Do Social Approaches

7/29/2019 Do Social Approaches

1/10

Motley,M. T. (1990).On whether onecan(not) not communicate:An exami-nation via traditional communicationpostulates. Western ournal of SpeechCommunication,54,1-20.Palmer, R. T. (1969).Hermeneutics: I nter-pretation theory in Schleiermacher. Di l-they, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evans-ton: Northwestern University Press.Pomerane, A. (1989).Epilogue. WesternJ ournal of Speech Communication, 53Rort y, R. (1979). hilosophy and the mir-ror of nature. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press.Rorty, R. (1991). ssays on Heidegger andothers. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sityPress.

linguistics (R. Harris, Trans.). LaSalle,IL: OpenCourt.Schrag, C.0.(1986).Communicativepraxis and the spaceof subjectivity.Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Steier,F. (1991)Ed.). Research and refex-ivity. London: Sage.Stewart, . (1986,November). Dimensionsof dialogue in Gadamers theory andpractice. Paper presented at the annualconventionof theSpeechCommunica-tion Association, Chicago.Stewart, . (1991).A postmodern look attraditional communication postulates.Western ournal of Speech Communica-tion, 55,354-379.

tions of the symbol model for communi-cation theory. In R. Conville (Ed.),Structure in communication study. NewYork: Praeger.Stewart,J ., &Philipsen,G. (1984).Com-munication as situated accomplish-ment: The cases of hermeneutics andethnography. InB. Dervin&M. J.Voigt (Eds.), Progress incommunica-tionsciences, V (pp. 177-218).Nor-wood, NJ: Ablex.Taylor, C. (1985).Human agency and lan-guage: Philosophical papers, Vol. 1 .Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.Theunissen, M. (1984). he other: Studiesin the social ontology of Husserl. Hei-degger, Sartre, and Buber. Cambridge,MA: MIT Press.Warnke,G. (1987).Gadamer: Hermeneu-tics, tradition and reason. Stanford:Stanford University Press.Wittgenstein, L. (1961).Tractatus logico-philosophicus (D. F. Pears& B. F. Mc-Guiness, Trans.). London: Routledge& Kegan Paul.

242-246.

Saussure,F.de(1983). ourse in general

Stewart, . (in press).Structural implica-

Wittgenstein,L. (1963). hilosophical in-vestigations (G .E. M. Anscornbe,Trans.). London: Blackwell.

Social ApproachesDo SocialApproaches toInterpersonalCommunicationConstitute aContribution toCommunicationTheory?

by Stuart . SigmanThis brief rejoinder to the symposiumedited by Leeds-Hurwitz (1992) s in-tended to question, not the efforts ofthe individual scholars presented(Bochner& Ellis, 1992; Carbaugh&Hastings, 1992; orgenson, 1992;Lannamann, 1992),but rather the util-ity and efficacy of social approachesmore generally. I am admittedly am-bivalent over the critical stance as-sumed in this response, sinceI havemyself been identified with a social-cultural approach to communicationtheorizing for the past 12 years (Sig-man, 1980, 1987). Nevertheless, mycurrent thinking leads me to the con-clusion that societal and cultural con-cerns are necessary, but not sufficient,features of communication theory.Moreover, the emphasis on social ap-proaches, in my estimation, serves toimport yet another framework or per-spective for the studyof communica-tion from outside the discipline, andfailstoprovide a unique communica-tion-focused theory.The first part of this essay reviewssomeof the essential social andcul-

347


2/10

CommunicationTheory

tural insights that contributetoourun-derstanding of human conduct and thefailure of the symposium to addressthe diversity of social-cultural ap-proaches; the second part arguesforareconceptualizationof the central in-tellectual problemtobe addressed bycommunication scholars, suggestingthat the contributors to the sympo-sium are moving toward, but have notas yet arrived at, this problematic; andthe third part proposest wocriteria orstandards that communication theorymust (might) meet.Tenetsof Social Approaches toCommunicationLeeds-Hurwitz(1992)acknowledgesthat the term social approaches isbroad and that there is a diversity ofviewpoints among scholars whoseworks might be placed under theru-bric, including those whose essays arepublished in the symposium. Never-theless, Leeds-Huxwitz does providethree themes or propositions said toconstitute a generic social approach:

1.Reality is assumed not to be agiven or fixed entity existingprior to human activity (p.133)but rather is best seen as a socialconstruction, that is, the resultof human activity (cf. Lanna-mann, 1992, and Jorgenson,1992).

