Do SEO Underwriters Charge Firms with Weak Shareholder Rights More? Ji-Chai Lin * Bahar Ulupinar Louisiana State University West Chester University [email protected][email protected]Abstract This paper examines whether shareholder rights have an external effect on the behavior of underwriters. We hypothesize that it is more difficult for firms with more restrictions on shareholder rights to raise external equity, and that since any difficulty in firm commitment offerings transferred to underwriters, they would ask for higher underwriting fees to compensate for the difficulty and put more efforts to promote the SEOs. Using analyst recommendations as a proxy for underwriters’ efforts, we find that, consistent with our hypothesis, analyst recommendations on issuing firms with weak shareholder rights increase more than those with strong shareholder rights prior to SEOs, and that underwriting spreads are positively related to issuing firms’ G-index. Furthermore, consistent with Bebchuk et al (2009), the effect of the G- index on underwriting fees is largely contained in the six provisions in the E-index. JEL classification: G32, G24 Key words: Shareholder Rights, Analyst Coverage, SEOs, Gross Spreads Comments welcome This draft: January 20, 2011 * Corresponding Author: 2160 Patrick Taylor Hall, LSU, Baton Rouge, LA 70803. Phone: 225-578-6252.
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Do SEO Underwriters Charge Firms with Weak Shareholder Rights More?
Ji-Chai Lin* Bahar Ulupinar
Louisiana State University West Chester University
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31
Fig. 1: Analyst Recommendation Mean Levels around the SEO Issue Month for the SEO
and Match Samples.
Recommendation mean level is calculated as the average of latest outstanding recommendations (in a 5-
point scale) issued by all analysts within one year period. The SEO sample includes SEOs from 1995 to
2006 that meet following criteria: (1) issuing firms must be present in both IRRC governance and I/B/E/S
recommendation databases; (2) offer price is greater than $5; and (3) issuing firms have a share code of
10 or 11 (i.e., we exclude ADR, closed-end fund, unit investment trusts, and Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs)). The match sample consists of 911 observations matched by size, G-index, and SIC.
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
4
4.1
4.2
-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
An
aly
st R
eco
mm
end
ati
on
Mea
n L
evel
Months Relative to SEO Issue Month
SEO Sample
Match Sample
32
Fig. 2: Analyst Recommendation Mean Levels around the SEO Issue Month for the
Shareholder Rights Subsamples
Recommendation mean level is calculated as the average of latest outstanding recommendations (in a 5-
point scale) issued by all analysts within one year period. The SEO sample includes SEOs from 1995 to
2006 that meet following criteria: (1) issuing firms must be present in both IRRC governance and I/B/E/S
recommendation databases; (2) offer price is greater than $5; and (3) issuing firms have a share code of
10 or 11 (i.e., we exclude ADR, closed-end fund, unit investment trusts, and Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs)). The Strong Shareholder Rights subsample consists of issuing firms that have a G-Index
5 or lower. Firms in the Weak Shareholder Rights subsample have a G-Index of 14 or greater. Remaining
firms make up the medium shareholder rights subsample.
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
4
4.1
4.2
-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
An
aly
st R
eco
mm
end
ati
on
Mea
n L
evel
Months Relative to SEO Issue Month
Strong Shareholder Rights
Medium Shareholder Rights
Weak Shareholder Rights
33
Fig. 3: Analyst Recommendation Mean Levels around the SEO Issue Month for the
Matched Subsamples
Recommendation mean level is calculated as the average of latest outstanding recommendations (in a 5-
point scale) issued by all analysts within one year period. For each SEO, we find a matched non-issuer,
which has analyst recommendation data available in the issue month; is in the same shareholder rights
subsample, based on the G-index; has a firm size between 75% and 125% of the issuing firm; and has the
same 3-digit SIC code. The Strong Shareholder Rights subsample consists of matched firms that have a
G-Index 5 or lower. Matched firms in the Weak Shareholder Rights subsample have a G-Index of 14 or
greater. Remaining matched firms make up the medium shareholder rights subsample.
