Do Those who Identify with Their Nation Always Dislike Immigrants?: An Examination of Citizenship Policy Effects

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Do Those who Identify with TheirNation Always Dislike Immigrants?: AnExamination of Citizenship Policy EffectsGal Ariely aa University of Haifa

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Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 18:242–261, 2012Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 1353-7113 print / 1557-2986 onlineDOI: 10.1080/13537113.2012.680862

Do Those who Identify with Their NationAlways Dislike Immigrants?: An Examination

of Citizenship Policy Effects

GAL ARIELYUniversity of Haifa

This article challenges the common wisdom that national identi-fication always leads to xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants.Analyzing cross-national survey data from dozens of countries re-veals how the relations between national identification and xeno-phobic attitudes toward immigrants vary according to countrycitizenship policy. The more inclusive the citizenship regime, theweaker the relations are between national identification and xeno-phobia. In fact, in countries with full jus soli law there are, onaverage, negative relations between national identification andxenophobia while in other countries there are positive relationsbetween the two. These findings are used to discuss the ways con-ceptions of nationhood are institutionalized in citizenship policyfrom a socio-psychological perspective.

INTRODUCTION

National identity is a unique type of social identity since nations are an ex-ceptional kind of collective. Unlike other collectives, like religion or class,nations constitute sovereign bodies. The ultimate sovereignty of nations is ex-pressed through their ability to draw lines between insiders and outsiders—todecide who is a citizen. While the question of how nations decide who thecitizens are is an old one, reaching all the way back to Aristotle, interna-tional migration has renewed academic interest in this issue in the last twodecades.1 The institutionalized approach examines the historical and politicalfactors that affect citizenship policy.2 Probably the most powerful explana-tion of these was Roger Brubaker’s argument that the “type of nationhood”shapes citizenship policies.3 There are “civic nations” with inclusive national

Address correspondence to Gal Ariely, University of Haifa, Haifa, 34601 Israel. E-mail:[email protected]

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identities and “ethnic nations” with exclusive national identity. The socio-psychological approach examines people’s conceptions of national identityby looking at public attitudes.4 Despite extensive research, the question ofwhether there are indeed civic and ethnic conceptions of nationhood is stillopen.5 Even the common wisdom that national identification always leadsto negative attitudes toward an out-group is not clear.

The current study combines the institutional and the socio-psychologicalapproaches. It does not offer an answer to the question of whether differentconceptions of nationhood affect state citizenship policies through time nordoes it propose to test the mechanism that link national identity and citizen-ship policies. Instead, the modest aim of this article is to demonstrate thatthe relations between national identification and attitudes toward immigrantsare related to country citizenship policies.

The article proceeds as follows. First, the institutional perspective willbe introduced. I then introduce the socio-psychological perspective and setexpectations about the impact of citizenship policy. Multilevel analysis ofdata from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) National IdentityII (2003) across dozens of countries is used to examine whether citizenshippolicy is related to attitudes toward immigrants. The core of the analysis isan examination of whether citizenship policy affects the relations betweennational identification and attitudes toward immigrants. Finally, the resultsare discussed in light of the study limitations as well as their potential forunderstanding the link between national identity and citizenship.

CITIZENSHIP POLICY—THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The modern idea of the nation-state describes a governing body holding finalauthoritative judgment over a historically distinct people—the nation and aparticular territory. Current understanding of the nation-state suggests thatthis idea has been more an image than a reality.6 Observers have pointedfor some time at the erosion of state sovereignty and its authoritative powerover people and territory.7 Nevertheless, one of the final frontiers of statesovereignty rests in its ability to determine who will become a member ofthe political community—a citizen. Despite ongoing pronouncements of itsirrelevance, citizenship is an important characteristic of the political order.8

It determines the chances in life for most of the world population who havenot won what Ayelet Shachar calls “the birthright lottery”—to be born ascitizens in well-off countries.9 After all, the world could be portrayed asdivided between those who enjoy the privileges and opportunities given tothem as members of prosperous political communities and those who donot.

The interest in states’ political boundaries has led to a growing literatureof comparative citizenship policies. One of the first conclusions that can

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be drawn from these studies is that there are significant differences betweenstates. Even in the European Union (EU), which has harmonized state policiesin many spheres, there are wide differences between states. Countries havemaintained almost unlimited national sovereignty in their citizenship policies.For instance, an in-depth examination of citizenship policies across the 15original EU member states found that while in some countries there are trendstowards liberalization, there are new restrictions for access in others.10

The comparative studies of citizenship policies identify different fac-tors that shape them, such as countries’ histories, colonization, internationalnorms, public opinion, and the competition between right-wing and left-wing political parties.11 Among these explanations, the most influential wasprovided by Roger Brubaker’s seminal work that comparatively examinedthe historical developments of citizenship policies in Germany and France.Based on this comparison, he argued that citizenship is determined by long-standing traditions of nationhood. The fundamental differences betweenFrench and German conceptions of nationalism have been related to dif-ferent citizenship policies throughout their historical development, as heargued: “The expansive, assimilationist citizenship law of France . . . reflectsthe state-centered assimilationist self-understanding of the French, and theGerman definition of citizenship as community of descent, restrictive towardnon-German immigrants yet remarkably expansive toward ethnic Germansfrom Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, reflects the pronounced ethnocul-tural inflection in German self-understanding.”12 In other words, in Germany,citizenship was determined by exclusive principles and in France it was de-termined by more inclusive standards. Broadening Brubaker’s argument be-yond the case of France and Germany, it suggests that ethnic countries tendto have more restrictive citizenship policies than civic countries.