2. Participants in communicationevents hold and engender a plu-rality of meanings for thoseevents, and researchers must ac-count for and respect the polyse-mous nature of communication.Relatedly, researchers must ac-count for andmake explicit theirown meaning-making activities

as they go about studying andexplaining participants commu-nication (cf. Bochner & Ellis,1992; Jorgenson, 1992; Lanna-mann, 1992).

3. Communication events, both in-terpersonal and mass mediated,occur in a cultural context (orcontexts), and it is the culturalconditioning and contextualizingof communication that research-ers must study (cf.Carbaugh &Hastings, 1992).

WhileI do not objecttoany one of theabove propositions (nor to the threeancillary ones: communication as pro-cess and product; identity as a socialconstruction; and symbols as the basicunitsof interaction), I do questionwhether the level of abstraction re-quired for their articulation is benefi-cial to the development of communica-tion theory. Stated differently, Iquestion Leeds-Hurwitzsdecision notto present, both in her introductionand in the collected essays, the veryreal differences between various ap-proaches (p. 131) abeled as social.Leeds-Hurwitzs decision to create thegeneric label obscures importantcon-ceptual and methodological distinc-tions among, say, symbolic interac-tionism, ethnomethodology, culturalanalysis, social-structural realism, andethnography of speaking/communica-tion, some of the subsidiary social ap-proaches. In a separate section below,I question the decision made by Leeds-Hurwitz and adhered to by thecon-tributors tofocusonlyon interper-sonal communication, but hereI takeup some of the diverse issues obscuredby the single social approaches rubric.

First, commitment to the social

348


3/10

Forum

constructionist proposition on the partof the diverse scholars placed by Leeds-Hurwitz under the one rubric must bequestioned. For example, Leeds-Hurwitz (1992)suggests that the workof the sociologist Goffman (e.g.,1959,1974,1983) is profoundly cen-tral to the study of interpersonal com-munication, indeed bemoaning that heis cited more often in articles devotedto other areas (p. 134) ,for example,media studies. WhileI would agreethat Goffman is an important socialtheorist whose work illuminates com-munication processes, I also believethat his connection to social construc-tionism can be debated. Some havesuggested that Goffman is best seenwithin the structural functionalistcamp articulated by Durkheim (1982) ,Raddiffe-Brown( 1965),and Warner(1959) , heir collective concerns beingwith an a priori social system thatstructures communal activity and ritu-alsso astomaintain the systems integ-rity, especiallyinthe face of disruptiveand dysphoric events. While this isnot the appropriate placeforan ex-tended analysisof Goffmans intellec-tual ancestry (cf. Coll ins, 1985; Sig-man, 1987), t is important tobroachthe possibility that Goffman does notbelong under the symposiums inexactrubric.

The same doubts can be raisedabout the work of the anthropologicallinguist Hymes (1974) ,which is citedby both Leeds-Hurwitz(1992)andCarbaugh and Hastings (1992) .Hymess emphasis on the cultural re-sources or competence for communica-tion may not hold to the Forums con-structionist framework.at least threeof the four essays are so-

In this regard, itseems to me that

cial constructionist pure and simple(Bochner& Ellis, 1992; J orgenson,1992;Lannamann, 1992),and thismight have been a more accurate anddelimited label for the Forum. Thetrue diversity of social approaches isneither represented nor analyzed bythe symposium contributions.Finally, the collective essays leaveunexplored the precise relationship be-tween and among communication,culture, social construction, andsociety. How are these terms re-lated? Lannamann (1992)and Jorgen-son (1992)seem primarily concernedwith a reorientation of twoconcepts,the individual and rapport respec-tively, from a relational perspective,but where society enters such a reform-ulation is left undescribed. Indeed,there is a tacit push for studiesof mi-crointeractional processes (althoughsuch analyses are not performed bythe four contributors themselves),with a seeming concomitant bias to-ward conflating levelsof socialorgani-zation or social structure. What is itabout the phenomena under consider-ation that makes themsocial? Whilethere is certainly precedent within soci-ol ogy for viewing society as embodiedin members practices (Garfinkel,1967; Heritage, 1984),this analyticchoice needstobe acknowledged, ex-plored, and contrasted with alterna-tives (cf. Collins, 1985).Carbaughand Hastings (1992)write that withones social and cultural footing estab-lished, [the scholar] can . .. reatein-terpersonal communication theory ac-cordingly (p. 157).Left totallyuntouched by their essay on the non-linearityof theory production is howinterpersonal communication theorythat is responsivetosocial and cul -