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
4.0
4.1
4.2
-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
An
aly
st R
eco
mm
end
ati
on
Mea
n L
evel
Months Relative to SEO Issue Month
Strong Shareholder Rights
Medium Shareholder Rights
Weak Shareholder Rights
34
Table 1: Frequency of SEOs by Offer Year
This table shows the frequency distribution of SEOs by year for the whole sample and the shareholder rights subsamples. Following Gompers et al (2003),
the Strong Shareholder Rights subsample consists of firms that have a G-Index 5 or lower; firms with Weak Shareholder Rights have a G-Index of 14 or
greater; and the remaining firms with a G-index between 5 and 14 make up the medium shareholder rights subsample.
Whole Sample
Strong Shareholder
Rights
Medium-Level Shareholder
Rights
Weak Shareholder
Rights
Year
Frequency
Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
1995
79
0.09
16
0.13
59
0.08
4
0.10
1996
50
0.05
5
0.04
41
0.05
4
0.10
1997
47
0.05
4
0.03
41
0.05
2
0.05
1998
83
0.09
18
0.14
62
0.08
3
0.08
1999
65
0.07
12
0.09
51
0.07
2
0.05
2000
65
0.07
13
0.10
50
0.07
2
0.05
2001
64
0.07
7
0.05
54
0.07
3
0.08
2002
124
0.14
16
0.13
103
0.14
5
0.13
2003
92
0.10
11
0.09
75
0.10
6
0.15
2004
133
0.15
14
0.11
113
0.15
6
0.15
2005
55
0.06
7
0.05
48
0.06
0
0.00
2006
58
0.06
5
0.04
51
0.07
2
0.05
Total
915
100%
128
100%
748
100%
39
100%
35
TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Whole Sample and Sub-samples
This table provides descriptive statistics for the SEO sample and for the shareholder rights subsamples. Following Gompers et al (2003), the Strong
Shareholder Rights subsample consists of firms that have a G-Index 5 or lower; firms with Weak Shareholder Rights have a G-Index of 14 or greater; and
the remaining firms with a G-index between 5 and 14 make up the medium shareholder rights subsample. E-Index is Bebchuck et al’s (2009) Entrenchment
index and O-Index contains the other 18 IRRC provisions not in the E-index. Principal Amount is offer price times number of shares filed. Mean Level is
the average of latest recommendations (in a 5-point scale) up to the SEO month issued by all analysts covering the firm. Size is market capitalization in
month -6. Share turnover is the ratio of average daily share trading volume from day -90 to day -11 divided by pre-SEO total shares outstanding. Gibbs
Estimate is an estimate of effective bid-ask spread in the SEO year. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns from days -90 to -11.
Reputation is the Carter and Manaster reputation measure in the year prior to SEO issuance. Shelf dummy for shelf registered SEOs. Many book runner is
equal to 1 if there are more than one book-runner and zero otherwise. Exchange dummy equals to 1 if issuer is listed in NYSE.
Whole Sample
Strong Shareholder Rights
Medium-Level Shareholder Rights
Weak Shareholder Rights
No of
Obs
Mean
Std.
Dev.
No of
Obs
Mean
Std.
Dev.
No of
Obs
Mean
Std.
Dev.
No of
Obs
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Gross Spread
915
3.65
1.46
128
3.50
1.63
748
3.66
1.43
39
3.90
1.26
Change in Mean
908
0.06
0.46
128
0.05
0.46
741
0.06
0.46
39
0.21
0.51
Mean Level
915
3.94
0.51
128
4.11
0.42
748
3.91
0.53
39
3.93
0.47
G-Index
915
8.73
2.78
128
4.51
0.68
748
9.12
2.00
39
15.10
1.31
E-Index
915
2.21
1.34
128
0.53
0.65
748
2.42
1.20
39
3.90
0.71
O-Index
915
6.51
1.92
128
3.98
0.80
748
6.70
1.43
39
11.21
1.32
Principal Amount (In $Mil.)
915
274
340
128
277
278
748
279
355
39
179
172
Size (In $Mil.)
