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Consociationalism and Regional Division - The Case of Belgium
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Consociationalism and Regional Division - The Case of Belgium
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A thesis presented
by
Kim, Soo Hyun
to Graduate Program
in International Area Studies Program in partial fulfillment of
the requirements
for the degree of Master of International Studies
Graduate School of International Studies Seoul National
University Seoul, Republic of Korea
February 2019
-
© Copyright by Kim, Soo Hyun 2019
All Rights Reserved
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i
Abstract
Regional divisions and secessionist movements in the
European
Union call for domestic and international attention and is
augmenting to be
a bigger issue that impacts politics at every level of the
society: micro-level,
regional, national, and EU. Manifested particularly in
multinational
states, however, independence movements derived from ambitions
for more
autonomy, security, economic freedom, etc., are a historical
phenomenon.
Why secede? It is a question that has kept its place to impact
many countries
not only within the EU but around the world. The ongoing
secessionist
movements (i.e. Catalonia, Scotland) pose a major challenge to
the
European Union (EU) and its member states. Even though the
Scottish and
Catalan independence referenda have failed to pass, it has
become globally
evident that a fair number of subnational regions in the EU are
making their
endeavors to claim independence for reasons including but not
limited to a
greater autonomy, linguistic and cultural difference, and
economic
discrepancy. Belgium, in this context, though having had the
similar reasons
of cause for its subnational region’s demand for independence,
has not held
a referendum or shown major intent for secession from either of
the two
regions (Flanders and Wallonia). What does Belgium have that
keeps itself
from being unified despite all the unfavorable circumstances?
Does its
power-sharing system have anything to do with it? If so, by how
much, and
is it effective in Belgium? What role does consociationalism
play in
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ii
Belgium’s subnational regions to make endeavors of achieving
regional
independence? This research purports the reasons behind
Belgium’s
malingering propensity towards regional independence and to test
the
relationship between regional division and consociational
tradition. I
hypothesize that there is a correlation between the dependent
variable
(regional division) and independent variable (consociational
tradition), and
that Belgium’s long-established tradition of consociationalism
is
encumbering the regions’ action towards an outright, de jure
secession.
Keywords: Consociationalism; regional division; secession;
European
Union; Belgium
Student ID Number: 2017-23410
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iii
List of Abbreviations
COCOF: French Community Commission in Brussels
EP: European Parliament
EU: European Union
FPTP: first-past-the-post (plurality formula)
LSq: least-squares index (Gallagher index)
N-VA: Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie
PR: proportional representation
VB: Vlaams Belang
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iv
Table of Contents
I. Introduction 1
II. Research Design 4
2.1 Methodology 4
2.2 Variables and units of analysis 6
2.3 Definitions 7
III. Theoretical Framework 11
3.1 Consociative democratic country 11
IV. Literature Review 13
4.1 Historical background 13
4.2 The consociationalist logic 28
4.3 Debate on the validity of consociationalism 39
V. Macro Level of Analysis 50
5.1 How consociational is Belgium? 50
5.2 Is consociationalism keeping Belgium united? 55
VI. Micro Level of Analysis 60
VII. Conclusion 69
Appendix 74
References 84
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v
Tables and Figures
TABLE 1Q.130 EVOLUTION OF THE BELGIAN STATE
............................................... 6
TABLE 2 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY,
CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY, AND CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY
(ADAPTED FROM LIJPHART 1984, 1989:40,
1999)................................................ 9
TABLE 3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE
LEVELS, PLANNING LEVELS AND PLANNING INSTRUMENTS
.................... 17
TABLE 4 LEGAL TERMINOLOGY OF ACTS, DECREES, ORDINANCES AND
DECISIONS IN A FEDERAL BELGIUM
................................................................
19
TABLE 5 AVERAGE ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE 1995-2003 (%), BELGIAN
REGIONS
...................................................................................................................
21
TABLE 6 LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS (%), BELGIAN REGIONS
.................... 22
TABLE 7 COUNTRIES, ETHNIC GROUPS, AND GROUP-YEARS
............................. 36
TABLE 8 MEASURING SEPARATISM
...........................................................................
37
TABLE 9 MODEL OF ETHNIC SEPARATISM
...............................................................
38
TABLE 10 CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTEMPORARY ELECTORAL SYSTEMS,
2000
............................................................................................................................
43
TABLE 11 MEAN, STD, MAX, AND MEAN OF INCLUSIVE AND
DISPERSIVE
POWER-SHARING INDEX
......................................................................................
52
TABLE 12 ANALYSIS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND CONTROL
VARIABLES
....................................................................................................................................
66
TABLE 13 ANALYSIS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
................................................................................................................
71
FIGURE 1 PERCENTAGE OF EACH REGION’S SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE _
2
FIGURE 2 ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS IN BELGIUM
_______________________14
FIGURE 3 BELGIUM AND ITS REGIONS, COMMUNITIES, PROVINCES,
MUNICIPALITIES _________________________________________________
15
FIGURE 4 THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL BELGIUM _______
16
FIGURE 5 COMPARISON OF EACH REGIONS' GDP PER CAPITA (2006-2016)
__ 21
FIGURE 6 AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME IN BELGIUM FROM 2006 TO 2016,
BY
REGION (IN EUROS)
_______________________________________________ 22
FIGURE 7 TRENDS IN TYPES OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS USED
WORLDWIDE,
1973-2003
_________________________________________________________ 42
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vi
FIGURE 8 LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY BY TYPE OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM, 2000
45
FIGURE 9 LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY BY TYPE OF CONSTITUTION __________
48
FIGURE 10 TRENDS IN DEMOCRATIZATION BY TYPE OF CONSTITUTION ___
49
FIGURE 11 SCATTER PLOT OF DISPERSIVE AND INCLUSIVE
POWER-SHARING
INDEX AMONG 29 COUNTRIES _____________________________________
53
FIGURE 12 EMPIRICAL LOCATION OF 36 COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO
LIJPHART’S DIMENSIONS OF CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY _____________
54
FIGURE 13 THE CORE SEQUENTIAL STEPS IN CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY __
59
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1
I. Introduction
Secessionist movements and regional divisions in the
European
Union call for domestic and international attention and is
augmenting to be
a bigger issue that impacts politics at every level of the
society: micro-level,
regional, national, and EU. Manifested particularly in
multinational
states, however, independence movements derived from ambitions
for more
autonomy, security, economic freedom, etc., are a historical
phenomenon.
Why secede? It is a question that has kept its place to impact
many countries
not only within the EU but around the world. Following the 1648
Peace of
Westphalia, each nation state gained exclusive sovereignty over
its territory,
which ended up with hundreds of nations across the whole
European
continent squashed and grouped in a little over 50 states, very
few of which
that is over 90 percent ethnically homogenous (Connor, 1972).
Seeing from
this angle, then, it is not an erratic idea for some regions to
have a desire to
become independent and is rather much acceptable. As Duerr puts
it,
different languages, cultures, historic, and these diversities
signify that
“state is the most important vehicle of a people” (Duerr,
2015).
After the establishment of the EU upon the signing of the Treaty
of
Rome, no notable claims for outright secession amongst the
member states
were significantly recognized until recently, when the world saw
and
became alerted by the seriousness of such regions as Catalonia
and Scotland
demanding for de jure independence (see Figure 1). Flanders in
Belgium, in
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2
this context, though having had the similar motives and driving
force to call
for a referendum for self-sufficiency, has rather stayed
relatively calm. What
does Belgium have that keeps itself from being unified despite
all the
unfavorable circumstances? Does its power-sharing system have
anything to
do with it? If so, by how much, and is it effective in Belgium?
What role
does consociationalism play in Belgium’s subnational regions to
make
endeavors of achieving regional independence?
Figure 1 Percentage of each region’s support for
independence1
Among many other scholars, Arend Lijphart has strongly been
arguing that Belgium “is not just a complete example of
consociational
democracy: it is the most perfect, most convincing, and most
impressive
1 Flanders: Norsk Senter for Forskningsdata
(http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/belgium/)
shows the percentage of support for Vlaams Belang, which is a
right-wing populist and Flemish nationalist political party in the
Flemish Region and Brussels of Belgium that calls for an outright
secession. Catalonia: Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió. Scotland: ScotCen
(http://www.scotcen.org.uk/media/1361407/ssa16-2fr8m-1ndyref-2-1ndyr8f-tw0-two.pdf).