349


4/10

Theory

tural features would in any way be dif-ferent from (or, at least, be distinctlycomplementary to) social and culturaltheory. Finally, Bochner and Ellis(1992) seem to equate social and in-terpersonal research modes (see pp.166-1 67).In brief, I am concerned that read-ersof the symposium will be left withthe impression that a collective school

of thought exists. The very real differ-ences across the subsumed social a pproaches are unexplored.A Central Problematic for aCommunication DisciplineMy second, and perhaps overridingconcern with the symposium is that itperpetuates disciplinary distinctions(interalia interpersonal, mass, organi-zational communication); these disci-plinary distinctions have traditionallyprecluded the study of communicationas a general process, emphasizing in-stead the unique constitution of partic-ular communication contexts. M ore-over, as I argue below, thecontributors to the symposium aremore focused onthe social and cul-tural antecedents to and products ofcommunication, than on the commu-nication process itself. A dmittedly, theauthors themselves claim a concernwith interactional processes: Whenthe concrete practices of the partici-pants in the research setting become in-cidental, the politics of the researchare obscured by abstract generaliza-tions (Lannamann, 1992, p. 146).Reformulating rapport from a socialperspective implies a change in the pri-orities given to interview content asagainst interview process (J orgenson,1992, p. 154, emphasis in original).Nevertheless, an emphasis on interac-tion, process, or communication isnot

sustained by the Forum essays. In theremainder of this essay, then, I wantto tease apart a distinction between so-cial-cultural approaches on the onehand and communication approacheson the other.The inspiration for my currentthinking on the need for general com-munication theory was first promptedby the Brenders-Cronen controversyconcerning theories of meaning appro-priate to the study of communicationprocesses (Brenders, 1987; Cronen,1987; Cronen, Pearce& Changsheng,1990). Brenders and Cronen (alongwith the latters CM M co-architectPearce) disagree on a number of philo-sophical points, the most important ofwhich for present purposes is Brend-erss insistence on an explanatory ap-paratus concerned with fixed and sta-ble meaningsof speech acts andCronens belief in fluid and ever-evolving meaning. Both Brenders andCronen establish themselves as purvey-ors of, and adherents to, impressiveancestral lineages: respectively,Searles (1969) speech act theory(Brenders), and Wittgensteins (1958)ordinary language philosophy (Cro-nen). What perplexes me about this de-bate since its initial appearance is theabsenceof some shared disciplinaryvocabulary for adjudicating the twopositions. I find this lacuna in ourdis-ciplinary development still troubling.The social approaches symposiumdoes nothing to redress this problem.

I do not think one needs to takesides with either the solution providedby Brenders or Cronen in order totake sides on the more general issueraised by the controversy. The generalissue, as I see it, is whether the processof communication plays some role inthe production of meaning, and, if so ,

350


5/10

how it is abletodo this. Should a disci-pline of communication be concernedwith preserving and developing a the-ory of meaning production in whichmeaning is predicated on a priori prag-matic conditions being met by utter-ances, as Brenders would have it, orshould we take up the causeof mean-ing as a context-dependent and con-text-evolving phenomenon, which isadvocated by Cronen?In other words, I believe thatBrenders and Cronen haveus at a criti-cal choice node, that regarding an on-tology of communication. The onechoice is to assume that the significantstuff of communication transpiresprior to, or at the least, behind thescenes of, the behavior being dis-played by communicating entities.Communication thus involves thetransmission and reception of mean-ings that derive from independent de-termining influences (that is, those in-dependent of communication): thesocial structural location of the com-municators; their affective states; theircognitive abilities; cultural, linguistic,and pragmatic rules; and so on. Tak-ing this choice assumes that communi-cation is a multiply influenced phe-nomenon, and justifies theimportation of explanatory conceptsof an interdisciplinary nature- bethese structural sociology, trait or per-sonality theory, cognitive psychology,or even the social constructionism em-ployed by the symposium contribu-tors.The alternative choice, however,freely admits to multiple influences onhuman behavior, but nonetheless sug-gests that there is a unique influencethat the processof communication it-self has in human affairs, and that thisunique influence is not captured by an-

thropological, psychological, or socio-logical explanations. T his secondchoice requires theorizing not merelyabout communication, butfromcom-munication as well. For reasons to bedeveloped throughout the remainderof this essay, I believe this is the appro-priate choice for an emerging disci-pline of communication.Consistent with the Cronen-Pearceposition described above, it seemstome that something occurs in the inter-actional processes of message genera-tion/reception that is not accountedfor either by the larger social structurein which the interaction occurs or bythe cognitive and affective processesthat enable persons to participate incommunication. In other words, theprocessof communication itself-whether that process is sustained byt wo people, a small group, an organi-zation, or a telemedium and an audi-ence-is consequential, and it is thenature of that consequentialitythatshould (might) be the appropriate fo-cus for a discipline of communication.

