Dissemination of Combat Information 25 January 1952

8/3/2019 Dissemination of Combat Information 25 January 1952

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CHI1.F OF.. '

ARMY FIELD FORCESV i r ~ i n i a

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25 January 1952S()'E.JiCT: Dissemination of Combat I n f O r ' t 1 J , ~ - -_._. .,,' . : : ; : ~ :

!J Pt::?:," ,', < ':IC:'!, - - ' " ' \i :.' _ ...FEa 1TO: See :dls t r ibut i on

.1 . In aocordance with SR 5 2 5 - 8 5 - 5 ~ ? r o c e s s i ~ of Ccmbat Infermation, the attached }!,XTBACTS are forwarded to De::'Jartment ::;f the Army,Army Field Forces and th e Service Schoels fo r evalu2.tir;n and necessaryact ion. I t may be ~ ) ~ r o p r i a t e , in cer ta in cases, fer these agenciesto take action. u:pcn a s i ~ l e extracted item; in others , it may bedesirable to develo:p a cress-sect ion of accuTnulated extracts en apar ' t icular subj ect befr:re in i t ia tine; action; and ef ten, the extractedi tem.serves.te,reaff irJI l cur doctrines an d techniques.

2. Copiesef Dissemination Combat Information are forwarded,wi t h Department of the .Army a p - ~ . r o v a l t to information ad0.ressees fcr useat th.e headquarters cf the ins ta l la t icn or ac t iv i t J concerned to keepthem, infor:ned c c n c e r n i n ~ theatre ~ ) r o b l e m s frc:m f ront l ine thr-:.ugh th el o ~ " i s t i c a l mmand

. 3. Tllese E j S R . A C ~ S are derived from re: /)r ts w:lich are class i f iedS E C a E ~ . For the breater convenience of the user , this Office dcwUbradeseach extracted item to the lowest class i f icat icn c o m p ~ t i b l e with securi ty_Uo effor t 1-5 made tc paraphrase or delete an y pl;)rti"n of the extractedremarks, so that none of the oriGinal intent is los t .

4. Generally, the E ~ ~ T R A C T S which perta in to t ra ining appear underthe class i f icat ion of R E S T R I C ~ E D . For combat inforillation of trainingTalue a t the CcmpaIl-Battery level , adclressees are referred to ArmyField Forces TR!'.I1HNG- BULLETIilS, which are also published under theclass i f icat ion of R E S T R I C T ~ D .

FOil. THb. CHIEF Oi' .ARlVJY l!'1LLD FORCES:c'

A ~ ~ ;///AJ ;lv7J l!1'tlftl1 1ncl W. H. ORNExtracts from sources Lt Col, AGC229 thru 249' ABet .Ad jut.ant GeneralDISTRIBUTI01.: 1 C,1Copy No__________' ~ _ ~ _ ..__Over) ,--.UNCLASSIFIED s sIiiWerq'_ f 'f 'U"R 'StM' ' ( 'C.


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UNClASSIFIEQr 51 : t : t ! 4 ~ { 1 v 1 O 2DIS'mIS'OTIbN t,I Action Addressees

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~ r t m e n t . . . at the. Arroz, 1-:0 ' 3 ACOFSi Q.-.l' , .4- ' 6 ACOFS, G-27- 21 AeOiS,22- 41 ACOFS. "",,4 42- 51 CCMLQ 52- 61 C O F E N ~ R S 62- 71 COl!'ORl>' 72 CCFrSYWAR.73- 82, 0"5100:, ,83" 92 "COFT, 9.3- 94 Chief of '}.tlli"rerY H1st02:"Y95-104 ", , ' . '

105-114 TSG,':'115-116 TAG" 'Office, Chief of !-I'ml ~ i e l d FC,rcesl iT Deput' Chief of Staff 118 Gl ' 119 'G2" 120-130 Gj(4)

131-132 G4133-137" RD138 Chemical ,,139 ,Engineer 140 ' Medical, 14.1: ',Ordnance 142 ~ a r t e ~ m a s t e r ,143 ; /, Signal 144,' T r a n s ~ o r t a t 1 c n 145 Adjutant General 146 Budget'& 'Fiscal 141' Chaplain 148 Inro'rmation: 149' Frovost Marshal , C o ~ m a n d a n t s , 150-152 ' J.rmy War 'College153-154 Command & General Staff Ccllee155-156 The Armored School157-158 The ARtillery Schocl159-160 The Infantry 'School161-162 ArID1 General Scheol163-164 Asst Comdt. The Art School. A } ~ G M ~ r Presidents165 ." AF]' Board No 1166 ArF Board No 2167 An' ' ~ o a r d N o 3168 AFF ~ o a r d No 4169 CO, Ui Arctic Test ~ r a n c h '

