of reducing the abilityof a
State to stand in the way of the will of a third party,the
destruction assets of the States confrontationcapabilities lose
their sense. They even lose much moresense, as asymmetrical
violence assets are much lessvulnerable to conventional strikes;
they no longer offer
numerous targets for high technological fires. Therefore,classic
strategies and weapons are partially struck withuselessness, whilst
the ability to produce non-solelymilitary effects becomes one of
the usefulness criteriaof the systems of forces.
A certain de-legitimization
Similarly to the gradual depreciation of destructionas military
and political tool, it can be noticed that itbecomes gradually
de-legitimized. This evolutionis based upon two phenomena. The
first one is
the information revolution. Today, any act of destruction -and
its unavoidable collateral damages - is rapidlytaken to the court
of international public opinion, quickto judge based upon criteria
that are very far frompolitical logics; indeed, advanced societies
are fragilein front of losses and violence shown endlessly on
homeTV screens. The second phenomenon lies in the fact that,today,
the forces are often committed for interests thatare no longer
vital for the nations or, at least, that donot appeal as such for
their citizens; although, whilstthe vital nature authorized by
itself, in the spirit ofnational defense legitimacy, the
destruction action,
the relative nature of the defended interest nowwithdraws from
this latter one, in the internationalconscience, its morality. In a
certain way, destructiondiminishes the legitimacy of the action
that today hasitself become the condition of freedom of action.
The rules
of the new military efficiency
The concomitant criteriaThe evolution of society and of the
context ofemployment of forces, together with immediateavailability
of information all over the world, hasreinforced three acceptance
essential criteria formilitary violence, and therefore for the
freedomof action of politic executives.
The first one is the respect of the essential valuesof the
intervening societies. These values, often atthe root of the
decision of using force, make up the baseof the right to war as
well as the laws of warfare.
The second criterion is legality; the multiplicationof legal
instruments and special international courtscompels the military
action to develop itself withina clear legal context. The third
criterion, an enrichedsynthesis of the first two, is the legitimacy
of action,
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intrinsic or to be constructed; closely related to theselection
of ways and assets, to modalities and intensityof the force, to
rules of engagement, it is fragile.Permanently having to be
protected and consolidated,it closely depends on communication
strategies, evenin the cases when it seems to be obvious, as in
the
contemporary minds, fair war doesnt necessarilycoincide with
legitimate war.
Upstream of this last criterion, the idea of strictnecessity or
strict proportionality reinforces itself:it imposes a permanent
capability of modulation andadjustment, a capability of
reversibility of the courses ofaction and assets, in accordance
with a subtle perceptionof the environment and of its changes
necessarilyacquired in contact.
In this way, the credibility of the security system is nolonger
based on forces ratios as they were conceived at
the time of interstate war, but on the capability to meetthe
adversary on his own terrain by sticking as closely aspossible to
his changing reality. The traditional topdown approach of
interstate conflicts (attackingthe State, favoring from now on
action from the thirddimension), is now replaced by the down
towards topapproach, as it is most often the case of starting
fromthe ground and from the population to rebuild the State.Through
the remoteness from the terrain it is looking for,the revolution in
military affairs seems from thenonwards to be out of touch with the
recent evolutionof conflicts and unable, in most situations, to
bring an
appropriate answer.
A protracted action
As weve seen it, modern conflicts may be characterizedby a
psychological action - through the winning over ofminds and wills -
as well as a material action, and from
this point of view they require a protracted action. Facingthe
new threats and environments, looking for animmediate or even rapid
result is a mistake in mostcases due to reasons coming from
duration and can onlybe dealt with on this scale. The idea of first
in, firstout, falsely attracting but regularly rejected idea by
experience, i.e. the idea of an intervention in firstconceived
to be punctual and followed by a withdrawalplanned from the start
as fast as possible even beforethe political resolution of
conflicts, is not compatible -unless the responsibilities are
subject to a transferto others - with the reality of crises, or
withthe indispensable tune that only the armies are able toplay in
the process of crises resolution. Indeed, successof a crisis
management is assessed after long monthsor years after the
beginning of the intervention and noton the efficiency of the
coercion initial action that isnever the decisive action directly
leading to the expectedstrategic result.
It is more the case of persuading in time, thanks todialog and
contact, than of imposing in the short termusing constraint and
destruction capability. What countsis the accompaniment as well as
the intervention.In this sense, the trend, born with the
technologicalimprovements of the Cold War, consisting in placingthe
soldier farther from the battlefield cannot favordurable
solutions.
One may notice that the very nature of new conflictslessens for
them the capability to be fenced in time.
In fact, limited warfare supposes a dialog betweenplayers that
is no longer permitted by the loss of controlby states and the
voluntarily disorganized scatteringof an opponent often lacking
political unity. Althoughthe deliquescence of States is often
nowadays atthe root of crises, it is all the more responsible
forthe difficulty to solve them.
Acting in the same spaceas the adversary
Facing the classicoverpower of its opponent,the adversary is
only leftwith the choice of refusingcombat on equal termsand of
looking forconfrontations withinoperational spaces wherehe hopes to
reach politicalresults without needinglarge scale
militarysuccesses. Rational and
classic warfare, reinforcedby the bad habits of theCold War,
uses the fourspaces land, sea, airand electromagnetic;
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the new opponent neglects them and concentrates on hisown
advantages in the sphere of information - or spaceof information
communication - and the human spacethat is very marked by its
affective and irrationaldimensions.
It is within the sphere of information - where the battlebetween
the weak and the strong nowadays takes place -that the adversary
tries to play upon public opinions. Asthe sphere of information
organizes the disconnectionbetween the strategic and tactical
spaces, progressesin the field of communications enablethe
adversary to project himself outside the physicalbattlefield, to
transpose tactical successes at strategiclevels and from them
directly build political victories.In this way, by playing upon the
sensitiveness andversatility of public opinions, communication -
brokerof the pity market - has become the terrain of victoryor
defeat; using it, the grandstand turning into a court,
the action bets its results and its acceptance thanksto the
image it shows.
Today, reaching political result is to become consciousthat
power is under control of the opinion and thatvictory supposes to
carry out combat within the spacesin which the adversary is
fighting.
Acting in contact
Due to the very changing context of new conflicting
situations, a good awareness of these latter ones isa key factor
of efficiency, thanks to the capabilityof continuous adaptation to
events that it brings.As the identification of the adversary proves
to beuncertain, and as the discrimination between friendsand foes
can generally come only from human intelligenceat contact,
understanding the threat requires a visioncoming from the field
rather than from technique; it isno longer the case of detecting
masses of tanks and oflocalizing potential targets, but of
understanding socialenvironments, behaviors, psychologies.
The military leader will have to carefully graspthe
sensitiveness of a complex and changingenvironment, and that can
only be carried out onthe field, at contact, being in wait of
micro-fluctuationsof circumstances. This will enable him to
graduatethe employment of force and ensure the smoothreversibility
of layouts in accordance with situations,whilst thus warranting the
continuity of the link betweentactical action and political
action.
Acting within the physical continuity
The fluidity and ubiquity of the threats, nowemancipated from
the territorial framework, theglobalization of behaviors and
contestations depreciatethe strongholds in which advanced societies
thoughtthey were efficiently protected.
In fact, this threat continuity imposes that of retaliationand
valorizes the force systems able to act continuouslyif necessary,
with tools and according to methods almostidentical, on either side
of the border: a continuum ofcapabilities of action in space and at
the same levelmust answer the continuum of threats.