The Bochner and Ell is (1992)arti-cle illustrates my concern over whathappens when the social is empha-sized over the communicational.Bochner and Ellis reveal the arenaofsocial (that s, group negotiated) mean-ings invoked by and involved in anabortion decision, but they do notshed light on the communication pro-cess by which those meanings are ar-rived at, shared, and/or negotiated.They write about the human side ofthe lived experience of abortion-themeanings and feelings embodied bythe experience (p. 168).Y et, what welearn about are the outcomes of com-munication (in this case, the social se-mantics of abortion) not the processinformingor resulting in this seman-

35 1


6/10

CommunicationIhmry

tics, that is, how communicationmakes such meanings possible.

There are compelling reasons forgrounding communication theorywithin a social-cultural framework- arecognition thatour lives as communi-cators parallelour lives as enmeshedmembers of communities(6.orgen-sen,1992,and Lannamann, 1992),that the emergenceof sign and symboluseoccursin conjunction withour bio-evolutionary development as membersof a socially oriented species. Never-theless, the activityof behaving itself,the real-time process of communica-ti on, demands scholarly attention. I t ishere that a warrant for communica-tion theory (and a disciplineof com-munication) emerges-that is,a war-rant for thedose inspectionof,andsystematic theorizing from, communi-cation processes. The process of com-munication can be held up as an influ-enceon message production andinterpretation, and as nonreducibletothe aforementioned social, cultural,and cognitive influences and determi-nants.

It is importantto stress that I amnot suggesting here that a discipline bedeveloped to study the consequencesof communication, that is, the effeasthat purported communication vari-ables have on other variables. This isbecause the studyof consequencesdoes not examine actual process;rather, it treats process as given in or-dertogauge effects and results. I usethe term consequentiality o meanthat communication itself evidences adynamic and structure with regard tomeaningcreation/recreation/storage,and it is the natureof this dynamicand structure that must be studied (seeSigman, in press). I am urging that westudybow it is possible for the commu-

nication processtohave consequencesandtoexert a consequential role inpeoples lives. Consequentiality eadsto a considerationof the procedures,dynamics, and structures of communi-cation, not the effects themselves.Two Criteria or CommunicationTheoryWhat might a theory of communica-tion look like? Rather than espouseany particular such theory at this time,I want to offer a general scaffoldingfor theory development. Given whathas been written above, I propose thefollowingt wocriteria for judgingwhat constitutes communicationtheory:

1. I t isstated and statable so as torefer to communication phenom-ena generally and not to any spe-cific locale, group, or context ofcommunication.2. It refers to the interactional orprocessual production of mean-ing (significance, value, order).

The first criterionI call thecrite-rion of context independence.WhileIstrongly believe that the real-time pro-ductionof meaning is always rooted ina particular historical and existentialcontext, I also contend that a theoryof communication must refertothegeneral nature of meaning productionas generativeof and shaped by con-text, but not to meaning production isany single context. An alternative wayof stating this criterion istosuggestthat a theoryof communication mustnot be limited in its application to or-ganizations, families, telemediation,intra- or interperson groupings, or thelike- itmust refer to meaning-genera-

352


7/10

Forum

tion processes in general, and there-fore in all these contexts.

This fist criterion does not denythe utilityoflocal or context-specific theories- for example,ofmass, organizational, or small groupcommunication- but it suggests thatgeneral communication theory mustbe built in such a way astobe applica-bletothe processesof meaning genera-tion found in all these (and other) con-texts. Communication theory in thisview looks to account for formal, bothstructural and processual, similaritiesin the ways messages are handled (cre-ated, stored, invoked, negotiated, andthe like) by media, persons, organiza-tions, andso on. It strivestodescribehow meaning is made possible fromand in interaction.

