Discursive methods in environmental decision making

DISCURSIVE METHODS INENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING

Ortwin Renn*, Birgit BlaÈ ttel-Mink and Hans KastenholzCenter of Technology Assessment in Baden-WuÈ rttemberg, 70565 Stuttgart, Germany

Sustainable practices can be initiated orencouraged by governmental regulationand economic incentives. A major elementto promote sustainability will be, however,the exploration and organization ofdiscursive processes between and amongdifferent actors. Many analysts agree thatsustainability will remain a highlydesirable, but unrealistic option fordevelopment, if people do not feel a degreeof ownership and identity with the goal ofsustainability for their own life and apreference for its policy implications.Inviting the public to be part of thedecision-making process from thebeginning improves the likelihood that theresulting decision will be accepted.Participatory processes are needed thatcombine technical expertise, rationaldecision making, and public values andpreferences. To accomplish such anintegration, negotiation, mediation, andarbitration are potential solutions. Manydifferent procedures and forms ofmediation have been proposed and sometested. One major attempt of the authorshas been the organization of round-tablediscourses among a wide variety of

stakeholders to develop environmentalpolicy goals or to design local and regionalwaste management plans. These discoursesare based on the assumption that eachparticipant can contribute to the commongood if the setting of the discourseencourages the generation of shared valuesand discourages strategic reasoning. Theemphasis of the paper will be on the modelof cooperative discourse and ®rstapplications in Germany, Switzerland andthe United States. # 1997 John Wiley &Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

Bus. Strat. Env, Vol. 6, 218±231, 1997

No. of Figures: 2. No. of Tables: 0.No. of References: 55.

Received 30 June 1997Accepted 30 June 1997

INTRODUCTION

Sustainable practices can be initiated or

encouraged by governmental regulation andeconomic incentives. A major element to

promote sustainability will be, however, theexploration and organization of mediational pro-cesses between and among different actors. Manyanalysts agree that sustainability will remain ahighly desirable, but unrealistic option for devel-opment, if people do not feel a degree of ownershipand identity with the goal of sustainability for their

* Correspondence to: Dr. Ortwin Renn, Centre of TechnologyAssessment in Baden-WuÈ rttemberg, 70565 Stuttgart, Germany

CCC 0964-4733/97/040218±14 $17.50# 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

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BUSINESS STRATEGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

own life and a preference for its policy implications(Redclift, 1994; Busch-LuÈ thi, 1990). Many targets ofsustainability require voluntary collective actions bydifferent players in society, most notably industry,government, unions and environmental groups. Aslong as they paralyse each other, nothing will begained with respect to a more sustainable economicpath.

Inviting the major actors to be part of the decision-making process from the beginning improves thelikelihood that the resulting decision will be accepted.Unfortunately, early public involvement may com-promise, however, the objective of ef®cient andeffective sustainable development or violate theprinciple of fairness. As economists have pointed out,preferences of people with respect to public goods areoften driven by short-term interests and objectivesand re¯ect people's expectation of immediate pay-offs rather than of investments in a sustainable future(Cansier, 1995; Fritsch, 1995). Such a short term per-spective is even more likely to occur if the alternativesfor actions include options that promise immediategains for all participants at the costs of a slowlyprogressing devastation of the environment. Longterm perspectives have only a chance to prevail if theparticipants associate catastrophic potential with therespective decision alternative (Renn, 1990). As far asfairness towards future generations is concerned,many analysts claim that most participatory pro-cesses may place little emphasis on this goal sincepeople feel more obliged towards the needs of thoseconstituencies that they represent than towards theneeds of yet unborn citizens (Frey and Oberholzer,1996; Linder, 1990, pp. 153ff). It depends on thestructure of the participatory program, however,whether participants develop moral responsibility forlong-term thinking and respect for the needs of futuregenerations (Linnerooth-Bayer and Fitzgerald, 1996;Webler, 1995).

Another problem is that the public consists ofmany groups with different value structures andpreferences. Without a systematic procedure toreach consensus on values and preferences, thepublic's position often appears unclear. Participa-tory processes that combine technical expertise,rational as well as moral decision making, andpublic values and preferences are thus needed. Toaccomplish such an integration, discursive pro-cesses such as negotiation, mediation and arbitra-tion are potential solutions. Many differentprocedures and forms of mediation have been pro-posed and some tested. One major attempt of theauthors has been the organization of round-tablediscourses (named cooperative discourse) among awide variety of stakeholders to develop environ-

mental policy goals or to design local and regionalwaste management plans. These discourses arebased on the assumption that each participant cancontribute to the common good if the setting of theround-table encourages the generation of sharedvalues and discourages strategic reasoning. Morespeci®cally, a round-table discourse is based on a setof rules that can be speci®ed by (Renn, 1992):

(i) reaching a consensus on the procedure that theparticipants want to employ in order to derivethe ®nal decision or compromise, such asmajority vote or the involvement of a mediator;

(ii) basing their factual claims on the ``state of theart'' of scienti®c knowledge and other forms oflegitimate knowledge; in the case of scienti®cdissent all relevant camps should be repre-sented;

(iii) interpreting factual evidence in accordance withthe laws of formal logic and analytical reason-ing;

(iv) disclosing the values and preferences of eachparty, thus avoiding hidden agendas and stra-tegic game playing;

(v) attempting to ®nd a fair solution whenevercon¯icting values or preferences occur, includ-ing compensation or other forms of bene®texchange.

