Doctors Without Borders and the Famine Crisis in Ethiopia.

1 Medecins Sans Frontieres and the Ethiopian Famine Crisis (1984-1986)

Table of Contents 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 2

2. Birth, Conflict, Expansion ......................................................................................................... 4

3. MSF in Ethiopia ............................................................................................................................ 7

4. After Expulsion: MSF France and MSF Belgium. .......................................................... 19

5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 20

Bibliography.................................................................................................................................... 22


1. Introduction

In the aftermath of the earthquake in Nepal, Médecins Sans Frontiers (MSF)

was the first international non-governmental organization providing medical

humanitarian relief. In one of the first public accounts Dr Brigitte Vasset, Deputy

Medical Director of MSF, informs the public about the deployment of the mission and

how the organization will deliver medical relief. 1 It is part of the wave of the pictures

and news from the earthquake reached every household, became covers and headlines

of almost every major media in the world and mobilized a myriad of institutions,

resources, citizens.

In order to understand the relations and complex network put in motion of the

event of such emergency events one can trace them back to early 19th century, some

historians even dating it even earlier. Humanitarianism ‘’as the way in which notions

of humanity result in organized efforts on behalf of others’’2 is originated in the western

traditions of Christian compassion and the secular variant streaming from the

Declaration of the Rights of Man 3. Humanitarian narratives therefore account for the

history of these efforts of organized compassion which are entagled with histories of

imperialism, colonialism, war and conflict as well as national and local histories.

This essay will investigate the history of a particular humanitarian

organization- the MSF- during a notable humanitarian event; the Ethiopian Famine

Crisis (1984-1986) . During that crisis Dr Vasset, then a medical coordinator on the

Ethiopian field, was informing the British public through a documentary which soon

was broadcasted all around the world and became the beginning of one of the biggest

humanitarian campaigns in recent times.4 MSF itself is an organization-movement with

distinct characteristics in a period which proved to be transitory for the international

political system and the national and local context of the famine.

1 Nepal Earthquake Emergency Response, http://www.msf.org.uk/country-region/nepal-earthquake-emergency-response, Accessed: 2015-05-08 12:15:27 2 Daniel Laqua. “Inside the Humanitarian Cloud: Causes and Motivations to Help Friends and

Strangers.” Journal of Modern European History 12, no. 2 (2014): 175–85. doi:10.17104/1611-

8944_2014_2_175. 3 B. Taithe, Reinventing French Universalism: Humanitarianism and the French Doctors, in: Modern and Contemporary France 12(2004) 2, 156. 4 BBC News Report For Ethiopian Famine 1984. 2011.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GkLPx8mQ-t0&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

http://www.msf.org.uk/country-region/nepal-earthquake-emergency-response


http://dx.doi.org/10.17104/1611-8944_2014_2_175

http://dx.doi.org/10.17104/1611-8944_2014_2_175

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GkLPx8mQ-t0&feature=youtube_gdata_player


1.2 Methodology-Argument-Structure

Global History has lately been used as a historical methodological tool by the

Overseas Institute whose publications on global humanitarian history aim to inform the

present and future practice of humanitarian practice. Defining globalization as “the

increased interconnectedness of different parts of the world due to changes in

technologies of transport and communications, systems of finance and trade,

internationalist political or social ideologies and phenomena such as as the spread

of disease or the incidence of natural hazards “ 5, one can see the merits of adopting

a contemporary point of view in studying humanitarian history as part of this

globalization process . The MSF in particular is an agent at the centre of the interactions

of ‘’political, spatial or cultural boundaries’’6 ,part of a Global Community of emerging

private non-governmental organizations whose study has the potential to provide a

better understanding of the complex web of humanitarian action.7

Furthermore, urged by the fact that reading and studying the history of MSF one

is also stuck by the constant self-reflexivity and self-reflection of the organization over

issues which have troubled practitioners of humanitarian aid since its birth: The motives

of humanitarian action; the questions of circumstantiality or universality of

humanitarian ethical principles ; the paradox of its emancipatory and dominant nature

; questions of whether it advances or undermines moral progress; the issue of fulfilling

not only the sufferers’ needs but also the providers’, and whether the latter sometimes

becomes of greater importance. 8

The main sources of this essay are mainly offered by MSF’ own collection for

the event: newspaper articles, publications, reports, and minutes of MSF assemblies,

interviews and writings of the people running the organization at the time.9 The

secondary resources draws critical viewpoints from scholars criticizing humanitarian

5 ‘’A Global History of Modern Humanitarian Action’’, Humanitarian Policy Group Network, Overseas Development Institute Integrated Programme research Project ( 2011-2015 ). 6 Patrick O’Brien O’Brien, Patrick. ‘Historical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the Restoration of Global History’, Journal of Global History, vol. 1, no. 1 (2006): 3–39. 7 Iriye, Akira. 2002. Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World 8 Michael Barnette, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. Cornell University Press, 2011 9 Laurence Binet, Famine and Forced Relocations in Ethiopia 1984-1986 (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2013).


action in general and in respect with the Ethiopian Famine crisis in particular, and

resources dealing with broader historical developments; Cold War and Ethiopian

political history.