0
10
20
30
40
50
Flanders
Catalonia
Scotland
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3
example of a consociation. Hence Belgium provides a highly
valuable
model that may be of great practical utility for other divided
societies
aspiring to democracy and peaceful coexistence” (Lijphart,
1980).
Consociationalism, in simple terms, is a type of democracy that
is designed
to reconcile societal fragmentations along linguistic, ethnic,
or religious
lines, regulate class conflict, and manages to establish a
stable power-
sharing system in which all groups, including minorities, are
well
represented on the political and economic levels.
According to the consociational model, citizens should
remain
deferent and passive (Lijphart, 1968; Bogaards, 1998) because
their
participation would hinder the fragile consociation between the
segments
(Huyse, 1970). Citizens’ input has been minimal in the process
of
federalization of Belgium throughout the years, and so it
becomes more
important to study how citizens view the future of Belgium in
terms of the
type of democracy they are living in because although they may
not be the
drivers of the political dynamics, they are supporters or at
least recipients of
politics and policies.
By using consociationalism as theoretical framework, of which
its
details will be explained in the later chapters, I will examine
the case of
Belgium in order to find the relationship between Belgium’s
consociation
model and regional division. There have been studies that
assesses the level
of consociationalism embedded in Belgium and how the model
prevents
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4
Belgium from having regional secessions. However, they are done
in the
macro level; in other words, no studies have been conducted in
the micro
level that tests whether consociationalism acts as a restraint
to having a
regional division in Belgium. The main aim of this thesis is to
fill this
research gap by testing the two most important characteristics
of
consociationalism with the dependent variable regional division,
by using a
survey data.2
II. Research Design
2.1 Methodology
This study conducts both qualitative and quantitative research.
First,
through literature review, I go through different studies
conducted, which
mostly focus on macro level analysis on consociationalism that
unites
Belgium and hinders from calling for regional independence. In
terms of
qualitative research, it uses an ethnographic model, in the
field of
anthropology, to study the culture of Belgium and its
relationship with
consociationalism and regional secession. Specifically, it first
explores what
consociationalism in the context of Belgium and sees what types
of defining
characteristics there exist. The process is also carried out in
pursuance of
identifying control variables that must be kept constant. The
macro level of
2 2007 General Election Study Belgium dataset compiled by
Institute for Social and Political Opinion Research / Point d’appui
interuniversitaire sur l’Opinion publique et la Politique
(ISPO/PIOP)
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5
analysis is divided into two parts: first, by using dataset
compiled by Strøm
et al. (2015) that measures consociationalism through related
variables
across 180 countries, I test how consociational Belgium is both
by itself and
compared to other countries; second, relying on past literature,
I examine
the characteristics of consociational framework embedded in
Belgium, of
which keeps the country from being united and not having a
regional
division.
Then, through the micro level of analysis, I test (two most
important
factors recognized by Lijphart: grand coalition and segmental
autonomy) in
order to find out the relationship between regional division
and
consociationalism by using a survey data. The data has a few
questions that
ask the respondents regarding grand coalition and segmental
autonomy
(Appendix II), of which I use as indicators. I then analyze the
distribution of
each variable, and do a crosstab analysis according to people
living in
Flanders and Wallonia for each question. Then, I conduct a
regression
analysis. For the dependent variable, regional division, I use a
question that
asks people from each region:
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6
Table 1Q.130 Evolution of the Belgian State Raw (absolute)
frequencies Percentages for Flanders
Percentages for Wallonia
1. The unitarian Belgian state should be restored.
496 11.5 43.0
2. The federal state should stay, but with more power to the
central government than it is now the case.
353 11.4 22.4
3. The present situation should be kept.
366 20.9 13.7
4. The federal state should stay, but with more power to the
communities and regions than it is now the case.
682 48.2 18.7
5. Belgium should split. 106 7.9 2.1 2003 100.0 100.0 7. Don’t
know 35 9. No answer 10 I set the variable to take the values zero
and one as a binary-response:
responses from 1 to 3 as 0, which put more emphasis on federal
level
Belgian state, and responses from 4 to 5 as 1, which put more
emphasis on
regional autonomy. Refer to Appendix II for details on the
questions that I
use for independent variables.
2.2 Variables and units of analysis
The dependent variable used in this study is regional division,
and
the independent variable is consociational framework, which
is
characterized by four principles: grand coalition, mutual
veto,
proportionality, and segmental autonomy. According to Lijphart,
who has
conceptualized the term, recognizes grand coalition and
segmental
autonomy as the most significant factors (Lijphart, 1979,
p.500), and so
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7
these two characteristics will be used to test against the
dependent variable,
regional division.
2.3 Definitions
Consociationalism, federalism, and power-sharing
Consociationalism and federalism, are two interrelated concepts
that
must be distinguished in in discourses regarding institutional
apparatus of
corresponding ethnic and national diversity (Lijphart,
1979).
Consociationalism, among other factors, necessitates power
sharing among
the majorities and minorities, whereas federalism requires the
authority to
be “divided between central and provincial governments, of which
both
exploit constitutionally separate competencies” (O’Leary, 2001:
49-52). So,
federations can be consociations, but not all federations can
be
consociations (Lijphart, 1977: 513). Lijphart, after 1969,
started using the
term ‘power sharing’ as a synonym for consociational democracy
for the
reason that ‘power sharing’ is simple to pronounce and is not
esoteric,
compared to the word ‘consociational.’ Power-sharing is what
Lijphart
identified with four characteristics of what he also termed
consociationalism:
(1) grand coalition; executive power sharing, (2) mutual veto
(3)
proportionality, and (4) segmental autonomy, such as federalism.
And so,
throughout the paper, power-sharing and consociationalism or
consociational democracy / tradition are used interchangeably.
Another
point worth to mention is, the difference between consensus
democracy and
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8
consociational democracy, two terms that are synonymously used
to each
other. However, they are not coterminous to each other. Although
they both
represent non-majoritarian types of democracy, consensus
democracy
focuses more on formal system, while consociational democracy
is
recommended for deeply-divided societies like Belgium, as
consociational
democracy is more practical. Specifically, consensus democracy
encourages
power sharing, while consociational democracy goes further and
prescribes
the methods for related parties to participate in power sharing.
In that regard,
I intend to use consociational democracy as opposed to
consensus
democracy in my paper for the reasons that it is more practical
and is a
better medicine for deeply-divided societies.
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9
Table 2 The characteristics of majoritarian democracy, consensus
democracy, and consociational democracy (adapted from Lijphart
1984,
1989:40, 1999) Majoritarian democracy
Consensus democracy
Consociational democracy
1. Minimal winning cabinets
1. Oversized cabinets 1. Segmental society
2. Cabinet dominance over legislature
2. Separation of powers
2. Grand coalition
3. Two-party system 3. Multi-party system 3. Proportionality 4.
Plurality system of elections
4. Proportional representation
4. Segmental autonomy
5. Pluralist interest group system
5. Corporatist interest group
5. Mutual (minority) veto
6. Unicameralism 6. Bicameralism 7. Unitary, centralized
government
7. (Non-)territorial federalism and decentralizations
8. Flexible constitution 8. Entrenched constitution
9. Parliamentary sovereignty
9. Judicial review
10. Dependent central bank
10. Independent central bank
Types of power-sharing
Power-sharing is divided into three types: inclusive,
dispersive, and
constraining. Inclusive power sharing is a type of system that
covers two of
Lijphart’s consociationalism yardsticks: grand coalition and
mutual veto.
Dispersive power sharing is an institution that distributes
segmental
autonomy like federalism among the decision makers. Constraining
power
sharing includes institutions that exist to protect individual
and social
groups’ rights from “encroachments and predation by, for
example,
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10
politicians or armed forces” (Strøm, 2015). Because power
sharing covers
different institutions, all three types have been included to be
analyzed in
the quantitative analysis.
Secession, regional division, devolution, independence,
separatism
The central variable in this study is regional division, also
called
secession, separatism, devolution, and independence, all of
which this paper
uses interchangeably, after having discussed their differences.
