Dimensions of Inclusive Development: Growth, Gender, Poverty and the Environment

Poverty Number 23

International Policy Centre for Inclusive GrowthPoverty Practice, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP

Dimensions of Inclusive Development

2 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth

G U E S TE D I TO R S

Growth, Equity and Sustainability: A Declaration of Interdependence

Over one billion of us live without many of the basics that the other six billion take as given.Although 28 countries have moved from low-income status to middle-income status, withGhana and Zambia among the newest Middle Income Countries, an estimated 800 millionpeople still live in low-income countries. Of these, half live in just five countries, three ofwhich are in sub-Saharan Africa. In these least-developed countries (LDCs), conflict, disasterand broader human insecurity impose structural limits on efforts to move from crisis to riskreduction and from growth to sustained development. So although many millions have beenlifted out of poverty in the last ten years, it is also true that more people live in chronic hungerthan ever before. Significant and sustained progress will require faster and better efforts.The message of this Poverty in Focus is that, “For Growth to be inclusive, it must be sustainedand sustainable and that, for it to be sustained and sustainable, it must also be equitable.”

As a contribution to the dialogue around Rio+20 and to the ongoing discussions arounda post-2015 MDG Agenda, this Poverty in Focus links future development to sustainability andparticularly to social sustainability. Looking beyond the critical issues of ‘carbon footprints’,‘low-carbon development’,’ green economy’ and the economics behind saving the planet,it draws attention back to the continuing challenge of ensuring that growth and developmentdeliver for the poor and vulnerable. In its many forms—energy poverty, lack of accessto water and sanitation, malnutrition or insecure access to food, and lack of access toeducation and health—the scale and scope of global deprivation call currentdevelopment policy and practice into question.

Growth, gender, poverty and the environment can no longer be treated as loosely connectedcomponents of development. Recognizing their interdependence is at the core of improvedand sustained development for all.

For one thing, the continuing decline of the quantity and quality of natural resources andof ecosystem functions is likely to exacerbate the likelihood of conflict over resources,particularly water. According to UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery,35 countries had entered what could be designated a ‘post-conflict phase’ by 2008.The cost of conflict has been enormous, matching or surpassing, according to someestimates, the value of ODA received in the last 20 to 30 years in the same countries.

Addressing topics such as the evolving debate on environmental and social justiceand improved accounting frameworks to ‘include’ environmental assets and servicesin considerations of growth, the enclosed articles can help us go beyond lip-service tothe notion of sustainability. They focus on the ‘software’ components of development,highlighting the need for equal attention to process and to results. Suggesting that inclusiveand sustainable development will need to leverage ‘social technologies’ such as politicalinnovations, true engagement and honest evaluation, they make a clear case for a strong,representative state and the complementary roles of civil society and the private sectorin defining and achieving sustained and sustainable development. They underscore therole of formal and informal mechanisms in the negotiation and reconciliationof conflicting and competing interests.

In view of the high expectations placed on the next year’s Rio+20 meeting, let us remindourselves that ‘social sustainability’ will be built on the foundations of productive and socialinclusion. Too often, the focus has fallen largely on productive inclusion, with limited effortto address the structural factors that cause and sustain exclusion and marginalization, bethey related to gender, political processes, property rights for the poor, and so on. Moreover,a focus on ‘sustained’ development as well as sustainable development acknowledges that,for many countries, existing development gains are fragile and easily reversed. The acutechallenges faced by countries in the Horn of Africa due to persistent drought, displacement,conflict and poverty are a case in point.

A socially sustainable approach, say these authors, is one in which policy efforts do not shyaway from the many interdependent multiple dynamics, processes and situations that affectvulnerability and predispose the poor and the vulnerable to harm from shocks and change.

Growth, equity and sustainability are mutually compatible, if efforts have enough timeand resources, are responsive to underlying structural causes and encourage the vigorousparticipation of the poor, allowing them to define their futures. What follows illuminates thecomplexity of inclusiveness as a development outcome and highlights bold action in and bythe South. We hope that these articles serve as a source of further innovation and inspiremore cooperation and the spread of knowledge within the South. Ours is an age of politicalconvulsions, global economic shifts, inexorable climatic change and stubborn poverty.Informed and catalytic strategies are needed now more than ever before.

by Olav Kjorven, Assistant Administrator and Director of the Bureau for Policy Development, UNDP

Poverty in Focus is a regular publication ofthe International Policy Centre for InclusiveGrowth (IPC-IG). Its purpose is to present theresults of research on poverty and inequalityin the developing world.

Guest EditorsLeisa Perch and Gabriel Labbate

Desktop PublisherRoberto Astorino

Copy EditorLance W. Garmer

Front page: Multiple Dimensions ofDevelopment is the spirit behind this Povertyin Focus. The images represent the rangeof issues, the people and the regions wecovered and also the message of dimensionswithin a broader context. They also reinforcethe duality which lies behind developmentat all levels, including the need for social aswell as technological innovation as part ofstructural transformation. Images 1, 3, 5-7are from the IPC-IG “Humanizing Development”Global Photography Campaign (photographersrespectively: GB Mukherji, Soleyman Mahmoudi,Ramesh Pathania and Joyce Wambui).Image 2 (Adrian Jankowiak) and image 4(Max Thabiso Edkins and ResourceAfricaUK).

Editors’ note: IPC-IG and the editorsgratefully acknowledge the generouscontributions, without any monetary ormaterial remuneration, by all the authorsand photographers of this issue.

IPC-IG is a joint project between the UnitedNations Development Programme and Brazil topromote South-South Cooperation on appliedpoverty research. It specialises in analysingpoverty and inequality and offering research-based policy recommendations on how to reducethem. IPC-IG is directly linked to the PovertyGroup of the Bureau for Development Policy,UNDP and the Government of Brazil.

IPC-IG DirectorRathin Roy

International Policy Centre for InclusiveGrowth (IPC-IG), Poverty Practice,Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP

Esplanada dos Ministérios, Bloco O, 7º andar70052-900 Brasilia, DF Brazil

[email protected]

The views expressed in IPC-IG publicationsare the authors’ and not necessarily those ofthe United Nations Development Programmeor the Government of Brazil.

Rights and Permissions – All rights reserved. Thetext and data in this publication may be reproducedas long as written permission is obtained from IPC-IGand the source is cited. Reproductions forcommercial purposes are forbidden.

Poverty in Focus 3

Twenty years after Rio, we are stillstruggling with many of the same issuesand contradictions in the developmentprocess that we faced earlier; in fact,many have become even more complex.

The Rural Poverty Report 2011 (IFAD, 2010)notes that some 1.4 billion peoplecontinue to live in extreme poverty,struggling to survive on less thanUS$1.25 a day, and that more than twothirds reside in rural areas of developingcountries. Papers by Andrew Sumner(2010)1 and Ortiz and Cummins (2011)2

further emphasise that growth has notbeen equitable, with the latter paperhighlighting that the rate of changeon the trajectory from indigenceto poverty and from poverty tonon-poverty has been very slow forthe global poor as a constituency.

As the world turns its attention to COP 17in Durban and the 20th anniversary of theRio Convention (the UN Convention onEnvironment and Development), phrasessuch as the ‘green economy’ and ‘inclusiveand sustainable development’ are nowshaping the discourse on development.In view of the expectations placed onthe ‘green economy’, carbon credits,and market-based mechanisms aspolicy responses for development ills,this is a good time to remind ourselvesabout the need for ‘social sustainability’, acritical pillar of sustainable development—in other words, to reaffirm thatgreening processes will not automaticallydeliver for the poor or the vulnerable.

Often, the backdrop for the discourse onsustainability has been characterised bytension, rather than by reconciliation,among the economic, social andenvironmental dimensions ofdevelopment (i.e., the three pillars).At times, the discourse has been framedwithin ‘limits to growth’,3 and, more

Overview:Where People, Poverty,Environment and Development Meet

by Leisa Perch,International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth

recently, within ‘making growth moreinclusive including integrating bothenvironmental risk and co-benefits’.

Overall, the successful combining ofsocial and environmental co-benefits inpolicy and practice has remained moreelusive. The Government of China’srecent statements4 on the need toreconcile growth and social developmentwith environmental sustainability signalpotential shifts, but the extent of suchreconciliation is not yet clear. Similarly,Indonesia and India have also takensteps to address such concerns, with theGovernment of India recently launching anincentive mechanism5 to promote greaterenergy efficiency in the private sector.

Given the predominant view of the roleof capital and labour (in the economicsystem) as factors of production andgrowth, competition and tensions aremanifest in policy and institutionalframeworks. Natural capital is still seenas another, even abundant factor ofproduction, and the capacity ofinstitutional checks and balances—environmental ministries—to drivethe agenda remains relatively weak.Social sectors remain peripheral tomany of the debates, national andglobal alike, about how to arrestcatastrophic environmental change.

The articles in this Poverty in Focus serveto highlight both the need for greaterfocus on ‘software’ components to makedevelopment work and the capacity of‘social technologies’ to producedevelopment and growth. Contributingto the debate about getting policy right,Gabriel Labbate discusses the challengesand opportunities that policy makersface in implementing policies withprobably environmental and socialdividends, and, together with KishanKhoday, argues that the environment

Often, the backdropfor the discourse onsustainability has beencharacterised by tension,rather than by reconciliation,among the economic,social and environmentaldimensions of development(i.e., the three pillars).

Overall, the successfulcombining of social andenvironmental co-benefitsin policy and practice hasremained elusive.

The sustainability ofthe supply of resources(environment), sustainedaccess to resources insecuring livelihoods(society) and the qualityof financial resources(investments) are essentialto stabilizing environmentalchange cycles, reducing/mitigating ecologicalscarcity, and enhancingthe renewal of theecological system.

1. See: <http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager120.pdf>.

2. See: <http://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Global_Inequality_Beyond_the_Bottom_Billion.pdf>.

3. See Silent Spring by Rachel Carson (1962) and Limitsto Growth by Donella Meadows (1972).

4. Thomas, L. (2011). ‘The Earth is Full’in The New York Times. Available from<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/opinion/08friedman.html?_r=1&src=me&ref=general>.

5. See: <http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/India%20Taking%20on%20Climate%20Change.pdf>.


and society are organic systemsconstantly in flux and change and thatthere may therefore be no ideal state ofsustainable development. Specifically,Khoday’s article, supported by manyothers, including those of Lindiwe Sibanda(FANRPAN) and Dan Smith and JananiVivekananda (International Alert), signalsthe need for more flexible policymaking,one able to adjust as new information ismade available. Nicolas Perrin’s article onthe ECA region argues for the importanceof taking note of the political economydimensions of various policies.

The article by Helene Connor and LauraWilliamson further reinforces this bycalling for a “blinders off” approachwhich move us beyond simplisticviewpoints of how power relationshipsdefine the interactions of the threepillars of development and howthose pillars interact with each other.

Individually and collectively, thecontributions herein make a clearcase for a strong, representative stateand the complementary role of civilsociety and the private sector indefining and achieving sustainedand sustainable development.They also refer directly and indirectlyto the role of formal and informalinstitutions necessary for the negotiationand reconciliation of conflicting andcompeting interests. The article byDenis Sonwa and Olufunso Somorin,for example, makes a clear caseanchoring rights and responsibilitiesin law where they can be defendedyet linked to fluid systems ofinstitutional building that respectlocal reality and culture.

This consensus suggests that theplanned discourse for the Rio+20meeting on ‘institutional frameworks’may need to ensure a broad scopethat can set standards and promoteinnovation and adaptation at alllevels of society.

This accords with Hodgson’s definitionof institutions as “systems of establishedand prevalent social rules that structuresocial interactions. Language, money,law, systems of weights and measures,manners and firms (and otherorganizations) are thus all institutions”.6

While not a comprehensive listor accounting of the richness of socialand political innovation available fordevelopment, the examples highlightedunderscore the need for global policy,including the global climate changeagenda, to focus on incremental andlong-term gains as well as immediate‘wins’. From the perspective of socialinnovations, the comparative analysis byDarana Souza and Danuta Chmielewskahighlights the benefits of ‘publicly-assigned rights and rights-holders’,particularly when policy andprogrammes then reinforce them.

The contributions by LeonardoHasenclever, Alex Shankland andNicolas Perrin highlight the continuinglack of coherence and the need toavoid complacency even when bigbattles are won. Leisa Perch’s articleon gender and employment alsospeaks to a number of subtle localizedand micro realities that continue toundermine socio-economic resilience.While specific to SIDS, they highlightthe dynamic interplay between theeconomy at the household, groupand macro level which often limitssustained growth.

Moreover, concerns expressed about thequality of employment and about thedisconnect between needs and incomeas well as the continuous exposure ofSIDs to external shocks, resonate alsofor other countries and suggest theneed to focus on adaptation andresilience-building, not just as markson the development trajectory, butalso as continuously evolving processes.

By probing some of the ‘uncomfortable’questions of politics and interests andby highlighting the potential forconflict, both overt and gradual, thesearticles suggest the need for greatercaution when addressing complexdevelopment challenges where not allinterests, capacities and implicationsrest easily or clearly on the surface.

They particularly outline the acute butlesser known ‘social’ knock-on effectsof public policy failures and warn thatsocially blind policies are unlikelyto be sustainable in the long term.Critically, the articles show the capacity

of policy mixes that combinethe macro and the micro to deliver.

On this point, Lucy Wanjiru’s article onaccounting for gender and sustainabilityraises the profile of equality as animportant condition for a greeneconomy and shows the potential ofthe Women’s Business Initiative to tacklegrowth and affordability in tandem withequity, access, opportunity and thequality of development. LeonardoHasenclever and Alex Shankland’sreview of REDD+ makes the case forthe indigenous community as an equalpartner, not just a beneficiary. Thus, apicture of cautious optimism, balancedwith the need to move beyondrhetoric, emerges.

Reviewing the development contextand challenges in the smallest countries(SIDS) to one of the largest (India), theauthors’ common clarion call is forsustaining development and anchoringdevelopment in society.

The authors argue that the sustainabilityof the supply of resources (environment),sustained access to resources in securinglivelihoods (society) and the quality offinancial resources (investments) areessential to stabilizing environmentalchange cycles, reducing/mitigatingecological scarcity, and enhancingthe renewal of the ecological system.Even so, they also note that populationgrowth and other demands placesignificant and potentially exponentialpressures on assets, goods and servicesthat are critical to future generations.

Perhaps most critical for a rapidlyglobalizing and changing South isour reconfirmation that transnational,regional and global concerns willincreasingly influence ‘national’ policy.There can be no green economywithout an international enablingenvironment, particularly on trade,that allows countries to invest, supportand anchor today’s developmentdecisions in tomorrow’s possibilities.

6. Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2006). ‘What are Institutions?’Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. XL No. 1. Pp 1-25.March edition. Accessed from <http://checchi.economia.unimi.it/corsi/whatareinstitutions.pdf>.

Poverty in Focus 5

The integration of environmentaland development policies can betraced as far back to the 1960s with thepublication of Silent Spring (Carson, 1962),to the 1970s with the establishmentof UNEP, and to the 1980s with theBrundtland Commission (WCED, 1987).The concept took central stage in theRio 1992 conference on environment anddevelopment and continues today as apivotal element in the ‘green economy’discussion (UNEP, 2011).

The understanding of how poverty andenvironment interact with each otherhas also evolved. Initially, the ideaof a poverty-environment nexusas a synergistic spiral of environmentaldegradation and poverty dominatedthe discussion (WCED, 1987; World Bank,1992). Short-term needs overran potentiallong-term benefits, with poverty inducingenvironmental degradation, which,in turn, exacerbated poverty. In thisconceptual model, poor individualsare both victims and agents ofenvironmental degradation.

This synergistic cycle, however,provides limited insight into thetrue dynamics of resource use by poorgroups (Brocklesby and Hinshelwood,2001; Dasgupta et al., 2005). Formal andinformal institutions are better atexplaining the short- and long-termincentives that influence patternsof resource use (North, 1990).

The generalisation of this synergisticspiral also ignores issues of heterogeneity,or the notion that not all poor individualshave the same capital endowments andthat, therefore, equally poor groups canmake different use of similar pools ofresources (Chomitz, 1999; Barbier, 2000).

Often, the drivers of environmentaldegradation are also moving away from

Integrating Poverty andEnvironment Policies:Issues, Challenges and Opportunities

by Gabriel Labbate, Ph.D,Senior Programme Officer,UN-REDD Programme/Povertyand Environment Initiative

the poor, with a substantial share ofdamage originating in commercialventures attempting to satisfy theincreasing demands of a growingpopulation that has an increasingspending capacity and shiftingconsumption patterns for value-addedgood and services (MEA, 2005).

There is little challenge to the idea thatthe integration of development andenvironment can result in cost-effectivepolicy options. The benefits can benon-trivial and encompass almostevery policy area, from local to national/regional, from urban to rural (DFID, EC,UNDP, WB, 2002; TEEB, 2010). However,while integrating poverty andenvironment policies can producesignificantly positive and quantifiableresults, it remains more theexception than the rule.

