Dissertation in Politics - US Foreign Policy Decision Making in Iraq

POL3046: Dissertation in Politics

Title: Allison’s conceptual models of Foreign Policy Analysis

and the Invasion of Iraq.

Name: Vijay Thapa Luhan

Student Number: 071701822

Advisor: Dr. James Bilsland

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the

degree of Bachelor of Arts in Politics.

School: School of Geography, Politics and Sociology

Date of Submission: May 2011

US Foreign Policy Decision Making in Iraq Page 1

Dissertation in Politics


By Using Allison's conceptual models of Foreign

Policy Analysis, how can these models of

Decision Making be used to explain the United

States’ decision to invade Iraq in 2003?

Abstract

This dissertation applies Graham Allison’s ‘Conceptual Models of Foreign Policy Analysis’ to the decision making process that preceded the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Allison’s 1971 work, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis revolutionised the study of governmental decision making on American Foreign Policy. The invasion of Iraq was a historic landmark in U.S. foreign policy. My study into governmental decision making in the United States applies different analytic models to uncover the different components that contributed to such an event. The assumptions and predictions of Allison’s models help to answer the questions of ‘how’ was a decision made, rather than just to explain the ‘why’ questions. My dissertation attempts to explain that the ‘how’s and why’s’ of decision making can best be explained using Allison’s conceptual models.



Table of Contents

Page

Abstract: 3

List of Abbreviations: 6

Introduction: 7

Chapter 1: The importance of Foreign Policy Analysis 9

and the case of Iraq

What is Foreign Policy Analysis and how does it relate to U.S 10

Foreign policy in Iraq?

What is the empirical puzzle you seek to explain? 11

Who are the main authors whose ideas you are drawing upon 14

and how do they help you explain your research question?

Chapter 2: The Rational Actor Model 16

What is the Rational Actor Model? 17

How can the Rational Actor Model be applied to the decision 19



to invade Iraq?

What are the criticisms of the model when applied to Iraq? 28

Chapter 3: The Governmental Politics Model 31

What is the Governmental Politics model? 32

Who were the key actors in the political bargaining process? 34

How well does the Governmental Politics Model explain the 37

decision to invade Iraq?

Does the model undermine the role of the President? 46

What are the criticisms of the model when applied to Iraq? 48

Conclusion 51

Bibliography 54



List of Abbreviations

9/11 – September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.

DoD – United State’s Department of Defense.

Neo-cons – Neo-conservatives.

NSC – National Security Council.

PNAC – Project for the New American Century

Resolution 1441 – United Nations Security Council Resolution offering Iraq under Saddam Hussein ‘a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under previous resolutions of the council’.

UN – United Nations.

UNSC – United Nations Security Council.

U.S. – United States.

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction.



Introduction

The aim of this individual study is to address the gap in the general understanding of why the

Bush administration decided to invade Iraq in March 2003. The problem that I seek to solve

is whether it is possible to explain ‘why’ the administration attacked Iraq by addressing ‘how’

the administration decided that attacking Iraq was in the best interests of the United States.

This is important as it may serve a function of helping ordinary observers of foreign policy

understand why the United States was willing to risk the support of its allies in the

international community by aggressively pursuing its own foreign policy objectives. My

dissertation aims to address this problem by avoiding the simple regurgitation on the general

disapproval of the war, and instead seek to ask questions on ‘who’ and ‘what’ were the key

actors and interests that influenced the decision to depart from American’s previous foreign

policy option of containment to a hard-line strategy of pre-emption.

An overview on the topic of my dissertation will be the main research questions I will attempt

to answer. My major area of focus is on the use of the academic discipline of ‘Foreign Policy

Analysis’ on the processes of foreign policy decision-making. The study of foreign policy

analysis is an important and interesting branch of political science as it provides unique

opportunities to examine the dynamics that influence foreign policy-making decisions. I shall

be referring to Graham Allison’s ‘conceptual models of foreign policy analysis’, which are

utilised to use specific methods of decision making made by the Bush administration to



formulate policy. Specifically by selectively using the assumptions and predictions of two of

his models of foreign policy analysis and referring to the wider literature on U.S. foreign

policy, I hope to address the interests and preferences of the President along with his various

policy advisors, and explain how and why they can be explained using Allison’s models. The

evaluation of each chapter will provide me with the conclusion as to whether one, both or

neither of the models can accurately explain the decision making process.

While the concept of foreign policy analysis has existed for decades to explain government

behaviour since during the Cold War, my research has showed that there has been little

effective use of Allison’s models to explain decision-making processes in the Bush

administration. Thus, my dissertation will challenge the general assumption that there was not

a rational justification for the invasion of Iraq, but also whether Bush, as President, acted

alone on his decision.

My methodology for conducting my research and writing this dissertation will be primarily

be comparative. I will be attempting to find direct comparisons between U.S foreign policy

decisions on Iraq and Allison’s conceptual models of foreign policy analysis. By referring to

foreign policy analysis as the basis of my examination, my approach will also be inductive as

I identify patterns between the two different collections of literature. My empirical

observation of the literature will help me produce an educated guess in my conclusion as to

which policy model can be used to associate decision-making on Iraq.

The first chapter of this dissertation provides an overview of foreign policy analysis and how

it can be incorporated on the study of Iraq. It will provide a better explanation of the

empirical puzzle that I seek to explain and a brief overview of the literature that I have

chosen.



Chapter 1:

The importance of Foreign Policy Analysis on the case of Iraq



What is Foreign Policy Analysis and how does it relate to U.S Foreign Policy in Iraq?

As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, much of the media and non-academic

discourse are focused on ‘why’ a certain decision was made. The academic discipline of

Foreign policy analysis attempts to answer ‘how’ a decision was made. This is what the

department on Foreign Policy Analysis studies and its role is to study the processes and

outcomes of certain foreign policy decisions, before analysing the implementation of foreign

policy.

To assess the actions of the Bush administration in 2003 to invade Iraq, analysts need to look

at the sequence of events that took place before 2003 and ask not just ‘why’ they were made

after the invasion, but ‘how’ they were made before the invasion. Foreign policy analysis

provides a framework to allow them to systematically pursue and answer these questions.1 By

referring to the specific models that foreign policy analysis uses, this places the individual

decision maker at the heart of the foreign policy decision-making process.2 Problems are

inherent in foreign policy making, and so foreign policy analysis allows the decision maker –

to some extent – to foresee the problems and consequences that may arise out of conducting

foreign policy, but more importantly, the possible outcomes that the decision maker is

pursuing.

The importance of ‘how’ decisions are made rather than ‘why’ is summarised effectively by

Marijke Breuning, as she explains that ‘why decisions are made’ is an easier field to

1 Brian White, ‘Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy Analysis’, in Michael Clarke and Brian White, Foreign Policy Analysis (Lancashire: G.W. & A. Hesketh, 1981): 3-132 Valerie Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations’ Foreign Policy Analysis 1 (2005): 1-30.



comment on and criticise as they have the benefit of hindsight. Breuning, however, argues

that to simply comment on decisions does not solve the puzzle of how and why the

government made those decisions.3 There are two models I shall be looking at that assess

how actors in the Bush administration were unified or divided in their interests to invade Iraq.

These two models along with the literature I have researched will give me insight in the

decision making process and assess the priorities and motivations behind individuals who

were part of the policy making process leading up to the invasion.

Glenn Hastedt claims that there is no single policy decision-making process that exists.

Therefore, in order to understand and make sense of the complex process of making

decisions, one must refer to models that have been produced to help ‘explain, predict, and

evaluate how U.S foreign policy is made’. 4 Using these conceptual models of foreign policy

analysis will help me to answer my research question and to explain precisely how decision-

making was carried out preceding the invasion of Iraq.

What is the empirical puzzle that you seek to explain?

Valerie Hudson believes that foreign policy analysis is ‘…characterised by an actor-specific

focus, based upon the argument that all that occurs between nations and across nations is

grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups’.5 The empirical puzzle that I

am aiming to analyse is how did President Bush come to a decision that invading Iraq would

be in the United States’ best interest? Was the decision one that he made on his own? Or was

it a decision he made a product of the internal negotiations that took place between his closest

policy advisors? These two issues will be the centrepiece of this dissertation and are

represented by the two models I have chosen to look at as part of my research. The two

3 Marijke Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 3.4 Glenn Hastedt, Encyclopaedia of American Foreign Policy (New York: Facts on File Inc, 2004): XII.5 Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, 2.



models consist of major assumptions about the foreign policy decision, the decision maker,

and the decision-making system that I hope to use to effectively analyse the empirical puzzle

that I seek to explain.

I shall start by reviewing the key author whose models I shall be using and whose work has

provided a significant contribution to my study.