The question raised is how MSF dealt with this humanitarian crisis. It will be

argued that MSF perception of humanitarianism is not a monolithic one. It is both a

reflexive and reflecting one; constantly in a flux about the nature of humanitarianism

revealing tensions and debates intertwined with broader historical developments.

The structure, therefore, to reflect this unique strand of humanitarian action

consists of three parts . The first part of the essay will deal shortly with MSF’s first

period; from its inception until the 1980 during which MSF becomes from a French to

an international humanitarian movement. The second part will deal with MSF

involvement in Ethiopian during which the focus will be placed on conflict within the

movement and the relations with the Ethiopian regime and the gradual isolation of MSF

France from the rest of the humanitarian community. The third part follows divided

MSF in the aftermath of their French part from Ethiopia and the continuing criticism

until the change of Ethiopian regime. In the fourth part, the conclusion will deal with

an overall evaluation of MSF’s history during the Ethiopian Crisis.

2. Birth, Conflict, Expansion

In this first period –from the Biafra War to the establishment of new MSF national

agencies- already one can see how the organization was reflecting on and was reflective

of the state of humanitarianism in the specific phase of the Global Cold War during the

1970s .

The Biafra war emerged at a time of US failure in Vietnam and of continuing

criticism of its intervention by popular protests and social movements mostly associated

with the left. This civil war in Nigeria mostly draws the attention of the most apolitical


and religious part of western civil society. As a civil war, UN had formally no obligation

in intervening in the affairs of a sovereign state and US and Soviet Union had other

priorities. As the war escalated, famine was used as a tool of war in order to put pressure

on the rebels; the theme of manipulation of famine and relief being a returning pattern

in MSF and humanitarian history in general.10

The Red Cross was the dominant provider of humanitarian aid in Nigeria and

its negotiations with the Nigerian government were constant. Among the medical staff

working for the ICRC were French medical students who witnessed the horrors of war.

Their political and ideological background favoured and inclined for giving a political

character to the action needed. ICRC’s neutrality seemed unfair when one side, the

weakest one, suffered the most, and there was nobody to speak out for the victims of

the humanitarian aid. A ‘’speaking out’’ would make the wider international public

aware of the situation with the means to put pressure on the Nigerian government. It

was also a demand compromising the humanitarian principle of neutrality and the

question of its morality. The young and idealistic doctors referred to the ICRC

neutrality during WWII as a negative historic example and a base for not repeating

similar tragedies.11

In the return from the field, the French medical students and journalists

managed to mobilize resources and founded their own medical humanitarian

organization which was about to formalize their understanding of providing

humanitarian aid adding up ‘’témoignage’’(speaking up) as one of their core principle.

Humanitarian ethics since then have acquired the potential for being more politicised

and paved away to open up discussion of humanitarian priorities.

The criticism for prioritizing speaking up would come from within the MSF

community within the context of another major humanitarian crisis. The ‘Boat People’

crisis was the case during which tensions over the priorities of humanitarian action

showcased the uneasy nature of the MSF movement. The crisis was a result of a major

wave of refugees fleeting South Vietnam after the end of the Vietnamese War.

Neighbouring countries were refusing to accommodate more migrants leaving them

suspended on boats. MSF had sent and established a mission on Thailand providing

relief for the refugees but Kushner- their charismatic leader- had also launched a

10 Taithe, Bertrand. 2004. “Reinventing (French) Universalism: Religion, Humanitarianism and the ‘French Doctors.’” Modern & Contemporary France 12 (2): 147–58. 11 Ibid.


campaign ‘’a boat for Vietnam’’ in order to attract media, and subsequently, media

attention . Although he managed to mobilise French public’s consciousness, his

initiative was doubted fundamentally from within the movement in terms of financial

cost and logistical efficiency. It was, for Kushner’s critics, more about the MSF and his

persona than about the recipients and those in need for humanitarian aid; a point raising

broader considerations about the motives and related ways of humanitarianism. 12

In response the then President of the MSF accused his critics as bureaucrats

submitting to the Red Cross managerial mind set threating the spontaneity of the

movement. This tension between media exposure priorities and efficiency on the crisis

field isn’t a new one. It has been there as long as humanitarian aid used media as a

means for raising public awareness and funds. What is new with MSF is that decisions

are taken by the humanitarian workers themselves. Their experience on the field seems

to inform MSF decision in decisively reflexive way: priorities should be given to further

already existing action on the ground. Bernard Kushner, the founding leader of MSF,

did not succeed to exercise his influence in favour of his perception. The majority’s

decision not to support further the ‘’boat’’ idea provoked Kushner’s departure and

founding of a new organization, in 1980, Medicines du Monde.

From the ‘’Boat Crisis’’ onwards, MSF continued on transforming from an

amateurish idealistic movement to a more efficient provider of medical humanitarian

aid. 1980 was the year in which MSF ceased to be an exclusively French organization

with the initiation of new national agencies in Belgium and paving the way for the

emergence of more national agencies. The movement had set about to become more

diverse and global in reach and character not without consequences for its future

cohesion.

12 Davey, E. (2012). Beyond the “ French Doctors ” The evolution and interpretation of humanitarian action in France, (October).