The idea that different conceptions of nationhood are related to differ-ent citizenship policies replicates one of the most widely employed con-ceptual building blocks in the study of nationalism—the distinction betweencivic and ethnic nationalism.13 Rooted in German and French historians’different interpretations of nationality, the civic-ethnic framework was devel-oped mainly by Hans Kohn’s historical account of nation building.14 Accord-ing to Kohn, Eastern and Western countries exemplify different historicalpaths into nationhood leading to fundamental differences between Westerncivic/political nations versus Eastern ethnic/cultural nations. Western nation-alism was mainly political and the ideas of nation and nationalism developedwithin preexisting state structures that encompassed populations with highdegrees of cultural homogeneity, or which developed simultaneously withthose structures. Kohn’s civic/ethnic dichotomy has been vastly criticizedfor its oversimplification, its lack of historical accuracy, and its normativeimplications.15 Others have shown that this framework is limited in its abil-ity to explain conceptions of nationalism.16 All the same, this approach hasbeen influential in the study of nation and nationalism.17 It has inspired many

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scholars who have used it not only in historical accounts but also in studyingcurrent relations between state and ethnicity.18

Similarly, Brubaker’s thesis, while considered a powerful theoretical po-sition on the question of how and why countries differ in their citizenshippolicies, has been criticized by a number of scholars. Some have arguedthat changes in citizenship policies under the impact of migration haveblurred such differences between countries. Since countries have allowedimmigrants to achieve social and economic rights without citizenship, therelevance of citizenship has declined.19 Others have argued more specif-ically that Brubaker’s argument cannot explain changes like the Germancitizenship reform of 1999 that reflect liberalization of the naturalization pol-icy.20 A comparative examination of 25 nationality laws led Patrick Weil toargue that “Despite much academic writing to the contrary there is no causallink between national identity and nationality law.”21 Other types of criticismoppose typologies of citizenship that obscure important differences betweenstates as well as simplifying the dynamics of citizenship policy.22

In-depth research of citizenship policy in the last decade, inspiredmainly by the EUDO-Citizenship project, reveals that countries’ citizenshippolicies are not divided between the purely “civic” and the purely “ethnic.”23

Instead, these policies are structured across various dimensions. Neverthe-less, citizenship policy can be more inclusive or more exclusive and there isa continuum between very restricted countries and very inclusive countries.

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP—SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

The very concept of the nation is a form of social identity that unites peopleinto national groups. From Ernest Renan’s aphorism that the nation is a“daily plebiscite” to Benedict Anderson’s famous conceptualization of nationsas “imagined communities,” scholars have defined nationalism in a verysimilar way to social identity. It is no wonder that the socio-psychologicalperspective is used to examine national identity, mainly through the useof social identity theory.24 According to this theory, people’s conceptionof a group is a kind of common reference point for the social world ofthe group members. People who identify with the group will also adoptthe norms of the group. In the domain of national identity, high levels ofnational identification are related to adopting norms and behaviors that areconsidered as typical for the national group.25

According to social identity theory, members of the national group willseek to differentiate themselves positively from out-groups. Higher levelsof national identification are related to higher levels of feeling distinct fromout-groups, such as immigrants. It is crucial, however, to emphasize that

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differentiation and positive evaluation do not necessarily lead to feelings ofsuperiority toward out-groups. Differentiation occurs on the value dimen-sions of comparison. It might lead to out-group devaluation but it can alsobe defined in terms of positive attitudes toward out-groups. What is valuedcan change from one national context to another. The specific national con-text, at least to some extent, affects the basis for differentiation between oramong national groups.

Several studies have looked at the ways different national contexts affectnational identity and have tried to establish the distinction between “ethnic”and “civic” conceptions of national identity.26 The conclusions about the rel-evance of the civic/ethnic distinctions are rather contradictory. Some studieshave found the civic/ethnic distinction irrelevant while others have foundit meaningful.27 Other studies have looked explicitly at the links betweennational identification and xenophobia. A study that compared “ethnic” Ger-many and “civic” United States found that national identification plays asimilar role in both countries.28 Another study, however, that compared Ger-many and Canada on other aspects of identity found that the dissimilarcontext is relevant.29 Similarly, a study in Belgium found a dissimilar impactof the national context. Identification with Flanders is related to negativeattitudes toward foreigners; the inverse is the case in Wallonia. Identifica-tion with Wallonia’s subnational identity correlates with a positive attitudetowards foreigners.30

While these studies compared only two dissimilar contexts, other stud-ies have examined larger sets of countries in order to systematically evaluatethe effect of the different national contexts. Examining citizenship laws andcitizenship policy, Weldon has developed a typology of individualistic-civic,collectivistic-civic, and collectivistic-ethnic types of citizenship regimes.31 An-alyzing 15 Western European countries, he finds that the ways that nationalidentity is institutionalized in the country affects tolerance toward ethnicminorities. Individualistic-civic countries demonstrate reduced intolerancetoward national minorities in comparison to collectivist-ethnic ones. A morerefined analysis of the institutional context has recently been offered byWright.32 In his analysis, he examined both multiculturalism policy and citi-zenship policy. He also extended the scope of the analysis beyond WesternEurope and included the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.He found that a jus soli citizenship policy is related to more immigrant-inclusive definitions of the national community. Furthermore, the effect ofcitizenship regimes was found to be more consistent than the effect of mul-ticultural policies across time.