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IJNClASSIFIED h , ~ t Z i t W l i L SOU"TY 'Nm?!' e


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2. : : r : : ; : :ASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIEDATTNG-64 350.05/38(DOCr)(c)(25 Ja n 52) 25 January 1952SUbject: D1.ssem.1.natian of Combat InformationDlam:t:BUTION: Information Addresseescopy No170-179 CDIC, Europea." Ccmd'180-189 CG, Trj.6ste US 'J.'Toops190-199 C0t", US Forces in Austria200-209 CDIC, Far East210-219 ca, us AY!'lY, Alaska220-229 qG, .YS. f'-:1'"llly, Pacif ic230-239 es.)' us- Ai7JIY, Ca.ribbeW

O f f ~ ' ? ~ E ~ ~ ~ ! " . . . 2 1 . ~ ~ ~ .. ! . . ~ e 1 d Forces 240-243 Inspector Secretar ia t 244.263 8-3 (64)2S4 A'} Eecords265-274 E ~ t r a Cories

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U l ~ t ; L A S S I F '

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- . . , . - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -a s the usu3,l pa t tern in th is terr.ain, otherwise IT.lUch of t h ~ f i re i swasted.. However, ar t i l le ry f i r ~ patterns must be varied , i f maximumc ~ s u a l t i e s 3 r e to be inf l icted on the e n e r . ~ . 01ack periods offriendly arti11ery f ire usual ly occurred a t meal t imes, jus t af terdark, Imd before d,q'.mj consequently the enemy moved 'iround a t thesetimes, '1ffording us a ~ o ? d . ~ I f . c ~ to , cfl,tch him in the ClpenlODifficulty was experienced in accurR.cy of f i r i n ~ when regis tra t ionswere made the da y before an at tack, I t follows that Rrt i l leryshould be registered, p r e f e ~ a b l y by individu.al battery , o n . t h e ~ d a y of .the attack. Aside from loss in a ccur;;wy , prematl,l,r'8 registra t ionha senem"telegraphed, the pmch " on s e ' l e r : ~ l occ:J.sionsa,pd allowedy to reinforce h is positi 'ons O , (H,'S'lRIC1'::D)

*.* '*, '* * '* *. * * ..the,,'t.

; , \ ,.Terrain has usually dictated how Glosely 9ss:lul t ,31ements ..crm

f o l l o ~ ' r ar t i l lery ' f i res . In some inst-:mces troops have followedar t i l le ry ,fire by on e hundred yards; in others , where vert icaldistance was involved, troops followed the f ire by many times thisdistance. Precipi tollS , : t ~ r r : ~ i p I . . g E 1 E F , ~ ; l l y prohibits c10se follow-upof supporting a.r t i l lery . ;:Jhexe th is happens troops may mo ','e underthe cover of .an a i r str i"e , , :or under recoil less 3:nd a u t o f ! 1 ~ t i c weqponsf i re . ( R . t ~ T R I C T : : i , D ) . '

* * *,-. * .... '* .. * *.The ; ."'sudcessful n i : : ~ t a : , t ~ a c k has, c':)rtain r e ' l U ~ r ; 8 m e n ' t ~ : (1) a

simple plan; (2) a sing1e objective; a n ~ (3) .a thorough reconnaissance. Gr'eatest succes's wasexperienc-o'o wnere men ~ N . t ; ' . . . r e mentallyconditioned. Tr.is condi t i o n i n ~ WflS ::lchie'fed:ts a by-product ofmaking d e - t a H e c l ' - p r ~ p a r ' ~ t ions for the 3.tt!'lck. Orders should be received a t leas t ' the night before and pref")rably several days beforethe attack. In one inst:tnce, to ;;J,id control , the route W-"lS m8.rkedby 1uminous markers plCiced by patrols pr ior to the a ttack., Thisproved highly successfu1. In other cases the attacking forces usedthe well-known technir:ue' of 1Ile.qring ":hite arm ba'1ds for easy iden t if ica t ion. Streams, r idge l ines and other fe a tures ,'rhich ''fere readilydistinguishab1e werp. selected as phase l ines . The forfl1ation usedwas invariablY,the f i le . ~ e c a u s e 1acj< of observ2tion reduced s-"lfetyto our OllJn troops and because it in ,101ved s-"lcrificing surprise ,

UNCLASSIFIEDForm No

15 Oct 51
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preparatory fires' were usu,3:11y not used on ni",ht attacks. It wasfound tha t the best timed attacks were those which placed friendlyforces on the objective jus t a t dawn, thus eliminating the oPIX'rtunity for the enemy to regroup under cover of darkness for a COllil terattack. The usual means of col!l!imnication was radio. It was agreedthat some l ight i s p r c ' O f ( ~ r a b l e to conplete darkno,ssj when there was nomoon indirect searchl ight illumirl'1tion was used. The use of f laresin a night attack i s not recommended as the enemy uses them extensively an d confusion results . (RSJ'l'RICTW)