Graham Tillet Allison Jr. is a political scientist and professor at the John F. Kennedy School

of Government. His analyses of government decision making during crises has contributed to

a better understanding of how government decision making is formulated towards a country’s

foreign policy. In 1971, he published the book, ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban

Missile Crisis’. The purpose of the book was to examine the events of the Cuban Missile

Crisis that took place in October 1962, and allow these models to be used as case studies for

future analyses of governmental decision-making on foreign policy or any other branch of

policy negotiations. Initially, Allison admitted that it was not possible to identify a single

dominant paradigm that could explain government decision making. Instead, each model

assesses the actions of both the United States and Soviet Union and explains how and why

both countries were pursuing an arms race with the build-up of their nuclear capabilities. The

models give a conceptual understanding of the crisis whilst also evaluating the effectiveness

of each model with its strengths and weaknesses. The strengths and weaknesses of each

model along with a few of the criticisms they drew from other authors and analysts were

included in a later revision of the book that was published in 1999.6

The first model I will analyse is the ‘Rational Actor Model’. The model assumes that

decisions are made as a result of evaluation of an actor’s goals and objectives, the available

policy options, and the consequences of making such a decision. Decisions are made

6 Graham T Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (United States: Addison-Wesley Education Publishers, 1999): vii



according to the maximum level of expected utility, where there is the highest possibility of

positive outcomes and the lowest possibility of negative consequences.7 My dissertation will

assess why President Bush viewed Iraq as an urgent security threat to the United States, and

why certain characteristics of Iraq’s history suggested that action was needed immediately

after September 11, 2001.

The second model I will use is the ‘Governmental Politics Model’, and arose out of a critique

of the rational actor model. This model is often called the ‘Bureaucratic Politics Model’, and

explains that decisions on foreign policy are not made by one individual or leader, but

instead, according to Allison, they are made as a result of bureaucratic bargaining that takes

place between numerous members of a policy making group who have different strategic

goals and objectives in mind.8 This model separates itself from the rational actor model

because the rational actor model does not take into account the possibility that decisions are

made after complex bargaining among different advisors and individuals.9 This distinction

allows the governmental politics model to provide a broader approach to foreign policy

analysis when trying to understand the complexities of decision making that elude rational

actor analysis.10

The governmental politics model is a very useful model in looking at the circumstances that

surrounded the invasion of Iraq, as it looks at the role of individuals within the

administration’s government agencies. In this chapter, I will look at the major role that the

neoconservatives played in convincing President Bush on the immediate importance of Iraq

as a security threat to the United States. However, this model also suffers from its

weaknesses, especially in relation to the superior role that the President plays in foreign

7 Allison, Essence of Decision, 24.8 Allison, Essence of Decision, 295.9 Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis, 96.10 Martin Smith, ‘U.S bureaucratic Politics and the Decision to Invade Iraq’ Contemporary Politics 14 (2008): 91-105.



policy decision-making and will be included in my evaluation of the model at the end of the

chapter.

‘Essence of Decision’ also includes a third model labelled the ‘Organisational Behaviour

Model’. This model refers to the formal organisations as the setting for where foreign policy

decisions are made.11 The decisions that are made are often linked to the organisational

structure or procedure of decision makers. Although this model is still an important aspect of

foreign policy analysis, it is difficult to utilise as part of my research question simply because

there is a shortage of data that could be used to provide evidentiary support for any argument

that could be used to link the model to the case of Iraq. However, this provides me with the

opportunity to look more closely at the two other models that Allison published, rather than

more briefly had I been able to use the third model.

Throughout this chapter, I have provided a general account of the empirical puzzle that I aim

to solve by subjecting the decision to invade Iraq under Allison’s two conceptual models of

foreign policy. The next two chapters will look into these models more closely and assess

whether they adequately apply to the invasion of Iraq.

Who are the main authors whose ideas you are drawing upon and how do they help you explain your research question?

Although I will be using Allison’s conceptual models of foreign policy analysis as the basis

of my comparison, I have drawn upon numerous sources to help build my argument and

frame a wide-ranging approach to this study. I have separated the use of foreign policy

analysis authors from those who have provided my chapters with the knowledge and

information on the processes the Bush administration went through to produce policy on Iraq.

11 Allison, Essence of Decision, 5.



In order to understand the concept of foreign policy analysis, I drew upon the ideas of

Marijke Breuning, Valerie Hudson, Brian White and Michael Clarke. These authors provided

me with the knowledge of how Allison’s models are linked to the wider literature on foreign

policy analysis. These are how the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions on foreign policy are linked

and how one can be used efficiently to explain the other. I introduced my dissertation by

explaining that the basis of my study is to explain ‘why’ President Bush decided to invade

Iraq in March 2003. These four authors all cite Allison’s models and how it can be used to

explain such an event.

The central focus of my dissertation is related to how Allison’s conceptual models can be

incorporated into U.S foreign policy in Iraq. Martin Smith’s ‘US Bureaucratic Politics and

the Decision to Invade Iraq’ helped me to find links between Allison’s governmental politics

model and the different actors who assemble the government bureaucracy on foreign policy.

Together with Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, the three authors provide a narrative of the

ascendency of the neoconservatives in foreign policy decision-making. I cited Bob

Woodward’s two major volumes on the Bush administration’s policymaking process. ‘Bush

at War’ focuses on the bureaucratic struggle that took place between Colin Powell and

Donald Rumsfeld whilst maintaining their departmental interests on foreign policy. On the

other hand I cited his later work, ‘Plan of Attack’ to focus on the personal relationship

between Condoleezza Rice and George Bush.

The collection of authors I have cited and acknowledged in this dissertation help to

incorporate Allison’s conceptual models on U.S. foreign policy as well as integrate it with the

wider literature on foreign policy analysis.



Chapter 2:

The Rational Actor Model



What is the Rational Actor Model?

The rational actor model is the first model that Allison uses to analyse foreign policy

decision-making. According to White, ‘…decision making analysts have tended to reinforce

‘rational actor’ assumptions by assuming a rational decision-making process’.12 The rational

actor model attempts to answer the question of why a decision maker chooses one policy

option rather than another.

Firstly, the decision maker is assumed to be a ‘unified, national actor’. This conceives the

nation or government to be rational, unitary decision makers, who have one set of

preferences, choices and estimates of the consequences of policy alternatives.13 Secondly, the

decision maker is assumed to rank preferences of policy options with a clear objective or set

of objectives in mind. These preferences are ranked according to the degree of satisfaction

and utility attained from achieving these goals and objectives, after having identified the

alternative policy options and their possible consequences.14 The decision maker will look at

these alternative policy options and their consequences, and will select the policy that gives

the decision maker the ‘maximum utility’.15 A decision made according to maximum utility is

one that gives the decision maker the highest positive outcome or ‘payoff’. Allison refers to

this rational choice as a ‘value maximising’ decision whose consequences rank highest in

terms of the decision maker’s goals and objectives.16

There are two major points to note about the rational actor model that can bring confusion

and criticism. These two points are very important when using the model to analyse the

decision to invade Iraq. Firstly, it is important to note that the key decision makers are not

12 White, Foreign Policy Analysis, 713 Allison, Essence of Decision, 24.14 Allison, Essence of Decision, 18.15 Alex Mintz and Karl R. DeRouen, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 57.16 Allison, Essence of Decision, 24.



always assumed to be acting rationally. Instead, the decision makers try to make the best

possible decision according to specific restraints that the decision making process allows

them to do so.17 Secondly, the decision that is made may not always be right. There can

sometimes be confusion that the term ‘rational’ can be linked to ‘right’, however, that does

not necessarily mean that the decision makers did not behave irrationally. The rational actor

model does not look for what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ about foreign policy decisions. It instead

looks at whether the decision can be deemed as ‘rational’ according to the information that

foreign policy decision makers provide.

My study into the invasion of Iraq will look into why the United States chose to change their

policy agenda of ‘containment’ against the Soviet Union to ‘pre-emption’ in Iraq.

Containment dominated the foreign policy agenda of the United States after the Second

World War and during the Cold War to ‘contain’ the spread of communism emerging from

the Soviet Union. This policy was later fused with the intimidating strategy of ‘deterrence’,

which promised to punish another state if they chose to attack the United States with the use

of nuclear weapons. Deterrence was seen to prevent the other nation from attacking as the

consequences of that attack could be met with a retaliatory strike of equal or greater

magnitude. This became what was known at the time as ‘Mutually Assured Deterrence’.18

However, after President Bush was elected in 2000, the US government wanted to change its

national security policy to face the challenges of the new international system. The U.S.

moved towards ‘pre-emption’, which looked to prevent immediate threats to the United

States before they could develop.19 This significant change in foreign policy was outlined in

the National Security Strategy in September 2002 where the Bush administration focused on

the use of ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (WMD) as the ‘greatest threat’ to the United 17 White, Foreign Policy Analysis, 21.18 Brian C. Schmidt, ‘The Primacy of National Security’ in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (eds) Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases (USA: Oxford University Press, 2008): 155-169.19 Beth A. Fischer, ‘Military Power and US Foreign Policy’ in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (eds) Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases (USA: Oxford University Press, 2008): 129-144.



States.20 This chapter will look at why this significant change occurred. Was the policy

change from ‘containment’ to ‘pre-emption’ a rational decision that looked at all possible

alternative policy options? Thus, was the decision to invade Iraq as part of a ‘War on Terror’

a rational decision? By using Allison’s rational actor model, I hope to understand and answer

these questions.

