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DoMuslimsandChristiansbelieveinthesameGod?
RezaShah‐Kazemi,TheInstituteofIsmailiStudies
‘Somegoddirectmyjudgment!’
ThePrinceofMoroccoinMerchantofVenice,ActII,SceneVII
ThisisthesupplicationmadebythePrinceasheisabouttotakethetestwhichhasbeen
setforwinningthefairPortia’shand:torightlyguesswhichofthethreechestscontains
herportrait.Shakespearemaywellhavebeenengaginginaplayfulironybyhavingthe
MuslimPrincemakethissupplication.Forhemusthaveknownthatacentraltenetofthe
Islamicmandatewas,precisely,toputanendtopolytheism.ThePrince’ssupplication,
though,helpsustoseequitestarklythecontrast,orratherincommensurability,between
polytheismandmonotheism:withinthefirstsystemofbelief,therearemanygodsfrom
whichtochoose,whilethesecondassertsthatthereisbutoneGodfromwhomtoseekhelp
andguidance.Weshouldseeinthelightofthiscontrastthatitisillogicalifnotabsurdto
giveanythingotherthananaffirmativeanswertothequestionputtous:‘DoMuslimsand
ChristiansbelieveinthesameGod?’If,instead,weweretoaskChristiansandMuslimsthe
question:doyoubelieveinoneGod—inaunique,ultimateRealityfromwhichallthings
emerge,towhichallthingsreturn,andbywhichallthingsaregoverned?,theanswer
wouldbe:ofcourse!IfbothpartiesagreethatthereisonlyoneGod,andnotmanyfrom
whichtochoosetobelieveornotbelieve;andifbothpartiesaffirmthattheybelieveinGod,
thentheconclusionfollowsinescapably:ChristiansandMuslimsdobelieveinthesame—
theone‐and‐only—God.‘Afalsegodhasnoexistenceintherealworld’,StPaultellsus,and
goesontoaffirm:‘ThereisnoGodbutone’(Cor.8:4).TheQur’ānstatesthesamesimple
principleinthefollowingverse,oneofmanywhichrestatethefirstpartofthebasiccreed
ofIslam,lāilāhailla’Llāh,‘nodivinitybutGod’:‘ThereisnoGodbuttheoneGod’(5:73;
emphasisadded).TheQur’ānthenmakesexplicitthelogicalconcomitantofthisoneness,
asregardsfellowbelieversinthisoneGod,bytellingtheMuslimstosaytotheChristians
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andJews:‘OurGod(ilāhunā)andyourGod(ilāhukum)isone’(29:46).Fellowmonotheists,
howevermuchtheymaydisagreeaboutothermatters,areasonewithregardtotheOne:
theyallbelieveinGodassuch,asopposedtobelievinginsuchandsuchagod.
However,oncewemovefromthisstraightforwardmonotheisticpostulateandenterinto
theologicaldiscussionofthenatureofthisGodinwhomallmonotheistsbelieve,we
encountermajorproblems.Themostinsurmountableofthesearegeneratedbythe
ChristiandoctrinesoftheIncarnationandtheTrinity:isJesusGodincarnate,andifso,to
whatextentdoesthisincarnationenterintothedefinitionoftheessentialnatureofGod?Is
beliefintheTrinityanessentialconditionforauthenticbeliefinGod?OnekindofChristian
position,basedonorthodoxdogma,canbeconceivedasfollows:
1) WeaffirmoneGod,butthisaffirmationisarticulatedintermsofabeliefinaTrinity
ofthreePersons:Father,SonandSpirit;
2) thisbeliefconstitutesanessentialelementofChristianbeliefinGod;
3) anyonewhodoesnotsharethisbeliefcannotbesaidtobelieveinthesameGod.1
Suchapositionnotonlyanswersnegativelytothequestionposed—Muslimsand
ChristianscertainlydonotbelieveinthesameGod—itwillalsoelicitfromtheMuslimside
acorrespondinglynegativeanswer:weagreewithyou,theywillsaytotheChristians,we
donotrecogniseourGod,Allāh,inthedivinityyoudescribe,sowecannotbelieveinthe
sameGod.
ItwouldseemthatouranswertothequestionwhetherMuslimsandChristiansbelievein
thesameGodmustthereforecomprisebothpositiveandnegativeelements,ithastobe
bothyesandno:‘yes’,objectivelyandmetaphysically;and‘no’,subjectivelyand
theologically.Buttheobjective,metaphysical‘yes’outweighsthesubjective,theological
‘no’.Inotherwords,MuslimsandChristiansdoindeedbelieveinthesameGod,insofaras
theultimatereferentoftheirbeliefisThattowhichtheword‘God’metaphysicallyrefers:
1 This view, together with a stress on the centrality of the Incarnation to the Christian conception of God, has characterised the response of many leading Evangelicals to the Common Word interfaith initiative, an initiative to which reference will be made at the end of this essay.
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thetranscendentAbsolute,ultimateReality,theuniquesourceofBeing.However,when
thissameRealityisconceivedbyhumanthought,andthisconceptionisframedin
theologicaldiscourse,withreferencetotheattributesandactsofthisReality—suchas
Creator,Revealer,Saviour,andJudge—thenfundamentaldifferencesbetweenthetwo
systemsofbeliefwillbeapparent.Thesedifferenceswillremaininplaceforaslongas—
andinsofaras—weremainconceptuallyboundbythelimitsoftheology;buttheycanbe
resolvedonthehigherplaneofmetaphysicsandthedeeperplaneofmysticism—planes
whicharenotconstrained,doctrinallyasregardsmetaphysicsorexperientiallyasregards
mysticism,bythelimitationsoftheology.2
Wewillaimtosubstantiatethisargumentwithreferencetotwochiefsources:therevealed
dataoftheQur’ān,andtheinspireddataofthemetaphysiciansandmysticsofboth
ChristianityandIslam.TheQur’ān—andtheSunnaorConductoftheProphet,whichisan
eloquentcommentarythereon—providesuswithcompellingevidencethatthesupreme
ObjectofbeliefandworshipisGodforbothMuslimsandChristians,eveniftheconceptions
ofGodheldbyMuslimsandChristiansdivergeand,atpoints,contradicteachother.The
perspectivesofsuchmysticsasIbnal‐‘ArabīinIslam,andMeisterEckhartinChristianity
helptorevealthemannerinwhichthesedivergentsubjectiveconceptionsofGodfailto
infringeupontheobjectiveone‐and‐onlinessoftheAbsolutebelievedinbyMuslimsand
Christians.TheAbsolutereferentoftheword‘God’/‘Allāh’,then,isoneandthesamewhen
ourfocusisonthetranscendentObjectofbelief,ratherthanthehumansubjectadheringto
thebelief:iftheword‘belief’bedefinedprincipallyintermsofthedivineObjectrather
thanthehumansubject,thenouranswertothequestionposedmustbeintheaffirmative.
Wecannotofcourseignorethesubjectivesideofthequestion,for‘belief’impliesboth
things,anobjectandasubject;butevenhere,wecanansweraffirmatively,ifthebeliefof
thehumansubjectbedefinedmoreintermsofspiritualorientationthanmental
2 If it be asked what is the difference between theology and metaphysics we would reply as follows, basing ourselves on the writings of René Guénon and Frithjof Schuon: theology is rational thought focused upon the data of revelation, while metaphysics is the rational expression of intellection, intuition, or inspiration, which is proportioned both to the substance of revelation and its source, that is, the Revealer, or the divine reality per se. The two are by no means mutually exclusive; indeed, as Palamite ‘mystical theology’, in particular, demonstrates, theology can be enriched by the intellectual insights of metaphysics and by the experiential certitudes of the mystics.
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conception,focusingmoreontheinneressenceoffaiththanonitsouterform.This
determinationtofocusontheessentialelementsoffaithwithinthesubject,ratherthanthe
relativelyaccidentalfeaturesofconceptualbelief,reflectsourconcernwithwhatismost
essentialinthedivineObjectoffaith—namely,ultimateReality—ratherthanderivative,
dogmaticallyexpressedaspectsofthatReality.Muslimswillnotbeabletoaffirmbeliefin
‘theTrinity’anymorethanChristians,ontheplaneoftheology,canunequivocallyaffirm
beliefinwhatMuslimscall‘Allāh’;forthistermhascometoimplycomplextheological
beliefsarticulatedintermsofawholemyriadofpremises,assumptions,andfoundations,
theacceptanceofall,ormost,ofwhichisnecessaryforthetheologicalaffirmationofbelief
inAllāh.If,however,attentionisdirectedawayfromthetheologicaldefinitionofAllāh,and
toitssupra‐theologicalormetaphysicalreferent—thatultimateEssence(al‐Dhāt)whichis
absolutelyineffableandthusun‐nameable;andif,likewise,welookbeyondthetheological
definitionoftheTrinitarianconceptionofGod,andfocusinsteadonitssupra‐theologicalor
metaphysicalreferent—the‘superessentialOne’,toquoteStDinoysius,towhomwewill
turnlater—thenweshallbeinapositiontoaffirmthat,despitethedifferentnamesby
whichtheultimateRealityisdenotedinthetwotraditions,theRealitythusalludedtois
indeedoneandthesame.AndwearejustifiedinreferringtothisRealityas‘God’,‘Deus’,
‘Theos’or‘Allāh’,orwhatevertermstandsforthisRealityinanylanguage,aslongasitbe
madeclearthatwearenotimplyingtherebyallthetheologicalramificationsofthese
differentterms.Rather,weareusingthesetermstodenotetheirultimatetranscendent
referent.
Thisessayiscomposedofthreeparts:thefirstbeginswithadiscussionoftheQur’ān,and
proceedstoaddressthedebatesandpolemicsgeneratedbytheTrinitarianconceptionof
GodinChristianity.Hereitwillbeseenthattheverynatureoftheologicaldebaterendersit
allbutinevitablethatfundamentaldisagreementsaboutthenatureofGodwillprevail,
overshadowingorevenunderminingtheelementsofcommonalityinbeliefsheldby
MuslimsandChristians.Thesecondpartthenshiftstotheplaneofmetaphysics,beginning
withdiscussionofanactoftheProphet,anactofgreatsymbolicsignificance,which
resolvestheapparentcontradictionbetween,ontheonehand,theQur’ānicaffirmation
thattheGodoftheMuslimsandtheChristians(andtheJews)isoneandthesame;and,on
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theother,theMuslimrepudiationoftheTrinity.Themysticsofthetwotraditionshelpus
toarriveatapositionofdivine‘objectivity’,aconceptualpointofreferencederivedfroma
spiritualperspectivesubspecieaeternitatis,apointofviewfromwhichtheunique
metaphysicalObjectofbelieftakespriorityoverthetheologicallydivergent,subjectively
variegated,conceptionsofthatObject.Finally,inpartthree,wereturntotheplaneof
theologyinthecontextofcontemporaryinterfaithdialogue,andevaluatetheextentto
whichthewell‐intentionedeffortsofMuslimsandChristianstoaffirmthatwedobelievein
thesameGodmightbenefitfromtheinsightsofthemystics,bymaintainingaclear
distinctionbetweenthelevelofspiritualessence,onwhichtherecanbeagreement,and
thatoftheologicalform,onwhichthereis—andshouldbe—respectfuldisagreement.3
1. Qur’ānicRevelationandMuslim‐ChristianTheologicalDisputation
Thekeytheologicalcontroversytobeaddressedhereis,quiteevidently,thatsurrounding
theTrinitarianconceptionofGod:doestheChristianbeliefinaTrinitarianGodnecessarily
implyforbothChristiansandforMuslimsthatChristiansbelieveinaGodquiteotherthan
thatbelievedinbyMuslims?TheTrinity,expressingthebeliefthatGodisoneandHeis
three;togetherwiththeIncarnation,expressingthebeliefthatGodbecameman,was
crucified,androsefromthedead,therebyliberatinghumanityfromsin—thesebeliefsflyin
thefaceofthecentraltenetsofMuslimfaith.ThemostfundamentalaspectoftheMuslim
creediscentredonanaffirmationofdivineoneness(Tawhīd),oneofthemostimportant
Qur’ānicformulationsofwhichexplicitlyrejectsthatwhichliesatthecoreofChristian
belief,theideathatGodcouldhavea‘son’.Chapter112oftheQur’ān,entitled‘Purity’or
‘Sincerity’(Sūratal‐Ikhlās)readsasfollows:
Say:He,God,isOne,
God,theEternallySelf‐Subsistent
3 This is an application of the principle finely articulated by James Cutsinger, ‘Disagreeing to Agree: A Christian Response to A Common Word ’ (unpublished, but see the online version at www.cutsinger.net/scholarship/articles.shtml). Cutsinger argues that Christians and Muslims can disagree on the level of theology in order to agree on that of metaphysics. This argument is based upon the teachings of Frithjof Schuon, whose perspective on this question is summed up in the formula: conform to holy separation at the base in order to realize holy union at the summit. See Frithjof Schuon, Logic and Transcendence—A New Translation with Selected Letters, ed. James S. Cutsinger (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2009), p.195.
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Hebegettethnot,norisHebegotten
AndthereisnonelikeuntoHim.
Thereisevidentlyatheologicalimpassehere,afundamentalincompatibilitybetweenthe
respectiveconceptualformstakenbybeliefinthesameGod.EvenifChristiansretorttothe
aboveversesbydenyinganykindofcarnalrelationinthe‘sonship’ofJesus,insistingthat
thesonshipinquestiondoesnotoccurintimeandspace,butisaneternalprinciple,of
whichthehistoricalIncarnationisbutanexpression,4itisnonethelessclearthatthe
Qur’ānemphaticallyrejectstheideathat‘sonship’—whetherphysical,metaphoricalor
metaphysical—shouldformpartofanycreedalstatementregardingGod.Inotherwords,it
rejectsthevalidityofascribingtoJesusthestatusof‘sonofGod’,andinsodoingrejectsa
beliefwhichconstitutesacardinaltenetofChristianfaith.Likewise,inrelationtothe
Trinity:theChristiansareinstructedbytheQur’āntodesistfromalltalkofthree‐nessin
relationtoGod:‘Saynot“three”;desist,itwouldbebetterforyou.Godisbutonedivinity
(innamāAllāhilāhwāhid)’(4:171).
OneGod:Qur’ānicaffirmations
AlongsidethiscritiqueofcertainaspectsofChristianbelief,theQur’ānalsocontainsalarge
numberofaffirmations,implicitandexplicit,thattheGodworshippedbytheChristians
(andJews)isnoneotherthantheGodworshippedbyMuslims;theRevealeroftheQur’ān
istheRevealerofallthescripturescontainedinboththeOldandNewTestaments;this
RevealerisnoneotherthantheoneGod,Creatoroftheheavensandtheearth.Itispartofa
Muslim’sbeliefthatGod,asthesourceoflifeandlove,wisdomandcompassion,has
revealedmessagesconcerningHimselftoallhumancommunities,indifferentways,andat
differenttimes;5andthattheserevelations,from‘above’,aresomanymeansbywhichour
innatecertaintyofGodfrom‘within’isaroused,awakened,andperfected.Thisbeliefis
clearlyarticulatedbynumerousversesoftheQur’ān.TheMuslimisenjoinedbytheQur’ān
4 They also point out that the idea that Jesus ‘became’ the son of God when he was born, or when he was baptised, or at some other point in his life—all such ideas are strictly heretical, being so many forms assumed by the heresy known as ‘Adoptionism’. See Geoffrey Parrinder, Jesus in the Qur’ān (London: Sheldon Press, 1965), p.127. 5 ‘For every community there is a Messenger’ (10:47).
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tobelievein‘GodandHisAngels,andHisBooks,andHisProphets’andtoaffirm:‘wedonot
distinguishbetweenHisMessengers’(2:285).Moreexplicitly,theMuslimisinstructed:
‘Say:WebelieveinGod,andthatwhichwasrevealeduntoAbraham,andIshmael,and
Isaac,andJacob,andthetribes,andthatwhichwasgivenuntoMosesandJesusandthe
prophetsfromtheirLord.Wemakenodistinctionbetweenanyofthem,anduntoHimwe
havesubmitted’(2:136).GiventhefactthatitistheoneandonlyGodwhohasrevealed
HimselftotheBiblicalProphets,toJesusandtoMuhammad,itisthisoneandonlyGodthat,
accordingtothelogicoftheQur’ān,isobjectively‘believedin’byMuslims,Christiansand
Jewsinthemeasureoftheirfidelitytotheirrespectiverevelations.TheAbsolute—however
itbereferredtoindifferentlanguages,whetherproto‐Semitic,Hebrew,Syriac,Aramaic,
Arabicoranyotherlanguage—isThatinwhichbeliefisinvested;itisThatwhich
transcendsnotonlythenamesandconceptsbywhichitisapproximatelydesignated,but
alsothetheologieswhichunfoldfromit,andbywhichitbecomesenvelopedandalltoo
oftenobscured.6
Thefollowingversesareofparticularrelevancetoourtheme:
‘HehathordainedforyouofthereligionthatwhichHecommendeduntoNoah,andthat
whichWerevealtothee[Muhammad],andthatwhichWecommendeduntoAbrahamand
MosesandJesus,saying:Establishthereligion,andbenotdividedtherein...’(42:13).A
singleJudeo‐Christian‐Muslimtraditionisherebeingaffirmed,onewhichisinwardly
differentiated,eachoftheProphetscomingtoaffirmandrenewwhatwasrevealedbyhis
predecessor.Thekeycharacteristicdefiningtherelationshipbetweenthedifferent
Prophetsisconfirmation:
AndWecausedJesus,sonofMary,tofollowintheirfootsteps[thefootstepsofthe
JewishProphets],confirmingthatwhichwas[revealed]beforehimintheTorah,
andWebestoweduponhimtheGospelwhereinisguidanceandlight,confirming 6 Al‐Ghazzālī, despite being a master‐theologian himself, was essentially a Sufi mystic, and says that theology can be a ‘veil’ over God; only spiritual effort (mujāhada) can disclose the true nature of God, His essence and attributes. See his Ihyā’ ‘ulūm al‐dīn (Beirut: Dār al‐Jīl, 1992), p.34; English translation by Nabih Amin Faris, The Book of Knowledge (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1970), p.55. Eric Ormsby sums up well al‐Ghazzālī’s calibrated approach to theology: ‘It was a weapon, essential for defending the truths of the faith, but not an instrument by which truth itself could be found ... it demolishes but it does not build.’ Eric Ormsby, Ghazali—The Revival of Islam (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008), p.64.
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thatwhichwas[revealed]beforeitintheTorah—aguidanceandanadmonition
untothosewhoarepious.LetthePeopleoftheGospeljudgebythatwhichGodhath
revealedtherein(5:46‐47).
Theverynextverse,5:48,beginswiththefollowingwords,reinforcingthiscrucialroleof
reciprocalconfirmation.‘Anduntothee[Muhammad]WehaverevealedtheScripturewith
thetruth,confirmingwhateverScripturewasbeforeit,andasaguardianoverit’.
Thelogicalconsequenceoftheassertionsoftheuniquesourceofrevelationforallthree
traditionsistheQur’ān’scategoricalaffirmationthattheGodworshippedbytheChristians
andtheJews(‘thePeopleoftheBook’)istheselfsameGodworshippedbyMuslims:
‘AndarguenotwiththePeopleoftheBookexceptinamannermostfine—butnotwith
thosewhoareoppressors,andsay:Webelieveinthatwhichhathbeenrevealeduntous
andthatwhichhathbeenrevealeduntoyou;ourGod(ilāhunā)andyourGod(ilāhukum)is
One,anduntoHimwesubmit’(29:46).
Thisversegivesusthemostdefinitiveanswertothequestionwehavebeenasked,theilāh
or‘divinity’believedinbytheMuslimsandthe‘PeopleoftheBook’—Jews,Christiansand
Sabians—isoneandthesame.Theword‘Allāh’,itshouldbenoted,isderivedfromthe
wordilāhtogetherwiththedefinitearticle,al‐;theconstructal‐ilāh,‘thedivinity’,was
transformedintothepropername,‘Allāh’.Thisname,therefore,refersintrinsicallyand
metaphysicallyto‘thedivinity’,toThatwhichisworshipped,totheAbsolute.Itisalso
etymologicallyequivalenttotheHebrewElôh,andtheSyriacAlāh.AllthreeSemiticforms
ofthisnamefortheAbsoluteareinturnderivedfromtheroot‘lh,meaning‘toworship’.7
Similarly,inregardtotheEnglishword‘God’,weshouldnotethatanidenticalmeaningis
conveyedbyitsetymologicalroot:foritisthepastparticipleconstructionoftheproto‐
Indo‐Europeanrootgheu,meaning‘toinvoke/supplicate’.Theliteralmeaningof‘God’is
thus‘theOnewhoisinvoked(orsupplicated).’Onthissemanticplane,then,weshouldsee
7 Umar F. Abd‐Allāh, ‘One God, Many Names’, in Seasons—Semiannual Journal of Zaytuna Institute, vol.2, no.1, 2004, p.47.
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nodiscrepancybetween‘Allāh’and‘God’—botharesimplysemanticformsofdesignating
thedivinitytowhichworshipandprayeraredirected.8
Theargumentderivingfromtheaboveversecanbereinforcedbyseveralotherverses,
amongstwhichthefollowingisoneofthemostimportant.Accordingtomost
commentators,thiswasthefirstverserevealedgrantingpermissiontotheMuslimstofight
inself‐defenceagainstaggressors.Itisofparticularpertinencetoourtheme,underliningas
itdoesthedutyofMuslimstoprotectfellow‐believersintheChristianandJewish
communities—thusinducingaspiritofsolidarityamongallthosewhobelieveintheone
andonlyGod:
Permission[tofight]isgiventothosewhoarebeingfought,fortheyhavebeen
wronged,andsurelyGodisabletogivethemvictory;thosewhohavebeenexpelled
fromtheirhomesunjustly,onlybecausetheysaid:OurLordisGod.HadGodnot
drivenbacksomebymeansofothers,monasteries,churches,synagoguesand
mosques—whereinthenameofGodisoft‐invoked(yudhkarufīhāismAllāh
kathīran)—wouldassuredlyhavebeendestroyed(22:39‐40).
‘The name of God’ (ism Allāh)—the one and only, selfsame God—is ‘invoked’ in
monasteries,churchesandsynagogues,andnotjustinmosques.JustasinIslamictheology,
theoneGodhasninety‐nine ‘Names’,withouttherebybecominganythingotherthanone,
so thedifferent ‘names’ given toGod in thedifferent revelationsdonotmake theobject
namedanythingbutone.ThenamesofGodrevealedbyGodintheserevelationsarethusto
be seen in stark contrast to those ‘names’manufactured by the polytheists as labels for
their idols. These false gods are described as follows: ‘They are but names that ye have
named, ye and your fathers, for which God hath revealed no authority’ (53:23). One is
remindedhereofStPaul’sdictum,citedattheoutset: ‘Afalsegodhasnoexistenceinthe
realworld’.
ThevariousnamesbywhichGodisnamedintheJudeo‐Christian‐Islamictradition,onthe
contrary,dohave‘authority’.TheyrefertooneandthesameRealityinamanneratonce
8 Ibid, p.51.
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authoritativeandauthentic,preciselyonaccountofhavingbeenrevealedbythatReality.
Thesenames,therefore,resonatenotonlywiththatsupremeRealitytranscendingall
thoughtandlanguage,butalsowiththeinnateknowledgeofGodwhicharticulatesthe
inmostrealityofthehumansoul,thefitra.9ThepointhereisthatitisthesameGodwho
createseachsoulwithinnateknowledgeofHim,thesameGodwhorevealsHimselftoall
soulsindiverseways,andthesameGodwhoisworshippedbythecommunitiesdefinedby
theserevelations.Itisforthisreason,amongothers,thattheQur’ānholdsoutthepromise
ofsalvationnotjusttoMuslimsbutto‘Jews,ChristiansandSabeans’,bringingthesethree
specificallymentionedreligiouscommunitiesintothegenericcategoryofbelieverswho
combinefaithwithvirtue,thesetwobeingthekeyconditions—necessarybutnot
sufficient10—forsalvation:
‘Trulythosewhobelieve[inthisRevelation],andtheJewsandtheChristiansandthe
Sabeans—whoeverbelievethinGodandtheLastDayandperformethvirtuousdeeds—
theirrewardiswiththeirLord,neitherfearnorgriefshallbefallthem’(2:62;repeated
almostverbatimat5:69).