8DOCTRINE # 09 JUNE 2006
At the center of new conflicts, fighting againstinternational
terrorism is a particular case, whichhas to however be taken into
account over time, as itis likely that this plague will continue to
feed itselfover a long period from disparities and imbalancescoming
from differentiated access to wealth andknowledge. In this field,
the destruction of terroristsand, possibly of their sanctuaries -
as essential it maybe - is only one part of success.
As terrorism is more a communication mode than away of fighting,
one must place oneself in the same
space whilst avoiding sending messages - ofdestruction for
example - that consolidatethe terrorist action and enrich its
environment.The key of the fight against terrorism may be foundin
the combination of direct action and in-depthaction, over time,
with the requirement of actingpreferably on the causes and the
minds than onthe symptoms. In this way and outside the
nationalterritory, fighting against terrorists directly falls
fromnow on under the direct responsibility of trained buttrivial
land forces.
Within this framework, the armed forces must playan active role
in accompanying the fight againstterrorists or, directly, in
counter-terrorism - which isaiming at preventing an action and
acting on the verycauses of the threat - preferably to
anti-terrorism,which directly gives an answer to an
attack:prevention is better than cure, and the formerbenefits from
the action of troops in contact.However, the duality of the forces
on the groundallows them to combine these two types of actionsover
time and to directly and very efficientlyparticipate, for the
benefit of the security ofthe French people, in the anti-terrorism
fight, now
occurring outside the national territory, tomorrowin it if,
alas, that would become necessary.
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A collection processfitted to human behavior
understanding
In the French concept and ata time when there are onlyfew major
commitmenthazards possibly leading toa direct hit of wills - likely
tocarry things to extremes -,any land commitment shouldbe
considered within
the framework of a limiteduse of force in order to keepit at a
level of violence justnecessary to reach political-military
objectives.
Ground IntelligenceFuture and Stakes
The Intelligence function is one among the four transverse
operational functions in the French
Army. Its purpose consists in identifying the enemy, the threats
and environment hazards as best
as possible in order to enable decision-makers to better draw
up, plan and carry out their operations
at any commitment level. It is one of the factors enabling to
master information.
In front of an increasingly sophisticated political-military
commitment framework and of threats that
diversify and sometimes seam to be elusive, this function is
subject to an obvious critical sight and
to a strong development pressure - at least at announcement
level. However, a significant change
has already started that takes place by stages; and the
following articles will show the way these
changes occur according to areas and circumstances.
Without featuring current threats - presented under various
aspects in other articles - the different
evolving ways to gather information will be presented as well as
the processing methods and tools.
It will end with some explanations about the organizational
aspects for this function; at a time when
the French Army is more in a situation of strengthening what has
been achieved, these explanations
will remain all-encompassing.
In this article, ground capabilities will be highlighted; but it
is obvious that land forces commitments
can be thought of within a joint and most often multinational
frameworkonly; and this is
permanently shown in the intelligence area. Incidentally,
several articles in this issue will make a
reference to it.
BY COLONEL JEAN-FRANOIS COPPOLANI,
CHIEF INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, FORCES EMPLOYMENT & COMMAND
STRUCTURES DIVISION, FORCES EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE CENTER
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During stabilization phases,which, in the short-term,are likely
to be the mostfrequent and the most
plausible kind of
commitment for the French
Army, it will be highlynecessary to understand thehuman
environment. First ofall, it is necessary to detecthostility
factors towardsthe land force that will bedeployed and to
identifythe various potentiallyhostile actors; then,according to
requirements,track them and provideintelligence enabling
toneutralize or to destroy
them. It is also useful toestimate the receptivityof populations
to our action(support and co-operationcapabilities) and to be
ableto feel these populationsrequirements - amongothers, for
assistanceoperations that are to befound in all the phases ofthe
operation continuum.
All this results into twooperational fields for
intelligence; they differ fromeach other in the way theyare
carried out but theycomplement each other asregards their
consequences.
On the one hand, accurateintelligence aboutthe enemy to
beoverpowered (the enemyand not his neighborslikely to become
collateralvictims) and aboutthe areas of activity forthe force:
enemyvulnerabilities, armament/equipment/logistics/infrastructure
to bedestroyed. All this willenable to carry out anaccurate
commitment,which, for example, isnecessary when carrying
out counter-terrorismoperations; and fortunately,the development
ofaccurate ammunitionenables to do it.
On the other hand,environment intelligence
in order to get andassimilate cultural, political,religious,
social andeconomic factors enabling
to understand thecommitment environment.Thus, this
understandingwill enable the commanderto anticipate actions
carriedout by human groups and,among others, to applyimmaterial
effects todirect them towardsthe intended direction.
This prerequisite resultsinto several improvement
requirements.
First of all, all the actors of aland force should carry out
a
more significant action asregards vigilance towardscommitment
environment,the research and gatheringof warning information,
itsearly dissemination within atactical unit and its earlyreporting
to G2s in order
to grant combined-armscommanders with the currentsituation
information theyneed. This action starts fromthe beginning; and
actionscarried out to highlight andrecognize the battalion S2srole
illustrate it. As far asthe Land Forces Commanderis concerned, he
stressedthe importance of collectiveintelligence training andthe
crux value of battalionS2s in his training guidancefor operational
readiness.
This intelligence cultureis also to be spread to anylevel of
responsibility.
Indeed, each commander isresponsible for informationresearch and
processing athis own level; and he shouldgive himself the means
totake on this responsibility.
Then, we have to think aboutincreased HUMINT
capabilities to be able tounderstand this human
environment; to date, theHUMINT sensor is the besttool to this
end. Everybodycan take part in this effort:from the most
specialized tothe least specialized one,
from scout andreconnaissance units topeople dealing with
sourceprocessing. However, it isnecessary not to makeconfusion
between anyonesknow-how and field ofactivity; they are the
bestproofs for the requiredprofessionalism inincreasingly more
sensitivejobs. When facing aparticularly difficult
commitment framework, ourAmerican allies were able toset up a
quick and efficientLessons Learned (LL)process; it resulted
intoconcrete and importantmeasures, thus enabling totake important
correctivemeasures in this field,despite obstacles. Indeed, forthem
as for us, interpretersavailability remains a
problem; but solutions stillmust be looked for.
Modern people - also inremote parts of the world -have a need to
communicate;and they are enticed to do soas modern
civiliancommunication systems areeasily used. To some extent,this
is also true forasymmetrical threat actors -whoever they are:
guerrillawarfare, partisans, terroristor other movements; andthey
are granted with hugepossibilities compared totheir former
members;but it also grants them withvulnerabilities that can
beexploited by our electronicwarfare and SIGINT
(SignalIntelligence) assets.
Thus, technical intelligence
is still relevant and the role itplays in the awareness ofenemy
networks is essential:the press regularly tells ushow some elements
were
located and neutralizedthrough communicationinterception - for
instancein Tchechnia or Palestine.As for cloak and daggerwarfare,
we can be sure that
it results into successes thatare not mentioned. Thus,
ourinterception and analysis
capabilities change to meetthe threat despiteencountered
difficulties; andthey increasingly require atechnical support -
within ajoint framework - monitoredby the Military
IntelligenceDirectorate (in French DRM),which is formalized in
thetactical SIGINT concept -
currently in development.