According to
Michael Stein, separatism is the “advocacy of separation or
secession by a
group or people from a larger political unit to which it
belongs” (Stein,
2006). Furthermore, many studies have examined the relationship
between
devolution and secession, particularly focusing on whether
devolution
fosters secession. There are mainly two opposing groups: a
school of
scholars that maintains the idea that devolution is an antidote
against
secession, and the other that contends consociationalism
actually fuels
secessionist aspirations. The former group supports the idea
that
consociationalism exacerbates secessionism within nationalism,
while the
latter group that opposes the given matter contends that Nagle
argues that
consociationalism “allied to regional devolution provides a
logical context
for the context for the paradoxical situation of contemporary
Irish
nationalism” (Nagle, 2013).
The next section presents a theoretical framework through which
we
can identify consociational framework and Belgium as a country
with
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11
profound social divisions, but at the same time the first and
foremost
democratic country.
III. Theoretical Framework
3.1 Consociative democratic country
Belgium has maintained itself as a politically consolidated
country
with rather sui generis conceptions that are obscure to
Anglo-Saxon
academic discourse (De Winter et al. 2006). Among them, such
terms
include verzuiling or pillarisation, partitocracy, dissociative
federalism, etc.
The most discussed and debatably credible disciplinary jargon
is
‘consociationalism,’ of which its context is most analyzed by
Arend Lijphart
as the “government by elite cartel to turn a democracy with a
fragmented
political culture into a stable democracy.” (Lijphart 1969:
216).
Consociationalism, simply put, is power-sharing. As explained in
the
previous chapters, Belgium is a country that is constitutionally
divided in
political, cultural, linguistically, and ethnically divided.
Nonetheless, it
manages to remain as a stable state, which makes Belgium a
‘consociational
state.’ Lijphart stated that “Belgium is the most through
example of a
consociational democracy,” and that it “is the most perfect,
most convincing,
and most impressive example of a consociation” ( Lijphart,
1981). Lijphart
recognizes four major organizational characteristics of a
consociational
democracy (Lijphart, 1981):
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12
1. A grand coalition; executive power-sharing. Grand
coalition
denotes that the “political leaders of all of the segments of
the plural
society jointly govern the country” (Lijphart 1979). It is also
used
interchangeably with the term ‘power-sharing,’ and the elites
make
efforts to gather with the interest of making consolidation, as
they
recognize the problems that will be brought upon if they do
not
cooperate. In the case of Belgium, the Belgian constitution
states
that “with the possible exception of the Prime Minister, the
Cabinet
comprises an equal number of French-speaking and
Dutch-speaking
Ministers.”3
2. Mutual veto. Synonymous with the ‘concurrent majority’4
principle,
mutual veto provides a guarantee that a share of power is not to
be
outvoted when main interests are at stake. Majority role is
ratified by
consensus, and mutuality that forms in mutual veto means that
“the
minority is unlikely to successfully block the majority.”
(Lijphart
1977).
3. Proportionality. Proportionality, which is opposite from the
winner-
take-all majoritarian rule, refers to representation based
on
population. It acts as a special safeguard to minorities and
the
3 Belgian constitution, Article 86B. 4 Coined by John C.
Calhoun, concurrent majority is a constitutional means to enable
minorities to block the actions of majorities that could threaten
the rights of the minorities by making them veto groups.
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13
fundamental standard for “political representation, civil
service
appointments, and the allocation of public funds” (Lijphart
1979).
Also, political representation is based on the percentage of
population.
4. Segmental autonomy and federalism. Segmental autonomy
purports
that “decision-making authority is delegated to the separate
segments as much as possible” (Lijphart 1979). Distinguished
from
the majority rule, it is indicated as minority rule “over the
minority
itself in matters that are the minority’s exclusive concern”
(Ibid.).
Complemented with the principle of grand coalition, it
allows
decisions of common interest to be jointly made by the leaders
of
segments; however, on other matters, decision-making is placed
to
each section. Through segmental autonomy, a sense of
individuality
is created, and it allows for disparate societal laws based on
culture.
These four characteristics will be used throughout the paper in
defining the
independent variable ‘consociationalism.’
IV. Literature Review
4.1 Historical background
This section expounds upon the background history of Belgium as
a
country and Belgium’s political structure as well as regional
information in
order to better grasp the lowdown of Belgium’s consociational
tradition.
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14
Situated in the North-West region of Europe, Belgium covers an
area of
30,528 square kilometers and has a population of approximately
11.27
million. Belgium’s capital and largest city is Brussels, and its
neighboring
countries include France, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg. The
politics ensue in the structure of a federal, representative
democratic,
constitutional monarchy.
Figure 2 Administrative Regions in Belgium
Belgium has three Regions that are each defined by its
Constitution:
the Walloon Region, the Flemish Region, and the Region of
Brussels-
Capital. Belgium also has three Communities that are discrete
from Regions:
the Flemish Community, the French Community, and the
German-Speaking
Community. Pursuant to the Constitution, a substantial degree of
autonomy
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15
is appropriated to the Regions and Communities, and each Region
and
Community:
“has a parliament, known as a Council (of the Region or the
Community) and an executive, the Government (of the Region or
the
Community). The Regional and Community Councils are directly
elected every five years;
passes decrees (ordinances in the case of the Region of
Brussels-
Capital) which have the force of statute;
controls their own budget, whose considerable resources come
from
both fiscal and non-fiscal revenues” (Istaz, 2000).
Figure 2 Belgium and its Regions, Communities, Provinces,
Municipalities
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16
There exists an asymmetry in the structure of institutions
between
the Regions (See Figure 4). In 1980, there was a unification of
the Regional
and Community on the Flemish side, which resulted in the
Flemish
Community being accountable for matters in both Community and
regions.
Also, “parts of responsibilities of the French Community are
transferred to
the Walloon side, and responsibilities of the French Community
that
concern Brussels are transferred to the French Community
Commission in
Brussels” (COCOF).
Figure 3 The institutional structure of federal Belgium
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17
Table 3 Relationship between the political-administrative
levels,
planning levels and planning instruments5 Political level
Planning level Instruments Status Belgium (federation)
Belgium None None
Region Region (3) Regional structure plan -Brussels (1)
-Flanders (1) -Wallonia (1) Regional destination plan -Brussels (1)
-Flanders (1)
Adopted (1995) Adopted (1997) In preparation In preparation
N/A
Planning region -Brussels (1) -Flanders (25) -Wallonia (23)
Regional plan None
Sub-region -Brussels (1) -Flanders (25) -Wallonia (23)
Sub-regional plan -Brussels (1) -Flanders (25) -Wallonia
(23)
Adopted, will be replaced by the Regional destination plan
Adopted some under revision Adopted some under revision
Province Province -Flanders (5) -Brussels Capital (0) -Wallonia
(5)
Flanders -Provincial structure plan -Provincial destination
plans
All in preparation
Municipality Municipality -Brussels (19) -Flanders (308)
-Wallonia (262)
Brussels -Municipal destination plan Flanders -Municipal
destination plan -Municipal structure plan Wallonia -Municipal
structure plan
In preparation Some adopted Some in preparation Some adopted
Sub-municipality Brussels -Particular destination plan Flanders
-Particular destination plan -Spatial implementation plan Wallonia
-Particular destination plan
Some adopted Several adopted N/A Several adopted
The number between (brackets) refers to the number of regions,
sub-regions, etc. 5 The EU compendium of spatial planning systems
and policies – Belgium (2000). Directorate-General for Regional and
Urban Policy (European Commission), European Commission.
CX-10-97-542-EN-C.
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/7b4561d9-56a3-43e6-94d4-373928195f67
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18
Legal Framework
Elections in Belgium hold a legal framework that constitutes
the
Constitution, the Electoral Code, and process legislations. The
bicameral
federal parliament that embodies the 150-member House of
Representatives
and the 60-member Senate, of which all the MPs serve five-year
terms.
Within the regional proportional representation (PR) system, the
members
of the House of Representatives are elected, and the number of
seats per
each constituency out of 11 that correspond to the Provinces are
allotted
according to official population figures. The Senate is composed
of 60
members. Acts are what the legislative power of the federal
state exercises.
Decrees are enacted with the exercise of the legislative power
of the
Communities and Regions. Ordinances (or
Ordonnanties/Ordonnances) are
exercised in the case of Brussels Capital Region.