3. MSF in Ethiopia

a. The Beginnings

When in late 1970s MSF conducted their first clandestine surgical

mission in the Eritrea and Tigre provinces of Ethiopia, the political tensions

responsible for need of humanitarian presence were mostly due to a

combination of Cold War dynamics and local disputes between tribes and

between Ethiopia and Somalia. Africa had been the ground for the two

superpowers to exercise their influence in gaining access to resources,

secure strategic positions and celebrate the prominence of their ideas. Both

superpowers had been united on their support against colonialism but

decolonization and the emergence of new African states had shaped a fragile

political environment.13 Ethiopia in particular was one of the states that

suffered the least from colonialism, mostly during the interwar Mussolini’s

Italy aggression and temporary occupation of its coastal part- Eritrea. The

Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie had unsuccessfully tried to modernise its

country. Poor economic planning and efficiency combined with

unanticipated weather conditions had brought a failed harvest causing the

1973-1974 famine resulting in an estimated 200,000 deaths14.

The famine decisively combined to overthrow the already trembling

throne of the Emperor. A period of political instability followed with

different political groups within the revolutionaries fighting for the form and

priorities of the new regime over their relationships with the Cold War

superpowers. Ethiopian geopolitical importance was used as a leverage to

obtain economic and military exchanges from USSR and USA. Under

imperial rule, Ethiopian was under western influence and the Marxist

inspired revolution was seen from Soviets as a primary example of

ideological success and opportunity to substitute US influence and control.

Eventually the most radical part of the Derg- the military committee that

organized the overthrow and had captured control of the ministries- with its

13 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times, pp 250-288, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 14 Ibid.


leader Colonel Mengistu prevailed and sided with the Soviet pole after US

denied to continue military support to the socialist regime. The

establishment of the regime wasn’t without problems, the Eritreans, the

population living on the coastal and most strategically important part of

Ethiopia, demanded independence and a civil war broke out with the new

Mengistu regime.15

Marxist inspired modernization despite a promising start didn’t seem to

work either and in late 1982 famine signs occur in the northern regions. The

leadership denies officially the famine, nevertheless it authorises the

Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (R.C.C.) to open a food

distribution centre. The authorities also deny MSF’s request to conducting

an evaluation mission. Not an unsurprising development given the

organization’s ‘’speaking out’’ principled policy and the regime’s

reluctance to expose its failures. 16

Against this Cold War context, in one of the first public accounts of the

situation the French readers are informed that “more than 10,000 people

have been waiting just outside the village, some for three months, to receive

a month’s allocation of grain - around 21 kilos’’, indirectly criticizing the

agrarian reform which coupled with continuing draught had forced people

out of their villages. The subtle, at this stage, critical remarks, point to the

complaints of the Ethiopian officials about ‘’not enough international aid”

while they claim to be Marxist-Leninist seeking to arm themselves from the

East. 17 It was of the first signs of the MSF’s France ideological non-

apolitical turn.

When RCC requests and manages to allow MSF’s evaluation mission in

February of 1984, the famine had expanded. RCC is the agent with which

MSF can collaborate with the Ethiopian government and the instrument

through which Ethiopia acknowledges indirectly the size of the

humanitarian crisis. On March 30th, RCC appealed to international aid

donors for 450,000 tonnes from which it initially received only 87,000

15 Ibid. 16 Binet:2013:11 17 Bernadette Colson, ‘Ethiopia: Following the Famine’s Path - In a Camp for Famine Victims at the Edge of the Tigre,’ La Croix (France) 16 April 1984 (in French)


tonnes. The next month MSF France opens a mission in Korem with five

volunteers. The organization refrains at that time from ‘’speaking out’’

directly about the conditions met on the ground but it informs the World

Food Council of the high mortality rates in Korem. At this point, ‘’speaking

out’’ doesn’t seem to provoke any remarkable reactions on behalf of either

the Ethiopian regime or on behalf of international institutions or states18.

Despite criticism on the regime’s policies and relative indifference from

the western institutions, MSF had kept on collaboration with the authorities

in order to access and provide assistance wherever needed.19 The situation

on the ground however was worsening. The high rate of starvation, diseases-

due to lack of water and hygiene – spread during the period from May to the

end of the summer. The MSF medical reports show a detailed account of

the deteriorating situation which was a result of peoples’ dislocation and

continuing failing crop due to draught.20

The following period was marked by a series of developments which

would endanger MSF presence and surface tensions inside the movement.

b. Conflict and Exodus.