Nevertheless, other studies found little support for the effect of the na-tional context. Citrin and Sides have examined whether citizenship policy isrelated to exclusionary attitudes toward migrants in Europe.33 They found avery weak connection between citizenship policy and attitudes toward im-migrants. In fact, they found that in the more restrictive countries there are

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less hostile attitudes toward immigrants. Pehrson and his colleagues used theISSP National Identity module to analyze 32 countries.34 Their study did notexamine citizenship policies. Instead, they investigated how the in-group it-self conceptualizes the nature of its national identity. The researchers did thisby examining how the in-group defines its criteria for national membershipwhile distinguishing among the civic, ethnic, and cultural components ofmembership. They found that different definitions of national membershipmoderated the relations between national identification and anti-immigrantattitudes. The relations between national identification and anti-immigrantattitudes were stronger in countries where national membership was de-fined in terms of language (cultural national identity) and weaker where itwas defined in terms of citizenship (civic national identity). The most im-portant element of ethnic identity—having ancestry from the country—wasfound, however, to have an insignificant effect on these relations. The re-sults of their study indicated the challenges in the distinction between ethnicand civic conceptions of national identity. As a recent study by Reeskensand Hooghe has shown, it is indeed difficult to compare civic and ethnicconceptions of national identity across countries.35

The current study differs from previous studies in that it does not usethe ethnic/civic distinction. Instead, it focuses on citizenship policy and in-tegrates the socio-psychological perspective with the institutional one bycombining two levels of analysis. At the individual level I assume, in linewith the findings from previous studies, that national identification will bepositively related to xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants. My main fo-cus is in the effect of the country-level citizenship policy on xenophobiaand, more importantly, on the relations between national identification andxenophobia. Assuming that the public sentiment is reflected, to some extent,in citizenship policy, I expect that (H1) inclusive citizenship policy reducesxenophobic attitudes toward immigrants. Following the social identity theoryidea that the macrosocial contexts affect the valued norms of the in-group,I expect that dissimilar contexts, that is, dissimilar citizenship policy, willaffect the positive relations between national identification and xenophobia.If inclusive citizenship policy reflects inclusive understanding of nationhood,I should find that (H2) an inclusive citizenship policy has a negative effecton the relations between national identification and xenophobia. Figure 1summarizes these expectations while illustrating the multilevel approach.

METHODOLOGY

Data were drawn from the ISSP National Identity II (2003).36 Thirty-twocountries were included in the analysis: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada,Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain,Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,

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FIGURE 1 Multilevel model for the influence of citizenship policy.

Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain,Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, United States, and Venezuela.37

The ISSP collected data from a representative sample of the adult pop-ulation in each country. As such, it included respondents from the “corenational group” (for example, Slovakians in Slovakia) as well as minorities(for example, Hungarians in Slovakia). While in some countries, perceptionsof national identity among the majority are rather similar to those of mi-norities, in other countries, there are substantive differences.38 Therefore, Ianalyzed the pooled sample twice: once with all of the respondents fromthe sample; the second time, after excluding from the analysis respondentswith an immigrant background (that is, they or their mother or father wereimmigrants), respondents that do not identify themselves as belonging to themajority group’s ethnicity, and respondents that do not use the dominantlanguage at home as a first language.39 As the results were nearly identical, Ican assume lack of bias due the nature of the sample, under the limitationsof the available data.

Measurements

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES

National identification was measured by the item: “How close do you feelto [your country]?” This item measures a person’s level of identification withhis/her country.40 While using only a single item to construct a scale fornational identity is not ideal, it made this study consistent with previousstudies that have used this scale.41

Xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants were measured with a meanof five items42: “Immigrants increase crime rates”; “Immigrants take jobsaway from people who were born in [Country Nationality]”; “Immigrants im-prove [Country Nationality] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures”;

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“Immigrants are generally good for [Country’s] economy”; and “The govern-ment spends too much money assisting immigrants.”43

In addition to these two variables of interest, the analysis included ad-ditional individual level variables: age, gender, education, religiosity, andunemployment. Controlling this variable ensures an accurate picture of therelations between national identification and xenophobic attitudes towardimmigrants. Appendix 1 presents the variable coding.

COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLE—CITIZENSHIP POLICY

Citizenship policy was measured using two scales: the jus soli policy variableand Access to Nationality Index. Jus soli policy is based on the classic dis-tinction between jus soli and jus sanguinis. In some countries, such as theUnited States, citizenship is determined by the jus soli principle. The placeof birth determines citizenship, and thus second-generation immigrants nat-uralize simply by being born in the country. Other countries, such as Japan,apply the jus sanguinis principle, which attributes citizenship to descent. Thedata about jus soli policy were obtained from the citizenship laws datasetfor 2001 used in the study by Graziella Bertocchi and Chiara Strozzi.44 Thisdata set used various sources about citizenship laws and distinguished be-tween three types of citizenship policy: jus sanguinis without any jus solielements (for example, Japan); mixed citizenship regimes with elements ofjus sanguinis and elements of jus soli (for example, Netherlands); full jussoli (for example, United States) where citizenship is automatically grantedupon birth within the country, regardless of the parents’ citizenship or status.Since all countries, including full jus soli countries, have some aspects of jussanguinis, a dichotomy variable for countries with full jus soli policy andcountries with jus sanguinis or with mixed policies was constructed.45

It is important to note, however, that this is a somewhat artificial distinc-tion. Close examination of citizenship policies reveals that the differencesbetween countries are much more complex than a simple distinction be-tween jus soli and jus sanguinis.46 While previous studies have followed thisdichotomist distinction, in-depth analysis of citizenship policy in Europe hasshown that citizenship policy is continuous and not dichotomized.47 Thereare other elements that affect access to nationality, like a naturalization testor dual nationality policy. The main advantage of using Bertocchi and Strozzidata is in its scope. Unlike studies that have focused only on Europe, it coversall of the 32 countries in the data set.