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19
Table 4 Legal terminology of Acts, Decrees, Ordinances and
Decisions in a federal Belgium6
Name Issued by Type Act Federal Parliament Legislation Decree
Flemish Council Legislation
Council Walloon Region
Legislation
Council French Community
Legislation
Council German-Speaking Community
Legislation
Ordinance Council of the Brussels Capital Region
Legislation
Royal Decree King and federal ministers
Implementation of an Act
Decision of the regional government
Regional government Implementation of a Decree or Ordinance
Decision of the community government
Community government
Implementation of a Decree
Ministerial decision Federal minister Implementation of a Royal
Decree
Regional minister Implementation of a Decision of the regional
government
Community minister Implementation of a Decision of the community
government
Voter registration and voting methods
As I intend to use a survey data in my micro level
quantitative
analysis based on Belgium General Election, it must be mentioned
how
voting works in the country, who gets to vote, etc. First, “all
citizens above
6 Ibid.
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20
the age of 18 who are registered in a municipality or a
diplomatic
representation and are not deprived of their voting rights by
court order are
eligible to vote. As of 1 March 2014, 8,003,856 voters were
registered for
the elections, including 129,139 out-of-country voters.”7 Voters
are
registered by municipalities, not by themselves. Furthermore,
“the law
offers five options for casting a ballot: voting in person or
via proxy at
polling stations in Belgium or, for citizens residing abroad, to
vote in person
or via proxy in diplomatic and consular representations or by
mail. Voters
residing abroad must indicate their voting option and their
municipality
when registering with the consulate” (Ibid.). In special cases
such as voters
being in prison or in military service, ill, etc., he or she may
appoint a proxy
to vote on their behalf.
Social and economic cleavages between the regions in Belgium
The two most apparent cleavages between Flanders and Wallonia
are
related to issues with language and economy. The former, as
explained in
detail previously, deals not only with the fact that the three
communities do
not interact and make a concession of which of the three
official languages
to use in the micro level, but also that in and around Brussels,
the Flemish
and French-speakers cohabit and incite “struggles about
political
representation and language use in public services”
(Vandecasteele et al.,
7 Kingdom of Belgium: Federal Elections 25 May 2014. OSCE/ODIHR
NEEDS ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT.
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21
2012). The latter is a rift that concerns a historical issue, in
which the hub of
economic engine in Belgium has shifted from Wallonia in the 19th
century
to Flanders throughout the 20th century, as Wallonia succeeded
in industrial
modernization with heavy steel and coal industries.
Table 5 Average economic growth rate 1995-2003 (%), Belgian
regions
Flanders 2.2 Wallonia 1.6 Source: IRES, INR, Regional Accounts,
2005 – Voka.
Figure 4 Comparison of each regions' GDP per capita
(2006-2016)
Overall, socioeconomic indicators show favorable results for
Flanders. For example, in 2016, GDP per capita in euro
purchasing parity in
Flanders was 38,288 euros while in Wallonia it was 27,220 euros.
Also the
rate of unemployment appears to be much higher in Wallonia than
in
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
euro
s
Brussels Flanders Wallonia
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22
Flanders: 9.8% in Wallonia and 4.4% in Flanders.8 Furthermore,
Flanders’
Gross Regional Product grew by 30% since 1990, whereas the rate
was 20%
for Wallonia. The average annual incomes for both Flanders and
Wallonia
are increasing, but with the constant disparity of 12-13% change
between
the two regions (See Figure 6).
Table 6 Labour market indicators (%), Belgian regions
Employment rate (2017) Unemployment rate (2017) Flanders 77.7 4
Wallonia 67.7 10.5
Figure 5 Average annual income in Belgium from 2006 to 2016, by
region (in euros)
8 Source: Statbel. bestat.economie.fgov.be
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Flemish Region Brussels-Capital Region Walloon Region
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23
In regard to the emergence of the two most evident cleavages
–
linguistic and regional cleavages in Belgium, scholars are
largely divided
into two groups in their lines of argument. Specifically, the
arguments are
based on the fundamental question of whether such conflicts such
as
political crisis are a product of cleavages, or vice versa.
Lipset and Rokkan
introduce passe-partout theory (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) in
their
comparative study on social cleavages and political consensus.
They claim
that conflicts are developed from cleavages, having incited from
a
revolution between “central nation-building elements and
cultural
peripheries” (Ibid.). In other words, rather than cleavages
being the product
of conflicts, communal conflicts, such as politicization of
language, are the
result of a cleavage. Whereas Urwin contends that the
“center-periphery
cleavage coincided to a marked extent with the linguistic
division of the
country,” (Urwin, 1970) Hill and Zolberg also argue that such
cleavage
could not have been forged along the linguistic lines (Hill,
1974).
Furthermore, Huyse maintains that although the Francophone was
culturally
apart from the major population, they were still very much
active in the
political sense, seeing that the politically active minority in
the Flanders
region were the Francophone (Huyse, 1981). In fact, what
triggered the
process of linguistic politicization, according to Zolberg, is
industrialization
from 1850, as it increased the relative costs of linguistic
disadvantages.
Specifically, as industrialization grew, the tertiary sector of
jobs such as
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24
management and white-collar occupations demanded more of skills
owing
to language-specific training rather than that of physical. And
so, more and
more jobs involved selecting those with formal education and
training, “all
of which increased the significance of language in the
allocation of scarce
resources” (Ibid.). Aside from language politicization,
industrialization also
changed the two distinct regions in terms of economic status.
Prior to
industrialization, Wallonia was economically far better off with
its rich land
and raw materials as well as resources that fostered the
region’s mining and
metallurgy. Huyse terms Flemish as the “language of
backwardness, French
the tongue of modernism, culture, and dynamic change,” as
modernization
and industrialization “laid the first sociological foundations
for the
transformation of a linguistic prise de conscience into an
ethnic we-feeling”
(Ibid.). Furthermore, Huyse specifies another factor that led to
politicization
in Belgium – the establishment of universal suffrage. In 1893,
the first
reform allowed all male adults to vote, which meant that Flemish
people
became better off, as Flanders had a bigger demographic
population and a
higher birth rate than the Wallonia region. In 2007, Belgium
underwent a
political crisis due to diverging parties and some of which had
ambitions for
independence. Specifically, its liberal New Flemish Alliance
from Flanders
and the pro-unity Socialist Party from Wallonia hindered the
federal
government to form a coalition, which ended up Belgium to
undergo 300
days of political deadlock. In ‘Belgium as a Crucial Test of
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25
Consociationalism: The 2007-2011 Political Crisis,’ Zsofia Pales
challenges
consociationalism as a method for mitigating ethnic conflicts in
Belgium,
and argues that consociationalism itself is the reason for and
is actually a
causal factor for the 2007-2011 political crisis, as the
“institutions provide
the means and incentives for ethnic parties to have more extreme
demands
and pursue a road towards secession.” (Pales, 2011). The
methodology Pales
uses to determine whether consociationalism is the cause for
Belgium’s
ethnic conflict is process-tracing, of which it is the means for
figuring out
the origins of the crisis by exploring “the chain of events of
the decision-
making process by which initial case conditions are translated
into case
outcomes” (Van Evera, 1997). Pales distinguishes several factors
that led to
the political deadlock. First, she recognizes the economic
disparity between
the Flemish region and the Walloon region as the most
significant factor.
She also identifies the Brussels-Halle Vilvoorde (BHV) conflict,
which is a
sensitive dispute in Belgium that has led to the 2007-2011
political crisis as
one of the major actors. The conflict involves around linguistic
cleavage, in
which the area embodies the bilingual Brussels-Capital Region as
well as
thirty-five municipalities in the Flemish Region. With this
division, the
French-speaking parties “can canvas for votes with their leading
politicians
in federal and European elections in the thirty-five Flemish
municipalities.
In return, Flemish residents of Brussels can vote for Flemish
candidates in
Halle-Vilvoorde. However, consociationalism itself cannot be the
reason for
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26
the political crisis and is actually the factor that has abated
the conflict by
pushing towards the elite cartel to form commitment to the
cohesion of the
political system and constitute a grand coalition.