Forourpurposes,thekeypartofthisverseisthecategory:‘whoeverbelievethinGod’.The
categoryisnotrestrictedjustMuslims,Jews,ChristiansandSabians,butencompassesall
thosewhobelievein‘God’assuch—whateverbethespecificnamebywhichGodis
referredto.Thisisrepeatedattheendoftheverse:therewardtothosewhobelieveand
actvirtuouslyisgivenfrom‘theirLord’,Rabbihim,whateverbethemeansbywhichthe
Lordassuchisdesignatedlinguistically.
ThePeopleoftheBookarenottoldtofirstensurethattheirconceptionofGodcorresponds
exactlytotheIslamicconception,andthentobelieveintheLastDay,andtoactvirtuously;
9 This primordial nature is the inalienable infrastructure not just of the soul, but also of the ‘right religion’. There can be no revelation from on high without innate receptivity to that revelation being present within: ‘So set thy purpose for religion with unswerving devotion—the nature [framed] of God (fitrat Allāh), according to which He hath created man. There is no altering God’s creation. That is the right religion (al‐dīn al‐qayyim), but most men know not’ (30:30). 10 For, according to a well‐known saying of the Prophet, nobody is saved on account of his deeds: only the mercy of God affords access to Paradise.
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rather,itistakenforgrantedthatThatwhichisreferredtoasAllāhistheGodinwhom
theyalreadybelieve,theGodwhocreatedthemandrevealedtothemthescripturesby
whichtheyareguided.Similarly,intheverysameverseinwhichtheProphetistoldnotto
followthe‘whims’(ahwā’)ofthePeopleoftheBook,heisalsotoldnotonlytoaffirmbelief
intheirscripture,butalsotoaffirmthatAllāhis‘ourLordandyourLord’:
Andbethouuprightasthouartcommandedandfollownottheirwhims.Instead
say:IbelieveinwhateverscriptureGodhathrevealed,andIamcommandedtobe
justamongyou.GodisourLordandyourLord.Untous,ourworks,anduntoyou,
yours:lettherebenoargumentbetweenus.Godwillbringustogether,andunto
Himisthejourneying(42:15).
If,asweshallseebelow,thereisindeedan‘argument’betweentheMuslimsandthe
Christians,overtheTrinity,forexample,thisargumentdoesnotpertaintothequestionof
whetherMuslimsandChristiansbelieveinthesameGod,orhavethesameLord;rather,
theargumentisoversomethingmorecontingent:thehumanconceptualisationofthat
Lord,togetherwithHisattributesandacts.ThatHeis‘ourLord’isnotdisputed—weall
believeinHim;how‘ourLord’isconceivedbyus—thatisthesubjectofthedispute.Unity
onthelevelofthedivineObjectgoeshandinhandwithdiversity—andeven
contradiction—onthelevelofthehumansubject.
Theverseswhichwehaveciteddemonstratethatthereisanessentialanddefinitiveaspect
tofaithin‘God’whichtakesprecedenceovertheconceptualanddogmaticformsassumed
bythatfaith.Thisessentialfaithisnotnecessarilyannulledbyanimperfectconceptionof
Thatinwhichonehasfaith.Thepositingoftwounequaldegreesoffaith,theoneessential
anddefinitive,theotherformalandderivative,isprincipallybasedontheQur’ānicverses
expressingthesetwoattitudestotheChristian‘faith’,ontheonehandaffirmativeandon
theothercritical;itisalsoderived,asweshallseelater,fromanactoftheProphetwhich
servesasanimplicitcommentary,atoncedramaticandeloquent,onthesetwoaspectsof
theQur’ānicdiscourse.
TheTrinity:Muslimcritique
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BeforelookingatthiscrucialactoftheProphet,letusconsiderthecritiqueoftheTrinity
foundintheQur’ān,andthenelaboratedinMuslimtheology.Althoughtheideaof
‘threeness’iscensuredinageneralwayintheQur’ān,theonlyspecific‘trinity’mentioned
intheQur’ānisnottheTrinityaffirmedinChristiandogma.Ontheonehand,boththe
specificbeliefinJesusasthesonofGod,andthegeneralideaofthree‐nessisrejected:
OPeopleoftheBook,donotexaggerateinyourreligionnorutteraboutGodaught
savethetruth.TheMessiah,JesussonofMary,wasbutaMessengerofGodandHis
WordwhichHecastintoMaryandaSpiritfromHim.SobelieveinGodandHis
Messengers,andsaynot:“Three”!Desist:itwillbebetterforyou.ForGodisOne
divinity(Allāhilāhwāhid)—FarremovedfromHisMajestythatHeshouldhavea
son...(4:171).
Ontheotherhand,aspecificconfigurationofthe‘trinity’11isgiveninthisverse:
‘Andbehold!Godwillsay:“OJesus,sonofMary!Didstthousayuntomen,‘Takemeandmy
motherfortwogodsbesideGod?’”Hewillsay:“GlorybetoThee!NevercouldIsaythatto
whichIhadnoright”’(5:116).
This‘trinity’isevidentlyonewhichallorthodoxChristianswouldsimilarlyreject.Asfor
4:171,letuslookathowitisinterpretedbyoneofthemostinfluentialcommentatorsin
thespecificallytheologicaltraditionofexegesis,Fakhral‐Dīnal‐Rāzī:
Thefirstissue:themeaningis,‘DonotsaythatGod,glorifiedbeHe,isoneSubstance
(jawhar)andthreehypostases(aqānīm).KnowthatthedoctrineoftheChristiansis
veryobscure.Whatcanbegleanedfromitisthattheyaffirmoneessence(dhāt)that
isqualifiedbythreeattributes(sifāt),exceptthateventhoughtheycallthem
attributes,theyareinrealityessences(dhawāt)...Thoughtheycallthem‘attributes’,
theyareactuallyaffirmingtheexistenceofseveralself‐subsistingessences(dhawāt
qā'imabi‐anfusihā),andthisispureunbelief(kufr)...If,however,wewereto 11 Another form of the ‘trinity’ is given at 5:72: ‘They indeed disbelieve who say that God is the third of three ...’ This, similarly, refers not to the orthodox Christian Trinity, but to a heretical form therof.
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understandfromthese‘Threeasmeaningthattheyaffirmthreeattributes,then
therecanbenodenying[thetruthof]this.Howcouldwe[asMuslims]say
otherwise,whenwe[aretheoneswho]say,‘HeisGodotherthanwhomthereisno
god,theKing,theHoly,thePeace,theKnower,theLiving,theOmnipotent,theWiller
etc.’,andunderstand[aswedo]eachoneoftheseexpressionsasbeingdistinct
fromalltheothers.Therecanbenoothermeaningfortherebeingseveral
attributes.Wereitunbelieftoaffirmtheexistenceofseveraldivineattributes,the
Qur’āninitsentiretywouldberefuted;andtheintellectwouldalsobeinvalidated
sincewenecessarilyknowthattheconcept12ofGodbeingKnower(‘āliman)isother
thantheconceptofHimbeingOmnipotent(qādiran)orLiving(hayyan).’13
Evenifthe‘trinity’beingrefutedhereisconceivedasconsistingoftheFather,Jesusand
Mary,theMuslimcritique,basedonsuchversesasthosecitedabove,isfocusedonthe
ChristianideaofthreePersonsbeingidenticaltotheoneEssence,eachPersonbeing
absolutelyidenticaltotheEssenceatthesametimeasbeingdistinctfromtheothertwo
Persons.Thisappearstopositthreedistinctessencesratherthanthreeattributesofone
Essence,andthuscontrastssharplywiththeMuslimtheologian’sdefinitionofthe
attributes‐Essencerelationship.Al‐Ghazzālī,forexample,givesthestandardSunni‐Ash‘ari
positionontheattributes,towhichRāzīalsosubscribed,14asfollows:theessential
attributesofGod—living,knowing,powerful,willing,hearing,seeing,speaking15—are
‘superadded’(zā’ida)totheEssence;theseattributesareuncreatedandeternal(qadīma),
butarenotself‐subsistent,ratherthey‘subsistthroughtheEssence’(qā’imabi’l‐dhāt);they
12 Literally: ‘that which is understood from’, mafhūm. 13 Fakhr al‐Dīn al‐Rāzī, Al‐Tafsīr al‐kabīr (Beirut: Dar Ehia Al‐Tourath Al‐Arabi, 2000), vol.4, pp. 271‐272. I am grateful to Dr Feras Hamza for pointing out to me the importance of this passage. 14 See, for a helpful introduction to this theme, Nader al‐Bizri, ‘God’s Essence and Attributes’, in Tim Winter (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), especially pp.129‐131. 15 These are the ‘essential attributes’ (sifāt al‐dhāt) as opposed to attributes of actions (sifāt al‐fi‘l); the essential attributes are most often deemed to be these seven, but sometimes there are just two (life and knowledge) sometimes eight, at other times 15, etc. There was considerable variation as regards what constituted an essential attribute.
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arenotidenticaltotheEssencebutneitheraretheyotherthanit.16WhereastheseMuslim
theologiansmaintainthattheattributessubsistnotthroughthemselves,butthroughthe
Essence,withwhichtheyareco‐eternal,theyunderstandtheChristianviewoftheTrinity
tobe,incontrast,aformofshirk,‘association’orpolytheism,insofarasitpositsthree
PersonswhoarealldeemedtobeGodwhilealsobeingeternallydistinctfromeachother;
eachPersonbeingeternallydistinguishedfromtheothertwowhilesharingacommon
substanceornature(homoousia).Rāzīsays,however,thatiftheChristiansconfined
themselvestoaffirmingonlythatGodhadthreeattributes,attributeswhichwereclearly
subordinatetotheEssencewhichtheyqualify—thuspositingauniqueEssencewhich
unambiguouslytranscendedthePersons—thentheycouldnotbeaccusedofkufrorof
shirk.
ThekindofreconciliationofthetwotheologiesbeingproposedbyRāzīisonewherebythe
ChristiansupholdthetranscendenceoftheuniqueEssencevis‐á‐visthethreePersons,or
affirmthetranscendenceofthe‘Father’understoodastheEssence,whothenmanifests
Himselfthroughtwoattributes;thisismeanttoreplacetheconceptionoftheEssence
being,asitwere,‘shared’equallybythethreePersonswhoaresimultaneouslyidenticalto
theEssenceanddistinguishableasPersonswithintheEssence.Rāzīwouldcontendthatthe
distinctivenessofthePersonscannotbesituatedatthesamelevelofabsolutenessasthe
Essence:ifthePersonsaretobeviewedasattributes,thentheycannotbedistinctfrom
eachotheronthesameplaneonwhichtheiridentitywiththeEssenceisaffirmed.
Variouseffortswereinfactmadetonarrowthegapbetweenthetwotheologiesalongjust
theselines.ThesewereformulatedforthemostpartbyChristianapologistslivingin
Muslimlands,whoattemptedtodomoreorlesswhatRāzīproposed:presenttheTrinityin
termswhichresembletherelationshipestablishedwithinIslamictheologybetweenthe
attributesandtheEssence.17Forexample,theJacobite18ChristianArab,Yahyāb.‘Adī(d.
16 Al‐iqtisād fi’l‐i‘tiqād (eds. H. Atay and I. Cubkcu) (Ankara: Nur Matbaasi,1962), pp.4‐5.
17 Sidney Griffith effectively refutes Harry Wolfson’s claim that the Muslim theologians derived their view of the attributes from the Christian Trinity, showing that it was the other way round: Christians in
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974),writinginArabicandmakingfulluseofArabictermsdrawnfromthevocabularyof
Muslimkalām,referstoGodasbeingone‘substance’(jawhar)andthree‘attributes’(sifāt),
eachofwhichisdescribedasbeingdistinctfromtheothertwoasregards‘meaning’
(ma‘nā).19Hewassensitivetothechargeofpolytheism,andreferstothe‘ignorant’(al‐
juhhāl)amongtheChristianswhoassertthatthethreehypostaseseachconstitutea
distinctsubstance.TheproperconceptionoftheTrinity,accordingtoYahyā,isbasedupon
thedoctrinesoftheChurchFathers,anditisthisconceptionthatisheldby‘thethreesects
oftheChristians’,bywhichhemeanstheMelkites,theNestoriansandtheJacobites.The
onesubstanceorousiaisdefinedintermsoftheArabicconceptsjawhar(substance),dhāt
(essence),andmāhiyya(quiddity)—allofwhichwereappliedbyMuslimtheologiansto
God.Withinthisuniquesubstance,however,onecandistinguishbetweenthreePersons
whoaredefinedbyunique‘personal’properties:paternity(ubūwa)fortheFather,filiation
(bunūwa)fortheSon,andprocession(inbi‘āth)fortheSpirit.20
Inthepreviouscentury,anotherArabChristian,theNestorian‘Ammāral‐Basrī(d.ca.850)
hadrebuttedthechargeoftritheismlevelledagainsttheChristiansbytheMuslims,and
articulatedinhisKitābal‐Burhān(‘TheBookofProof’)apositionveryclosetothat
proposedbyRāzī:
BeforeGod,weareblamelessofallegingthreegods.Rather,byoursayingFather,
SonandHolySpirit,wewantnomorethantosubstantiatethestatementthatGodis
Muslim lands came to frame their Trinitarian theology in terms already established within Muslim kalām, as will be evident in what follows. 18 The Jacobites, Melkites and Nestorians were the main Christian sects in the territories conquered by the Muslims in the eastern part of the Byzantine empire, principally Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, in the first wave of the expansion of Islam. They were distinguished principally by different Christologies. As Sidney Griffith shows clearly, these Christian sects were not only granted tolerance by the Muslims, their identity was in large part forged by the culture of Islam which ‘fostered the articulation of a new cultural expression of Christian doctrine, this time in Arabic, and it provided the cultural framework within which the several Christian denominations of the Orient ultimately came to define their mature ecclesial identities.’ Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque—Christians and Muslims in the World of Islam (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), p.4. 19 See Sidney Griffith, The Beginnings of Christian Theology in Arabic—Muslim‐Christian Encounters in the Early Islamic Period (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), p.177. 20 See Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp.335‐336.
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living(hayy),speaking(nātiq).AndtheFatheristheonewhomweconsidertohave
life(hayāt)andword(kalima).ThelifeistheHolySpiritandthewordistheSon.21
ThispresentationechoesthatofStIrenaeus,oneoftheearliestChurchFathers(d.ca.202),
whoreferredtotheSonandtheSpiritasbeingakintothe‘twohands’ofGodtheFather,by
whichHecreatesallthings,suchthattheFathercomestocreationthroughtheSonandin
theSpirit,andcreaturesgototheFatherintheSpiritandthroughtheSon.StIrenaeus
referstotheSonastheWordofGod,andtheSpirittotheWisdomofGod;thesetwowere
eternallypresentinGodandwithGod,withoutdividingHimintothree:‘sincetoHimis
everpresentHisWordandWisdom,theSonandtheSpirit,bywhomandinwhomHemade
allthings.’22
Here,thederivativeaspectofthedivinityofthesecondandthirdPersonsoftheTrinity,in
relationtothefirst,iscombinedwiththeunityoftheGodhead—thetwo‘hands’being
inseparablefromthe‘body’ofthepersontowhomtheybelong.TotheobjectionthatGodis
notcomposedofparts,andcannotbecomparedtoabodywithtwohands,StIrenaeus
wouldnodoubtrespondbysayingthatonehastoapplytothisanalogyastrongmutatis
mutandisclause:God’s‘body’—thedivineReality—isabsolutesimplicity,thusnon‐
composite;His‘hands’—thatisHisWordandHisWisdom—areakintothehandsofabody
onlyinonerespect.Justasitisthroughthehandsthatthebodyacts,soitisthroughthe
divineWordandWisdomthatGodcreates.Inanotherrespect,however,thereisno
commonmeasurebetweenthetwothingscompared,fortheWordandWisdomare
inseparablefromtheverysimplicityofGod’sReality,whereasthetwohandsofabodycan
beseparatedfromthebodyofwhichtheyarerelativelyaccidentalparts,boththebodyand
itshandsbeingcompositesubstances.
AnotherChristianArab,theJacobiteAbūRā’ita(d.ca.850)pursuedasimilarlineofthought
tothatof‘Ammāral‐Basrī,makinguseoftheMuslimattributesofknowledgeandlife.Just
21 Cited in Sidney Griffith, Beginnings, p.170. 22 St Irenaeus, Five Books of S. Irenaeus Against Heresies, tr. John Keble (Oxford & London: James Parker & co, 1872), Book 4, ch.20.1, pp.364‐365.
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asMuslimtheologiansacceptthatGodis‘theKnowing’(al‐‘Alīm)and‘theLiving’(al‐Hayy),
withouttheseattributesbeingconsideredas‘partners’(shurakā’,sing.sharīk)alongside
God,so,fortheChristians,thesetwoattributesaregiventhenames‘Son’and‘Spirit’:
‘Furthermore,asperfectentities,God’slifeandknowledgemustbeconsiderednotonlyas
distinguishable,butalsoassimultaneouslyinunion(ittisāl)withoneanother,andwithHis
perfectbeing.’23God’slifeandknowledgearethushypostases(aqānīm),24whichare
distinguishedonefromtheotherwithoutthisdistinctionrupturingtheunityofthe
substanceofGod’sbeing.
Whilesuchformulationsmayappeartobridgethegapbetweenthetwotheologiesinsome
respects,therapprochementonthislevelisafragileone.Fortheveryinsistenceofthe
ChristianapologistsupontheeternaldistinctionbetweenthePersonsoftheTrinityatthe
leveloftheGodhead,alongsidetheaffirmationthateachofthePersonsisidenticaltothat
Godhead,ensuredthatmostMuslimtheologianswouldnotacceptthedoctrine.Typicalof
thekindofargumentmadeagainsttheChristianTrinityisthatofthephilosopheral‐Kindī
(d.873).Hearguedthatif,ontheonehand,thereisasolesubstancewithineachofthe
hypostases,andontheother,eachofthehypostaseshasaproperty,whichiseternalinit,
andwhichdifferentiatesonehypostasisfromtheother,itfollowsthat:
...eachofthehypostasesiscomposedofasubstance,whichiscommontoallofthem,and
aproperty,whichisuniquetoeachofthem.Buteverythingcomposedistheeffectofa
cause,andeffectofacausecannotbeeternal,whenceitfollowsthatneitheristheFather
eternalnoristheSoneternalnoristheHolySpiriteternal.Thus,thingswhichhavebeen
assumedtobeeternalarenoteternal.25
Yahyāb.‘AdīcitesKindī’scritiqueandretorts:thisargumentholdsonlyforcreated
substances;thecompositenatureofcreatedthingsisaconcomitantoftheirtemporality,
causeandeffectonlytakingplaceintime.InthecaseofthePersonsoftheTrinity,however,
23 Griffith, Beginnings, p.183. 24 This is the plural of uqnūm, the Arabic transliteration of the Syriac qnoma, which translates the Greek hypostasis. Griffith, Beginnings, p.180. 25 Cited in Wolfson, Philosophy of the Kalam, p.322.
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thetemporalconditionistranscended:theyhavenevernotexisted,thustheycannothave
beenbroughtintoacompositeformcomprisingsubstanceandproperty.Onthecontrary,
‘thesubstanceisdescribedbyeveryoneoftheseattributes(al‐sifāt)and...theseattributes
areeternal,withouttheirhavingbeenproducedinitaftertheyhadnotbeen.’26
Kindīwouldprobablyhaverespondedthatthecompositenatureofacompoundisnot
contingentupontemporalityalone;rather,itisapropertyofthesubstanceofthething
itself:anysubstancecomposedofmorethanoneelementcannotbutberegardedas
composite,itcannotbesimple.Itisthefactoftheexistenceoftwoormoreelementsthat
makesasubstancecompound,thequestionoftimedoesnotenterintotheessential
definitionofsubstance.
Inanycase,Yahyāb.‘AdīistryingheretoanswerMuslimobjectionstotheTrinity,while
bringingthefocusbacktosomethinghethinksiscommonbetweentheMuslimand
ChristianconceptionsofunityandpluralityinrelationtoGod.Hearguesthat,likethe
Muslimattributes,theChristianTrinityisaneternallysubsistentmodeofpluralitywithin
unity,itisathree‐nesspertainingtotheuniquesubstanceofdivinity,withthereal
distinctivenessofeachPersonbeingmaintainedwithinthatonesubstance.Butthe
problemsremain,asiswelldemonstratedbythefollowingpolemicalexchange—among
themostprotractedinallsuchexchangesthathavebeenrecordedinthehistoryofMuslim‐
Christianpolemics.Thecorrespondencebeganwithaletterwritteninthe13thcenturyby
PaulofAntioch,theMelkiteBishopofSidon,to‘aMuslimfriend’.Thisapologyforthe
Christianfaithwentthroughvariouseditions,oneofwhichwassentby‘thepeopleof
Cyprus’totwoMuslimtheologiansinDamascus,IbnTaymiyyain1316andIbnAbīTālibal‐
Dimashqīinthefollowingyear.AsregardstheTrinity,theletterechoestheargumentof
‘Ammāral‐Basrī,notedabove.Itasserts:‘Thethreenames[Father,SonandSpirit]areone
eternalandeverlastingGod:athinglivingandarticulate(shay’hayynātiq),theEssence,
speech,life.Asweseeit,theEssenceistheFather,thespeechistheSon,andthelifeisthe
HolySpirit.’Theresponsefromal‐Dimashqīconcentratesonthedistinctionbetweenthe
26 Ibid.
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namedentities,arguingthateachnamedbeingisutterlydifferentfromtheothertwo,‘the
FatherisdifferentfromtheSon,andutterlydistinctfromhim,andsimilarlytheSpiritis
differentfrombothofthem.’Giventheaffirmationofthesethreeapparentlydiscrete
entities,theresultcanonlybekufr(unbelief)andshirk(polytheism).
InthiswayyoudeclareunbeliefandpolytheismbydeclaringthattheFatherexists
byhisessence,thatis,Heiseternal,andthatheislivingbytheSpirit,and
articulatingbytheSon;thattheSpiritislivingbyitsessence,thatis,itiseternal,and
thatitexistsbytheFather,andisarticulatingbytheSon;andthattheSonis
articulatingbyhisessence,thatis,heiseternal,andheexistsbytheFatherand
livingbytheSpirit.Thusyougivetheclearestindicationofpolytheism.27
Inotherwords,wereturntotheobjectionmadebyRāzī:thePersonsarenotattributes
(sifāt),butareinrealityessences(dhawāt),eachessencebeingdefinedbyaproperty
particulartoit:existenceistheeternallysubsistentdefiningproperty—hencetheeternal
‘essence’—oftheFather;lifeistheeternallysubsistentdefiningproperty—hencethe
eternal‘essence’—oftheSpirit;andarticulationistheeternallysubsistentdefining
property—hencetheeternal‘essence’—oftheSon.Weshouldmakeitclearherethat
Dimashqī’sresponseisbasedontheclassicalAsh‘ariteformula,mentionedabovebyal‐
Ghazzālī:theattributesmustbedescribedasbeingneitherGodnorotherthanGod.This
ambivalentformula,alone,isdeemedtosatisfytherequirementofsimultaneously
safeguardingthedivineunitywhilstaffirmingtherealityoftheattributesintheir
distinctiveness.Letuslookatthisformulamoreclosely:
1)‘notGod’:theattributesaretrulydistinctintheirplurality,buttheycannotbesaidto
constitutedifferentessencesalongsideGod,andthisiswhy,intheirdistinctiveplurality,
theymustnotbeidentifiedpurelyandsimplywiththeAbsolute:theattributes,inthis
respect,arethus‘otherthanGod’.AndthisiswhattheChristianformulationsofthe
Essence‐Person(orEssence‐attribute)relationshipfailtoassert;theymaintain,onthe
contrary,thateachPersonoftheTrinity—evenifthisPersonbedescribedasaMuslim‐
27 Cited in Rifaat Ebied & David Thomas (eds.), Muslim‐Christian Polemic during the Crusades—The Letter from the People of Cyprus and Ibn Abi Tālib’s Response (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p.333 (translation modified).