How can the Rational Actor Model be applied to the decision to invade Iraq?

The first important point is to highlight who, according to Allison’s model, can be identified

as the actor. It is difficult to pinpoint one such unitary actor as the prime decision maker as

the structure of the U.S government is made of multiple components that formulate and

decide on foreign policy. The actor could simply be designated as the Bush administration, or

the State Department, or just President Bush. By selecting the U.S government as the actor

would be incorrect as this is too abstract, as the government consists of many different actors

and the most important of which shall be discussed in Chapter three. Similarly, it is difficult

to choose the State Department as the unitary actor because despite its role as the primary

institution for the development of foreign policy, the State Department had many critics when

it came to developing policy against Iraq. Therefore, I am left to say that the rational actor is

the President. As President and ‘Commander-in-Chief’, George W. Bush is in the unique

position of making the final decision according to the advice and strategy of his advisors.

Having identified the rational actor, it is now possible to look at policy options and outcomes.

Before applying Allison’s rational actor model, it is important to understand the context of

the reasons for the invasion. The importance of this is related to why Iraq was perceived as an

immediate problem for the United States. The reasons for the invasion contribute to the

20 ‘National Security Strategy – September 2002’, The White House Archives (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf, 7th April 2011).


http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf


rational actor model as possible policy options and consequences and so it is important to

know what they were.

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, did not in themselves place Iraq on

the government’s foreign policy agenda. Rather, the attacks brought the question of Iraq back

to the policy table once again and continued where it had left off since the Gulf War in the

early 1990’s and the bombing of Iraq in December 1998. However, after the attacks on 9/11,

there was a greater sense of urgency about what to do with Iraq.21 Before 9/11, there had been

a succession of attacks on US infrastructure and personnel in Yemen, Mogadishu, Riyadh,

and in East Africa. These attacks clearly demonstrated that the current policy of containment

was insufficient in tackling global terrorism.22 However, what was a greater threat was that

the attacks - designated as terrorist attacks - on 9/11 were the first to take place in the United

States by a foreign terrorist group.23 These attacks stressed the importance of looking at the

greater significance that the attacks represented. American global supremacy was under

attack and a tough response was required. After the invasion of Afghanistan, the war in Iraq,

which began on 19th March 2003, represented the second phase of the Bush administration’s

‘War on terror’. The reasons for invasion, however, were different to that of Afghanistan.

Firstly, Bush and his closest advisors believed that Saddam Hussein was seeking to develop

WMD, going against previous UNSC resolutions that forbid him from developing WMD.

Secondly, the Bush administration firmly believed that Iraq had been harbouring terrorists

and could be linked to the attacks on September 11, 2001. The plausibility of this accusation

is irrelevant, because whatever the case, it was a major factor that contributed to the

administration’s rationale for invading Iraq.

21 Smith, U.S bureaucratic Politics, 99.22 Dominic McGoldrick, From 9/11 to the Iraq War 2003 (Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004): 10.23 Noam Chomsky, 9/11 (Canada: Open Media, 2001): 35.



Citing these two main reasons for the decision to invade Iraq, I can now begin to apply the

assumptions of Allison’s rational actor model to my study on foreign policy decision-making

in Iraq.

President George W. Bush, along with his key policy advisors defined their strategic

objectives, considered the possible alternatives, weighed together the possible risks and

benefits of invading Iraq, and then selected the option that maximised the possible benefits

whilst minimising the consequences.24 From looking at these classical assumptions of the

rational actor model, it is plausible to agree that these assumptions fit the decision-making

procedure that took place before the invasion of Iraq. However, it is only possible to confirm

these assumptions by assessing what the different policy options, along with the expected

benefits and consequences were that faced the Bush administration. I have identified two

major policy options that can be drawn from U.S. Foreign Policy. The first option is

continued ‘containment’, which had been used towards Iraq following the end of the first

Gulf War. The second option is military force through ‘pre-emption’, and has been identified

as one of the key justifications under the Bush administration for launching an attack on

Iraq.25

By identifying the policy options, it is now possible to look for the possible outcomes and

consequences of each policy and assess whether these can be seen as contributing factors to

the decision to invade Iraq.

The first policy option that I shall assess is the policy of continued containment against Iraq.

The use of containment in Iraq had been deployed ever since the beginning of the first Gulf

War in 1990, and was a phased strategy of pressuring Saddam Hussein. The ‘Iraq sanctions’

24 Michael J. Mazarr, ‘The Iraq War and Agenda Setting’, Foreign Policy Analysis 3 (2007): 1-23.25 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 139.



were imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 6th August, 1990, four days

after Iraq invaded Kuwait, and were in the form of economic sanctions and trade embargos

aimed at Iraq’s military to withdraw their forces from Kuwait. At the end of the Gulf War,

the UNSC extended these sanctions further by banning all financial resources except for

medicines and aid used for ‘humanitarian reasons’.26 Other policies of containment included

requirements for disarmament, continued, uninterrupted weapons inspections, no-fly zones,

and maritime interdiction operations to disrupt the banned trade of resources to Iraq.27 The

issue of uninterrupted weapons inspections was the major cause for concern in the lead up to

the invasion of Iraq. Before the December 1998 bombings of Iraq, Scott Ritter, the chief

weapons inspector for the UN had alerted the international community because of the

continued obstruction of his personnel from known weapons sites. His opinion was that

without full access to these sites, Iraq could swiftly restart its weapons programme and put it

in material breach of existing UNSC resolutions.28 According to Allison’s rational actor

model, this would represent a severe threat to the United States if it continued with its policy

of containment in a post 9/11 world.

However, one can only identify the severity of the costs by placing them against the benefits

of continued strict containment towards Iraq. Scott Ritter continued with his testimony on

Iraq that containment had already seen Iraq destroy up to 95% of its WMD capability and this

evidence had been made visible to the UN. He claims:

“...we have to remember that this missing 5 to 10% doesn’t necessarily constitute a threat. It doesn’t constitute a weapons programme. It constitutes bits and pieces of a weapons programme which, in its totality, doesn’t amount to much, but which it is still prohibited.”29

26 ‘Resolution 661 adopted by the Security Council at its 2933rd meeting on 6th August 1990’ United Nations (http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0661.htm, 23rd April, 2011).27 ‘War In Iraq versus Containment’ American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (http://www.aei.org/docLib/20060221_davisPaper060215.pdf, 23rd April 2011).28 Steven Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf Security: Foundations of the War on Terror (Berkshire: Ithaca Press, 2007): 141.29 Scott Ritter, ‘Iraq has been Fundamentally Disarmed’, Third World Network (http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twr147e.htm, 23rd April 2011).


http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twr147e.htm

http://www.aei.org/docLib/20060221_davisPaper060215.pdf

http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0661.htm


Therefore, if it is possible to use a claim by the chief weapons inspector in Iraq as reliable, it

is likely that the policy of containment as an option may have been enough to see Iraq as less

of a security threat to the United States. If it was true that the remaining 10% of unaccounted

WMD was not enough to pose as a catalyst to restart Iraq’s weapons programme, than the use

of containment as an alternative policy option to full-scale pre-emption could be seen as

viable. Furthermore, prior to the invasion, the United Kingdom and other allies pursuing

similar policies to thwart Iraq’s weapons programmes followed the United States policy of

containment. Such a response was beneficial to international cooperation against Iraq by the

legitimate use of sanctions according to UNSC resolutions that were supported by the

international community. This benefit of containment as a policy option presses the case

further to support continued containment against Iraq.

However, to see if this is the case, I must look at the related consequences the administration

identified of pursuing a continued policy of containment towards Iraq.

The Bush administration feared that remaining biological and chemical weapon stocks could

risk the chance of continued WMD development if they were not accounted for and

destroyed. According to Vice President Cheney, if there was a 1% chance of a grave threat

materialising from Al Qaeda developing a nuclear weapon with help from Pakistani

scientists, the United States should treat the threat as a certainty and act immediately to

eliminate it.30 After 9/11, the administration could not afford to take any risks with the

probability that al-Qaeda could build a nuclear weapon. National Security Advisor,

Condoleezza Rice, encapsulated this fear when she spoke of the fear of “smoking guns

turning into mushroom clouds”. 31 This could be represented as a significant ‘cost’ to the 30 Yuen Foong Khong, ‘Neoconservatism and the Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy’ in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (eds) Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008): 251-267.31 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004): 109.



United States if a threat were to materialise with the continued development of WMD, and

according to Allison’s rational actor model, is not likely to be viewed favourably by the Bush

administration.

Having looked at the various costs and benefits that come with choosing continued

containment as the method of U.S foreign policy towards Iraq, I will now look at the costs

and benefits of using pre-emptive military force.