This paper will address the procedures, problemsand prospects of new mediational processes tofacilitate a discourse among different actors. First,we will describe the levels of debate that are likelyto dominate environmental debates. Based on thisanalysis, we will introduce different processes anddiscuss their problems and merits. The fourthchapter will explain our own approach and itscharacteristics. After a brief description of ourexperiences with this approach, we will articulatesome conclusions about the potential contributionof mediation and similar processes for resolvingenvironmental disputes.

THE THREE LEVELS OFENVIRONMENTAL DEBATES

Before looking at the requirements of con¯ictresolving processes it is important to focus on thesubstance of environmental debates in general.Although topics vary from one environmental pro-blem to the next, most environmental debates centrearound three themes (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1985;Rayner and Cantor, 1987):

� factual evidence;

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� institutional performance, expertise, andexperience;

� con¯icts about world views and value systems.

Figure 1 is a graphical representation of thismodel using a modi®ed version of the originalcategories (taken from Renn and Levine, 1991). The®rst level involves factual arguments about evi-dence of environmental damages, risks and poten-tial side effects. If the con¯ict is clearly focused onthese topics. i.e. factual evidence, the discourseorganizer can help to resolve this con¯ict by usingthe following suggestions:

(i) Refer the disputed question to an expert orgroup of experts who have high credibilityamong all discourse participants.

(ii) Have each participant select a group of experts;ask each group to develop a response to thedisputed question; organize a workshop for allexperts; identify issues where experts agree andspecify the range and scope of their disagree-ments.

(iii) Involve a third party to conduct a researchproject that would be appropriate to provideanswers to the question in dispute.

(iv) Find an agreement on the methodology andanalytical procedure which is regarded asappropriate for the question in dispute andevaluate all studies on the basis of the metho-dological criteria (peer review).

It is not advisable to allow each party to havetheir own scienti®c advocates and feed theseadvocacies into the discourse. Rather the discourseorganizer should try to employ the methodologicalrules and evaluative criteria that are accepted in therespective science ®eld to evaluate factual claims.

This can be done in expert workshops (for exampleusing the Delphi procedure) or through peer review.The discourse participants should have the right toco-determine the experts and the methodologiesused for evaluation.

The second, more intense, level of debate concernsinstitutional competence to deal with environmentalproblems. At this level the focus of the debate is onthe distribution of risks and bene®ts, and the com-patibility of the proposed solution with currenteconomic and social conditions. This type of debatedoes not rely on technical expertise, although redu-cing scienti®c uncertainty may help. If the con¯ict ison the second level, resolving con¯icts about factualevidence is not suf®cient. The major question here istrust in the experience, commitment and expertise ofthe risk managing institutions. Even if risks areperceived as low, doubts about competence orimpartiality of the risk management agencies maylead to ®rm opposition. The con¯ict resolutionmechanisms must focus in second level con¯icts onthe past record of institutions, the structure of checksand balances (mutual control), the openness of theinstitution to incorporate public concerns anddemands, and the effectiveness of monitoring andcontrol over the lifetime of the risk generatingfacility. The discourse organizer can provide infor-mation on these questions by:

(i) asking a group of independent experts to eval-uate institutional performance;

(ii) investigating past failures of the respectiveinstitution and analysing the responses toavoid future mistakes;

(iii) organizing a panel discussion with representa-tives of the managing institution and its critics;

(iv) suggesting structural changes, such as includ-ing more public control of the institutional

Figure 1. The three levels of environmental debates.

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performance or establishing a better system ofchecks and balances;

(v) establishing a continuously operating oversightboard consisting of representatives of eachparty in the discourse.

Con¯icts on the second level will affect adminis-trative agencies as well as private companies. Theprivate sector is often associated with pro®t-seekingbehaviour beyond economic reason and dishonestywith respect to environmental performance. Privatecompanies are often accused of lip-service to theenvironment while their actions speak a differentlanguage. The competence in the ability of companyof®cials to understand environmental risks and tomanage them effectively is rarely disputed. Ratherthe focus is on the credibility and trustworthiness ofcompanies when they reach out for public support.The most important lesson here is to unify rhetoricand reality. Trust depends on the potential con-gruency between public expectations and perceivedperformance (Renn and Levine, 1991). Corporationsare well advised to promise not more than they candeliver. This includes the task of refuting unrealisticexpectations and of monitoring actual performanceaccording to the corporate's public statements.Openness to public demand is crucial in gaining orregaining public trust. In¯exibility to respond topublic demands has been one of the predominantreasons for failed attempts to con¯ict resolution.Representatives of institutions should thereforeclarify in advance which changes they are willing toaccept and which not. Complete in¯exibility is aninvitation to disaster.

At the third level the con¯ict is de®ned alongdifferent social values, cultural lifestyles, and theirimpact on environmental management. In this case,neither technical expertise nor institutional compe-tence and openness are adequate conditions forpublic involvement. Decision making here requiresa fundamental consensus on the issues that underliethe environmental debate. Con¯icts on the thirdlevel are most dif®cult to resolve since they are notgrounded in empirical evidence or past history.Discussion about values and lifestyles are highlyindividualized and idiosyncratic. An intensiveexchange of arguments can be very bene®cial ®rst toclarify the positions of each party and second todesign compromises that avoid strong value viola-tions for any of the parties involved. Compromisesfor third level con¯icts require that value violationsin one area can be offset by value ful®llment inanother area. However, the two value sets must beperceived as equivalent. This is the major reasonwhy monetary compensation is often rejected as

unacceptable or even cynical. Salient values cannotbe compensated by gains in non-salient values. Socompensation can be materialized in form of riskreduction, better access to resources, more controloptions, improvement of environmental quality,and others. Some of these options can be offered byprivate companies other need the approval of poli-tical bodies such as environmental agencies orparliaments. A discourse organizer may suggest thefollowing strategies to ®nd viable compromises:

(i) invite philosophers and conceptual thinkers todebate value issues and show the legitimacy ofdifferent value clusters for addressing the sameproblem;

(ii) use structuring techniques (such as value treeanalysis) to identify the relevant values, issues,and interests of each party;

(iii) focus ®rst on the shared values of all parties inorder to give them the feeling that they are notas far apart as it seemed from the outset;

(iv) identify or even quantify the degree of valueviolations caused by the proposed technologyor facility;

(v) identify or construct solutions that minimizestrong value violations;

(vi) suggest compensatory measures for each partyusing a type of compensation that increases oneof the salient values of the respective party (forexample, provide additional environmentalbene®ts to a group concerned about environ-mental impacts);

(vii) in the case of a deadlock, suggest an arbitrationprocedure by which a third party makes the®nal decision based on their evaluation ofpotential value violations.

Con¯icts on the third level may require most timeof the discourse. Their resolution is contingent on®nding a viable compromise. First and second ordercon¯icts will not be resolved unless some agreementis reached on the third level. However, resolution ofthird level con¯icts require some agreement on the®rst and second level. This dilemma can be over-come by starting the discourse on third level issues(identifying values and potential value violations),then turning to con¯icts on the ®rst and secondlevel, and ®nally addressing the value problemsagain (identifying compromises and designingcompensatory measures).

There is, however, a strong tendency for man-agement agencies and company of®cials to re-framehigher level con¯icts into lower levels ones: thirdlevel con¯icts are presented as ®rst or second levelcon¯icts, and second level con¯icts as ®rst level.This is an attempt to focus the discussion on tech-

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nical evidence, in which the of®cial spokesperson ofan agency or a company is ¯uent (Dietz et al. 1989).Citizens who participate in the discourse are thusforced to use ®rst level (factual) arguments torationalize their value concerns. Unfortunately, thisis often misunderstood by environmental managersas ``irrationality'' on the part of the public. Fru-strated, the public retreats to due process and rou-tinization of the process, abscising it of substance,and departs with disillusion and distrust of thesystem.

FORMS OF DISCURSIVE PROCESSES:NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION ANDARBITRATION

Once the level of the debate is established, aninteractive method for resolving the con¯ict needsto be organized and structured. The ®rst crucialquestion for organizing such a discourse is: who isallowed to participate to what degree? The ®rst partof the question refers to the problem of selectionand representation, the second to the degree ofpower that the representatives of the public or otherconstituencies can exercise in the process. Further-more, models of involvement vary considerably inthe structure of the decision-making process itselfand its integration into the existing political insti-tutions. Finally, the question of the role and powerof the process facilitator has to be addressed.

With respect to selection procedures, there arethree generic types of selection procedures forappointing representatives for the negotiation pro-cess:

(i) self-selection based on the volunteer principle(such as public hearings);

(ii) determination of social groups or constituentsby the regulatory agency or a third party(invitation of stakeholder groups to the pro-cess);

(iii) systematic or random selection of members ofthe relevant public (such as surveys, focusgroups, consensus conferencing, town meet-ings).

Self-selection is the most popular approach in theUnited States, while invitation of organized stake-holder groups is the predominant method in mostEuropean countries (Renn, 1988). The three types ofselection can be combined or structured sequen-tially. For many environmental problems, a combi-nation of at least the ®rst two selections processes isalmost inevitable because opposition is likely to

evolve from the pool of local residents and from avariety of non-local, environmental consciousgroups who feel affected by a decision that impactson the environment.

The degree of power given to the representativesof either stakeholder groups or the public dependson the structure of the process and the issue at stake.The following classi®cation lists the degree ofempowerment on a scale from low to high (Pollak,1989):

(i) informing the public about a pending decision;(ii) communicating to the public the reasons, pro-

cedures and potential impacts of the respectiveenvironmental policy;

(iii) inviting the public to express their concernswith the understanding that the decision mak-ing bodies will incorporate these concerns intotheir ®nal decision;

(iv) asking the public representatives to take part inthe deliberations and evaluations of decisionoptions, but leaving the ®nal decision to theresponsible decision makers in private compa-nies or political agencies;

(v) giving the public representatives the right tomake recommendations for the ®nal decision,but leaving the decision makers the option tooverride this recommendation;

(vi) giving the public representatives the right to co-determine the ®nal decision (various votingprocedures);

(vii) giving the public representatives the exclusiveright to determine the ®nal decision (bindingdecision for the public authorities).

Similar to the selection process, these stages inempowerment can be combined or structuredsequentially. In addition, some of these rights maybe given only to some representatives (such asorganized stakeholders or clearly affected abuttersof facilities). While in many European countries, thelegal process of involvement is structured by lawand does not leave many choices in the selection ofprocesses or participants, the American tradition ofparticipation is less rigid in structure and encoura-ges public expectations that, without prior consent,decisions cannot be implemented.