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sounding‘attribute’—isidentifiedwithGod,atthesametimeashavingitsown
distinctivenessasaPerson.
2)‘nototherthanGod’:theAsh‘aritesaddtotheprecedingdenialthecomplementary
affirmationthattheattributesare‘nototherthanGod’,fortheattributeshavenoself‐
subsistentessencesoftheirown,andsubsistonlythroughtheuniquedivineEssence.But
thisaffirmation‘nototherthanGod’canonlybeacceptedifitbeconditionedbythe
negation:theattributesare‘notGod’.Theresultingsynthesisofthetwocomplementary
statementsaffirmstherealityoftheattributeswithoutunderminingtheunityofGod,while
upholdingtheunityofGodwithoutdenyingtherealityoftheattributes.FortheAsh‘arites,
then,alltheattributesareco‐eternalwiththeEssence,notbeingabsolutely‘other’thanIt,
norbeingabsolutelyidentifiedwithIt;thustheyarerealandnotsimplymetaphorsor
merenames,buttheirrealitydoesnotintroducedivisionwithintheoneEssence.
AtthispointoneshouldnotethatitisnotjusttheChristianswhofallshortoftheAsh‘arite
criteriaoftawhīdonthisissue,forboththe‘attributionists’or‘assimilationists’(al‐
mushabbiha,literally:thosewhocreatealikenessorsimilarity),referredtoasal‐
Hashwiyya,andthe‘anti‐attributionists’,theMu‘tazilites,areregardedasholding
erroneousandevenhereticalbeliefsaboutGod.Thefirstgroup,basingthemselvesona
literalreadingofcertainQur’ānicverses,ascribedtoGodquasi‐corporealattributes(a
body,hands,aface,andsoon),thusfallingfoulofassimilationism(tashbīh),ormakingGod
comparabletocreatures,andanthropomorphism(tajsīm),leadingtothe‘sin’ofassociation
orpolytheism(shirk);whiletheiropponents,theMu‘tazilites,aredeemedtostraytoofarin
theoppositedirection,strippingGod(ta‘tīl)ofallattributesinavainefforttosafeguardHis
transcendentunicity.Forthem,Godcanbedescribedas‘knowing’,butnotthroughan
attributecalled‘knowledge’;Heisindeedomnipotent,butnotthroughanattributecalled
‘power’.28Itispertinenttonoteherethattheaccusationofbeinga‘Christian’ismadeinthe
disputesovertheattributes:theAsh‘aritetheologianal‐ShahrastānīaccusestheMu‘tazilite,
Abūal‐Hudhaylal‐‘Allāf(d.841)ofimitatingtheChristiansintheirviewoftherelationship
28 Cited by Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, trs. A.Hamori & R.Hamori (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), p.95.
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betweentheEssenceandthePersons,saying,‘AbūHudhayl’saffirmationofthese
attributesasaspectsoftheEssenceisthesameasthehypostasesoftheChristians.’29
TheMu‘tazilitepositionistypicallybasedonthiskindofreasoning:
1. Thatwhichiseternalisdivine.
2. Thedivinityisabsoluteunity,uttersimplicity.
3. TheunityandsimplicityofGodthusstrictlyexcludesthepluralityofeternal
attributes.
Godcannotthereforehaveattributesthatarebotheternalandmultiple:toassertthe
contraryistofallintopolytheism.30Inhisargumentagainstthose‘philosophers’whodeny
thateternalattributescanbeascribedtoGod,al‐Ghazzālīwrites:‘Whyshoulditbe
impossibletosaythat,justastheessenceofHimwhoisnecessaryofexistence[wājibal‐
wujūd,‘thenecessaryexistent’]iseternalandhasnoefficientcause,soalsoHisattribute
existswithHimfrometernityandthushasnoefficientcause?’AsWolfsonnotes,this
argumentisnotsodissimilarfromtheChristiandefenceoftheTrinity31—aswesawabove,
inYahyāb.‘Adī’sresponsetoKindī.
ItisthusnotsurprisingtofindtheSpanishscholaroftheZāhirīschoolofthought,Ibnal‐
Hazm(d.1064),sarcasticallyaskinganAsh‘arite:‘Sinceyousaythatco‐existentwithGod
arefifteenattributes,allofthemotherthanHeandallofthemeternal,whydoyoufind
faultwiththeChristianswhentheysaythatGodisthe“thirdofthree”?’32TheAsh‘arite,
accordingtoIbnHazm,lamelyrepliesthattheonlymistakemadebytheChristiansis
restrictingtotwothenumberofthingsco‐existingwithGod.Inlikefashion,the
contemporaryIranianShi‘itescholar,AyatollahJavādi‐Āmulī,takestheAsh‘aritestotask
29 Cited in Sidney Griffith, Beginnings of Christian Theology, p.178. 30 See Wolfson, Philosophy of the Kalam, pp.132‐143. 31 Ibid, p.139 and p.323. As regards Wolfson’s claim that ‘Muslims [were led] to adopt a Christian doctrine which is explicitly rejected in the Koran, and transform it into a Muslim doctrine… [They were] led to the substitution in Muslim theology of divine attributes for the Christian Trinity’ (ibid, p.128), it is clear that the differences between the two doctrines greatly outweigh their similarities. 32 Ibid, p.314.
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forbelievinginseven,eightornine‘gods’ratherthanjustthethreeoftheChristians.Itis
theAsh‘ariteaffirmationoftheattributesasbeingbotheternal,ontheonehand,and
‘super‐added’totheEssence(zā’ida‘alā’l‐dhāt),ontheother,thatleadsJavādī‐Āmulīto
accusetheAsh‘aritesofbelievinginmorethanoneGod:‘Ifweacceptthatthereareeight
attributesoftheEssence,inadditiontotheEssenceitself,thenwewillhavenineeternal
existententities.’33HemountsastrongargumentinfavouroftheShi’itepositionwhichis
neitherthatofsimplystrippingGod’sEssenceofallattributes(ta‘tīl),asdidthe
Mu‘tazilites,noraffirmingthemasbeingsuper‐addedtotheEssence,asdidtheAsh‘arites.
Rather,fortheShi‘is,alloftheattributesareviewedasbeingreal,ontheonehand,this
realitybeingabsolutelyidenticalwiththeEssence;and,ontheotherhand,eachofthe
attributesaredistinctfromtheEssence,andthusfromeachother,onlyinrespectof
conceptualmeaning(mafhūm).34
Furthermore,thestricttraditionalists—amongthem,Hanbaliteliteralists—pourscornon
allthosewhoengageintheology(kalām),sayingthattheliteralmeaningoftheQurʾānand
thepropheticSunnasuffice;theuseofreason,argument,anddisputationonlyleadsastray.
Thegreatjuristal‐Shāfiʿī,founderofoneofthefourschoolsofSunnijurisprudencesaid:
‘Myverdictonthepeopleofkalāmisthattheyshouldbebeatenwithwhipsandthesolesof
sandals,andthenparadedthroughalltribesandencampments,whileitisproclaimedof
them,“SuchistherewardofthosewhoforsaketheQurʾānandtheSunna,andgive
themselvesuptothekalām”.’35
33 ‘Abd Allāh Javādī‐Āmulī, Tawhīd dar Qur’ān [Tawhīd in the Qur’ān], vol.2 of Tafsīr‐i mawdūʿī‐i Qur’ān‐i Karīm (Qum: Isrā’ Research Centre, 1386 Sh./1998), p.301. 34 Javādī‐Āmulī, Tawhīd, pp.305‐311. This perspective is based on such texts as the sermon no. 1 of the Nahj al‐balāgha of Imam ‘Alī b. Abī Tālib. See our translation of and comment upon this seminal text, Justice and Remembrance—Introducing the Spirituality of Imam ‘Alī (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), Appendix 1, pp.208‐218. On the one hand, one’s conception of the Essence must be shorn of all attributes, insofar as these latter are susceptible to distinctive conception apart from the Essence, and on the other hand, the ontological reality of the attributes is affirmed, each attribute having no ‘binding limitation’, insofar as its substance is identified absolutely with the divine Essence. 35 Cited by Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, op.cit., pp.110‐111.
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Itwouldappearnecessary,inthelightoftheseintra‐Muslimpolemics,toaskthequestion:
doallMuslimsinfactbelieveinthesameGod?36ThesamecanbesaidoftheChristians,
whosemutualanathematizationsandexcommunicationsaretoomanyandcomplexto
begintomentionhere.Sufficetosaythat,onthetheologicalplanewhichwearepresently
considering,wecertainlyneedtoaskthequestionwhetherandtowhatextentCatholics
andOrthodoxbelieveinthesameGod,ifthesetwogreatbranchesoftheChurchcouldsplit
sodefinitivelyandacrimoniouslyoverthecorrectunderstandingoftheTrinity:doesthe
SpiritproceedfromtheFatheralone,astheOrthodoxmaintain,orfromtheFatherandthe
Son(filioque),astheCatholicsmaintain?Ifthisquestion,goingtotheveryheartofthe
TrinitarianconceptionofGod,isdisputed,then,inthemeasurethatone’sbeliefinGodis
predicateduponaproperunderstandingoftheTrinity,itisnotirrelevantorirreverentto
askthequestion:doCatholicsandOrthodoxbelieveinthesameGod?Thequestionisbyno
meansmerelyacademic,norofmerelyhistoricalinterest,pertainingonlytothe‘great
schism’whichwasformalizedin1054.Asrecentlyas1848,whenPopePiusIXissuedan
invitationtotheEasternchurchesonthesubjectofunity(intheapostolicletterInSuprema
PetriApostoliSede)hemetwithablisteringresponsefromtheEasternPatriarchs:how
couldtheyunitewiththeCatholicswhoprofessedthefilioque,‘condemnedbymanyHoly
Councils...subjectedtoanathemabytheeighthEcumenicalCouncil’;thefilioquewhich
introducedunequalrelationsintheTrinityand,mostseriouslyofall,‘destroyedthe
onenessfromtheonecause’,i.e.theFather:
36 As we shall see in the next section, Ibn al‐‘Arabī’s metaphysics allows us to answer in the affirmative: yes, Muslims do believe in the same God, as regards the divine essence of belief, even if the human form assumed by belief contradicts other such forms. It might also be noted here that he offers a strictly metaphysical view of the divine attributes, arguing that they are certainly real, but only as the Essence (this being identical to the Shi’i position); but as regards their diversity, he argues that this is not only due to the diverse modes of perfection indistinguishably comprised within the Essence, the diversity is a concomitant also of the plurality of created being, with which the one Essence enters into so many relationships; the attributes are thus so many modes of relationship with the cosmos, they become outwardly diversified according to the multiplicity of the cosmos. The metaphysical ‘oneness of being’, and not just the oneness of God, is established by Ibn al‐‘Arabī through his assertion that the multiplicity of the cosmos is rooted in the ‘fixed archetypes’ (al‐a‘yān al‐thābita), and these, in turn, have no real existence—no ontological substance. They ‘exist’ only in the consciousness of God, in a manner analogous to the subsistence of ideas within the mind of man. He thus can assert that there is nothing in being but God, and since God is one, being cannot but be one. See William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge—Ibn al‐‘Arabī’s Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1989), pp.31‐58, et passim.
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ThenoveldoctrineoftheHolyGhostproceedingfromtheFatherandtheSonis
essentiallyheresy,anditsmaintainers,whoevertheybe,areheretics,accordingto
thesentenceofPopeStDamasus(‘IfanyonerightlyholdsconcerningtheFatherand
theSon,yetholdsnotrightlyoftheHolyGhost,heisaheretic’),andthatthe
congregationsofsucharealsoheretical,andthatallspiritualcommunionin
worshipoftheorthodoxsonsoftheCatholicChurchwithsuchisunlawful.37
ItistheCatholicadditionofthefilioquethat,sotheOrthodoxarguetothisday,undermined
the‘monarchy’oftheFatherassolecauseoftheGodhead,andtherebyruinedthebalance
betweentheunityofGod—determinedbytheFather—andthethreenessofGod
establishedbythePersons.IftheSpirit‘proceeded’notfromtheFatheralone,butalso
fromtheSon,thentherearetwosourcesorcausesoftheGodhead,insteadofone.Thisis
whatisimpliedintheaccusationthattheveryonenessofthecauseoftheGodhead,the
Father,is‘destroyed’bytheadditionofthewordfilioquetotheCreed.38
Canonesay,then,thattheOrthodoxconceptionoftheTrinity,withitssolesourceofunity
locatedintheFather,ismorelikelytomeetMuslimtheologicalcriteriaofTawhīd?Not
necessarily.FortheTrinityremainscentraltoOrthodoxtheology,andanyefforttoelevate
theunityofGodabovetheTrinityisfraughtwithproblems.EveniftheFatherisdescribed
astheuncausedcauseoftheSonandtheSpirit,onecannotcalltheFather‘superior’to
them,foranykindofelevationoftheFatherimpliesasubordinationoftheothertwo
Persons.Orthodoxtheologiansfirmlyresistedanysuch‘subordinationism’,asisclearfrom
thefollowingstatementbyStGregoryofNazianzen:
IshouldliketocalltheFatherthegreater,becausefromHimflowboththeequality
andthebeingoftheequals[i.e.,theothertwoPersons]...ButIamafraidtousethe 37 The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Controversy, Edward Siecienski (Oxford: Oxford University press,
2010), pp.188‐189.
38 See Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972 [reprint]), pp. 218‐223 for a
concise explanation of the doctrinal implications of the filioque; and for a more extended theological
exposition, Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Cambridge: James Clarke,
2005 [reprint]), pp.51‐66, et passim.
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wordOrigin,lestIshouldmakeHimtheOriginofinferiors,andthusinsultHimby
precedenciesofhonour.FortheloweringofthosewhoarefromHimisnoglorytothe
Source...Godheadneitherincreasednordiminishedbysuperioritiesorinferiorities;
ineveryrespectequal,ineveryrespectthesame,justasthebeautyandthe
greatnessoftheheavensisone;theinfiniteconnaturalityofThreeInfiniteOnes,
eachGodwhenconsideredinHimself;astheFather,sotheSon,astheSonsothe
HolyGhost;theThree,oneGod,whencontemplatedtogether;eachGodbecause
consubstantial;theThree,oneGodbecauseofthemonarchy(emphasisadded).39
FortheMuslimtheologiantheprincipleofunity—‘oneGodbecauseofthemonarchy’—is
fatallycompromisedbytheassertionoftrinity:‘eachGodbecauseconsubstantial’.The
logicalconsequenceofthisconsubstantialityisthatallattributesoftheGodheadpertainto
eachofthethreePersonsoftheTrinityinaquasi‐absolutemanner:eachPersonisfully
Godbydintofsharingthesamesubstance(homoousia)ofGodhead;theyareofthesame
nature,whilebeingdistinctfromtheothersonlyonaccountofaparticular‘personal’
quality:‘begetting’inthecaseoftheFather,‘beingbegotten’inthecaseoftheSon,and
‘proceedingfrom’inthecaseoftheSpirit,aswehaveseenabove.InthewordsofStJohnof
Damascus:
Forintheirhypostaticorpersonalpropertiesalone—thepropertiesofbeing
unbegotten,offiliation,andofprocession—dothethreedivinehypostasesdiffer
fromeachother,beingindivisiblydivided,notbyessencebutbythedistinguishing
markoftheirproperandpeculiarhypostasis...TheFather,theSon,andtheHoly
Ghostareoneinallrespectssavethoseofbeingunbegotten,offiliationandof
procession.40
Thisstatementhelpsustoperceivethereasonwhy,onthetheologicalplane,itisso
difficulttoformulatetheTrinityintermswhichfitwithintheframeofanIslamic
39 Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology, op. cit., p.63. To introduce any kind of inequality within the Godhead is to fall into a kind of Arianism, against which St Gregory of Nazienzen railed: ‘We believe that to subordinate anything of the Three is to destroy the whole’ (from his attack on Arius in the treatise ‘On St Basil’). 40 Cited in ibid, p.54.
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conceptionofattributes.ForaccordingtothedogmaoftheTrinity—whetherOrthodoxor
Catholic41—everythingpossessedbytheFatherisequallypossessedbytheSonandthe
Spirit;inotherwords,allthedivineattributessuchasknowledge,power,will,etc.are
ascribedequallytoallthreePersons,whoaredistinguishedonefromtheotherexclusively
accordingtotheirPersonalproperties.ThisviewdivergesradicallyfromtheIslamic
conceptionoftheattributes,allofwhicharepossessedbyonesoleEssence,andeachof
whichisdistinguishedfromalltheothersbyvirtueofitsparticularpropertyorquality;the
attributeofknowledge,forexample,cannotbeequatedwiththatofpower,exceptbyvirtue
oftheircommonrootandsourceintheEssence.AccordingtotheTrinity,however,both
attributesareequallypredicatedofeachofthethreePersons,whoaredistinguishedfrom
eachother,notasoneattributeisdistinctfromanother,butsolelybyapersonalproperty
definedinrelationtoorigin:‘thepropertiesofbeingunbegotten,offiliation,andof
procession’,asStJohnputit,describing,respectively,theFather,SonandSpirit.
Accordingtothisstrictapplicationofthedogma,itisdifficulttoseehowthethreePersons
constitutedifferentattributesofGod,if‘attributes’bedefinedaccordingtoMuslim
theology.ForeachofthePersonsequallypossessesalloftheattributesoftheothertwo,
withthesoleexceptionofthequalitydeterminedbytheirrespective‘personal’properties.
Apartfromthissoledistinction,eachPersonoftheTrinityisdeemedtobeequaltothe
othersinsofarasallthedivineattributesareconcerned;sotheSonandtheSpiritareas
omniscientandomnipotentastheFather,andthesameappliestoalltheattributes.St
ThomasAquinas,forexample,afterdefiningtheSonastheWordorthe‘understanding’of
God,writesthatinGod‘tobeandtounderstandareidentical.Therefore,thedivineWord
thatisinGod,whoseWordHeisaccordingtointellectualexistence,hasthesameexistence
asGod,whoseWordHeis.Consequently,theWordmustbeofthesameessenceandnature
asGodHimself,andallattributeswhatsoeverthatarepredicatedofGod,mustpertainalso
41 St Augustine, for example, in his treatise on the Trinity, maintains that ‘there is so great an equality in that Trinity that ... the Father is not greater than the Son in respect to divinity.’ Cited by Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. 1, ‘Faith, Trinity and Incarnation’, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p.357. The Father, the Son and the Spirit are equally ‘divine’; so every attribute of divinity is to be equally attributed to all three Persons.
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totheWordofGod’.42ThesamelogicisappliedtotheSpirit,identifiedbyAquinasasthe
loveofGodforHimself.43ThusitistoallthreePersonsequallythatalltheattributesof
divinitypertain,foreachisnothingotherthantheonesubstance.Itispreciselythis
‘sharing’ofalldivineattributesthatisdeemedbyMuslimtheologianstobeaviolationof
Tawhīd,foritappearstopositthreedifferentiatedrealitieswhichareatoncefullydivine
andyeteternallydistinctfromeachother.ItisthisthatmakestheologianslikeRāzīclaim
that,eveniftheChristianscallthethreePersons‘attributes’ofoneEssence,theyinfact
believeinthreedistinctessences.
TheChristianmightrespondasfollows:whenitisassertedthattheSonorWordpossesses
alltheattributesoftheFather,ortheEssence,whatismeantisthatinsofarasthedivine
natureissimple,ontheonehand,andinsofarastheSonisidentifiedwiththisnature,on
theother,theSonmustpossessalltheattributespossessedbytheFather.TheSondoesnot
possessalltheseattributesbyvirtueofthatwhichdefineshimas‘Son’—hisbeing
begotten—butbyvirtueofhissubstance,whichisidenticaltothatoftheEssence.The
argumentmightbeextendedthus:youMuslimsmustregardeachoftheessentialdivine
attributesasequallypossessingalltheotherattributes—failingwhichthesimplicityofthe
divinenatureisviolated.Eachattributemustpossessalltheotherattributes,notinrespect
ofwhatdistinguishesitasaspecificattribute—wisdom,forexample,asopposedtopower;
rather,itcanonlypossessalltheotherattributesinsofarasitisnototherthantheobjectof
attribution,thus,insofarasitistheoneEssence,towhichalltheessentialattributesare
ascribed.Fromthispointofview,theChristianmightconclude,Muslimbeliefinaplurality
ofessentialattributesisnotsodifferentfromtheTrinitarianconceptionofGod.
TheAsh‘aritemightreplyasfollows,beginningwithareminderofthedefinitiveformula:
‘theattributesarenotGodandnototherthanGod’;whatismissingfromtheTrinitarian
conceptionispreciselytheapophaticelementoftheformula.TheChristianonlysaysthat
42 Aquinas’s Shorter Summa—Saint Thomas’s own concise version of his Summa Theologica, trans. Cyril Vollert (Manchester, New Hampshire: Sophia Institute, 2002), ch.41, p.38. 43 See ibid, chs. 45‐48. At the end of this essay we shall see the way in which Aquinas helps to build a bridge between the two theologies—a bridge constructed out of a philosophical conception of the absolute simplicity of the divine Essence.
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eachPersonisnottheothertwo,butasregardsthedivineidentityofeachPerson,thereis
onlyaffirmationandnonegation.Thatis,theChristianonlyaffirmsthedivinityofallthree
Persons,withoutmakingthenegationwhichwouldregistertherelativityofthe‘Persons’in
relationtothepureabsolutenessanduntrammelledunicityoftheEssence.Thenegation—
‘notGod’—isrequiredasthepremiseuponwhichthecomplementaryaffirmation—‘not
otherthanGod’—isvalid.TheShi‘itheologianwouldalsorejecttheTrinitarianconception,
butforadifferentreason:theessentialattributesareindeednothingbuttheEssence,and
arethusallequally‘God’,giventhedivinesimplicity;butwhatismissingfromthe
Trinitarianconception,fromthispointofview,isthecorrectdefinitionofwhat
distinguishestheattributesfromeachother:theyaredistinguishednotbypersonal
propertiesofbegetting,beingbegottenandproceeding,astheChristianswouldsay,rather,
theyaredistinguishedonlyasregardstheirmeaning,thatmeaningwhichisconceivable
fromthehumanpointofview.44Thatwhichdistinguishesoneattributefromanotheris
thereforeeminentlycontingent.TheTrinitarian,bycontrast,notonlyconceivesofthe
distinctionswithintheGodheadasbeingdefinedaccordingtopersonalproperties,butalso
conceivesofthesedistinctionsasbeingeternal:thedistinctionsbywhichthethreePersons
aredistinguishedareeternaldistinctions.ForbothShi‘isandSunnis,thePersonsofthe
Trinitycannotbeatonceeternallydistinctandequallydivine.ForallMuslimtheologians,
distinctionimpliesrelativity,whiledivinityimpliesabsoluteunity.
Allsuchtheologicaldisagreementnotwithstanding,theargumentmadeearlier,basedon
Qur’ānicverses,thattheChristiansdoindeedbelieveinandworshiptheselfsameGodas
theMuslims,isnotnecessarilyinvalidated.Thequestionhere,fortheMuslims,isthis:
whichaspecttakesprioritywithintheQur’ānicdiscourse,rejectionofChristiandogmaor
affirmationofChristianbeliefintheoneGod?Bothaspects,ofcourse,havetobeaccepted
bytheMuslimwhowishestobefaithfultotheQur’ān,butthechallengeistodetermine
whichistobegivenpriorityintheprocessofsynthesisingthetwoaspectsintoone
44 This does not mean that the attributes are merely figments of human imagination, devoid of objective ontological substance; it means, on the contrary, that the one Essence constitutes the ontological reality of the attributes, and that what the human intellect conceives as distinct attributes is but a reflection of the infinite perfections of the Essence, perfections which cannot in any way be distinguished from the absolute infinitude of the Essence, that is: an absolute oneness which is infinitely perfect.