Even development agencies findthe integration of their poverty andenvironment portfolios a challenge,despite expanded efforts like thePoverty and Environment Initiative,a partnership between UNEP and UNDP,and the global commitment to theMDGs as an overarching developmentpolicy framework.

There are good reasons for this:

First, poverty and environmentalpolicies can have significantsynergies and be complementary,but they still comprise largelydifferent types of interventionpackages. A healthy environmentcan be a necessary, but not sufficient,condition to lift people out ofpoverty. Some of the deepest povertyreadings take place in quite pristineenvironments, such as in tropical forestsbeyond the agricultural frontier(Chomitz, 2007).

The integration ofpoverty and environmentpolicies has taken centrestage in the developmentdebate for their potentialto generate substantialsocial benefits.

Contrary to acceptedbeliefs, these policiesdo not produce systematicwin-win situations forall sectors of societyand therefore theirimplementation facespolitical difficulties.


The relationship can go the other way, too.Addressing social imbalances can be anecessary, but not sufficient, conditionto ensure sustainable resource use(see also Gilbert, 2010).

Second, a healthy environment isnot a binary (0,1) variable. In mostcases, the challenge is to find thatlevel of resource pressure which allowsfor increased income among the poor,yet that stays within perceived safelimits—for example, those required topreserve the resilience of ecosystems.This can turn into a complexoptimisation problem, one in whichthe target is not to maximise a singlevariable, but rather to find thebest balance among several.

Third, improving the well-being of thepoorest implies increased consumptioncapacity (e.g., more food, betterclothing, housing, etc.). Traditionally,development has been coupled with anincreased production and consumptionof goods and services, resulting in arate and pattern of growth in the last50 years in which the global economyhas increased six-fold, food productionhas increased by two and a half times,and water use has doubled. The effectof this very rapid growth on ecosystemsand their services has not been trivial.More than half of all ecosystemservices are degraded or beingused unsustainably. The speciesextinction rate is 1,000 times abovethe estimated normal level. Cultivatedsystems already cover one quarterof the Earth’s terrestrial surface, whilethe amount of water impounded indams is three to six times thatof natural rivers (MEA, 2005).

Some estimates put global environmentaldamages in 2008 alone at 11 percent ofglobal GDP, several times the impactof the global financial crisis in the sameyear (UNEP, 2010).

The unlimited production ofconsumer goods is not a feasibleoption. Consequently, the increasedconsumption of the poorest underconditions of sustainable resource use willneed to be balanced by readjustmentsin the consumption patterns of middleand upper classes in developed and

developing countries. In this context,integrating poverty and environmentwould require policies that could bepolitically unpalatable. The notionthat sectors of society might have tosacrifice some consumption to achievea world free of poverty under conditionsof sustainability is still anathema to somecitizens in developed and developingcountries (Lind, 2010; Soley, 2010).

Fourth, mainstreaming poverty-environment policies in developmentplans is not cost-free. It demandstime and attention from qualifiedstaff, a generally scarce resource.It can also entail re-accommodationof expenditures between sectorsbecause realizing the benefits ofpoverty-environment mainstreamingcan require increases in environmentalspending, a potentially difficult choicefor a policy maker with limited resources(see also Bah, 2008).

As a result, some needed environmentalinvestments may not be carried outbecause, as portfolio theory teaches us,the fact that an intervention has apositive payoff is not a sufficientreason to automatically expectits implementation. Proposedinterventions must have a positivepayoff and a rate of return abovethat of other competing demands.In the long run, environmentalpolicy can pay for itself, but, inthe short run, the transition costscan often be significant. Developmentagencies would do well to betterunderstand these costs and theirinfluence on the decision-making process.

Finally, the mainstreaming ofpoverty-environment policiesdoes not escape the law of diminishingreturns. Projects that provide technicalsupport to countries in order to integratepoverty and environment policiesshould prioritise those interventionsin which payoffs are maximised,preferably in the short run, and usethese as building blocks for morecomplex efforts.

Vaguely focused interventionsdistract scarce public-service talent,render poor services to the objective ofscaling up the mainstreaming of poverty-

The effect of very rapidgrowth on ecosystemsand their services has notbeen trivial. More thanhalf of all ecosystemservices are degraded orbeing used unsustainably.

Some estimates putglobal environmentaldamages in 2008 aloneat 11 percent of globalGDP, several times theimpact of the globalfinancial crisis in the sameyear (UNEP, 2010).

The best chances ofsuccess will come fromsustained interventionsthat are honest atrecognizing challenges,focus on impact, do notdivorce themselves fromthe underlying reasonsof poverty, and investin better governanceand greater efficacyof public policy.

Poverty in Focus 7

environment policies, and generallyhave difficulties in demonstrating impact.

Notwithstanding the above, the potentialfor integrating poverty-environmentpolicies is immense. The followingexamples outline the scale of potentialpayoffs for rural and urban environments.

For the rural sector, small-scaleagriculture and improvedwater and soil management holdgreat potential for integrated povertyand environment policies. In manysettings, it can reverse ongoingprocesses of land degradation,improve food security, and diminishthe vulnerability of poor populations(Barbier, 1987; Holt, 2001). It is truethat, in many rural settings, realisingthe benefits of poverty-environmentpolicies can require addressing landtenure issues, land concentration, andpower asymmetries, underscoring theobservation that environmentalinvestments are insufficient, in ofthemselves, to lift peopleout of poverty.

Current efforts at reducingdeforestation and forestdegradation (REDD+) provideanother avenue with tremendouspotential for ‘win-win’ povertyand environment policies.A mosaic of improved landuse practices and forested areassupported by economic incentivesand technical support is probablythe best option currently availableto stabilise frontiers in large sectorsof developing countries and toreduce rural poverty. Such effortsalone will not reverse deforestationtrends; they should be accompaniedby efforts to tackle large-scaleagriculture, real estate speculation,and other forces that promoteforest cutting.

At the urban level, the traditionalsectors of water and sanitationremain the most promisingareas for a twin-track approach.The poverty-environment linkageshere have been well researchedand the payoffs are substantial(UNDP, 2005). Linked to theseis the interface between health,

exposure to toxics, the informalwaste collection sector, and recycling,an area in which the PovertyEnvironment Initiative is alreadyworking in Uruguay.

The increased production ofwaste has surpassed the capacitiesof most urban centres in developingcountries and has provided groundsfor the establishment of an informalwaste collection sector that isresponsible for most recycling.The conditions under which thisactivity takes place are extremelyharsh and often reinforcestructural poverty.

In summary, the integration of povertyand environment policies can havesignificant social rewards. Sustainedinterventions that keep structuralrealities in view, focus on impact,do not divorce themselves fromthe underlying causes of poverty,and invest in better governancein and greater efficacy of publicpolicy are more likely to deliverthe transformations necessaryto anchor sustainable development.

Bah, El-hadj M. (2008). ‘StructuralTransformation in Developed andDeveloping Countries’, MPRA Paper 10655.Available at: <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10655/1/MPRA_paper_10655.pdf>.

Barbier, E. (1987). ‘Cash Crops, Food Cropsand Agricultural Sustainability’, GatekeeperSeries 2, International Institute forEnvironment & Development.

Barbier, E. (2000). ‘The Economic Linkagesbetween Rural Poverty and LandDegradation: Some Evidence from Africa’,Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment,Vol. 82, pp. 355-370.

Brocklesby, M. and Hinshelwood, E. (2001),‘Poverty and the Environment: What thePoor Say: An Assessment of Poverty-Environment Linkages in ParticipatoryPoverty Assessments’, DFID.

Carson, R. (1962). Silent Spring.New York, Houghton Mifflin.

Dasgupta, S., Deichmann, U., Meisner, C.,and Wheeler, D. (2005). ‘Where is thePoverty Environment Nexus? Evidencefrom Cambodia and Lao PDR and Vietnam’,World Development, Vol. 33, No. 4,pp. 617–638.

Chomitz, K., (1999). Environment-PovertyConnections in Tropical Deforestation,

discussion notes prepared for theWDR Summer Workshop on Poverty andDevelopment, 6-8 July 1999, Washington DC.

Chomitz, K. (2007). At Loggerheads?:Agricultural Expansion, Poverty Reduction,and Environment in the Tropical Forests,Washington DC, World Bank.

DFID, EC, UNDP and the World Bank (2002).Linking poverty reduction andenvironmental management:Policy Challenges and Opportunities.

Gilbert, N. (2010). ‘Can ConservationCut Poverty?’, Nature 467, 264–265.Available at: <http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100913/full/467264a.html>.

Holt, E. (2001). ‘Measuring Farmers’Agroecological Resistance to HurricaneMitch in Central America’, GatekeeperSeries No.Sa102, International Institutefor Environment & Development.

Lind, M. (2010). From Shrillness to Sobriety: Pragmatism in Climate Politics.Available at: <http://www.policy-network.net/publications_detail.aspx?ID=3758>.

Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005).Ecosystems and Human Well-being:Synthesis, Washington DC, Island Press.

North, D. (1990). Institutions, InstitutionalChange and Economic Performance,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Soley, C. (2010). ‘Needs Must: Should theEnvironment Trump Prosperity?’Available at: <www.policy-network.net/publications_download.aspx?ID=3662>.

TEEB (2010). The Economics ofEcosystems and Biodiversity.Available at: <http://www.teebweb.org/TEEBSynthesisReport/tabid/29410/Default.aspx>.

UNDP (2005). Millennium Project.Report of Task Force 7 on Waterand Sanitation. Available at: <http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/WaterComplete-lowres.pdf>.

UNEP (2010). Why environmentalexternalities matter to institutionalinvestors. Available at: <http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/universal_ownership.pdf>.

UNEP (2011). Towards a Green Economy:Pathways to Sustainable Developmentand Poverty Eradication.Available at: <http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/GreenEconomyReport/tabid/29846/Default.aspx>.

World Bank (1992). World DevelopmentReport 1992 – Development and theEnvironment, New York, OxfordUniversity Press.

World Commission on Environmentand Development (1987). Our CommonFuture, Report of the World Commissionon Environment and Development, Oxford,Oxford University Press.


The world is shifting away fromeconomic growth models based on fossilfuels and toward a new ‘green’ economybased on low-carbon development.The financial and economic crises haveprompted increased investments inenvironmental infrastructure througheconomic stimulus packages, whilecountries continue to make commitmentsand substantial monetary pledges tosupport emerging financing mechanismsto mitigate and adapt to climate change.

A green economy can help to achievesustainable development by alleviatingenvironmental threats, contribute to thecreation of dynamic new industries andincome growth, and create quality jobsthat can improve workers’ economicstanding and thus their ability tobetter support their families.

These new industries and jobs can helpprotect and restore ecosystems andbiodiversity, reduce energy consumption,decarbonize the economy, andcontribute to climate changemitigation and adaption.

The sustainability of the new greeneconomy depends, however, not onlyon that economy’s ability to yieldenvironmental benefits, but also onits effectiveness in helping to eradicatepoverty and to increase gender equalityand women’s empowerment.

Green economy initiatives that aim atcreating more environmentally-soundeconomies are not automaticallyinclusive of fundamental socialrequirements such as income equity,job quality and gender equality. In failingto account for social factors, they couldmaintain or even aggravate the negativesocial and distributive trends of thetraditional economy, such as existinginequalities and gender gaps.

While a green economyhas the potential tocontribute to globaleconomic recovery and tocreate both high- andlow-skill jobs, it alsosupports qualityinvestments at thecommunity level to provideclean, affordable energyand to reduce threats fromfood, water, ecosystemand climate crises.

A green economy thatfunctions in this way ismore likely to deliver on itspromise to eradicate povertyand to promote equity,especially among women.

Accounting for GreenGrowth From the Lensof Gender Equality: Why It Matters!

by Lucy Wanjiru,Programme Specialist,

Gender and Environment,UNDP/BDP Gender Team

While a green economy has the potentialto contribute to global economicrecovery and to create both high- andlow-skill jobs, it also supports qualityinvestments at the community level toprovide clean, affordable energy andto reduce threats from food, water,ecosystem and climate crises. A greeneconomy that functions in this way ismore likely to deliver on its promise toeradicate poverty and to promote equity,especially among women.

In many developing countries, womenare living on the frontlines of climatechange. As primary producers of staplefoods—a sector that is highly exposedto the risks of drought and uncertainrainfall—women are disproportionatelyimpacted by climate change and areoften excluded from political andhousehold decisions that affect theirlives. During natural disasters such asfloods and hurricanes, for example,women suffer disproportionately andoften count higher among the dead.1

In addition, women tend to possessfewer assets and have insecure forestand land tenure rights. Even wherelegislation to secure women’s land rightsexists, the process of implementing thelaws remains a challenge. In Madagascar,for example, only 15 percent of womenown small landholdings, although theconstitution guarantees women’s landrights and 83 percent of employeesin the agricultural sector are women.Furthermore, agricultural financingprocesses do not often include genderconsiderations. “OECD statistics showthat of the US$18.4 billion spent onagricultural aid between 2002 and 2008,donors reported that just 5.6 percentincluded a focus on gender”.2

Although women generally lack decision-making power in social and political

1. Oxfam International (2005).

2. Gender Justice: Key to Achieving the MillenniumDevelopment Goals. Available at <http://www.ungei.org/resources/files/MDGBrief-English.pdf>.

3. Policy Paper: Intellectual Property, Agrobiodiversity and Gender.

4. Evidence for Action Gender Equality and EconomicGrowth. Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/15/45568595.pdf>.

5. UNDP and Energy Access for the Poor: Energizing theMillennium Development Goals. Available at: <http://www.undp.org/energy/>.

6. “A Gender Perspective on the “Green Economy”Equitable, healthy and decent jobs and livelihoods“,Women’s major group position paper in preparationof the “Rio+20" United Nations Conference onSustainable Development 2012.Available at: <http://www.unep.org/civil-society/Portals/59/Documents/12_GMGSF/docs_and_presentations/Additional_messages/gender_perspective_on_the_green_economy.pdf>.

http://www.unep.org/civil-society/Portals/59/Documents/12_GMGSF/docs_and_presentations/Additional_messages/gender_perspective_on_the_green_economy.pdf

Poverty in Focus 9

institutions and are excludedfrom leadership positions or given onlysecondary roles, they are not only victimsof adverse climate impacts. Indeed, theyare also active agents of change, leaders,and champions of economic growth andsustainable development.

Despite suffering from socio-economicdisadvantages, women are alreadyresponding to climate changes whilethey work to maintain their familiesand communities. They are at thefrontlines of everyday adjustment andadaptation to changing conditionsand environments.

As primary caretakers of families,communities and natural resources,women are energetically supportingrural food security and maintainingagricultural biodiversity.3

They have accumulated specificknowledge and skills about localconditions and ecological resourcesand have the power to contribute toeconomic transformation and sustainabledevelopment. But to reach their fullpotential, they need support in scaling upand upgrading their activities related tosustainable agriculture, renewable energy,and the conservation of water supplies,forests and other natural resources so thatthey can generate greater economicbenefits from their labour.

Increased access to cleaner fuels, energysources and technologies, all of which

Women and the Environment:

Forests contribute to the livelihoods of many of the 1.2 billion people living inextreme poverty, and the large majority of these poor (over 70 percent) are women(Gurung and Quesada, 2009).

70 percent of the 1.3 billion people living in conditions of povertyare women. In urban areas, 40 percent of the poorest households areheaded by women (UNDP, 2009 from UNFPA, 2008).

Women predominate in the world’s food production (50-80 percent), but theyown less than 10 percent of the land (UNDP, 2009 from UNFPA, 2008).

In sub-Saharan Africa, women comprise 60 percent of the informal economy,provide about 70 percent of all the agricultural labour and produce about90 percent of the food (FAO, 2008).

By training women, including grandmothers, to be solar engineers, the BarefootCollege has helped them and communities to access renewable energy and reducereliance on biomass as an energy source (Castonguay, 2009).

are essential for climate changemitigation, can have significant andrapid economic benefits for womenin developing countries. It can improveproductivity and efficiency and open upnew income-generating opportunitiesfor women, especially in currentlyunderserved rural areas.

Supporting women in designing,producing and marketing new energy-related equipment could trigger apositive chain reaction. Research showsthat women are most likely to invest inthe wellbeing of their families; theirincreased control over resources likelyleads to increased spending on children,a greater accumulation of human capitalin the next generation, and the creationof sustainable livelihoods forwhole communities.4

The green economy will need to supportinnovative approaches and businessmodels to facilitate women’sentrepreneurship opportunities andsupport the scaling-up of field-provensolutions and approaches that facilitategrowth for female-owned businessventures beyond social assistance andmicro-credit schemes. In Mali, BurkinaFaso and Senegal, for example, accessto mechanical power (multifunctionalplatforms), some of which is run fromclean biofuel, is generating income for2 million rural women, increasing schoolcompletion rates, and equalising thegirl-to-boy ratio in primary schools.New options (e.g., off-grid decentralised

mini-grids, water pumping and biofuel)are also being introduced rapidly.Scaling up energy access in off-gridareas across Africa will be instrumentalin empowering women and acceleratingprogress on multiple MDGs.5

Still, despite recent gains in genderequality and women’s empowerment,a significant wage gap and extremelylow numbers of women in high-growthemployment fields remain. Womenstill face significant challenges inentrepreneurship, including limitedaccess to start-up capital, financing,networks, and technical expertise,as well as a lack of opportunity tobid on competitive federal contracts.6

A truly sustainable ‘green economy’must promote gender-friendly, green-collar employment and entrepreneurshipopportunities and social equity andmust create green pathways out ofpoverty for both genders.