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Generally, the w e ~ I X ' n s used in reduction of bunkers dependlargely on the type of construction of the for t i f ica t ion and theavai labi l i ty of the desired weapon. aecoil less r i f les were foundto be quite effective aga:inst bunkers carved out of rock. Handgreesdes, r i f l e grenades, and phosphorous grenades were part icular lyeffect ive against log bunkers. The flame thrower has a greatpsychological effect on the enemy, but bulk and weight of thisweapon make it unwieldy for use in steep t er ra in . The 105-mm andISS-mm Howitzers ::tnG five hundred (SOO) pound aerial bombs provedto be very effective. Counter to experience in the ~ u r o p e a n campaign,the enemy did not relinquish adjacent posi t icns when it bec3.'1letac t ica l ly disadvantageous to renain. Pre-plannin' the reduction ofbunkers paid dividends. I t assured te.amwork rather than relyingsolely on the spontaneous :inspiration of the individual. Where timepermits, rehearsals prior to the attack are believed to be highlYbeneficial. (R1!SI'RICTED)

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The ma:in problem in organization of defensive positions wasone of log is t ical support. Sectors of f i re were properly designated.'iUre was usually placed a t night and instal led correctly, employingprotective f i re . Range cards and aiming stakes were used, though!l(\t as extE"nsivley as they should be. li.ange cards for al-mm MortarsVlere affixed to the mortar tubes so th l t planned concentrationscould be fired.. Close supervision 'tras needed in clearing fieldsof f i re and in building for t i f icat ions. Al though communicationswere normally adequate, a signal plan for the use of pyrotechnics

3UNClASS\F1ED JW;TZflh,..Form No 73 IMIN(.Reviaed 15 Oct 51)


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should be established in case of emergency_ ThG f i re power of the....-16 materially aided the Infantry in defemi"e roles and provedto be very satisfactory whenever the 1'-16's 1vere suitably located.Tanks were best eiilployed on the defense by assigning t.he..-n a v!l.devalley. Tank f ir ing s:1ould have been r e s t r i c t B l ~ to direct f i remissions, as inclil-ect f ir ing proved u..rlsatisfactory. Contdct pointsshoul.'. have been designgted by higher headquarters rac.ner thanallo,Ting units concerned to pick t h ~ m . Improved minefield doctrineand proper repcrting and plotting' of mine instal la t ions shouldmaterially reduce friendly casualties. I t was recoJil.mended thatname. throwers be instal.led in defensive positions in the future toreduce an assnul t on the position. (R2STRIC.l'Il:D)

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Broad missions should be assigned, leaving detai ls of thepatrols to the uni t given the mission. If ' the intent i s to occupythe ground patrolled and if ' no enemy are on the posi t ion, thepatrol should be reinforced' quickly by enough persol'L.'191 t o defendadequately. 'i'he enenw 'will quite often move in a n d " o c ~ u p y an areawhich has b8en patrolled but not occupied by f r i , ~ n d l y forces Simplyb0cause he realizes it i s i ~ p o r t a n t to us. Patrols repeated tothe sarna location or over t h e s a i . ~ e route very qUiel:ly resul t in'lmbu31.es", Night patrol missions should be' assigned at leas t twentyfoUl" (24) hours in advance if planning i s to resul t . (RS:>TRlcrED)

SOURCE: Cornrr."'.nd Report - loth 'mgr C EnDATE: February 1951 ~ o u r c e No, 230------.....-------------------------------_ ............_

dIGNALThe sbortA.ge of tclephone wire and the short range of the presentradios with which the battalion is no"" e!,..lipped present problemsin communications. This battalion recommends that radios withlonger range be added to the i:ngineer T / O & ~ . ( C O N } i ' I D , j ~ T I A L )

UNCLASSIFIED6fiitifii .'OCAFF Form No '71'\ eartEria; 1Mm ytW( j l . e ' r i ~ d 15 Oct 5
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S O U R C ~ ~ : Com:;J'lnd 1l.eport - 2d :Jiv fu-tykay 1951 Source No. 231

ATTACHiJ:!NT OF ,ji:ARCE!.I3RT UNITSBatt lef ield i l l u m i n ~ t i o n with s e ~ r c h l i ; l , h t s continued during; ay with considerable success in a l l except the "Torst wea ther condit ions. I t i s recommended that ei ther platoon of s8archliq,htsbe made organic to Division ~ r t i l l e r y or th- t &'1 iPFSineer:.i3arci1

l igh t Conpany be att3ched to the Corps ~ r t i l l ' ~ r : , - . ( C O ) ' J F I D ~ ' T T . l : \ L ) * * * * * ~ ~ * ~ . * *