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fundamental,definitiveattitudetoChristianbelief.Wewouldarguethattheaspectof
affirmationmusttakepriority,insofarastheobjectivegroundsuponwhichonecanaffirm
thatChristiansandMuslimsbelieveinthesameGodprevailoverthesubjectivedifferences
ofconceptionofthatGod.Thedifferentconceptionshavebecomeembodiedintheological
dogmas,butwe(Muslims)needtoaskthequestion:dothesedogmasdefinetheessenceof
ChristianbeliefinGod?Orisitthecase,rather,thattheessenceofChristianbeliefinGod
transcendsthedogmaswhichattempttodefinebothGodandorthodoxbeliefinGod?We
alsoneedtobringintotheargumentthecrucialprincipleofintention:insofarasweregard
theprincipleofspiritualintention,governedbythedivineObject,astakingprecedence
overtherationalconception,fashionedbythehumansubject,wecanassertthatwhat
unitesMuslimsandChristians—beliefinoneGodandnotseveralgods—isinfinitelymore
significantthatwhatdividesthem,namely,theirrespectiveconceptionsoftheprecise
nature,theattributesandtheactionsofthatGod.TheQur’ānicassertionthattheGodofthe
ChristiansandMuslimsisoneandthesameisanassertionrelatingmoretoobjective
realityandtoultimateprinciplethantosubjectiveperceptionsanddogmaticdefinitions:
howevertheChristianssubjectivelydefinetheirGod,theobjectoftheirdefinitionsandthe
ultimategoaloftheirdevotionistheoneandonlyGod.Thiskindofreasoningcanhelp
MuslimstoarriveattheconclusionthattheonenessofthedivinityinwhomtheChristians
affirmbelieftakespriorityoverthefactthattheirdescriptionofthisGodentailsaTrinity
withintheUnity.However,inthemeasurethatone’sreasoningfollowsatheologicaltrain
ofthought,thetendencywillbeintheoppositedirectionsothat,formostMuslim
theologians,Trinitariandogmawillberegardedasovershadowingifnoteclipsingtheunity
ofGod.
2.BeyondTheology
Theargumentbeingproposedheremightbenefitfrominsightsderivedfromadifferent
approachtotheissue,symbolicandmetaphysicalratherthanratiocinativeandtheological.
Anappealhastobemadetospiritualintuition.Thereisanincidentwhichtookplaceinthe
lifeoftheProphetwhichcallsouttobedecipheredbypreciselythiskindofspiritual
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intuition.ItdemonstratesgraphicallythatChristiansbelieveinandworshipnothingbut
theonetrueGod.Italsoshowstheimportanceofaffirmingsolidaritywith‘fellow‐
believers’,andhowthisspiritualsolidaritymustultimatelyprevailoveralltheological
differencesbetweenthem.
Inthe9thyearaftertheHijra(631)45aChristiandelegationfromNajran(inYemen)came
toMedinatoengageintheologicaldiscussionandpoliticalnegotiation.Forourpurposes,
themostsignificantaspectofthiseventisthefactthatwhentheChristiansrequestedto
leavethecitytoperformtheirliturgy,theProphetinvitedthemtoaccomplishtheirritesin
hisownmosque.AccordingtothehistorianIbnIshāq,whogivesthestandardaccountof
thisremarkableevent,theChristiansinquestionwere‘Malikī’thatis,Melchite,meaning
thattheyfollowedtheByzantineChristianrites.Theseritesembodiedallthefundamental
dogmasoftheChurchCouncils,sowearespeakinghereaboutanenactmentofthevery
doctrines—Trinity,Sonship,Incarnation—thatarecriticisedintheQur’ān.Thoughwedo
notknowexactlywhatformofliturgywasenactedintheProphet’smosque,whatisknown
isthatChristianswerepermittedtoperformtheirprayersinthemostsacredspotinthe
Prophet’scity—anactwhichwouldbeunthinkableweretheseChristiansprayingto
somethingotherthanAllāh.
Clearly,inthis‘existential’commentaryontheQur’ānicdiscourserelatingtotheChristian
faith,itisthesupra‐theologicalormetaphysicalperspectiveofidentityorunitywhichtakes
priorityovertheologicaldivergence.Therealityofthisdivergenceisnotdeniedbythe
propheticact;46rather,theinvalidityofdrawingcertainconclusionsfromthisdivergenceis
revealed:onecannotusethedivergenceasgroundsforassertingthatChristiansbelievein
andworshipsomethingotherthanGod.TheactoftheProphetshows,onthecontrary,that
disagreementontheplaneofdogmacan—andshould—coexistwithspiritualaffirmation
45 There is some discrepancy in the sources about the precise date of this event. See A. Guillaume (Tr.) The Life of Muhammad—A Translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah (Oxford, 1968), pp.270‐277; see also Martin Lings, Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources (Cambridge, 1984), pp.324‐325. 46 Indeed, the dispute over the nature of Jesus was cut short by a revelation to the Prophet instructing him to challenge the Christians to a mutual imprecation (mubāhala): the curse of God was to be invoked on ‘those who lie’; see Q 3:61. The challenge was in fact not taken up by the Christians.
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onthesuperiorplaneofultimateReality,thatRealityofwhichdogmaisaninescapably
limited,conceptualexpression.Exotericortheologicaldistinctionremainsonitsownlevel,
andthisdistinctionisnecessaryforupholdingtheuniquenessandintegrityofeachpath:‘
...foreachofyou[communities]WehaveestablishedaLawandaPath(5:48;emphasis
added)’;whilemetaphysicalidentityisimpliedbyspiritualintention:thesummitisOne,
andthebelievermovestowardsthatonenesspreciselybyobeyingtherevealedLawand
traversingthespiritualPaththatleadstothatsummit:‘UntoyourLordisyourreturn,allof
you,andHewillinformyouaboutthosethingsconcerningwhichyediffered’(5:48,endof
theverse).
TheProphet’sactionthusreinforcestheprimarythrustoftheQur’ānicmessageregarding
theGodoftheChristians:itisthesameGodthatisworshipped,butthatdivinityis
conceiveddifferently—erroneously,aseachwouldsayabouttheother.Theonenessofthe
divineObjecttakesprecedence—infinitely,onemightadd—overanydiversitywroughtby
thehumansubjects;forthatwhichisspirituallyintendedbysincerefaithtakespriority
overtheverbalandconceptualformsassumedbytheintention:theseformsareaccidental,
whiletheobjectintendedisessential.Thisspiritualintentionmanifestsanintrinsic
‘tendency’towardstheTranscendent,andthisharmoniseswithan‘in‐tending’,ora
‘tendinginwards’,aspirituallyinteriorizingmovement,engagingthedeepestpointofthe
heartofthebelieverinthequestforGod.Whatissharedincommonisthefundamental
aspirationtoworshiptheoneandonlyGod—theobjective,transcendent,unique,and
ineffableReality;thatwhichisnotsharedincommonisthemannerinwhichthatRealityis
conceived,andthemodebywhichthatRealityisworshipped:wehavehereafusionatthe
leveloftheEssence,withoutanyconfusionatthelevelofforms.Thedogmasandritualsof
eachfaithremaindistinctandthusirreducible,whilethesummitofthepathdelineatedby
dogmaandritualisunderstoodtobeoneandthesame.Itmightbearguedthatthedegree
ofambiguityattachingtoChristianworship—worshippingGod‘throughJesus’—opens
suchworshipuptothechargeofpolytheism.Butonecanretortthatconceptualambiguity
intermsofreferenceistrumpedbyspiritualintentionalityinsincereworship;conversely,
thatwhichissincerelyintendedcannotbeinvalidatedbythatwhichisambiguously
defined.Giventhatdivinerealitycanneverbeexhaustivelydefined,themostonecanaim
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atinthisdomainislessinadequateconceptions,accompaniedbyaspiritofhumble
acknowledgementthatthedivinerealityforevereludeshumanattemptsatcomprehension.
‘ThatthereisaGodisclear;butwhatHeisbyessenceandnature,thisisaltogetherbeyond
ourcomprehensionandknowledge’,asStJohnofDamascusputit.47
Onecanandmustacceptthatthereisanirreducibletheologicalincompatibilitybetween
IslamicandChristianconceptionsofGod,butoneneednotgofurtherandclaimthatthis
incompatibilitypermitstheMuslimtheologiantosaythatChristiansworshipsomething
otherthanGod,thattheirworshipisaformofpolytheism.Thiswouldbejustifiedneither
bytheQur’ānicdiscoursepertainingtoChristianitytakenasawhole,norbytheProphet’s
sayings,again,takenasawhole,andparticularlyinrelationtohisallowanceofChristian
worshipinthemosqueofMedina.Suchanactonhispartwouldbeunthinkablewerethis
worshiptobequalifiableas‘polytheistic’inanysense.OnecanindeedimaginetheProphet
receivingArabpolytheistleadersintohismosque,foritistruethattheProphet’smosque
atthattimewasnotonlyaplaceofworship,italsoservedasakindofdīwānorcourt;but
onecannotimaginetheProphetinvitinganypolytheisttopraytohisgodsinthemosque.
Nonetheless,someMuslimtheologiansmightarguethattheProphetwasonlybeing
‘diplomatic’and‘courteous’inallowingtheChristianstoprayinhismosque,andthatone
mustnotdrawanytheologicalimplicationsfromthisact.Theargumenthoweverbackfires,
foriftheProphetwerewillingtogosofar,forthesakeofdiplomacyandcourtesy,asto
permit‘polytheistic’worshiptobeenactedinhismosque,howmuchmoreincumbentis
this‘diplomacy’and‘courtesy’uponhisfollowers,whomust,accordingtothelogicofthis
argument,refrainfromcharacterisingChristianworshipas‘polytheistic’,ifonlyoutofa
diplomacyandcourtesyinemulationofthepropheticexample?ForMuslimstoaccuse
Christiansofengaginginpolytheismis,therefore,notonlytogomuchfurtherthanthe
ProphetortheQur’āneverwent;italsoconstitutesanimplicitcriticismoftheProphetfor
compromisinganessentialtheologicalprinciple—distinguishingclearlybetweenTawhīd
andshirk—forthesakeofsomethingsoeminentlycontingentas‘diplomacy’or‘courtesy’.
47 On the Orthodox Faith, 1:4; cited by Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church, op.cit., p.217.
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ThemetaphysicalprincipleexpressedbytheProphet’sactcanalsobediscernedinan
eschatologicaleventdescribedbytheProphet.Thefollowingsaying—whichexistsin
slightlydifferentvariants,inthemostcanonicalofhadīthcollections—concernsthe
possibilityofseeingGodintheHereafter.TheMuslimsareconfrontedbyatheophanyof
theirLord,whomtheydonotrecognize:‘IamyourLord’,Hesaystothem.‘Weseekrefuge
inGodfromyou,’theyreply,‘wedonotassociateanythingwithourLord’.ThenGodasks
them:‘Isthereanysign(āya)betweenyouandHimbymeansofwhichyoumight
recognizeHim?’Theyreplyintheaffirmative,andthen‘allisrevealed’,andtheyalltryto
prostratetoHim.Finally,asregardsthispartofthescene,‘HetransformsHimselfintothe
forminwhichtheysawHimthefirsttime,48andHesays:“IamyourLord”,andtheyreply:
“YouareourLord!”.’49
Ibnal‐‘Arabīandthe‘godcreatedinbelief’
Theconsequencesofthisremarkablesayingarefar‐reaching.Godcanappearinforms
quiteunrecognisableintermsofthebeliefsheldbyMuslims;andifthisbetrueontheDay
ofJudgmentitisequallysointhisworld.IntheSufitradition,Ibnal‐‘Arabīprovides
arguablythemostcompellingcommentaryonthecognitiveimplicationsofthisprinciple.
Insodoinghealsofurnishesuswithstronggroundsforansweringintheaffirmativethe
questionposedtousinthisconsultation.Theessenceofhiscommentaryisthatoneand
thesameRealitycantakeamultitudeofforms,henceItmustnotbeconfinedwithinthe
formsofone’sownbelief.Thedivinityconceivedbythemindisnot,andcannotbe,the
pureAbsolute,butis,rather,the‘godcreatedinbeliefs’(al‐ilāhal‐makhlūqfi’l‐i‘tiqādāt).
This‘created’god,however,farfrombeingasourceofmisguidanceforthecreatures,is
itselftheconsequenceofthemercifulradiationoftheGodwholovestobeknown,in
accordancewiththewell‐knownsaying,citedmorebytheSufisthanthetheologians:‘Iwas
ahiddentreasure,andIlovedtobeknown’.Ibnal‐‘Arabīcommentsonthisinmanyplaces,
48 The wording here is extremely important: wa‐qad tahawwala fī sūratihi allatī ra’ūhu fīhā awwal marra. 49 This version of the saying comes in the Sahīh Muslim (Cairo: Īsā al‐Bābī al‐Halabī, n.d), chapter entitled Ma‘rifa tarīq al‐ru’yā (‘knowledge of the way of vision’), vol. 1, p.94.
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buthere,themostimportantaspectofthesayingconcernsthemercyinherentinthelove
tobeknown:‘AftertheMercyItself,“thegodcreatedinbelief”isthefirstrecipientof
Mercy.’50Godissaidtohave‘writtenmercy’uponHisownsoul,accordingtotheQur’ān
(6:12,and6:54).BeingHimselftheessenceofMercy,thefirst‘form’receivingthatmercyis
thequalityofmercyitself,thefountofradiantcreativity.Thereafter,the‘godcreatedin
belief’receivesmercifulexistentiation,andthisrefersnotjusttothediversemodesof
theophanicrevelationtohumankind,butalsotothecapacityofeachhumansoulto
conceiveofGod,thus,inasense,thepowerto‘create’Godinone’sbelief.‘SinceGodisthe
rootofeverydiversityinbeliefs...everyonewillendupwithmercy.ForitisHewho
createdthem[thediversebeliefs]...’51
Accordingtothisperspective,thevariousrevelations,alongwithdiversebeliefsfashioned
thereby,constitutesomanywaysbywhichGodinvitesHiscreaturestoparticipateinHis
infinitelymercifulnature.Recognitionofsuchrealitiesmeansthatitis‘improper’todeny
GodsuchasHeisconceivedinthebeliefsofothers:
Generallyspeaking,eachmannecessarilystickstoaparticularcreedconcerninghis
Lord.HealwaysgoesbacktohisLordthroughhisparticularcreedandseeksGod
therein.SuchamanpositivelyrecognizesGodonlywhenHemanifestsHimselfto
himintheformrecognizedbyhiscreed.ButwhenHemanifestsHimselfinother
formshedeniesHimandseeksrefugefromHim.Insodoinghebehavesinan
improperwaytowardsHiminfact,evenwhilebelievingthatheisactingpolitely
towardsHim.Thusabelieverwhostickstohisparticularcreedbelievesonlyina
godthathehassubjectivelypositedinhisownmind.Godinallparticularcreedsis
dependentuponthesubjectiveactofpositingonthepartofthebelievers.52
50 Fusūs al‐hikam, translated as Bezels of Wisdom, by R. Austin (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), pp. 224‐225. See our Paths to Transcendence—According to Shankara, Ibn al‐Arabi and Meister Eckhart (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), the chapter on Ibn al‐‘Arabī (pp.69‐129) for a discussion of this theme of universality in the context of his metaphysical teachings. 51 Cited by William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge—Ibn al‐‘Arabī’s Metaphysics of Imagination
(Albany, NY: SUNY, 1989), p.388.
52 Cited by Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p.254 (translation modified).
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Inotherwords,GodmercifullyandlovinglyrevealsHimselftoHiscreationintheophanies
whichcannotbutconformthemselvestothesubjectivelimitationsofthecreature;but
thereisadynamicinteractionbetweenthehumansubjectandthedivineObject,between
theaccidentalcontainerandthesubstantialcontent:thehumanisdrawnintothedivine,to
theextentthattheconceptuallycircumscribedformofbeliefgiveswaytothespiritual
realizationofthecontentofbelief.Ifthisspiritualmovementortendencyfromtheformto
theessence,fromthesubjecttotheobject,fromthecontainertothecontent,doesnottake
place,thenoneenvisagestheopposite:thehumansubjectivisationofthedivine,the
relativisationoftheAbsolute,theindividualbecomingblindedbythecontingentformof
hisbelieffromitsessentialcontent.
Asmentionedabove,thedifferentbeliefsareapriorideterminedbythe‘heart’,butthe
capacityoftheheartitselfisinturnfashionedbyaninitialcosmogoniceffusionofgrace
fromthemercifulLord.Sohumansubjectivityisitselftheresultofdivinecreativity,and
cannotthereforeintrinsicallyrelativisetheAbsolute,evenwhileappearingtodoso.God
notonlycreatesman,butinasenseallowsmantocreateHim,whichhedoesbyconceiving
ofHimandbelievinginHimandworshippingHimaccordingtothemodesdeterminedby
theformassumedbyhisbelief.God,however,istrulypresentandactivewithinthat
belief—oratleastonedimensionofdivinityis.ForIbnal‐‘Arabīdistinguishesbetweenthe
absoluteEssenceofGod—sometimesreferredtoasal‐Ahad,theall‐exclusiveOne—andthe
Lord(al‐Rabb),alsocalledthe‘divinity’(al‐ulūhiyya),orsimplythe‘level’(al‐martaba),or
al‐Wāhid,theall‐inclusiveOne.Thesetwodimensionsoftheoneandonlydivinityhelpus
toseethatthedistinctivenessofthedivinequalitiesisconceivableonlyatthefirstdegree
ofSelf‐manifestation.Itisonlyatthisleveloftheophanythattheperfectionshiddenwithin
thesupra‐manifest‘treasure’ofthedivineOnenessaredistinctivelyaffirmedasaplurality;
itisonlyatthislevelthatthereisaforeshadowingofthemanifestationoftheinfinite
perfectionsoftheall‐exclusiveOne,thisanticipationofmultiplicitynotdetractingoneiota
fromitsoneness.Forthepluralityofitsperfectionsisstilllocatedattheprincipial,supra‐
manifestlevel,thatofaonenesswhichis‘all‐inclusive’,al‐wāhidiyya.Thedistinction
betweenthesetwodimensionsofoneness,al‐wāhidiyyaandal‐ahadiyya(ortheonenessof
themany,ahadiyyatal‐kathra,andtheonenessoftheone,ahadiyyatal‐ahad)iscrucialin
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themetaphysicsofIbnal‐‘Arabī;andwhatmustbestressedaboutthisdistinctionisthatit
pertainstothedivinenatureandnothingelse;itreferstotwodimensionsofoneness
withintheabsolutelyindivisibledivinenature,onedimensionpertainingtotheAbsoluteas
such,andtheothertotheAbsolutewithits‘face’turnedtowardscreation.Asweshallsee
below,thisdistinctioncanhelpustodemonstratethecompatibilitybetweentheTrinity,
metaphysicallyorsupra‐theologicallyconceived,andtheprincipleofTawhīd.
Wecanonlyknow,andrelateto,thenamesandqualitiesoftheLord,orthe‘divinity’,orthe
‘level’;buttherecanbenodirect,unmediatedrelationshipbetweenusandtheEssence.
ThisisbecausetheEssencehasnothingtodowithcreation;theonlypossiblekindof
relationshipbetweenthedivineRealityandcreationismediatedbyanintermediary
principle,whichistheLord,the‘divinity’orthe‘level’:aprincipleatoncedivineand
relative.Itisthisdegreeofrelativitywithindivinitywhichcanbeconceived,andthus
believedinandworshipped.ThisisthefirstdegreeoftheophanicSelf‐determination
propertotheEssencewhichremains,nonetheless,forevertranscendentinrelationtoall
thatflowsforthfromthisSelf‐determination,andafortiori,allthattakesplacewithin
creation:‘ItisnotcorrectfortheRealandcreationtocometogetherinanymode
whatsoeverinrespectoftheEssence’;theRealandcreationcanonlybebroughtinto
relationship‘inrespectofthefactthattheEssenceisdescribedbydivinity.’53
TheEssencebecoming‘described’bydivinitymeansthatItistranscribedwithinrelativity
by this theophany,without in anyway sacrificing its immutable transcendence. It is this
divinityorLordthat,alone,canbeconceivedandworshipped.Ibnal‐‘Arabīexpressesthis
principle in various ways, amongst which themost striking is the following exegesis of
18:119: ‘Let him not associate (any) one with his Lord’s worship’. The immediately
apparentmeaningoftheverserelatestotheprohibitionofshirk,orassociatingfalsegods
withthetruedivinityorwiththeworshipofthatdivinity,butIbnal‐‘Arabīmakesthe‘one’
inquestionrefertotheEssence,andinterpretstheversethus:
HeisnotworshippedinrespectofHisUnity,sinceUnitycontradictstheexistenceof
theworshipper. It is as ifHe is saying, ‘What isworshipped is only the “Lord” in 53 Ibid, p.59.
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respect of His Lordship, since the Lord brought you into existence. So connect
yourself to Him andmake yourself lowly before Him, and do not associate Unity
withLordshipinworship...ForUnitydoesnotknowyouandwillnotacceptyou...54
Thedegreeofdivinitythatcanbeconceivedof,believedin,andworshippedcannotbethe
pureuntrammelledunityoftheEssence.Thereisnoroom,inthismetaphysicalunity,for
themultiplicitypresupposedbycreation.TospeakoftheCreatoristospeakofthe
creature,tospeakoftheLordistospeakofthevassal:buttheOnehasno‘other’towhichit
relates,ifitdid,itwouldceasetobetheAbsolute,itwouldberelativizedbyitsrelationship
totherelative.Wemustnot,therefore,‘associate’UnitywithLordship:intermsofUnity,
thecreatureisapurenon‐entity,itisonlyinrelationtotheLordthatthecreaturehasany
existence,andtheraisond’êtreofthecreatureistoworshiptheLordwhomitcanconceive.
TheOne,however,foreverevadestheconceptualisationwhichisthebasisforforming
belief.Wecanconceivethatitis,butnotwhatitis.ItisforthisreasonthattheProphet
asserted,invarioussayings:meditateonthequalitiesofGod,butnotonHisEssence.55
AsweshallseewithbothStDionysiusandEckhart,thisapophaticapproachtothesupreme
Realityopensupapathwhichtranscendsalldivergencesasregardstheological
descriptionsofGod.TocontinuewiththisbriefexpositionofIbnal‐‘Arabī’sperspective,let
usnotethatdespitethetranscendenceoftheOneaboveallbeliefsconcerningit,Godis
nonetheless‘witheveryobjectofbelief.’Thisstatementevokesthedivineutterance:‘Iam
withtheopinionMyslavehasofMe.’56Theword‘with’translates‘inda,whichmightalso
betranslatedas‘presentwithin/as/to’57:Godthusdeclaresthat,inasense,Heconformsto
54 Ibid, p.244 55 Al‐Rāghib al‐Isfahānī, a major lexicographer of the Qur’ān, writes in his explanation of the Qur’ānic concept of fikr, ‘meditative thought’: ‘Meditation is only possible in regard to that which can assume a conceptual form (sūra) in one’s heart. Thus we have the following saying [of the Prophet]: Meditate upon the bounties of God but not on God [Himself, His Essence] for God is above and beyond all possibility of being described in terms of any form (sūra).’ Mu‘jam mufradāt alfāz al‐Qur’ān (Beirut: Dār al‐Fikr, n.d.), p.398. 56 This is a strongly authenticated hadīth qudsī, or divine utterance, transmitted by the Prophet. It is found in Bukhārī, al‐Tirmidhī and Ibn Mājah. See Forty Hadith Qudsi, selected and translated by E. Ibrahim and D. Johnson‐Davies (Beirut: Dar al‐Koran al‐Kareem, 1980), p.78. 57 The translators of the above‐mentioned work render the saying as follows: ‘I am as My servant thinks I am.’