This crisis within MSF and the Ethiopian regime emerges during a simultaneous shift

in the interest of global public opinion and the status of relative calmness of Cold War

tensions. The latter was a result of developments within the Soviet Union which would

result in ‘’perestroika’’. Soviet foreign policy became milder and more conciliatory

with the ‘’ideological’’ opponents of the West21 . Historical contingency played its own

part with no major crisis emerging in the Middle East which would normally

overshadow any other crisis. Subsequently when the BBC documentary22 showed the

apocalyptic images of Ethiopian starving children triggered a series of developments

18 Binet,:2013: 12 19 Moral Report, 1983-1984, MSF France 1984 General Assembly, May 1984 (in French). 20 Medical Report of MSF Team in Korem, from 14 May 1984 to 14 June 1984 (in English) / Medical Report of MSF Team in Korem, from 7 June 1984 to 7 July 84 (in English) / Medical Report of MSF Team in Korem, from 1 July to 30 July 1984 (in English). 21 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev revolution and the end of the Cold War in The Cambridge history of the Cold War / edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad. 22 BBC News Report For Ethiopian Famine 1984. 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GkLPx8mQ-t0&feature=youtube_gdata_player.


with an impact on the volume of the humanitarian aid, and questions started to be raised

about its management among the humanitarian community and especially within MSF

while the pressure from the media put pressure on the Ethiopian regime. Increased

media attention changed the way both international community and the Ethiopian

regime treated the famine reasserting the importance of media practice with

humanitarianism.

At the centre of the BBC reporting was Brigitte Vasset’s- then MSF France

Medical Coordinator in Korem, ‘’témoignage’’: “If nothing happens, I don’t know what

we are doing here.[…] I am not a politician. I don’t care about what’s going on. I am

just a witness in Korem, in Wolli, and Wolli is not the only place in Ethiopia where this

is happening’’.23 It was statement in accordance with the ethics of apolitical

humanitarianism but in stark contrast with MSF France General Assembly adoption of

a resolution creating “a research centre on development, human rights, and minority

rights issues.” The initiation of the think tank ‘’Liberté Sans Frontières’’ (LSF) became

a point of infringement for a heated debate within the MSF Community eventually

resulting in another split of the MSF movement.24

Development, Human Rights and minority rights issues set as priorities in the

establishment of the think tank on the agenda of MSF put in the context of the Ethiopian

Crisis could be perceived as political ones and indeed were. They were also in conflict

of MSF’s principles and emergency character. Development as term has been identified

with western efforts of modernising; already failed in Ethiopia, human rights were also

a term highly politicised as means to criticize communist regimes and minority rights

were bound to create tensions in a country in civil war. Furthermore, the proclaimed

challenge to doubt theories of ‘’third-worldism’’- historically connected with the

emergence of the third world, Bandung’s institutionalized effort to promote world

peace by advocating neutralism in the Cold War25, the dominant conflict of the time

would give a specific biased and politically driven character to MSF.

There was some justification for such an ideological turn. When the Ethiopian

famine became a media sensation, the funds channelled to the Ethiopian regime were

23 Ibid. 24 General Assembly Newsflash, MSF France, May 1984 (in French) 25 Artaraz, K. (2005). Third-worldism. In R. Carlisle (Ed.), Encyclopedia of politics: The left and the right: Volume 1: The left and volume 2: The right. (pp. 451-452). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. doi: http://dx.doi.org.ez.statsbiblioteket.dk:2048/10.4135/9781412952408.n227


used to serve the government’s plans to intensify the collectivization schemes and

relocate populations which further intensified the famine crisis. Third Worldism as an

ideology inspired by Marxist concepts of development was giving an ideological

justification to Mengistu’s authoritarian regime and LSF was founded to counter stand

as an institution which produced ideas, discussions and ultimately an anti-totalitarian

approach. According to MSF’s France Director of that period, Rony Brauman,

‘’humanitarianism can serve a murderous political project’’ and warned that while

neutrality can serve as being apolitical, it can also breed silence that serves the

powerful. For Brauman and the French MSF the Ethiopian regime was seen as Stalinist

approach to modernization.

MSF Belgium expressed its doubts about the usefulness and the character of

LSF. Although initially the verbal statements didn’t signal any major conflict, the

debate was about to climax when the think tank would materialize in the months to

come and associated with the increased criticism to the regime by MSF France.26

The press conference in Paris 10 January 1985 stating the purpose and role of

LSF would the point of departure of the internal conflict. Few days later a colloquium

could define LSF objectives. ‘’Ideological assumptions today obscure the debate over

human rights and development. When new countries emerged 30 years ago, it was quite

reasonable for them to explore a range of paths to progress. But when it came time to

draw lessons based on experience, these assumptions led too many observers to

conclusions that contradicted reality’’27. The new proclaimed reality, however, would

be challenged-amongst others- by humanitarian workers from within MSF.

MSF Belgium expressed its concerns about the new doctrine bringing back the

old debate about how ‘’political’’ humanitarianism is or ought to be. ‘’ The

(Belgian)board is not debating the soundness of the ideas but in keeping with its role,

seeks to ensure strict observance of one of Médecins Sans Frontières’ founding

principles: to remain non-political.28 For the critics of this ‘’political turn’’ who saw

the undertaking as as just a Parisian critique of tiers-mondisme, provoked by a few

26 Michael Barnet, Empire of Humanity, pp 155-158 27 ‘Liberté Sans Frontières - Information on Human Rights and Development,’ Introductory Materials, January 1985 28 Minutes of the 20 January 1985 Meeting of the MSF Belgium Board of Directors


MSF officials and one he hopes will quickly disappear. 29 The schism however was

only bound to enlarge.