IMINT collection keepsdeveloping andthe forthcoming fielding
ofthe Contact-ReconnaissanceUnmanned Aerial Vehicle(in French
DRAC1) will providecombined arms and supportunits with a capability
forstand-off observationbeyond crest-lines, thus
providing them with a slightincrease in their scouting
andreconnaissance capability.
As a matter of fact, all thesecapabilities are necessaryand they
increase eachother in value thanks tothe multisensor synergythat
has already been usedby the intelligence brigadesince several
years. It willbe fully operational whenimplementing the ISTAR2
principle, which will bepossible when achievingBattlespace
Digitizationwithin intelligence andfielding analysis-support -and
if possible merging -software.
The development of ourprocessing capabilities
However, if looking forinformation is good, beingaware of what
to do with itis better. Even more todaythan yesterday, the
actual
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difficulty regarding
intelligence consists in
processing the information
collected. In former highintensity operations,rebuilding the
enemy
disposition by wonderingwhere the famousIndependent Tank
Battalion3 -assumed to representthe axis of advance ofthe CARMINE
MotorizedRifle Division - was locatedresulted into manyIntelligence
officers sweating.Today, it seems easyin comparison with the
meredescription of anasymmetrical threat
in theatres where it actuallyexists; and a fortiori if wehave to
issue possibleEnemy Courses of Action(ECOAs), whatever they
arecalled. Yet, encounteredintelligence difficulties inthe Ivory
Coast, in Iraq and inAfghanistan for example, arealready within
intelligencecollection. They are alsopertaining to processing
to a large extent, i.e.understanding populations,rebuilding
hostile networks,identifying their maneuversand spotting riots they
arelikely to prepare.
For our intelligence-headquarters qualifiedofficers, a
significant trainingeffort is in progress, thanksto what has been
done bythe CEERAT(Army IntelligenceStudy and Training
Center);currently, it is responsible forall Army intelligence
trainingcourses and, in the future, itwill result into
increasedknow-how for this branchsstaff. It is completed
withlessons learnt duringexercises and operations,what enables to
enrichthought. However, a gooddefinition of expertise to
possess and of processingmethods to be used is still anambition.
Anyway, one ofthe human capabilities to bedeveloped consists in
being
able to sort what is usefuland what is useless in anover
informed world.The lack of it could leadcommanders to indecisionor
to blindness when facingactual issues.
If ever improvement is one
of the sources for thisinformation flood, it couldalso provide
us withsolutions. Indeed, moderninformation flows areincreasingly
electronic flows.
The progressiveimplementation ofBattlespace digitization intothe
forces in general, and itsspecific applications tointelligence in
particular, willlead to a significant increasein flows arriving at
a G2 cell,as well as in documentationintelligence quantities
thatwill have to be dealt with forprocessing purposes.A significant
part of thisinformation will be composedof open source
information;though they include muchnoise, they arenevertheless an
increasingsource of information.
In comparison, availabletools to meet these flows
and these stocks aresignificantly insufficient, both
with specializedComputerized DocumentManagement appliances
andwith software applicationsaiming at supporting G2s intheir
analysis work.Command, Control andInformation Systems (CCIS =French
SICF) expected
capabilities - including SICFV3 - are very limited; and it
isdifficult to know today - andwith current budget estimates- what
we can expect fromthe Forward intelligenceoptimization
system(French : SORA4 initiative).
Some experience has beengained by the Land ForcesG2s, in
particular bythe Technical intelligenceexploitation center
withinthe framework of its standingsupport mission to
B2sOperational ReadinessTraining 5 among othersthanks to tests
conductedwith the IDELIANCEapplication; but much workis still ahead
for operational
capabilities to meet the new
requirements.
When facing this floodof electronic informationon the one hand
andthe requirement to takewarfare against asymmetrical
threats into account(including participating inlimited
counter-terrorismwarfare) on the other hand -which means being able
tolook for low signals - do wehave manpower fitted to this
need? We certainly dont.There again, [information]
harvest is abundant andworkers are few. Indeed,our G2s are very
busy withcurrent operations; duringthese operations, they setup G2s
with strengths muchhigher than those plannedin homeland Tables
ofOrganization andEquipment but they do nothave all the
requiredcapabilities and expertise.
Adapting capabilitiesand organizations
Then, these deep changes intargets and trades shouldhave an
impact onorganizations, which arenot everlastingcathedrals, but
structuresenabling the Army to carryout its mission in
the best conditions.Indeed, the intelligencefunction has
takenadvantage of a first setof measures following
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the 2001 function review;among these, the mostimportant ones
are:
extending thisspecialization field;
setting up a comprehensive
training for intelligenceofficers to begin right aftergraduating
from branchschools;
any training in theintelligence area taken intoaccount by the
ArmyIntelligence Study andTraining Center (CEERAT),which completed
itsbuilding-up in late 2005;
The creation of the GroundIntelligence ProcessingCenter(CERT)
withinthe Land Forces Command.
Once this experience issettled - which should bea significant
improvementin the near futureregarding manpowerprofessionalization
inthis area, other measuresshould certainly be
considered and all the moreas 2001 changes stoppedhalfway on
numerousissues. So, there is stillmuch room for thinkinginorder
either to carry on in the
same direction or to influencethe course of events in thelight
of lessons learnt.
More basically, we have tothink about the balance ofcapabilities
of our forces
regarding the most probablecommitment framework; andwe have to
wonder whetherlooking for accuratecommitments is not likelyto
downsize forceful-action-devoted capabilities tothe benefit of an
increase ininformation collectingcapabilities. And this,whatever
this information is:part - or not - of what we callspecialized
research today
and especially to the benefitof a significant increase inour
information processingcapabilities considering theimplementation of
the ISTARprinciple - agreed by Franceat Army and joint levels.
Ofcourse, all this is to be setwithin the framework of
Armyrebalancing, regularlyallowed/compelled bymilitary programming
laws.The new responsibilities
of the French Chief of Staff ofthe Armed Forces willnecessarily
have an influencein this field: if someintelligence required bythe
Army is well the Armys
province, on the one handthe Army takes part into
jointintelligence and on the otherhand if takes advantageof what
the latter does.The example of our alliesshows that different
solutions
are possible.
However, without waitingfor this term, we can alreadymention an
area within whichimprovements can beachieved rapidly:
namely,co-operation with the otheractors tasked to defend
ourcountry. Indeed, the sundryvariety of threats headingtowards
security-increasingthreats - i.e. security that
police forces and servicesare regularly coping with -may, in the
near future, resultinto changes in Army trades;but it already
requiresreinforcing co-operationin the theatres of operation:
co-operation amongServices;
land/military intelligencedirectorate co-operationand land /
military counter-intelligence agencyco-operation;
co-operation between theServices and Ministry ofdefenses other
services;
Co-operation betweenthe Ministry of defenseand other
Departments.
A Defense Ministersinstruction issued in January2006 already
leads the way
in this field.
As for the Army, it wouldtake advantage of aclarification of
itsrequirements and of thelimits of its trade whenconsidering what
mustremain other actors job;then, it should draw up itspolicy with
related doctrineand procedures without
mentioning equipment andcoordination structures thatare
sometimes entailed.
1 Fielding planned in 2007.2 SA2R in the French Army.
3 Independent Tank Battalion (ITB).4 SORA: (Systme doptimisation
du
renseignement aroterrestre) =Air-land Intelligence
OptimizationSystem.