, ~ , P L O Y L - : ' , l \ r T OT' r ' i ~ i l l I U : .. _ A)!) H -;',VY .1TIL.:... HYAV:lilabili ty of Ion!?, range h'3avy ar tHler : - provided c;reatlydesired and needed d:=pth to th,") batt lef i .eld, both on th3 offenseand the defens8. 'I'o some e1.:tent the employ:.ent of heavy ar t i l le rycOi:J.pensated for the i n a d t 3 Q u , ~ t e r O ~ 2 d n , ~ t of KOR;;.b.. I t ''!as necess,')ry,

however, due to the l i rd t,9d amount avai lable 'mJ the s t i l l re la t ivelybroad Division an d Corps f ronts , to 811'ploy rnedium a r t i l l ':ry infor1."rard areas, in ODe caSe in front of the iLrf'antry, to cover daytimeP;'l t ro1 s. ..: Hl. ' .L ',,1 ....... ) CO''QTD ' ' ' ' ' 'I .L'

30TJRC3: Comrr.and tteport - 187th j.bn RCT - [


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COrm:l-3nd Report - 3d En - l87th Abn ReT;..,:ay 1951 Source : ~ o . 233HIGH GROillm

Il.ction on th i s Q3.te indicated clearly that lll1its must investigatea l l high terrain fa?t;.lres v.'ithin their assigned:ireas. I f th is typeterra in is bypassed co::'pletely on 3.pprooch to fin:-ll obj0ctive, ther


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Recommend that in a Task Force of th is t:y"pe, a l l ar t i l lery-beeliminated from the Covering Force and SP a r t i l l e ry be used as par tof the Advance Guard. Tank f i re can be used fo r direct f i r2 withthe Covering Force. From. the posit ion in t h ~ column witi1 theAdvance Guard, the a r t i l l e ry wil l be free fron e..'1emy small arms f i re .Util iz ing .:if' gWls J they ca n go quickly in to acticn and furnishmaximum arti l lery_ support to the Covering Force yrith a minimum ofdelay, par t icular ly i f the COvering Force i s under the command ofthe Advance GUArd C o ~ m a n d e r . I f close-in a r t i l l e ry support i snccessar;y to ass i s t an advance guard too closely e n g a ~ e d for u s ~ of thei r 01-n. ar t i l le ry , th is f i re ca n bE'! given by the a r t i l l e ry withthe Main Body. (RZ3TRICTZD)

* * * * * * * ~ . * * ARTIIJ..:':RY F I T 1 . . ' ~ 1,;,\.3K ~ i ) BY PLi;N.:;s

'!he Battal ion COTfI!nander again asled fo r the a r t i l l e ry . ' He wasto ld tha t he could not ee t ar t i l J ery because f i re "Tas masked by planesin the area. ( R t : : 5 I ' I U C T ! : ~ D ) * * * * * * * * * *

O)I'iTIDL OF. :I.RTILL/RY FIRlArt i l le ry support "!laS receiv8ci lJ j ''1" Co',pany a t approximately1900 hours and " ~ r a s verry effect ive . During th i s act ion, .3 Forward

Qbssrver with the tanks c"lncelled the artille..ry f ire supporting"1" Coltpany b:;r instructin:s the FDC tha t the a r t i l l e ry was landingtoo close to friendly ground t.roops (''1'' Co). Actually, this f ire'.rms landing very accuratply in the ~ r e q d8sired by the COl!1.1TlandingOff icer of C o r ~ p a n y "L".

I t must be ~ : n p h a s i z e d tha-t. the c131ling in or cancell ing ofsupporting f i res i s a command function 2nd responsibil i ty . AFOMrard Observer i s p u r e l ~ an advisor , 3ven yr:len attached to acommand. Bu t a Forvf_'1rd Observer not assigned or attached directlyto a UJ."1it should never take it upon hi: lself to interfp.re withmissicns being f i red for the uni t . ( R . : : ; ' : ; T R I C T : ~ D )

3 0 U R C ~ ~ : Command Report - 138th :H'\. Gp - hm1ex 6, Appl.'mdix IDATE: J.qrch 1951 Source No. 234

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dFOlrSmONO /13) II 11' J WClIES".eVlse ct ' _.,I _______
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C O l : ~ i D N I C I ~ T I O N 5