The second criterionforcommuni-cation theory I call thepragmaticcrite-rion. Without denying the contribu-tion that presumablyaprionandindependent social-cultural, linguistic-semiotic (multichannel), and affective-cognitive resources make to the gener-ation of meaning, this second criterionderives from a belief that the ongoingprocessof meaning generation is itselfconsequential, and that it isthe natureof this consequentiality that must beaccounted for by communication the-ory. If the processof communicationdoes not make any difference to themeanings that are generated in mass,organizational, or interpersonal con-texts, then communication is not wor-thyof study. If meaning is assumed tobe (and is studied as) determined byfree-standing cognitive processes, lin-guistic patterns, social structures, cul-tural codes, and the like, then commu-nication is at best a neutral vehicle forconveying meaning-certainly it hasno determining nfluence- and its sta-

tus as an analytic interest ultimately re-fers back to the free-standing disci-plines already engaged in the studyofthe aforementioned processes andstructures. On the other hand, if themeaning that emerges at any one mo-mentof communication cannot bepredicated on the social structural lo-cations or psychological features ofthe participants, or onaprion social-cultural grammars, then we must turnattention to the determining forceplayed by the processof communica-tion itself. As suggested above, whilethe Social ApproachesForumcon-tributors do encourage a processualorientation tophenomenena such asculture, identity, rapport, relation-ships, and abortion, it is the study ofthese phenomena rather than commu-nication itself that is described.Summary and ImplicationsI admit to some ambivalence regard-ing this enterpriseof criteriaorstan-dards generation. On the one hand, Iam not comfortable casting myself inthe role of legislating what is or isnotwithin the purviewof communicationstudy. Creative scholarship is not nec-essarily dependent upon (or fosteredby) the creationormaintenance of reg-ulations, and indeed the scholarly en-terprise is potentially threatened bythe impositionof external prescrip-tions. On the other hand, I do believethat a discipline of communication ispossible, but that itremains a distantgoal. In my estimation, a communica-tion disciplinewiIl emerge simultane-ously with the development of a set ofintellectual problems dnd concernsand an analytic vocabulary that drawpeople, not into the study of separatecontextsof message production, buttothe general (across contexts) mes-

353


8/10

CommunicationTheory

sage production processes (see the for-mat of Sigman[19921for one possibleperspective for accomplishing thisgoal). This discipline of communica-tion bears little resemblanceto the cur-rent sociological (institutional) fact ofa scholarly communication researchenterprise. Instead, it will be foundedon the belief and demonstration thatcommunication processes interrelatewith, yet are distinct from, linguistic,sociological, social psychological, andcognitive processes with regard to themeanings generated by persons in ev-eryday community life.One final way to conclude this es-say is to note my belief that the prob-lematic established by the Forumsco-editor is both too broad and toonarrow, and must be respecified.First, the problematic strikes me as ex-ceedingly broad, in the sense that aso-cial approach is too far afield of com-munication and does not specify aunique role for communication the-ory. Leeds-Hunvitz (1992)describesher concern thus: Social approacheshave influenced the larger body ofcommunication theory . . .yet havetouched interpersonal communicationonly at the periphery, never becomingmainstream. This Forum seekstochange that (p. 132). I believe thatthere is a useful debate to be mountedthat questions the wholesale swallow-ing up of communication within aso-cial approachor approaches (or, forthat matter, within other disciplinaryapproaches). A social approach willalways maintain disciplinary loyaltyand contribution tosociology (orso-cial philosophyor social anthropol-ogy),and while it may take communi-cation as one of its objects of study itwill always doso from the standpoint

of being about communication periph-erally rather than from communica-tion directl~.~ocial constructionismdeveloped as a particular solution toparticular sociological questions (Col-lins, 1985);what questions aboutcommunication it addresses has notyet been explored in the presentForum.

At the same time, Leeds-Hunvitzsproblematic is arguably too narrow,in the sense that she is passionate onlyabout change in theoretical and meth-odological approaches to interper-sonal communication; while shelauds recent paradigm shifts in mediaand organizational studies, Leeds-Hurwitz does not offer a scheme thatquestions prevailing subdisciplinaryboundaries. I believe that subdiscipli-nary paradigm shifts are inadequatefor the development of communica-tion theory -the expressed purpose ofthis journal-if they do not coincidewith a discipline-wide paradigm shiftas well. Perhaps I am wrong and aso-cial approach in andof itself will pro-duce the needed paradigm shift; never-theless, at present I stand firm in mybelief that the needed paradigm shiftwould undermine taken-for-grantedsubdisciplinary distinctions. In otherwords, a new paradigm must stand asa contribution to (general) communi-cation theory, and thus adhere to thecriteria articulated above. Any changewithin interpersonal communicationserves too limited a purpose.