The Case of UNDP’s Women’s GreenBusiness InitiativeThe United Nations DevelopmentProgramme’s (UNDP’s) strategic approachto addressing climate change is guidedby the principles of inclusion andsustainable development, recognizingthat climate change is a developmentissue and must be addressed hand-in-hand with efforts to reduce poverty.To this end, UNDP has launched theWomen’s Green Business Initiative,a global programme aimed atpromoting women’s employment andentrepreneurship opportunities throughclimate change mitigation andadaptation activities.

Working in close collaboration withgovernments, civil society organizations,and the private sector, the Initiative isestablishing “service delivery platforms”that offer policy advice, capacitybuilding, financing options, information,and increased access to newtechnologies for developing countries.This initiative will further the UN System-wide Policy on Gender Equality and theEmpowerment of Women7 and the UNDPGender Equality Strategy (2008-2013).8

The Women’s Green Business Initiativewill contribute to poverty reduction


and the achievement of the MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs), especially ofMDG 3 on gender equality and women’sempowerment. This is particularlyimportant for gender-responsiveand green public investment.

The Initiative equips women to engagevigorously in new economic activitiesthat address climate change threats whilebuilding stronger, more resilient and self-reliant communities by implementingthree strategic elements:

Creating a policy environment thatenhances equal economic opportunitiesfor women: The Initiative providesadvice and technical support togovernments on policy and planningframeworks to remove legal,administrative and financial constraintsaffecting women’s economicadvancement and provides incentivesand resources for the expansion ofwomen’s green enterprises.

Building capacity for women’sorganizations and women entrepreneurs:The Initiative provides training andsupport services to assist women’sorganizations and entrepreneurs instarting, incubating and scaling upviable business enterprises thatcontribute to climate mitigation,adaptation and resilience.

Increasing women’s access to climatechange finance mechanisms:The Initiative promotes gender-responsive public and privateinvestments. It facilitates increased

access to existing climate changefunds and pursues the establishmentof new targeted financing options forwomen’s green business initiatives.

The Women’s Green Business Initiativeaims to directly empower women indeveloping countries to engage in thedesign, production and delivery of greentechnologies, products, services, andinformation to adapt to and mitigate theeffects of climate change. It also providessupport services to remove legal, policyand regulatory biases that hinderwomen’s entrepreneurship andemployment in the new green industriesand activities of the future. Evidenceshows that investing in gender equalitycan accelerate economic growth andreduce poverty.9

Therefore, integrating genderconsiderations in the green economyis critical to the creation of a moreequal and sustainable society for all.Doing any less means not involvingand capitalising on the capacity,innovation and learning of 50 percentof the world’s population.

The following references are relatedto the box on page 9:

Gurung, Jeannette and Andrea Quesada(2009). Gender-Differentiated Impactsof REDD to be addressed in REDD SocialStandards. A report prepared for aninitiative to develop voluntary Socialand Environmental standardsfor REDD. Available from: <http://www.wocan.org/files/all/gender_differentiated_impacts_of_redd_final_report1.pdf>.

7. UN System Doc. CEB/2006/2.

8. The UNDP Gender Equality Strategy callsfor tailored initiatives to support broad-based,equitable development that is inclusive of women’sneeds and contributions—especially those of poorwomen. Section 6.1 of the Gender Equality Strategydeals broadly with “Poverty Reduction and theAchievement of the MDGs” and includes initiativesfor “Promoting inclusive growth, gender equalityand MDG achievement.” Paragraph 51 states thatUNDP will be pro-active in working with nationalentities to incorporate a gender perspective,with special attention to four areas:1) macro-planning instruments that incorporategender analysis and specify gender equality results;2) women’s unpaid work; 3) gender-responsive publicinvestment; and 4) gender-sensitive analysis of data.

9. Klasen, S. “Does Gender Inequality ReduceGrowth and Development? Evidence fromCross-Country Regressions“.Available at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER/Resources/wp7.pdf>.

The Types of Enterprises that can be Supported by theWomen’s Green Business Initiative Include:

Producing and marketing low-emission, more efficient stoves and equipment.

Producing, marketing, and installing renewable energy technologies.

Producing biofuels and biogas for lamps, cookers and motorised equipment.

Expanding existing businesses using new energy efficient and renewableenergy sources.

Preserving forest and biodiversity through tree planting, ecosystem conservationand sustainable use of indigenous resources.

Providing financial, business and environmental managementand consulting services.

The green economywill need to supportinnovative approachesand business modelsto facilitate women’sentrepreneurshipopportunities andsupport the scaling-upof field-proven solutionsand approaches.

Integrating genderconsiderations in thegreen economy is criticalto the creation of a moreequal and sustainablesociety for all.

UNDP (2009) Resource guide onGender and Climate Change.Available from: <http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/download/publication/?version=live&id=2087989>.

FAO (2008). Gender Equality: Ensuring ruralwomen’s and men’s equalparticipation indevelopment. Food and AgricultureOrganization. <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0765e/i0765e10.pdf>.

Castonguay, Sylvie (2009).Barefoot Colleague Teaching Grandmothersto be Solar Engineers. WIPO Magazine,3/2009. June 2009. WIPO, CommunicationsDivision. Available from: <http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2009/03/article_0002.html>.

Poverty in Focus 11

Control over energy and theenvironment has been central to statelegitimacy and power in the Arab region,shaping the nature of governanceand influencing how sovereignty andstatecraft function in the region.As the systemic transition across the Arabregion proceeds and countries craft newsocial compacts for development, theequitable and sustainable use of naturalresources will likely emerge as a centralissue of contention.

The social compact in past decades hasbeen defined by a balance between statecontrol over natural capital, on theone hand, and the provision of socialwelfare benefits, on the other. However,sustainable development is about morethan charity—it is also about justice andaccountability, with a key challengebeing to expand the benefits of theregion’s natural wealth for the averagecitizen and the poor in particular.

Higher expectations have emergedfor more transparent, accountableand participatory use of energy andthe environment as a public good,combating corruption, preventingthe squandering of natural wealth,and preserving natural capitalfor future generations.

The spirit of transformational changein the region stands as an opportunityto address entrenched systems ofcontrol, broaden access and benefit-sharing related to natural wealth,expand the role of local governance, andstrengthen resilience of the natural assetbase on which the poor depend.While analyses of the links betweenenvironment and human developmentoften focus on consumptionsustainability, a broader perspective isneeded to address the important role ofnatural resources as a means to expand

As countries across the Arabregion move forward withnew social compacts, theequitable and sustainableuse of natural resourceswill emerge as an issueof contention.

Transformational changein the Arab region is anopportunity to rethinkthe role of natural resourcesin creating more inclusiveand sustainable growth andas a means of expandingpeople’s long-term choicesand freedoms.

Sustainable development isabout more than charity—itis also about justice andaccountability.

by Kishan Khoday,Deputy Representative,UNDP Saudi Arabia1

Sustainable Developmentas Freedom: Energy, Environmentand the Arab Transformation

people’s long-term choices and freedoms.Unless trends of resource scarcity andecological change are addressed, basicfreedoms, human security and humandevelopment stand in jeopardy.

In particular, the vulnerability of food,water and energy resources and theexacerbation of climate change togetherbring serious risks to sustaining humandevelopment. As noted by former UNSecretary General Kofi Annan, “whenresources are scarce—whether energy,water or arable land—our fragileecosystems become strained, as dothe coping mechanisms of groups andindividuals. This can lead to a breakdownof established codes of conduct, andeven outright conflict.” Underlying shiftsin global resource demand and fragilityof supply combined to create recordprices for basic food and energycommodities in recent years,exacerbating social and politicalinstability in many countries.

The transformation in the Arab regionnow provides space to rethink the roleof natural resources in the economy, withnew green economy concepts potentiallyproviding a channel to increase socialequity and the efficiency of resource useand generating new knowledge-basedapproaches to economic innovation andcompetitiveness. Such rethinking woulddo well to consider the role of the greeneconomy, defined as an economy “thatresults in improved human well-beingand social equity, while significantlyreducing environmental risks andecological scarcities”. 2 The concept hasemerged as a way to stimulate economicactivity, while responding to food, water,energy and climate crises and reorientingthe global economy from a “system thatallowed, and at times generated, thesecrises to a system that proactivelyaddresses and prevents them.”3

1. Kishan Khoday has served with UNDP since 1997,as UNDP Sustainable Development Advisor andDeputy Coordinator for Natural Resourcesand the Environment in Indonesia (1997-2005), UNDPAssistant Representative and Team Leader for Energy& Environment in China (2005-2009) and UNDPDeputy Representative in Saudi Arabia (since 2009).

2. UNEP, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways toSustainable Development and Poverty Eradication –A Synthesis for Policy Makers, UNEP, Nairobi (2011), 2.

3. Jose Antonio Ocampo, The Transition to a GreenEconomy: Benefits, Challenges and Risks from aSustainable Development Perspective, Report ofExperts to Second Preparatory Committee for the UNConference on Sustainable Development (Rio2012),UNDESA, UNEP and UNCTAD, New York (2010), 2.


Food Security at the CrossroadsFood security accelerated the emergenceof some civil society movements, with2011 seeing record prices because ofsurging global demand and historicdroughts and flooding in key exportingcountries in 2010.

The Arab region already stands as theworld’s largest net food importer andmany fear we are witnessing a shift awayfrom cyclical price fluctuations towardslonger-term structural change drivenby a shift in supply and demandfundamentals—a convergence of surgingemerging economy demand alongsidebottlenecks to expansion of agriculturalland and productivity that include climatechange, rising energy costs, reducedgroundwater irrigation capacities,desertification and reduced soil fertility.

Enhanced social safety nets and newapproaches to agricultural productivitygains are needed for Arab countries toadapt to these challenges. New attentionis needed to review economic and fiscalpolicies related to agricultural productionand land use, subsidy and social securitysystems, ecologically sound farming, cropdiversification, expansion of sustainableirrigation and water use efficiency, use ofenergy efficiency and renewable energymeasures, and soil replenishment.

Furthermore, food insecurity is drivingsome Arab countries to explore overseasland acquisition and leasing. Globally,the acquisition of land for food securityhas topped 140 million acres, bringingwith it an investment potential of US$50billion to host countries.4

Saudi Arabia, for example, is now activein land acquisitions and leasing inEthiopia, Indonesia and Sudan driven byhigh population growth in the Arab Gulf,with populations expected to doublefrom 2000 levels by 2030 in anenvironment of scarce arable land andgroundwater resources. However, thisnew global trend brings concernsabout the impact on local communitiesin terms of land and water rights andtheir own food security, with a needfor South-South cooperation andintegration of sustainability, inclusionand equity into growth andinvestment policies.

Energy and Inclusive GrowthAs noted by the 2010 IMF World EconomicOutlook, “the persistent increase in oilprices over the past decade suggeststhat global oil markets have entered aperiod of increased scarcity. Giventhe rapid growth in oil demand inemerging market economies and adownshift in the trend growth of oilsupply, a return to abundance isunlikely in the near term.”5

The convergence of declining energyreserves, the dramatic rise in emergingeconomy demand, and a gradual globalshift to climate-friendly growth havecreated a break from the type of cyclicalfactors that shaped the past, with oilprices likely to remain high for sometime to come. This holds risks forArab countries, most of whichare net energy importers.

There is now recognition that risingprices could constrain future humandevelopment trends unless energyalternatives are engaged. As a result,countries across the region are nowintensifying efforts to expand renewableenergy and energy efficiency measuresto reduce import dependence andthus to save public resources for socialdevelopment goals while also creatingthe foundations for new growthand a green economy.

Energy plays an equally important rolein defining the nature of the state andhuman development in oil-exportingcountries in the Arab region. The energysector remains central to the region’seconomy, making up approximately 40percent of GDP, but, as reserves decline,oil-exporting countries are alsointensifying efforts to expand localrenewable energy and energy efficiencymeasures. This is meant to conserveincreasingly scarce oil reserves for futureexport revenues, on the one hand, and todiversify economies beyond oil to ensurea sustainable base for economic growthand youth employment, on the other.

In Saudi Arabia, for example, which islargely dependent on oil-burning powerfacilities and the expansion of non-oilindustrial sectors, recent years have seena dramatic increase in local direct oil use.The new King Abdullah City for Atomic

The 2012 Rio EarthSummit is an opportunityto engage in new south-south cooperation forsustainable development,to engage the new role ofthe South in emergingrisks and solutions.

A south-south solutionsexchange can supportsharing of models forsustainable developmentand green economypolicy, and the transferand development of cleantechnologies within thesouth. It could alsofacilitate the integrationof green economyapproaches into rapidlygrowing ODA and foreigninvestment flows fromemerging economies toleast developed countries.

4. Lester Brown, The New Geopolitics of Food, May/June 2011, Earth Policy Institute, Washington DC, 7-8.

Poverty in Focus 13

and Renewable Energy forecasts that, ifcurrent trends prevail, local oil demandcould increase from about 2.5 millionbarrels per day (mbpd) out of the 10mbpd produced today, to as manyas 8 million barrels per day by 2028.6

Thus, in addressing energy risks andopportunities in the Arab region, twocomplimentary goals are taking shapein the region, both in line with the visionof the UN Secretary General’s AdvisoryGroup on Energy and Climate Change:1) to reduce the energy intensity ofgrowth and 2) to expand access tosustainable forms of energy for thepoor, the latter of which is in particularfocus in 2012 as the InternationalYear of Sustainable Energy for All.7

As a result of the global shift inresource supply and demand andemerging green economy opportunities,clean technology reached a record highmarket capitalization of US$386 billionin 2010, of which US$200 billion was inclean energy (see Figure).8 This is drivenby emerging economies like Brazil,China, and India.9 Potential also existsfor the Arab region to join this trendby building on its world-leading energysector capacities and solar radiationlevels. Initial steps include renewableenergy and energy efficiency targetsin Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,Morocco, Tunisia and UAE, and plansfor a pan-Arab solar power network.

However, while clean energy holdsbenefits for the sustainability ofdevelopment, it will not necessarilybenefit the poor without policiesfor inclusive growth in the sector.10

The 2008 Riyadh Declaration onEnergy for Sustainable Development,for example, advocated to make cleanenergy accessible for Least DevelopedCountries and was supported bythe OPEC Fund for InternationalDevelopment and other partners.

This is important for the Arab region,where 40 percent of the poor lack energyaccess, with electrification rates in Sudanand Yemen as low as 25 percent. As notedat the global MDG+10 Summit in 2010,“lack of access to modern energy servicesis a serious hindrance to economic and

social development and must beovercome if the MDGs are to be achieved.”

South-South SolutionsComing 20 years after the landmark 1992Rio Earth Summit, the upcoming 2012 RioEarth Summit will place a major focus oninstitutions for sustainable developmentand on the green economy.

Two underlying issues are important:the role of emerging economies in globalsustainability challenges and solutionsand the emerging risks from resourcescarcity for social equity and inclusivegrowth. Unlike in previous eras ofeconomic transformation, currentresponses to food, water and energysecurity are emerging throughleadership of the South.

Thus, South-South cooperation can playa key role in harnessing the comparativeadvantages of partners in the South tobring about transformational change inthe global economy and to supportsustainability of their own economicand social development.

Just as the agricultural green revolutionof the past reduced poverty across theworld, so, too, could the next wave ofclean technologies emerge as a criticaltool for achieving inclusive growth andsustainable development. South-Southcooperation can be a transformativeforce in this regard.

5. IMF, World Economic Outlook, International MonetaryFund (IMF), Washington (2011), 89.

6. KACARE (2011), Statement by the Presidentof the King Abdullah City for Atomic and RenewableEnergy to the Global Competitiveness Forum,14 January 14 2011, Riyadh.

7. UN, Report of the UN Secretary-General’s AdvisoryGroup on Energy and Climate Change, United NationsPublications, New York (2010), 7-9.

8. Nicholas Parker, The Emerging Global Clean Economy:The Race for Sustainability Prosperity Goes Mainstream,Cleantech Group, Presentation to the GlobalCompetitiveness Forum, 24 January 2011, Riyadh.

9. UNEP, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways toSustainable Development and Poverty Eradication:Policy Synthesis, UNEP, Nairobi (2011), 23.