Difficulty was encount.ered in radio communication with survei l lance r.sdClr s i tes . '::'he t t 'ansmitters ,'lt these s i tes have a ra tedpo'!J'rer output of 40 W'1tts. Tests were conducted with various t:;pesof ant8..Ylnae to deterldne the most sui table typ8 for 24-hour operation.Distances range; from tW'enty-two (22) to forty-seven (47) miles.,{ h a l f - ~ " ' a v e , two (2) ','''ire, folded douulet type, fe d by a 200 Ohliicoaxial transmission l ine , V1'as found to provide sat is factory radiotelephone communication betvreen the t\ntiaircr:-l f t Opet'ations Roomand these s i tes . Th:i,s type of ,"ll1tenna "?-'ill be ins ta l led a t eachsurveil lance radar s i te e ( C J N F I 1 ) ~ ; : r , T ~ L )

* 1:- '* * * "* *

A s taf f stud;y was pr3pared on electr ical power for t ac t icalequipment. I t 'l'Tas recommended t ~ : a t diesel drJ'h:m generf:ltors, LodelRD-14A, be au t orized for i ssue on 3 Jasis of one per 120-mm gunbatter;y-. ( R ~ ~ r J U C T ' ~ : D )

; : ) O U R C ~ : Cormnand Report. ,arch 1951

- 3d In f Div Ji.rty

Over a period 1 i 'arch-through 9 ~ _ 3 r c h 1951, two (2 ) platoonsof tanks ,imre train'ad to t h ( ~ extent tha t on 7 ::arch through 9 ~ 5 a r c h they were used 3S ar t i l l e ry in support of 2Sth Infantry in the i rcrossing of the }i,qn Riv"!". One platoon of only four (4 ) gunsfired e.40 rounds in. t'.'lQ (2) hours f i f ty (50) minutes for a ra teof f i re of 1.25 rounds per minut"J. For the above three (3 ) dayoperation approxi:.liately 1500 rounds W(3re f i red . (CONl7ID;i;:,TVL)

SOURCE:DATE:

COInreand Rcopor ti.:ay 1951

- 9th In f Regt.source No. 236

UNCLASSIFIED '! J ~ ; ' W POCAFF Form No 7- '" s a 12'(.Revised 15 Oct 5 ...


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1. Patrols must ut i l ize high ground desp1te the, - physicaleffor t and the slowness of progress. I f lo"N ground, valleys,vil lages, road junctions, etc, are to be searched, adequate securitymust be maintained on the high ground overlooking these features.

2. Artil lery PO parties and the Battalion TAP must accompanythe patrol . In th isregirnent i t i s often necessary fo r these groupsto establish relay stations in order to insure continuous communication with the controlling agency.3. Upon contacting and locating the eneIl\Y, i t i s usually farmore advantageous to fa l l Qack to ()()ver posit ions and make maximumuse of supporting ar t i l l e ry and mortars than to re'main in a smallaros engagement.4. Patrols must know c h ~ n n e l cal l signs of a l l adjacentuni ts . R 8 p e a t e d l ~ r patrols have ro.ad to r e l l on al ternate means ofconruunication to the i r base. I t i6 flC'.asiblemd highly desirableto extend wire l ines on company size patrols . The SCR 619 is bettersuited for patrol action t h ~ n the 3CR 610, since the patrol neednot stop and set up the radio for communication.5. I t must be kept in mind that Company size patrols are bulky

and oftE".n times diff icul t to control . In many cases most Battalionand Company Comnanders would prefer to ut i l ize smaller groups,feeling that they can accomplish the same resul ts . (R"3'fRICT.])**********

The baSic concepts and principies of our doctrtne, when er.lployedin the preparation of d e r ~ n s i V e l ines and f ie ld for t if ications,have been proved sound. Properly applied, they have, in most instances, guaranteed the retention of any ground. ( l : f ~ T R I C T 1 ! D )

**********ASSUJLT OF ~ ; ' I X I D ro.3ITION$

t

1. I t has again been found that personnel and units wil l notfollow closely the i r supporting f i res . Tbo oftpn there is a time

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lag bet."reen the - ' i r t i l l ~ X ~ Q W ~ - W ~ ~ and the actual assaul t .This likewise haa held true with tactical a ir support.2. One B:!.ttalion has successfull.V uti l ized "dry runs If bysuppot"ting ai rcraf t to c O ' \ l ( ~ r thei r assault . ,\fter the planes h'ivemade their str ike the ground < - c o n t t - o l l ~ r has th e f l i ~ h t . cont-inu;:) tomake runs on the o"ujective w h 1 l ~ the troops Advanee. 'l'his s ~ ~ , m 8 unit has' uti l ized .50 cal iber rrach;1n.e ~ u n s in support of t i le attackiilgunits. This ha s been in l i ~ u of tbe 75-mm recoi l less r i f l e ;'!hichhas l imitation in th is ~ p e of tet ' rain.3. Close l iaison m U ~ , t , ue efe