5 CERT - (Centre dexploitation durenseignement terrestre).
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Being careful to the slight evolution of threats that are likely
to jeopardize our committed forces, the ground intelligencefunction
has taken into account the stakes that this change meant as regards
its role when land forces are being committed.According to the
impulses regularly sent by the Army Staff it has begun a
progressive evolution that should slightly increaseits efficiency
in the future.Yet, this important challenge is still increasing and
it seems to be necessary to make new steps forthoughts that come up
here and there to materialize:
in order to be more able to assess human environment for
operations; among others, to understand and, if possible,anticipate
when dull or hazardous threats may become true;
in order to provide information at the lowest required level in
due time, and ideally in reflex time in the future;
in order to develop the integration of the intelligence chain,
including with joint components, highly required to
controlinformation;
In order to increase its capabilities in comparison with
requirements.
This way, it will keep providing the joint commander with assets
enabling him to keep the freedom of action he needs to carryout an
ever more sophisticated mission, within a commitment framework that
requires an increasing control of the use of forceand of the effect
of force.
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New Techniques,
New ThreatsThe threats that the Military Intelligence
Directorate (DRM) has to assess naturally take placewithin the
framework of symmetrical - even dysymmetrical - conflicts. However,
to meetforces needs, the boundary for the DRMs missions has
extended to some threats pertainingto asymmetrical
warfare.Symmetrical conflicts are characterized by enemies
endeavoring to achieve superiority by usingstructures and doctrines
complying with the same rules. Dissymmetry relies on a qualitative
or
quantitative superiority from one of the opponents but it meets
the same logic. It is trickier todetermine the asymmetry concept
that cannot be limited to armaments and to their use byguerillas
and terrorists. Any conflict is asymmetrical when two enemies close
with each other indifferent areas to make the other ones action
illegitimate. Then, psychology and information arenew fields to be
explored and to be taken over not to become overwhelmed by the
enemy 1.
If the threat is currently linked to the implemented weapon
systems - or in development amongforeign armed forces - it is also
linked to the most various and unexpected assets used by
non-governmental armies and it increases because of the infospheres
permeability. From now on,the armed forces are compelled to do a
balancing act between the Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
concept- in which technological superiority is overwhelming -
and the stand-off use of force - acritical trump card - on the one
hand, and the entanglement between armed forces and
civilianpopulations - that have to be sometimes protected,
sometimes controlled - on the other hand.Therefore, the threat is
less within the last 300 meters than in the first 10 ones.
In a democracy, asthe psychological field for conflictsand
information control cannot beentrusted to militaries only -
who,besides, have only very limitedmeans to get into both these
fields -we are going to deal only with newpieces of equipment that
come upinto asymmetrical conflicts andthat are at the core of
DRMsconcerns.
BYCOLONELCHOLLEY, HEAD OF THE ARMAMENTS AND PROLIFERATION
DIVISION AT THEMILITARYINTELLIGENCEDIRECTORATE(DRM) 2
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Improvised ExplosiveDevices (IEDs)Booby traps have alwaysbeen
used by soldiers orinsurgents. They are not
new. Until now, they used tobe one among many hazardsfacing
soldiers in operations.An unpinned grenade undera corpse or a
trip-wire acrossa path triggering anexplosive are usually partof
harassing or delayingactions. Experience andcommon sense were
oftenenough to protect ourselvesagainst them and theirinfluence was
negligible
towards other hazards.Yet, the employmentof Improvised
ExplosiveDevices (IEDs) has becomea favored COA (Courseof Action)
in asymmetricalcrises. Their diversity, thelarge dissemination of
theirmanufacturing process andof their implementationthrough modern
media andthe Internet, their relatively
easy setting-up andtriggering, their destructivepower and their
impactwithin human andinformation environmentsare such that they
are trulya threat from now on.
Therefore, we have to set upthe most comprehensive listas
regards implementationtechniques, used materials,packaging to
conceal themand frequency bands used totrigger them. Their
evolutionis steady and is in theaftermath of availablecutting-edge
technologies.Their diversity is limited onlyby the imagination of
theirdevelopers and theavailability of explosives.They easily
fulfillconventional weapons suchas small-caliber weapons,
anti-tank rockets or mortars.
Fighting against IEDsrequires a decisive actionfrom intelligence
services
in order to set up the abovelist, the fielding of newequipment
(jammers,armor...), the adaptationof doctrines of use (MOUT
-Military Operations on
Urbanized Terrain,protection of logistic flows,preventive
posture...) andrelevant training for thehighest number of
people(from SOF - SpecialOperation Forces -committed in theatersto
units deployed onthe homeland territorywithin the framework
ofVigipirate3). Only thecombination of all these
measures is likely to leadto a significant threatdecrease. A
single - tacticalor technical - solutionwould be nonsense as
itwould rapidly be foiled andcircumvented by those whodevelop them
or use them.
Thermobaric explosives
Thermobaric explosives area technological breakdownin the field
of militarywarheads and theirdissemination is worrying.The word
thermobaricwas introduced by Russianengineers, who have a
longexperience and a robustknow-how in this field.Coming from the
Greeklanguage, it associatesthe concepts of warmthand pressure.
Comparedto conventional explosives(burst), the efficiency ora
thermobaric weapon islinked to secondary aerobicreactions that
increase thethermal effect and the blasteffect.
There are several possibletechniques to develop
thermobaric explosives, theoldest and the best known ofwhich is
fuel air explosivewith the famous BLU-82BDaisy Cutter bomb.
What is really new isthe reduction in size oflaunchers and their
diversitythat perfectly fit guerrillawarfare: in addition tobombs
dropped from aircraft,
we now have rockets of thePG-7 or RPO-A type, mortarshells and
even grenades.According to the sizeand the architecture ofthe
military head andof the kind of thermobaricexplosive, the
ammunitionwill be more dedicated toopen space targets or setwithin
confined space(vehicles, buildings, bunkersor tunnels). In this
last case,
the ammunition will either befired through an aperture,
orintegrated into an armored-piercing device to furtherexplode
inside. Then,conventional protectionsare useless towards the
blasteffect.
New calibers
The lethality of small caliberammunition can be definedby the
equality:Pkill = Phitx Pkill/hit wherePhit is the Probability of
Hit(PH) and Pkill/hit is the enemycombat ineffectivenessprobability
if he is hit, whatis usually termed stoppingpower. The first factor
iscritical and it mainly relieson the weapon-shooter pair.The
second factor mainlyrelies on the ammunitionand on the Point of
Impact(PI) (impact locationand presence of protectionor not).The
latest lessons learntfrom US soldiers committedin Iraq show a lack
of endefficiency for the 5.56 x 45ammunition. However,the
Probability of Hit (PH) Phithas increased as most
shootings are MOUTshootings at distancesranging from 20 to
30meters; and the useof sighting aid devices of
the red point type has spreadto a large extent.On the reverse,
the 5.56 x 45standard has a lack ofstopping power. Indeed,
thisprojectile is too light and its
residual energy is notsufficient enough toneutralize at the
first hit.Now the choice of this caliberin the 60s mainly relied
ontwo criteria: a rapid projectilewith important
after-impactsecondary effects andincreasing twofold theinfantrymans
firepower incomparison with the NATO7.62 or the venerable
30-06.