The structure of the process also varies con-siderably from arena to arena. Most popular in theUnited States and Europe is the hearing procedurein which participants are given the right to expresstheir concerns and to question the technical expertsof the other parties (for example the proposer of afacility). Since the hearing does not include a directparticipation in the decision-making process, i.e.does not empower the participants to actually co-

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determine the decision, controversial proposals areusually taken to court. Litigation, however, is notonly costly and time-consuming, it also results inoften unsatisfactory resolutions of the con¯ict, sincethe legal system is not prepared to adequately copewith problems in which highly technical aspects areat the center of the controversy. In the United States,procedures of mediation have gained more andmore popularity as a means to incorporate publicconcerns into the decision process without sacri®-cing technical expertise or rational reasoning (Amy,1987). Mediation is also less expensive and time-consuming than litigation.

The different forms of negotiation, mediation,and arbitration are usually de®ned in terms of therole and in¯uence of the process facilitator.Although the de®nitions for these terms are notconsistently used in the literature, most authors usethe three terms in the following meanings:

� negotiation: parties are invited to communicatewith each other and to design potential com-promises on their own; the facilitator acts ascommunication specialist who structures theprocess without interfering into the negotiation;

� mediation: parties are invited to communicatewith each other and to help the mediator todesign compromises; the mediator plays a moreactive role here by proposing solutions of thecon¯icts and have the parties vote on his sug-gestions;

� arbitration: parties are invited to exchange argu-ments and try to convince the arbiter that theirviewpoint is correct; the arbiter articulates acompromise at the end; participants vote for oragainst the arbiter's judgment; in some modelsarbiter has voting rights and produces thedecisive vote if a tie occurs;

� binding arbitration: same as arbitration exceptthat arbiter does not need the approval of anyparty, but is free to make a binding judgment atthe end of the process.

These four forms of con¯ict resolution can also becombined. For example, the participants may agreeto use negotiations to set an agenda and to de®ne aprocedure of how to reconcile factual disputes andvalue con¯icts, but they may prefer arbitration todraft the content of the ®nal agreement. Distin-guishing between arbitration and binding arbitra-tion may appear super¯uous, but non-bindingarbitration is often used in labour disputes (inwhich the arbiter may cast the decisive vote in a tie),while binding arbitration is almost exclusively usedas an alternative or substitute to legal suits. In theeconomic literature, the term bargaining is also used

in connection with mediation (O'Hare, 1990). Bar-gaining means negotiations about the appropriatecompensation of those who have utility losses bythose who reap bene®ts from the planned inter-vention. Since all types of con¯ict resolution mayentail some form of bargaining, regardless whethercompensation is explicitly addressed the term bar-gaining should be reserved for one method of con-¯ict resolution within negotiation, mediation, orarbitration.

CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFULCONFLICT RESOLUTION

What are the conditions or prerequisites for a suc-cessful mediation or other forms of con¯ict resolu-tion? Success can measured in two ways: ®rst, wasthe objective of the con¯ict resolution processaccomplished; and second, are all participantssatis®ed with the outcome and the process itself?Both indicators of success depend on the structureof the process. In the literature, structural require-ments are often discussed by referring to the con-cept of rational discourse. A rational discourse isde®ned as a communication process in which allaffected parties resolve a con¯ict by a speci®c set ofrules. The success or failure of a rational discoursedepends on many factors. Among the most in¯u-ential are (cf. McCarthy, 1975; Habermas, 1984;Kemp, 1985; Bacow and Wheeler, 1984, pp. 190±194;Burns and UÈ berhorst, 1988; Fiorino, 1990; Renn,1992; Renn et al. 1995):

(1) Time: A discourse cannot be organized in aweek or even a month. It is advisable to allocatesuf®cient time for a discourse before the actualdecision has to be made. This is not always politi-cally feasible, because many decisions have to bemade instantaneously. Most siting con¯icts, how-ever, have provided enough evidence that insuf®-cient consultations with the affected parties delaythe decision process much longer than the pre-paration time needed to organize a discourse priorto the decision (Kasperson, 1986).

(2) Openness of result: A discourse will neveraccomplish its goal if the decision has been made(of®cially or secretly) and the purpose of the com-munication effort is to ``sell'' this decision to theother parties. Individuals have a good sense whe-ther a decision maker is really interested in theirpoint of view or if the process is meant to pacifypotential protesters (Fiorino, 1989).

(3) Equal position of all parties: A discourse needsthe climate of a ``powerless'' environment (Haber-

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mas, 1984). This does not mean that every party hasthe same right to intervene or claim a legal obliga-tion to be involved in the political decision makingprocess. However, the internal rules of the discoursehave to be strictly egalitarian; every participantmust have the same status in the group and thesame rights to speak, make proposals, or evaluateoptions (Kemp, 1985). Two requirements must bemet: First, the decision about the procedure and theagenda must rely on consensus; every party needsto agree. Second, the rules adopted for the discourseare binding for all members and no party is allowedto claim any privileged status or decision power.The external validity of the discourse results are,however, subject to all legal and political rules thatare in effect for the topic in question.

(4) Willingness to learn: All parties have to beready to learn from each other. This does notnecessarily imply that they have to be willing tochange their preferences or attitudes. Con¯icts canbe reconciled on the basis that parties accept otherparties' position as a legitimate claim without giv-ing up their own point of view. Learning in thissense entails:

� Recognition of different forms of rationality indecision making (Perrow, 1984; Habermas,1984);

� Recognition of different forms of knowledge, beit systematic, anecdotal, personal, cultural, orfolklore wisdom (Habermas, 1971);

Willingness to subject oneself to the rules ofargumentative disputes, i.e. provide factual evi-dence for claims; obey the rules of logic for drawinginferences; disclose one's own values and pre-ferences vis-aÁ-vis potential outcomes of decisionoptions, and others.