915
4334
14210
128
5549
20782
748
4185
13103
39
3194
5611
Gibbs Estimate (%)
915
0.42
0.28
128
0.51
0.32
748
0.41
0.28
39
0.36
0.24
Turnover (%)
915
0.83
0.89
128
0.90
0.96
748
0.82
0.89
39
0.66
0.60
Volatility (10-3)
915
25.51
13.75
128
27.42
11.90
748
25.11
13.82
39
26.77
17.41
Reputation
914
0.94
0.24
127
0.91
0.28
748
0.95
0.22
39
0.82
0.39
Shelf Dummy
915
0.41
0.49
128
0.33
0.47
748
0.42
0.49
39
0.41
0.50
Tobin's Q
909
2.02
1.84
127
2.44
1.80
743
1.96
1.87
39
1.72
1.12
Many Book-runner Dummy
915
0.31
0.46
128
0.21
0.41
748
0.33
0.47
39
0.28
0.46
Number of Analysts
915
7.60
4.95
128
7.35
4.49
748
7.60
4.89
39
8.46
7.10
Net Proceeds (In $Mil.)
900
265
333
124
268
271
737
270
347
39
173
167
Offer Price
915
34.80
22.86
128
37.31
21.55
748
34.60
23.37
39
30.38
22.86
36
TABLE 3: Correlations among Selected Variables
This table presents correlations among selected variables defined in Table 2 for the 915 sample SEOs. ***, **, * refer to the 1%, 5% and 10%
significance levels, respectively.
Gross Spread
Mean Level
Change in
Mean Level
Log (Principal
Amount )
Log (Size)
G-Index
E-Index
Gross Spread 1
Mean Level
0.159 ***
1
Change in Mean Level 0.072
0.382 ***
1
Log (Principal Amount ) -0.334 ***
0.060 *
-0.005
1
Log (Size)
-0.550 ***
-0.120 ***
-0.077 **
0.709 ***
1
G-Index
0.047
-0.134 ***
0.052
-0.062 *
0.029
1
E-Index
0.074 **
-0.123 ***
0.018
-0.089 ***
-0.082 **
0.779 ***
1
Gibbs Estimate 0.282 ***
0.246 ***
0.025
-0.130 ***
-0.217 ***
-0.156 ***
-0.175 ***
Turnover
0.048
0.028
-0.051
0.039
-0.043
-0.101
-0.034
Volatility
0.237 ***
0.182 ***
0.004
-0.010
-0.131 ***
-0.089
-0.084
Tobin's Q
0.016
0.154 ***
-0.035
0.164 ***
0.190 ***
-0.141 ***
-0.137 ***
Reputation
-0.141 ***
-0.026
-0.020
0.268 ***
0.208 ***
-0.061
-0.042
Many Book-runner 0.136 ***
-0.083 **
0.012
0.276 ***
0.203 ***
0.064
0.075
Exchange Dummy -0.190 ***
-0.076 **
-0.020
0.187 ***
0.193 ***
0.159 ***
0.118 ***
37
TABLE 4: Mean Analyst Recommendation Levels Surrounding the Issue Month
Analyst recommendation mean level for each firm in a given month is calculated as the average of latest outstanding recommendations (in a 5-point scale)
issued by all analysts covering the firm within one year period. The SEO sample includes 915 SEOs from 1995 to 2006. Following Gompers et al (2003), the
Strong Shareholder Rights subsample consists of firms that have a G-Index 5 or lower; firms with Weak Shareholder Rights have a G-Index of 14 or greater;
and the remaining firms with a G-index between 5 and 14 make up the medium shareholder rights subsample. The match sample consists of 911 observations
matched by size, G-index, and SIC. Panel A and Panel B present the average of the mean analyst recommendation levels in selected event months and test
whether they are significantly different from that in the issue month; and the bottom row tests whether the difference between Strong and Weak shareholder
rights subsample in a given month is significantly different from zero. Panel C show the average differences in mean analyst recommendations between the
SEO and the match samples. ***, **, * refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Panel A:
SEO sample
Pre-Issue Month Period
Issue
Month Post-Issue Month Period
-12
-9
-6
-3
-1
0
1
3
6
9
12