It was schism that revealed another pattern of conflict between ‘’apolitical’’,

‘’technical’’ humanitarianism and one politically motivated. In a reversed fashion the

leaders of MSF France who were once accused of bureaucratism by Bernard Kushner

in the aftermath of the Biafra crisis, now they were criticized by their Belgian

counterparts as politically motivated and originated while the newly founded MSF

Belgium was consisting of people coming directly civil society, apolitical and

technically focused. 30 The scepticism was also expressed from humanitarian workers

working outside Ethiopia, in Chad, who saw LSF foundation as violation of the MSF

Charter.31

The conflict escalated from verbal to legal action and one can say that from that

point on there were two MSF strategies derived from different humanitarian

perspectives. The overwhelming majority of MSF Belgium Assembly- summoned on

27 and 28 April 1985- voted in favour of breaking up with MSF France. Rony Brauman

in effect criticized the MSF Belgium for double standards referring to their

irresponsible stance in previous humanitarian crisis when they had chosen to align

politically in Central American conflicts revealing that there was an ideological gap

much earlier than LSF foundation and he defended the choice to bring human rights as

indispensable part of MSF values32. Almost a month later MSF France requested that

‘’ MSF Belgium change its name; interim relief measures will be sought in case of

refusal’’.33

The conflict had taken an ideological character between ‘’extremists of the New

Right’’ as Belgian MSF accused their French colleagues and ‘’tier mondists’’ hiding

behind the neutrality principle. Despite the ruling of the court denied MSF France

demands to strip MSF Belgium the right to use the MSF name, the conflict wasn’t

resolved. This conflict however wasn’t only a matter of the MSF. The implications of

29 Pierre Lefèvre, ‘Questions Asked About Médecins Sans Frontières,’ Le Soir, (Belgium), 25 January 1985 (in French ) 30 Philippe Laurent, MSF Belgium Executive Director (in Frech) in Famine and Forced Relocations page 29 31 “Open Letter to the Management and Membership of MSF,” from the members of MSF Belgium, France, and Holland in Chad, 10 February 1985 (in French) 32 ‘Relationships Between MSF France and MSF Belgium,’ Minutes of the 3 May 1985 Meeting of the MSF France Board of Directors regarding the MSF Belgium General Assembly (in 33 ‘Summary of the 31 May 1995 Meeting of the MSF France Board of Directors‘ (in


the different perception of humanitarianism was expressed in a constant struggle

primarily between MSF France and the Ethiopian regime as much as with a substantial

part of the international community34. In fact as Alex de Waal has argued the

international community namely the UN were clearly supporting Mengistu’s regime

and coordinating the humanitarian funds in accordance with the relocation

programmes.35

The tensions already in place started levelling up during the September of 1984

and while the famine was in full development had spent ‘’between $150 and $200

million on celebrating his Marxist government’s tenth anniversary[…]following the

$226 Ethiopian Airlines has just spent purchasing two new Boeing passenger jets ‘’36.

This contradiction had well pushed for MSF France decision to intensify speaking out

against the Ethiopian government’s government relocation policies but not against the

‘’business as usual’’ approach of western institutions.

The regime, however, after the celebrations came to an end, acknowledged

officially the famine and allowed access to the famine stricken areas of northern rural

Ethiopia. It was a move that unleashed a series of events with mixed results whose

legacy is still discussed and debated. It gave the opportunity for MSF to provide the

medical speaking up of the BBC documentary which subsequently made the Ethiopian

event the major humanitarian and media event. As the famine became a media product,

mobilized western donors and resources which flooded into Ethiopia.

For MSF, it was the beginning of intensifying their speaking up. As the funds

were channelled mostly through the Ethiopian authorities, their use as a means of

suppressing the rebels, the criticism now was double fold; both on the regime’s

‘’socialist’’ policies and on the misuse of funds meant for humanitarian relief. The

Ethiopian government, in response, soon after acknowledgement of the famine and

the media storm which followed initiated on 26 October, a National Committee for

Natural Disasters and Rehabilitation composed of individuals closed affiliated with the

party replacing RRC. It was a negative development for MSF since RRC was the most

collaborative part of the regime. Speaking up and media attention had the unforeseen

34 Famine and Forced Relocations in Ethiopia page 46 35 Alex de Waal, ‘’Famine Crimes.Politics and and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa’’, Chapter 6: Northern Ethiopia. Revolution, War-famine and two models of Relief’’, pages 106-132 36 ‘Ethiopia’s $150 Million Celebration…While Millions Starve,’ News Weekly (USA), 3 October 1984


reaction of the authoritarian regime to have a closer control and monitoring of

humanitarian aid. 37

Indeed humanitarian work wasn’t facilitated as anticipated by the increasing

international attention and fundraising. On the contrary, MSF’s work was disrupted by

the governments and UN supported relocation programme. As one of the reports

describe: ‘. One morning at the end of the month, the MSF team found the camp half

empty. The army had come in the very early hours of the morning to find ‘volunteers’

for resettlement.’’38 MSF reports and open criticism of the regime as a result intensified

throughout the next year along with widespread sceptism about the merits of

humanitarian aid in the international press.