(5) Resolution of allegedly irrational responses:Discourses in which the public stakeholder groupsor affected individuals are represented frequentlydemonstrate a con¯ict between two contrastingmodes of evidence: the public refers to anecdotaland personal evidence mixed with emotional reac-tions, whereas the professionals play out their sys-tematic and generalized evidence based on abstractknowledge (Lynn, 1986; Keeney and von Winter-feldt, 1986; Dietz et al. 1989). A dialogue betweenthese two modes are rarely accomplished becauseexperts regard the personal evidence as a typicalresponse of irrationality. The public representativesperceive the experts often as uncompassionatetechnocrats who know all the statistics, but couldn'tcare less about a single life lost. This con¯ict canonly be resolved if both parties are willing to accept

the rationale of the other party's position and tounderstand and maybe even empathize with theother's party view (Bacow and Wheeler, 1984, p.191). If over the duration of the discourse somefamiliarity with the process and mutual trustamong the participants have been established, roleplaying can facilitate that understanding. Resolvingalleged irrationalities means to discover the hiddenrationality in the argument of the other party.

(6) De-moralization of positions and parties: Theindividuals involved in a discourse should agree inadvance to refrain from moralizing each other oreach other's position (Renn, 1992). Moral judgmentson positions or persons impede compromise.Something cannot be 30% good and 70% bad; eitherit is good, bad, or indifferent. As soon as partiesstart to moralize positions, they cannot make tra-deoffs between their allegedly moral position andthe other parties' immoral position without losingface. A second undesired result of moralizing is theviolation of the equality principle stated above.Nobody can assign equal status to a party which isallegedly morally inferior to the other partiesinvolved. Finally, moralizing masks de®cits ofknowledge and arguments. Even if somebodyknows nothing about a subject or has only weakarguments to support his/her position, assigningblame to other actors and making it a moral issuecan help to win points in the public arena and to bea respected participant in the dispute (Scheuch,1980). Many parties in a discourse try this route ifthey feel they are not taken seriously or theirrationality is not accepted. Given the conditions 1±5are met, there is a good chance that participantsvoluntarily agree to refrain from the ``unfair''instrument of moralization. The absence of mor-alizing other parties or their position does not meanto refrain from using ethical arguments, such as``this solution does not seem fair to the future gen-eration'' or ``we should conserve this ecosystem forits own sake''.

In addition to the above mentioned requirementsthat help structure the deliberation process andprovide rules of argumentation and behaviour forall participants, it is important that the processmeets speci®c requirements with respect to itslegitimizing effect vis-aÁ-vis the outside world.Among the most important aspects that discourseorganizers need to consider are:

A clear mandate for the discourse participants: Whatare topics of discussions? What is the product thatthey are asked to deliver?

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A clear understanding of the options and permissibleoutcomes of such a process: If for example, the site fora risk producing facility is already chosen, the dis-course can only focus on issues such as choice oftechnology, emission control, and compensation.

A prede®ned time table: It is necessary to allocatesuf®cient time for all the deliberations, but a clearschedule including deadlines is required to makethe discourse effective and product-oriented.

A mutual understanding of how the results of thediscourse will be integrated in the decision making pro-cess of the regulatory agency: As a pre-decisional toolthe recommendations cannot serve as bindingarbitrations in most cases. Rather they should beregarded as consultancy reports similar to the sci-enti®c consultants who articulate technical recom-mendations to the legitimate public authorities.Of®cial decision makers need to acknowledge andto process the reports by the discourse panellists,but they are not obliged to follow their advice.However, the process will fail its purpose if devia-tions from the recommendations are neitherexplained nor justi®ed to the panellists.

A THREE STEP MODEL OF PUBLICINVOLVEMENT

Is there any procedure that would meet therequirements for such a discourse and at the sametime assure the incorporation of expertise and socialvalues? Many models for public participation havebeen suggested in the literature that promise tofacilitate a rational discourse (Crosby et al. 1986;Kraft, 1988; Burns and UÈ berhorst, 1988; Chen andMathes, 1989; see reviews in: Nelkin and Pollak,1979; Pollak, 1985; Fiorino, 1990).

This is not the place to discuss these models indetail. We would like to focus on one hybrid modelof citizen participation that we have termed``cooperative discourse''. With several modi®ca-tions, this model has been applied to studies onenergy policies and waste disposal issues in WestGermany, for waste-disposal facilities in Switzer-land and to sludge-disposal strategies in the UnitedStates (Renn et al. 1985; Renn et al. 1989; Renn et al.1991; Renn et al. 1993; Renn et al. 1995). The modelentails three consecutive steps:

(i) Identi®cation and selection of concerns and evalua-tive criteria. The identi®cation of concerns andobjectives is best accomplished by asking allrelevant stakeholder groups (i.e. socially orga-nized groups that are or perceive themselves asbeing affected by the decision) to reveal their