Strong SHR
3.99 *
3.98 **
4.04
4.06
4.08
4.11
4.11
4.06
4.00 *
3.95 ***
3.92 ***
Medium SHR
3.80 ***
3.80 ***
3.85 **
3.88 *
3.89
3.91
3.93
3.93
3.90
3.84 ***
3.80 ***
Weak SHR
3.59 ***
3.69 **
3.72 **
3.86
3.89
3.93
3.97
4.02
3.97
3.84
3.73 *
Diff. (S-W)
0.40 ***
0.30 ***
0.32 ***
0.20 **
0.19 **
0.17
0.14 *
0.04
0.03
0.11
0.19
Panel B
Match sample
Pre-Issue Month Period
Issue
Month Post-Issue Month Period
-12
-9
-6
-3
-1
0
1
3
6
9
12
Strong SHR
3.79
3.65
3.66
3.74
3.73
3.74
3.73
3.74
3.74
3.75
3.69
Medium SHR
3.71
3.70
3.70
3.68
3.72
3.70
3.72
3.72
3.68
3.59 ***
3.57 ***
Weak SHR
3.71
3.75
3.77
3.75
3.77
3.68
3.61
3.66
3.54
3.48
3.76
Diff. (S-W)
0.08
-0.09
-0.11
-0.01
-0.05
0.07
0.12
0.08
0.20
0.27 **
-0.07
38
Panel C
SEO-Match
Pre-Issue Month Period
Issue
Month Post-Issue Month Period
-12
-9
-6
-3
-1
0
1
3
6
9
12
Strong SHR
0.22
0.36
0.39
0.31
0.36
0.36
0.38
0.33
0.26
0.19 *
0.20
Medium SHR
0.09 ***
0.09 ***
0.13 **
0.20
0.17
0.22
0.20
0.21
0.21
0.23
0.20
Weak SHR
-0.18 **
-0.09 *
-0.06 *
0.12
0.16
0.25
0.36
0.36
0.36
0.39
-0.08
Diff. (S-W)
0.40 *
0.45 **
0.45 ***
0.19
0.20
0.11
0.02
-0.03
-0.10
-0.20
0.28
39
TABLE 5: Underwriting Spreads by Shareholder Rights and Mean Analyst Recommendation
Levels
This table presents average underwriting spreads for three equal portfolios sorted by the mean analyst
recommendation at the issue month for each shareholder rights subsample. Following Gompers et al
(2003), the Strong Shareholder Rights subsample consists of firms that have a G-Index 5 or lower; firms
with Weak Shareholder Rights have a G-Index of 14 or greater; and the remaining firms with a G-index
between 5 and 14 make up the medium shareholder rights subsample. Column 5 shows the differences in
gross spreads (H-L) between the High Mean subsample and the Low Mean subsample. Row 6 shows the
differences in gross spreads (W-S) between the Weak Shareholder Rights subsample and the Strong
Shareholder Rights subsample. The last cell at column 5 and row 6 represents the difference between the
Weak Shareholder Rights & High mean analyst recommendation subsample and the Strong Shareholder
Rights & Low mean analyst recommendation subsample. ***, **, * refer to the 1%, 5% and 10%
significance levels for one-tail test.
Mean Quintile
Difference
(H-L)
Shareholder Rights
Low
Medium
High
Strong Shareholder
Rights
3.290
3.433
3.778 0.488 *
Medium Shareholder
Rights
3.411
3.641
3.938
0.527 ***
Weak Shareholder Rights
3.699
3.781
4.213
0.514
*
Difference (W-S)
0.409
0.348
0.435*
0.923
***
40
Table 6: Percentage of Firms by the Shareholder Rights Subsamples
This table presents the ratios of firm-year observations in a subgroup to all firm-year observations in the whole
group in a given year for the IRRC Universe and for the SEO sample. Following Gompers et al (2003), the Strong
Shareholder Rights subsample consists of firms that have a G-Index 5 or lower. Firms in the Weak Shareholder
Rights subsample have a G-Index of 14 or greater. Remaining firms make up the medium sample. The last row
presents the number of firm-year observations (SEOs) for the entire sample period. Row Total presents the ratios
of firm-year observations in a subgroup to all firm-year observations in the whole group over the entire sample
period.