New standards areappearing, such as the SPC(Special Purpose
Cartridge)6.8 mm shot by the BarrettM468 assault rifle.These new
cartridges bothhave the advantage of the5.56 x 45 (high
MuzzleVelocity, flat trajectory,small maximum ordinate)but also the
same trajectorystability as for the 7.62 x 51
(heavy projectile with highenergy on impact) whilepiercing most
ofinfantrymans protections,either with additional armorplates or
without them.
MANPADS
Shoulder Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems(MANPADS) should also
belinked to new threats owingto the technological changesthey take
advantage of, butalso owing to their smallsize, which eases
theirscattering and theirtransportation. No helicopteris sheltered
from them, aswell during overseasoperations as on thehomeland
territory. Spottingthem is illusory as their
deployment meets noconventional organization.The diversity of
thesesystems (in Afghanistan only,the presence of SA-7B, SA-
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OTAN
14, HN-5, Blowpipe andStingeris established),whose homing heads
havedifferent characteristics andwhose IRCCM (InfraredCounter
Counter-Measures)
capabilities keep improving,makes protection measurestrickier
and trickier. For thetime being, the threat is stillto be kept in
perspective asMANPADShave so far beenserved by poorly
trainedpersonnel.
The proliferationof Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMDs)
At last, armed forces arelikely to close with enemiespossessing
chemical orbiological, even nuclearweapons tomorrow. It hasnow been
established thatAl Qaeda endeavored todevelop a quite
organizedprogram of biologicalweapons in Afghanistan
and tested chemical agents.We are now attending aprivatization
of proliferation,whose nature andthe scope of transferare not
completely grasped,like Dr. A.Q. Khan networks;most of his
customers arenot known.
In overseas theaters, armedforces rear bases, such asthe Green
Zone in Baghdad,with heavy concentrations oftroops, would be as
manypossible targets for the
insurgents that would havegot this kind of weapons.Deployed
armies at the heartof hostile populations wouldthen be deprived of
a safehaven for reconstitution andof a unique home base tolaunch
and conductoperations.
1 To improve our understanding of
these concepts, see the excellentbook by Jacques
Baud:asymmetrical war or the defeatof the winner, ditions du
Rocher.
2 DRM - Direction durenseignement militaire.
3 Translators note: governmentwatch and security programtowards
terrorist threats.
The above mentioned threats are not exhaustive.They have been
chosen because of their relativelyold features in technical terms
(IEDs, light infantryweapons, MANPADS...) and their innovative
aspect
as for their impact on the human and informationenvironments.
This way, they highlight the difficultyfor Western armed forces to
do a balancing actbetween a compulsory modernization to keep upwith
their technological and doctrinal advance infront of emerging
powers that are likely to hit theirvital interests one day and to
clash with them insymmetrical warfare, and the requirement to
tacklenew environments featuring asymmetrical conflicts.Eventually,
these threats take place within whatis usually called military
intelligence, whichis at the heart of military-oriented
intelligence.Other threats, more difficult to grasp - because
they are less direct but as heavy - are the provinceof
environment intelligence, which has no limits,and for which the
human and technical capabilitiesof intelligence services appear to
be currentlyinsufficient.
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What threat?
The main interferences that
a land force has to face are
terrorism, espionage,sabotage, subversion andorganized crime
(TESSOC2).
Terrorism consists inillegally using orthreatening to use force
orviolence in order toconstrain or intimidategovernments
andsocieties in order to reachpolitical, ethnical,religious or
ideologicalobjectives. It is aimed atstriking the minds,
atsubjecting them and atimposing a minority willthanks to the
horror itintentionally provokes.
Espionage is the secretmethod used by a foreign
power or other groups ofinterests in order tosecure information
towhich they do not haveaccess.
Sabotage consists in
the destruction orthe neutralization of criticalmaterials for
the friendlyforces operations aimingat jeopardizing
theirmaneuver.
Subversion is defined asan action conceived atweakening the
military,economical or politicalstrength of a nation byundermining
its citizensmorale, fidelity orreliability. On operations,the aim
is to demoralizethe force thanks tooperations conceived
atneutralizing or weakeningthe force combateffectiveness. A
subversiveattack is difficult to detectand to counter.
Organized crime may be
described as an action oforganizations of a criminalnature
aiming at illegallyattaining some kind ofpower thanks to
influence
or money, and by
disregarding thedemocratic laws ofthe countries in whichthey
operate. Onoperations, the varioustraffickings (drugs,prostitution,
counterfeit orsmuggled materials orproducts, weapons)directly
appeal to themembers of the force andcan weaken its potentialand
even jeopardize itscredibility.
The threat mainly consistsin the action of the enemyintelligence
services orthe special forces ofthe opponents or fightingparties,
of organizations,terrorist groups orindividuals, subversivegroups
or individualsor criminal organizations
or groups.
Up till the collapse ofthe former USSR, this threatwas mainly
represented
by the action of the USSR
services, as well as thatof its official allies
(Easterncountries for example) orobjective ones; either theywere
being financed by it,or they were simple fellowtravelers even
objectiveallied groups or individuals(various Middle-Eastterrorist
organizations,some pacifist or anti-nuclear organizations); butnow
this threat has becomewidely diversified.
The decaying of the formerUSSR and the developmentof the serious
criminality ithas generated in this areaon the one hand,
thedevelopment of Islamicfundamentalism and offanatic terrorist
groups thatclaim to draw their
inspiration from it on theother hand, have totallydiversified
this threat andmade it difficult tounderstand and master.
The Threat Continuity -From National Territory to
Theaters of Operations
On overseas operations, land forces are subject to threats from
organizations or individuals trying to
undermine them by other means than military confrontation. These
threats are qualified as interferences.
These interferences or attempts of the like, already existing in
normal periods, are reinforced on operations,
be it on the given theater, or even outside the theater. They
can even carry on through hostile actions on
the national territory, especially from the part of
organizations or groups that have a multinational settlement
or a multinational capability of action.
This article will propose a statement about these threats then
several reflections about the present situation
evolution to conclude on a few recommendations.
BYMAJORGENERALDENISSERPOLLET, DEFENSEPROTECTION
ANDSECURITYDIRECTOR(DPSD1)
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A permanent threat
over the theaters
This threat is no longer
anecdotic or even secondaryfor our forces on operations.It can
be further detailedby taking the conventionalpresentation of
operationsdrawn from the notion ofcontinuum of operations,developed
by NATO3 andcomplemented by the Frenchvision expressed throughthe
stabilization concept.Unlike classic warfare whichencompasses an
intense
combat phase followedby the signature of peaceand a complete
halt inviolence, the presentoperations can be brokendown into three
phases:intervention, stabilizationand normalization. Withinthis
context, the TESSOC
threat is always there butat various levels, dependingon the
phases of theoperation.
The diagram below showsin a theoretical manner,
the threat characterization:Whatever the phase ofthe operation
may be,the terrorist threat isthe most flagrant and willtake an
important part onfurther operations. However,one can think that the
forcesare in a better position tofight against it duringthe
intervention phase inthe coercion actions, as
the rules of engagementsat the moment and the forceposture allow
a betterdefensive capability.
On the other hand, the threatis greater duringthe stabilization
phase, asdramatically shown today inIraq: the force has been
compelled to deploy andintermingle at least partiallywith local
populations,the rules of engagement arelighter, the acceptance
ofthe force by the local playersis far from being complete
and armed groups remain.