The criticism didn’t come without a response from the authorities which were

trying to balance between manipulating the international aid for war purposes and the

pressure which came with it from abroad. Although the pressure wasn’t

straightforwardly questioning the regime’s legitimacy, it provoked counteraction when

humanitarian organizations wouldn’t comply with the civil war realities or when

humanitarian aid was destined for the rebels. MSF France was the most outspoken of

the humanitarian NGOs using its workers testimonies for the disastrous effects of the

forced relocations of rural populations and the misuse of the aid by the Ethiopian

Government.39 The latter was trying to entertain the accusation by criticizing some of

the aid organizations for their mismanagement of the funds and inviting diplomats and

officials to the suffering regions.

MSF France however acknowledging that international pressure and

témoignage had mixed results, decided to act accordingly: ‘’ MSF can respond in a

variety of ways: Criticize the conduct of the resettlement publicly in the media, which

would involve withdrawing the teams; given that it’s more important to continue to aid

these populations, we could take a more pragmatic approach’’40. A combination of the

urgent need to act and reflecting on their strategy MSF’s decision doesn’t seem to have

a result in the coming months.

37 François Jean, ‘Making Good Use of the Famine’ Report, Médecins Sans Frontières, October 1986 (in French) 38 Dr Claude Malhuret, ‘Mass Deportations in Ethiopia,’ Report, MSF Confidential, December 1985, p.15 (in English) 39 “‘Government Accuses International Organizations of “Embezzling” Aid Meant for Famine Victims,’ Le Monde/AFP/Reuters, 12 February 1985 (in French). 40 Summary of the 24 March 1985 Meeting of the MSF France Board of Directors, (in French)


When MSF speaks out about the cholera epidemic ‘’killing 20 persons a day’’,

the use of the word ‘’cholera’’ provokes the reaction of the Ethiopian government. For

once more every reference that directly or indirectly shows the inability of the regime

to deal with the famine is perceived as an effort to scrutinize Ethiopian efficiency and

planning. The MSF’s speaking up almost caused its expulsion from Ethiopia justifying

concerns by other aid organizations’ choice to remain silent41.

Shortly after, the violent evacuation of 50000 people from Ibnet camp from the

local military authorities became another major reason for infringement between MSF

France and the Ethiopian government. The reports from the forced relocation caused

for another time public international outrage especially in US. The Ethiopian

government originally denied the reports, downplayed the ‘’forcibility’’ of the

relocations and eventually admitting their limited violent character due to the

unfortunate zeal of local officers. The events in Ibnet almost caused, once more, the

MSF France operational withdrawal since according to its President “We were just

about ready to pull out at the request of our teams on site.”42

The following months until mid-June 1985 the situation deteriorated for both

humanitarians and the affected populations. MSF France and MSF Belgium-at the

height of the conflict within the movement- kept on collaborating with the authorities,

conducted evaluation mission and opened new medical and food centers. Despite

témoignage and a public debate about the efficiency of delivering aid, appeals and

fundraising events kept the attention of global public opinion. In mid-June however

humanitarian workers noticed a gradual suspending of forced relocations which by July

had been officially halted for the first time since the famine occurred. 43

The resume of the forced transfers in early October coincides with an MSF

request to open a new therapeutic feeding center in Kelala deemed necessary for

children’s malnutrition.44 It was also a time during which the Cultural Survivor report

conducted by a team of renowned anthropologists headed by Jayson Clay and based on

the testimonial evidence of dislocated people themselves rather than humanitarian

workers’, reinstated the consequences of the forced relocation policies. Jayson Clay

41 Blaine Harden, ‘Ethiopians are Said to be Dying of Cholera - Government Disputes Aid Official’s Report of Camps’ Epidemic,’ The Washington Post, (USA), Addis Ababa 20 April 1985 42 Pierre Haski, ‘Helping the Victims and Keeping Quiet,’ Libération (France), 3 May 1985 (in French) 43 Jonathan Steele, ‘Ethiopia Calls Halt to Resettlements,’ The Guardian (UK), 20th June 1985 44 Telex from Dr Bertrand Desmoulins to Comrade Shymalis, Wollo Administrator, 7 October 1985 (in English)


was invited to testify before US House of the Representatives and the congress and the

results of the report had already been earlier to MSF France.45

The authorities denied the opening of the new therapeutic center causing MSF

France reaction . ‘’ The row over Korem will add to the problems of Médecins Sans

Frontières, which threatened to withdraw from Ethiopia last week if restrictions were

not lifted. The agency, which has 400 local staff at four feeding centers in Wollo,

complained last week that the government had denied permission for intensive feeding

for 2,000 children at the Kelala feeding camp in the province.46’’ RCC replied that the

opening would slow the dislocated people’s return to their homes and villages and

accused MSF France for disinformation.

The ‘’threat to withdraw’’ came as shock for most of the MSF community. Rony

Brauman’s rather reflexive, ‘’spontaneous’’ and angry attestation caused a non-

anticipated impact on the news and a confusion even to the leadership and his close

partner’s : ‘’ I was looking straight at Malhuret [MSF’s Executive Director] and

Dominique Rigaut [Communications Director] as I related all this. They had these

shocked expressions on their faces. They couldn’t image what had gotten into me and

were absolutely furious that I would let myself go off like that.47’’ The statement,

however no discussion seem to have been taken place, did express the general sentiment

among the French humanitarians.