10. IEA and UN, Energy Poverty: How to Make ModernEnergy Access Universal, OECD/IEA (2010), Paris.

Source: Cleantech Group (2011).

Opportunities exist to build new strategicpartnerships to combine experiences andexpertise and to establish policies andinstitutions as the foundations for newgreen growth and benefits to the poor.Scope also exists for cooperationamong natural resource exporting andimporting countries in the South to findnew solutions to surging prices, marketvolatility, and vulnerability of the poor.

A South-South solutions exchangeon issues of natural resources andthe environment can add value to thisprocess, connecting achievements andbest practices among partners andhelping shape evolving green economystrategies in follow-up to the upcoming2012 Rio Earth Summit.


In the Europe and Central Asiaregion (ECA), where the effects ofclimate change are already being felt,post-Communist legacies create uniqueenvironmental and infrastructuralproblems, and the consequences ofclimate change could easily exacerbateexisting social inequalities.

This article seeks to identify someof these intersecting considerationsand the role of social approaches insustaining efforts to mitigate andadapt to climate change.

Why? A focus on the social dimensionsof climate change improves theoperational quality of substanceand process, thereby contributingto better overall results. Social andinstitutional analyses help providea snapshot of vulnerabilityand assess institutional capacityfor responding to climate change,helping us to understand not justvulnerability itself, but also who isvulnerable, for how long, and why.

Can ECA countries adapt to climaterisks and reduce emissions whilesafeguarding development?Climate change represents a multi-sectoral concern for the Europeand Central Asia region. Temperatureincreases between 0.5 degrees celsius inthe south and 1.6 degree celsius in thenorth have been noted, with anticipatedincreases of up to 1.6 to 2.6 degreescelsius by the mid-century.

Climate variability significantly threatensECA countries, with negative effectsalready evident. The region’s poorinfrastructure and dire environmentalsituation, rather than the changingclimate itself, figure most prominently asthe region’s key drivers of vulnerability.Due to these pervasive socio-economic

A focus on the socialdimensions of climatechange improvesoperational quality interms of both substanceand process, therebycontributing to betteroverall results.

Social and institutionalanalysis helps provide asnapshot of vulnerabilityand assesses institutionalcapacity for responding toclimate change helping usnot just to understandvulnerability in itself butwho is vulnerable, forhow long and why.

This strategy is particularlyimportant in the Europe andCentral Asia region (ECA),where the effects of climatechange are already beingfelt, post-Communistlegacies create uniqueenvironmental andinfrastructural problems,and existing socialinequalities could easily beexacerbated by theconsequences ofclimate change.

by Nicolas Perrin,Senior Social Development Specialist

Europe and Central Asia Region,World Bank

Challenges and Opportunitiesfor InclusiveGreen Growth

and legacy issues, even countries andsectors that potentially stand to benefitfrom a warming climate are poorlypositioned to do so (Fay et al., 2009).

Although most ECA countries haveachieved an absolute reduction inemissions during the past two decadesdue to industrial decline, emissionshave begun to rise again, as effortsto de-couple economic developmentfrom carbon intensity meet with littlesuccess (World Bank, 2010).

Among the world’s top ten highestgreenhouse gas emitters per unit of GDP,five are from the ECA: Uzbekistan (1),Kazakhstan (3), Ukraine (6), Russia (7),Azerbaijan (8). Still, while reducing GHGemissions is vital for stabilising theglobal climate, national public policyoften seeks to balance this with the needto provide access to affordable energy,opportunities for the mobility of people,goods and services, and transitionalsupport to those dependent oncarbon-intensive livelihoods.

Structural transformation of theeconomy to renewable energies in ECAoffers opportunities for GHG reductionsand important distributional andinstitutional challenges.

Social dimensions of greengrowth and climate change in ECAUnprepared to manage a changingclimate, ECA countries face increasingeconomic losses and inequitable socialimpact that will be disproportionatelyborne by the poor. Climate change,combined with a crumbling andinflexible infrastructure, renders ECAcountries vulnerable.

Over the past 30 years, natural disastershave cost ECA countries about US$70billion, a figure anticipated to rise.

Poverty in Focus 15

Possible Social Impact of Climate Change in ECA

1. Loss of livelihoods related to stressed agriculture sectors (especially aroundrain-fed agriculture), water access degradation, increased climate variabilityand natural disasters.

2. Increase of forced migration (both rural and regional) triggered by climatevariability can create new social challenges in the provision of urban services,remittances, social justice.

3. Increased conflicts between social groups (and possibly between countries)over scarce resources, especially water.

4. More frequent natural disasters can be devastating to health, infrastructure,and housing.

5. Raised morbidity rates due to the likely return of malaria to the Caucasusand Central Asia, and an increase in other weather-related diseases.

6. Climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies can exacerbate inequalitiesbased on gender, youth, and wealth and undermine the realisation of rights to basicsocial services (housing, access to health and water, participation, etc.) and reinforceinequity through socially unsound mitigation efforts to reform energy and transportsectors and restructure industries.

Source: World Bank (2008).

Most of this damage has occurredin Armenia, Romania, Poland, Russiaand Turkey (World Bank, 2010). This addsto the challenges confronting individualsfacing poverty, hunger, disease, mortality,displacement and conflict who alreadylack the necessary access to social capital,financial assets, effective governanceand community mobilisationstructures (see Box).

Ensuring the creation of alternativelivelihoods, equitable energy tariffreform, equitable access to renewableenergy and social assistance, robustnational institutions and legal structures,as well as awareness-raising amongmajor industry and citizens ongreenhouse gas emission reductiontargets (often defined as ‘softadaptation’) are a prerequisiteto developing holistic, effectivelong-term green growth strategies.

The economies of ECA countries arehighly carbon-intensive due to energy-intensive export industries (mining,metals, and textiles) and a dearth ofefficiency regulation and standards.

International efforts to mitigate climatechange set stringent emission reductiontargets for the energy sector (WorldBank, 2010), causing significant increasesin the household cost of energy,potentially limiting access for poorerhouseholds, and ultimately underminingreform efforts. The poor are critical

stakeholders for long-term GHG emissionstrategies because, as residents, theywould benefit from reductions inemissions (and particularly in airpollution) precisely when emissions havethe potential to grow markedly as theliving standards of the poor improve.

These are inherent contradictionsbetween poverty reduction and naturalresource management that need to bebetter understood and addressed.

Whereas technology is often toutedas the starting point for green growth,social dimensions may prove to be evenmore crucial. Large-scale biomass andheat production programmes and thealteration of electrical grids to makebetter use of renewable energy sourceswill be pivotal in ensuring accessibilityof those services across society whilesafeguarding livelihood opportunitiesand offering equitable employmentopportunities to a changing

Source: World Bank (2010).


workforce in reformed infrastructure andsectors. New and innovative land usedevelopment practices will need to beexplored to reduce infrastructure costsalong with the energy required fortransportation, community services,and buildings. Similarly, transportationtechnologies are likely to reduce thecarbon footprint while improvingdevelopment prospects, particularlyfor poorer and rural communities.Moreover, better forestry and agriculturaltechniques can offer cost-effectivemitigation with significant potential toimprove livelihoods, reduce soil erosion,and protect biodiversity(World Bank, 2010).

How can social approaches contribute tosuccessful green growth strategies?Green growth changes are largelysocietal if one considers the changesand scale required. In many countries,though, the climate change agenda hasnot been seen as a priority and is oftenmet with skepticism.

The lack of general awareness of greengrowth options and climate risks remainsan important obstacle for the adoptionand adaptation of effective policy.Institutional challenges further reinforcethis knowledge deficit. Green growthinnovation as a public policy response isoften divided among various agenciesat national-level and lower-levelinstitutions (regions, municipalities),where implementation capacitygenerally remains weak. This persistentcapacity gap has direct consequencesfor the sustainability and effectivenessof short- and long-term strategies.

It is crucial for ECA countries to betterunderstand drivers of vulnerability and

resilience in their respective contexts sothat they can design and implementsocially inclusive, climate-resilientpolicies and programmes.

Social analysis can inform thediscussion by ensuring that greengrowth interventions effectively targetvulnerable populations, deliver directbenefits, and support their adaptivecapacity and resilience while ensuringsolutions for more equitable mitigation(by, for instance, applying a gender lensto reforms in low-carbon growth sectors).

Applying political economy analysis toassess the levels of accountability andinclusiveness could help to managemore effectively the political andsocial risks of mitigation and ensurethat adaptive capacity is strengthenedmore comprehensively across societies.Promoting good governance is keyto pro-poor adaptation and mitigationand reinforces social resilience.

As recent experiences from the PilotProgram for Climate Resilience haveshown, designing and implementingparticipatory approaches to increasetransparency, accountability, andperformance, while supporting theparticipation of dynamic civil societyorganizations, can help achieve betterprogramme outcomes and deliverbenefits to societies’ most vulnerablegroups.1 Experiences with community-based disaster risk management andcommunity-based adaptation holdimportant lessons here.

Capacity-building and awareness-raisingof local institutions and communities/citizens to respond and adapt to thechallenges of the green growth agendain the ECA region are indispensibleif those strategies are to succeed.This should be complemented byenhanced monitoring of the socialdimensions of the green growth inlocally and externally fundedprogrammes to ensure synergiesbetween all levels (government,donor, private sector, civil society).

The next decade offers a window ofopportunity for ECA countries—a criticalopportunity to get the politics and thepolicy right. Knowledge-sharing will

play a central role in ensuring that greengrowth investments are not onlyprofitable, but also equitable.

Banda, K. (2009). ‘Gender and Mitigation’,presentation to Global Gender and ClimateAlliance side event, Bonn, Germany, 1 June2009. Accessed online at: <http://unfccc2.meta-fusion.com/kongresse/090601_SB30_Bonn/downl/20090601_Banda.pdf>.

Cameron, C., Bachofen, C. and Perrin, N.(2010). ‘Social Dimensions of ClimateChange, Learning in Focus: Europe andCentral Asia region series: vulnerability,resilience and adaptive capacity, climatepolicy building blocks, mitigation,adaptation’, Washington DC, World Bank.

Fay, M., Block, R. I. and Ebinger, J. (eds.)(2010). ‘Adapting to Climate Change inEastern Europe and Central Asia’,Washington DC, World Bank.

Perrin, A., Agrawal, A. and Kononen, M.(2009). ‘The Role of Local Institutions inAdaptation to Climate Change’, SocialDevelopment Paper No. 118, Washington,DC, World Bank.

Perrin, A., Agrawal, A. and Kononen, M.,(2009). ‘Climate Policy Processes, LocalInstitutions and Adaptation Actions:Mechanisms of Translation and Influence’,Social Development Paper No. 119,Washington, DC, World Bank.

World Bank (2010a). ‘Climate Changeand the World Bank Group. Phase II:the challenge of low carbon growth’,Independent Evaluation Group,Washington, DC.

World Bank (2010b). ‘Development andClimate Change’, World DevelopmentReport 2010, World Bank, Washington, DC.

World Bank (2011). ‘Issues Paper on Genderand Energy: A Background Paper for theWorld Bank Group’s FY2011 EnergyStrategy and Activities’, World Bank,Washington DC.

World Bank (2011). ’Low carbongrowth in Europe and Central Asia: Principal issues and a program of work’(draft), World Bank, Washington, DC.

This article seeks toidentify some ofthese intersectingconsiderations and therole of social approachesin sustaining theefforts to mitigateand adapt toclimate change.

1. The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR),approved in November 2008, was the first program medeveloped and operational under the Strategic ClimateFund (SCF), which is one of two funds within the designof the Climate Investment Funds (CIF). The PPCR aimsto pilot and demonstrate ways in which climate risk andresilience may be integrated into core developmentplanning and implementation. In this way, the PPCRprovides incentives for scaled-up action and initiatestransformational change. The pilot programmes andprojects implemented under the PPCR are country-ledand build on National Adaptation Programs of Action(NAPA) and other relevant country studies andstrategies. They are strategically aligned with otherdonor funded activities to provide financing for projectsthat will produce experience and knowledge useful todesigning scaled-up adaptation measures.See: <http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/ppcr>.

Poverty in Focus 17

Over the past three years,the global discourse on climatechange has shifted from an almostexclusive focus on mitigation to moreattention being given to adaptationoptions for vulnerable communities.Whilst this shift is welcome and needed,it presents policy makers with a stubbornchallenge, namely, how to cope withuncertain future changes.

At the macro level, scientific data on thephysical impacts of climate change arepatchy. And if this is the case at theglobal level, then the quality andreliability of data only diminish at theregional, national and subnational levels.

It suggests that there is a limit to whatand how science can inform the processof adaptation and the requisite flexibilityand nimbleness required to confrontincreasing uncertainty. How, then, canpolicies and programming be plannedand implemented to addressthese great challenges?

Standard approaches to planning tend toanalyse historical records and the currentsituation in order to extrapolate to thefuture. In principle, this methodologyalso needs to cover climate and thenatural environment: nature setsthe context for everything andenvironmental change is a variablethat must be included in designing anystructure or process that is designed tolast for more than a few months.

However, climatic events of the recentpast and of the present are likely to belargely unreliable ‘predictors’ of thefuture. In development, policy makersseek to build societies, infrastructure, andeconomies to fit a certain set of physicalconditions assumed to be constant.In contrast, environmental changedirectly challenges those conditions

Adapting to Change:The Linked Challenges ofBuilding Resilient Communities

by Dan Smith and Janani Vivekananda,Secretary General and Senior ClimateChange and Security Adviser,respectively, at International Alert

As climate change interactswith other features of thesocial, economic andpolitical landscape, manycountries face a high riskof political instability andviolent conflict. This risk ofinstability both adds tothe burdens faced bydeprived and vulnerablecommunities, and makesit harder for them toreduce their vulnerability byadapting to climate change.

By tracing these complexand interlinked trajectoriesof risk, it is clear that climatechange and variability arenot climate issues alone.

To shape adaptation policiesto best effect, it is necessaryto go beyond responding tothe most immediate naturalimpacts of climate changeand look to the broaderdimensions of resiliencesuch as power, livelihoodsand access to justice.

and the norms that they shape. Whenone adds to the ‘mix’ a diverse humanityin various conditions of well-being,persistent inequality and a rapidlyevolving global ecosystem, traditionalassumptions no longer apply either inthe same ways or even at all.

The implications of this are far-reaching.Adaptation, as process, cannot relysolely on forecasting and the design ofscripted solutions for predicted impacts.That itself is daunting enough formost countries and well beyond thecapacity of existing financial andscientific resources.

The significant public investment ininnovation and ‘green transformations’,including research and development,by Brazil, India, China and South Africa arebeyond the reach of many other countriesin the South. Brazil’s investment in theagricultural sector in 2009-10 amounted toover US$60 billion, more than double theavailable global funds for climate changeas of October 2010 (Perch, 2011: 17) andChina reportedly plans to invest US$738billion in renewable energy over the next10 years (Wirth and Podesta, 2010).

Even if the capacity and funds wereavailable, there would still be anadditional challenge: responding tothe unpredictable. One solution wouldbe to strengthen communities’ resilience,i.e., their ability to face and ride outshocks to the system, whatever formthose shocks might take. Such thinkingis reinforced in the World ResourcesReport (2010-2011) Decision-makingin a Changing Climate.

The Framing Paper for the Report (Levi, 2010)cites five elements for effective climatechange adaptation, one of which is‘adaptive’, i.e., flexible and able to adaptto new information and conditions.


Given increasing uncertainty and insecurity,it also makes sense for adaptationefforts focused on resilience-buildingto learn from other governance failures.The failure of institutions responsiblefor safeguarding poor communities’interests—both formal and informal—has been at the root of the vulnerabilityof those communities. Governmentsincreasingly acknowledge thatvulnerability to climate change liesmore in context than in absolutes.

Poverty, weak governance, politicalinstability and corruption are allpotential barriers to effective adaptation;they also drive insecurity. Moreover, thecombination of these elements oftenheightens susceptibility to events,turning them into crises and disasters.

A review by Colten et al. (2008) oncommunity resilience and lessons fromNew Orleans and Hurricane Katrinahighlights the role of threat-multipliersand manifold challenges in shaping thescale of impact and the length of therecovery from disasters. Their findingsnote that vulnerability to hurricanesarises from numerous causes,1 andnot just from the hurricane itself.

Additionally, ‘silent’ emergencies areat risk of further escalation by climatechange. Malaria currently costs Africaneconomies US$12 billion a year in lostproductivity (World Bank, 2011:19) and,according to the Food Price Watch,escalating food prices have driven anestimated 44 million people into povertyin developing countries since mid-2010(World Bank, 2011).2

Riots over access to food skyrocketed in2008 and have been, it is suggested, atthe root of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011.3,4

Thus, resilience, conflict resolution,and peace-building go hand-in-hand.

Yet, despite many acknowledgements ofthis, most recently by the UK governmentin the recent review of its bilateral aidprogramme, efforts to operationalisethese linked goals remain stilted andsilo-ed. Most efforts respond to thedirect environmental risks of climatechange by switching crops, buildingflood defences, moving homes, andbuilding dwellings differently.