LEVEL OF SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
Strong Shareholder
Rights
Medium Shareholder
Rights
Weak Shareholder
Rights
YEAR
IRRC
Universe
SEO
Sample
IRRC
Universe
SEO
Sample
IRRC
Universe
SEO
Sample
1995
0.100
0.203
0.839
0.747
0.061
0.051
1996
0.101
0.100
0.837
0.820
0.062
0.080
1997
0.101
0.085
0.837
0.872
0.062
0.043
1998
0.141
0.217
0.813
0.747
0.045
0.036
1999
0.141
0.185
0.812
0.785
0.047
0.031
2000
0.100
0.200
0.853
0.769
0.046
0.031
2001
0.102
0.109
0.848
0.844
0.050
0.047
2002
0.090
0.129
0.861
0.831
0.049
0.040
2003
0.088
0.120
0.861
0.815
0.051
0.065
2004
0.084
0.105
0.873
0.850
0.043
0.045
2005
0.083
0.127
0.872
0.873
0.046
0.000
2006
0.075
0.086
0.886
0.879
0.039
0.034
TOTAL
0.100
0.140
0.851
0.817
0.049
0.043
Number of Firms/SEOs
1,973
128
16,788
748
972
39
41
TABLE 7: Differences in the G-index Between the SEO Sample and the IRRC universe
This table tests the differences in means of the G-Index (and the E-Index) between the IRRC universe and
the SEO sample. ***, **, * refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Panel A: G-Index
YEAR
IRRC Universe SEO Sample
IRRC-SEO
1995
9.277
8.342
0.935 ***
1996
9.288
9.340
-0.052
1997
9.288
9.106
0.182
1998
8.755
8.494
0.261
1999
8.781
7.831
0.950 ***
2000
8.981
8.092
0.889 ***
2001
9.003
9.203
-0.200
2002
9.010
8.919
0.091
2003
9.084
9.163
-0.079
2004
9.052
8.985
0.067
2005
9.152
8.273
0.880 **
2006
9.022
8.672
0.349
TOTAL
9.049
8.727
0.322 ***
Panel B: E-Index
YEAR
IRRC Universe SEO Sample
IRRC-SEO
1995
2.228
1.873
0.354 **
1996
2.225
2.300
-0.075
1997
2.225
2.191
0.034
1998
2.187
1.964
0.223
1999
2.170
1.754
0.416 **
2000
2.333
1.815
0.517 ***
2001
2.332
2.484
-0.152
2002
2.386
2.363
0.023
2003
2.414
2.511
-0.097
2004
2.455
2.414
0.041
2005
2.481
2.273
0.208
2006
2.429
2.431
-0.002
TOTAL
2.295
2.220
0.075 *
42
TABLE 8: Subgroup Tests between the SEO Sample and the IRRC universe
This table tests the differences in mean of governance provisions (in each of the 5 subgroups in the G-index) between
the IRRC universe and the SEO sample. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
STATE LAWS
DIRECT TAKEOVER DEFENSE
SPECIAL VOTING
YEAR
IRRC
Universe
SEO
Sample
IRRC-SEO
IRRC
Universe
SEO
Sample
IRRC-SEO
IRRC
Universe
SEO
Sample
IRRC-
SEO
1995
1.77
1.56
0.22
1.06
0.75
0.31 ***
2.13
2.01
0.11
1996
1.8
1.54
0.26
1.08
1.04
0.04
2.12
2.36
-0.24 **
1997
1.8
1.57
0.22
1.08
0.79
0.29 **
2.12
2.26
-0.14
1998
1.68
1.64
0.04
0.94
0.83
0.1
2.16
2.12
0.04
1999
1.7
1.54
0.16
0.94
0.57
0.37 ***
2.15
2.09
0.06
2000
1.7
1.51
0.19
0.95
0.77
0.18
2.19
2.09
0.09
2001
1.74
1.67
0.07
0.95
0.97
-0.02
2.19
2.23
-0.05
2002
1.67
1.96
-0.29 **
0.89
0.76
0.13 *
2.22
2.1
0.12
2003
1.69
1.72
-0.03
0.91
0.93
-0.02
2.22
2.35
-0.13
2004
1.68
1.79
-0.11
0.88
0.78
0.1
2.22
2.25