To address this limitation, another scale for citizenship policy was in-cluded in the analysis: the Access to Nationality Index. This index is part ofthe Migrant Integration Policy Index, a cross-national collaboration that in-quires into and compares integration policy across countries.48 The index isconstructed by national experts and standardized by the Migrant Integration

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Policy researchers. The Migrant Integration Policy Index focuses on Euro-pean countries but it also includes the United States, Canada, Australia, andJapan. Therefore, there are 24 countries that are included both in the ISSP2003 and in the Migrant Integration Policy Index data set. The shortcomingin covering only 24 countries is balanced by the ability of this index to offera refined measure of citizenship policy. Unlike the jus soli policy variable,it covers various dimensions of citizenship policy and focuses on the re-quirements for citizenship acquisition (like language tests or the existenceof citizenship integration courses) or the allowance for dual nationality.49

These various dimensions have been used to construct a score between 0(exclusion) and 100 (inclusion) in the Access to Nationality Index. In ourset of countries, the highest score (82) is for Portugal and the lowest score(15.5) is for Latvia.50 Appendix 2 presents the country-level variables.

To conclude, using these two different measures for citizenship policystrengthens the validity of the analysis since it enables cross-validation fordifferent citizenship policy scales. Unfortunately, their combination is limitedto the available data. While the coverage of countries is restricted, it coversmore countries than do previous studies.51

RESULTS

The aim of the analysis is to examine how the country-level variable (that is,citizenship policy) affects the level of xenophobia and the relations betweennational identification and xenophobia. To that end, a multilevel approachwas applied for the analysis. This approach takes into account that peopleare nested in different contexts (countries), and it facilitates examinationof country-level explanations (in this case, citizenship policy), affecting andmoderating individual-level results.52 To clarify the logic of the multilevel ap-proach, I will explain how the models are constructed and visually illustratethe merit of such an approach.

The first part focuses only on the individual level, that is, the relationsbetween national identification and xenophobia. In this analysis, the pooledsample across all the 32 countries is used. The model also included age,education, gender, religiosity, and employment status that are consideredimportant factors in shaping xenophobia and are regularly included in suchstudies.53 The model results are presented in Table 1.54

Model 1.1 shows that, as I assumed, national identification is positivelyrelated to xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants. By and large, those withhigher levels of national identification also have more xenophobic attitudestoward immigrants. It is important to emphasize, however, that such an anal-ysis across 32 countries provides an average estimation of the entire pooledsample. This does not mean that in each of the 32 countries there are positiverelations between national identification and xenophobia. Figure 2 presents

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FIGURE 2 Slopes for the relations between national identification and xenophobia across32 countries (Model 1.1).

all of the 32 slopes from Model 1.1. It illustrates that there are countrieswith positive relations between national identification and xenophobia butthere are also countries with insignificant relations or even negative relationsbetween the two. The main focus of the analysis is to examine if citizen-ship policy can explain the variation of these slopes as well as the level ofxenophobia.

The second part of the analysis integrates the country-level variable, citi-zenship policy. It examines whether citizenship policy, that is, measures withthe country-level variable, has a direct effect on the levels of xenophobiaand negative interaction effect on the relations between national identifica-tion and xenophobia (the slopes in Figure 2). Model 1.2 shows that thereis significant direct effect of jus soli policy on the levels of xenophobia andthis supports the first hypothesis. The levels of xenophobic attitudes towardimmigrants are lower in countries that mainly apply jus soli policy. As thebetween-country variance is reduced by 14%, the direct effect of jus soli pol-icy is not only statistically significant but also seems to be rather meaningful.These findings do not reject the first hypothesis.

Model 1.3 examines how, in addition to the direct effect, a jus solipolicy affects the relations between national identification and xenophobia.The results indicate that there is a negative interaction effect for jus solipolicy and the second hypothesis, therefore, is not rejected. Slope tests re-vealed that the differences are significant at p < .001. This difference is notonly statistically significant but also shows opposite relations between na-tional identification and xenophobia. Figure 3 illustrates the results by show-ing how the slopes differ between the seven jus soli countries and other

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Citizenship Policy Effects 253

FIGURE 3 Slopes differences for the relations between national identification and xenopho-bia under the effect of jus soli policy (Model 1.3).

25 countries. It is evident that the relations between national identificationand xenophobia are negative in the jus soli countries and positive in the restof the countries.