Though important, they often fail toaddress the knock-on social consequencesthat require more attention andresources and that ultimately canundermine the sustainability ofdevelopment progress. These remainleast understood in policy and practice.

In fragile contexts, particularly, this hassignificant resonance. Changing rainfallpatterns and increasing natural hazardswill affect national economy, trade,development, equity, governance,and political stability, and these,in turn, affect the ability of people andgovernments to respond adequatelyto the challenges of climate shocks.

The humanitarian crisis in Pakistan lastyear, as a result of floods, rapidly fuelledwidespread political unrest, linked tothe perceived inability of the nationalgovernment to adequately respond topeople’s needs. Individuals often do notnecessarily distinguish between climate-driven stressors and other stressors(unequal market-access, populationgrowth) that result in heightenedinsecurity and deteriorating livelihoods.

Accordingly, a shift to the ‘no-regrets’approach of building resilience,writ large, becomes critical. Yet, thisremains more concept than reality.Berrang- Ford et al. (2010: 6) found that“most adaptations are occurring at theindividual level with weak involvementof government stakeholders, andadaptation activities are more likely tooccur in natural resource sectors such asagriculture, fisheries and forestry, or thesecuring of food resources”.

Adaptation mechanisms are more likelyto include community-level mobilisationrather than institutional, governmental or

policy tools.” Consequently, the appeal ofan ‘all-risks’ approach to developmentbecomes obvious.

How to embark on such an approach?First, there needs to be greaterunderstanding of the social complexitiesin adapting to climate change. Second,decisions and institutional mechanismsneed to be shaped to address linkedproblems with linked responses.Take, for example, a water-relatedproblem such as floods, where thebest approach to adapting mightactually lie in the education sector.See the example in the box.

The World Bank (2010:34) acknowledgesthat “education will also affect a person’sability to anticipate climate events, makeproactive adaptation decisions andreduce losses related to disasters.”Accordingly, adaptation practice mustalso begin to reflect that climate changeis not just a climate issue.

In considering what makes peopleand systems resilient, including theavailability of information and the abilityto digest and act on it, relationships oftrust between citizens and authorities,viable livelihoods options and goodgovernance, there is a good chancethat adaptation efforts could yielddouble and triple dividends.

Failure to do so will likely resultin maladaptation and the wastingof a rare opportunity to re-engineerdevelopment for the benefit of thosewho need it most.

Berrang-Ford, L., Ford, J. D., andPaterson, J. (2010). ‘Are We AdaptingTo Climate Change?’, Global EnvironmentalChange 21 (1), 25–33.

Adapting Socially?

On the flood plains of the Brahmaputra, in the state of Assam, India, people respondto increased flooding by seeking new livelihood opportunities, often challengingtraditional cultural norms on acceptable livelihoods strategies for specific socialgroups. For instance, agriculture is connected with a certain group in the society,while fishing is connected to another that the local community considers to be alower-class ethnic group. In some cases, it might be suggested that a shift awayfrom agriculture could reduce their vulnerability. However, a shift from agriculture,weakened by floods and sedimentation, to fishing requires considerably more thanequipment and finance. Complementary moral support and capacity-building forcultural change is a vital component for sustaining change.

Poverty in Focus 19

1. A summary from an article by Kates and the reportwere also included in ‘Lessons in ResilienceFrom New Orleans’ by Andrew Revkin (2010).Available at:<http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/lessons-in-resilience-from-new-orleans/>.

2. See: <http://www.worldbank.org/foodcrisis/food_price_watch_report_feb2011.html>.

3. See: <http://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/survival-2011/year-2011-issue-2/global-warming-and-the-arab-spring>.

4. See: <http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/bp018.pdf>.

Ambitious claims are being madefor the potential of enhanced approachesto the reduction of emissions fromdeforestation and forest degradation(REDD+) to become a key source offunding for forest conservation.Moreover, the development of REDD+schemes is expected to bring so-called‘co-benefits’ for forest conservation andforest-dependent livelihoods, includingbiodiversity conservation, forestrecuperation, and sustainableharvesting of forest resources.

Indigenous peoples continue to playa critical role in forest and biodiversityconservation through their livelihoods,or ways of living, in the absence ofbroader policy initiatives. While ‘REDD+’recognizes this and promises to deliversignificant resources at an unexpectedscale, there is some danger that this ismore panacea than a fundamental shiftin development policy and practice.Indigenous territories, which coveraround a quarter of Amazonia (in Brazil)and a substantial proportion of theworld’s other major forest regions, havebeen shown to be the most effective

Indigenous peoples playa critical role in forest andbiodiversity conservationthrough their livelihoods,or ways of living, even inthe absence of broaderpolicy initiatives.

The extent to whichthe ‘carbon price’ accountsfor all co-benefits, and thusserves as proper incentivefor sustaining pre-REDDenvironmental stewardshipactions, is still unclear.

Challenges for theReal Participation ofIndigenous Peoples in REDD+

by Leonardo Hasenclever, Research Fellow, IEB1

and Alex Shankland, Research Fellow, IDS2

land use category in reducing tropicaldeforestation (Nelson and Chomitz, 2009).This fact received relatively littleacknowledgement before the adventof global climate change. In contrast,references to indigenous peoples arenow increasingly common in climatechange policy statements, with anapparent international consensusemerging on the importance ofinvolving them in adaptationand mitigation initiatives.

Even so, clear policy frameworks for theeffective and equitable involvement ofindigenous peoples have yet to emerge.Greater clarity is needed in both the‘what’ and the ‘how’: what theseframeworks should contain and howthey should be implemented. As LeisaPerch noted in a recent review, policymakers across a range of internationalagencies agree that “the ‘how’ remainsthe greatest challenging in movingforward on sustainable and co-benefitsapproaches” (2010: 10).

Some of the most important issues forco-benefits debates in the context of

1. IEB – International Education Instituteof Brazil – Research Fellow-Climate Change andEnvironmental Economics.

2. IDS – Institute of Development Studies – ResearchFellow-Participation, Power and Social Change Team.

This article draws on work supported by UKaidthrough the Learning Hub for Low Carbon ClimateResilient Development, a project funded by theUK Department for International Development (DFID)for the benefit of developing countries. The viewsexpressed are not necessarily those of DFID, IDS or IEB.

Colten, C. E, Kates, R. W., and Laska, S. B.(2008). ‘Community Resilience: Lessons fromNew Orleans and Hurricane Katrina’, CARRIResearch Report No.3, Oakridge ResearchLaboratory. Available online at: <http://rwkates.org/pdfs/a2008.03.pdf>.

Levin, K. (2010). ‘World Resources 2010Framing Paper: Decision Making in aChanging Climate’, World Resources Report,Washington DC. Available online at: <http://www.worldresourcesreport.org>.

Perch, L. (2011). ‘Mitigation of What and byWhat? Adaptation by Whom and for Whom?Dilemmas in Delivering for the Poor and theVulnerable in International Climate Policy’,Working Paper 79, Brasilia, InternationalPolicy Centre for Inclusive Growth.Available at: <www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper79.pdf>.

Smith, D. and Vivekananda, J. (2009).Climate Change, Conflict and Fragility:Understanding the Linkages, ShapingEffective Responses. International Alert.

World Bank (2010) Economicsof Adaptation to Climate Change:Social Synthesis Report.Available online at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1232059926563/5747581-1239131985528/EACC_Synthesis_report_final_web.pdf>.

World Bank (2011). Africa’s Futureand the World Bank’s Support to It.Africa’s Regional Strategy.February 2011. Available online at:<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/Africa_s_Future_and_the_World_Bank_s_Role_in_it.pdf>.


indigenous peoples, indigenousterritories and REDD+ relate to thequestion of how different mechanismscan effectively translate the value of theircomplex livelihood system into carbonprices, i.e., how they can give economicvalue to the source of the positiveexternalities that these territorieshave historically generated.

As payment for such externalities arediscussed in terms of cash (per CO2

stored/emissions avoided), concerns arebeing raised about how such communities,whose economies are not cash-basedand/or who have very little access to otherformal mechanisms such as banks or otherfinancial service providers, will access andbenefit from such opportunities.

A further ‘how’ also needs to beaddressed: How can indigenous peoplesthemselves actually shape the policiesthat affect them? Alcida Ramos andcolleagues note that “sovereignty,self-government and self-determinationare core values in the Western world,but they are seldom contemplatedin relation to indigenous peoples.[…] To indigenise development is to takeinto account the indigenous version ofthese values” (2009: 5).

In view of the findings of a recentstudy of the political economy of REDD+regulation in Brazil, equi-proportionality—or equity and proportionality together,that is, an equity criterion submittedto principles of proportionality—should be an essential element of amore inclusive approach. In the caseof REDD+, this applies specifically toredistributive parameters/principlesfor benefit-sharing, proportional to therelative benefits generated, conserved,

warranted—or, in other words, the areaof forest conserved, the degree ofpreservation of its major ecosystemservices and social, cultural andecological processes.

Consequently, the redistributionof REDD+ benefits would follow equitycriteria proportionally on the basisof the relevant aspects of forestconservation for which indigenouspeoples (and other local communities)can claim responsibility and that areimportant for their livelihoods andcultural and social values, includingnon-use/intrinsic values.

By informing price formation systemsthat seek to account for the criticalco-benefits generated by indigenouspeoples, positive incentives forpre-existing conservation activitiescan also be created. Such a shift wouldalso require compensating for likelyunderestimations of the opportunitycosts of REDD+ for forest-dwellingpopulations and would clearlyrequire significant political willbefore implementation.

The literature on environmentaleconomics has already shown thatmarket-based instruments can be a‘dynamically efficient’ incentive for thedevelopment, innovation and adoptionof low-cost abatement technologies thatenable adopters to reduce the costsof achieving emissions targets, in linewith the principle of equi-marginality3

(Requate, 2005).

However, they may also contain anexcessive bias against other seeminglyexpensive mitigation technologies thathave a large potential for cost reductions,

particularly in the long term, bringinginto question the extent to whichcost-effectiveness alone is a sufficientcriterion4 for evaluating policy options.

On the one hand, the principle ofequi-marginality requires strong marketinstitutions in order to permit economicagents to achieve socially optimal results—often with no explicit effort to addressequity. Most of the discussion aroundREDD+ and related economic instruments(such as benefit-sharing, warranty, andliability) derive from standard welfareeconomics, but also understand thatthis is also inherently contradictoryand counter-intuitive.

On the other hand, the principle ofequi-proportionality requires strongpolitical will, efficient participation,solid institutions and regulationto enable economic agents to achieveequity-optimal results according towell-defined criteria—which dimensionsof forest conservation will be the basisfor establishing proportionality, forexample—within well-definedsocially defined objectives.

According to the theory of priceformation, prices reflect only the relativescarcity of the goods and services beingpriced—in this case, tons of carbon or,say, carbon credits via sequestrationor storage. In reality, though, these areinfluenced by many of the aspects citedearlier, a differentiation currently appliedwithout regulation.

The extent to which the ‘carbon price’5

accounts for all co-benefits, and thusserves as proper incentive for sustainingpre-REDD environmental stewardshipactions, is still unclear.

In Brazil, concern about the potentialfor rapid expansion of unregulatedREDD+ activities targeting indigenouslands has been growing among policymakers, NGOs and indigenouspeoples themselves.

In our recent study of the politicaleconomy of REDD+ regulationin Brazil, we examined the differentnational and subnational processesthrough which government andnon-governmental actors have

Box 1Scope and Scale of Indigenous Lands in Brazil

The territory of Brazil comprises 851,196,500 hectares, or 8,511,965 squarekilometres. There are 673 Indigenous Lands (TIs), with a total area of 111,523,636hectares (1,115,236 square kilometres). Thus, 14 percent of the country is reservedfor the Indigenous peoples.

The majority of TIs, numbering 405, are concentrated in the “Legal Amazon”(Amazônia Legal), and their combined area of 108,211,140 hectares, equates to20.67 percent of the total area of that region. The remaining 3,312,496 hectares arescattered across the country’s northeastern, southeastern and southern regions andthe non-Amazonian parts of the mid-western region.

Source: <http://pib.socioambiental.org/en/c/terras-indigenas/demarcacoes/localizacao-e-extensao-das-tis>.

Poverty in Focus 21

tried to shape a national REDD+ policyframework (see Shankland andHasenclever 2011).

We noted that the initial polarizationbetween ideological positions favouringand opposing the use of marketmechanisms for REDD+ initiatives,though not yet formalized, seemed tohave been overcome through a series ofconsultation processes, including a civilsociety-led initiative that shifted thedebate towards a consensus on theimportance of defining safeguards forany such initiatives involving indigenouspeoples or other local communities.

Still, we concluded that this apparentconsensus also risked marginalizingindigenous concerns, given the speedof the policy process and the practicaland political difficulties in ensuringmeaningful involvement not only ofindigenous leaders, but also of theirgrassroots constituents.

Furthermore, we observed that safeguardsare not a sine qua non condition for REDD+project implementation, a situationpotentially leading to further risk ofmarginalization for indigenous peoplesand other local forest communities.

Managing these macro-micro dynamics—including effective and inclusivecommunication and representationacross different levels from the localto the global—is a key challenge forindigenous peoples’ engagement inREDD+ policy processes. Despitestrong efforts to ensure inclusion ofrepresentatives of indigenous peoplesand other forest communities, efforts to

accommodate indigenous peoples’ ownmechanisms of political deliberation anddecision-making, are inconsistent.

So far, Brazil’s REDD+ consultationprocess has not fully taken on board theprofoundly different understandings ofhuman beings’ relationships with ‘nature’among indigenous peoples. Thesedifferent understandings are linked toequally profound differences in values(see Box 2).

These findings resonate with othercritiques of REDD and even REDD+globally and spotlight the need forlocal-global (micro-macro) managementstructures to appropriately match thenature of the issues involved.

There is limited good practice, to date,on managing resources of local, nationaland global relevance within a single,complementary framework.

The principle of equi-proportionalityadds a critical normative perspective, thatis, it is concerned with the differencebetween how things actually are andhow they should be and explicitlyrecognizes the importance of values.

Anything less than a full recognition ofand respect for distinctive values anddecision-making processes underminesthe principles of participation enshrinedin many UN human rights conventions,including the International Conventionon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, andbroader social justice principles of accessand benefit-sharing as also expressed inthe Nagoya Protocol of the UNConvention on Biological Diversity.

Nelson, A. and Chomitz, K. M. (2009).Protected Area Effectiveness in ReducingTropical Deforestation: A Global Analysis ofthe Impact of Protection Status. Washington:World Bank.

O’Brien, K. L. and Wolf, J. (2010). ‘A values-based approach to vulnerability andadaptation to climate change’, WileyInterdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change,Volume 1, Issue 2, pp. 232–242, March/April2010. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Perch, L., with Stahlberg, S. G. and Potiara,C. (2010). ‘Maximizing Co-Benefits:Exploring Opportunities to StrengthenEquality and Poverty Reduction throughAdaptation to Climate Change’, IPC-IGWorking Paper 75.

Ramos, A. R., Osório, R. G. and Pimenta, J.(2009). ‘Indigenising Development’, Povertyin Focus 17.

Requate, T. (2005). Environmental Policyunder Imperfect Competition: A Survey.Available at: <http://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/cauewp/3198.html>.

Shankland, A. and Hasenclever, L. (2011).‘Indigenous Peoples and the Regulation ofREDD+ in Brazil: Beyond the War of theWorlds?’, IDS Bulletin 42 (2).

BOX 2Perspectives on Values

Values are important. O’Brien and Wolf (2010: 233) note that “a values-basedapproach to vulnerability and adaptation recognizes that economic assessmentsof impacts and responses, as exemplified in the Stern Review, cannot capturethe full significance of climate change.

The experiential and cultural dimensions of climate change, largely ignored inassessments by the IPCC, examine the meaning and relevance of climate changefor individuals and groups. Vulnerability is not simply about the negative materialoutcomes associated to climate change. [...] Consequently, what is consideredlegitimate and successful adaptation depends on what people perceive to beworth preserving and achieving, including their culture and identity”.

3. The basic intuition for the principle of equi-marginality is that economic agents interacting in anyspace (market) and all conscious of their cost structurefor some kind of good or service supplied, if left alone,will arrive at the best /optimal social result by, at themargin, adjusting their quantities and prices to the bestfor each one or, say, by maximizing individual profits.It is an equity principle for private liberal economicinteractions, derived from welfare economics.

4. By developing mechanisms such as REDD+ basedon a criterion like ‘cost effectiveness’ (STERN, 2007), theresults will be those which predict welfare economicsor, say, a social Pareto optimum, which have not beenpositive in the context of equity. Cost effectivenessworks under a perspective of economic efficiency—the largest quantity with the minimum prices—butlimits space for differential price formation schemes.