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whateverformofbeliefHisslavehasofhim.Ibnal‐‘Arabīcontinues:‘His[i.e.God’s]
existenceintheconception(tasawwur)ofhimwhoconceivesHimdoesnotdisappear
whenthatperson’sconceptionchangesintoanotherconception.No,Hehasanexistencein
thissecondconception.Inthesameway,ontheDayofResurrection,hewilltransmute
Himselfinself‐disclosurefromformtoform...’58
Ibnal‐‘Arabīisherereferringbacktotheprincipleofthedivinecapacitytoundergo
tahawwul,accordingtothepropheticsayingcitedearlier.WhatistrueofGodontheDayof
Resurrectionistruehereandnow.Whetheritbeacaseofdifferentindividuals,different
schoolsofthoughtwithinIslam,ordifferentreligions:Godistrulypresentwithinallthese
diverseconceptionsandbeliefsconcerningHim,withoutthisresultinginanyfundamental
contradiction,giventheunlimitedformsbywhichGodcanrevealHimself.Whatweare
givenhereisapictureofradicalrelativism,butonewhich,paradoxically,‘proves’theone
andonlyAbsolute.FortheAbsoluteisthatwhichtranscendsallpossiblepowersof
conception,andyetimmanentlyandmercifullypervadesallthoseconceptionsofHim
whichstemfromauthenticdivinetheophanies.Oneofthemostusefulimagesemployedby
Ibnal‐‘Arabītoreconcilethetwotermsofthisparadoxisthis:watertakesonthecolourof
thecup.Thecupsymbolisestheformofbelief,whilethewatercontainedthereinstandsfor
theObjectofbelief.
Hewhoseesthewateronlyinthecupjudgesitbythepropertyofthecup.Buthe
whoseesitsimpleandnoncompoundknowsthattheshapesandcolorsinwhichit
becomes manifest are the effect of the containers. Water remains in its own
definitionandreality,whetherinthecuporoutsideit.Henceitneverlosesthename
‘water’.59
Inthisimage,thecupsymbolizestheformofthe‘preparedness’or‘receptivity’(isti‘dād)of
aparticularbelief;thewaterinthecupsymbolisesthetheophanywhichhasadapteditself
to the form and shape of the belief. The substance and colour of water as such is
undifferentiated and unique, but it appears to undergo changes of form and colour on
accountof theaccidental formsof the receptacles inwhich it ispoured.This recognition
58 Sufi Path, p.337. 59 Ibid., pp.341‐342.
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enables one to realize that the ‘water’ (or theophanies) in ‘cups’ (or beliefs) other than
one’sownisjustasmuch‘water’asisthewaterinone’sowncup.Onecanthusaffirmthe
veracityofallbeliefsorrather:allthosebeliefswhose‘cups’containthewaterofauthentic
Revelation, even if these beliefs are also forged by the unavoidable relativity of the
creaturelyfacultyofconception.
Thisprincipleisexplicitlyreaffirmedinthefollowingimportantpassage:
Hewho counsels his own soul should investigate during his life in thisworld, all
doctrines concerning God. He should learn from whence each possessor of a
doctrineaffirmsthevalidityofhisdoctrine.Onceitsvalidityhasbeenaffirmedfor
himinthespecificmodeinwhichitiscorrectforhimwhoupholdsit,thenheshould
supportitinthecaseofhimwhobelievesinit.Heshouldnotdenyitorrejectit,for
hewillgatheritsfruitontheDayofVisitation....Soturnyourattentiontowhatwe
havementionedandputitintopractice!ThenyouwillgivetheDivinityitsdue... .
ForGodisexaltedhighaboveenteringunderdelimitation.Hecannotbetieddown
by one form rather than another. From here you will come to know the all‐
inclusivenessoffelicityforGod’screaturesandtheall‐embracingnessofthemercy
whichcoverseverything.60
Inanswertothequestion,howdoesoneascertainthe‘validity’ofadoctrineorbelief,Ibn
al‐‘Arabīwouldanswerintermsofrevelation:thosedoctrineswhichclearlyderivefromor
are rooted in a revelation of God are to be accepted. This answer emerges from the
following sentence, dealing with the legitimacy of prostration to something ‘other than
God’—as did the angels to Adam, or the family of Joseph to Joseph: ‘Hewho prostrates
himself tootherthanGodseekingnearnesstoGodandobeyingGodwillbefelicitousand
attaindeliverance,buthewhoprostrateshimselftootherthanGodwithoutGod’scommand
seekingnearnesswillbewretched’(emphasisadded).61
Doctrinesandbeliefswhichareman‐madeare thusclearlyrejected—weare far froman
‘anything goes’ attitudewhich accepts all doctrines as true in an indiscriminatemanner. 60 Ibid., pp.355‐356. 61 Ibid., p.365.
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Rather,we are being urged by Ibn al‐‘Arabī to be open to all receptacleswhich contain
beliefs rooted in divine revelation, and to judge them according to their content, rather
than be misled into judging the content according to the accidental properties of the
container.Whatis‘accidental’hereincludeseventhedogmasofthedifferentfaiths,noneof
whichcanclaimtoexhaustthemysteryofthatSubstancetowhichtheyallude.
Toaffirmonlythe‘God’createdwithinone’sbeliefisthustantamounttodenyingHiminall
otherbeliefs:‘HewhodelimitsHimdeniesHiminotherthanhisowndelimitation....But
he who frees Him from every delimitation never denies Him. On the contrary, he
acknowledges Him in every form within which He undergoes self‐transmutation.’62 The
consequencesof thisdenialwill be adiminution inone’s receptivity to the lovingmercy
containedwithinthebeliefsofothers.However,attachingoneselfonlytothe‘water’within
one’s own cup still results in mercy, given that the theophanic form is still a true
theophany,itisGodandnothingbutGod,eveniftheformassumedbyGodbeextrinsically
limitedby the formof one’s belief: there is an absoluteness of content, combinedwith a
relativityofthecontainer,butthatabsolutenessisnotrelativizedbythecontainer.Rather,
whatisexcludedbythecontaineristheinfiniteformsoftheophanyfillingthecontainersof
otherbeliefs. Inotherwords, it isnotthecasethatGodisrelativizedbythespecificityof
one’sbelief,bythelimitedcontainer;rather,therelativityofthehumanbeliefisdisplaced
bytheabsolutenessofitsowncontent,inthemeasurethatthiscontentisrealizedthrough
spiritualassimilation,andnotjustconceivedbyrationalthought.Forthenoneperceives—
ordrinks—waterassuch,thesubstanceofwhichisidenticaltothatcontainedinallother
containers. So the very absoluteness of the content of one’s realized belief leads to an
assimilationoftheinfinitudepropertothatabsoluteness.‘Drinking’thewaterwithinone’s
own cupmeans drinkingwater as such, and thus, in principle, one has drunk the same
substance as thatwhich is contained in all the other cups.Aswe said at the outset, one
believesinGodassuchandnotsuchandsuchagod.
62 Ibid., pp.339‐340. See our Paths to Transcendence—According to Shankara, Ibn Arabi and Meister Eckhart (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), for further discussion of these themes in the context of the quest for transcendent realization, according to these three mystics.
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Evenifthistotalrealizationisnotattained,thebelieverwillnonethelessbenefitfromhis
capacitytorecognizeGodinbeliefsotherthanhisown,forhehasaglimpseofthefelicity
whichflowsfromtheunrestrictedbeatificvisionofGodinallHisforms.Thebeatificvision
experiencedbythebeliever intheHereafterwillconformtothenatureofhisconception
andattitudetowardsGodinthehere‐below.ThisisclearlyassertedbyIbnal‐‘Arabīinthe
courseofdescribingthe‘share’accordedtothehighestsaint:heenjoysthefelicitywhichis
the fruit of all forms of belief held by the faithful of the different religions, because he
recognizes their correspondence to real aspects of the divine nature.63 This direct and
plenaryparticipationinthefelicitythatiscontainedwithintheformsofbeliefsconcerning
Godisthusseentobearealityalreadyinthis life—aprefigurationofthehighercelestial
states.
Thus,Ibnal‐‘Arabīurgesthebelievertomakehimselfreceptivetoallformsofreligious
beliefbothforthesakeofobjectiveveracity—thatis,‘thetrueknowledgeofthereality’
thatGodisimmanentwithinallformsofHisSelf‐revelation—andintheinterestsofone’s
posthumousstate—the‘greatbenefit’thataccruestothesoulintheHereafterin
proportiontotheuniversalityoftheknowledgeofGodwhichithasattainedonearth.The
visionthatresultsfromthisopennesstothediversityoftheophanieswithintheformsof
differentbeliefsisbeautifullyexpressedinthemostfamouslinesfromIbnal‐‘Arabī’spoetic
masterpiece,Tarjumānal‐ashwāq:
Myhearthasbecomecapableofeveryform:
itisapastureforgazellesandaconventforChristianmonks,
Andatempleforidolsandthepilgrim’sKa‘ba,
andthetablesoftheTorahandthebookoftheKoran.
IfollowthereligionofLove:whateverwayLove’scamelstake,
thatismyreligionandmyfaith.64
63 See M. Chodkiewicz, Le Sceau des Saints (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), p.73. 64 The Tarjuman Al‐Ashwaq, R.A. Nicholson, (trans.) (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1978), p.52.
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ItisclearthatintheselinesIbnal‐‘Arabīisnotaffirmingthattheformsmentionedareall
equallylegitimatereligiousforms;onlythattheyareall,quaforms,equallymanifestations
ofthedivinereality.Heismakinganontologicalandnotspecificallyreligiousaffirmation.
EverythingmanifestedinbeingisamanifestationofGod,sinceGodisbeing;onthisbasis,
heinterpretstheverse:‘ThyLordhasdecreedthatyoushallnotworshipanybutHim(17:
23)asadescriptivestatementratherthanasanormativeinjunction,forGodis‘identical
witheverythingtowardwhichthereispovertyandwhichisworshipped’.65Everythingthat
isworshippedisthereforedivine,butasregardsthespecificallyreligiouscriterionfor
authenticworship,this,asseenabove,isderivedupontheprincipleofGod’sscriptural
revelations,whichareconcreteandspecific,notonthedivineself‐disclosureswithinthe
domainofmanifestation,whichareuniversalandinescapable.
Finally,letuslookattheremarkableinterpretationgivenbyIbnal‐‘Arabītoonehisown
linesofpoetryinthiswork.Thisgivesusonepossiblewayofunderstandingthemeaning
oftheChristianTrinityfromamysticalMuslimperspective.Thelineinthepoemisas
follows:
‘MyBelovedisthreealthoughHeisOne,evenasthePersonsaremadeonePersonin
essence.’Theinterpretationgivenbythepoethimself:‘Numberdoesnotbegetmultiplicity
intheDivineSubstance,astheChristiansdeclarethattheThreePersonsoftheTrinityare
OneGod,andastheQur’āndeclares:“CalluponGodorcallontheMerciful;howeverye
invokeHim,itiswell,fortoHimbelongthemostbeautifulNames”(17:110).’66
ThemostbeautifulNamesofGod,al‐asmā’al‐husnā,canbeseenasthearchetypesofall
possiblemodesoftheophany,andthereby,ofthediverse—evencontradictory—beliefsof
Godfashionedbythosetheophanicmodesofself‐revelation.Thenamesarediverse,
referringtothedifferentaspectsoftheNamed;beliefsfashionedbytherevelationofthose
namesarethuslikewiseinescapablydiverse,butallthebeliefsarenonethelessatonein
thesupremeObjectoffaith.Ibnal‐‘ArabīunreservedlyidentifiesthethreePersonsofthe
65 Cited by W.Chittick, ‘Towards Sainthood: States and Stations’, in M. Chodkiewicz (ed.), Les Illuminations de La Mecque (Paris: Sindbad, 1988), p.319. 66 Ibid., p.70.
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Trinityasthreeaspectsor‘names’oftheoneEssence,thusresolvingmultiplicitywithin
unityinamannerwhichisanalogoustothatbymeansofwhichtheninety‐nine‘names’
refertobutoneEssenceinIslam.For‘numberdoesnotbegetmultiplicityinthedivine
Substance’.Asweshallseebelow,thisisamirror‐imageofwhatEckhartsaysaboutthe
Trinity,aboutnumberwithinthedivinity,andabout‘ahundred’Personswithintheone
God.BothEckhartandIbnal‐‘Arabīsituatepluralitywithinthedivinenatureonaplane
whichisbelowthatoftheEssence,aplanewhichpertainstotherelationshipbetweenthe
Essenceandthedomainofmanifestation.Tospeakof‘relationship’isthusineluctablyto
speakofrelativity,anditisonthisplaneofrelativity—stillwithinthedivinenatureitself,
butrelativitynonetheless—thatonecanascribepluralitytoGod.TheEssence,however,
transcendsthisrelativityandis‘one’notinanynumericalsenseofunitywhichcanbe
distinguished,onthesameplaneofnumber,fromplurality;forthenwewouldstillbeon
theplaneofrelativity,assertingone‘unit’orthingasopposedtoothersimilarlylocated
unitsorthings.Rather,theEssenceisoneinaproperlymetaphysicalsense,asensewhich
goesbeyondphysisornature,understandingbynatureallthatwhichpertainstothe
createdorder,andnumberevidentlypertainstothisorder.NumberasappliedtoGodmust
thenbeappliedinaconsciouslymetaphysicalmanner:ifoneistospeakofGodintermsof
thecontingentcategoryofnumber,thenoneshouldassertthatGodisindeed‘one’,for,on
theplaneofnumber,‘one’isthemostadequatesymbolbywhichtheAbsolutecanbe
described.67
SpiritualreceptivitytotherealizationoftheEssenceisdeepenedbythecapacityto
conceiveoftheinescapablylimitednatureofallconceptions:theintrinsicallyinconceivable
natureofultimateRealitycanberealized,toonedegreeoranother,inspiritualvision,that
visionwhicharisesinproportiontotheeffacementoftheindividual(fanā’).Thisshiftfrom
conceptuallimitationtospiritualvisioniswellexpressedbyIbnal‐‘Arabīinrelationto
67 As Frithjof Schuon writes, in his irrefutable critique—and also inspiring interpretation—of the dogma of the Trinity: ‘Only Unity as such can be a definition of the Absolute; in the realm of number, unity alone represents an element of absoluteness, as does the point or the centre in space, and the instant or the present in time...’. This is from the essay entitled ‘Evidence and Mystery’ in his Logic and Transcendence, op.cit., p.91. For another compelling interpretation of the Trinity, see Schuon’s Understanding Islam (Bloomingon, IN: World Wisdom, 1994), p.53.
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Moses’squesttoseeGod.Ibnal‐‘ArabīrecordsthefollowingdialoguehehadwithMosesin
thecourseofhisspiritualascentthroughtheheavens:
[Isaidtohim]...yourequestedthevision[ofGod],whiletheMessengerofGod
[Muhammad]saidthat‘notoneofyouwillseehisLorduntilhedies’?
Sohesaid:‘Anditwasjustlikethat:whenIaskedHimforthevision,Heanswered
me,sothat“Ifelldownstunned”(Q7,143).ThenIsawHiminmy[stateof]being
stunned.’Isaid:‘While(youwere)dead?’Hereplied:‘While(Iwas)dead....Idid
notseeGoduntilIhaddied’.68
Thisistheconsummationoftheapophaticpath:‘extinctionwithincontemplation’(al‐fanā’
fi’l‐mushāhada),thisbeingpreciselythetitleofoneofIbnal‐‘Arabī’smostexplicittreatises
onthethemeoffanā’.69Asweshallseeinamoment,thesimilaritiesbetweenthis
perspectiveandthoseofbothStDionysiusandMeisterEckhartarestriking.
Christianapophaticismandsuperessentialidentity
TheperspectiveofIbnal‐‘Arabī,wewouldargue,ismirroredintheapophatictraditionof
mysticaltheologywithinChristianity.Itisinthistraditionthatalldogmaticformulationsof
theultimateRealityareseenasfallingshortofadequatelyexplainingordescribingIt.As
withIbnal‐‘Arabī’s‘godcreatedinbeliefs’,mysticsofthistraditioninsistontheneedto
transcendallconceptualexpressions,andtheverysourceofthoseconcepts,theminditself,
inordertoglimpsewiththeeyeoftheheart,andfinallytorealizeinthedepthsofone’s
spirit,theineffablemysteryofGod.Wewouldarguethatitisthroughunderstandingthis
processofradicaldeconstructionattheconceptuallevel,graspedasthepreludetoan
‘unthinkable’spiritual‘reconstruction’atthetranscendentlevel,thattheonenessofthe
GodbelievedinbyChristiansandMuslimsstandsoutmostclearly.Forifthemindandall
68 Cited by James W. Morris, ‘The Spiritual Ascension: Ibn ‘Arabī and the Mi‘rāj,’ Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol.108, 1988, p.375. 69 See Michel Valsan’s translation, Le Livre de l’Extinction dans la Contemplation (Paris: Les Éditions de
l’Oeuvre, Paris, 1984).
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thatitcanconceiveistranscendedbythespiritualrealizationofThatwhichis
inconceivable,thenafortiorialldesignationsoftheIneffablearelikewisetranscended,
eventhosedesignationswhichformthecoreoftheTrinitariandogma.
LetusnotefirstofalltheimportanceofthefollowingpointmadebyVladimirLosskyabout
thistraditionof‘thought’ingeneral:itisoneinwhichthoughtitselfissubordinatedto
‘being’,toanexistentialtransformationofthesoul:
Apophaticismisnotnecessarilyatheologyofecstasy.Itis,aboveall,anattitudeof
mindwhichrefusestoformconceptsaboutGod.Suchanattitudeutterlyexcludesall
abstractandpurelyintellectualtheologywhichwouldadaptthemysteriesofthe
wisdomofGodtohumanwaysofthoughts.Itisanexistentialattitudewhich
involvesthewholeman:thereisnotheologyapartfromexperience;itisnecessary
tochange,tobecomeanewman.ToknowGodonemustdrawneartoHim.Noone
whodoesnotfollowthepathofunionwithGodcanbeatheologian.Thewayofthe
knowledgeofGodisnecessarilythewayofdeification.…Apophaticismis,therefore,
acriterion:thesuresignofanattitudeofmindconformedtotruth.Inthissenseall
truetheologyisfundamentallyapophatic.70
Furtheroninthisseminaltext,Losskyreferstotheultimatefunctionofthedogmaofthe
Trinity:‘ThedogmaoftheTrinityisacrossforhumanwaysofthought.’71Weunderstand
thistomeanthatthedogmaoftheTrinityisnotintendedtofunctionasan‘explanation’or
‘description’ofGod;rather,itisameansofthinkingtheunthinkableinordertoeffaceall
thoughtwithinthemysterythatisintrinsicallyincommunicable.Thisprincipleisbrought
homeclearlybyStDionysiusinhisprayertotheDeity‘aboveallessence,knowledgeand
goodness’attheverybeginningofhistreatiseTheMysticalTheology:‘...directourpathto
theultimatesummitofThymysticalLore,mostincomprehensible,mostluminousand
mostexalted,wherethepure,absoluteandimmutablemysteriesoftheologyareveiledin
70 Vladimir Lossky, Mystical Theology, op.cit., p.39. 71 Ibid, p.66.
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thedazzlingobscurityofthesecretSilence,outshiningallbrilliancewiththeintensityof
theirDarkness...’72
Thepurposeofdefiningtheultimaterealityintermsofdarkness,andasthatwhichiseven
‘beyondbeing’,isnotsimplytoshroudthatrealityinutter,impenetrableobscurity,but
rathertoprecipitatereceptivitytothatrealitybyshowingtheinabilityofthehumanmind
inandofitselftoattaincomprehensionof,orunionwith,thatreality.Itisthecontrast
betweenultimatereality—asutterDarkness—andmentalabstraction—apparentlight—
thatisinquestion.Hecontinues,addressinghisdisciple:
Dothou,dearTimothy,inthediligentexerciseofmysticalcontemplation,leave
behindthesensesandtheoperationsoftheintellect,andallthingssensibleand
intellectual,andallthingsintheworldofbeingandnon‐being,thatthoumayest
arisebyunknowingtowardstheunion,asfarasisattainable,withHimwho
transcendsallbeingandallknowledge.Forbytheunceasingandabsolute
renunciationofthyselfandofallthings,thoumayestbeborneonhigh,throughpure
andentireself‐abnegation,intothesuperessentialRadianceoftheDivineDarkness.
Hethenreferstothe‘transcendentalFirstCause’,andcriticizesthosewhoidentifyGod
with‘theimageswhichtheyfashionaftervariousdesigns’.ThisresonatesdeeplywithIbn
al‐‘Arabī’simageofthecupandthewater.Thesimilaritybetweenthetwoperspectivesis
deepenedwhenwereadthatthistranscendentReality‘revealsHimselfinHisnakedTruth
tothosealonewhopassbeyondallthatispureandimpure,andascendabovethesummit
ofholythings,andwho,leavingbehindthemalldivinelightandsoundandheavenly
utterances,plungeintotheDarknesswheretrulydwells,astheScripturesdeclare,thatOne
Whoisbeyondall.’73
72 Dionysius the Areopagite, Mystical Theology and the Celestial Hierarchies (Fintry: The Shrine of Wisdom Press, 1965), p.19. 73 Ibid, p.21
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ThisOneisevidentlybeyondanyconceivablenotionofthreeness—butitisalso,aswe
shallsee,equallybeyondanyconceivablenotionofoneness.First,letusnotethat,likeIbn
al‐‘Arabī,DionysiususesMoses’squestforthevisionofGodtobringhomethepointthat
Godcannotbeseen,butHecanberealized.Godcannotbeseenbecause‘thedivinestand
highestthingsseenbytheeyesorcontemplatedbythemindarebutthesymbolical
expressionsofthosethatareimmediatelybeneathHimWhoisaboveall.’Itisonlythrough
beingplungedintotheDarkness,andafter‘allhisreasoningpowers’havebeensilenced,
thatthesoulcanbe‘unitedbyhishighestfacultytoHimwhoiswhollyunknowable;thus
byknowingnothing,heknowsThatwhichisbeyondhisknowledge.’74
WeareremindedhereofwhatIbnal‐‘ArabīsaidinrelationtotheLord/divinity/level:itis
thataspectofRealitywhich,incontrasttotheEssence,canbeconceived;itisthatdegreeof
being,beneaththeEssence,towhichbeliefandworshiparedirectedandproportioned.
LikewiseforStDionysius,vision,conceptionandcontemplationpertainonlytothe
penultimateontologicaldegree,nottoultimateReality:‘thedivinestandhighestthings
seenbytheeyesorcontemplatedbythemindarebutthesymbolicalexpressionsofthose
thatareimmediatelybeneathHimWhoisaboveall.’Alldoctrinesanddogmas,eventhose
reachinguptothe‘divinestandhighest’cannotevenberegardedassymbolsofultimate
Realityitself,theycanonlysymbolizewhatis‘immediatelybeneathHim.’Thefunctionof
thesymbols,then,istoinducereceptivitytoThatwhichcannotevenbeadequately
symbolizedletaloneexplainedordescribedbyconcepts.Wewouldpropose,onthebasis
ofthisapophaticunderstandingofsymbols,thattheTrinityconstitutesjustsuchasymbol
ofpenultimateReality;itcannotbeappliedtotheultimateReality,forthislattercannotin
anywaybesymbolized.