However, other threatsshould not be neglectedespecially
espionage that issystematically used by localintelligence services
thanksto the recourse to nativecitizens of the countryemployed by
the force.This threat is the base of allinterferences, as none
ofthem can be carried outagainst a force withoutthe collection of
information.An action of terrorism orsabotage is, in fact,
alwayspreceded by the collection ofthe information necessary
fortargeting and for selectingthe course of action,
as the terrorist action is,in fact, a precisely targetedaction
aimed at actingagainst our vulnerabilities,which are more of
apsychological nature than
of a real military one.
Similarly, a subversive actioncan only prove efficient ifthe
opponent knowsthe morale status ofthe members of the forceand their
weaknesses.It will therefore translateinto collection actionsof the
opponent on ourorganization, ourmotivations, the
understanding of the truemotivations of the force. Itwill also
try to identify howthe force commanders ortheir opinion leaders
couldbe discredited, as well as todetect the force members itcould
convert/subvert anduse as a relay.
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INTERVENTION STABILIZATION NORMALIZATION
Time ->
Threat
Terrorism
Sabotage
Espionage
Subversion
The threat continuum
Terrorism
Espionage
SubversionSabotage
Organised Crime
Terrorisme
EspionageSubversion
Organised
Crime
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Criminal organizations canonly develop their
traffickingactivities within a force ifthey know how it works.They
will also look forthe weak links to corrupt
them and use them for theirbenefit.
We must also notice thatthe various players do notexclusively
act within theirpreferred TESSOC domain:without probably using
thisvocabulary, they haveunderstood and used beforethe armies the
principlesof versatility, info-valueand even synergy of
effects!
In this way some terroristorganizations find theirfunds thanks
to criminalpractices (drug dealing,bank robberies,...);
somecriminal organizations donot hesitate to carry outterrorist
acts to weakenstates (for example:cartels in Columbia).
In the past, intelligenceservices used terroristmovements to
countertheir opponents(i.e. the attack againstthe pope attributed
toSoviet intelligence services).In Iraq, it is difficult to makethe
difference betweenthe criminal and the terroristpart in
hostage-takings.
An important difficultythat a force is confrontedwith is that
services,organizations andindividuals using TESSOCbenefit from an
activesupport or, at least, from
the neutrality of all or part
of the local population, be itin a national operation as inthe
Ivory Coast or amultinational one as in
Afghanistan. They moveabout within theirenvironment and are
allthe more so difficult todetect and to neutralize.
A threat withoutgeographical borders
Another characteristic ofmodern interferences lies inthe fact
that the time-space
framework of the operationdoes not limit them.The development
ofcommunication, physical ortelecommunication assets,the
significant influence roleplayed by the media, haveblown up the
geographicaland state frameworks.Although this is probably notthe
case for the action of ourforces limited by rules of lawand
treaties, this is certainly
the case for the studiedthreat that frees itself fromthese
limits without anydifficulty.
The activities linked to
interferences can thus be
launched outside the area
of operation, and evenbefore it starts. Thesepreceding
interferences canparticipate to opponents
deterrence, and contributeto its own intelligence
beforelarge-scale actions withinthe political-military playthat
precedes and goesalong with the militarycommitment. Nowadays, itis
not conceivable to imaginemilitary operations thatwould not
haveconsequences overthe national territory oranywhere in the world
whereFrance has some interests.The October 6 2002 attackagainst the
French tankerLimburg in the Yemenitewaters and that of May 82004
against the personnelof the Navy ShipbuildingDirection at Karachi
perfectlyillustrate this. France hasbeen targeted because
itparticipates actively tooperations in Afghanistan.
Although the terrorist threatis the most flagrant ontheaters of
operations, otherthreats should indeed not beneglected.
In this way, during the aircampaign against Serbia in1999, a
French officer, postedwith NATO, gave targetinginformation to the
Serbians.Some defense personnel
are approached by foreignintelligence services and asalways in
this kind of affair,for one discovered, howmany remain secret?
The most insidious threat
remains subversion. It is alsothe most difficult one to
fightagainst, insofar as it rarelytranslates into actions likelyto
be legally qualified ascrimes or offences. Over
the national territory, it istargeted against the publicopinion.
In our hyper-mediasocieties, the smallest pieceof news benefits
from aphenomenal resonancechamber amplified byInternet. The
broadcastof the Abu Ghraib jail imagesillustrates this point
verywell. Subversiveorganizations or individuals
benefit, in their fight, fromthe help of influence agentsactive
or not, the first rankof them being televisionchannels. In
Vietnam,the American public opinionmainly switched against wardue
to reports that showedin quasi real time therealities of the
conflict.This type of information,appropriately manipulatedby
disinformationtechnicians, will have effectsentailing some
consequenceson the theaters.
In order to perpetrate theiracts far from their bases,the
organizations andservices must be able tobenefit from some
supportin the countries in which
they operate. On ofthe characteristics of our
Western democraticsocieties, including France,is the extreme
andespecially ethnical diversityof their population, due to
the presence of more orless important communitiescoming from
countries ofthe area of operation;the corollary of this is a
widereligious or ideological
diversity. It is within thesecommunities that activistsare
recruited and thatsleeping or supportnetworks are
developingthemselves.
Countering the threat
As the African wise mansays the foreigner only
sees what he knows.Knowing the threat isthe first step of
counter-interference. The other twosteps are its detectionand its
neutralization.
Detecting the threat consistsin collecting the
securityintelligence and in gatheringthe facts and evidences,
inexploiting them in order to
give the force commanderan assessment of the threat.
Neutralizing the threat
consists for the commander,in a first step, in takingmeasures
enabling theachievement of a state ofsecurity.This means reaching
asatisfactory level ofprotection of information,materials and
installationsthat are sensitive toterrorism, espionageand sabotage,
and alsothe protection of personnelagainst subversionand organized
crime.
Countering interferences onoperations is one of themissions of
the DefenseProtection and SecurityAgency. However, the action
that has to be carried out isnot only limited to that
ofspecialists, to those whocould be considered as theprofessionals
of suspicion.
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SIRPA
TERRE
Organizationally speaking,the coordination of
counter-interference actions withina projected multinationalunit is
deemed to be carriedout by the G2X structure,
taking advantage of theconcept developed in theAJP 2.14; it is a
doctrine thathas been approved byFrance but that should haveto be
translated into facts,by identifying the structuresand by drafting
theappropriate procedures.
Our organizations wouldthen be in sync with thoseof our Allies
with whom weare bound to be mostfrequently committed.The DPSD has
trained
personnel that are preparedto staff the correspondingcells of
this G2X.
When specific cases areidentified pertaining tonational
citizens, themultinational chain handsthem over to the national
chain, which then takes theappropriate measures. Onthe theater,
this chain isrepresented by the DefenseProtection and
Securitydetachment deployed
together with the force. Itbrings its assistance tothe various
levels ofnational elements commandfor exercising
theirresponsibilities as far assecurity is concerned andfirstly to
the ForceCommander in case of a
national operation or tothe French Senior Officerin case of a
multinationaloperation.
1 DPSD - Directeur de la protectionet de la scurit de la
dfense.
2 In French: TESSCO - Terrorisme,lespionnage, le sabotage,
lasubversion et le crime organis.
3 AJP 3.2, Chap. 1.64 AJP: Allied Joint Publication.
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However, the behavior of each of us must be the first line of
defense facing the opponents threat : compliance tosecurity rules,
no angelism even vis--vis native citizens of an angelic faade. One
should not hesitate to raise thequestion of the opponents intention
and of its likely courses of action, etc. If intelligence partly
concerns each ofus with reference to the culture everybody should
have and to the contribution of all the personnel involvedin the
collection of information, counter-interference cannot solely rely
upon the competence of a limited numberof specialists.