Model 1.4 and 1.5 replicate the analysis using the Access to NationalityIndex. As this index is available only for 24 countries, eight countries wereexcluded from the analysis.55 The model results indicate that using the Ac-cess to Nationality Index leads to similar results as in previous models. Onaverage, in countries with higher levels of access to nationality, the public isless xenophobic toward immigrants. In such countries the relations betweennational identification and xenophobia are also less strong. To further illus-trate the logic of the multilevel model, Figure 4 presents the plot betweenthe access to nationality index and the coefficients of national identificationon xenophobia across the 24 countries.56

Looking at Figure 4, it seems that the access to nationality index is onlypartly connected to the relations between national identification and xeno-phobia (r = −.337, p = .107). Closer examination indicates, however, that sixEastern European countries (Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria,and Czech Republic) are not part of the pattern in which higher levels ofaccess to nationality are related to lower relations between national identifi-cation and xenophobia. In fact, after excluding these six countries the neg-ative correlation between nationality index and the national identification-xenophobia relations are very strong (r = −.697, p = .001). Put differently,Figure 4 illustrates what Model 1.5 indicated; in countries with greater accessto nationality, the relations between national identification and xenophobiaare less strong than in countries that restrict access to nationality. In Canada,

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FIGURE 4 Plot for the access to nationality index and coefficients for national identificationon xenophobia across 24 countries.

these relations are even negative. Figure 4 also shows that six Eastern Euro-pean countries, which are emigrant rather than immigrant countries, are notpart of this pattern. It illustrates that any comparative analysis that includessuch variation of countries should pay attention to that context as it will bediscussed in the conclusion.

CONCLUSIONS

The idea that “national character” explains citizenship policy is as attractiveas it is in dispute. Different studies that have used different methods and haveexamined different sets of countries have reached different conclusions. Thepresent study does not suggest a resolution to this puzzle. Instead, it com-bines the institutional and the socio-psychological perspective to examinewhether citizenship policy is related, in a systematic way, to the relations be-tween national identification and xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants.Using multilevel analysis of cross-national survey data, the results show thatthe positive link between national identification and xenophobia is not auniversal pattern. It is related to the country citizenship policy. The more the

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citizenship regime is inclusive, the weaker the positive relations are betweennational identification and xenophobia. In fact, in countries with full jus solilaw, there are, on average, negative relations between national identificationand xenophobia while in other countries there are positive relations betweenthe two.

The results of this study should be viewed in light of its limitations.First of all, analyzing large numbers of countries limits the ability to addressthe variation of context and measures in a refined way.57 For example,while our use of two scales to measure citizenship policy cross-validatesthe results, one might wonder about their comparability. This also holdstrue for measuring national identification with cross-national survey dataacross dissimilar national contexts. It is not clear that the form of nationalidentification found in a country such as Canada is directly comparablewith that found in Poland. The extent to which survey measures of nationalidentity are comparable across countries is an open question.58

Second, while this study includes a relatively large number of countries,one should recognize the limit in the generalizability of the findings. The32 countries that are included in the analysis of the jus soli policy effect andthe 24 countries that are included in the analysis of the Access to NationalityIndex effect were chosen by data availability. The ISSP National Identity(2003) includes mainly European countries and several countries outside ofEurope. While the combination of the ISSP data and the citizenship policydatasets include more countries than previous studies, one should rememberthat data from a different set of countries might have produced completelydifferent findings and conclusions. Future studies that include additionalcountries are needed to strengthen the generalizability of the findings.59

Third, cross-sectional analysis can point to the relations between policiesand attitudes. It does not specify causal relations. One cannot claim fromsuch an association that public perceptions lead to state policy or vice versa.While this study has found significant statistical relations, its cross-sectionalresearch design undermines the ability to conclude about causality.

Fourth, while sociodemographic variables were controlled in the anal-ysis, the issue of heterogeneity in nationalist attitudes in each country is notaddressed. Bart Bonikowski has recently shown that most of the variation inthese attitudes is found within countries, not between them.60 These caveatsshould be considered when the findings are interpreted in the context ofthe debate regarding nationhood and citizenship. The meaning of the resultsis limited to the countries that were analyzed and to the ways citizenshippolicy and national identity were measured in this specific study.

Notwithstanding these limits, the results might offer some insights re-garding the debate about the ways that “types of nationhood” are related tocitizenship policy. Today, after two decades of in-depth comparative stud-ies of citizenship policy, it is clear that Brubaker’s thesis is neither the solenor even the major explanation for citizenship policy. In fact, Brubaker’s

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thesis has been vastly criticized. Nevertheless, findings that the link betweennational identification and xenophobia at the individual level are related tocitizenship policy at the country level imply that claiming the irrelevanceof national identity to nationality law should be reconsidered. According tosocial identity theory, while members of the national in-group will seek todifferentiate themselves positively from out-groups, they also identify withthe norms of the in-group. If the in-group norms are based on inclusiveunderstanding of their national identity, positive relations between nationalidentification and attitudes toward out-groups will be found. While this studycannot examine the causal relations between citizenship policy and nationalidentification, the findings imply that there is some mechanism that connectsnational identification and citizenship laws.

The results also indicate that in Eastern Europe, which has often beenportrayed as reflecting “ethnic” national identity, the links between nationalidentification and xenophobia are relatively weak while there is restrictiveaccess for citizenship (except for Latvia, see Figure 4). One explanationmight be that these are not countries of immigration. The lack of immigrantpresence in such countries means that the discourse about national identitydoes not focus on immigration. Nevertheless, their distinct patterns furtherimply that the simplistic distinction between “ethnic” Eastern Europe and“civic” Western Europe should be reconsidered.