It was the beginning of the end for the French mission. Dr. Francis Charhon,

Executive Director of MSF France writing to Dawit Wolde Georgis, RRC Chief

Commissioner of RCC, described the situation for justifying the need for establishing

a therapeutic feed center. He does refer to the previous denied appeals of establishing

one but it the end it is not clear in requesting a specific action rather asking in a personal

tone ‘’ that is why I am writing to you directly, knowing that you feel strongly about

moving ahead on these issues so that life can quickly return to normal in this region.48’’

Undoubtly there were good reason for establishing the center but the vague, semi-

informal character of the appeal combined with the speaking up in international press

about the refusal and lack of cooperation with the authorities gave mixed, contradictory

signals providing enough ground to RCC to answer back: ‘’the allegations made by the

45 “Priority to Economic Rebuilding and in Africa,” AFP (France), Washington, 5 November 1985 46 David Blundy, ‘Famine refugees Herded as Cattle,’ The Times (UK) 47 Rony Brauman, MSF France President in ‘’MSF Speaks Out’’ 48 ’Telex from Dr Francis Charhon, Executive Director of MSF France to Dawit Wolde Georgis, RRC Chief Commissioner’ 23 October 1985 (in French)


MSF are absurd and baseless’’ and ‘’ MSF has always felt that its relief work is

overshadowed by those of larger and more experienced charities and, therefore, sought

to make its presence felt by making more noise than miracles ‘’49. MSF France

persistence in this double edged communication policy was about to create further

tensions.

Indeed, despite some overwhelming evidence and international press being in

general supportive of MSF’s claims, MSF France seemed to become increasingly

isolated. United Nations representative in Ethiopia had asked for actually assisting

Ethiopian’s relocation programme acknowledging nevertheless that its current

effectiveness isn’t satisfactory50. In an effort of finding a middle ground, a meeting was

set including four RCC members, a UN official, MSF’s Rony Brauman, the French

Ambassador in Ethiopia and four journalists. It was a heated discussion which rather

showed the different attitude between MSF France and both RCC and the French

ambassador.’’ It was a tense and heated discussion. Rony gave a point- by-point

summary of all the accusations he had already put into the public domain. The UN

representatives [….] supported the RRC position. The French ambassador, who began

the meeting in a conciliatory tone, became violently angry with MSF towards the

end.”51 MSF’s France speaking out appears to have created a hostile reaction from a

united front of various actors: UN, Ethiopian state and the French state itself.

Sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs seems to be at the heart of their

own priorities.

The rest of the humanitarian community were also silently disapproving

‘’speaking up’’ avoiding the risk to be expelled. Ironically the once ‘’conservative’’

IRCC was the only humanitarian actor openly supporting MSF’s France suggestions.

‘’The ICRC delegate in Ethiopia was the only person to totally agree with the form and

substance of MSF’s position. The other aid organizations, while approving the

substance, remained circumspect as to the form through fear of expulsion’’52. MSF

France seems to be in isolation of how humanitarian aid should be provided putting

principles and a specific way to implement.

49 ‘Press Statement, RRC Ethiopia,’ 24 October 1985 (in English) 50 Jonathan Steele, ‘Appeal to Support Resettling of Ethiopia Families,’ The Guardian (UK), 29 October 1985 51 Summary of the board meeting, MSF France, 25 November 1985 (in French) 52 Famine and forced relocations in Ethiopia 1984-1986, page 68


Rony Brauman was fully aware of the nature of the conflict but his approach

and one adopted by MSF France wouldn’t be altered despite the apparent isolation. In

correspondence to both the UN and RCC representatives parts he reinstated the

conditions under which he considered the ‘relocations’ policies would comply with the

minimum standards for assisting humanitarian aid. It was a last effort for MSF to find

some kind of viable compromise but the mutual accusations exchanged in the meeting

wouldn’t’ be bridged by Brauman’s persistence. ”I will not accept your insistence on

setting conditions. You will be humanitarian if you do your job. You are not competent

to comment on any other aspect of our program. We have different ways of doing things

in Ethiopia. We cannot be dictated to”53 was the verbal reaction of the RCC

representative in the meeting showcasing clearly that MSF’s policies were considered

as actions compromising Ethiopian sovereignty. Brauman didn’t even try to write to

the French ambassador unsurprisingly if one considers Brauman’s own account of the

quarrel: ‘’ I called him a Pétainist. I said: “you would be a Pétainist under Pétain and

a Gaullist under de Gaulle. I’ve got absolute contempt for you - fuck you.” I didn’t pull

my punches’’!54

On the 2 December RCC delivers a notice to the MSF office in the Ethiopian

capital city ordering to cease its operations. The news soon became headlines to

international media. The departure wasn’t without problems with the Ethiopian

authorities freezing the banking accounts of MSF not allowing-among others- for the

local staff to get paid their salaries.55 The exit was abrupt and far from subtle. The

French Government complained for the expulsion referring to the organization’s

‘’saving millions of lives’’ but the rest of the actors namely the British embassy and