Pro-independence parties in Flanders
The only political party in Flanders that calls for outright
independence from Belgium is Vlaams Belang (translates to
Flemish
Interest), which sets independence as its highest priority, of
which is stated
in every party publication, broadcast, and statement. Their
belief in a
nutshell is that every problem in Flanders can be more easily
fixed if
Flanders become independent. Vlaams Belang started as Vlaams
Blok in
1977 with very extreme platforms on constitutional reform and
introducing
itself as a radical party (Laible 2001, 230). Vlaams Blok
gradually gained
support, and in 1999, it gained 12 seats. However, in early
2000s, the party
was judged in a court to be racist, so it had to be disbanded.
It then changed
its name to Vlaams Belang (VB), and also adjusted its image from
being
radical to being conservative. Conforming to traditional Western
values, it
opposes to multiculturalism but is open to immigrants who are
willing to
become Flemings:
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27
The former Vlaams Blok, as well as Vlaams Belang at the
initial
stages of its commencement was radical, Eurosceptic, and not
open to
immigration and minorities. However, as can be observed in the
interview,
people are changing to previously banned ideas and opening up to
non-
European immigrants.
Practical and legal obstacles for Flanders to achieve
independence
There are no major indication of Flanders to secede from Belgium
in
the near future, and even if the societal inclination becomes
favorable
towards its independence, Flanders does not have the ability to
make a quick,
outright independence. In order for Flanders to achieve de jure
secession,
there still remain legal obstacles that it needs to undergo.
First, a re-
negotiation of accession to the EU needs to be completed, and
even when
the negotiation is successful, it needs to have its membership
approved by
all the EU member states. Furthermore, such issues as European
citizenship,
currency, and adaptation of international treaties must be
concluded.
“We are a Flemish party and we are fighting for Flemish
interests and identity, so
if there are immigrants who agree and consider themselves as
part of our society,
that is a good thing and we agree. We welcome that. But we only
work with them
as such, as people who have integrated into our society. So we
don’t want to reach
out to them as Moroccan and Turks or whatever. If these people
consider
themselves Flemings, well we do too, then we don’t have any
reason to do
anything special for them. (Duerr’s interview with MEP Philip
Claeys (2003-
present) on April 9, 2010).
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28
4.2 The consociationalist logic
Lijphart recommends a set of policies that can mitigate the
challenges faced by deeply-divided societies like Belgium.
Focusing on
constitutional engineering, Lijphart’s set of recommendations
puts emphasis
on power sharing and autonomy. As broad as the two factors might
sound,
they are in fact optimal and crucial for societies that endeavor
to achieve
democracy by overcoming such obstacles of having different
cultures or
languages within one society, or subdivisions that are not
parallel in terms
of economic status, etc. These two elements are the two most
important
characteristics of consociational democracy, and when the
basic
requirements are met, divided societies are able to achieve
power sharing
democracy with group autonomy. This is mentioned because
this
constitutional design presented by Lijphart is not a
one-size-fits-all. In
particular, as mentioned, Horowitz has constantly criticized
consociationalism that it cannot be easily adopted due to the
specific
requirements that the societies should be equipped with.
However, once
implemented correctly, states are able to enjoy a full-fledged
consociational
democracy, as did Belgium, South Africa, and Lebanon. In other
words,
states need to actually work to be able to achieve
consociationalism. For
example, Belgium implemented a policy that require equal numbers
of the
two major ethnolinguistic groups (i.e Flanders and Wallonia);
South Africa
granted “all parties with a minimum of 5 percent of the
legislative seats the
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29
right to be presented in the cabinet”; and Lebanon “permanently
earmarked
the presidency for one group and the prime ministership for
another”
(Lijphart, 2007). Lijphart further puts forward nine areas of
constitutional
design.
The legislative electoral system
The three major electoral systems include proportional
representation (PR), majoritarian system, and intermediate
systems. Among
the three, Lijphart praises PR to be most effective for
deeply-divided
societies. Horowitz, in contrary, suggests majoritarian system
to be a better
choice; however, Larry Diamond contends that “If any
generalization about
institutional design is suitable… it is that majoritarian
systems are ill-
advised for countries with deep ethnic, regional, religious, or
other
emotional and polarizing divisions. Where cleavage groups are
sharply
defined and group identities (and intergroup insecurities and
suspicions)
deeply felt, the overriding imperative is to avoid broad and
indefinite
exclusion from power of any significant group (Diamond,
1999).
Guidelines within PR
Even after narrowed down with PR, societies need to
determine
which type of PR to settle down with. Lijphart recommends to
choose the
simplest system to operate, especially for states that are newly
introduced to
democracy. Once set, “several desiderata can be derived: a high,
but not
necessarily perfect, degree of proportionality; multi-member
districts that
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30
are not too large, in order to avoid creating too much distance
between
voters and their representatives; list PR, in which parties
present lists of
candidates to the voters, instead of the rarely used single
transferable vote,
in which voters have to rank order individual candidates; and
closed or
almost closed lists, in which voters mainly choose parties
instead of
individual candidates within the list” (Lijphart, 2007).
Parliamentary or presidential government
Lijphart’s next concern is the choice between the different
forms of
government, namely parliamentary, presidential, and
semi-presidential.
Lijphart contends that for societies like Belgium, parliamentary
government
is the best medicine. Presidential form of government is well
criticized by
Juan Linz, who argues that this type has the strong tendency to
be taken as
the ‘winner-take-all’ form of so-called democracy. What is more,
he
emphasizes two additional problems, which are “frequent
executive-
legislative stalemates and the rigidity of presidential terms of
office” (Ibid.).
Lijphart believes that semi-presidential form is an upgraded
version of
presidential form, but not much better, in that power sharing is
not flexible.
It is maintained that parliamentary system is a better option
mostly for the
reasons regarding the smooth flow of power sharing.
Power sharing in the executive
Parliamentary system promotes power-sharing, but Lijphart
raises
the concern that collegial cabinets “do not by themselves
guarantee that
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31
power sharing will be instituted” (Ibid.). He gives two examples
to support
his argument. Belgium ensures the equal number of Dutch-speaking
cabinet
members and French-speaking cabinet members, while in South
Africa,
there is too much discrimination against some races and
ethnicities that
hinders from having an executive power sharing. And so, South
Africa
provides power sharing in the political party level, through
which any party
of any race or ethnicity that has more than 5% of the seats in
the parliament
can participate in the cabinet. Lijphart suggests the Belgian
model to be
more preferable in two ways: first, “it allows for power sharing
without
mandating a grand coalition of all significant parties and
therefore without
eliminating significant partisan opposition in parliament;
second, it allows
for slight deviation from strictly proportional power sharing by
giving some
overrepresentation to the smaller groups, which may be desirable
in
countries where an ethnic majority faces one or more ethnic
minority groups”
(Ibid.).
Cabinet stability
Lijphart mentions that there is one possible problem with
parliamentary system, which is that because cabinets are
dependent on the
majority support of the parliament, “and can be dismissed by
parliamentary
votes of no confidence may lead to cabinet instability – and as
a result,
regime instability” (Ibid.). This is the reason for states to
write a provision
in the constitution that allows cabinets to form legislative
proposals.
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32
Selecting the head of state
The head of state can vary in the parliamentary system, from
prime
minister (which is mostly the case), constitutional monarch,
etc. Lijphart
advises that the president should have little power over
politics, and should
not be elected by popular vote, as this could prompt the
president to having
more power than intended.
Federalism and decentralization
Lijphart recommends federalism for deeply-divided societies, as
it
allows for autonomy among communal groups that are
geographically
concentrated, but not in the system where “two legislative
chambers with
equal, or substantially equal, powers and different compositions
[because it]
makes too difficult the forming of cabinets that have the
confidence of both
chambers” (Ibid.).
Nonterritorial autonomy
For divided societies in which communal groups that are not
geographically concentrated, Lijphart contends that autonomy, in
this case,
can be formed on a nonterritorial basis. For example, Belgium
bestows
autonomy to schools by supporting them with equal state finance,
which
allows for neutrality in the field of education, even if the
state is divided
between religion and state.
Power sharing beyond the cabinet and the parliament
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33
Aside from the cabinet and the parliament, power sharing
should
also be allowed in civil service, judiciary, police, and
military. Lijphart says
this “aim can be achieved by instituting ethnic or religious
quotas… for
example, instead of mandating that a particular group be given
exactly 20
percent representation, a more flexible rule could specify a
target of 15 to 25
percent” (Ibid.).