The major goal behind using pre-emptive military force to strike Iraq was the removal of

Saddam Hussein from power. This had been a long-standing goal for many of the policy

advisors in the Bush administration, and is a characteristic I shall explain in detail in chapter

three. Although there were many other policy objectives as part of the invasion, removal of

Saddam was the primary objective. Firstly, according to the administration, the notion of pre-

emption could be used against Saddam’s regime, as it had refused to comply with UNSC

resolutions aimed at preventing the use of WMD’s.32 Secondly, Saddam’s history of

aggression towards other countries spoke for itself and in dealing with him, one the major

costs of not dealing with him could be negated and turned into a benefit. The evidence

supported the likelihood of aggression if he were able to continue to develop WMD. He had

already attacked both Iran and Kuwait in order to seize control of their vast oil reserves. By

removing him from power, the U.S could enjoy the uninterrupted flow of oil to the western

hemisphere, as well as not have to repeat the events that brought about the first Gulf War.

Thirdly, despite UNSC resolutions forcing Iraq to destroy its WMD capability, as discussed

earlier, there were still remaining stockpiles that, according to Bush, could be used to restart

Iraq’s weapon programme. If this were to happen, the consequences could be devastating to

the United States. Attacking Iraq pre-emptively would seem rational as once more, Saddam’s

32 Abraham D. Sofaer, ‘On the Necessity of Pre-Emption’, European Journal of International Law 14 (2003): 209-226.



history of using WMD worked against him. In what become known as the ‘Anfal Campaign’,

his regime used chemical weapons to systematically eliminate the Kurdish population of

northern Iraq during 1986 to 1989, during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war. The United

Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide labelled

the killings as genocide, as the organised indiscriminate killings of the Kurdish population

killed at least 180,000 people.33 The rationale of pre-emption against Iraq was simply put that

if Saddam Hussein could kill hundreds of thousands of his own people, what would stop him

from doing the same against the United States? This possible outcome of non-action against

Iraq would represent a serious cost of not choosing pre-emptive force as a policy option.

The negative outcomes of choosing pre-emption against Iraq are similar to that of any war.

Firstly, there would be a very high monetary cost to fight a war on the scale of Iraq. The

United States Congressional Budget Office estimated that that the war could cost anywhere

between $48 billion and £93 billion, depending on the length of the campaign.34 Not included

in these costs are the extra costs for humanitarian assistance and post-war reconstruction,

which could cost up to $40 billion. 35 However, the most significant cost is the interest in

borrowing to finance these additional costs over time. This could significantly hamper

support for the war as the money to finance the payments on interest could be used for other

public services. Secondly, there could potentially be high military casualties. The number of

casualties depends on how long the Iraqi army can withstand an American attack. Former

Senator Gary Hart explained:

‘If the Iraqi army collapses at the first blow, casualties may be as few as a couple of hundred, maybe 500 at the most. But if they dig in and defend the major cities, if they fight house to

33 Dave Johns, ‘The Crimes of Saddam: The Anfal Campaign’ Frontline PBS (http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_anfal.html, 24th April 2011).34 ‘Assessing the Cost of Military Action Against Iraq: Using Desert Shield/Desert Storm as a Basis for Estimates: An Analysis by the House Budget Committee’, House Budget Committee (http://usiraq.procon.org/sourcefiles/DHBC.pdf, 24th April 2011).35 House Budget Committee, Assessing the Cost of Military Action Against Iraq.


http://usiraq.procon.org/sourcefiles/DHBC.pdf

http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_anfal.html


house, if they take off their uniforms and merge with the civilian population, casualties can easily reach 50,000 or even 100,000 Americans and 250,000 or more Iraqis’.36

When attempting to explain the policy that was chosen before the invasion, in relation to the

rational actor model, the number of casualties would have to be a significant factor. However,

in a post 9/11 world, the U.S government had to ask what option was worse; over a 100,000

military casualties fighting in war, or the same figure of innocent American civilian casualties

from the use of WMD.

Using this momentum of selecting the most viable policy option, it is now possible to explain

why the Bush administration chose to pre-emptively attack Iraq rather continue a policy of

containment.

From addressing the positive and negative outcomes of policy options and from the research I

have undertaken in this study, my perception of the U.S justification to pre-emptively attack

Iraq was because of a necessity to act after September 11, 2001. Speaking to Bob Woodward

in 2003, President Bush claimed:

‘“September 11th obviously changed my thinking a lot about my responsibility as president. Because September 11th made the security of the American people the priority…a sacred duty for the president. It is the most necessary duty for the president, because if the president doesn’t take on that duty, who else is going to?”37

After 9/11, removing Saddam Hussein became a necessity in order to effectively continue in

destroying remaining WMD stockpiles. Bush was certain that the future of U.S. security

would not be certain with the possibility of WMD’s and the likelihood of further terrorist

attacks against the United States and required immediate attention. This argument reiterates

36 Leslie Evans, ‘President Bush Silent on Potential Costs of War with Iraq’, UCLA International Institute (http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=2229, 24th April 2011).37 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 22.


http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=2229


the statement I made at the beginning of this chapter, which is that the September 11 attacks,

did not put Iraq on the agenda as a new problem, but instead, that it put Iraq back on the

agenda after the first Gulf war. This can be seen in the meetings and discussions that took

place within 24 hours of the attacks, where Vice President Rumsfeld mentioned attacking

Iraq.38 Rumsfeld was later quoted as saying that America acted because they saw “existing

evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass murder in a new light, through the prism of our

experience on September 11th”.39 Although I will look at the reliability of this ‘evidence’ in

my evaluation of the model, this did not change the issue that Bush and his administration

were well aware of the threat posed to the United States from terrorists if they were able to

build a nuclear weapon.

To conclude, I have attempted to find many linkages between the Bush administration’s

decision to invade Iraq and Allison’ rational actor model. I have identified who the ‘actor’ is,

as well as the two main policy options of containment and pre-emptive war. By looking at the

possible outcomes as well as the weighing of their respective costs and benefits, I have tried

to explain why Bush ultimately chose a policy of pre-emptive war. This section has tried to

identify the reasons ‘why’ Bush invaded by addressing the ‘how’ questions that are involved

in decision making processes of foreign policy. However, the model does come under

criticism and will be evaluated in the next section.

What are the criticisms of the model when applied to Iraq?

Throughout chapter one, I have been able to find many comparisons in the decision making

process to invade Iraq and Allison’s rational actor model. This is possible because of the

simple and uncomplicated approach that the rational actor model uses to analyse decision-

making. The general method of analysis that sees a single, unitary decision maker select the 38 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 149.39 Steve Schifferes, ‘Rumsfeld Brushes aside WMD Fears’, BBC (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3054423.stm, 25th April 2011).


http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3054423.stm


option that has the highest possible benefit at the lowest possible cost or risk can be seen

when applied to President Bush on Iraq.

However, the model can be criticised for its over-simplification when looked at in further

detail. The general criticisms of the model by foreign policy analysts allow further scrutiny

into whether the rational actor model is a reliable approach to use in foreign policy analysis.

The most common criticism that can be made is the reliability of information. Herbert

Simon’s notion of ‘bounded rationality’ is used by Allison to highlight the dangers of using

the rational actor model. He writes that in making a decision, the decision maker is in the

presence of ‘inescapable limitations of knowledge’ that hinder the ability to make an

absolute, rational decision.40 Along with this is the presence of immediate time constraints

that hinders the facility of making drawn out, calculated, rational decisions on foreign policy.

The attacks of 9/11 pressured Bush to see the United States as a clear and vulnerable threat

from foreign terrorist networks and thus with the information he had, he decided that pre-

emptively striking Iraq would protect the security interests of the United States. This is

important because my chosen study for this dissertation does not comment on whether the

threat of a possible attack from Iraq was plausible, but instead it focuses on whether the

decision to invade could be deemed as rational with the information it had at hand. The

information was clear to Bush; Firstly, Saddam Hussein had the capability of manufacturing

WMD’s, and had used them previously to attack an ethnic division of his country. Secondly,

with the advice of Rumsfeld, Bush was convinced that Saddam was involved in the 9/11

attacks and posed a clear and present danger to the national security of the US. 41 These two

major points provided his justification for the invasion, and ultimately the decision to choose

pre-emption over containment. However, the reliability of this information was what

40 Allison, Essence of Decision, 20.41 Karl K. Schonenberg, Constructing 21st Century U.S Foreign Policy: Identity, Ideology, and America’s World Role in a New Era (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 158.



eventually drained the limited support the invasion previously had. This can be seen in the

inaccurate information Bush received that Saddam Hussein had sought to buy yellow cake

uranium from Niger.42 This information had two functions. Firstly, it served as new

information to the President as it had not yet been seen by government intelligence. Secondly,

it was indicative as it signalled that Saddam Hussein was willingly seeking to develop WMD

and thus falsely gave Bush the justification to invade Iraq. Using this major caveat in

information, it is thus not possible to plausibly justify the decision to invade Iraq using the

features of the rational actor model as the evidence is littered with scenarios of confirmation

bias and cherry picking. Inevitably, President Bush was accused of ‘seeing what he wanted to

see’ as was already convinced that Iraq was linked to the 9/11 attacks and wanted absolute

proof to corroborate his case.