5. Theoretically, the price system will lead prices toreflect mainly the relative scarcity of the good/servicebeing priced.

The principle ofequi-proportionalityadds a critical normativeperspective. It is concernedwith the differencebetween how thingsactually are and howthey should be andexplicitly recognizesthe importance of values.

Source: See O’Brien, K. L. and Wolf, J. (2010).


In the past two decades,extensive policy reforms havefundamentally transformed theinstitutional conditions for the governanceof natural resources in most developingcountries. As centralised and free market-oriented solutions have floundered, newand more decentralised institutionalarrangements that seek to incorporatelocal actors and communities haveemerged (Andersson, 2006).

Embedded in these decentralisedinstitutional arrangements is powerin the form of ‘local authority’ given tocommunities to manage their naturalresources. Local authority and decision-making systems pertaining to themanagement of natural resources affectlivelihoods and the overall well-beingof the local communities thatdepend on them.

Central to the global movement forincreasing the decentralisationof power, particularly in resourcemanagement, is the recognition of theimportance of the participation andbenefit-sharing of local stakeholders andactors for the success and sustainabilityof interventions and especially for theeffectiveness of development.

The 1994 Forestry Law of Cameroonintroduced the decentralisation policyfor the forestry sector. Through this law,community forestry was established andthe management of forest resources wasformally transferred to local actors andinstitutions. According to the ForestryLaw (Article 37) and the Manual ofProcedure of the Ministry of Environmentand Forestry, community forestry is“a part of the non-permanent forestestate, measuring up to 5000 ha, that isthe object of an agreement betweengovernment and a community in whichcommunities undertake sustainable

The management boardsof some community forestsuse their connections withexternal donor agencies todraw on interventionssuch as technical trainingand innovations to extendtheir livelihoods beyondtraditional agriculture.

New opportunities such asthe domestication of high-priced wild leaves andfruits, beekeeping, snailry,grasscutter farming, to namejust a few activities, haveincreased household income,potentially reducing povertyby as much as 18 to 30 percent, especially amongwomen, over aboutthree years.

forest management for a period of 25years.” The community can therefore becomposed of one or more villageslegally represented by an association orcommon initiative group that representsthe local communitarian institution.

The creation of community forestsaims above all to improve livelihoodsdependent on forest management byempowering precisely the users of localresources. In managing their forests, themembers of the community forestsgenerally make rules in the commoninterest in order to reduce the loss of theforest resources on which they depend,thereby reconciling short-term andlong-term interests.

Based on the assumption thatcommunity forestry could be a promisingand viable approach to reducing ruralpoverty and to promoting sustainableforest management, many case studieshave investigated the success ofcommunity forestry in the last decade(Vabi et al., 2000; Somorin, 2011).

The focus has been on its effectiveness intimber logging and forest management,financial returns for socio-economicdevelopment, poverty alleviation, cost-benefit analysis of participation andreturns, and institutional roles inmediating external interventions.

With respect to poverty alleviation, thefindings of these studies show that somecommunities have benefited monetarilyand more broadly economically eitherthrough direct cash payments oremployment in timber processing.For some households, this income,which supplements their normal gainsfrom agriculture (their main occupation),is financial capital that can be used todiversify into other livelihoods. Manycommunities claimed to have at least

by Olufunso A. Somorin andDenis J. Sonwa, Central African Regional

Office, Center for International ForestryResearch (CIFOR)

People, DecentralisedPower and CommunityForestry in Cameroon

Poverty in Focus 23

received financial returns in cash or tohave benefited from local infrastructureprojects such as the construction ofclassrooms or the roofing of local houseswith aluminum (Oyono, 2005; Brown andLassoie, 2010). The management boardsof some community forests use theirconnections with external donoragencies to draw on interventions suchas technical training and innovations toextend their livelihoods beyondtraditional agriculture.

New opportunities such as thedomestication of high-priced wildleaves and fruits, beekeeping, snailry,grasscutter farming, to name just a fewactivities, have increased householdincome, potentially reducing poverty byas much as 18 to 30 percent, especiallyamong women, over about three years.In other contexts, the communitarianarrangement has increased marketopportunities for local traders, whereresources (both agricultural and NTFPs)are sold together at negotiated prices inorder to maximise returns (Somorin, 2011).

At the heart of the creation ofcommunity forestry in Cameroonis the need to achieve better forestmanagement at the local level. Manyresearch findings have shown thatcommunities often develop a simplemanagement plan to regulate theexploitation of timber and to reducedeforestation and degradation asmuch as possible. Critically, higherecological goods and servicessuch as biodiversity and carbon incommunity forests promise newfuture opportunities for paymentfor ecosystem services—a potentialsource of future income for localcommunities (Ingram, 2010).

It is also noteworthy, though, thatcommunity forestry in Cameroon hashad mixed results on poverty alleviationfor various reasons, which includevarying degrees of access to marketinformation, communities’ varyingtechnical and managerial capacities, andvarying degrees of access to externalintervention programmes (Ingram, 2010).

There is also a cultural dimension todecentralising power in the forest sectorof Cameroon. Decentralisation of forests

and its related benefits have created asphere of recognition for ‘forest peoples’or marginalised groups such as thepygmies. With these changes, marginalgroups whose interests and needs werenot formerly integrated into formalpublic legal system of laws andlegislations now have access andmanagement rights to the forests.

As a result, financial returns from forestdecentralisation have been used forsocial infrastructure such as communityhouses, health centres, schools, churches,water wells, and schoolteachers’ salaries.Community forestry can also be seen as aspace for social negotiation between theold and young generations.

In a sense, where social amenities areprovided in the rural areas through thereturns from community forestry, someof the younger generations have chosento remain in their communities ratherthan to migrate to urban cities in searchof a better life. Thus, their innovativeideas and human capacities contributeto the implementation of social andeconomic innovations (Oyono, 2005).

Community forestry in Cameroonis not totally devoid of challenges.Additional revenue streams fromcommunity forestry can be substantialfor poverty reduction, but, wheresuch benefits are not equitable, theprocess can be a source of conflict orsocial disorder. In most cases, thereis a dire need for local communitiesto strengthen their technical andmanagement capacities in order tomaximise livelihood returns from thecommunity forest arrangement.

The uncontrolled exploitation of timberin some community forests, pursued togenerate sufficient financial returns tooffset the transaction costs of obtainingtheir legal status as community forests,has weakened sustainable forestmanagement. Furthermore, conflictsbetween traditional authorities (eldersand village chiefs) and community forestmanagement boards (younger andeducated) within local forest managementauthorities have often arisen.

This conflict often affects the socialrelations between local institutions and

authorities, thereby reducing the benefitsof the decentralisation of power forlivelihoods. Where local customaryauthority has been reconciled withcommunity forestry, there were reportsof ‘elite capture’, whereby a few eliteshad mismanaged or embezzled revenues(Oyono, 2005; Brown and Lassoie, 2010).

Still, overall, community forestry as a formof power decentralisation in Cameroonhas provided various pathways forparticipation and benefit-sharing,mainly in the form of legal accessto the forest—a natural resource thatsupports many livelihoods. Additionally,local access and well-defined propertyand management rights to localresources are value-added benefitsof community forestry, enablingsustainable livelihoods.

Critically, the interest of local communitiesin designing their own rules to regulateresource exploitation is a good step forsustainable forest management, withoutwhich the designation of ‘formal access’may not necessarily bring about eithertransformation in the managementof forest resources or reconciliation ofpoverty reduction with conservationand management.

Andersson, K. (2006). ‘Understandingdecentralised forest governance: anapplication of the institutional analysis anddevelopment framework.’ Sustainability:Science, Practice and Policy, 2(1): 25-35.

Brown, H.C.P and Lassoie, J.P. (2010).‘Institutional choice and local legitimacyin community-based forest management:lessons from Cameroon.’ EnvironmentalConservation, 37(3): 261-269.

Ingram, V. (2010). ‘Cost-benefit analysisof community forestry in Cameroon’,unpublished document.

Oyono, R.N. (2005). ‘Profiling local-leveloutcomes of environmental decentralizations:the case of Cameroon’s forests in the CongoBasin.’ Journal of Environment andDevelopment 14(2): 1-21.

Somorin, O.A. (2011). ‘Forest livelihoods,community forestry institutions andadaptation to climate variability: evidencefrom southern Cameroon’, unpublished report.

Vabi, M.B., Ngwasiri, C.N., Galega, P.T. andOyono, R.P. (2000). The devolution of forestmanagement responsibilities to localcommunities: context and implementationhurdles in Cameroon. Yaoundé,Cameroon: WWF.


The goal of ecodevelopment1

is to create a lasting harmony betweenhumans and nature. Since the firstenvironmental international conferencein Stockholm in 1972, the vision andoverarching principles embodied in theecodevelopment concept have sustainedan international social movementconcerned with the environment.

The objective of ecodevelopment wasalso adopted by the world’s governmentsthat signed (but did not necessarilyratify) the 1992 Rio Treaties on Climate,Biodiversity and Desertification.Ecodevelopment also inspires thedevelopment of Agenda 21s worldwide.Still, while there is an all-inclusive visionof what ecodevelopment could andshould be, few efforts to implement ithave been fully successful.

It is widely accepted that developmentshould proceed along the three pillarsidentified in the Brundtland Report(1987). Numerous lengthy articles andbooks have been written about theneed to protect the environment,the importance of the economy,and the social requirements to befulfilled in a civilised society.

In the early days of the environmentalmovement, such concerns about natureand people signalled definite progress.More recently, discourse on socio-environmental justice has led to suchquestions as: Why is the gap betweenpoor and rich increasing—whether it beamong or within countries? Why arewomen still the most adversely affectedgroup among the poor worldwide? Whyis there so much social distress in a veryaffluent world? Why are there suchapparently irreversible failures?

There is real cause for concern. In 2010,gross world output was estimated at

The vision and overarchingprinciples embodied in theecodevelopment conceptare so powerful that forover forty years they havesustained the environmentmovement as it strives tomeet this elusive goal.

However, achievingecodevelopment canonly be attained if theappropriate relationshipsbetween the three pillars ofsustainable development arebetter understood.

Ecodevelopment:One Vision, Two MoralImperatives, Three Pillars

by Hélène Connor, PhD,Chairman of the Board and

Laura E. Williamson,Project Director,

respectively, at HELIO International

US$63.17 trillion, with the US, the EU,China, the UK, Brazil, India and Russiacontributing collectively 69 percent ofthis output (CIA WorldFactbook, 2010).2

Simultaneously, inequity seems to beincreasing and stagnating, in some areas(see Ortiz and Cummins, 2011).

To answer any of these questionsrequires reflection on the concepts,thinking and politics behind theseissues. The idea that development willautomatically benefit all is reminiscentof Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ andVoltaire’s Candide, where, in the latter,“everything is for the best in the best ofall possible worlds”. This innate equilibriumin all things has not materialised, and,even in the face of deliberate policy, therecord is marked by limited success andmultiplying challenges.

China’s Environment Minister, ZhouShengxian, wrote in February 2011that, “In China’s thousands of yearsof civilization, the conflict betweenhumankind and nature has neverbeen as serious as it is today.[…] The depletion, deteriorationand exhaustion of resources and theworsening ecological environment havebecome bottlenecks and graveimpediments to the nation’s economicand social development.”3

To understand this contrast between‘intent’ and ‘application’, we must digdeeper, analysing behaviour andscrutinising the sources of those failures.We suggest that the characteristics of thethree development pillars and therelationships between them, i.e., thepower structure that is formed betweenthem, is fundamental in this regard.

The three pillars—environment, society, andthe economy—are obvious tools at ourdisposal to bring about ecodevelopment.

1. “Ecodevelopment refers to development at regionaland local levels, consistent with the potentials of thearea involved, with attention given to the adequate andrational use of natural resources, technological stylesand organizational forms that respect the naturalecosystems and local social and cultural patterns.The term is also used to describe an integratedapproach to environment and development.” See:<http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=710>.

2. See: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html>.

3. Jacobs, A. (2011). China Issues Warning on Climateand Growth. Published 28 February 28 2011.Available online at:<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/world/asia/01beijing.html?_r=2&adxnnl=1&ref=world&adxnnlx=1300129236-TZEjvuDx2e0asPlfRc/WKA>.

4. Daily scientific discoveries prove that there is stillmuch to learn about our environment and thatthoughtless initiatives are destroying this capitalasset, which we still do not understand fully.

5. Out of the availability, use and regenerationof the human-nature relationship comes civilisationthat encompasses culture, arts, politics, technologies,social constructs, institutions, and all forms of materialand social capital.

Poverty in Focus 25

Logically, this triad is efficient if eachof the tools is well-designed and usedappropriately. Sustainability also impliesthat both quantity and quality areimportant, i.e., that an internal healthystructure is needed to allow each pillarto play its role and act symbioticallywith the other two pillars.

The first pillar, environment (the new namefor nature), provides all the goods andservices available in the world, directlyand indirectly. This refers to energy,raw materials, food, etc. However,these goods and services are subjectto physical, biological, and other lawsthat must be studied and respected.4

For example, humankind must notharm (beyond repair) natural inputs,lest it hamper society’s survival. Knowingthat we are degrading our environmentand thus sawing off the branch onwhich we sit, renders our existenceprecarious and uncertain.

There is perhaps no greatermanifestation of this than in the worst-case scenarios for global climate change.It is undeniable that our first and mainpillar (environment) is under threat fromignorance, short-term thinking, and acavalier attitude to the importanceand relevance of nature, which isoften largely defined in utilitarian terms.

The second pillar, society or humankind,is the beneficiary of the naturalcapital from ‘nature’. Humankind isboth recipient and steward—whoseknowledge is important for defining thebalance between supply and demandand in devising new goods. As societyevolves continuously, no real ‘ideal state’exists. What, for example, can be calledsocial progress? It can be access to morefood, clean water, and electricity forrefrigeration, health improvement,and light for education and socialising.

But is it ‘progress’ if people get sick fromtheir jobs? Is more income ‘progress’ ifobtaining it is made at the expense ofone’s quality of life? A balanced viewof progress has to be devised by thebeneficiaries themselves and mustinclude the input of women and theeconomically disadvantaged. As women’spolitical participation has stagnated,gender-based violence persists and

inequality deepens, it is arguable thatour collective development and thusview of ‘progress’ runs the risk ofremaining skewed, and mostly towardsthe rich and powerful. In a recent paper,Ortiz and Cummins (2011:10) calculatethat it has taken the bottom billion(the poorest) 17 years to increase itsshare of world income from 0.77 (1990)to 0.95 (2007) and could take eightcenturies (at the current rate of progress)to increase this share to 10 percent.

The third pillar of development has beenidentified as the economy, oftenrestricted to the market. Contrary tocurrent Western thought, which hastended to make this a central pillar towhich the others are secondary, this pillaris only one dimension of civilisationand thus is an output generated byhumankind5 (the second pillar). For some,the predominance given to this thirdpillar has unbalanced development.

As discussed in Zaman (2008)and Sen (2010), an overrelianceon or predominance of any onepillar (in a balanced system) will lead todisequilibrium or inefficient equilibrium.This tension between growth anddevelopment continues to play out inthe aftermath of the global financialcrisis and in the wake of significantbailouts of the private sector. Moreover,despite gargantuan leaps in technologyand infrastructure as well as energyinnovation, more than 75 percent of sub-

Saharan Africa’s total population as wellas more than 50 percent of the ruralpopulation in South Asia lack accessto electricity (UNDP, 2010b: 42).

Implicit in these contradictions is thatcapital, labour and natural resources aresubstitutable for each other. Costanza(1997) argues that the environment cannever be wholly substituted. So how cana focus on the second pillar (humankind)improve the evolution of developmentso that it benefits all, equally, fairly andsustainably? We suggest that twoprinciples be systematically appliedby decision makers in this context.These two moral imperatives can thenmould the interface between thethree pillars mentioned above andensure a convergence of actionstowards ecodevelopment.

First, we need to rethink the humankind-nature relationship vis-à-vis what hasbeen given to us, i.e., our patrimony,heritage, and nature. Adopting ausufructal approach may better reflectthe dual role of beneficiary and steward.

This suggests focusing on using naturalcapital’s ‘interest’, as opposed to usingthe basic capital itself, thus escaping thetemptation to slowly erode the qualityof nature’s goods and services. (This is,in fact, the advice any banker or portfolioadviser would give to a potentialinvestor.) We suggest a return to what areknown as ‘soft’ technologies that allow

Source: HELIO International.


for the harvest of nature and protectionof its regenerative capacity. Usufructualmanagement approaches show promisein moving us from the ‘what’ to the ‘how’,including the reconciliation of competingideas, approaches and technologies.

Second, we suggest a repositioningof how we think about what we arecreating. Humankind can only achieve afair equilibrium among all its members ifthere are equality, fairness, and freedom,notions that precipitate social revolutions.In the realm of development, this requires:1) a balanced approach between needsand resources; 2) the establishmentof participatory governance at alllevels, from the UN fora to nationalgovernments, local and municipalauthorities, down to the family sphere;and, 3) the means to monitor the firsttwo requirements. This third componentis rarely implemented and has led to therepetition of revolutions, silent or otherwise.