The findings of the study should be considered in light of the currentpolitical debates about citizenship policy and not only from a theoreticalperspective. One of the major factors that explain citizenship policy duringthe last decade in Europe is the impact of far right parties.61 Their risingpower leads governments to adopt more restrictive citizenship policies.62

These parties, like the Austrian Freedom Party or the Belgian Vlaams Belang,use the public’s concerns about immigration to mobilize support and togain electoral successes.63 They use nationalist rhetoric and sentiments toemphasize the differences between natives and immigrants and to portraythe immigrants as a threat. The question that this article cannot answer iswhether such mobilization efforts are also possible in nations that definethemselves in more inclusive terms. After all, the results of the analysisshow that the relations between national identification and negative attitudestoward immigrants might be in opposite directions if the effect of citizenshippolicy is considered. Further research, using other methods than those usedin this study, is required to answer this question.

It is important to consider the existence of alternative contextual expla-nations for xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants. The literature suggeststwo main explanations: the relative numbers (real or perceived) of immi-grants and economic competition.64 In short, the idea behind these expla-nations is that competition with immigrants increases hostile attitudes, asseveral studies have found.65 Such alternative explanations are considered tobe relevant at the local level (that is, city, district) and not only at the country

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level.66 Focusing on the country-level explanation, this study did not addresssuch explanations, but future studies might examine the combination of thelocal-level with country-level citizenship policy. At the same time, it is impor-tant to note that the analysis included countries with different immigrationexperiences (sending versus receiving states). Future studies that considerthe lasting impact of such experience are required.

NOTE

1. Marc Morje Howard, “Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-National Research,” Per-spectives on Politics 4(3): 443–55 (2006); Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas B. Klusmeyer, Citi-zenship Policies for an Age of Migration (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,2002).

2. Maarten P. Vink and Gerard-Rene De Groot, “Citizenship Attribution in Western Europe: Inter-national Framework and Domestic Trends,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36(4): 713–34 (2010);Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska, eds., Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in LiberalNation-States (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Marc Morje Howard, The Politics ofCitizenship in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

3. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship & Nationhood in France & Germany (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1992).

4. Victoria M. Esses, Kay Deaux, Richard N. Lalonde, and Rupert Brown, “Psychological Per-spectives on Immigration,” Journal of Social Issues 66(4): 635–47. (2010); Alin M. Ceobanu and XavierEscandell, “Comparative Analyses of Public Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Using Multina-tional Survey Data: A Review of Theories and Research,” Annual Review of Sociology 36: 309–28 (2010).

5. Robert M. Kunovich, “The Sources and Consequences of National Identification,” AmericanSociological Review 74(4): 573–93 (2009); Stephen Shulman, “Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/EastDichotomies in the Study of Nationalism,” Comparative Political Studies 35(5): 554–85 (2002); SamuelPehrson, Vivian L. Vignoles, and Rupert Brown, “National Identification and Anti-Immigrant Prejudice:Individual and Contextual Effects of National Definitions,” Social Psychology Quarterly 72(1): 24–38(2009); Christopher A. Bail, “The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries Against Immigrants in Europe,”American Sociological Review 73(1): 37–59 (2008); Tim Reskens and Marc Hooghe, “Beyond the Civic-Ethnic Dichotomy: Investigating the Structure of Citizenship Concepts Across Thirty Three Countries,”Nations and Nationalism 16(4): 579–97 (2010).

6. Walter C. Opello and Stephen J. Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order (Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner, 2004).

7. Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership inEurope (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994); David Jacobson, Rights Across Borders: Immigration andthe Decline of Citizenship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1996).

8. Rogers R. Brubaker, “In the Name of the Nation: Reflections on Nationalism and Patriotism,”Citizenship Studies 8(2): 115-1–27 (2004); Howard, “Comparative Citizenship,” 445.

9. Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 2009).

10. Rainer Baubock, Eva Ersbøll, Kees Groenendijk, and Harald Waldrauch, eds., Acquisition andLoss of Nationality (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).

11. Galia Lahav, Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2004); Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, Citizenship Policies; Vink and De Groot,“Citizenship Attribution in Western Europe,” 713–34 Joppke and Morawska, Toward Assimilation andCitizenship; Howard, “Comparative Citizenship,” 443–55.

12. Brubaker, Citizenship & Nationhood, 14.13. It should be emphasized that Brubaker himself in his later work has criticized the civic/ethnic

framework. Roger Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).14. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study In Its Origins and Background (New York:

Macmillan, 1944).

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15. David Brown, “Are There Good and Bad Nationalisms?,” Nations and Nationalism 5(2):281–302 (1999); Taras Kuzio, “The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn’s Frame-work for Understanding Nationalism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25(1): 20–39 (2002).

16. Thomas Jeffrey Miley, “Against the Thesis of the “Civic Nation”: The Case of Catalonia inContemporary Spain,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 13(1): 1–37 (2007).

17. Johann P. Arnason, “Nations and Nationalisms: Between General Theory and ComparativeHistory,” in Gerand Delanty and Krishman Kumer, eds., The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism(London: Sage Publications, 2006), 44–56.

18. Hyun Choe, “National Identity and Citizenship in the People’s Republic of China and theRepublic of Korea,” Journal of Historical Sociology 19(1): 84–118 (2006); Nadya Nedelsky, “Civic Na-tionhood and the Challenges of Minority Inclusion: The Case of the Post-Communist Czech Republic,”Ethnicities 3(1): 85–114 (2003); Geneviev Zubrzycki, ““We, the Polish Nation”: Ethnic and Civic Visionsof Nationhood in Post-Communist Constitutional Debates,” Theory and Society 30(5): 629–68 (2001).