The additional problem of time constraints also pushed the U.S. to not wait for a second

resolution to be produced by the UNSC following Resolution 1441 that gave Saddam a final

warning to comply with its disarmament obligations. Thus, using Simon’s idea of ‘bounded

rationality’, it can be suggested that the decision to invade Iraq was not a ‘rational’ decision,

but one that was based on the ‘satisficing of foreign policy objectives’.43 This suggests that

the decision making process that took place before the invasion of Iraq did not require Bush

to weigh all options. Instead, it chose the most optimal solution that sounded reasonable or,

according to Breuning, ‘good enough’.44 As I will discuss in chapter three, the administration

had significant interests in invading Iraq, and this can be linked in this evaluation. The policy

of pre-emption to foster regime change in Iraq allowed the decision makers in the

administration to be selective in the way they viewed intelligence and sequentially discard

42 Janice Gross Stein, ‘Foreign Policy Decision Making: Rational, Psychological, and Neurological Models’ in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (Eds) Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008): 101-116.43 Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis, 62. 44 Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis, 62.



any options that did not meet their criteria, and ultimately, they chose the option that was

adequate to satisfy their political interests.

This final point is the key reason as to why it is not possible to accurately use the rational

actor model to illustrate the decision making process of invading Iraq. The oversimplified

rational actor model allows me to continue to seek for my answer in the more extensive

‘governmental politics’ model that I shall discuss in chapter three.



Chapter 3:

The Governmental Politics Model

What is the Governmental Politics model?

As discussed by Allison, the rational actor model assumes that government decisions are

rational, utility-maximising decisions that occur within specified restraints. However, Allison

also included an alternative model. This is known as the governmental (or bureaucratic)

politics model. Allison included this model in his work, Essence of Decision, in order to

‘provide a base for improved explanations and predictions’ on foreign policy decision-

making.45 The alternative model has tended to be less influential compared to the rational

45 Allison, Essence of Decision, 5.



actor model as foreign policy analysts have preferred to reduce the bureaucratic

complications of government to the much simpler explanation of decision-making by a single

actor.46 However, by looking at his justification of the alternative model of analysis, and

including the broader bureaucratic functions that operate and take place in foreign policy

decision-making, Allison therefore claims that his alternative model can explain foreign

policy decision making more effectively.

The single, fundamental element that can be used to describe the governmental politics model

is hierarchy. The governmental politics model focuses on the individual ‘leaders’ who are at

the top of their respective organisations. These leaders, according to the model, are ‘players’

in a competitive game of political bargaining, which sees negotiations on policy swing back

and forth before a final decision can be made. Allison refers to this swing as the ‘pulling and

hauling that is politics’.47 Welch asserts that the governmental politics model is used to allow

the scope of the model to be broader and more ambitious in its goals than the rational actor

model.48

A second method of emphasising the case made by the governmental politics model is that no

individual is in a position to decide issues alone. The power to influence decisions is shared

between the players, and it is this power that led the players to disagree on issues that arise

from foreign policy decision-making. This is clearly evident in the case of Iraq, as the leading

members of President Bush’s administration, who sit atop of vastly different government

institutions, were seen to have diverging views on the use of diplomatic sanctions and the use

of military force. Hastedt identifies the United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, as one

of the most important examples of this predicament. As the highest-ranking diplomat and

46 Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A paradigm and some Policy Implications’, World Politics 24 (1972): 40-79.47 Allison, Essence of Decision, 255.48 David A. Welch, ‘The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect’, International Security 17 (1992): 112-146.



head of the State Department, Powell is free to advise the President as he sees fit. Although

the Secretary of State should traditionally remain devoted to the use of diplomacy rather than

military force, they are also allowed to advise the President to go to war if it is required.

Despite eventually supporting the decision to invade Iraq, Powell’s position on how the

United States should invade ran counter to the firm opinion of the neo-conservative section of

the administration, composed of the military Chiefs of Staff in the Department of Defense.49

Powell’s position as a ‘dove among hawks’50 in the administration saw him become a victim

to a situation of ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’.51 This aphorism of foreign

policy decision-making suggests that the policy stance adopted by an individual in

government, will be determined by their position in the government bureaucracy.52

Thus the political bargaining process that takes place within the governmental politics model

is constrained by the organisational context within which policymakers represent and thus

operate. This influence, however, does not necessarily have to impact the power of the

President of the United States to make the final decision. This is why the President can be

seen as a unique ‘player’ in the government politics ‘game’ and this shall be looked into later

in this chapter.

In the next section, I shall incorporate the use of the governmental politics model into my

case study of Iraq. During the policy making procedure that preceded the invasion of Iraq,

there were tensions both public and private within the administration on whether to invade

Iraq. This should provide an important contribution into understanding the bureaucratic input

on U.S foreign policy.

49 Fraser Cameron, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff? (Oxon: Routledge, 2005): 160.50 Simon Jeffrey, ‘Powell: A Dove Among Hawks’ The Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/nov/15/usa.simonjeffery, 6th April 2011).51 Smith, Martin, U.S bureaucratic Politics. 92.52 Smith, US Bureaucratic Politics, 92.


http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/nov/15/usa.simonjeffery


Who were the key actors in the political bargaining process?

According to Allison, the players who are involved in the political bargaining process that

takes place during policy making represent a specific department or agency who have their

own interests to protect, but these interests are also used to impose on policy-making. 53 These

interests represent preferences that the players bring to the policy making table as options for

foreign policy. Therefore, the preferences that are related to these different organisations tend

to reflect a certain bias that favours one organisation and can come into conflict with the

recommendations of other groups. This can be linked back to the case of ‘where you stand

depends on where you sit’, that I touched upon in the previous section. In this chapter, I shall

mention the three main American state institutions that were responsible for coordinating

policy on Iraq, however, what is more important, are the main actors that sat atop of these

institutions, and how they as individuals affected policy making on Iraq.

The Department of State is the lead institution that is responsible for American foreign

policy. Its role is to advance the political goals and objectives that reflect the country’s

national interest. These goals and objectives are important factors that are adhered to for

conducting and implementing foreign policy.54 During the early administration, Colin Powell

was the United States Secretary of State. His tenure as Secretary of State ran from 21 st

January, 2001 to 26th January, 2005. Although, Powell, a moderate Republican, eventually

supported the administration’s decision to forcibly overthrow Saddam Hussein, he had

always favoured to have the support of the international community rather than to go in

alone.55

53 Allison, Essence of Decision, 298.54 ‘Duties of the Secretary of State’, U.S Department of State (http://www.state.gov/secretary/115194.htm, 6th April 2011).55 ‘Powell Seeks UN Support for Iraq Ultimatum’, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/sep/13/iraq1?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487, 1st April 2011).


http://www.state.gov/secretary/115194.htm


The Department of Defense (DoD) is the main body that is responsible for protecting and

maintaining the U.S. national security. The head of the institution is the Secretary of Defense,

which before and during the invasion of Iraq was Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld’s approach to

Iraq was different from that of the neo-conservatives, as his position was that the war in Iraq

was about demonstrating American power to the rest of the world. The war in Iraq was an

extension to America’s attack on those who threatened the United States dominancy. Khong

builds on this proposition as he claims that Rumsfeld’s eagerness for attacking Iraq was based

on deterrence and demonstration of American power, rather than morality, and thus his

position is different to the typical neo-conservative, who I shall discuss later in the chapter.56

However, his position in the administration is crucial as his position on Iraq coincided with

President Bush’s, which was the American capacity to use military force to remove Saddam

Hussein from power.57

The National Security Council (NSC) is the President’s principal forum for considering

foreign policy matters. The council advises and assists the President on national security and

foreign policy issues and is composed of senior national policy advisors and cabinet

officials.58 In September 2002, the NSC published the United States’ ‘National Security

Strategy’, the first since 9/11. It codified some of the policies that George Bush emphasised

in his speech he gave to a Joint Session of Congress as part of his ‘Bush Doctrine’ to fight

terrorism via the use of military pre-emption.59 Condoleezza Rice served as the National

Security Advisor from January 21st, 2001 to January 26th, 2005. As a proponent for the

invasion of Iraq, she publically refused to accept that Iraq had disbanded and disarmed its

nuclear, chemical and biological weapons technology as part of the UN’s Security Council

56 Khong, Neoconservatism and the Domestic sources of American Foreign Policy, 260.57 Martin Smith, U.S bureaucratic Politics and the Decision to Invade Iraq, 101.58 ‘National Security Council’ The White House Archives (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/, 6th April 2011).59 Anup Shah, ‘The Bush Doctrine of Pre-emptive Strikes; A Global Pax Americana’ Global Issues (http://www.globalissues.org/article/450/the-bush-doctrine-of-pre-emptive-strikes-a-global-pax-americana, 6th April 2011).


http://www.globalissues.org/article/450/the-bush-doctrine-of-pre-emptive-strikes-a-global-pax-americana

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/


resolution.60 According to Woodward, Rice realised the deep tensions and divisions between

Powell and Rumsfeld, and in doing so, she had a tremendous amount of personal influence on

President Bush and the foreign policy decision-making process.61

The final and most crucial aspect to the governmental politics model that I shall be analysing

is the role of the neo-conservatives. George Bush’s presidency from 2000 to 2008 has

predominantly been described by observers of foreign policy to be neo-conservative.62

Neoconservatism in the Bush Administration was not an institution like the DoD or State

Department, but was the dominant political ideology that was adhered to by certain members

who held positions of power within these institutions, particularly in the DoD and NSC.