It must be part of a culture of discretion, of security and
vigilance.
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It thus appearedindispensable to remedy
these problems if we
wanted our army to be
ready to be confronted
to the new conditions
of engagement. Alliesoperations in Iraq or ourown involvement in
theIvory Coast were toreinforce that requirement.It has thus been
proposedto the Army Chief of Staff toinitiate comprehensivestudies
about differentpossible options, and thefirst objective was to
definethe stabilization operations
concept and then a doctrine
related to those operations.
An action has then beeninitiated in common withCFAT2 to redefine
the LandForces synthetic scenario
that would supportexercises from level 1 to 3.
This action, which is aboutto be finished, shouldprovide the
force with a
significant training supportmeans for getting ready tothe
stabilization phases ofoperations.
And last, in June 2004,CDEF initiated a study onthe upgrading of
the Land
Forces exercise and training
synthetic enemy. An enemythat should serve as areference for
building upthe OPFOR to be used duringthe exercises implementingthe
new generic scenariowhich would guaranteethe coherence of the
entireset of training tools selectedby the Army.
That endeavor had beeninitiated in a very favorable
period:
- NATO had no generic
enemy (AJP 2.4 - GenericOPFOR was still a projectat the
time);
- CDEF was believing that
this was a European
common requirement,
beyond our own borders;
- DRM3 s willingness to getinvolved in drafting AJPsand in
particular to startworking on a newsynthetic OPFOR.
Moreover an additionalspecific requirement existedand that was a
concern forFAT4 and CDEF, the finetuning of SCIPIO, the
newsimulation system to beused for CAX within the FAT.This program
has beendeveloped by France underCDEF/DSROs5 authority.By the end
of 2006, itshould replace BBS, the USprovided tool. SCIPIO is
much more sophisticatedthan BBS, it usesautomated elements
toportray basic units at lowerlevel than company. This
constitutes a definite plusfor friendly representationsince it
allows a significanteconomy of personnel(LOCON). It was
thusnecessary to define a
precise OPFOR doctrine
that could be implemented
within SCIPIO for
portraying OPFOR
automated basic units.
This led to initiating thestudy whose result is nowwell known
within most ofFAT units and trainingcenters. This is what
thisarticle will develop beforedrawing some lessons forthe
future.
The product
It has been developedkeeping in mind a key
word, realism, that couldactually be split into threemain
ideas:
The Land Forces
Synthetic OPFORTaking New Threats into Account
The requirements
T
he threat that western forces had to be prepared to confront has
evolved a lot since
the vanishing of the Warsaw Pact. However, in spite of the fact
that real world engagements,potential threats and even the
strategic thinking had all changed, the synthetic training and
exercise OPFOR had only drifted very slightly from the good old
Red-Army type one . This issue
appeared particularly vividly during the OPERA 3T exercise, in
November 2003 which portrayed
a Fulda Gap type of threat without any asymmetrical dimension
whatsoever.
BYCOLONELERICROUSSEL, CDEF/DEO1
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- The taking into accountof the diversity of ourforces
frameworks ofengagement,
- The integration ofconventional forces which
could still constitute apotential threat,- Integration of
asymmetric
threat (guerilla andterrorist organizations).
The solution selected is atoolbox concept. Thereis no single
enemysdescription but a varietyof potential OPFOR which
would allow FAT/FLT6
exercises directors andchiefs of G3/S3 exercisesin schools or
battalions tomake their selection, thatthey would organize and
integrate in exercises tobetter fit their objectives.No country
books weredeveloped, it would havebeen an error: when wewant a
product evolutionaryand adaptable to variousspecific requirements,
thedocumentation should notbe fully drafted and fixed.The CDEF
commanding
general has alreadyvalidated and publishedBook I which includes
12
scenarios - as a matter offact, it is rather 12 scenariosnuclei
- that cover all
potential types offrameworks into whichthe Army could be
engagedin the short term to respondto the current
operationalcontract. They have beendeveloped jointly with DRMbut
they are not a carboncopy of the real worldalthough any
knowledgeablereader will be able to
recognize actual or potentialcrisis. The number ofscenarios
selected
represents a sufficient
diversity of frameworks of
engagement for the limited
number of exercises ortraining sessions that canbe organized.
Book I hasbeen published in Englishand offered to our
Europeanpartner through the FINABELforum.
Of course, there stillremains a possibility thatan engagement
against
conventional forces occur.Three types of forces have
been selected (which webelieve to be enough)according to the
followingcriteria:- GLAISE armed forces
constitute the level 1force. This is the forceof a major
regional power.It has a modernequipment that hasbeen bought onthe
international market
and it is able to conductcoordinated actions,at least, at
division level.
- TOURBE constitutethe second level force.It serves a local
powerbut which has however asignificant role at regionallevel. Its
equipment isoutdated and not highlyperforming. In spite ofthe
personnels highmorale, it is unable toconduct coordinatedactions at
a level higherthan combined armsbattalion task force; butthey
master quite wellthat level.
- HUMUS is the third level.This is the force of a poorcountry.
Very weaklyequipped, it is however
very efficient for whatregards Infantrywarfighting. It is able
toconduct locally dreadfulcommando type of
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actions. It is unable toconduct coordinatedactions at a level
higherthan combined armscompany task force.
These forces reflect realones because the objectivewas to drift
from the Soviet
template and to get closer
to existing or potential
conflict areas, howeverthose have been slightlytransformed in
order tomake them less easy torecognize.
Up to this day, the main
effort was the developmentof GLAISE, which isintended to be used
asthe main support to buildthe SCIPIOs first OPFORmodelization.
This workwas achieved by the endof 2005, it is now
validated,translated into English,and readable online byeverybody
via the CDEFwebsite on INTRATERRE
(Book II/1). It will bepresented in this magazinein a separate
article.
HUMUS has been
the following force to be
developed: its an Africantype synthetic OPFOR.Its the one thats
the mostdifferent from GLAISE andthat corresponds the mostto our
current requirements.This synthetic OPFORdocument has recently
beendistributed to the forcesand to the Army TrainingCommand
(CoFAT7) forbeing commented beforevalidation.It is to be noted that
it willbe presented differentlyfrom GLAISE. As a matterof fact, on
the opposite toGLAISE which could be
more or less defined withconstants, i.e. a doctrineand an
organization that arevalid at all time and in anyplace, HUMUS
doctrine,
organization and behaviorare supposed to beadaptable to
circumstanceThere is thus moreemphasis put on HUMUSstyle, even
though the
presented doctrine isunderstandably a morebasic one.Two more
specificities areworth to be noted. FirstHUMUS can incorporate
ahighly performing privatemilitary firm, capable byitself to give
hard time tofriendly forces and tobecome a force multiplierfor
HUMUS. And second,courses of action specific
to local environment havebeen developed: offensiveactions in
desertenvironment, actions in rainforest, actions in urbanizedareas
as well as courses ofactions that include supportprovided by
civilian riotersand also crowdmanipulation. Theseinnovations remain
howeverdescribed in a very simple
way and will have to beformalized and refined aslessons learned
arereported after this OPFORhas been used in exercises;AAR from
actual operationswill also be used.