19. See Soysal, Limits of Citizenship.20. Christian Joppke, “Transforming of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity,” Citizenship Studies

11(1): 37–48 (2007).21. Patrick Weil, “Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws,” in

Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas B. Klusmeyer, eds., Citizenship Today: Global Perspectivesand Practices (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), 17–35.

22. Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy, Contested Citizenship:Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2005).

23. Vink and De Groot, “Citizenship Attribution in Western Europe,” 713–34 Baubock et al.,Acquisition and Loss; Iseult Honohan, The Theory and Politics of Ius Soli. Eudo Citizenship observatory(2010).

24. In this article, we focus only on the implications of social identity theory in our inquiry ofnational identification. For a review of social identity theory, see Rupert Brown, “Social Identity Theory:Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Challenges,” European Journal of Social Psychology30(6): 745–78 (2000). For a review of social identity theory and national identity, see Stephen Reicherand Nick Hopkins, Self and Nation: Categorization, Contestation and Mobilization (London: Sage, 2001).

25. For application of social identity theory to analyze the American national identity, see ElizabethTheiss-Morse, Who Counts as an American?: The Boundaries of National Identity (New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2009).

26. Fredrika Bjorklund, “The East European ‘Ethnic Nation’ Myth or Reality?,” European Journal ofPolitical Research 45(1): 93–121 (2006); Heinrich Best, “History Matters: Dimensions and Determinants ofNational Identities Among European Populations and Elites,” Europe-Asia Studies 61(6): 921–41 (2009);Kunovich, “National Identification,” 573–93; Pehrson et al., “The Sources and Consequences,” 24–38.

27. Mikael Hjerm, “National Identity: Sweden, Germany and Australia Compared,” Journal of Ethnicand Migration Studies 24(3): 451–69 (1998); Mikael Hjerm, “National Sentiments in Eastern and WesternEurope,” Nationalities Papers 31(4): 413–29 (2003); Rebeca Raijman and Oshrat Hochman, “NationalAttachments, Economic Competition and Social Exclusion of Non-Ethnic Migrants in Israel: A Mixed-Methods Approach,” Quality and Quantity 45(6): 1151–74 (2011); Frank L. Jones and Philip Smith,“Diversity and Commonality in National Identities: An Exploratory Analysis of Cross-National Patterns,”Journal of Sociology 37(1): 45 (2001); Jan Germen Janmaat, “Popular Conceptions of Nationhood in Oldand New European Member States: Partial Support for the Ethnic-Civic Framework,” Ethnic and RacialStudies 29(1): 50–78 (2006).

28. Thomas F. Pettigrew, Ulrich Wagner, and Oliver Christ, “Who Opposes Immigration?: Compar-ing German with North American Findings,” Du Bois Review 4(1): 19–39 (2007).

29. Victoria M. Esses, Ulrich Wagner, Carina Wolf, Matthias Preiser, and Christopher J. Wilbur, “Per-ceptions of National Identity and Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration in Canada and Germany,”International Journal of Intercultural Relations 30(6): 653–69 (2006).

30. Jaak Billiet, Bart Maddens, and Roeland Beerten, “National Identity and Attitude Toward For-eigners in a Multinational State: A Replication,” Political Psychology 24(2): 241–57 (2003).

31. Steven A Weldon, “The Institutional Context of Tolerance for Ethnic Minorities: A Comparative,Multilevel Analysis of Western Europe,” American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 331–49 (2006).

32. Matthew Wright, “Policy Regimes and Normative Conceptions of Nationalism in Mass PublicOpinion,” Comparative Political Studies 44(5): 598–624 (2011).

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33. Jack Citrin and John Sides, “Immigration and the Imagined Community in Europe and theUnited States,” Political Studies 56(1): 33–56 (2008).

34. Pehrson et al., “National Identification,” 24–38.35. Reskens and Hooghe, “Beyond the Civic–Ethnic Dichotomy,” 579–97.36. ISSP Research Group, International Social Survey Program (ISSP): National Identity II, 2003

(Cologne, Germany: Leibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences, 2003).37. Details of data collection, sampling, and response rates can be found on the ISSP website

(http://www.issp.org). Taiwan and South Africa, which were part of ISSP 2003, were excluded fromthe analysis since the items for xenophobia were not available for the South Africa sample and thecountry-level data were not available for Taiwan.

38. C. Christian Staerkle, Jim Sidanius, Eva G. T. Green, and Ludwin E. Molina, “Ethnic Minority-Majority Asymmetry in National Attitudes around the World: A Multilevel Analysis,” Political Psychology31(4): 491–519 (2010).

39. For example, for the Slovak Republic, we included only respondents whose parents (bothmother and father) do not have an immigrant background, who identify their ethnic group as Slovak,and who speak Slovak at home as their first language. Nevertheless, it is important to note that not allthe variables for ethnic identity or first language were available across all the 32 countries.

40. The respondents’ options were “very close,” “close,” “not very close,” and “not close at all.”41. Staerkle et al. used this scale for the analysis of national identification from ISSP data. Pehrson

et al. used this item with another item that measures national pride to construct a scale of nationalidentification.

42. The respondents’ options were “agree strongly,” “agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “dis-agree,” and “disagree strongly.”

43. The multiple groups’ confirmatory factor analysis established a partial metric equivalence formigrant devaluation.

44. Graziella Bertocchi and Chiara Strozzi, “International Migration and the Role of Institutions,”Public Choice 137(1): 81–102 (2008). For details of the data set, see http://www.economia.unimore.it/Bertocchi_Graziella/datasets/citlaws.pdf (accessed 13 Oct. 2011).