AuthorStuart J . Sigman (Ph.D., UniversityofPennsylvania) s associate professor andchairperson in the Department of Commu-nication, State University of N ew Y ork atAlbany, Albany, N Y 12222.

354


9/10

NotesEarly symbolic nteractionism offered asimilar critique, in this case of classic sociol-ogy! Human group life is necessarily a for-mative process and not a mere arena forthe expression of pre-existing [sociologicaland psychological] factors (Blumer,1969,p. 10).One need not endorse the solutionsprovided by symbolic nteractionism totake seriously the role of interaction in ev-eryday life and the rejection of a priori so-cial and cognitive explanations.any discipline that attempts to place com-munication within its purview: cognitivepsychology, the ethnography of communi-cation, and so on.

One possible exception o this state-ment is ethnomethodology (see Garfinkel,1967;Heritage, 1984),although even herethe essential problematic (social order) maybe different from that appropriate to a com-munication discipline (meaning).1am in-debted to Professor Harold Garfinkel fordiscussions at UCLA during Fall 1990,which prompted my development of theconsequentiality notion. Garfinkel woulddoubtless disagree with my insistenceonformal theory. Nevertheless, his insistenceon the practical accomplishment of sociallife and social facts has convinced me of theimportanceof studying behavioral conse-quentiality.

The argument here canbemade against

ReferencesBlumer, H. (1969).Symbolic interaction-ism.Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall.Bochner,A. P., & Ellis,C. (1992).Per-sonal narrative as a social approach tointerpersonal communication.Commu-nication Theory,2,165-172.Brenders, D. A. (1987).Fallaciesinthe co-ordinated management of meaning: Aphilosophy of language critique of thehierarchical organization of coherentconversation and related theory. Quar-terly J ournal of Speech, 73,329-348.Carbaugh,D., &Hastings, S.0. 1992).A role for communication theory in eth-nography and cultural analysis.Com-munication Theory,2,156-165.Collins,R . (1985).Theesociological tru-ditions.New York: Oxford UniversityPress.Cronen, V. E. (1987).The curious caseofpropositions. Paper presented to the

Speech Communication Association, Chi-cago, IL .Cronen, V. E., Pearce,W. B., &Chang-sheng,X. (1990).The meaning ofmeaning in the CMM analysis of com-munication:A comparisonof tw o tradi-tions. Researchon Lnnguage and SocialInteraction, 23, 1-40.Durkheim, E. (1982).The rules ofsoci o-logical method (W. D. Halls, Trans.).New York: Free Press. (Original workpublished1895)methodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall.Goffman, E. (1959).Presentation ofself ineveryday life.Garden City, NY: Dou-bleday Anchor.

Goffman, E. (1974).Frame analysis: An es-say on the organization of experience.New York: Harper.Goffman, E. (1983).The interaction or-der. American Sociological Review,48,

Garfinkel, H. (1967).Studies in ethno-

1-17.Heritage, . (1984).Gatfinkeland ethno-methodology. Cambridge: Polity Press.Hyrnes, D. (1974).Foundations in sociolin-guistics.Philadelphia: University ofPennsylvania Press.Jorgenson, J. (1992).Communication, rap-port and the interview:A social perspec-tive. Communication Theory,2,148-156.Lannamann,J . W. (1992).Deconstructingthe person and changing the subject ofinterpersonal studies.CommunicationTheory,2,139-148.duction: Social approaches to interper-sonal communication.CommunicationTheory,2,131-139.Radcliffe-Brown,A. R. (1965).Structureand function in primitive society. NewYork: Free Press.Searle,J . R. (1969).Speech acts: An essayin the philosophy of language.London:Cambridge University Press.Sigman,S.J . (1980).Oncommunicationrules from a social perspective.HumanCommunication Research. 7,37-51.Sigman,S . J. (1987).A perspective on so-cial communication.Lexington,MA:Lexington Books.Sigman,S. J . (Ed.). (1992). ntroduction tohuman communication: Behavior,codes and social action. NeedhamHeights,MA: Ginn Press/Simon&Schuster.

Sigman,S. J . (Ed.). (in press). The conse-

Leeds-Hurwitz,W. (1992).Forum intro-

35s


10/10

CommunicationTheory

quentialityof communication.Hills-dale,NJ :Erlbaum.Warner,W. L . (1959) . The livingand thedead: A studyof the symbolic lifeofAmericans. NewHaven: Y ale Univer-sityPress.

Wittgenstein,L . (1958) .Philosophical in-vestigutions (G.E . M . Anscornbe,Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell.

356

Do Social Approaches

Documents