Ifallvisibleandintelligibleformsarealike‘symbolicalexpressions’ofthepenultimate
Reality,theymustthereforebe‘seenthrough’,justasonemustseethroughthe‘cup’of
one’sbelieftothewaterit‘contains’.Thiscapacitytoappreciatethesymbolicnatureof
one’sbeliefs,andindeedofone’sentireconceptualapparatus,isthepre‐requisitefor
74 Ibid, pp.21‐22.
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takingtheplungeintothatOnenesswhichisinconceivable,beingbeyondeventhenotion
ofoneness.Inthislight,theessentialnatureofthedivinityaffirmedbyChristiansand
MuslimscanbeintuitedasoneandthesameReality,thatRealitywhichcanonly
extrinsicallybeconceivedoforsymbolized.Themostfaithfulorleastinadequatemeansof
alludingtothisReality,however,isnotthroughaffirmation,butthroughradicaldenial.The
TranscendentOneisdescribedasnotbeing‘oneoroneness…norsonshipnor
fatherhood’.75
BoththeChristiandogmaoftheTrinityandtheMuslimdoctrineofTawhīdareherebeing
challenged—asconcepts.TheultimateRealitycannotbedescribedintermsofnumber,nor
afortiori,intermsofanydualisticrelationshipsuchasisimpliedby‘fatherhood’and
‘sonship’.Boththeideaofonenessandthatoftrinityarealiketobegraspedassymbolicof
thethresholdofReality,andarenottobetakenliterallyasdefinitionsofthatthreshold,or,
stillless,asdefinitionsoftheEssenceofthatReality.ThefirsttestimonyofIslam,lāilāha
illa’Llāh,‘nodivinitybutGod’canbemetaphysicallyunderstoodtorefertotheapophatic
principlebeingdescribedhere:noconceivabledivinity,onlytheinconceivableAbsolute.
OnecanconceivethattheAbsoluteis,butonecannotconceiveexactlywhatitis.Itcanbe
intuitedasabsoluteReality,thesourceofallbeingandexistents,orasabsoluteGoodness,
thesourceofallfelicityandlove,orasabsoluteConsciousness,sourceofallwisdomand
knowledge,butwhattheabsolutenessofthesequalitiesreallymeanscannotbeputinto
words.76ThereisthereforesomethingcommunicableaboutthenatureoftheAbsolute,as
75 Ibid, p.29. 76 We have elaborated upon this theme in our Paths to Transcendence—According to Shankara, Ibn
‘Arabi and Meister Eckhart (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006). The three mystics studied in that work
are at one in affirming that while the Absolute is indeed ineffable and incommunicable in its essence, it
reveals something of its nature in the ultimate spiritual realization, and that ‘something’ is described by
each of these mystics in strikingly similar terms. In this, we believe, there lies an answer to the questions
posed in Denys Turner’s excellent paper in this volume, ‘The “same” God: Is there an “Apophatic”
solution, or, Who’s to Know?’ The crux of his position is summed up in this sentence: ‘For the absolute
unknowableness of “ultimate reality” eliminates all content on which any criteria of sameness and
difference can get a grip.’ On this basis, Turner argues that there is no ‘apophatic solution’ to the
question of whether or not Muslims and Christians worship the same God. We would argue, however,
that for the mystics we studied the impossibility of acquiring full cognitive knowledge of ultimate Reality
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wellassomethingincommunicable;itisineffableinitsessenceandyetrevealssomething
ofthatessencetotheprophets,saints,sagesandmystics.Itmightbespirituallyglimpsed
bythe‘eyeoftheheart’ofthespiritualseeker,an‘eye’whoseopeningispredicatedupon
somedegreeofself‐effacement,initially,and‘extinction’,ultimately.Inthewakeofthis
vision,however,itisstillimpossibletoadequatelydescribeinwordstheRealityglimpsed.
Asal‐Ghazaliputit:‘Hewhohasattainedthemysticstateneeddonomorethansay:“Ofthe
thingsIdonotremember,whatwas,was;thinkitgood;donotaskanaccountofit”.’77
EckhartianTrinityandMetaphysicalTawhīd
LetusnowturntoMeisterEckhart,andlookinparticularatthedaringmannerinwhich
theTrinityisarticulatedinthewakeoftherealizationoftheAbsolute.Hisexpositionofthe
Trinityhasthemeritofrenderingexplicitsomeofthekeypremiseswhichmaybeimplicit
intheassertionbyChristiansthattheMuslimsdobelieveinthesameGodasthemselves,
evenifthey,theMuslims,denytheTrinity:theybelieveintheEssenceofthatDivinity
whichcan‘assume’dogmatically,andatalowerontologicaldegree,theaspectofthree‐
ness.ItalsohastheconsiderablemeritofshowingMuslimsthatthereisapresentationof
theTrinitywhichnotonlyharmoniseswithTawhīd,butindeedbringstolightdimensions
ofTawhīdinamannercomparabletothegreatestofthemysticalsagesofIslamwhohave
asserted,quiteparadoxically,thattheconceptof‘monotheism’canbeaveilovertheOne,
justasmuchaspolytheismis.Thatis,ithelpstheMuslimtotransformadogmaticand
paradoxically goes hand in hand with spiritual realization of that reality. This realization produces a
certain degree of knowledge of Reality, such knowledge being the trace or, to use Shankara’s term,
reflection (abhasa), of Reality left within the consciousness of the mystic after his return to ‘normal’
modes of awareness. One who only sees the sun as it is reflected in a mirror will know something of the
nature of the sun, but nothing of its true dimensions in space. Likewise, the mystic, upon the return to
normal awareness, will be able to speak of the reflected image of the reality attained in the moment or
state of enlightenment, but cannot convey anything of the ‘dimensions’—absolute, infinite, perfect—of
that reality as it truly is. As Ibn al‐‘Arabī writes: ‘Gnostics cannot impart their spiritual states to other
men; they can only indicate them symbolically to those who have begun to experience the like.’ Quoted
by R.A. Nicholson in The Mystics of Islam (London: G. Bell, 1914), p.103 (translation modified).
77 Al‐Ghazzālī is citing a saying from Ibn al‐Mu‘tazz in his autobiographical work al‐Munqidh min al‐dalāl
(‘Deliverance from error’), translated by Montgomery Watt, p.61.
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formalconceptionofonenessintoanexistential,spiritualandtransformativeawarenessof
thatwhichisbeyondbeingandthus,afortiori,infinitelybeyondtherealmofnumber.
This,indeed,istheontologicalshiftofconsciousnesswhichtheSufisinsiston:Godisone,
notjustinthesenseofbeing‘nottwo’or‘notmultiple’,butinthesenseofexcludingall
otherness.ThetheologicalaffirmationofoneGodistransformedintoaspiritualrealization
thatthereisbutauniquereality,whichisoutwardlydifferentiatedbyvirtueofitsown
infiniteradiance.Tothinkotherwise,fortheSufis,istofallintoa‘hidden’polytheismor
shirk.
BeforeaddressingdirectlytheTrinity,itisworthnotingthatEckhart’sapproachtothought
generallycoincidespreciselywiththatofDionysiusandIbnal‐‘Arabī.Allmentally
articulatedattributesfallshortof‘describing’thedivinereality:‘Itisitsnaturetobe
withoutnature.Tothinkofgoodnessorwisdomorpowerdissemblestheessenceanddims
itinthought.Themerethoughtobscuresessence...Forgoodnessandwisdomand
whatevermaybeattributedtoGodarealladmixturestoGod’snakedessence:forall
admixturecausesalienationfromessence.’78
Itsnatureis‘withoutnature’,thatis,itisdevoidofanyspecificnature,orattributesthat
canbeadequatelyexpressedinhumanlanguage;onemustnotrelativizethedivinereality
byequatingitwithanyattributeswhicharesusceptibletomentalarticulation.Itdoes
possesstheseattributes,intrinsically,butItalsotranscendsthem,andthisisthekeypoint:
itisthistranscendenceofeveryconceivableattributethatmakesittheAbsolute.The
Absolutepossessesallpositiveattributes,butalsotranscendsthem:oneisremindedhere
oftheAsh‘ariteformula:‘theattributesarenotGod’,fortheAbsolutetranscendsall
attributes;but‘theattributesarenototherthanGod’,fortheAbsolutepossessesall
attributes,andthatwhichispossessedbytheAbsolutemustbeonewithit,onpainof
violatingthedivinesimplicity,andattributingdivisiblepartstotheAbsolute.
78 Meister Eckhart: Sermons & Treatises, tr. M.O’C Walshe (Dorset: Element Books, 1979), vol.2, pp.32 &
39.
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Eckhart’sinsistencethatourconceptionofGodbeshornofany‘nature’orattributeis
echoedinthefollowingwordsof‘Alīb.AbīTālib,thecousinandson‐in‐lawoftheProphet,
fourthcaliphofIslam,andfirstImamoftheShi’aMuslims.79Thisishowhecommentson
themeaningofikhlās,literally‘makingpure’,referringtothepurificationofone’s
conceptionofGod:
Theperfectionofpurification(ikhlās)istodivestHimofallattributes—becauseof
thetestimonyofeveryattributethatitisotherthantheobjectofattribution,and
becauseofthetestimonyofeverysuchobjectthatitisotherthantheattribute.So
whoeverascribesanattributetoGod—glorifiedbeHe!—hasconjoinedHim[with
somethingelse]andwhoeversoconjoinsHimhasmadeHimtwo‐fold,andwhoever
makesHimtwo‐foldhasfragmentedHim,andwhoeverthusfragmentsHimis
ignorantofHim.80
Godofcoursepossessesattributes—theninety‐nine‘names’ofGodbeingthenamesof
theseattributes.Imam‘Alīclearlyisnotdenyingtherealityoftheseattributesassuch,for
earlierinthesermoncitedabove,heaffirmsthatGod’sattributeshave‘nodefinedlimit’.
TheycanhavenolimitbecausetheattributesareontologicallyidenticaltotheEssenceas
such,andhavenoself‐subsistingrealityapartfromthatEssence.Onecanidentifythe
attributeswiththeEssence,butnotviceversa:itisanactofshirktoidentifytheEssence
eitherwithItsownattributesor,stillworse,withourunderstandingoftheseattributes.
Thus,Eckhart’sviewoftheAbsoluteastranscendingallmentalconceptions,specific
nature,andeven(asweshallseeinamoment)theTrinity,caneasilybereadbyaMuslim
asrootedintheavoidanceofsubtleshirk,andasacommentaryonthemeaningofthefirst
testimonyofIslam,nodivinitybutGod.
ThisisparticularlyclearwhenwelookatthewayinwhichEckhartdealswiththequestion
ofGod’s‘being’.ForhestressesinmanyplacesthatGodis‘beyondBeing’,andthus 79 He is aptly described by Frithjof Schuon as the ‘esoteric representative of Islam par excellence’. See his The Transcendent Unity of Religions (tr. Peter Townsend) (London: Faber & Faber, 1953), p.59. See our Justice and Remembrance—Introducing the Spirituality of Imam ‘Alī (London: IB Tauris, 2006) for discussion of some of the major themes articulated by this seminal figure of nascent Islam. 80 Cited in ibid, p.208.
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transcendsallpossibilityofbeingdescribedbytheattributespropertoBeing.God,hesays,
isashighabovebeingasthehighestangelisabovethelowestant?81‘WhenIhavesaidGod
isnotabeingandisabovebeing,IhavenottherebydeniedHimbeing:ratherIhave
exalteditinHim.IfIgetcopperingold,itisthere...inanoblermodethanitisinitself.’82
Thedenial,then,ofthespecific,conceivableattributesofGod—includingeventhatmost
indeterminateanduniversalattribute,Beingitself—meansanexaltationofallofthese
attributesintheirundifferentiatedessence.ThisappearstobeidenticaltowhatImam‘Alī
meanswhenhenegatesthedivineattributes,ontheonehand,andsublimatesthemonthe
other.Theattributesaremorefullyandreallythemselvesinthedivineonenessthanthey
areintheirownspecificity,andafortioriinthementalconceptionswehaveofthem.Sothe
denialoftheattributesisadenialonthepurelymentalplane,itisnotadenialoftheir
intrinsicsubstance:conceptualapophasispavesthewayforaneminentlypositiveopening
tothetranscendentsubstanceoftheattributes.83Thissubstanceisone,butitisoutwardly
articulatedinconformitywiththedifferentiatedplanesuponwhichitsinnerinfinitude
outwardlyunfolds.Thisleadstothefollowingimportantpointpertainingtothenon‐
numericalnatureoftheTrinity:
Foranyonewhocouldgraspdistinctionswithoutnumberandquantity,ahundred
wouldbeasone.EveniftherewereahundredPersonsintheGodhead,amanwho
coulddistinguishwithoutnumberandquantitywouldperceivethemonlyasone
God...(he)knowsthatthreePersonsareoneGod.84
ThisechoesthepointmadeearlierbyIbnal‐‘Arabī:‘numberdoesnotbegetmultiplicityin
thedivineSubstance’.Godcanrelatetomultiplicityinavarietyofways,butthisdoesnot
introducemultiplicityintothedivinenature;themultiplicitycomesfromthecreatedor
manifestedrealm:fromtheworld,notfromGod.ButforbothEckhartandIbnal‐‘Arabī,the
levelofdivinitywhichcanassumemultiplerelationswiththerealmofrelativityisitself 81 Meister Eckhart, op.cit., vol. 2, pp.150‐151.
82 Ibid. 83 One is reminded here of a cognitive principle within the school of Advaita Vedanta: ‘That which cannot be expressed is expressed through false attribution and subsequent denial (adhyaropa‐apavada).’ It should be noted that the Sanskrit apavada is cognate with the Greek apophasis. See our Paths to Transcendence, op.cit., pp.2‐8. 84 Ibid, vol.1, p.217.
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perforcerelative;itisalevelordegreeofdivinitywhichistranscendedbytheEssenceof
divinity.Thus,thisEssence—Eckhart’s‘Godhead’—transcendsallconceivabledistinctions.
Allthatcanbesaidofit,provisionally,isthatitisabsolutelyone.Mentalconception—and
thusalldogmapredicatedthereupon—isincapableofexpressingtherealityofGod,and
yetonehastomakeanefforttoconceiveofthedivineEssenceaspureanduntrammelled
unity.However,eventheconceptionofonenessistaintedbyitsveryformasaconception:
‘themerethoughtdimstheessence’.OneisthusleftwiththetaskofconceivingoftheOne
whileatthesametimeknowingthatthisconceptionisinescapablyflawed:onehasto
conceiveonenessbyspirituallypiercingtheveilofthatveryconception.Asmentioned
earlier:onehastoconceiveofThatwhichisinconceivable;foritispossibletoconceivethat
itis,butimpossibletoconceivewhatitis.Itisa‘something’ashesaysinthepassage
below,‘whichisneitherthisnorthat’.
Sotrulyoneandsimpleisthiscitadel,somodeandpowertranscendingisthis
solitaryOne,thatneitherpowernormodecangazeintoit,norevenGodHimself!...
Godneverlooksinthereforoneinstant,insofarasHeexistsinmodesandinthe
propertiesofHisPersons...thisOnealonelacksallmodeandproperty...forGodto
seeinsideitwouldcostHimallHisdivinenamesandpersonalproperties:allthese
Hemustleaveoutside...ButonlyinsofarasHeisoneandindivisible(canHedo
this):inthissenseHeisneitherFather,SonnorHolyGhostandyetisasomething
whichisneitherthisnorthat.85
Thismetaphysicalperspective,clearlyindicatingtherelativityoftheontologicalplane
uponwhichtheTrinityisconceivable,canhelpMuslimstoseethatbeliefintheTrinity
doesnotnecessarilyimplyanycompromiseasregardstheabsoluteonenessofGod;
indeed,thesensitiveMuslimmightcometoseetheTrinityisalegitimatedoctrine
accountingforthemysteryofGod’sself‐revelation,becomingtherebyanalogoustothe
doctrineofthedivinenamesandattributesinIslam.ThePersons,likethedivineattributes
85 Ibid, vol.1, p.76. One might note here that Nicholas of Cusa says something very similar. He writes that
in His ineffable infinitude, God cannot be described as ‘one or three or good or wise or Father or Son or
Holy Spirit’. Rather, God ‘infinitely excels and precedes all such names.’ This is from his Cribratio
Alkorani, p.88, as cited by Miroslav Volf in his forthcoming book, Same God ...
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inIslam,areidenticaltotheEssence,whichisabsolutesimplicity;buttheconverseisnot
true:theEssenceisnotexhaustivelyidentifiablewithanyofthePersons.Justasthe
Personsaredistinguishedfromeachotherintermsoforigin,otherwisebeingequalinall
respectsquanatureorsubstance,sotheattributesaredistinguishedfromeachotherin
termsoftheirspecificproperties,butareequaltoeachotherquaEssence:eachattributeis
identicaltotheAbsolute,theobjectofattribution.Inbothcases,thereisanoutward
differentiationwhichdoesnotinfringeuponaninwardidentity,orunicityofsubstance.
The‘names’aredistinguishedintermsofthespecific,henceexclusive,propertiesthey
denote,buttheyarealsoindistinguishablebyvirtueoftheircommonroot,theEssence.
EachnameisthusidenticaltotheEssence,inonerespect,anddistincttherefromin
another;asbeingidenticaltotheEssence,eachnameisthusidenticaltoeveryothername.
ThisviewoftherelationshipbetweenthenamesandtheEssenceinIslamicmetaphysics
canbeseentocorrespondtotherelationshipbetweenthePersonsandtheGodheadin
Eckhartianmetaphysics.AccordingtoEckhart,thethreePersonsareidenticaltoeachother
onlyatthetranscendentlevelofBeyond‐Being,thelevelwhichtranscendsthelevelof
BeingordivinityuponwhichthePersonsaredistinctasPersons.
OneoftheclearestexpressionsofthedistinctionbetweentheleveloftheTrinityandthe
levelofthepureAbsoluteisgivenbyEckhartwhenhespeaksofthesoulbeingborneupin
thePersons,accordingtothepoweroftheFather,thewisdomoftheSonandthegoodness
oftheHolyGhost—thesethreebeingthemodesof‘work’propertothePersons.86Hegoes
ontosaythatitisonlyaboveallthis‘work’that‘thepureabsolutenessoffreebeing’isto
befound;thePersons,assuch,are‘suspendedinbeing’.Here,wehaveadoublelesson:not
onlyistheTrinityrelativizedinthefaceofthepureAbsolute,itisalsorendered
conceivableasthedeploymentofthedivinegracesbywhichthesoulattainsspiritual
realization.Itismadesubordinatetopureorabsolutebeing,ontheonehand;and,onthe 86 Ibid, vol.2, pp.174‐175. In terms of strict Trinitarian dogma this interpretation might be regarded as depriving the Persons of their full divinity, by ascribing to them only one particular ‘work’ or divine quality. All three Persons, so it might be argued, do all kinds of ‘work’, as each of them is as much God as the other two Persons are, distinguishable one from the other only as regards the single characteristic defining their Personhood: ‘begetting’ for the Father, ‘being begotten’ for the Son and ‘proceeding’ for the Spirit.
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other,itisgraspedasthedeploymentofdivinepower,wisdomandgoodnesswhich,alone,
carrythesoultowardsitsgoalanditssource,tothat‘placewherethesoulgraspsthe
Personsintheveryindwellingofbeingfromwhichtheyneveremerged’.
ThePersons‘neveremerged’fromthe‘indwellingofbeing’,becausethat‘indwellingof
being’isnothingotherthanBeyond‐Being,ortheGodhead,andtheessentialrealityofthe
Persons‘resides’inthatEssence;nowtheiressentialrealityistheirtruereality—their
apparent‘emergence’therefrom,quadistinctPersons,isjustthat:anappearance.Weare
remindedhereofwhatIbnal‐‘ArabīsaysaboutthedivineNameshavingtwoconnotations:
‘thefirstconnotationisGodHimselfWhoiswhatisnamed,thesecondthatbywhichone
Nameisdistinguishedfromanother’;so,ontheonehand,‘theNameistheReality’,while
ontheotherhand,‘itistheimaginedReality’.87Moreexplicitly,asregardstheapparent
realityoftheNames:‘TheNamesintheirmultiplicityarebutrelationswhichareofanon‐
existentnature.’88
So,forbothEckhartandIbnal‐‘Arabī,thepureAbsoluteisidentifiedintermsofan
essentialonenesswhichprecedes—notsomuchtemporallyasontologically—thedegreeof
beingatwhichanydistinctionsbecomediscernible.WhenEckhartsaysthatthePersonsas
suchare‘suspended’atthelevelofbeing,thisisanotherwayofsayingthatthePersons
87 Cited by Ralph Austin, The Bezels of Wisdom (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), p.125. 88 Cited by Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p.161. In referring to the Names as ‘relations’ one thinks of St Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of the Persons: they, too, are called by St Thomas ‘relations’—but he would most likely have problems defining these relations as being ‘non‐existent’. He may accept, however, the argument that they are not ‘existential’, in the sense of ‘standing apart’ from God’s Esse (Being): they are ‘non‐existent’ because absolutely identical with God’s Esse, subsisting above all contingent things, all ‘existents’, and are thus ‘supra‐existent’. This is similar to Ibn al‐‘Arabī’s view in one respect, but quite different in another: for Ibn al‐‘Arabī, the Names are non‐existent (‘adam) only in their aspect of specificity, hence exclusivity—the fact that in one respect each Name is distinct from and thus excludes all others—because non‐existence is the defining feature of this exclusivity proper to multiplicity. In another respect, however, the Names are real: they are real insofar as they are identical to the Named, the Essence, pure wujūd (Being), which is absolutely one, and absolutely universal: absolutely unspecifiable, or non‐delimited, and yet also, not delimited by this non‐delimitation. ‘Do not declare Him nondelimited and thus delimited by being distinguished from delimitation!’ he warns us: ‘For if He is distinguished then He is delimited by His nondelimitation. And if He is delimited by His nondelimitation, then He is not He.’ Cited by Chittick, Sufi Path, op.cit., p.112. Cf. Denys Turner’s illuminating discussion of the meaning of God as esse indistinctum (indistinct Being) in Eckhart’s perspective, The Darkness of God—Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), pp. 162‐167. See also the following note, 91.
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‘boilover’(bullitio)fromBeyond‐Beingintobeing,fromtheuniqueGodheadintoandas
theTrinitarianGod.89However,theTrinitarianGodisnotsomethingotherthanthe
Godhead:itis,toparaphraseIbnal‐‘Arabī,theEssence‘described’bydivinity.Itisthe
onenessoftheone(ahadiyyatal‐ahad)becomingdiscernibleastheonenessofthemany
(ahadiyyatal‐kathra):90thatwhichisdistinctanddiscernibleasapluralityinthelatteris
nothingbuttheinitial,metaphysicalprefigurationoftheperfectionswhicharehiddenand
undifferentiatedintheformer.BothIbnal‐‘ArabīandEckhart,then,revealtheinadequacy
ofallmentalconceptionsofdivineunityinthefaceoftheoverflowinginfinitudeoftheOne.
ForthepurelyconceptualaffirmationofGod’sonenesssmacksofshirkinthemeasurethat
itimpliesthatGod’sonenessisa‘countable’ornumericalone,thatGodissimplyoneunit
amongothersimilarunits.Imam‘Alīexpressesthisprincipleinthefollowingsaying.Heis
askedaboutthemeaningofGod’soneness,andrefersfirsttotheerroroftheperson‘who
says“one”andhasinmindthecategoryofnumbers.Nowthisisnotpermissible,forthat
whichhasnoseconddoesnotenterintothecategoryofnumbers.’91
ThisstatementresonatesdeeplywiththefollowingwordsofEckhart:
Oneisthenegationofthenegationandadenialofthedenial.Allcreatureshavea
negationinthemselves:onenegatesbynotbeingtheother...butGodnegatesthe
negation:Heisoneandnegatesallelse,foroutsideofGodnothingis.Allcreatures
areinGod,andareHisveryGodhead,whichmeansplenitude…Godalonehas
oneness.Whateverisnumberdependsonone,andonedependsonnothing.God’s
89 One of Eckhart’s boldest claims is to be identified with the undifferentiated Godhead in his uncreated essence. To quote Turner’s summary of Eckhart’s claims: ‘ .... not merely does the Father give birth to me in the Son, before all that I was in the Godhead in its absolute, primitive oneness, a oneness which “precedes” all the differentiations of the Trinity of Persons, that “seething and boiling” or bullitio ... my existence in the Godhead is beyond all distinctions, in the undifferentiated oneness of the Godhead, it cannot be distinct from the Godhead as such. Therefore I existed in the Godhead before God, in God’s very “own ground”. If I was there in that ground at the birth of the Trinity, a fortiori I was there before my own creation.’ The Darkness of God, op.cit., p.145. 90 ‘In respect of His Self, God possesses the Unity of the One, but in respect of His Names, He possesses the Unity of the many.’ Cited by Chittick, Sufi Path, op.cit., p.337. 91 Justice and Remembrance, op.cit., p.