Bush’s election and the immediate aftermath of 9/11 allowed a small group of radical

intellectuals that had been mostly marginalised in the 1990’s by former President Bill

Clinton, to formulate and produce American foreign policy in a post 9/11 world. The next

section to this dissertation will answer many of the questions on the neo-conservatives. Who

were they? What were their goals? What positions did they hold in the administration? How

influential were they in formulating policy? These questions will be answered in the next

section, and the public infighting between the neo-cons and the other departments of the Bush

administration will represent a strong case for the governmental politics model put forward

by Allison. The analysis of Neoconservatism as an ideology rather than an institution should

help justify my selection of the role of the neoconservatives in foreign policy decision-

making.

This section has identified the ‘players’ in the political bargaining process and allows a link

to be drawn to the governmental politics model as it identifies the players in the game, the

60 Condoleezza Rice, ‘Why we Know Iraq is Lying’, The New York Times (http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E01E5DF1E30F930A15752C0A9659C8B63, 6th April 2011).61 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004): 20.62 Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf Security, 31.


http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E01E5DF1E30F930A15752C0A9659C8B63


seats they held, the policies they pursued, and the impact they had on foreign policy. The

governmental politics model plays an important role in explaining the role of delegation by

Bush on Foreign Policy. Unlike his father, Bush had little foreign policy expertise, so it was

his prerogative to delegate and ask for advice from his principal advisors who were skilled in

the deliberative process of foreign policy.63

How well does the Governmental Politics Model explain the decision to invade Iraq?

I shall open this section by repeating what I discussed in Chapter two. The attacks that took

place on September 11, 2001, did not in themselves put Iraq on the US government’s foreign

policy agenda. To numerous members of the Bush administration, it was an embarrassment to

the United States that Saddam Hussein had remained in power after the first Gulf War, and

thus pushed President Bush to push for active regime change in Iraq. This again, was not a

new development, as during the Clinton administration, several members of the ‘Project for

New American Century’ (PNAC), a neo-conservative think-tank, had written an open letter to

President Clinton to enunciate a new strategy to protect U.S. interests and should aim to

remove Saddam Hussein from power by using diplomatic, political and military power to do

so.64 The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 had, according to PNAC,

proven that the use of containment in the form of sanctions against Iraq had eroded to the

point that it was insufficient to protect the United States from acts of terrorism by foreign

perpetrators. Several members of PNAC were appointed to key positions within the

administration including Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of Defense), Richard Armitage

63John P. Burke, ‘The Contemporary Presidency: Condoleezza Rice as NSC Advisor: A Case Study of the Honest Broker Role’ Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 (2005): 554-575.64Lloyd C. Gardner (ed.), The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy from the 1970’s to the Present (New York: The New Press, 2008): 108.



(Deputy Secretary of State), Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense) and Dick Cheney (Vice

President).

Thus, it is possible to provide the first link between decision making on Iraq and the

governmental politics model. In ‘Essence of Decision’, Allison underlined how the

government or group response to a problem would depend on the way the problem is

framed.65 Kingdon builds on this issue by describing such policymakers as ‘policy

entrepreneurs’ who are able to ‘…persuade decision making groups to pay attention to their

proposals by controlling the agenda of the group that is responsible for making the decision

and framing the problem in terms that make it look especially attractive or urgent’.66 Using

this concept, September 11, 2001 provided these individuals with the momentum to actively

seek to remove Saddam Hussein as part of the response to 9/11.67

As discussed briefly above, PNAC identifies its ideological roots with neo-conservatism.

According to Khong, there are four main tenets to neo-conservative foreign policy thought.

Firstly, it emphasises the moral necessity of distinguishing between the forces of ‘good’ and

‘evil’ in the international arena. This works by distinguishing between liberal democratic

regimes and tyrannical regimes and thus that morality should be tied to diplomacy. Secondly,

it stresses the importance of the maintenance of U.S. military predominance in the post-Cold

War world. To the neoconservatives, the United States should be able to enjoy both strategic

and ideological predominance as part of a ‘benevolent US hegemony’, which ‘fair minded’

nations would appreciate and happily live under.68 Thirdly, the United States should show a

greater willingness to use force to maintain its dominance and pursue its foreign policy goals.

Finally, its advocates share a deep distrust and scepticism of international law and the

65 Allison, Essence of Decision, 280.66 John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1995): 179-180.67 Martin Smith, U.S bureaucratic Politics and the Decision to Invade Iraq, 99.68 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’ Foreign Affairs 75 (1996): 18-32.



institutions that abide by them. This is because neoconservatives believe that they are too

weak and are unable to bring about peace and justice effectively. 69

Having firstly identified the link between the invasion of Iraq and Allison’s governmental

politics model, and secondly defined neo-conservatism, it is now possible to look for further

comparisons.

The second link that I shall discuss relates back to the main point put forward by Allison

when describing the governmental politics model. This is that government decisions are made

as a result of bureaucratic bargaining. According to Allison, government decisions are

formulated in part by the structure or apparatus of government that allows the political

leaders who sit atop of major political organisations to form a central circle of ‘players’ in the

foreign policy decision-making process. My interpretation of Allison’s claim here is that

these ‘organisations’ represent the different departments that come together to form the

legislative bodies of government administration. In the case of the United States, these

departments can be related to the Department of Defence, the Department of State, the

National Security Council and other smaller organisations. It is then possible to place the

leaders, which Allison refers to, at the top of these organisations. Donald Rumsfeld, as the

secretary of Defense, is the head of the Department of Defense. Colin Powell, as the

Secretary of State, is the head of the Department of State, and Condeleeza Rice, as National

Security Advisor, is the senior official of the National Security Council. It is also important to

include Vice President, Richard ‘Dick’ Cheney in this list as his influence on the President

was undeniable during the lead up to the invasion of Iraq.

However, what is more important, is what Allison refers to as the ‘bureaucratic bargaining’ of

decision making, and it is this point that Allison makes, which I shall now analyse in depth in

69 Khong, Neoconservatism and the Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, 252.



the form of a study of the decision making narrative that took place between the individual

departments. Although this section could be seen as too much a story-telling narrative, it

highlights the key discussions that took place between different sides of the administration

and how the interests of key actors affected negotiations on foreign policy. This together

helps to explicitly justify the choice I have made to look at Allison’s model and how it can be

applied to the decision to invade Iraq.

According to Mitchell and Massoud, the hierarchal system of government decision-making

‘...creates an environment that can lead to inter- and intra-bureaucratic conflict.’70 This can be

linked to what Allison meant by ‘bureaucratic bargaining’. This is that the decision to invade

Iraq was a result of competition and bureaucratic infighting between the different heads of

government departments that existed in the Bush administration. However, much of the

rationale for infighting can be identified by assessing the long standing policy positions that

these lead advisors maintained on Iraq. There were a number of key actors who were pushing

for war, notably Cheney and Rumsfeld, who were also signatories of the letter PNAC sent to

President Clinton. Both of these advisors had personal misgivings about Iraq as a security

threat to the United States. According to Zunes, Cheney’s commitment to regime change in

Iraq could be described as ‘a disquieting obsession’.71 There were also other prominent

neoconservatives who supported regime change in Iraq, and were later given key positions in

the Bush administration. The general consensus between these actors was to deter any

possibility of a threat to the pre-eminent position of the United States. The September 11 th

attacks changed the neoconservative’s perception of terrorism and saw it become, according

to Wright, a readily identifiable threat which was capable of striking against them within the

United States.72 However, the neoconservatives and other advocates of Iraq faced vigorous 70 David Mitchell and Tansa George Massoud, ‘Anatomy of Failure: Bush’s Decision-making Process and the Iraq War’ Foreign Policy Analysis 5 (2009): 265-286.71 Stephen Zunes, ‘The United States: Belligerent Hegemon’ in Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006): 21-47.72 Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf Security, 34.



opposition from Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and slightly less so from Deputy Secretary

of State, Richard Armitage. Powell and Armitage were both regarded as moderates in the

Bush administration. Despite agreeing with Cheney, Rumsfeld and other neoconservatives in

the administration that the US should maintain its qualitative military supremacy, they

strayed away from neoconservative ideology on the use of multilateralism in maintaining that

supremacy.73 Whilst the neoconservative philosophy tended to favour unilateralism and

‘going in alone’ on international problems, Powell and Armitage saw value in the use of

multilateralism and working with the international community on problems of international

concern. Furthermore, both disagreed on the use of ideology on foreign policy. This position

put them in direct conflict with the neoconservatives, especially Condoleezza Rice and Paul

Wolfowitz.