The initiation of TOURBE
study has been delayed,
due, in particular tocommitments taken withinthe FINABEL
framework,a topic that will bedeveloped later.
The main innovation of that
study lies in the
description of asymmetric
threats, which, as this isclearly demonstratedespecially in the
MiddleEast, represent a seriousthreat against which it isvital to
get ready.
A preparatory in-depthstudy analyzing, sincethe 30s, all
revolutionaryand guerilla movements,has been conducted by
the Foundation for StrategicResearch at the CDEFrequest, to find
out whatwere the main trends and todraw some standardizationdata.
It appeared that,
although they seem to beapparently diverse, several
constants can be identified.
It is thus possible to drawout of that study and tothe greatest
benefit of allofficers in charge ofpreparing exercises(without
having to study atChe Guevaras or BenLadens schools) anirregular
forces doctrine,with notions of maneuver,
desired effects, coursesof action, all ingredientsallowing the
exercisespreparing teams to developscenarios and MEL/MIL.The
correspondingtheoretical elements aredescribed at the beginningof
Book III; they can beregarded as being tooschematic and not
completeenough but they however
allow serious studies to beconducted about the
OPFORbehavior.
A guerilla organization
(the theological liberationmovement) and a terroristmovement
(the true faithcombatants) have beencreated out of that study;
those organizations thatare well adapted to thescenario 2
framework ofengagement, can also be
exported towards otherscenarios provided a fewadaptations are
brought by
the preparation team. As amatter of fact, and morethan with a
conventional
force, the description aswell as the shaping of anasymmetric
OPFOR arevery much dependant
on the scenario andthe adaptations have to becarefully made in
order to
keep the OPFOR realistic.This OPFOR is also in the
process of being validated
and available on the
INTRATERRE network.
An archipelagic type ofguerilla, similar tothe pirates of Sunda
Straits,
is currently being defined. Itcould become an interestingjoint
OPFOR but stillrequires a lot of work beforebeing usable. The
documenthas not been distributed.For the moment, the studieson
other asymmetric typesof OPFOR have stoppedwhile waiting for the
resultsof multinationalcooperation (see below).
What should now followthese studies?
Prospects
and developments
First, the Army should takethe time to get acculturatedto these
studies. After arather gradual start, thesestudies are now well
publicized since they havebeen the object of severalpedagogical
presentationsat different levels.A major step has beenthe
presentation of thestudies to the seniorcommanders during
theirperiodic conference in
January 2006. COMFATand CoFAT have both issuedguidances to have
this newsynthetic OPFOR well takeninto account by theirsubordinate
commands.
However this work is notsomething that the Armydiscovers out of
the bluesince the study has notbeen conducted by CDEFalone: it is
the result of alasting and well developed
collaboration: DRMproviding the foundations
(several models of crisisserved as a basis forbuilding up the
scenarios,models of real armedforces, and participation
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of experts in all draftingseminars); CFAT wrote aGLAISE first
draft; the Armybrought an importantparticipation to GLAISE andHUMUS
follow on drafts(April - December 2005).It has to be noted that
manyDirectorates for CombatDevelopments got involvedsignificantly -
which wasvital - in the developmentof that study, this is a
verynoticeable sign that threatevolution is well advancedin our
trainingorganization.
To write is one thing, but
now one has to implement
what has been written.
CDEF DSRO is currentlytranslating organizationand doctrine into
digitizedcode. This will be aprotracted project due to
the vastness of the task:digitization of GLAISEorganization is
alreadyfinished, the doctrine isnow being processed. Thefirst
AURIGE exercise usingGLAISE full capabilitiescould be conducted
earlyin 2007; HUMUS shouldfollow. CEPC8 will of courseinclude
GLAISE in itsexercises as DSRO deliversthe product components.
In addition there will befurther developments tothe study
itself. During
the FINABEL Chiefs ofArmy Staffs meeting,the French Chief of
staffoffered to exploit thatstudy which he offeredto our partners,
aiming
thus at developing aEuropean combinedsynthetic exerciseOPFOR.
This was a verynatural proposal sinceour engagement arealways
moremultinational,the same for ourexercises starting fromlevel 2
on,and in additionthe requirements for
multinationalinteroperability increaseregularly. That offer
hasbeen positively receivedby the other chiefs whodecided to make
thatstudy a priority for theyear 2006, with, as agoal, to make it
anoperational product fortraining (which is aninnovation for
FINABEL).
Corresponding studieshave started, underthe conduct of theFrench
representative.It remainsto be asked if ourpartners vision of
whatis an exercise and themodelizationof the threat will permitthe
development of acommon product.
And last, since our forcesengagement has to beregarded as being
partof a joint effort, the sameshould be done for theexercises
synthetic OPFOR.Indeed these studies haveup to now been mostly
conducted by an Armyworkforce and this for apractical reason,
becauseit was for the Army thatthe requirement wasurgent.
Supplementary
studies have to beenvisaged not only to
depict how OPFOR air and
maritime forces could
threaten a land force but
also to describe a more
global threat against
friendly air and maritime
components. These studiesare to begin shortly andthey should
lead to thedevelopment of a jointOPFOR corresponding
to the NATO expectedproduct. Collaborationon that topic with
othernations under DRMsguidance should be lookedfor.
1 Forces Employment DoctrineCenter /Forces Employmentand Command
StructuresDivision.
2 Land Forces Command.3 Military Intelligence
Directorate which, inter alia,represents France within allNATOs
organizations thatelaborate intelligence related
doctrine.4 Land Forces.5 Forces Employment and
Command Structures Division/Simulation and OperationalResearch
Division.
6 Land Logistic Forces.7 Commandement de la
formation de larme de terre.8 Brigade CP Battle Command
Training Center.
Our forces should soon be provided with an advanced tool
enabling them not onlyto conduct training, including within a joint
environment, but also to think about
their maneuver and doctrine. It could also be used as a support
to studyingthe capabilities that we ought to require in the short
term. Just like any other tool, itwill only produce what we ask it
to produce and its capabilities are still to be
furtherdeveloped.
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GLAISEGLAISE Army comprises two major elements: the regular
armed forces (400,000 pers.) and a Law Defenderscorps (80,000
pers.). Apparently similar to Vermillion, GLAISE is anArmy
corresponding to the one of a regionalpower and that includes
powerful and modern forces well organized and equipped like the
Former Warsaw Pactwas. However, GLAISE forces are very different as
far as structures are concerned; its Armys basic tactical elementis
the battalion. In addition, the brigades are much less numerous
than the Warsaw Pact ones and they have aternary type of
structure.GLAISE Army has three major characteristics. First, it
favors defensive doctrines. Contrary to our former genericenemy,
GLAISE fights on its territory, perfectly knowing how to command
and conduct mobile or static defense,
fighting on in depth prepared positions adapted to the terrain.
They do not hesitate to leave vacuum areas withintheir field
configuration. GLAISEs logistics organization relies on
pre-positioned stockpiles and civilianinfrastructure facilities;
its weak transportation capability does not enable it to conduct
significant operationsoutside its borders. GLAISE frequently makes
use of deception and decoy positions. GLAISE has at its disposal
anamazingly important amount of firepower (field and air defense
artillery)
The major originality of GLAISE Army is then the presence at its
sides of perfectly trained and fanaticizedideological forces.
Constituting the Praetorian guard of the regime, they are in charge
of ensuring the countrysinternal security, and in particular the
defense of the capital city governmental sites as well as the one
of the majorstrategic