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richesandwisdomandtruthareallabsolutelyoneinGod:itisnotone,itis
oneness.92
Referringtothenon‐numericalonenessofGodasbeing‘thatwhichhasnosecond’isImam
‘Alī’swayofreferringtotheuniquerealityofGod,outsideofwhom‘nothingis’,as
Eckhart’sformulationhasit.Similarly,Imam‘Ali’snegationoftheattributes,andhis
identificationofthemallwiththesimplicityofthedivineEssence,isexpressedbyEckhart’s
insistencethatGod’s‘richesandwisdomandtruthareallabsolutelyoneinGod’;and
Eckhart’scorrectionofhimself‘itisnotone,itisoneness’canbereadasadeliberate
encouragementtohislistenerstoshifttheirconsciousnessfromastaticnumerical
conceptionofunity,standingopposedtoanequallystaticconceptionofmultiplicity,toa
dynamicspiritualconceptionoftheeternalintegrationofmultiplicitywithinunityandthe
overflowingoftheinnerrichesofthatunitywithinmultiplicity.Thisreciprocalintegration
isoneaspectofmetaphysicalTawhīd,andisreferredtobytheSufisintermsof‘the
multipleOne’(al‐wāhidal‐kathīr)andthe‘uniquemultiplicity’(al‐kathīral‐wāḥid).93
GodaloneisabsoluteReality,forbothofthesemysticalauthorities,andthissolerealityis
atonceall‐exclusive,byvirtueofitsineffabletranscendence,andall‐inclusive,byvirtueof
itsinescapableimmanence.The‘negationofnegation’istantamounttopureaffirmation,
butaffirmationnotofacountableoneness,rather,ofanall‐inclusiveoneness,withinwhich
allconceivablemultiplicityiseternallycomprised.Imam‘Alī’swayofexpressingEckhart’s
‘negationofnegation’isasfollows.‘Being,butnotbywayofanybecoming;existing,butnot
fromhavingbeennon‐existent;witheverything,butnotthroughassociation;andother
thaneverything,butnotthroughseparation;acting,butnotthroughmovementsand
instruments;seeing,evenwhennothingofHiscreationwastobeseen;solitary,evenwhen
therewasnonewhoseintimacymightbesoughtorwhoseabsencemightbemissed.’94
92 Meister Eckhart, op.cit., vol. 2, pp.339 & 341. 93 See the discussion of this principle, in the context of al‐Kāshānī’s Sufi commentary on the Qur’ān, in R. Shah‐Kazemi, The Other in the Light of the One—The Universality of the Qur’an and Interfaith Dialogue (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2006), ch.2, section 1, entitled ‘The One in the Many, the Many in the One’, pp.76‐97. 94 Cited in Justice and Remembrance, op.cit., pp.208‐209.
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Godis‘witheverything,butnotthroughassociation’:Heisnotsomeseparateentity
conjoinedtothecreature,forthiswouldentailaduality—GodandthethingsHeis‘with’;
and‘otherthaneverything,butnotthroughseparation’:Hisinaccessibletranscendence
doesnotimplythatHeisseparatefromwhatHetranscends,forthiswouldagainentaila
duality—GodandthethingsHetranscends.Multiplicityisthusintegratedwithinan
ontologicalunityaccordingtoImam‘Alī’sperspective,andthis,webelieve,iswhatEckhart
meanswhenhesaysthat‘outsideGodnothingis’:theapparentmultiplicityofexistenceis
integratedwithinthetrueunityoftheOne—Beyond‐Being—inamannerwhichreflectsthe
wayinwhichtheapparentmultiplicityoftheTrinityisrenderedtransparenttotheunityof
itsownEssence.Torepeat:weshouldbeable‘tograspdistinctionswithoutnumberand
quantity’,andtherebycometoseethatPersonsorattributescanexistwithintheGodhead
which,nonetheless,remainsuniqueandindivisible.
Thisuniqueness,however,mustbeconceivedastranscendingnumber.Neitherthree‐ness
norone‐nesscanadequatelydescribethisone‐and‐onliness.Eckhartthereforesaysthat
everythingutteredabouttheTrinity‘isinnowayreallysoortrue…becauseeverynameor
ingeneraleverythingthatdenotesanumber,ormakesanumbercometomind,orbe
conceived,isfarfromGod.’HethenquotesasayingfromBoethius:‘Thatistrulyonein
whichthereisnonumber’.95
ItisimportanttorepeatherethecrucialprincipleenunciatedbyFrithjofSchuon,referred
toearlier:‘OnlyUnityassuchcanbeadefinitionoftheAbsolute;intherealmofnumber,
unityalonerepresentsanelementofabsoluteness,asdoesthepointorthecentreinspace,
andtheinstantorthepresentintime...’.
ThemetaphysicalperspectivesofEckhartandIbnal‐‘Arabī,StDionysiusandImam‘Alī,
helpustoperceivethegroundsuponwhichwecanaffirmunequivocallythatMuslimsand
ChristiansdobelieveinthesameGod.ThisGodcanbeconceivedasThatwhichtranscends
thedomainwithinwhichallexistentialcategoriessubsist,includingnotjustthecategories
time,space,form,matter,andnumber,butalsoalldistinctdivineattributes.Itisthusa
Realitywhichcannotbeadequatelydescribed,whetherbyattributesorPersons,forboth
95 Meister Eckhart—Teacher and Preacher (ed. B. McGinn), (New York/Mahwah/Toronto: Paulist Press, 1986), pp.210‐211.
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attributesandPersonsarerelativitiesbydintoftheirverysusceptibilitytoconceptionin
distinctterms,thisdistinctivenessbeinganinescapablecocomitantoftheir‘ex‐istence’,
takingthiswordaccordingtoitsetymologicalroots,ex‐stare:their‘standingapartfrom’
thatall‐embracingRealitywhichcannotbeconceived,thisinconceivabilitybeingthe
extrinsic,apophaticconcomitantofitsintrinsic,‘super‐essential’mystery.
3. ContemporaryWitnessandPhilosophicalTheology
ACommonWord
OnOctober13,2007,aground‐breakinginterfaithinitiativewaslaunchedbytheRoyalAal
al‐BaytInstituteinAmman,Jordan.96Anopenletterentitled‘ACommonWordBetweenUs
andYou’,signedby138Muslimleadersandscholarsrepresentingeverymajorschoolof
thoughtinIslam,wassent‘toleadersofChristianchurcheseverywhere.’Thiswasan
invitationtoengageindialogueonthebasisofloveofGodandloveoftheneighbour,these
beingrecognisedasthetwo‘greatcommandments’enjoinedbybothtraditions.The
overwhelminglypositiveChristianresponsesfromtheleadersofallthemajorChurches
impliedthatthebasic,albeitunspoken,premiseofthetext—beliefinthesameGod—was
accepted.Someresponsesmadethismoreexplicitthanothers.Forexample,inthe
responseoftheYaleDivinitySchool,weread:‘WeapplaudthatACommonWordBetween
UsandYoustressessoinsistentlytheuniquedevotiontooneGod,indeedtheloveofGod,
astheprimarydutyofeverybeliever.’97
Inhisresponse,theArchbishopofCanterbury,DrRowanWilliams,notonlyaffirmsthat
ChristiansandMuslimsbelieveinthesameGod,butalsogoestogreatpainstopointout
thattheTrinitarianGodisinessencenototherthantheOneGodbelievedinand
96 See www.acommonword.com for the text itself, and the responses thereto. 97 See, for the full text, ‘A Christian Response to A Common Word Between Us and You’, New York
Times, Nov.18, 2007.
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worshippedbyMuslims,evengoingsofarastoapply—whetherconsciouslyornot—two
Muslim‘names’ofAllāhtotheTrinitarianGod,thatis,al‐Hayy(theLiving)andal‐Qayyūm
(theSelf‐subsistent).Themeaningoftheword‘God’accordingtotheArchbishop,is‘a
natureoressence–eternalandself‐sufficientlife....wespeakof“Father,SonandHoly
Spirit”,butwedonotmeanoneGodwithtwobeingsalongsidehim,orthreegodsoflimited
power.SothereisindeedoneGod,theLivingandSelf‐subsistent,associatedwithno
other.’98
Suchexplicitaffirmationoftheidentity—thesameness—oftheChristianandIslamicGodis
bynomeansrestrictedtoourtimes.Thefollowingaresomeofthenoteworthyprecedents
inthehistoryofChristian‐Muslimdialogue:
1.TimothyI(d.823),CatholicosandPatriarchoftheChurchoftheEast,wholivedmostof
hislifeinBaghdad,centreoftheAbbasidempire,wassummonedtothecourtoftheCaliph
al‐Mahdī(r.775‐785)torespondtovariousquestions.Heassertedclearlyhisbeliefthatthe
ProphetMuhammadcalledpeopletotheonetrueGod:
Muhammaddeservesthepraiseofallreasonablemenbecausehiswalkwasonthe
wayoftheProphetsandoftheloversofGod.WhereastherestoftheProphets
taughtabouttheonenessofGod,Muhammadalsotaughtaboutit.So,hetoowalked
onthewayoftheProphets.Then,justasalltheProphetsmovedpeopleawayfrom
evilandsin,anddrewthemtowhatisrightandvirtuous,soalsodidMuhammad
movethesonsofhiscommunityawayfromevilanddrawthemtowhatisrightand
virtuous.Therefore,hetoowalkedonthewayoftheProphets.99
2.PopeGregorywrotetotheMuslimKingAnzirofMauritaniain1076,expressing
gratitudeforacharitableactperformedbythelatter:‘WebelieveandconfessoneGod,
althoughindifferentways,andpraiseandworshipHimdailyastheCreatorofallagesand 98 See the full text of the Archbishop’s response on www.acommonword.com. 99 Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque—Christians and Muslims in the World of Islam (New Jersey & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp.104‐105. Timothy’s statement is all the more remarkable given his refusal to explicitly acknowledge that the Qur’ān was indeed a divine revelation. He believed nonetheless in the sincerity of the Prophet’s summons to believe in the one true God and to lead a life of virtue in consequence thereof.
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therulerofthisworld.Forastheapostlesays:“Heisourpeacewhohasmadeusbothone”
(Eph.2.14).’100
3.PopePiusXIsaid,whendispatchinghisApostolicDelegatetoLibyain1934:‘Donot
thinkyouaregoingamonginfidels.Muslimsattaintosalvation.ThewaysofProvidenceare
infinite.’101IfMuslimsarenot‘infidels’theymustbeincludedinthecategoryof
‘believers’—thosewhobelieveintheoneandonlyGod.
4.Similarly,sometwodecadeslater,PopePiusXII(d.1959)declared:‘Howconsolingitis
formetoknowthat,allovertheworld,millionsofpeople,fivetimesaday,bowdown
beforeGod.’102Muslims,then,worshiptheoneandonlyGod,theGodworshippedby
Christians.
Letusnowreturntothequestionposedatthebeginningofthisessayaboutthedegreeto
whichtheTrinityiscentralandindispensabletoChristianbelief,andask:whatdosuch
affirmationsbyChristianauthoritiesimplyforthestatusofthedoctrineoftheTrinityin
Christianbelief?Threeimplicationsmightbepositedhere:
1) ThedoctrineoftheTrinityisnotanessentialelementintheChristianbeliefinone
God.ThatiswhywecanembraceMuslimsasfellow‐believersintheoneGodevenif
theydonotbelievein—andindeed,repudiate—theTrinity.
2) ThedoctrineoftheTrinityisessentialtoChristianbeliefinGod,anditaccurately
definesthetrue,objectivenatureofthatoneGod;soMuslimswhotrulybelievein
theonetrueGodcannotbutbelieveintheTrinity,objectivelyandinreality,evenif
100 See J. Neuner & J. Dupuis, The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church
(London: Collins Liturgical Publications, 1983), pp.276‐277
101 L’Ultima (Florence), Anno VIII, 1934; cited in William Stoddart, What do the Religions say about Each Other?—Christian Attitudes to Islam, Islamic Attitudes to Christianity (San Rafael, CA: Sophia Perennis, 2008), p.12. 102 Cited in ibid, p.12. Abundant material of a similar nature can be found in this valuable compilation of William Stoddart. One should also note here such statements as the following; Pope John‐Paul II said to a group of Moroccan Muslims (August 19, 1985): ‘We believe in the same God, the one God, the living God, the God who created the world and brings his creatures to their perfection.’ For this and other similar statements by modern Popes, see http://www.usccb.org/seia/textsislam.shtml
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theyareunawareofthefactsubjectively,andfailtoregisteritdogmatically.The
taskfortheChristianhereistosaytotheMuslimswhatStPaulsaidtothe
Athenians:‘Whomthereforeyeignorantlyworship,HimdeclareIuntoyou’(Acts,
17:23).103
3) TheTrinityisessentialtoChristianbelief,butitispossibletoconceptuallyabstract
thisaspectofbelief,andstillretainanadequateconceptionoftheEssenceofGod,
theEssenceofthatdivinitybelievedinandworshippedbyMuslims.SoMuslims
maynotbelieveintheTrinity,butinsofarastheybelieveinGod’sunicityand
simplicity,transcendenceandperfection—togetherwithmostifnotalloftheother
attributesascribedtothedivineEssencebyChristians—theybelieveintheselfsame
EssenceornatureofGodaspositedandarticulatedinChristianfaith.
WehaveseenintheprevioussectionhowEckhartprovidesuswithgroundsuponwhich
thislatterposition,3),mightbemetaphysicallyarticulated.TheOne,theGround,the
Godheadis‘beyondBeing’,whilethePersonsoftheTrinityare‘suspended’atthelevelof
Being,therewhereGodisdefinableasGodinrelationtocreatures.Itwasalsoseenthat
thiscorrespondscloselywithIbnal‐ʿArabī’sdistinctionbetweentwodegreesofoneness
withinthedivinity:theonenessoftheOne,andtheonenessofthemany.Inbothcases,
pluralitywithindivinityisaffirmedwithoutdetrimenttotheunity,simplicityor
transcendenceofGod,suchpluralitybeingsituateduponanontologicalleveltranscended
bytheOne,thepureEssence.However,onemightask:isthereawayofarticulatingthis
perspectiveintheologicalterms,doingsobyreferencetoauthoritieswithintheChristian
traditionwhoarelesscontroversialthanEckhart?Webelievethatitis,andthisessaywill
103 A variation on this position is given by such figures as Abelard and Bonaventure. Abelard affirmed that no Jew or Gentile—nor any person with ‘common sense’—could doubt that ‘God is Power, Wisdom and Goodness’. Trinity in Aquinas, p.8. Similarly, Bonaventure gave a host of ‘natural reasons’ which proved that God was a Trinity. See ibid, pp.19‐20. As we shall see shortly, Aquinas strongly rejects this position: belief in the Trinity requires a leap of faith, and is by no means a logical or natural concomitant of belief in the oneness of God.
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beconcludedwithanecessarilybriefattempttosketchoutsuchaperspective,doingsoin
relationtothewritingsofStThomasAquinas.104
StThomasAquinasandtheCommonGroundofTranscendence
Afteraddressingthequestionofsacreddoctrineingeneral,AquinasbeginshisSumma
TheologicawithatreatiseontheunityofthedivineEssence.Thereislittle,ifanything,in
thistreatisewithwhichaMuslimcoulddisagree.OnereadsaboutGod’sunity,simplicity,
indivisibility,togetherwithsuchfundamentalattributesasthedivineperfection,wisdom,
andgoodness;aboutdivineexistencebeingidenticaltodivineessence,togetherwithahost
ofexplanationspertainingtoGod’snecessaryexistence—nearlyallofwhichcouldeasily
havecomefromthepenofaphilosophically‐mindedMuslimtheologianinhisdescription
ofGod.105Asregardsthemeaningoftheword‘God’,itisimportanttonotethatAquinas
assumesthatallofthosewhospeakof‘God’haveinmindanidenticalsignification,the
wordorconceptalwaysindicatinganidenticalreferent:‘ThenameGodsignifiesthedivine
nature,forthisnamewasimposedtosignifysomethingexistingaboveallthings,the
principleofallthings,andremovedfromallthings;forthosewhonameGodintendto
signifyallthis.’106Theword‘God’thussignifiesthatsupremerealitywhichtranscendsall
thingsatthesametimeasbeingthesourceofallthings.
AsregardstheunityofGod,AquinasgoestogreatpainstoassertthattheoneGodisnot
composedofparts,eventhoughitcomprisesinfiniteperfections.Althoughthedivine
natureorEssenceisabsolutelyoneandnon‐composite,itisconceivedbytheintellectin
inescapablymultipleways.Thus,intheefforttounderstandsomethingmeaningfulabout 104 One might also choose such figures as St Gregory Palamas and St Maximus the Confessor, within the Orthodox tradition, whose articulation of the concept of the divine Essence would also provide us with strong grounds for asserting commonality, if not identity, with the Muslim conception of the divine Essence. 105 Indeed, the influence of such philosophers as Ibn Sīnā and al‐Fārābī (and such mystical theologians as al‐Ghazzālī) on fundamental themes of Aquinas’s ontology, philosophy and theology has been amply demonstrated by contemporary scholarship. See, for example, A.M. Goichon, The Philosophy of Avicenna and its Influence on Medieval Europe (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969). 106 The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, trs. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1981), vol.I, p.68, I.13.8, reply to objection 2.
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thenatureofGod,thehumanintellectformsconceptions‘proportionaltotheperfections
flowingfromGodtocreatures’;theseperfectionspre‐existinGod‘unitedlyandsimply’,
whereasincreatures‘theyarereceived,dividedandmultiplied’.Tothesevariegated
conceptionsofdifferentperfections,however,‘therecorrespondsonealtogethersimple
principle’,aprinciple‘imperfectlyunderstood’bythedifferentconceptions.107
Hecontinuesthus,inhisreplytoobjection3inthisarticle:‘TheperfectunityofGod
requiresthatwhataremanifoldanddividedinothersshouldexistinHimsimplyand
unitedly.ThusitcomesaboutthatHeisoneinreality,andyetmultipleinidea,becauseour
intellectapprehendsHiminamanifoldmanner,asthingsrepresentHim.’Again,noneof
thiswouldbeobjectionabletotheMuslimtheologian.Indeed,thelattermightregardsuch
statementsasthesetobestrongevidenceforthesubjectivenatureofthedoctrineofthe
Trinity:itisbutamodeof‘plurality’subsistinginthemindofthecreature,notinthe
objectiverealityoftheCreator,whois‘oneinreality’andonly‘multipleinidea’.
Inhisso‐called‘shorter’Summa(entitledCompendiumofTheology)Aquinasmakeseven
clearerthewayinwhichtheunicityofthenature/Essenceisrenderedmentallycompound
onlybyandwithinthehumanintellect;andhestressestheneedtoseethroughourown
creaturelycategoriesinordertograspGod’sutterunityandsimplicity:‘IfwesawHis
essenceasitisinitself,amultiplicityofnameswouldnotberequired;ourideaofitwould
besimple,justasHisessenceissimple.Thisvisionwehopeforinthedayofourglory;for,
accordingtoZechariah14:9,“InthatdaythereshallbeoneLord;andHisnameshallbe
one”.’108
Again,thissoundsverymuchlikeIslamicTawhīd.Indeed,Aquinassumsupthispartofthe
discussiondealingwiththenatureofGodbywriting:‘ThetruthsaboutGodthusfar
proposedhavebeensubtlydiscussedbyanumberofpaganphilosophers’,bywhomhe
meansbothGreeksandMuslims.However,whendiscussionturnstotheTrinity,thereisan
abruptchangeoftone:
107 Ibid, vol.I, p.63 I.13, 4. 108 Aquinas’s Shorter Summa, ch.24, p.26
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ButthereareothertruthsaboutGodrevealedtousintheteachingoftheChristian
religion,whichwerebeyondthereachofthephilosophers.Thesearetruthsabout
whichweareinstructed,inaccordwiththenormofChristianfaith,inawaythat
transcendshumanperception.TheteachingisthatalthoughGodisoneandsimple,
ashasbeenexplainedabove,GodisFather,GodisSon,andGodisHolySpirit.And
thesearenotthreegods,butareoneGod.109
While‘paganphilosophers’mightwellunderstandsuch‘essentialattributes’asdivine
goodnessandwisdom,theycannotgraspthepersonalpropertiesoftheessence,suchas
paternityandfiliation110—norcantheChristianprovetheexistenceofsuchpropertiesby
meansoftheintellect.AquinasquotesHilary’sstatement,fromthetreatiseontheTrinity:
‘Letnomanthinktoreachthesacredmysteryofgenerationbyhisownmind’;and
Ambrose:‘Itisimpossibletoknowthesecretofgeneration.Themindfails,thevoiceis
silent.’Hethenadds:‘Since,therefore,mancannotknow,andwithhisunderstandinggrasp
thatforwhichnonecessaryreasoncanbegiven,itfollowsthatthetrinityofpersons
cannotbeknownbyreason’.
HegoessofarastosaythatanyattempttoprovetheTrinitybymeansofreason‘derogates
fromfaith’,andthisintwoways.‘Firstlyasregardsthedignityofthefaithitself,which
consistsinitsbeingconcernedwithinvisiblethingsthatexceedhumanreason’.Inother
words,beliefintheTrinitydoesnotderivefromanythingthatreasoncandeducefromits
conceptionofthedivineEssence;rather,itcomesexclusivelyfromfaithinthespecifically
Christianrevelation,transmittedbyauthority,andreceivedinaspiritofhumbleobedience
bythefaithfulsouloftheChristianbeliever.Thosethingswhich‘exceedhumanreason’
cannotbeprovenbyhumanreason.Faithistheonlymeansbywhichthesethingscanbe
understood:credoutintelligam—‘Ibelieveinordertounderstand’,asStAnselm’sfamous
dictumhasit.
ThesecondwayinwhichtheattempttorationallyprovetheTrinityderogatesfromfaith
concernsthequestionof‘drawingotherstothefaith’.Hewrites:
109 Ibid, ch.36, p.35. 110 Summa Theologica, vol.IV, p.2040, III.3, 3.
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Forwhenanyoneintheendeavourtoprovethefaithbringsforwardreasonswhich
arenotcogent,hefallsundertheridiculeoftheunbelievers:sincetheysupposethat
westanduponsuchreasons,andthatwebelieveonsuchgrounds.Thereforewe
mustnotattempttoprovewhatisoffaithexceptbyauthorityalone,tothosewho
receivetheauthority;whileasregardsothers,itsufficestoprovethatwhatfaith
teachesisnotimpossible.111
ThenecessityoftheTrinity,then,cannotbedemonstratedbyreason,thereareno
argumentswhichcarrysufficientweighttoprovetheTrinity;butthedoctrinemightbe
shownbyreasontobe‘notimpossible’.Intermsofintellectualexposition,then,thisisa
modestclaim:theChristiancannotprovethelogicalnecessityoftheTrinity,inthewayhe
canprovethenecessityofthedivineEssence.HecanatmostdemonstratethattheTrinity
is‘notimpossible’.Thismeansthatwhilenon‐Christianscanneverbetaughtbyreasonto
believeintheTrinity,theymightcometoseethatitis‘notimpossible’thattheessential
attributeswhichtheycanlogicallydeducefromtheexistenceoftheEssencemightbe
broughtintosomekindofcorrespondencewith,orapproximationto,thepropertiesofthe
Persons.Hence:
ThephilosophersdidnotknowthemysteryoftheTrinityofthedivinePersonsby
itsproperattributes,suchaspaternity,filiationandprocession,accordingtothe
Apostle’swords,‘WespeakthewisdomofGodwhichnoneoftheprincesofthe
world’—i.e.,thephilosophers—‘knew’(ICor.ii.6).Nevertheless,theyknewsomeof
theessentialattributesappropriatedtothePersons,aspowertotheFather,wisdom
totheSon,goodnesstotheHolyGhost.112
Hereonecanseeatheologicalbridgeconnectingthetwotraditions.Aquinasacceptsthat
‘philosophers’,i.e.,MuslimsandGreeks,canattainknowledgeofsuchessentialattributesas
power,wisdomandgoodness,attributeswhichareundifferentiatedinthesimplicityofthe
divineEssence,inonerespect,whilealsopertaining,inanotherrespect,totheFather,Son
andSpirit,respectively.Itisthuspossiblefortheologiansofbothtraditionstocome
togetheronthistranscendentcommongroundconstitutedbytheunicityandsimplicityof
111 Summa Theologica, vol. I, p.169, I.32.1. 112 Ibid, reply to objection 1.
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theEssence,withinwhichcertain‘essentialattributes’arepresentbutundifferentiated.On
thebasisofthiscommonconceptionofthetranscendentEssencetheycanaffirm:weas
ChristiansandMuslimsdobelieveinthesameGod,thesameGodconceivedessentially.But
asregardstheappropriationoftheessentialattributesbythePersons,ortheascriptionto
eachofthethreePersonsofalloftheessentialattributes,therewillbetheological
disagreement.Nonetheless,theagreementontheplaneoftheEssencecanprevailover
disagreementontheplaneofthePersons:thismaybeputforwardasthetheological
premiseimplicitintheaffirmationbyChristiantheologians—includingtheArchbishopof
Canterbury,andvariousPopes,pastandpresent—thattheyandMuslimsdobelieveinthe
sameGod.