45. In full jus soli, countries’ jus sanguinis elements are reflected in the provisions of citizenshipfor the children of their citizens born outside of their territory.

46. Vink and De Groot, “Citizenship Attribution in Western Europe,” 713–34; Baubock et al.,Acquisition and Loss; Honohan, “The Theory and Politics.”

47. Markus M. L. Crepaz, Trust Beyond Borders: Immigration, the Welfare State, and Identity inModern Societies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2008); Lahav, Immigration and Politics, 258;For citizenship policy analysis, see Howard, The Politics of Citizenship.

48. For further details about the research project, see http://www.mipex.eu/ (accessed 15 Oct.2011).

49. For further details about the index, see http://www.mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/mipex_indicators_2010.pdf (accessed 15 Oct. 2011).

50. The average of 2007 data and the 2010 data was used, when it was available.51. For example, Weldon’s study examined 15 Western European countries.52. Joop J. Hox, Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications (New York: Routledge, 2010).53. Ceobanu and Escandell, “Comparative Analyses of Public Attitudes,” 317.54. Grand mean centering was used throughout the models.55. The countries that were excluded are Chile, Israel, New Zealand, Philippines, Russia, South

Korea, Uruguay, and Venezuela.56. These are unstandardized coefficients for the regression model that were conducted in each

of the 24 samples. The analysis included the control variables from Model 1.1.57. Jean Laponce, “Research on Ethnies and Nations: Comparing is the Way, But Comparing

What?,” Nationalism & Ethnic Politics 14(2): 223–38 (2008).58. Richard Sinnott, “An Evaluation of the Measurement of National, Subnational and Supranational

Identity in Cross-National Surveys,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18(2): 211–23 (2006).59. For example, using the forthcoming third study of ISSP National Identity might include 49

countries.60. Bart Bonikowski, Toward a Theory of Popular Nationalism: Shared Representation of the

Nation-State in Modern Democracies (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Dissertation, 2011).

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61. Howard, “Comparative Citizenship,” 451.62. Marc Morje Howard, “The Impact of the Far Right on Citizenship Policy in Europe: Explaining

Continuity and Change,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36(5): 735–51 (2010).63. Jens Rydgren, “Immigration Skeptics, Xenophobes or Racists?: Radical Right-Wing Voting in

Six West European Countries,” European Journal of Political Research 47(6): 737–65 (2008).64. Ceobanu and Escandell, “Comparative Analyses of Public Attitudes,” 322.65. See, for example, Moshe Semyonov, Rebecca Raijman, and Anastasia Gorodzeisky, “Foreign-

ers’ Impact on European Societies,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 49(1): 5–29 (2008);Lincoln Quillian, “Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe,” American Sociological Review 60: 586–611 (1995); Bart Meule-man, “Perceived Economic Threat and Anti-Immigration Attitudes: Effects of Immigrant Group Size andEconomic Conditions Revisited,” in Eldad Davidov, Peter Schmidt, and Jack Billiet, eds., Cross-CulturalAnalysis: Methods and Applications (London: Taylor & Francis, 2011), 283–312.

66. Elisa Rustenbach, “Sources of Negative Attitudes Toward Immigrants in Europe: A Multi-LevelAnalysis,” International Migration Review 44(1): 53–77 (2010); Elmar Schlueter and Ulrich Wagner, “Re-gional Differences Matter,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 49 (2–3): 153–73 (2008).

Appendix 1 The Individual-Level Variables

Variable Items Scale Mean (SD)

Xenophobic attitudestoward immigrants

• Immigrants increase crime rates(V50).

1–5 3.163 (0.825)

• Immigrants are generally goodfor [Country’s] economy (V51).

• Immigrants take jobs awayfrom people who were bornin [Country Nationality] (V52).

• Immigrants improve [CountryNationality] society bybringing in new ideas andcultures (V53).

• The government spends toomuch money assistingimmigrants (V54).

National identification How close do you feel to [yourcountry]? (V9)

1–4 3.392 (0.743)

Age (age) 16–98 46.062 (17.238)Gender Dummy variable (reference

group females) (sex)45%

Education degree 0–5 2.706 (1.457)Unemployment Dummy variable (reference

group employed) (wrkst)5%

Religiosity Attend at religious activity(attend)

1–8 3.706 (2.311)

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Appendix 2 Country-Level Variables

Country jus soli Access to Nationality Index

Australia 0 77Austria 0 22Bulgaria 0 24Canada 1 74Chile 1Czech Republic 0 33Denmark 0 33Finland 0 55.5France 0 59Germany 0 55.5Great Britain 0 67.2Hungary 0 29.5Ireland 1 59Israel 0Japan 0 33Latvia 0 15.5Netherlands 0 65.5New Zealand 1Norway 0 41Philippines 0Poland 0 35Portugal 0 82Russia 0Slovak Republic 0 32.6Slovenia 0 33South Korea 0Spain 0 39Sweden 0 79Switzerland 0 36United States 1 61Uruguay 1Venezuela 1

Notes. Jus soli for 2001 from Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008) data set (see note 44). A “1” is for full jus solipolicy. Access to nationality index scores from Migrant Integration Policy Index. Higher scores meanhigher access to nationality.

Gal Ariely teaches at the University of Haifa. His research interests are citizenshipand national identity.D

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