In deeply divided societies, political violence is more likely
to
prevail than in societies without cleavages. Through a
majoritarian type of
democracy, it is comparatively hard to resolve political
conflicts and
competitions in such divided societies, as the numerical
majority of a
population would have the final say when making an outcome of a
decision,
leaving out all others, including minorities. This is the reason
for coining of
the term ‘tyranny of the majority’ by Alexis de Tocqueville and
is of a great
concern to scholars such as John Stuart Mill because if the
majority is given
the power to determine major political decisions, it is assumed
that they
would tyrannize over minorities. Also, if election by census is
brought about
by ethnically-motivated voting, and each groups’ “share of the
electorate is
reflected in the votes for each political party, there is a
great possibility of
minorities to be permanently excluded from office” (Chandra
& Boulet,
2005). Also, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) adds that when an
ascriptive
group of a certain ethnicity is pertinent, the “threat of
coethnic challengers
can discourage party leaders from generating cross-group
electoral appeals,
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34
[of which it could lead to parties being] driven to engage in
ethnic-
outbidding and act to advance mutually exclusive group claims to
power.”
Furthermore, it could also be challenging regarding the
supplying of public
goods, as officials elected in the majority-type democracy could
transmit
resources to coethnics in a narrow channel (Easterly &
Levine, 1997;
Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). All these factors account for
ethnically
heterogeneous societies to be more prone to having ex ante
challenges to the
enactment of stabilization than are homogeneous societies, as
the social
divisions will crack itself more deeply. In the extreme end,
scholars such as
Chesterman (2004) and Snyder (2000) disclose that peaceful,
full-fledged
democracy is impossible in states with ethnic cleavages because
of
unbearable political competition, and advise that autocratic
regimes could
rather be the best alternative means to tolerate such
complications.
Such complications are, in theory, solvable through a
consociational
type democracy, based on the premise that institutions are of
consequence
for politics: “that the formal rules of the state,
constitutional and otherwise,
both structure political competition and have fundamental,
generalizable,
long-run consequences for a wide range of political outcomes”
(Selway and
Templeman, 2012). And so, consociational framework is believed
by many
scholars to be the best “solution” to such social divisions,
through two main
practices: (a) power sharing, or grand coalition of all relevant
social groups
in the executive decision-making process, and (b) segmental
autonomy or
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35
federalism, of which it allows all relevant social groups to
have a say over
the issues of their own communities. On the electoral system,
Lijphart
suggests a proportional representation system, or a closed-list
PR with large
district magnitudes (2004), and strongly discourages the
majoritarian system.
When considering the fact that PR gives comparatively more
quality to all
groups in political representation in the electorate, PR is
clearly more
preferable than majoritarian type. Lijphart argues that the more
majoritarian
the electoral system, the greater possibility of more
disproportionality in the
conversion of votes into seats, which also means the “less
accurate and
secure” representation of minorities will be (Lijphart, 2004,
p.100).
Furthermore, my research mostly focuses on two most
important
characteristics of consociationalism: grand coalition and
segmental
autonomy. One other characteristic that Lijphart also stresses,
as mentioned
previously, is proportionality, which refers to the
proportional
representation system that encourages and facilitates minority
cooperation.
Consociationalism prefers the proportional representation (PR)
system
mainly because it is the most simple and flexible mechanism to
represent
the most minority groups. In that regard, Belgium is a model
state for such
doings, as it was the first country ever to take the system in
pursuance of
reserving seats from various parties including those of
subcultures.
Although not analyzed in my research, Wesselkamper (2000), in
his
research ‘Electoral System Design and Ethnic Separatism: A
Rationalist
-
36
Approach to Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe,’ attempted to
find the
relationship between proportionality of the electoral system and
ethnic
separatism. His hypothesis was: “The less disproportional the
electoral
system (that is, more proportional), the lesser the degree of
ethnic
separatism. He uses a sample of 21 cases with minorities at risk
and 52
group-years (See Table 7).
Table 7 Countries, Ethnic Groups, and Group-Years Country Ethnic
Group Group-Years Albania Greeks 1992,1993,1995,1998 Bulgaria Turks
1991,1992,1995,1998
Roma 1991,1992,1995,1998 Croatia Serbs 1993,1996
Roma 1993,1996 Czech Republic Roma 1991,1993,1997
Slovaks 1991,1993,1997 Estonia Russians 1993,1996 Hungary Roma
1991,1995 Latvia Russians 1994,1996 Lithuania Poles 1993,1997
Russians 1993,1997 Macedonia Albanians 1991,1995
Serbs 1991,1995 Roma 1991,1995
Moldova Gagauz 1995 Slavs 1995
Romania Hungarians 1991,1993,1997 Roma 1991,1993,1997
Slovakia Hungarians 1991,1993,1995 Roma 1991,1993,1995
Wesselkamper measures his dependent variable, separatism, by
deriving an
index from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Dataset Phase III.
-
37
Table 8 Measuring Separatism Score Description 1 “Latent”
Separitism, meeting one or both of the following
conditions -Ethnic group was historically autonomous, or -Ethnic
group was transferred from another state, either physically or in
terms of jurisdictional modification
2 Historical Separatism: The group gave rise to a separatist or
autonomy movement that persisted as an active political force for
five or more years in their region of origin (Between 1940 and
1980).
3 Active Separatism: The group has an active separatist or
autonomy movement in the 1980s or 1990s.
Then, Wesselkamper used Gallagher’s Least Squares measure of
disproportionality (LSq) (Gallagher, 1991) as a measurement for
the degree
of proportionality, which is one of his independent variables. I
focus only on
this variable due to the purpose of my research. LSq basically
“measures an
electoral system’s relative disproportionality between votes
received and
seats allotted in a legislature”9 (Ibid.). The index is
calculated by taking the
square root of half the sum of the squares of the difference
between the
percentage of votes (Vi) and the percentage of seats (Si) for
each of the
political parties (i = 1…n). The larger the value of index, the
larger the
disproportionality. Gallagher index is used here among others,
as other
9 Special Committee on Electoral Reform (a Canadian
Parliamentary Committee) (December 1, 2016). Report 3:
Strengthening Democracy in Canada : Principles, Process and Public
Engagement for Electoral Reform (Report). Parliament of Canada. p.
69 (or p. 83 in PDF search). Retrieved December 26,2016. One tool
that has been developed to measure an electoral system's relative
disproportionality between votes received and seats allotted in a
legislature is the Gallagher Index, which was developed by Michael
Gallagher (who appeared before the Committee).
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38
indices including the Loosemore-Hanby index is more sensitive to
small
discrepancies. LSq is calculated on the following formula:
Wesselkamper’s results proved his hypothesis to be right;
however, it did
not achieve statistical significance, and it had the weakest
result from his
other variables. The following is his table of results.
Table 9 Model of Ethnic Separatism Variable Beta T Sig. LSq .084
.683 .498 Economic Discrimination
-.127 -.944 .350
Political Discrimination
-.142 -1.118 .270
Spatial Distribution
.490 3.679 .001
N=52 F=6.820 Sig.=.000 Adjusted R2=.327 What Wesselkamper’s
findings can suggest is that although more
proportionality in the electoral system does have a curvilinear
relationship
with ethnic separatism, there is not much statistical
significance. However,
it must also be noted that the small number of countries that
are observed in
Wesselkamper’s research have to do with consociational
democracy. It is,
though, interesting to see that proportionality, one of the
main
where Vi = the popular vote share of party i Si = the seat share
of party i in the lower house
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39
characteristics of Lijphart’s consociational framework, and
ethnic
separatism have a minor significance in their relationship,
which suggests
that there should be a similar research done with only the
states with
consociational democracy.