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call ing for concentrations both a l100d of an10n friendly positions.The Infantry had foxholes with overhaad cover lo r each m9n, theplan being to f i re VT on friendly positions in case of enemY in f i l t rat ion tac t ics . The l ~ r g e amount of work that th is necessitat.edla ter paid great dividends for our :troops , for th8 enemy was drivenoff our positions 'by VT fuzed a r t i l l ~ r y shells .!:.'ired over friendlytroops. (RJ.1JTR1CT, .D)

t 1 \ ,

Command l{eport - lOth J . ' , ~ 1 g r CApril 1951 . 30urce l io. 238

The Reconnaissance S e c ~ i o n i s continuallY out gathering engineerinfor:111 t ion. It would facilitat!3 m'hters considerably ifa "LandPolaroid" camera "f-rcre added to that sect ion 's T!O&E. I t would ",..nablathem to return from a reconnaissance with pictures of bridges needingrepair , bad sActions of r03d, etc. l'his would help in planningoperations. ( R . l : ~ ; ) T R I C ! ' - ; ; D )

COr.1Il1and Report - 3dl lg r C 3n - Staff JournalApril 1951 30urce No. 239

TRAINING IN US:X OF r::INiSSince the area in which the Divisional elements were involveO.had been previously defended durin'"?, the . : ! ~ i g h t h .J'llW withdrawal,there w ~ r e countless scattered m i n e f i e 1 d s ~ dome of these had beenproperly recorded and vrere easily and quickly removed, The majority

however, W3re small isolated groups or fields of mines, of ten 'booby-trapped and found or.lf when friendly troops were injured withirithat ,qrea. 2ven 'P.ric.h the aid of mine f ield reports the rf'lYlovalof the f i , ~ l d s was made e . x t r ~ m e l y dif f icul t by the inaccuracies ofthe reports. r"ore and bet ter training i s required for a l l ranksand branches i f highest efficiency i l i ith minimum casual t ies tofriendly troops is to be obtained.. ( R : ~ J T R I C T ' ; ; D ) 11

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S O U R C . : ~ : Command Report - 3d Inf DivSource Eo. 240

. ~ ; ; X p e r i e n c e in operations in' orea ha s proved a defini te requirement of additional off icers in Division headquarters, over and abovethose authoriz3d in T/O['c3 7-11;, to i:lsure eff ic ient , smooth an daccurate ~ u n c t i o n i n g of the headquarters .

The T/O for the 0-3 Section i s :G-3 Lt ColAsst G-3 : i ~ a j o r r e , c ~ Off I"ajorI & : ' ~ Asst G3.ptG-3Air ;":J.jorLiaison Off CaptLiaison Off CaptLiaison Off Capt

Ixcept for the ;'ssist!:'lnt I & ~ Officer , a l l of the T/O posit ionsare fu l l time jobs "vhich do not pm.-mit tho .lse of these offic(-'>-I'sfor ~ n y a(.dit ional duty. ;'ihen Psychological ' ;arfar8 'Mas t r ~ m s f 8 r r e d to 0-3, '!fith the require;:ent that an offic.3r be put on fu l l timeduty in th i s assignm'3!lt, the .Assistant I & ' ~ Offict:r ":-a5 d81eted andthe Psychological ' a r fa re Officer was subst i tuted in his pl3.ce. tJhderthe T 0&:;', only the 0-3 and 3.sSi.3tant G-3 are Avail3ble to actual lyoperate as Pl3Il.5 and O p e ' ~ a t i o n s personnel.In order to ade:F


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Photo Interpreter LieutenantI n t . e r r ~ g l l t o r Prisoner CaptainInterrogator Prisoner LieutenantI n t ~ r o g a t o r Prisonflr LieutenantInterrogRtor P r i s o n ~ Lieutenant

Comment: Interrog?tors a r ~ assigned when s p e c i f i c a l l ~ - authorized by Lepartment of the Army (Section l IB, T / o t . ~ 7-lI'J Nov lS1950) Al though the Photo InterprAters


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observe cr i t ica l areas to note changes in enemy disposi t ion an dto check repor ts of other observers. ,i.ll of the i n f o r m : ~ t i o n thussecured i s sent immeriiately to ).COFS, G-2. Sinc:3 th is i s a fu l ltiu8 job, it i s recoumenrJed that the T/O be -1ugmented by the",ddit im of a C3.ptajn or Lieutenant, G-2 -l.ir Officer .