values and criteria for judging differentoptions. It is crucial that all relevant valuegroups be represented and that the valueclusters be comprehensive and include eco-nomic, political, social, cultural and religiousvalues. It seems obvious that protection ofhuman health and environment is the pre-dominant goal, but the speci®cation of this goalas well as the identi®cation of constraints(costs, aesthetics, employment, local culture,etc.) involve a selection of additional evaluativedimensions, such as economic consequences,equitable risk sharing, community cohesion, orindividual satisfaction. As soon as more thanone dimension is selected for analysis, tradeoffshave to be assigned to each dimension. Bothprocesses, identi®cation of values and deter-mination of their relative weights, rely onsubjective values and should therefore begrounded in public consensus. The identi®ca-tion of concerns and objectives is best accom-plished by asking all relevant stakeholdergroups (i.e. socially organized groups that areor perceive themselves as being affected by thedecision) to reveal their values and criteria forjudging different options. Although strategicreasoning and hidden agendas may in¯uencethe responses of these groups, the mere listingof concerns as expressed in values and, subse-quently, the deduction of criteria does not pre-determine the potential outcome of theevaluation process. It is thus less susceptible tostrategic game playing. It is crucial that allrelevant value groups be represented and thatthe value clusters be comprehensive by inte-grating into the analysis economic, political,social, cultural, and religious values. To elicitthe values and criteria for such a list the tech-nique of value-tree analysis has proven appro-priate (Keeney et al. 1985; von Winterfeldt andEdwards, 1986; von Winterfeldt, 1987). Theresulting output of such a value-tree process isa list of hierarchically structured values thatrepresent the concerns of all affected parties.

(ii) The identi®cation and measurement of impacts andconsequences related to different policy options. Theevaluative criteria derived from the value-treeare operationalized and transformed into indi-cators by the research team or an external expertgroup. These operational de®nitions and indi-cators are reviewed by the participating stake-holder groups. Once approved by all parties,these indicators serve as measurement rules forevaluating the performance of each policy optionon all value dimensions. Experts from varying

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academic disciplines and with diverse perspec-tives on the topic of the discourse are asked tojudge the performance of each option on eachindicator. For this purpose, a modi®cation of theDelphi method has been developed and applied(Renn and Kotte, 1984; Webler et al. 1991). Theobjective is to reconcile con¯icts about factualevidence and reach an expert consensus viadirect confrontation among a heterogeneoussample of experts in the ®eld. The desired out-come is a speci®cation of the range of scienti®-cally legitimate and defensible expert judgmentsand a distribution of these opinions among theexpert community with verbal justi®cations foropinions that deviate from the median view-point. At the end of this step, performance pro-®les for each option are constructed which re¯ectthe strengths and the weaknesses of each optionon each indicator.

(iii) Conducting a rational discourse with randomlyselected citizens as jurors and representation ofstakeholder groups as witnesses. The last step isthe evaluation of potential solutions by onegroup or several groups of randomly selectedcitizens (Dienel, 1978; Dienel, 1989). Thesepanels are given the opportunity to evaluateand design policy options based on theknowledge of the likely consequences and theirown values and preferences. The participantsare informed about the options and the con-sequence pro®le generated by the experts inStep 2 before they are asked to evaluate theseoptions on each dimension identi®ed in thevalue tree process (Step 1). The participantsmay augment the list of concerns and criteriaand may also include new options or modifythe options presented to them. The repre-sentatives of stakeholder groups and theexperts take part in the process as witnesses;they provide their arguments and evidence tothe panels who ultimately decide on the var-ious options. This deliberation process takestime: citizen panels are conducted as seminarsover three to ®ve consecutive days or anyselected days over a period of several months.All participants are exposed to a standardizedprogram of information, including hearings,lectures, panel discussions, videotapes, and®eld tours. The process is similar to a jury trialwith experts and stakeholders as witnesses andadvisers on procedure as ``professional'' judges.

Figure 2 illustrates the functions and procedure ofthis model. The ®gure shows that all three groups

(experts, stakeholder groups, and the general pub-lic) play a role in each step, but that they areencouraged to impact the decision process with thespeci®c knowledge with which they are most pro-®cient. The stakeholder groups have the most pro-®cient and diverse knowledge of evaluative criteria,the experts the best systematic knowledge aboutfactual performance, and the citizens an appropriateand legitimated deliberation potential to weighbene®ts and risks. This division of labour provides acheck-and-balance process and a sequential orderfor multiple actor involvement. Organizing acooperative discourse requires careful planning andpreparation and relies on the willingness of thecommunicator to learn from the participants and toadjust his/her preferences if deemed necessary.Several procedures lend themselves to organizing acooperative discourse. However, it is not so muchthe structure of the process that determines thesuccess or failure of a risk discourse as the will-ingness of all participants to meet the conditions ofadequate time allocation, openness of the process,willingness to learn, acceptance of different ration-alities, and the agreement to refrain from moralizingthe positions of other participants.

EXPERIENCES WITH THE COOPERATIVEDISCOURSE METHOD

German experiences

Applications of the cooperative discourse model inGermany emerged from the early experiences withcitizen panels in urban planning (Dienel, 1978).Community governments wanted to give citizensthe opportunity to take part in community devel-opment. As long as the recommendations weretechnically feasible and economically viable, thelegitimate decision maker (city or communitycouncil) had no reason to reject them. After initialtest runs in the years 1972±1973 at the town ofSchwelm (considering a waste disposal facility),citizen panels were established in many commu-nities in Germany. From the 1970s to todayapproximately 26 cities or communities used citizenpanels as a method of local planning. More than2600 adults were involved in these panels for anaverage of 3±5 days each. A full run of all threesteps of the cooperative discourse method wasperformed in two large-scale applications:

(i) The most comprehensive study dealt with theevaluation of national energy policies. InAugust 1982, the German Ministry of Research