4.3 Debate on the validity of consociationalism
Critics of consociational theory raised a series of
arguments
concerning the “fluidity of ethno-political identities and the
validity of
incentives for cooperation among communities” (Norris, 2008). In
a nutshell,
in plural societies, Lijphart argues that PR is the most
effective for
democratic consolidation, while Horowitz supports the
majoritarian
electoral system for such matter. The main line of argument in
terms of
political relevance of social identities contends to a
constructivist
perspective, which indicates that the multiple identities in a
society are
socially constructed, and that their shared interests derived
from the
identities are funneled and organized by “community leadership
elites into
grievances and demands requiring a collective response in the
political
system” (Lijphart, 2004). Furthermore, Horowitz argues that
consociationalism is a system that is “inapt to mitigate
conflict in severely
divided societies,”10 as Roeder also makes a point that “Belgian
power
10 Horowitz, David. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985. p. 256 as cited in O’Leary,
Brendan. ”Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and
Explanatory Arguments.” In: S. Noel. Ed. From Power Sharing to
Democracy: Post-
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40
sharing was most stable as long as ethnicity was not elevated
above other
group rights and institutional weapons did not concentrate in
ethnic foci,”
claiming that consociationalism ultimately intensified the
tensions between
the Flemings and the Walloons, as it contributed the ethnic
groups the
incentives to become more assertive of their ethnicity. It is
for the same
reason that Norlinger and Cornell argue that consociationalism
leads to
secession, with the idea that it can lead to extreme
polarization and
ultimately the collapse of federalism, as ethnic groups have the
means to
demand concessions. (Nordlinger, 1972) (Cornell, 2002). Due to
its
fundamental characteristic, consociationalism can reduce
interaction
between the elites and the ethnic groups, as the elites have the
power to
make consolidations through executive power-sharing with a
top-down
approach. This top-down approach power-sharing, according to
Rothchild
and Philip, provides the ethnic groups the incentives and the
means to
intensify the conflicts (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). Horowitz
also asserts
that consociations are not capable of mitigating conflicts in
divided societies
as they are “the products of resolved struggles or of relatively
moderate
cleavages” (Horowitz, 2000).
Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies.
McGill-Queens University Press, 2005. p. 4.
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41
What evidence is there that resolves this debate?
In order to touch upon the issues that underlie the claims
above,
Pippa Norris conducted an analysis that first classifies
power-sharing
electoral systems, identifies the types of electoral system and
the positive
action strategies for minority representation, using worldwide
nation states,
using the dependent variable of democratic consolidation. Using
191 nation
states, Norris classifies them into them having a system of
majoritarian (75),
combined (39), PR (68), and no direct elections (9). Figure 7 is
a
comparison of trends in types of electoral systems used among
worldwide
states, and as can be observed, states that have no competitive
elections
drastically fall in the 1990s, and while all other types slowly
rise in trend,
PR rises the most in popularity.
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42
Figure 6 Trends in types of electoral systems used worldwide,
1973-200311
11 Coded by Pippa Norris, using the source from Arthur S. Banks.
2005. Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive; Andrew Reynolds and
Ben Reilly, Eds. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral
System Design. 2nd ed. Stockholm: International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
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43
Then, she makes a classification of electoral systems with
different variables
in order to compare the three different systems (Table 10).
Table 10 Characteristics of contemporary electoral systems,
200012
PR Combined Majoritarian N (i) Largest governing party, %
of seats 44.4 53.7 68.1 158
(ii) Rae party fractionalization index
65.2 54.6 34.6 189
(iii) Mean number of all parliamentary parties
9.3 8.7 5.0 175
(iv) Mean number of relevant parliamentary parties
4.7 4.4 3.2 175
(v) Herfindahl index for all parliamentary parties
0.33 0.39 0.57 153
(vi) Effective number of parliamentary parties
3.69 3.77 2.33 103
(vi) Index of proportionality 90.4 83.2 83.1 110
(vii) Effective electoral threshold
11.3 24.5 35.4 148
12 Notes from Pippa Norris: (i) The number of seats held by the
largest governing party in the lower house of each country’s
national assembly (Banks 2000). (ii) The Rae party
fractionalization index (Banks 2000). (iii) The mean number of
parliamentary parties with at least one seat in the lower house of
the national parliament (calculated from Elections around the
World). (iv) The mean number of relevant parliamentary parties
(those with more than 3% of seats in the lower house of the
national parliament) (calculated from Elections around the World).
(v) The Herfindahl index for all parliamentary parties, ranging
from 0 to 1, representing the probability that two randomly
selected members of the lower house of parliament belong to
different parties (The Database of Political Institutions
Keefer/World Bank 2005). (vi) The Rose index of proportionality (a
standardized version of the Loosemore-Hanby index) (Rose 2001).
(vii) The effective electoral threshold, using the formula
(75/m+1), where m refers to the district magnitude or the number of
members returned in the electoral district (calculated from Rose
2001).
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44
Results show that the largest number of seats held by the
largest
governing party was in majoritarian system and the least in PR,
which
suggests that PR is more likely to develop coalition
governments. Also, it
was found that facilitates elections of many smaller parties,
shown by the
fact that the indicator of the effective electoral threshold is
systematically
the lowest as well as the high value of Rae party
fractionalization index for
PR. These outcomes certainly show positive evidence that PR is
favorable
in regards to the variables used, but is it then safe to say
that proportional
representation is the most operative system for democratic
consolidation?
By using the analysis of variance (ANOVA), Pippa used the major
types of
electoral systems used around the world, and found that PR is
significantly
the most democratic, next to combined types of electoral system,
and to
majoritarian that was consistently less democratic (Figure 8).
In the long run,
PR electoral system was proved to be more democratic than that
of the
majoritarian.
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45
Figure 7 Levels of democracy by type of electoral system,
200013
Another factor of consociationalism that needs to be assessed
for its
validity is federalism, which generates vertical power-sharing
between
several layers of government. Pippa analyzes federal
constitutions in way of
creating social stability and making democratic consolidation
in
multinational states. In a nutshell, federalism strengthens
state’s right sand
regional autonomy, which allows for power devolution from the
national
13 Note from Pippa Norris: The four scales measure liberal
democracy (Freedom House 2000), constitutional democracy (Polity IV
2000), participatory democracy (Vanhanen 2000), and contested
democracy (Cheibub and Gandhi 2000). When tested by ANOVA, the
differences between mean scores are significant (At the p=.001
level). Contemporary electoral systems are classified in 191
nation-states worldwide on the basis of the Technical Appendix in
Andrew Reynolds, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis, 2005. Electoral
System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. The
type of electoral system was classified into three categories:
majoritarian/plurality (single member plurality, second ballot,
bloc vote, alternative vote, and single nontransferable vote),
proportional representation (party list and STV), and combined
(using more than one type of ballot in simultaneous elections for
the same body).
58
35
25
49
65
57
32
67
77 71
42
78
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
FH Polity Vanhanen Cheibub
Low
<<
Dem
ocra
cy >
> H
igh
Majoritarian Combined PR
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46
level to the subnational level, as well as create a safeguard of
self-
government for minorities. Discussion on debate regarding
decentralized
governance is necessary here, whether it is an effective way of
advocating
constitutional solutions for reducing conflicts, protecting the
interests of
marginalized communities in deeply divided societies. First,
theorists
including but not limited to Montesquieu to Madison claim
that
decentralized governance is advantageous for (i) “for
democratic
participation, representation, and accountability; (ii) for
public policy and
governmental effectiveness; and (iii) for the representation
and
accommodation of territorially based ethnic, cultural, and
linguistic
differences” (Erk, 2006). Lijphart further conjectures that if
social
boundaries are reflected by political boundaries in subnational
governments,
homogeneity can exist in distinct plural societies, which would
develop
political stability and facilitate diverse interests that
embrace the boundaries
of a state. He also argues that in plural societies where ethnic
groups are
dispersed geographically, “administrative and political
decentralization also
helps to promote accommodation, for example, allowing minorities
to elect
local representatives who could manage policies toward
culturally sensitive
issues such as education” (Norris, 2008). Bermeo also claims
that armed
rebellions are far more conventional in unitary state than that
of federal,
while they also undergo lower levels of discrimination and
grievances
(Bermeo, 2002). Another scholar who agrees with decentralization
for
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47
stability and consolidation in multinational states is Stephan,
who argues
that “plural societies without federalism, such as the Russian
Federation and
Burma/Myanmar will never achieve consolidated democracies”
(Stephan,
1999).
Opponents of decentralized governance
Critics focus on efficiency when it comes to debating on the
effectiveness of decentralized governance. They argue that an
extra layer of
government bureaucracy generates “increased costs, poorer
service
efficiency, worse coordination, greater inequality among
administrative
areas, and macroeconomic instability”(Prudhomme, 1995),
while
“centralized government is thought to enhance integration,
decisiveness,
uniformity, economies of scale, and cost efficiency” (Ranson
& Stuart,
1994).
What evidence is there that resolves this debate?