The T/O for the G-4 Section i s :G-4 Lt Col Asst G-4 l':ajor Asst G-h Transport!j,tion ; 'ajor ~ . , o tor Officer ",-0

The one t ranspor tat ion off icer now authorized the Divisionadvisr?s the G-4 on t ransportaLion requirements of the Division,maintains a daily truck av?il ,qbil i ty t!:lble, controls the allocationan d operation of cargo vehicles within the Livision, and preparest raf f ic circluat ion plans, jncluding al ternate routes and dotours,in Goordination with G-J, Division ,.:ngineer and Provost ~ ' i a r s h a l . On r a i l mOV06 he maintains l ia ison vrith local RIDs regarding pro curement of r a i l tr


18/22

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UNCLASS\F\ED

the fu l l time assignmr;;nt. of two {2} ofi'ic8!"S a t the .:Jivision level .3upplies mll3 t be dra"m B. t 1"u.san, signed. for b;y an off ic2r , movedto the Uivision truck or r a i l , broken d o ~ n Go uni ts for sale , ~ n d accounted for on a s t r i c t ~ o c o u n t a b i l i t y basis . Ti1is system re (jUires on e off ic9r c o n t 1 ~ 1 1 ; ; ; ' I ' J ~ l ' : 1 n g between Division and Pusan,dra'.ring an d moving s u p p 1 5 . . ~ " l n ~ ; $ : ~ h e r offlcer working ' l t theDivision PX point , control l ing and allocatillg s::'ocks, sup0rvisings31es, ~ n d m a i n t ~ i n i n g ~ ~ e o u n t a b l l i t y records. It i s recommendedtha t the T/O be a u g m ~ by the addit ion o ~ ' a Captain 3.nJ. aL i e u t ~ n a n t , Post ~ x c ' , a n g ' S v.ffi.cer. (.:iECRET)

D u r i n ~ the occUtn t iOtld I;hlfensive pos i tbns , in order toin f l i c t casual t ies on the eiui';Jr ,:tud to m3.ke the r iver l ine untenablefo r him, sniper posi tbns "I'rere pr;::par.!O!d ne'lt' the r iver bank inposit ion to f i re on e n 3 l I \ . ~ dctivity on the f3r sho re . l hese poSit ionswere prepared a t niJ,ht "lnd '!'rare ','mIl C,qillQufl-:lged. ,':.ft(;r cOI'lpletion,t h e ~ ' vrere occupied prior to oo,j'light 3.nd \'T8r(; v:,cated 9nly : lfterdArk. The posit ions -"r-:r:} mos t effect ive . Casu"l t i8S ~ r , . c . r p , in f l ic tedfrol:l them every day. To supp18ment th8se f ire3, pl'ltoons of theTank fut tal ion an d i"c, ~ . : a t t A . l i o n occupied hul l defil1de posit ionson the lo w hi l l s ncar the r i w ~ r to snipe a t appropri;l tc targetsacross the r iver . l'hese f i res , together with the :ii&I f i re ofDivision /u"til13ry, made the enemy posj.tions n ~ 3 r the river ' so costlyto :na in tain t t ~ e y "TiSre virtuall:;; a t a n d o n i ~ ; c l , even before thegener8.1 withdrawal beganio (R ~ , 3 : ; ' R I C ' ; : i : ; n )

COIllJTI.r"1nd B,"port - hq 8th US , ~ r r l 1 Y !forea (;U3AK)Sec I I : . iupporting .i)ocumentsBook l I t ChemicalDATI: June 1951 Source No. 241

NAP.ill: MIKINGA napalm 'dxing te'3TIl consisting of eight (8 ) enlis t ed membersof this org8nization d(;part3d the c o m ~ Y m y base 15 June and returned

15UNCLASSIFIED

OCAFF Form No 73(.Revised 15 Oct 51)


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uoFW(l t6 'Nf i ; 16JbUNCLASSIFIED

to the company 23 June, af ter having mixed 43,000 gallons of napalm.( I E d T R I C T ' ~ D )

* * * * * * * * * *

SOURCE:

DATJ:

SOURCZ:DATE:

[ This i s believed to be the r01son for an oV3rall & J / ~ drop in issues from th0 mSAK AdV'1nce Ch!3ffiical lJepot. (C01,iFIDGLTIAL)

C o r n m a n d ~ u ~ p o r t - Hq 8th LTS ;\rITtY' Korea (WSAK)Book 3: ACOFS G-2

June 1951 Source No. 242

'lIhe m . l m ~ ) e r o f active guerrill!3.s. operating in friendly rearareas '!TaS


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'- ...-:: .. WE (QJ1ZJZ I. a ern' BTta.

UNCLASSIFIED- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~

ACCURACY WI'1H GRENADESOur perSoMel .us ed g r e n ~ d e s , but wer e no t too a ccur '1 te with

this weapon. (CONPIDENTIAL)

SOURCE:DATE:

Command Report.- 36th Engr C GpMarch 1951 SOURCE NO. 244

Dl'TERIOR Mft.NiI.GEMENTEffective this month a report sect.ion has been establishedwith the responsibil i ty of C',oordin"ting a l l reports requj.red by

SOURCE:

DATE:

SOURCE:DATE:

) j t < . ~ . - ....... , _ ~ : i < . " ' . > , .