ThisargumentisreinforcedwhenweaskStThomasabouttheformalstatusofabeliefin
GodwhichisdevoidofanyconceptionoftheChristianTrinity.Fortheanswergivenbyhim
isasfollows:
Ifwementallyexcludethepersonalpropertiestherewillstillremaininourthought
thedivineNatureassubsistingandasaPerson…Evenifthepersonalpropertiesof
thethreePersonsareabstractedbyourmind,neverthelesstherewillremaininour
thoughtstheonePersonalityofGod,astheJewsconsider.113
Soevenif,liketheJews,MuslimsdonotbelieveintheTrinity,whattheydobelievein—the
‘divineNature’,theunique‘Person’the‘OnePersonality’—isidenticaltowhatChristians
believeinatthatsamelevelofdivinity—thetranscendentunicityofthedivineEssence.
ThisoneGodistheGodofAbrahamandMoses,neitherofwhommadeanymention
whatsoeveroftheTrinity,andyetitisaffirmedinChristiandogmathatitwas‘theTrinity’
whobestowedrevelationuponthemboth,anduponallprophetsofGod.Inthewordsof
thetextoftheFourthLateranCouncil(1215):‘ThisholyTrinity,whichisundivided
accordingtoitscommonessencebutdistinctaccordingtothepropertiesofitspersons,
113 Summa Theologica, vol.IV, p.2040, III.3, a.3, reply to objections 1 and 2.
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gavetheteachingofsalvationtothehumanracethroughMosesandtheholyprophetsand
hisotherservants,accordingtothemostappropriatedispositionofthetimes.’114
TheTrinity,being‘undividedaccordingtoitscommonessence’,isthusnothingotherthan
theOneGodofAbrahamandMoses—andofMuhammad,oneshouldadd.However,neither
AbrahamnorMosesnorMuhammadwouldrecognisethatthisOneGodis‘distinct
accordingtothepropertiesofitspersons’;theywouldnotaffirmanyTrinitywithinthe
Unity.Sowereturntothepointjustmade:ChristiansdobelieveinthesameGodasthe
JewsandtheMuslims—thesameGodconceivedessentially;butinadditiontothisessential
belief,ChristiansalsoaffirmbeliefinatriuneaspectofGod,anaspectvehementlydenied
byJewsandMuslims.Onenoticeshereadifferencebetweenimplicationandpredication:
forChristians,beliefinGodmaywelltheologicallyimplybeliefintheTrinity,butisnot
essentiallypredicateduponit,failingwhichtheycouldnotaffirmthatJewsandMuslims
believeinandworshiptheonetrueGod.ItwouldappearthattheChristiancanbelievein
God,therefore,withoutthisbeliefbeingpredicatedontheTrinity;buttheChristiancannot
believeintheTrinitywithoutbelievinginGod.ThisshowsthatbeliefinoneGod—thebasic
postulateofmonotheism—musthaveprimacyoverbeliefintheTrinity.Tociteoneofthe
keyprinciplesofThomistictheology:whatiscommontakespriorityoverwhatisproper:
‘Whatisessentialisprioraccordingtoourunderstandingtowhatisnotional,justaswhat
iscommontowhatisproper.’115WhatiscommontothePersons—thedivinenature,
substanceoressence—precedes,ortakespriorityover,whatispropertothePersons—
theirspecific,personalproperties;likewise,whatisessentialoruniversalinourknowledge
takespriorityoverwhatisnotionalorspecific.Thisprinciplecanbeappliedtothequestion
atissuehere:whatiscommontothetwotheologiesofIslamandChristianity—beliefinthe
onedivineEssence—takespriorityoverwhatdifferentiatesthem—thedistinctive
114 We have taken this translation from the compendium of Catholic documents made available at http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1215‐1215,_Concilium_Lateranum_IIII,_Documenta_Omnia,_EN.pdf. See also J. Neuner & J. Dupuis, The Christian Faith, op. cit., for this and many of the most important doctrinal texts of the Catholic Church. 115 This is cited from St Thomas’s commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences (I, Sent., d.29, q.1, a.2) in Gilles Emory, Trinity in Aquinas (Ypsilanti, Michigan: Sapientia Press, 2003), p.179.
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‘properties’(whetherattributesorPersons)ascribedtothatEssencewithinthetwo
theologies.
ItisthecommongroundofaffirmationofbeliefinGodassuch—GodquaEssence,
SubstanceorNature—that,evenintheabsenceofanyreferencetotheTrinity,allows
ChristianstoaffirmthatMuslimsbelieveintheonetrueGod,theGodofAbrahamand
Moses.ThisappearstouslogicallyimpliedinthestatementofStThomas:IfthePersonal
propertiesareabstractedfromourminds,‘therewillstillremaininourthoughtthedivine
Nature...theonePersonalityofGod,astheJewsconsider’.TheChristianconceptionofGod,
then,isnotunderminedbythementalabstractionoftheTrinitytherefrom:itmaybe
devoidoftheplenituderenderedspirituallyaccessiblebyexplicitrecognitionofthe
TrinitariandimensionsoftheoneGod,butitremainsnonethelessanadequatedoctrinal
expressionoftheonetrueGodpostulatedbyallmonotheistictraditions.TheChristian
theologianmightregardtherelationshipbetweenthiskindofunitaryconceptionofGod
andthefull‐bloodedTrinitarianconceptionofGodasbeinganalogoustotherelationship
between,ontheonehand,anabstract,purelymentalconceptionofacircle,which,being
onlyaconceptioninthemind,isdevoidofanyobjectivedimensionsinspace;and,onthe
other,aconcreteperceptionofanactualsphereexistinginspace.TheChristiancanthen
argueboththattheMuslim/JewishconceptionofGodisidenticaltotheChristian
conceptionofGod—bothpositthesameconceptual‘circle’;andthattheChristiangoesone
stepfurther,bygraspingthedimensionswhicharemissingfromthatconception—the
concretemanifestationoftheabstractcircleasanactualsphere.Theshiftfromtheoneto
theothermightbeseenassymbolizingtheshiftfromtranscendencetoimmanence,or
simply:theactbywhichGodbecomesincarnateinJesus—thefocalpointoftheological
incompatibilitybetweenthetwotraditions.TheTrinitybothanticipatesandresultsfrom
themysteryoftheincarnation,andforthisreasonoughttoremainbracketedoutofany
efforttoestablishcommontheologicalgroundbetweenthetwotraditions,thiscommon
groundbeingconstitutedbytheaffirmationoftheabsolutetranscendenceoftheoneand
onlydivinity.
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Aquinas—andwithhim,theentirescholastictradition,itseems—regardstheshiftfromthe
onenessofGodtotheTrinityasbeingashiftfromgeneral‘metaphysics’116tospecific
‘theology’.117ThethreenessofGodisagreatermystery—greaterinthesenseofmorefully
transcendentvis‐à‐visthecreaturelycategoriesofthoughtandbeing—thanisthemerely
metaphysicalorphilosophicalonenessofGod.Thisonenessissomethingthatboththe
JewsandtheGreeksunderstood;thethreenessofGod,however,spirituallytrumpsthis
abstractconception,itmoreadequatelyrevealstheintrinsicincapacityofhumanthought
toattainknowledgeofthemysteryofGod:‘thefoolishnessofGodiswiserthanmen’(1
Corinthians,1:25);italsoeffectivelyforeshadowsthedoctrineofsalvationthroughthe
Cross,whichis‘untotheJewsastumblingblock,anduntotheGreeksfoolishness’(1
Corinthians,1:23).118Allthreemysteries—Trinity,IncarnationandtheRedemption
wroughtthroughtheCrucifixion—aresummedupinthechallengingenunciationbyby
VladimirLossky,citedearlier:‘ThedogmaoftheTrinityisacrossforhumanwaysof
thought.’
SotheChristiantheologiancanplaceMuslimsinthesamecategoryastheJews:asSt
Irenaeussaid,insofarastheJewsbelieveinGod,loveHimandpractisevirtue,they‘reveal
oneandthesameGod’.119Throughhisdetailedelaborationofthedoctrinepertainingtothe
uniquenature/EssenceofGod,then,Aquinashelpstorenderexplicitwhatisimpliedin
suchstatementsbyIrenaeusabouttheJews,andthosemadebytheauthoritiescitedabove
aboutMuslims:thisuniqueEssenceisthecommongrounduponwhichallmonotheistscan
cometogetherandassertwithunanimitythattheybelieveinthesameGod.Letusalsonote 116 Which we would prefer to call ontology or philosophy, reserving metaphysics for such perspectives as those of Eckhart and Ibn al‐‘Arabī, perspectives which reveal the limitations of theology; see footnote 2. 117 See for example St Bonaventure’s treatise, ‘The Soul’s Journey into God’, where the final three chapters address, in clearly ascending hierarchical order, the unity of God, the Trinity, and then the flight into ‘spiritual and mystical ecstasy’. Bonaventure—The Soul’s Journey into God, The Tree of Life, The Life of St Francis, tr. and ed. Ewert Cousins, (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1978), pp.94‐116. 118 St Gregory of Nyssa writes that the Christian faith is distinct both from the monotheism of the Jews and the polytheism of the Greeks, a point of view which is summed up by St John of Damascus who writes in his De Fide Orthodoxa (I, 7): ‘On the one hand, of the Jewish idea we have the unity of God’s nature and, on the other, of the Greek, we have the distinction of hypostases—and that only.’ Cited by Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, op.cit., p.363. 119 Even if he also asserts that only through the Son can the Jews be liberated from slavery to God and become friends of God. See Five Books of S. Irenaeus Against Heresies, op.cit., book 4, ch.13. 4.
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thatAquinas’sstatementthatitispossibletoabstracttheTrinityfromone’sconceptionof
God,withoutruiningone’sconceptionofthisEssence,isimpliedinthefollowing
declarationoftheFourthLateranCouncil.AfterstatingthepositionofJoachim,who
rejectedthatofPeterLombard,thefollowingstatementismade:
We,however,withtheapprovalofthissacredanduniversalcouncil,believeand
confesswithPeterLombardthatthereexistsacertainsupremereality,
incomprehensibleandineffable…eachofthethreePersonsisthatreality—thatis
tosaysubstance,essenceordivinenature—whichaloneistheprincipleofallthings,
besideswhichnootherprinciplecanbefound.Thisrealityneitherbegetsnoris
begottennorproceeds;theFatherbegets,theSonisbegottenandtheholySpirit
proceeds.120
AlongsidethedogmaticaffirmationoftheidentityofeachofthethreePersonswiththe
Essence,thereisareferencetothatEssenceintermswhichclearlyindicatethepossibility
ofdistinguishingItfromthePersons,andthus,inversely,thepossibilityofabstractingthe
PersonsfromtheEssencewithoutdetrimenttoone’sconceptionoftheintrinsicnatureof
theEssence;thisessentialnaturebeingdefinedinthisconciliartextbythefactthatit
‘neitherbegetsnorisbegottennorproceeds’.WeareremindedhereofEckhart’s
statement,citedabove:forGodtoseeinsidetheOne‘wouldcostHimallHisdivinenames
andpersonalproperties’;onlyinsofarasGodisoneandindivisible,‘neitherFather,Sonnor
HolyGhost’,canHeseeorenterintotheOnenessthatEckharthasdiscovered.Ashesaid,
whendefendinghimselfagainsttheaccusationsofheresy:‘AlthoughinGodtheFather
essenceandpaternityarethesame,Hedoesnotgenerate[theSon]insofarasheisessence,
butinsofarasHeisFather,eventhoughtheessenceistherootofthegeneration.’121
ItisdebatablewhetherAquinaswouldhaveacceptedtheimplicationthatEckhartdraws
fromthefactthattheEssenceisthe‘rootofthe‘generation’,namely,thattheEssence
transcendstheTrinity,accordingtothesameprinciplebywhichGodheadtranscendsGod,
120 From the website cited above: http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1215‐1215,_Concilium_Lateranum_IIII,_Documenta_Omnia,_EN.pdf. 121 Cited by Denys Turner, The Darkness of God, op.cit., p.154.
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Beyond‐BeingtranscendsBeing,everycauseontologicallyprecedesitseffect,orastheroot
haspriorityoverthetree.ButonecanarguenonethelessthatforAquinastheunityofthe
divineEssenceisthephilosophical‘infrastructure’ofthedogmaoftheTrinity:onehasto
understandfirstwhattheessenceornatureofGodis,andonthisbasisproceedto
discussionofGodquaTrinity.AndthisindeediswhytheSummastartswithatreatiseon
theunityofGodandthenproceedstotheTrinity.122This,togetherwiththefactthathe
acceptsthattheunitarianconceptionofGodremainsvalidonitsownlevel,evenifthe
Trinitarianconceptionbeabstractedfromit,meansthatitisentirelylegitimatefor
ChristianstoinvokeAquinas’sperspectivesoutlinedhereasjustificationforpositingthe
uniqueEssenceofGodasthatinwhichChristians,MuslimsandJewsbelieve,irrespective
ofthefactthatbothMuslimsandJewsdisbelieveintheTrinity.
FromtheMuslimpointofview,theChristianconceptionofatranscendentEssencewhich
‘neitherbegetsnorisbegotten123norproceeds’inthewordsoftheFourthLateranCouncil,
canformthebasisuponwhichtheaffirmationcanbemadethatChristiansandMuslimsdo
indeedbelieveinthesameGod;but,addedtothisaffirmationwillcomearejectionofthe
verydoctrines—theTrinityandtheIncarnation—whichtheChristiansdeemtobethe
ultimatefulfilmentofmonotheism.Andhereinliesthecoreofthemutualtheological
irreducibilitybetweenthetwotraditions;however,thisincompatibilitycanbeacceptedon
onelevel,withoutcompromisingthecompatibilityachievedatanother:eachcanrecognise
theotherasafellow‐believerintheonetrueGod.Inotherwords,therecanbeagreement
asregardsthefactthatGodisoneandtranscendsallthings,anddisagreementoverthe
claimthatGodisalsothreeandisuniquelyimmanentinJesusChrist.Buttheagreement
cantakepriorityoverthedisagreement,fortheagreementissituatedontheuniversal
groundofmonotheism,andinrelationtothetranscendentEssenceoftheoneGodwhich 122 This is the basic argument of Rudi Te Velde: ‘The treatment of the Trinity presupposes therefore a
prior clarification of God’s activity, which in turn presupposes a clarification of the divine essence (or
substance), since the activity follows upon the being of the subject of activity (agere sequitur esse).’
Aquinas on God—The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p.69.
123 One is reminded here of the fundamental verses of the chapter of sincerity/purity (112): ‘Say: God is One; God, the Eternally subsistent. He begetteth not, nor is begotten, and there is nothing comparable to Him.’
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definestheverytermsofthatmonotheism;whereasthedisagreementissituatedonthe
particulargroundofChristiantheology,andinrelationtothePersonsofaTrinitywhich
canbeabstractedfrombeliefinGod,withoutthisabstractionnegatingorunderminingthe
essentialpostulateofmonotheism:beliefinoneGod.
AffirmingthiscommongroundoftranscendenceispreciselywhatFrithjofSchuoncallsfor:
hestressestheneedfor‘spiritualsolidarity’betweenallthose‘whotraditionallytake
cognizanceoftranscendenceandimmortality’.124Asregardsthequestionposedhere,
MuslimsandChristianscertainlybelievein‘transcendence’;theywillagreethatGodis
absolutelytranscendent,butwilldisagreeabouthowthistranscendentdivinityrelatesto
andispresentwithin,thecreatedworld;thatistosay,theywilldisagreeaboutthe
modalitiesofdivineimmanence,ashasbeenstressedrepeatedlyinthisessay.Itisthus
significantthatSchuondoesnottalkaboutimmanenceinthiscontextof‘spiritual
solidarity’betweenbelieversofdifferenttraditions.Forthestressontranscendence,by
contrast,allowsonetobuildabridgeofunanimity,notjustbetweenthetheologiesofIslam
andChristianity,butalsobetweenallthegreatreligioustraditionsoftheworld.Asregards
immanence,itisonlyontheesotericplanethatthetwotraditionsmightbeseentobein
harmony,butevenonthisplanetherearesignificantdifferencesasregardsspiritual
accentuation.125
But,returningtotranscendence,bothtraditionsareatoneasregardsallthekeyfeaturesof
theessentialnatureofGod,definedabovebyStThomasas‘somethingexistingaboveall
things,theprincipleofallthings,andremovedfromallthings’.Wehaveseenthat,
metaphysically,thiscommonbeliefisrenderedirrefutablyself‐evident,whereas
theologicallyithasalltoooftenbeenobscuredbehindimpenetrableveilsofconflicting
124 Schuon makes it clear that he does not believe it possible or desirable to establish ‘a generalized metaphysical or quintessential understanding’, a project which he regards as ‘self‐defeating in practice’; rather, what he has in view is simply the possibility of ‘an adequate understanding’ for the sake of upholding the quintessence of the spiritual heritage of mankind, summed up in the principles of the transcendence of the Absolute, and the immortality of the soul. F. Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, op.cit., p.5. 125 See our forthcoming essay, ‘Light upon Light? The Qur’ān and the Gospel of St John’.
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linguisticformulations.WiththehelpofStThomas,though,wecanframethiscommon
beliefintermsofphilosophicaltheology—something,thatistosay,half‐waybetween
theologyandmetaphysics—focusingonthetranscendentcommonground,theunique
EssenceofGod,andlegitimatelybracketoutthedoctrineoftheTrinityforthepurposesof
affirmingbeliefinthatuniqueEssence.
ThisabstractionoftheTrinityfromtheChristianconceptionofGod,forthepurposesof
affirmingsolidaritywithfellow‐monotheists,bynomeansimpliesanyderogationofthe
TrinitybyChristians.Onthecontrary,itservestodeepenthemysteryoftheTrinityby
denyingthatitcaninwaybebroughtwithinthepurviewof‘ordinary’monotheism:the
Trinityisanextraordinaryinstanceofmonotheism,onewhichspurnsallpurelynatural
reasoning,andcallsouttobegraspedbythesupernaturalmeanspropertospecifically
Christianfaith.Aswehaveseenabove,thisiswhatStThomasinsistsupon;anythingshort
ofthis—anyattempttodemonstrateorprovetherealityoftheTrinity‘derogatesfrom
faith’.Moreover,andsurprisingasitmayseem,thisveryrighttograntTrinitariandogmaa
divinerightofexemptionfromtherulesoflogic,andallmerely‘natural’modesofreason,
canserveboththeChristianandtheMuslimtheologianintheirefforttoembraceeach
otherasfellow‐believers.126
FortheChristiancanclaimthatnothingessentialabouttheTrinityissacrificedinthis
embrace:inaffirmingwithMuslimsacommonbeliefinthetranscendentunityofGod,one
isaffirmingbeliefinoneaspectofthedoctrineoftheTrinity—therationallydemonstrable
unityofthecommonnaturesharedbythethreePersons;whileatthesametimekeeping
intactthespecificallyChristianmysterypropertotheotheraspectoftheTrinity—thefact
thatitisbeyondallrationaldemonstration,orratherthatitsdivine‘logic’onlybecomes
126 What Schuon says about ‘true ecumenism’ is pertinent here: ‘either it involves an understanding between the religions which is based upon their common interests in the face of a danger that threatens them all, or it may call into play the wisdom that can discern the one sole truth under the veil of different forms.’ Logic and Transcendence, op.cit., p.182. In this final section of the essay we have focused on the ‘common interests’ of all believers in the face of the dangers posed by atheism; whereas in section two of the essay, our concern was with the ‘wisdom which discerns the sole truth under the veil of different forms’.
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apparentthroughplumbingthemysteriesofcontemplativefaith.Forhispart,theMuslim
theologiancanlikewiseaffirmwithChristiansacommonbeliefinthetranscendentunityof
God,withoutthisaffirmationinanywayimplyingacceptanceoftheTrinity:whatfor
ChristiansisbeyondallrationaldemonstrationisforMuslimssimplyillogical.
Inthisway,thetheologiansofbothtraditionscanexercisetheirright—socrucialtothe
definitionofthetheologianperse—tobearwitnesstotheirfaith,doingsointhevery
bosomoftheirbrotherlyembraceasfellowbelievers.Asnotedabove,theChristiancan
quoteStPaul’sdeclarationtotheAthenians:‘Whomthereforeyeignorantlyworship,Him
declareIuntoyou.’TheChristianinvitationtotheMuslimsmightbeenvisagedasfollows:
wenotonlybelieveintheone,transcendentGodasyoudo,but,inaddition,webelievethat
thisveryGodbecamemanwithoutsacrificinganyofHistranscendence;andthatthe
miraculousnatureofthisincarnation,onceitisacceptedandempoweredbyfaith,will
allowyoutoseethattheTrinityisinfacttheleastinadequateexpressionofthefull
plenitude,profoundmystery,andsalvificpowerofthedivinenature.
Forhispart,theMuslimtheologiancanembraceChristiansasfellow‐monotheists,while
invitingthemtoconsiderthecrystallineconsummationofthedefiningprincipleofthe
monotheismtheyshareincommon:lāilāhailla’Llāh,‘nodivinitybutGod’,suchasitis
expressedinamyriadwaysbyGod’sultimaterevelationtoman,theGloriousQur’ān.Once
itisacceptedthattheQur’āncompletesthecycleofpropheticrevelation,andthereby—
uniquelyamongworldscriptures—confirmsthevalidityofallpreviousrevelationsofGod,
andallpreviousProphets;andthatitrestoresnotjustthepristinepurityofthefaithof
Abraham,butalsotheprimordialnatureofmanassuch(al‐fitra),doingsothroughanall‐
embracing‘lawandaway’providentiallyadaptedtomeetboththeparticularneedsofman
inthislastphaseofthecycleofhumanityandtheuniversalneedsofallhumancultures
untiltheendofthisphase—whenthisisaccepted,thenitisentirelylogicaltotakethenext
step:followinthefootstepsofthelastMessengerwhowassentbyGodasthe‘sealofthe
Prophets’,hewhoembodiedtoperfectionboththeoutwardclarityandtheinnermystery
oftheMessagewithwhichhewascharged.Inotherwords,theinvitationwillbetoaddto
theuniversalmonotheisticprinciple,expressedbythefirsttestimony,‘nodivinitybutGod’,
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thespecificallyIslamicappeal,nottoGodbecomeman,butto‘thePerfectMan’(al‐Insānal‐
kāmil),thisbeingexpressedbythesecondtestimony:‘MuhammadistheMessengerof
God’.