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and Technology initiated a large research pro-ject to investigate the preferences of the Ger-man population with respect to four energypolicy options developed by a parliamentarycommission in 1979 (Renn et al. 1985; Renn et al.1986; Dienel and Garbe, 1985). The Govern-ment was interested in eliciting reliable infor-mation on which energy scenario was mostappealing to the population and on what basiscitizens would evaluate the policy options laidout in each scenario. A research team in whichone of the authors served as senior investigatorconducted a 3-year study to collect data onpublic preferences and to analyze the motiva-tions and underlying reasons for the judgmentprocess of evaluating the prede®ned energyscenarios. The study operated with 24 citizenpanels (each including approximately 25 par-

ticipants) drawn from seven communities indifferent parts of West Germany. The panelsunanimously rejected a high energy supplyscenario and opted for an energy policy thatemphasized energy conservation and ef®cientuse of energy. Nuclear energy was perceived asnon-desirable butÐat least for an intermediatetime periodÐas a necessary energy source. Thepanellists recommended stricter environmentalregulation for fossil fuels even if this meanthigher energy prices. They developed a prioritylist for policies and drafted recommendationsfor implementing high priority policies (Dieneland Garbe, 1985).

(ii) A regional study was conducted from 1994 to1996 in the northern part of the Black Forest(Southern Germany). The objective was to havestockholders and citizens take part in planning

Figure 2. Basic concept and elements of the three-step participation model.

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a waste-management program (Akademie,1996). A round table with 16 major stakeholdergroups was organized in 1994 to develop wastereduction policies and to assess the potentialrecycling potential of the area. The samegroups also were asked to ®nd the most suit-able technical solution for waste processingbefore ®nal disposal. After these decisions weremade, 200 randomly selected citizens frompotential host communities were asked to ®ndthe most appropriate site for the types offacilities that had been chosen previously. Themost outstanding result was that panellistswere willing to approve a siting decision thatwould affect their own community.

In summary, the German applications of coop-erative discourse method provided some evidenceand recon®rmation that the theoretical expectationslinked to this method can be met on the local as wellas on the national level. It is a valid instrument toelicit preferences and educated responses of citizensin a rather short time period. Far from being anestablished planning tool, it has proven its viabilityand feasibility in different contexts and constitutesat least a serious alternative to other forms of publicinvolvement.

Swiss experiences

In 1992, the Building Department (Baudepartement)of the canton Aargau (Northern part of Switzerland)asked a research team at the Swiss Federal Instituteof Technology (including two of the authors O.Renn and H. Kastenholz) to organize a cooperativediscourse for siting one or several land®lls in theeastern part of the canton. The Building Departmentproposed, and the Cantonal Government approvedthe plan to construct a 1 million m3 land®ll. Beforeour involvement in the project, the BuildingDepartment characterized the need for new dis-posal facilities and chose 13 potential sites through amapping-elimination process. Our mandate was toorganize a cooperative discourse with four citizenpanels asked ®rst to develop criteria for comparingthe different sites; second, to evaluate the geologicaldata that were collected during that period; third, toeliminate the sites that should not be further con-sidered; and fourth, to prioritize the remaining siteswith respect to suitability to host a land®ll. Wemanaged to meet these objectives during the timefrom November 1992 to September 1993 (Webler,1994).

In late October of 1992, we asked the repre-sentatives (GemeinderaÈte) of the 13 communities in

which the potential sites were located to send onemember of the town council to serve on an over-sight committee (BehoÈrdendelegation). The over-sight committee consisted of one member of eachtown council and the director of the buildingdepartment. The oversight committee had thelegitimate right to make the ®nal recommendationto the Building Department. In addition, they wereasked to inform the public about the site selectionprocess, to review and critique the participationprocess, and to select the representatives from eachof their communities for the citizen panels.

The selection of representatives for the citizenpanels differed from our theoretical approach.Rather than use random selection, we gave theoversight committee the task to recruit and selectcitizen participants. The sponsoring agency wasconcerned about the legitimacy of the recommen-dations issued by the panels and felt that randomselection would not be seen as a legitimate way ofchoosing representatives. Using lotteries as a poli-tical means of achieving equity is alien to the Swisspolitical culture. In substitution we proposed thateither a town meeting or the community govern-ment nominate the representatives, with someassistance by the research team to encourage con-sideration of all relevant social and political view-points. We asked each community to select eightrepresentatives.

Once the representatives were chosen, four panelswere formed, each consisting of two representativesfrom each potential site community. With theexception of one community, every town sent eightpeople to the panels. Not one of these peopledropped out during the process. Between Januaryand June 1993 the panels met 7±9 times before theyattended a workshop of two days to come up withthe ®nal decision. All participants rated each site onthe basis of their self-selected evaluative criteria,their personal impressions, the written and oralinformation, and the results of consultations withexperts.

All four panels composed a list of prioritized sitesfor the land®ll. The most remarkable outcome wasthat each panel reached a unanimous decision. Eventhose participants whose towns were selected forthe short list of recommended sites agreed with thepanel's recommendations. Furthermore, the out-comes of the four groups were rather similar. The®rst priority site was the same for all panels. Therewere some minor differences in the order of theremaining priorities. To resolve this con¯ict, eachpanel appointed ®ve representatives to a super-panel. The superpanel met in September 1993 andissued a consensual list of ®ve sites ordered in a

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priority list. This list was later approved by theoversight committee and forwarded to the BuildingDepartment. In December of 1993, the result of theparticipation process was made public and thecanton government entered the next phase of thelicensing procedure.