The first such bureaucratic infighting that took place on Iraq occurred 24 hours after 9/11 and

catalysed the growing rift in policy making between the State Department and the DoD. The

infighting that took place was in regards to the American response to the attacks. Whilst

much of the focus was on Al Qaeda, Rumsfeld mentioned the possibility of invading Iraq,

which was met with disapproval by Powell. Powell’s position on a response was focused

more on what kind of reaction the American public would approve of. According to Powell,

the public were concerned with Al Qaeda, not Iraq.74 This intensified further when Powell

responded to an implicit comment made by Wolfowitz on regime change. Wolfowitz

believed that an American response should be about ‘ending states who sponsor terrorism’.75

Powell, however, disagreed with Wolfowitz and was more concerned with ‘just ending

terrorism’, and that an attack on Iraq could irreparably harm the coalition that the US had

with its allies after 9/11.76 The internal dispute continued between the State and Defense

73 Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf Security, 34.74 Halper and Clarke, America Alone. 149.75 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003): 52.76 Woodward, Bush at War, 52.



Department on the scope and breadth of the campaign. There were two different positions

held by Wolfowitz and Powell. Wolfowitz wanted to pursue a range of military targets, which

after the scale of the 9/11 attacks, could seem politically feasible to the American public. On

the other hand, Powell wanted to continue to utilize the proper diplomatic initiatives that

were available in the form of political and financial sanctions. However, Powell eventually

agreed on the use of military force in Iraq, but that the use of force should remain

limited.77This bureaucratic negotiation on policy decision-making can be linked back to

Allison’s governmental politics model. In Essence of Decision, Allison writes:

‘Because their preferences and beliefs are related to the different organisations they

represent, their analyses yield conflicting recommendations. Separate responsibilities laid on

the shoulders of distinct individuals encourage differences in what each sees and judges to be

important’.78

As I discussed earlier in this chapter, Allison notes that the ‘pulling and hauling’ of the

political bargaining process that takes place within the governmental politics model is

constrained by the organisational context within which policymakers represent and thus

operate. Both Powell and Wolfowitz were faced with departmental constraints that made each

of the two policy advisors stand firm on their beliefs on Iraq by putting forward

recommendations that came in direct conflict with one another. These departmental

constraints can be seen in the Defense Department, where Wolfowitz worked under Secretary

of Defense Rumsfeld, a strict supporter for the invasion of Iraq, and a fellow signatory of

PNAC’s letter to President Clinton.

On the other hand, Condoleezza Rice remained as the ‘honest broker’ between the two

departments and did not face the same organisational constraints that Powell and Wolfowitz

77 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 151.78 Allison, Essence of Decision, 256.



endured.79 Rice’s role was to scrutinize the strategic options of conducting war and, according

to Burke, provide ‘brokerage’ between Bush and Powell. Rice was held in high regard by

Bush, and was even given the role of notifying Powell that a decision had been made to go to

war with Iraq.80 The personal relationship Rice shared with Bush was not the same for Powell

and Bush. Woodward claims that Rice was the only close advisor who Bush personally

questioned on whether the U.S should go to war with Iraq.81 As National Security Advisor,

Rice was successful in her role by being able to influence and broker the relationship between

the State and Defence Department’s. However, what is more important is that her success

was attributed to the personal relationship she shared with Bush. This had a profound impact

on U.S. foreign policy in Iraq.

Furthermore, the bureaucratic infighting that took place later in the meetings on war in Iraq

continued over the issue of tactics on invasion. This was whether the US should favour

unilateralism or multilateralism. A multilateral effort would see the war in Iraq as legitimate

by the United Nations. The bureaucratic negotiations that took place would give victory to

Powell and the State Department as President Bush agreed that the US would use the UN

General Assembly Plenary session in the autumn of 2002 as the forum to make the case for

the removal of Saddam Hussein.82 The result of bureaucratic bargaining in Washington led to

the UNSC, in November 2002, to vote to implement the Security Council Resolution 1441

that offered Iraq under Saddam Hussein “...a final opportunity to comply with its

disarmament obligations” that has been set out in previous resolutions.83

79 Burke, The Contemporary Presidency, 555.80 Burke, The Contemporary Presidency, 561.81 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 151.82 John Davis, ‘Infighting in Washington: The Impact of Bureaucratic Politics on US Iraq Policy’, in John Davis Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War: From Forty One to Forty Three (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2006): 92-122.83 “Resolution 1441 (2002) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th Meeting, on 8 November 2002” United Nations Security Council (http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dda0f634.html, 19th April 2011).


http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dda0f634.html


Allison’s ‘basic unit of analysis’ of the governmental politics model is that “the decisions and

actions of governments...are not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from

compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal

influence...”.84 Much of this chapter has already explained the different interests of the actors

involved in the decision making process to invade Iraq, however, this next section will

analyse the unequal influence of the neoconservatives on the decision to invade Iraq, and the

increased marginalisation of Colin Powell and the Department of State.

On the use of military force in Iraq, Draper claims that Rumsfeld was able to appeal, in a way

that Powell was not able to, and used his relationship with Dick Cheney to win President

Bush’s approval to invade Iraq.85 Draper continues his assertion of Powell’s lesser influence

on the President by claiming that his favoured option of “careful, measured, diplomacy, on

subtlety and process rather than radical change” placed him as a ‘dove among hawks’ when it

came to the policy making table.86 By this, he meant that Powell’s position for continued

diplomacy towards Iraq had already put him on an unequal footing with Bush and the

neoconservatives who surrounded him on the policy making table. Furthermore, as Secretary

of State, Powell was expected to involve the United Nations as part of the American tactical

strategy to gather diplomatic support for the effort against Iraq. This further stems the issue

that Powell was a victim of ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’. As Secretary of

State, it was expected that that someone who held this position would advocate for

international support. Smith explains that Powell’s position as Secretary of State put him in

an unfavourable situation as the State Department had a long standing organisational

disadvantage during times of national crisis.87 In addition to this point, where Powell sat in

the administration, especially amongst characters such as Cheney and Rice, affected his

84 Allison, Essence of Decision, 294, 295.85 Schonberg, Constructing 21st Century U.S Foreign Policy, 193.86 Schonberg, Constructing 21st Century U.S Foreign Policy, 193.87 Smith, U.S bureaucratic Politics and the Decision to Invade Iraq, 101.



process of gathering international support as they felt that involving the United Nations

would lead a ‘never-ending process of debate, compromise and delay’.88 However, these

compromises that were made in meetings between the different sides of the administration

would come to an agreement, as the neoconservatives understood that international

legitimacy would still need to be required.

Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to draw comparisons between Allison’s

governmental politics model and the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq in March

2003. I have addressed the key issues without any major form of criticism as all of these

points are relevant and can be compared to points made by Allison. The next section will

look at criticisms of the model and what areas of analysis are left out when looking at foreign

policy decision-making.

Does the model undermine the role of the President?

As seen from the account I have given about the decision making process that took place

preceding the invasion of Iraq, much of the detail has tended to focus on the different actors

who represented respective departments of government. Although this was accurate in the

case of Iraq, this example, as well as the wider use of the governmental politics model tends

to underestimate the power and role of the President. This underestimation, according to

White and Clarke, is in the form of mistakenly placing the President as ‘one player amongst

many’.89Although the model addresses the importance and relevance of the bureaucratic

procedures that take place in policy making, the model fails to recognise the President as a

unique player in the political bargaining ‘game’. The unique character of the President is his

88 Steven Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf Security, 173.89 Clarke and White, An Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis, 80.



responsibility to make the final decision or choice on policy, and is a feature that is constantly

overlooked by Allison.

This can be seen in President Bush. Allison’s model states that the different actors involved

in policymaking all have interests that are being imposed on foreign policy. However, what is

left out is what interests the President may also have in conducting a certain policy measure.

In this context, it was clear that Bush, unlike his predecessors, was interested in and receptive

to the idea of removing Saddam Hussein from power by using military force.90 His own

personal ambition of removing Saddam Hussein gave encouragement to his advisors –

especially the neoconservative partnership of Cheney and Rumsfeld – to impose their case.

His position gave a starting advantage to the neoconservatives and a strong disadvantage to

representatives of the State Department, notably Powell.

Secondly, the power of the President also rests on his ability to appoint and dismiss the

positions of those who are close to him. As I discussed earlier in the chapter, as President,

Bush appointed 8 of the 18 (Founder’s William Kristol and Robert Kagan plus 16 other

signatories) to key positions in his administration. Although not all of these positions were

filled by neoconservatives, namely Rumsfeld and Cheney, they all shared the same position

on regime change in Iraq.91 However, fellow neoconservative’s, Elliot Abrams, John Bolton,

joined Wolfowitz and Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, in becoming key advisor’s to Bush. Therefore,

Bush can be seen as being directly responsible for the ascension of the neoconservative

ideology on foreign policy.