Ecodevelopment therefore entailshumans employing usufructal

technologies to use natural resourcesand applying participatory governanceto control and regulate markets.It is through these processes andinteractions that ecodevelopmentis achieved (Connor, 2008).

We can no longer remain at the stageof the discourse when famine and othersilent and not-so-silent emergencies andrevolutions continue to take place.The recent Arab Spring suggests thatthe ‘people’ are, in fact, no longer willingto wait. From an ecological viewpoint,ecodevelopment must become a reality;it is the basis of our human survival inthe Anthropocene era.6

Connor, H. (2008). ‘Assessing the EnergyContribution to Sustainability’, in OECDSustainable Development Studies’,Conducting Sustainability Assessments,pp. 109-118.

Costanza, R. (1997). ‘The Value of theWorld’s Ecosystem Services and NaturalCapital’, Nature 387, 253–260.

Ortiz, I. and Cummins, M. (2011). ‘GlobalInequality: Beyond the Bottom Billion –

A Rapid Review of Income Distribution in141 Countries’, Social and Economic PolicyWorking Paper, UNICEF Policy andPractice Series. Available online at:<http://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Global_Inequality_Beyond_the_Bottom_Billion.pdf>.

Sen, A. K. (2010). ‘Markets and Freedom’,Oxford Economic Papers 45, 519–541.Accessed at: <http://tek.bke.hu/korok/sen/docs/markets.pdf>.

UNDP (2010). The Path to Achieving theMillennium Development Goals: A Synthesisof MDG Evidence from around the World.United Nations Development Programme,New York.

Zaman, M.M. (2008). ‘Welfare DynamicsBased on a New Concept of InefficientEquilibrium’, Munich Personal RePEc Archive18. Available online at: <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11303/1/MPRA_paper_11303.pdf>.

6. Wikipedia : “The Anthropocene is a recent andinformal geologic chronological term that serves tomark the evidence and extent of human activitiesthat have had a significant global impact on theEarth‘s ecosystems.”

For more information about HELIO,please consult our website at:<www.helio-international.org>or write to us at: [email protected]

Employment, for example,served as a multiplierfor more traditionaltransmission channelsin the crisis.

Several features of informal-sector employment exposedhouseholds to significantvulnerability and incomevolatility: seasonality,high mobility and turnover,low skills, little capacity toadapt to dynamic labour-market needs, andthe lack of structuralprotective mechanisms.

As the global economy emergesfrom the global economic crisis (GEC)somewhat unevenly and as the globalpolitical agenda focuses on Rio+20,it is important to highlight key lessonsfrom the crisis, especially the role thatinequality played in predisposingspecific groups and households tosocio-economic vulnerability. The crisisrevealed a worrying picture of localisedand structural vulnerabilities withinhouseholds, heightened by multiplyingand escalating risks and shocks.Some of these are explained by adeclining economy and sectoral fragility,but others reveal a vulnerability shapedmore by structural inequalitieswithin society.

Employment, for example, servedas a multiplier for more traditionaltransmission channels in the crisis.While the structure of the economiesin small island developing states (SIDS)often meant that the government servedas the ‘employer of last resort’, otherfactors also contributed. Youthunemployment and underemploymentwere particularly acute in the Caribbeanand the Pacific, with unemploymentespecially affecting young men in St.Kitts and Nevis (Perch and Roy, 2010).Moreover, poverty data for the Caribbeanreveal significant levels of workingpoverty (Perch and Roy, 2010), suggestingthat employment provided a key ‘securityfunction’ and that any reductions in

by Leisa Perch, Team Leader Ruraland Sustainable Development,International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth

Gender, Employmentand Economic Crisis:Seeding Social Sustainability in SIDS

Poverty in Focus 27

income would be potentially disabling.Findings in the synthesis report on thesocial impacts of the GEC in theCaribbean identified coping strategiessuch as acceptance of delayed salarypayments and partial payments in orderto remain employed (UNDP, 2010: 28).

In this context, gender (at the macro andmicro scales) played an important role inconditioning household vulnerability.Several elements highlight howthis occurred.

1. The labour market itself. In SIDS tendsto be segmented by gender and limitsopportunities for men and women.The domination of men in the privatesector compared to women in thepublic sector (as in Antigua andBarbuda), exposed men to incomelosses from the crisis as the tourismand construction sectors, which theydominated, declined sharply (Perchand Roy, 2010). Moreover, severalfeatures of informal-sectoremployment, which seem to dominatethe labour-market dynamics of SIDS,particularly in the Pacific, exposehouseholds to significant vulnerabilityand income volatility: seasonality, highmobility and turnover, low skills, littlecapacity to adapt to dynamic labour-market needs, and the lack ofstructural protective mechanisms.

2. Gender-differentiated labourmarket participation. Data from theInternational Labour Organization(ILO, 2009) indicate that, in the Pacific,82 percent of men of working age(15 years and older) were active in thelabour market, compared to about 57percent of women (ILO, 2009: 34), withthe implication that some households

had only one source of income.Even where high and sustainedinvestments in education havepersisted (on average, about 4 to 6percent of GDP annually in SIDS),returns have been variable, withmany new entrants to the labourmarket often unable to find jobs(Perch and Roy, 2010).

3. Income volatility and related knock-oneffects. High informality in thelabour market results in stochasticuncertainty,1 with dependenthouseholds experiencing greateruncertainty than those involvedin regular wage labour, thus beingexogenously inelastic2 (Perch and Roy,2010). As a result, households withonly one employed adult, particularlyfemale-headed households, werevulnerable to the effects of the crisis.In the Solomon Islands, female-headed households seemed to beslightly disadvantaged overall, withslightly higher representation in thethree lowest expenditure deciles andhigher representation among poorrural households (Perch and Roy, 2010).

4. Household structure. Pressure onincome did not arise simply from anincreased cost of living, but was alsohighly influenced by the manydemands on income in poor andsingle-income households, whichusually include children and elderlypeople. Before the crisis, 23 percent ofpoor households in Dominica includeda person with disabilities, 10 percenthad someone with a long-term illness,and 27 percent had someone who wasdiabetic or hypertensive (Governmentof Dominica and CaribbeanDevelopment Bank, 2003: 87).

The implied impact of this on thecapacity of poor households to meettheir needs is significant, often entailinga high susceptibility to ‘food poverty’—that is, an inability to meet basic foodconsumption requirements. Betweenthe already relatively high expenditureon food and the increased pressure onincome through inflation and prices, dietand nutrition, children’s development,health, and education also becamesusceptible to decline.

Implications for the BroaderPolicy AgendaThese realities suggest some criticallessons for the discourse on makinggreen growth inclusive and for ensuringthat the green economy also contributesto poverty eradication and that greenjobs also follow the dictates of theglobally agreed ‘decent work’ agenda.They also raise key questions about thecapacity of individuals and systems tocope with numerous and cyclical crises.

In the background paper of a majorhigh-level conference, the NansenConference on Climate Change andDisplacement in the 21st century, held inJune 2011,3 numerous critical questionswere raised about sudden-onset(disasters) and slow-onset events (crises).

The broad implications of a longer-termloss of assets and livelihoods andof the limited recovery time betweenevents, thrust new light on sustainingpoverty reduction and equity.

BOXBlue Carbon with Potential Social Co-benefits?

With the emerging discourse on ‘Blue Carbon’ and the push for the carbonsequestration of wetlands and mangroves to be fully integrated into the CleanDevelopment Mechanism (CDM), there may be potential new sources of investmentfinancing that could stimulate new sources of growth and employment. Wetlandsplay a critical role in regulating the climate (IUCN, 2011). On 6 June 2011, theUNFCCC approved the methodology for calculating mangrove carbon storage (ibid.).In this area, large and small countries in the South potentially have much incommon—a potential catalyst for enhanced collaboration at the global level.

1. This refers to the fact that it is difficult topredict the level of income, sometimes thepayment dates, or the extent to which theemployment may last. There are no structuralprotections such as contracts, so a person could beunemployed the next day and have few resources.Consequently, it becomes harder to predict incomeand so saving and asset-building become much harder.

2. This means that, due to structural factors,earnings can be inherently volatile. For example,earnings in the tourism sector can depend on high-season or low-season realities. Thus, in high season,staff may be able to earn 50 per cent more than inlow season. Additionally, some people work in severalsectors, depending on availability, the seasonalityof work, and income needs. They face a greateruncertainty of income, payment and durationof employment. This is not something that theycontrol or could be improved by working harder, etc.

3. See webpage and background paper: <http://d2530919.hosted213.servetheworld.no/expose/sites/clientweb/default.asp?s=1931&id=1937>.


It spotlights a larger ‘security’ questionfor governments and people alike: that ofsecuring development gains and securingassets and capabilities in the face ofescalating uncertainty. Insights into thiscycle emerges from data on disasterscollected for research about the socialpolicy implications of the economiccrisis on SIDS (Perch and Roy, 2010).Our findings highlighted a worryingpattern of events, some with a lag timeof 4 to 5 years and some within a year orless, and some within the same year.

Given the need to mitigate the impactsof such events, to strengthen socialresilience, and to shore up naturaldefences, a co-benefits approachseems to be an obvious choice for SIDS.

As the ‘green growth’ concept grows,expands, and is further integrated intothe thinking on sustainable development,there is significant potential to improveproductivity and reduce environmentalimpacts simultaneously, achieving manybenefits from one intervention. Such anapproach maximises resources, bring moretimely results, serves to help countriesdiversify away from public sector-ledgrowth, enables new businesses todevelop, and eases some of the fiscalconstraints they continue to experience.

Perhaps more important for SIDS is theattractive prospect of public employmentserving dual benefits for development byharnessing public works capacity forpublic environmental goods. Coastalimprovements, including the constructionof beach and coastline fortifications andthe maintenance of key natural assetssuch as mangroves, wetlands, sea-grassesand marshes, potentially deliver manybenefits for sustained employment andimproved resilience. Recent researchfindings and discussions (see Box)on ‘blue carbon4, 5, 6 suggest that thiscould be a significant opportunity fora blue-green economy in SIDS.

A new framework to promote a moreinclusive labour market also demandsinnovations in the quality of educationand training (ADB, 2009b: 11).

Thinking AheadPolicy efforts to identify new opportunitiesfor growing the economy and for

stimulating progress on ‘low-carbon’pathways in SIDS must thereforeconsider how gender and other formsof structural inequality may hinderthe full and participatory inclusion,particularly that of women, in thebenefits of such transformationsand opportunities.

In early phases of development, manyhave been left behind. Reversing suchtrends goes beyond addressing women’slack of access to and lack of participationin the economic process: it must also leadto their greater involvement and to theirassumption of more leadership.

Women’s leadership in the greeneconomy was the focus of a parallelevent in the wings of this year’s Meetingof the Commission on the Status ofWomen (see: <http://www.wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/LocaltoRio_2March_WEDO-GGCA.pdf>). Much more is needed in thisregard, including research, in order toreconcile macro-level imperatives withmicro-level reality.

Asian Development Bank (2009). VanuatuEconomic Report: Accelerating Reform.Executive Summary.

Government of St. Kitts and Nevis andCaribbean Development Bank (2009).Country Poverty Assessment St. Kitts and Nevis2007/08: Living Conditions in a CaribbeanSmall Island Developing State. Volume 1:Living Conditions in St. Kitts and Nevis.

Government of the Commonwealth ofDominica and Caribbean DevelopmentBank. Country Poverty Assessment: FinalReport. Volume 1 of 2: Main Report.

ILO (2009). Global Employment Trends.Geneva, International Labour Organization.

Perch, L. and Roy, R. (2010) ‘Social Policyin the Post-Crisis Context of SIDS:A Synthesis’. IPC-IG Working Paper 67.Brasilia, International Policy Centre forInclusive Growth.

UNDP (2010). Social Implications of theGlobal Economic Crisis in Caribbean SmallIsland Developing States (SIDS): 2008/2009.

A larger ‘security’ questionfor governments andpeople alike is how tosecure development gains,assets and capabilities inthe face of escalatinguncertainty.

Coastal improvements,including theconstruction ofbeach and coastlinefortifications and themaintenance of keynatural assets such asmangroves, wetlands,sea-grasses and marshes,potentially deliver manybenefits for both societyand the environment.

Reversing current trendsgoes beyond addressingwomen’s lack ofparticipation in theeconomic process;it must also lead totheir assumptionof more leadership.

4. Nature 473, 255 (2011) | doi:10.1038/473255a .“Add coastal vegetation to climate critical list”.Posted 18 May 2011 online. Available online at: <http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110518/full/473255a.html>.

5. This article, Guest Article #59, focused on Wetlandsand Climate Change. Available online at:<http://climate-l.iisd.org/guest-articles/wetlands-and-climate-change/>.

6. See: <http://iucn.org/?7595/Mangroves-to-receive-huge-boost-from-new-carbon-credit-rules>.

Poverty in Focus 29

Food security has been in thespotlight at the global level as concernsover significant challenges in securingsustained access to food have beenmounting. These challenges include thedegradation of natural resources andclimate change, which are expected tosubstantially increase risks to agriculturalproduction and people’s vulnerability tofood insecurity in the coming years; atthe same time, food production will needto increase by at least 70 percent by 2050in order to meet the demands ofgrowing populations (FAO, 2010).

Other persistent concerns such asrural poverty will only exacerbatethese expected difficulties; indeed, over70 percent of the world’s extremely poor—nearly one billion people—live in ruralareas, particularly in Africa and Asia.

Furthermore, the livelihoods ofsmallholder farmers, who constitutethe majority of the rural population indeveloping countries, are particularlyincreasingly insecure (IFAD, 2011), giventheir dependency on the weather forfarming and their limited access tohuman, social and financial capital.

From the outset, it has been clear thatone-dimensional answers will not besufficient to tackle these challenges.Instead, solutions must be comprehensiveand integrate factors such as theenvironment, agricultural production,and rural poverty. Additionally,alternative approaches should providefor socio-economic sustainability andequity by supporting the livelihoodsof the rural poor and promotingenvironmentally sustainableagricultural practices.

Emerging economies have considerablepotential to contribute to development

Alternative approachesprovide for socio-economicsustainability and equityby supporting thelivelihoods of the ruralpoor and promotingenvironmentally sustainableagricultural practices.

Emerging economies haveconsiderable potential tocontribute to developmentpractice. Lessons learnedby devising food productionsystems to reduce hunger,poverty and inequality intheir own populations,could apply to efforts inother developing countries.

practice. Lessons learned by devisingfood production systems to reducehunger, poverty and inequality in theirown populations, could apply to effortsin other developing countries.

Each of the IBSA partners—India, Braziland South Africa—has developednationally defined policy frameworksthat guide each country’s food securityagenda and distinctively treat thecomplexity of this phenomenon.This mini-lateral group is thus anoteworthy example for policydebate within the South.

The Brazilian official concept of foodsecurity is anchored in its Organic Lawof Food and Nutritional Security (LOSAN),which states that “food and nutritionalsecurity is the realization of everyone’sright to regular and permanent accessto quality food in sufficient quantity,without compromising the access toother essential needs, based onhealth-promoting food practices thatrespect the cultural diversity and that areenvironmentally, culturally, economicallyand socially sustainable” (Brazil, 2006).

Specific threads of the Brazilianpolicy discourse also reflect this broadlydefined approach, wherein questionssuch as who produces the food,what is produced and how it is producedare pivotal. Brazil’s efforts are largelyfocused on smallholder producers,legally classified as ‘family farmers’,1 whoform the bulk of the rural population.

This support is attentive to thepromotion of agro-ecological foodproduction models. Such orientations arepresent both in the Zero Hunger (FomeZero) strategy and in the National Foodand Nutritional Security Policy (PNSAN),which underpin the guidelines and

Access to Food in the Context ofSustainability and Equity:Elements from IBSA by Darana Souza and Danuta Chmielewska, Senior and Associate

Researchers, respectively, at International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth

1. In Brazil, family farmers are legally defined in theNational Family Farming Act (Law 11.326), of 2006,according to four requirements: 1) the rural establishment(or undertaking’s area of activity) may not exceed fourfiscal modules (defined in each municipality);2) the labour used in the related activities must bepredominantly family-based; 3) the family’s incomemust originate predominantly from activities related tofarming and the small-holding; and 4) the family mustdirectly manage the establishment.


objectives of the nationalpublic support to food security.Among the Brazilian government’sinitiatives that respond to thesematters, the National Programme forStrengthening Family Farming (PRONAF)is one of the main entry points.

Providing loans nationwide with low-interest rates to promote diverse ruralactivities, three of its credit lines (PRONAFAgro-ecology, PRONAF Eco and PRONAFForest) seek to reconcile environmentalconcerns with the general support tofamily farmers.