American experiences

Using randomly selected citizens for policy makingand evaluation is not alien to the United States. TheJefferson Center in Minneapolis has conducted 14projects with citizen panels similar to the planningcells (Crosby et al. 1986). Several community plan-ners have experimented with citizen panels whichwere composed to re¯ect a representative sample ofthe population (cf. Kathlene and Martin, 1991).There has been one major attempt to implement theoriginal version of the cooperative discourse in theUnited States. In July 1988 the Department ofEnvironmental Protection of New Jersey asked aresearch team of Clark University directed by one ofthe authors, Ortwin Renn, to apply the model tosewage sludge management problems. The projectstarted in August 1988 and was completed in Sep-tember 1989. The objective of the project was to givecitizens of Hunterdon County, New Jersey, theopportunity to design the regulatory provisions foran experimental sludge application project on aRutgers University research farm located in Frank-lin Township (New Jersey).

Although much smaller in scale, the project pro-vided many new insights and experiences thatpartially con®rmed our German observations andpartially documented the need for adjustments tothe U.S. political culture. The project was organizedin a fashion similar to the German energy study. Weconducted the citizen panels on two consecutiveweekends. The desired goal was to elicit recom-mendations for regulatory provisions that should beincluded in the permit for the land application ofsewage sludge on the site in question.

The envisioned programme for the citizens panelwas radically altered after the participants, in par-ticular the land owners abutting the site, made itclear that they rejected the project of land applica-tion and that they felt more comfortable conductingtheir own meetings without assistance of a thirdparty. The citizens met several times without theassistance of a facilitator and formulated recom-mendations that were forwarded to the sponsor(New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-tion). The proposed sludge management project atthe Rutgers Experimental Farm was rejected by the

panellists. As a result of this recommendation,Rutgers University withdrew its proposal.

In addition to the policy recommendation to rejectthe proposal of land application, the process pro-vided us valuable information about citizen concernsand values. Whereas most of our consulted expertswere convinced that citizen concerns focused onissues such as odour, traf®c and contamination ofground water, the value tree analysis of the citizensrevealed that their major concerns were the expectedchange of community image from an agriculturalcommunity to a ``waste dump'' and the long-termeffects of pollutants on farmland (Renn et al. 1989). Inaddition, the questions of equity and fairness playeda major role in the citizen deliberations.

The unexpected change of the panel's structure toexclude us from further meetings was clear evidencethat the U.S audience is more sensitive to due processand methods of participation. Whereas in West Ger-many and Switzerland participants were almostgrateful and pleasantly surprised that someone madethe effort to pre-plan and structure a procedure fortheir participation, U.S. citizens distrust pre-fabri-cated participation models and suspect hiddenagendas with such an approach (Lynn, 1986). Inresponse to the desire of the participants to havecontrol over the process we think that it is advisableto have a meeting with the participants 2 weeksbefore the actual planning cells to discuss the agendaand the information material. During that pre-liminary meeting, the participants can be informedabout the process and the importance of the giventime schedule. They can also add points to the agendaor change the allocated time frame. This preventssurprise discussions or rebellions during the actualplanning cell procedure.

CONCLUSIONS

The objective of this paper was to review thepotential of mediations and public participation forresolving environmental con¯icts. The procedure ofpublic involvement is as much an issue of dissent asa problem of the subject matter itself. Politicians,stakeholders, experts and citizens have developed asensitivity for procedure and are aware that theycan exercise power in changing or delaying projects.The functioning of public involvement is, therefore,contingent on the approval of the technique ormodel of participation by the affected con-stituencies.

Involving citizens in the decision making processrequires careful planning, thoughtful preparation,and ¯exibility to change procedures on the demand

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of the affected constituencies. One might be temp-ted to ask: If citizen involvement is so dif®cult andpainful, why should anyone bother to promoteparticipation or go beyond the mandated publichearing to elicit citizens concerns? In addition tolegal requirements, the ®rst response to this ques-tion is that social acceptance of any policy is closelylinked with the perception of a fair procedure inmaking the decision (Rayner and Cantor, 1987). Thebest ``technical'' solution cannot be implemented ifthe process of decision making is perceived asunfair or biased. This is equally true for companiesin their quest to expand operation and gain publicsupport as well as public agencies in their mandateto regulate environmental performance.

The second response to this challenge is morefundamental: our own experiences from previousprojects and the implementation of our cooperativediscourse model indicate clearly that the public hassomething to contribute to the planning process.Experts and regulators are often restricted in theirassessment of a project and con®ne their analysis tothe typical risk factors. Local speci®cs or otherdimensions of concerns are often neglected. Publicparticipation helps to include these concerns in thedecision making process and to avoid potentialconsequences that the experts involved were notaware of (Crosby, 1986; Fiorino, 1989).

The central tenet to keep in mind, with publicparticipation projects, is that the public is in prin-ciple capable and wise in making prudent decisions.Public input is essential to make the right decision,and not only strategically necessary to gain accep-tance. The rationality of public input depends,however, on the procedure of involvement. Pro-vided citizens are given a conducive and supportivestructure for discourse, they are capable to under-stand and process environmental information andto articulate well-balanced recommendations. Thediscourse models are an attempt to design a pro-cedure that allows citizens to take advantage oftheir full potential and includes the professionalknowledge and expertise necessary to make pru-dent decisions. It has been our conviction that acarefully designed participation program will notonly be instrumental in resolving eminent con¯ictsamong different stakeholders and public groups,but also contribute to a climate of cooperation andmutual understanding.

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BIOGRAPHY

Prof. Ortwin Renn, Center of Technology Assess-ment in Baden-WuÈ rttemberg, Stuttgart 70565, Ger-many. Fax: +49 711 906 3299.

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