Looking further into Bush’s personal apprehension towards Iraq, the model also

underestimates the function of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ on U.S. Foreign Policy. This takes the

mistake of placing the President as ‘one amongst many’ further, and describes the various

90 Smith, U.S bureaucratic Politics and the Decision to Invade Iraq, 100, 101.91Khong , Neoconservatism and the Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, 258.



attributes Bush imposed on U.S. Foreign Policy. The ‘Bush Doctrine’ shifted the

administration’s rhetoric towards war by rejecting containment as the traditional strategy of

defence and placed the use of pre-emption, as discussed in chapter two, at the heart of

American national defence policy.92 The threat of using pre-emption as a strategy of defence

could be seen particularly in the ‘National Security Strategy’ of 2002, where Bush warned

that the U.S. would ‘if necessary, act pre-emptively...to forestall or prevent hostile acts by our

adversaries’.93 The National Security Strategy also pinpointed Bush’s hostility towards

international multilateral institutions when it came to protecting U.S. national security:

‘While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international

community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense

by acting pre-emptively against … terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our

people and our country.”94

The rhetoric used in the statement suggests that although Bush was an advocate for the use of

multilateral institutions on other international concerns, he did not think they were suitable in

protecting U.S security interests. This belief mirrored the opinion of advisor’s that were key

to policy-making on Iraq.

What are the criticisms of the model when applied to Iraq?

As I have mentioned throughout this chapter, it is not possible to downplay the role of

bureaucracy in foreign policy. Despite the tendency to underestimate the role of the President

in decision making, there are many comparisons that can be made by foreign policy analysts

92 Gardner, Long Road to Baghdad, 141.93 Patricia L. Dunmire, ‘9/11 Changed Everything: An Intertextual analysis of the Bush Doctrine’, Discourse and Society 20 (2009): 195-222.94 Mark Gerard Mantho, ‘The Bush Doctrine: Origins, Evolution, Alternative’ Commonwealth Institute (http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0404mantho.pdf, 26th April 2011).


http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0404mantho.pdf


on the link between the decision to invade Iraq and Allison’s governmental politics model.

However, there are a few criticisms that can identified, and like the rational actor model,

these are criticisms that reflect the wider use of the governmental politics model, not just on

Iraq, but on other examples of foreign policy decision making.

The first criticism I shall make is to challenge Allison’s aphorism on ‘where you stand

depends on where you sit’. Although this may be accurate when evaluating Powell’s position

as Secretary of State and Rumsfeld’s position as Secretary of Defence, it is not applicable to

Rice’s position as National Security Advisor. The close personal relationship that Rice shared

with Bush, along with her role as the ‘honest broker’ between the two departments was not

defined by her position in the government bureaucracy, but instead, by her personal

association with Bush. This can be interpreted as claiming that where you stand, does not

necessarily depend on where you sit. The wider criticism of the aphorism by critics such as

Krasner argue that Allison’s motto exaggerates the importance of this one factor over other

equally important concerns such as personality and ideology.95

The second criticism of the model I have identified whilst writing this chapter is the tendency

to revert to a story-telling narrative on the bureaucratic conflict that took place between

Bush’s advisors. Allison himself admits that in order to be an effective model of empirical

foreign policy analysis, the model requires vast sources of documents and information that, as

a side effect, can render the model as overwhelming to the analyst.96 Much of the chapter

focused on the numerous discussions between the higher level ‘leaders’ of the U.S.

government’s departments and thus, it is difficult to efficiently illustrate how the different

leaders interests and policy positions affected foreign policy without regressing into a tedious

95 S. Krasner, ‘Are Bureaucracies Important?’ Foreign Policy 7 (1972): 159-179.96 Graham Allison, ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’ The American Political Science Review 63 (1969): 689-718.



narrative. This also limits the use of statistical analysis that would be used when using a

rational actor model of decision-making.

The final criticism can be linked back to the above section on the underestimation of the

President’s role in the formulation of policy. Although I have discussed the undeniable role

bureaucracy plays in foreign policy formulation, Allison makes a categorical mistake by not

including the powerful position of the President in his analysis. By placing him as ‘one

amongst many’, one cannot argue the powers that are given to the President to appoint and

dismiss policy position’s according to Bush’s personal opposition to Iraq, as one of the major

influences to policy formulation. Although Allison focuses on the ‘policy entrepreneurs’ who

make policy, he overlooks the President’s part in placing these ‘policy entrepreneurs’ in his

powerful positions and in doing so, overlooks Bush’s role in employing the numerous

neoconservative members to his administration. However, as the previous section

acknowledged, in my opinion, it would be difficult to incorporate this criticism as a critical

factor in disassociating the model with the case of Iraq.



Conclusion

The purpose of this dissertation is to explain the Bush administration’s decision to invade

Iraq using a selected field of foreign policy analysis to help me do so. In the introduction I

made the point that there had been little effective use Allison’s policy models on the decision

to invade Iraq. I have attempted to address this concern in this dissertation by applying his

models to my analysis of U.S. foreign policy on Iraq.

The different chapters I have written on assesses firstly, whether the decision by made my

Bush, as a unitary actor, to invade Iraq was rational according to the information that was

available, and secondly whether the decision was a product of bureaucratic bargaining made

by multiple influences on policy in his administration.

In my chapters, I found many similarities that can be associated between Allison’s model and

the U.S. government’s decision to invade Iraq. I was able to conclude the second chapter to



my dissertation by suggesting that attacking Iraq pre-emptively was a result of what Herbert

Simon refers to as the ‘satisficing’ of foreign policy objectives. This discards whether the

decision to invade Iraq was rational as the choice was made using false and unreliable

information and can more accurately be explained using Simon’s notion of ‘bounded

rationality’ (refer to page 20).

In the third chapter, I was also able to find numerous comparisons to Allison’s governmental

politics model by assessing the undeniable role of the State and Defense Department on

foreign policy decision making. The ‘bureaucratic bargaining’, which Allison refers to as the

‘pulling and hauling that is politics’, could be seen when examining the bureaucratic conflict

that took place firstly between Colin Powell and Paul Wolfowitz, and secondly between

Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld. This bureaucratic conflict was a result of each of the

policy advisors acting in the role of ‘players’ who sat atop their different departments in

government. Although I concluded the model with a criticism of Allison’s negligence on the

unique role of the President, I attempted to offset this mistake by Allison, by illustrating that

this criticism was a recurring problem of the policy model, and because of the incontestable

role of bureaucrats in the Bush administration, it did not have as much influence on

discarding the model as inaccurate to explain the decision to invade Iraq.

Additionally I made criticisms that focused on the over-simplification of the rational actor

model compared to the narrative nature of the governmental politics model. The

parsimonious approach of the rational actor model that I discovered helps to explain why

Allison chose to have the rational actor model as the first model of analysis before producing

the alternative governmental politics model. However, I also questioned the abstract and

general nature of the rational actor model compared to the historically contextual

governmental politics model as an approach of analysing the decision to invade Iraq. This is



because despite having to tediously recount the discussions that took place in the government

bureaucracy, it allowed me to separate the interests and preferences of different individuals in

the administration rather than assuming that these were reflected by one, unitary position as

assumed by the rational actor model. After conducting research on the decision making

process that preceded the invasion, I found it difficult to agree with Allison’s assumption of

the rational actor model that assumes that there is one set of interests, preferences and

estimates that reflects the entire U.S government, and identifies the President as the ‘rational

actor’.

This dissertation has provided one contribution to a fairly broad case study by using two

reasonably straight-forward models of analysis. However, if I were able to retake this

assignment, I would have hoped to have been able to integrate Allison’s third model on the

‘organizational behaviour’ paradigm. In chapter one, I addressed the issue of not being to

incorporate the model due to the lack of available data and information. This could affect the

neutrality of my dissertation as an additional model could have helped widen the scope of my

study, rather than focus on just two models.

Discovering differences between the interests and perceptions of policy advisors in the U.S.

government is important as it has the propensity to challenge the public perception that the

decision to invade Iraq was one that was supported by the entirety of the administration. As a

consequence, my dissertation on U.S foreign policy in Iraq has provided me with a better

understanding of the bureaucratic and diverging processes that take place in foreign policy

decision-making rather than the abstract observation I had preceding this study. By using

Allison’s models, I have made an attempt to explain the relevance of foreign policy analysis

on decision-making and U.S. foreign policy. In completing this dissertation, I can confidently

state that there is an unquestionable significance in the academic discipline of foreign policy



analysis on the influences and factors that affect foreign policy decision making. However,

there is still an opportunity to explain this link further by the wider use of Allison’s models in

the academic literature of U.S. foreign policy in Iraq.

Word Count (excluding abstract, references and bibliography: 13,939 (including 5%

department limit)

Bibliography

Front cover picture

Bush: http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/01239/george-bush_1239113c.jpg

Meeting: http://www.hdtvideo.de/img/Bush-Wolfowitz.jpg

Air strike: http://warpost.blogsome.com/wp-admin/images/aaaa.75.jpg

Essence of Decision: http://vig-fp.prenhall.com/bigcovers/0321013492.jpg

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Dissertation in Politics - US Foreign Policy Decision Making in Iraq

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