-0.03
2005
1.73
1.44
0.3 **
0.91
0.75
0.17
2.22
2.25
-0.03
2006
1.72
1.52
0.2
0.84
0.67
0.17
2.21
2.26
-0.05
TOTAL
1.74
1.66
0.07 *
0.98
0.8
0.18 ***
2.18
2.19
-0.01
TAKEOVER DELAY
MANAGEMENT PROTECTION
YEAR
IRRC
Universe
SEO
Sample
IRRC-SEO
IRRC
Universe
SEO
Sample
IRRC-SEO
1995
2.07
1.95
0.12
2.51
2.27
0.24 *
1996
2.07
2.38
-0.31 *
2.49
2.32
0.17
1997
2.07
2.28
-0.21
2.49
2.32
0.17
1998
2.1
2.25
-0.16
2.09
1.94
0.15
1999
2.11
2.09
0.01
2.1
1.69
0.41 **
2000
2.18
2.15
0.03
2.19
1.77
0.42 ***
2001
2.17
2.19
-0.02
2.2
2.31
-0.12
2002
2.4
2.4
0.01
2.05
2.1
-0.04
2003
2.4
2.34
0.07
2.08
2.07
0.02
2004
2.46
2.43
0.03
2.05
2.09
-0.04
2005
2.46
2.13
0.33 **
2.09
1.91
0.18
2006
2.46
2.5
-0.04
2.05
2.02
0.03
TOTAL
2.16
2.27
-0.11 ***
2.24
2.06
0.17 ***
43
TABLE 9: The Effect of the G-Index on Underwriting Fees
This table presents OLS regressions of underwriting spread on the G-Index, changes in the mean level of analyst
recommendations, the mean level of analyst recommendations in month -6 and a set of control variables defined in
Table 2. Year dummies are included but not reported. In parentheses are t-values, based on robust standard errors;
and ***, **, * refer to the estimates are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Intercept
16.190 ***
16.691 ***
11.370 ***
(19.91)
(22.86)
(8.33)
Change in Mean
0.059
0.080
0.338 ***
(0.56)
(0.79)
(3.18)
Mean at month -6
-0.017
0.005
0.261 ***
-(0.19)
(0.06)
(2.67)
G-Index
0.045 ***
0.044 ***
0.032 **
(3.32)
(3.24)
(2.05)
Log(Principal)
0.078
-0.489 ***
(1.06)
-(7.07)
Log(Size)
-0.689 ***
-0.649 ***
-(13.19)
-(21.29)
Gibbs
0.445 ***
0.437 ***
81.844 ***
(2.88)
(2.85)
(4.59)
Turnover
-0.011 **
-0.011 **
-0.012 **
-(2.15)
-(2.12)
-(2.03)
Volatility
7.877 **
8.336 **
17.666 ***
(1.99)
(2.07)
(3.86)
Tobin's Q
0.054 **
0.053 **
-0.021
(2.31)
(2.36)
-(0.84)
Reputation
-0.275
-0.241
-0.309
-(1.61)
-(1.43)
-(1.53)
Shelf Dummy
-0.399 ***
-0.406 ***
-0.528 ***
-(3.98)
-(4.06)
-(4.69)
Many Book-runner
0.884 ***
0.906 ***
0.882 ***
(10.84)
(11.31)
(9.74)
Exchange Dummy
-0.236 **
-0.218 **
-0.282 **
(-2.30)
(-2.15)
(-2.42)
Year Dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
R-Square
0.4812
0.48
0.3361
N
901
901
901
44
TABLE 10: The Effect of the E-Index on Underwriting Fees
This table presents OLS regressions of underwriting spread on the E-Index, the O-index, changes in the mean level
of analyst recommendations, the mean level of analyst recommendations in month -6 and a set of control variables
defined in Table 2. The O-index contains the 18 IRRC provisions not in Bebchuck et al’s (2009) E-index. Year
dummies are included but not reported. In parentheses are t-values, based on robust standard errors; and ***, **, *
refer to the estimates are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.