UN preferred not to comment and stay neutral. The French doctors, however, after their

return to Paris continued to speak up.56

53 Blaine Harden, ‘Ethiopia Still in Need But No Longer Starving,’ Washington Post Service for International Herald Tribune, 30 November 1985, (in English) 54 Rony Brauman, MSF France President in Famine and Forced Relocations in Ethiopia page 74 55 Letter from MSF France Administrator in Ethiopia to RRC Deputy commissioner, 3 December 1985 (in English) 56 ‘Ethiopia Closes French Relief Agency,’ International Herald Tribune (AP), Addis Ababa, 3 December 1985


4. After Expulsion: MSF France and MSF Belgium.

MSF Belgium distanced themselves further from their French counterparts after the

expulsion. They continued operating in areas between Eritrea and Tigray where the

political and military tensions were minimal. They admitted that this was probably the

reason for not speaking out. The politically controversial relocation programme didn’t

reach their operating regions. They also admitted the reported violence by MSF France

but they, as the majority of the non-governmental humanitarian community on the field,

publicly distanced themselves from them. The linking with LSF’s political and

ideological was particularly conducive to MSF France isolating itself and eventually

getting expelled. Rony Brauman actually continued to lobbying against the Ethiopian

relocation programs managing to exercise influence on the European Parliament in

asking a three moratorium of the relocations and allowing MSF back in Ethiopia.57

As the MSF France were campaigning to explain and support their reasons for

leaving Ethiopia, MSF Belgium signed a contract with Ethiopia’s government to

‘’provide one million dollars’ worth of medical aid. For critics of humanitarian aid in

general this conflict reveals the inadequacies of humanitarian action. One could accuse

MSF Belgium for letting be manipulated by the Ethiopian regime in using the

humanitarian aid as tool of war against the rebels. One could also accuse the MSF

France to be suspiciously naïve for believing that speaking out would change the

broader political realities at play. In this respect Alex de Waal has convincingly argued

that humanitarian action in Ethiopia ignored or chose to ignore that relief in the specific

war context is unavoidably political. These different visions of humanitarianism,

however, reveal in balance a transitory phase during which the realities of

humanitarianism are being transformed. Shortly after the reconciliation of the MSF

movement, the end of Cold War also brought Mengistu’s regime fall and signaled in a

non-anticipated fashion; a troubled transition which is still under way.

57 Famine and Forced Relocations in Ethiopia, pg 93


5. Conclusion

A first concluding remark in evaluating MSF humanitarian presence during the

famine crisis in Northern Ethiopia could be that reflected the state of the world it aspired

to ameliorate. Despite humanitarian claims for being non-political and neutral MSF’s

adventure reveals that humanitarian action is bound to be political and neutral. MSF

France chose a ‘’naïve’’ human rights path of action with an anti-communist, anti-

authoritarian character at once reflecting a liberal vision of the international system and

challenging Cold War balances. MSF Belgium on the other hand played by the rules of

the Cold War game preferring not to challenge Ethiopian state’s sovereigns claims in

exchange of saving lives. In the short term MSF Belgium was the one to ‘’win’’ and be

justified but in retrospect MSF’s France ‘’liberal neo-conservatism’’- Rony Brauman’s

own self descriptive term- was the forerunner of the post Cold War dominant form of

humanitarianism.

MSF’s split is also a returning pattern of historical continuity between

competing visions of humanitarianism. Different prioritizing of humanitarian principles

result in different kind of compromises and strategies. MSF uniqueness though is that

despite being a relative small humanitarian ngo at the time, it reflected a broader

discussion in the humanitarian community and beyond.

The Ethiopian crisis also reaffirms the nonlinear course of humanitarianism led

exclusively by universal humanitarian values. Circumstantiality and contingency play

an equally big role in defining humanitarian action. The very fact that it was the media

attention brought by the sensationalist BBC documentary and the lack of any other

major crisis at the time is conducive to how the MSF humanitarian workers provided

relief based on their prescribed principles.

MSF presence during the Ethiopian crisis also reflected questions about the

emancipatory and/or paternalistic character of humanitarian action. Despite proclaimed

emancipatory claims from both the French and Belgian MSF, they were also part of a

humanitarian governance operating themselves within political power structures. MSF

France was persistent in connecting western development practices with humanitarian

relief while MSF Belgium was aligned with UN and Ethiopian Marxist inspired ways


of development. It’s also a returning pattern of humanitarian history: the paradox of

balancing emancipatory intentions and paternalistic practices.

Historical experience ultimately puts a constant test on the role of

humanitarianism as a factor of moral progress. The Ethiopian Famine crisis revealed

how two different perceptions of humanitarian action were mutually accused for

humanitarian immorality. In sum, scholars such as Alex de Waal and critics of

humanitarian intervention have doubted the moral effectiveness and/or motives of

humanitarianism. The question therefore of morality is one with no monolithic answer.

Humanitarianisms are bound to be compromised by historical contingency and

changing moral standards and priorities. MSF movement is a reflective agent of this

continuing dialogue and the study of history has a role to play in reflecting on how

humanitarian relief is and will be provided in the future.


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