In order to prove that federalism in decentralized governance
is
worth the extra layer of government bureaucracy that critics say
is
inefficient, Pippa compares 191 nation states worldwide, 25
(13%) of which
have federal constitutions, but because many of them are
geographically
large countries, 41% of the world’s population is living under
federal
constitutions, which makes the study more credible. Hybrid
unions that are
common in Western Europe and Asia-Pacific regions are counted to
be 22,
and unitary constitutions are counted to be 144 out of 191.
Using the Polity
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48
IV 100-point index of democracy, Pippa finds that federal
constitutions
scored 69% on average (Figure 9). Also, federal constitutions
have shown to
be consistently better in the records of democracy than unitary
states and
hybrid unions (see Figure 10). The results showed that compared
with
unitary states and hybrid unions, federal states showed stronger
performance
of democracy.
Figure 8 Levels of democracy by type of constitution14
14 None from Norris: The type of constitution was classified
using the definitions in the text according to data derived from
Griffiths (2005), Watts (1999), and Banks (2004). The four scales
measure liberal democracy (Freedom House 2000), constitutional
democracy (Polity IV 2000), participatory democracy (Vanhanen
2000), and contested democracy (Cheibub and Gandhi 2000). When
tested by ANOVA, the differences between mean scores are all
significant (at the p=0.001 level).
54
17
44
37
63
28
61
54
70
30
69
58
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
FH Vanhanen Polity Cheibub
Unitary states Hybrid unions Federal states
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49
Figure 9 Trends in democratization by type of constitution
As much as it is successful when implemented correctly and
appropriately, consociational democracy is in reality complex to
instigate
and not undemanding of the necessary requirements. This is
probably one of
the main reasons that consociationalism is much debated for its
validity.
Consociationalism has of course failed in some states like
Cyprus and
Uruguay; however, it should be noted that consociationalism
requires
different constraints, with which Cyprus and Uruguay were not
successful.
As mentioned previously, for consociationalism to be successful,
(1) elites
have to have the motivation and capability to listen to the
needs of the
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50
minority groups; (2) which “requires that they have the ability
to transcend
cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of
rival subcultures”
(Lijphart, 2007); (3) which “in turn depends on their commitment
to the
maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion
and
stability” (Ibid.); (4) and all of the above requirements are
based on the
assumption that the elites understand the perils of political
fragmentation”
(Ibid.). With these requirements, successful consociational
democracy is
met, as did with the Low Countries, Switzerland, Austria, and
Lebanon. As
Lijphart stresses, successful consociationalism has to do with
“inter-sub-
cultural relations at the elite level, inter-subcultural
relations at the mass
level, and elite-mass relations within each of the subcultures”
(Ibid.). In sum,
power sharing is the best medicine for deeply-divided societies
like Belgium;
however, it must be prescribed to the ‘right’ deeply-divided
societies that
follows the necessary requirements and societal characteristics,
in order for
it to be lucratively exploited.
V. Macro Level of Analysis
5.1 How consociational is Belgium?
This section analyzes Belgium’s consociational framework in
macro
level. Relying on data compiled by Strøm et al. (2015) and other
literature, I
test how consociational Belgium is in terms of different
characteristics
defined by Lijphart (1991). The way I utilize Strøm’s dataset is
two-fold. I
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51
first see how consociational Belgium is by itself; second,
because the level
of consociationalism can also be relative, I also see how
consociational it is
compared to other states. 180 states are available from the
dataset over the
period 1975 to 2010, and I take all 180 states measured in the
most recent
year, 2010.
The main variables I use to test consociationalism are
inclusive
power-sharing and dispersive power-sharing, which covers all of
Lijphart’s
key factors of consociationalism: inclusive power-sharing (grand
coalition
and mutual veto) and dispersive power-sharing (proportional
representation
and segmental autonomy). Specifically, for inclusive
power-sharing, grand
coalition is coded in two types: “one mandated by constitutions
or peace
treaties (mandated grand coalition) and de facto grand
coalition, i.e.,
governments of national unity, which are usually installed by
peace treaties
(unity). Mutual veto provision (mutual veto) is coded 1 if there
is a
constitution or a treaty provision that provides a minority veto
over
legislation” (Urwin, 1970). Mandated reserved legislative seats
(resseats)
captures the number of seats reserved for minorities that is
divided by the
total number of seats in that house of the legislature. For
dispersive power-
sharing, three factors are calculated: (1) “the powers allocated
to subnational
governments; (2) the accountability of subnational governments
to citizens;
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52
(3) the representation of subnational constituencies in the
central
government”.15
Belgium is coded 1 for gcseats as it (1) has the two largest
parties
both in government; (2) government is a majority government; and
(3) the
legislature is competitive. There is a provision for minority
veto over
policies (mveto); for mandated reserved legislative seats
(resseats), the value
is 0.1408. Table 4 shows the mean, standard deviation, maximum
value, and
minimum value of the variables inclusive and dispersion
power-sharing
compiled with 180 countries for the year 2010.
Table 11 Mean, STD, max, and mean of inclusive and dispersive
power-
sharing index
Inclusive Dispersion
Mean -0.06382 0.153948
STD 1.018401 0.871059
MAX 7.312246 2.090979
MIN -0.19827 -0.78917
Belgium was given the value 1.33752 for inclusive power-sharing,
and
2.090979 for dispersion power-sharing, which is 1.40134 and
1.937031
higher than average respectively. For a clearer visualization of
where
15 For an exhaustive account of all variables and detailed
coding of data, refer to Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint
(IDC) dataset, which is available online for public.
https://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/faces/study/StudyPage.xtml?globalId=doi:10.7910/DVN/27961&versionNumber=1
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53
Belgium stands in terms of level of consociationalism compared
to other
countries, a scatter plot is created (Figure 11). This self-made
scatter plot
indicates where each selected country situates on a table where
x-axis is
inclusive power-sharing and y-axis is dispersive power-sharing.
The values
are extracted from Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint
dataset. See
Appendix I for the values of the variables in each dimension for
all
countries.
Figure 10 Scatter plot of dispersive and inclusive power-sharing
index
among 29 countries
The countries that are used to compare are other European Union
members
states, as well as Canada, the US, and Australia. The figure
shows that
among these countries, Belgium has comparatively high numbers
for both
dispersive and inclusive power-sharing indices. Other
high-ranking
countries in this plot include Poland and Canada, two of which
countries
that are both high in inclusive and dispersive power-sharing,
despite its
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54
political and social cleavages. Furthermore, Lijphart (1999)
presents an
empirical location of 36 countries according to his dimensions
of consensus
democracy for 1945-1996 over the two dimensions: federal-unitary
/ divided
power and executive-parties / shared power (Figure 12).
Figure 11 Empirical location of 36 countries according to
Lijphart’s
dimensions of consensus democracy
These results show that Belgium is classified, with comparison
with other
states, one that is high in executive-parties/shared power,
which means that
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55
it has a solid grand coalition with leaders representing
significant segments
of society. Having a little over 0.00 index for
federal-unitary/divided power
infers that it is both segmentally autonomous and federal, which
has been
continuously clarified throughout the research: that it gives
minority groups
the possibility for self-rule within the boundaries of the
state.
5.2 Is consociationalism keeping Belgium united?
How are consociational rules effective in consolidating
democracy in
Belgium with deeply divided groups? Distinct ethnic communities
in
multiethnic societies. First, consociationalism is based on the
principle that
the social psychological attachment toward group identities –
based on
shared language, culture, religion, etc. – are the force of
power that divide
the multiethnic societies. Consociationalism handles ethnic
identities in one
large unit instead of cross-cutting groupings, as exhibiting
group interests
and psychological alignment, and as being able to override
“other social and
political cleavages, like those that come from socioeconomic
status,
ideology, or gender” (Chandra, 2005). In this schema, language
and ethnic
divisions in Belgium are taken for granted “as the unshakable
building
blocks that have to be recognized and accommodated… in which the
social-
psychological prism regards these communities as each sharing
largely
homogenous preferences and fixed boundaries, where politics
represents a
zero-sum game” (Norris, 2008). What this means is that the
entrenched
social and political cleavages in Belgium, such as those of
linguistic and
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56
ethnic identity are taken for granted, and are considered
intractable, and
such accommodations accounts to achieving realistic reconcil