Group and qy. higher Headquarters. The large number of reportshas made such a section n e c e s s ~ r y in order to keep subordina te .units, abreast bfrequireinents and suspense dates. (RESTRICTED)

Report ,of US ArmY Aircraft Flying Accident from Commanding General,2d Infantry Division to Commanding General EUSAKAugust 1951 Source No. 2 ~ 5 HELICOPrER. LP:.NDING AND TAKE OFF FIELDS

A combination of high alt i tude (:1500 f t msl), high temperature(900 F), and no. wind (under: 10 mph) may make a normal helicopterlanding and take off impossible. (RESTRICTED)

Conunand Report ,2d Infantry DivisionM.:iY 1951 Source No. 246PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

A successful application of psychological warfare principles17UNCLASSIFIED


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vras i l lus t ra ted when an infantry regiment p"ncountered an estimated300 enerrw in a road block. A division l iaison plane effected aprearranged SCR 300 contact with. the loudspeaker plane and with theForward ~ , i r Control ler. All ground f i re was stopped while the VoicePlane broadcasted. rhe enentf was told that further resistance was .hopeless, th9t the only al ternat ive to destruct ion 72S surrender,and that surrender would be accepted i f they would walk down theroad toward th e UN Forces., Several groups of enemy responded byvmlking down the road and surrendering. Other groups were seenmoving north, apparently feel ing that the promised lu l l would be agood time to effect an escape. In any event, there VIas no furtherresistance from that part icular road block. After the time s t ipulated, a f inal message w:::\s broadcast ~ t o the effect tha t those vlhohad not taken the opportunity to surrender would noW' be s lain. Thear t i l le ry immediately placed a h & ~ v y concentration on the roadalong which the e n e r r ~ ' ~ ~ s r e ~ r e a t i n g . The operation vms successful ,therefore, in convincing many of the Communists to surrender while,a t the same t:iJ:1e, lO1flering th e 'l'd.ll to f ight of thos e who remained.(RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: CorrillBnd Report - 2d Inf Div Appendix D - OperationsDATE: May 1951 Source No. 247

FOUGAS3EUnits are urged to ut i l ize fougasses in the organization ofpOSitions. Eight (8) dug-in improvised flame throw,,,rs (napalmthickened gasoline) already are ins ta l led COVering the jW1.ction oftwo (2 ) valleys. These fougasses cover two (2) probable e n e ~

avenues of approach to a' port ion of the Line manned by elements of"'in infantry battal ion. Each fougasse wil l produce a mass of flametwenty-five (25) to forty (40) yards in range and one-third (1/3)that in width, sirnila::- in effect to a napalm bomb but on a reducedscale. &lch is buried and sandbagged a t a thrit;>r degree (300)angle from the horizontal , or i s horizontal i f the t arget is downh i l l , with the uncovered end facing the .enemy a ~ p r o a c h avenue. Apropelli...'!g, exploding, and igni t ing charge of to 2 pounds ofblock TNT (or equivalent explosivo), two (2) M 1 5 ~ " p grenades (orone 81-mm m o r t ~ r WP round) and a d e t o n ~ t o r ei ther with or without

OCAFF Form No ~ ' \ t,a.ricl 15 Oct !... ~ - - - . - - - - .

-.----


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UNCLASSIFIED

blast ing cord (primacord) i s taped to the center of the barrelhead ~ m i c h is buried. Activation wil l be ei ther by remote controlthrough manually operated e lec t r ic d e t o n ~ t i o n , or by a primacordJ_ead from the nearest foxhole, thus assuring detonation when alucr,3.tive t a rge t presents i t se l f . (RF...:i'rRICTED)

SOURCE: Conmand Report - I US CorpsDATE: May 1951 Source No 248

LESSONS LEARNED IN R E T R O G R ! ~ D E Jl!DVThLEN TAl though an all-out attempt to recapture SEOUL by the enenwappeared iminent during the f i r s t days of May, railheads for d iv i sions wore retain8d in STItH,iI., together wi th the ammunition a t

ammunition supply point 54. Bridges an d switches were l e f t in tact .'!his '!fas as a resu l t of lessons loorned on previous retrograde move ments and subsequent advances.

As t h f ~ United Nations counteroffensive progressed northwards,only minor repqirs were required to p l ~ c e r a i l l ines in operationonce again. (RESTRICTED)

DATE:Conm3nd Report - 76th Engineer Canst EnMarch 1951 Source No. 249ADMINISTRATIVE O V ! i ~ R L O A D

The administrative repor ts required of the unit present a majorproblem. An example is t h ~ : ! Command Report , of which th is writing i sa par t , which consumed f iVD hundred and sixty (560) pages, .qnd isrequired monthly. (RESTRICTED)

19UNCLASSIFIED

Dissemination of Combat Information 25 January 1952

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