PRONAF Agro-ecology provides low-costsupport to family farmers based on theprinciples of the National Policy ofTechnical Assistance and Rural Extension(PNATER). In addition, the newly createdBolsa Verde (´Green Grant´) provides lump-sum payments for environmentalservices for extremely poor farmers.

Through the Food AcquisitionProgramme (PAA) and the NationalSchool Feeding Programme (PNAE),2

market access promotion delivers avariety of public benefits, particularlyin education.

Despite these innovations, thepromotion of new production modelsin the country still needs furtherconsolidation. On the one hand, publicsupport to family farming, measured interms of budget allocation, is still limitedcompared to export-led agriculture,despite the critical relevance of familyfarming for Brazilian food securityand rural development.

In the 2009-2010 agricultural year, theagribusiness sector was allocated abudget six times that of family farming—US$59.3 billion versus US$9.6 billion(MAPA, 2009).

On the other hand, agriculturalproduction is still significantly tiedto the use of agro-chemicals, withBrazil ranking as the world’s largestuser of these products3 (Souza andChmielewska, 2011).

South Africa’s macro-policy frameworktreats food security as a multi-dimensional challenge, acknowledging

the definition developed from theWorld Food Summit of 1996.4

This concept states that food securityexists when all people, at all times,have physical, social and economicaccess to sufficient safe and nutritiousfood that meets their dietary needsand food preferences for an activeand healthy life.

Reflected in the National Integrated FoodSecurity Strategy (IFSS), it underpins astrategy that aimed to harmonise thedifferent food security programmes inthe country according to areas ofpriority (with a focus on householdfood production and trading), butthat remained somewhat limitedin its implementation.

The country is currently discussingits Zero Hunger plan, which considersat least three dimensions of thephenomenon: food production,food access, and food use.Important programmes reflectthese orientations and include theComprehensive Agriculture SupportProgramme (CASP), which is designedto support previously disadvantagedgroups, e.g., small-scale and emergingfarmers who constitute the majority ofthe population.

Through the Micro-Agricultural FinancialInstitutions of South Africa (MAFISA),access to finance is made easier via loans,savings and banking facilities, with afocus on crop production, farmingequipment, and production on piggery,ostrich and poultry. It does not, however,have a particular focus on ecologically-based approaches.

Like South Africa, India adopts theWorld Food Summit’s multi-dimensionaldefinition of food security (1996),as reflected in the concept notefor the proposed Indian FoodSecurity Act (NFSA).

The controversial NFSA, which isunder consideration by the Cabinet,seeks to enact a bill to ensure foodsecurity and statutory standing torelated policies in India. Currently,it is at the heart of national debateson the right to food.

Each of the IBSApartners—India, Braziland South Africa—has developednationally definedpolicy frameworksthat guide each country’sfood security agendaand distinctively treatthe complexity of thisphenomenon.This mini-lateralgroup is thus anoteworthy examplefor policy debatewithin the South.

2. For further reference on these programmes,see Chmielewska, D. and Souza, D. (2010).

3. This data refers to absolute consumption in tons.

Poverty in Focus 31

In India, where three quarters of thepopulation live in rural areas, mostly onsmall properties, with over 40 percentof them below the national povertyline, there is already a range ofprogrammes anchored in benefitsthat the Supreme Court has declaredto be ‘legal entitlements’ (Souza andChmielewska, 2011).

Included within the current policyframework is the Targeted PublicDistribution System (TPDS), a largeprogramme that ensures that the mostvulnerable sectors of society are entitledto a defined minimum quantity ofsubsidised cereals per month.

This wide-reaching initiative aims toprovide mainly food items at subsidisedprices to pre-identified poor families.It also offers market opportunities toagricultural products throughgovernment procurement.

This support, however, does not considerparticular environmental concerns orfarmers’ specific profiles. TPDS facesnumerous challenges and is the focusof debates on reform efforts (Souza andChmielewska, 2011).

Critically, the food security policies ofthese three countries represent diverseapproaches to reconciling agriculturalproduction, environmental integrityand rural poverty as well as to thecontribution these make to sustainabilityand equity.

Social, economic and environmentalsustainability along with equity remainconcerns for the Brazilian food securitypolicy agenda, with increasing attentionto production models based on familyfarming and agro-ecological practices.

South Africa’s current policy, on the otherhand, directs equity and social-economicsustainability efforts through support tohousehold production, while focusingless on environmental issues.

India’s policy, in further contrast,concentrates on the right of accessto food as an attempt to promoteequity and social sustainability,while its connections withenvironmentally innovative food

production models and with supportto marginalised food producershave been less explicit.

The achievements and gaps of theseexperiences go beyond the nationalscope and serve to inform South-Southdialogue more broadly.

Further debate and research in thisregard could help to promote nationaland global efforts to consolidatecomprehensive food security approachessupporting the transition to adaptiveand resilient production systems in theface of environmental, economic andsocial challenges.

Finally, our initial review suggests thatthere are many pathways to addressingthe complexities of the ‘right to food’,with each pathway having its ownstrengths and weaknesses.

Our findings highlight that settingthese policy objectives at the highestlevel of policy and policy-makingis an important element and canbring numerous benefits. Still, in theabsence of consistent monitoring of theirmulti-dimensions, the full impact andsustainability of such efforts becomemuch more difficult to gauge andadjustments become moredifficult to realise.

Brazil (2006). Organic Law of Foodand Nutritional Security (LOSAN).Law No. 11,346 of September 15, 2006.

Chmielewska, D. and Souza, D. (2010).‘Market Alternatives for SmallholderFarmers in Food Security Initiatives:Lessons from the Brazilian FoodAcquisition Programme’, IPC-IGWorking Paper 64. Brasilia,International Policy Centre forInclusive Growth.

FAO (2010). ´Climate-Smart Agriculture:Policies, Practices and Financing for FoodSecurity, Adaptation and Mitigation´,Rome, FAO.

IFAD (2011). ´Rural Poverty Report 2011´,Rome, IFAD. Ministério da Agricultura,Pecuária e Abastecimento (MAPA) (2009).Agricultural and Livestock Plan 2009/2010.Brasília, MAPA.

Souza, D. and Chmielewska, D. (2011).‘Public Support to Food Securityin India, Brazil and South Africa:Elements for a Policy Dialogue’,IPC-IG Working Paper 80. Brasilia,International Policy Centre forInclusive Growth.

Further debateand research in thisregard could help topromote nationaland global effortsto consolidatecomprehensive foodsecurity approachessupporting the transitionto adaptive and resilientproduction systemsin the face ofenvironmental,economic andsocial challenges.


Africa’s adaptive capacityto climate change is itselfconstrained by widespreadpoverty, low human capacity,a lack of appropriatetechnologies, poorinfrastructure, andsusceptibility to highfood prices.

Agriculture is central toAfrica’s economies and itspeoples’ livelihoods.If harnessed, its enormouspotential could help thecontinent meet its widerambitions of peace andprosperity, becoming a keydriver of sustainable growthand development.

The African ChallengeThe 21st century has seen renewed effortsto tackle Africa’s development problems.Since 2008, there has been greaterinterest in investing in Africanagriculture, a sector that is the backboneof the majority of African economies(World Development Report 2008;AlertNet, 2011).

However, Africa’s sustained developmentis often hampered by an unpredictableand unforgiving climate, with 12 of the25 most-at-risk countries being in Africa(Maplecroft, 2010). The close link betweenthe changing climate and human securityhas increasingly become part of theglobal discourse and Africa’s climatestory is largely defined by itsdependence on rain-fed agriculture.

Risks to Africa’s well-being are not purelyeconomic, though, but also include thepotential for the spread of disease andescalating conflicts over increasinglylimited and scarce resources, particularlywater. Indeed, the volatile mix of foodand water insecurity has already beenlinked to conflicts in Somalia,Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso.

Yet, Africa’s adaptive capacity toclimate change is itself constrained bywidespread poverty, low human capacity,a lack of appropriate technologies,poor infrastructure, and susceptibilityto high food prices.

These factors put millions of Africansat greater risk of poverty and hunger,imperil the region’s chances to achievethe Millennium Development Goals(MDGs), and, indeed, increase thelikelihood of mass emigration.

Climate change, therefore, is one of themost pressing challenges on the regionalpolitical and economic agenda.

Agriculture – Climate NexusAgriculture is central to Africa’seconomies and its peoples’ livelihoods.If harnessed, its enormous potentialcould help the continent meet its widerambitions of peace and prosperity,becoming a key driver of sustainablegrowth and development. Yet, in certainsystems, agriculture contributes as muchas 30 percent of total greenhouse gasemissions (Meridian Institute, 2011).

Thus, sustaining food security willrequire intense efforts to increaseproductivity while shifting to low-carbonand zero-waste modes of production.Climate-smart agricultural techniquesoffer the potential to substantiallyreduce emissions and increasecarbon storage in soil.

For FAO, climate-smart agriculturedelivers a critical ‘win-win’ situation,one that includes higher sustainableproductivity, greater resilience, reducedgreenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), andprogress toward national food securityand development goals (FAO, 2010).

Through sustainable intensification, useof alternative crops and changes in farmmanagement practices, African farmerscould remain on the same land, enjoyincreased yields, and contribute tomitigating climate change by reducingdeforestation and the encroachment ofagriculture into natural ecosystems(Bellassen, 2010).

Accordingly, Africa’s political leadershipat the highest level has stated itscommitment to address the challengesof climate change.

This is reflected in various decisionsand resolutions of African Union (AU)Summits and conferences of relevantAfrican ministerial bodies, most

by Lindiwe Majele Sibanda, PhD,Chief Executive Officer,

Food Agriculture and Natural ResourcesPolicy Analysis Network (FANRPAN)

What Is Needed to EnsureAn Equitable Dealfor Africa at COP 17

Poverty in Focus 33

notably the African MinisterialConference on the Environment (AMCEN),the Joint Annual Meetings of the AUConference of Ministers of Economyand Finance, and the EconomicCommission for Africa (ECA) Conferenceof Ministers of Finance, Planning andEconomic Development (ECA, 2010).

Furthermore, Pillar 1 of theComprehensive African AgriculturalDevelopment Programme (CAADP)advances the development of aFramework on Agriculture ClimateChange Adaptation and Mitigationas part of the sustainable land andwater use portfolio.

Agriculture in the United NationsFramework Convention on ClimateChange (UNFCCC) ProcessStill, Africa cannot make suchfundamental transformations on its own.Development aid and foreign directinvestment are needed, at appropriatelevels of scale, particularly in theagriculture sector. To date, though,there has been no decision or workprogramme dedicated to agriculturewithin the global climate change policynegotiations in the United Nations

Framework Convention on ClimateChange (UNFCCC) process.

Despite the clear recognition ofsustainable agriculture under theKyoto Protocol (Article 2, paragraph 1),the 53 African countries, constitutingover a quarter of the 193 membercountries of the UNFCCC, have so farnot managed to sustain a visible policyspace for agricultural adaptation andmitigation in the global climatepolicy framework.

During COP 16 in Cancun, agriculturewas considered under sectoralapproaches within the Ad Hoc WorkingGroup on Long-term Cooperative Actionunder the Convention (AWG-LCA) text,but was ultimately excluded in the finalhours of deliberations.

The Cancun agreements recogniseagriculture as a driver of deforestation,thereby making the sector eligiblefor consideration under adaptationactions, essentially allowing agricultureto piggy-back on deforestation inorder to gain eligibility. Overall, thepolicy message remains mixedand inconsistent.

Pillar 1 of the ComprehensiveAfrican AgriculturalDevelopment Programme(CAADP) advancesthe development ofa Framework onAgriculture ClimateChange Adaptation andMitigation as part of thesustainable land andwater use portfolio.

Still, the policy messageremains mixed andinconsistent.

BOXAfrican Ministerial Conference on the Environment May 2009Nairobi Declaration on the African Process for Combating Climate Change

1. To call upon Governments of Africa to promote further the common African position on thecomprehensive international climate change regime beyond 2012 and participate actively in thecontinuing international negotiations, knowing that failure to reach a fair and equitable outcomewill have dire consequences for Africa.

2. To agree that the African common position forms the basis for negotiations by the African groupduring the negotiations for a new climate change regime and should take into account thepriorities for Africa on sustainable development, poverty reduction and attainment of theMillennium Development Goals.

3. Also to agree that the key political messages from Africa to inform the global debate and negotiatingprocess, in terms both of the commitments that it seeks from the international community, andalso of the actions that African countries can take themselves, should be based on the establishedprinciples of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.

4. To urge all Parties and the international community that increased support to Africa under thefuture climate regime should be based on the priorities determined by Africa: adaptation,capacity-building, research, financing and technology development and transfer, includingsupport for South-South transfer of knowledge, in particular indigenous knowledge.

For a complete list of the recommendations,see: <http://www.unep.org/roa/Amcen/Amcen_Events/3rd_ss/Docs/nairobi-Decration-2009.pdf>.


What is Needed for Africato Be Successful in Durban, COP 17?The next round of climate talks ispoised to take place in Sub-SaharanAfrica in November 2011 for thesecond time; in Durban, South Africa.

Supported by the African Union (AU),the African Development Bank (AfDB),and the New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment (NEPAD), African statesare now in the driver’s seat andhave a real chance to push for theoperationalisation of the agreementsreached in Copenhagen (COP 15)and Cancun (COP 16).

Africa must maximise this singularopportunity to score a victory basedon a dedicated track for agriculturewithin the UNFCCC process.

Success will rely on a numberof key strategies:

1. Increasing Advocacy though SmartGlobal PartnershipsSince 2009, the climax event for keypolicy advocates of the agriculture-climate nexus, including FANRPAN,has been Agriculture and RuralDevelopment Day (ARDD),held in parallel with the annualUNFCC COP meetings.

The event brings together hundredsof pro-climate, smart-agricultureproponents, including researchers,governments, farmers, the privatesector, NGOs and, unfortunately,only a small crop of negotiators(http://www.agricultureday.org/).

Such efforts should be increased inthe run-up to COP 17, with greaterinvolvement of negotiators.

2. Training JournalistsA well-informed and well-preparedmedia can help to give prominenceand visibility to key issues, alsomaking them more easily understoodby policy makers and the public alike.

FANRPAN’s training workshops for themedia help to build capacity andknowledge in accurately coveringagricultural development issues inthe region.

These are usually held alongsidethe FANRPAN Regional FoodSecurity Policy Dialogues(http://www.ips.org/africa/library/FANRPAN-newsletter-2010-SML.pdf ).

3. Empowering African NegotiatorsAgriculture’s position in the discourseis not without its value-laden context,often portrayed as a villain in thecontext of emissions.

In contrast, its socio-economic role—livelihoods, nutrition and health—calls for a broader and moredevelopmental approach in whichsocial and environmental benefitshave priority.

Progress toward this has been slowpartially due to a lack of informationand knowledge, a situation requiringurgent attention.

The poorest countries, significantlyaffected by such inconsistencies inglobal policy, must strengthen theirinfluence and advocacy in the globalclimate institutional framework.

Scientific evidence grounded in thelocal context is a key ingredient tomore meaningful engagement byAfrican negotiators.

BOXFANRPAN High Level Policy Dialogue, September 2010Key Recommendations on Climate Change

1. Emphasis should be placed on designing more coherent and dynamicresearch and policy agendas, necessary to reduce poverty and vulnerabilityin the face of climate change.

2. Policy frameworks and development planning should be climate proofedso they do not become obsolete as environmental and economicconditions change.

3. Sufficient resources should be devoted to adaptation, includinginfrastructure and market development, to mitigate effects of climatechange on rural populations.

4. Increase investments in research for mitigation, the development of thecapacity to undertake the research and technology development to helpsupport political will and commitment to address impacts of climate changeon agriculture, fisheries and rural livelihoods.

Agriculture’s positionin the discourse is notwithout its value-ladencontext, often portrayedas a villain in the contextof emissions. In contrast,its socio-economic role—livelihoods, nutritionand health—callsfor a broader and moredevelopmental approachin which social andenvironmental benefitshave priority.

Poverty in Focus 35

The UNDP and the Climate andDevelopment Knowledge Network(CDKN), amongst others, provideUNFCCC negotiators with the toolsto make evidence-based,pro-development interventions(http://www.unitar.org/delivering-one-undp-and-unitar-join-forces-strengthen-african-participation-key-multilateral-negotia; http://cdkn.org/resource/defining-climate-compatible-development/).

4. Supporting Bottom-upAdvocacy CampaignsBringing the voice of affected ruralcommunities, where the greatestsense of urgency exists, more directlyinto the negotiation process is key.

Civil society organizations have apivotal role in advancing bottom-upand people-centric policies, includingthe scaling-up of ‘good practice’multi-focus adaptation interventions.

Farmer participation andthe use of innovative techniquessuch as theatre for policy advocacy(http://www.fanrpan.org/documents/d00958/) are ideal for bringing anAfrican flavour to COP 17.

5. Engaging in Multi-stakeholderIntersectoral Policy DialoguesAdding voice to the ‘triple win’of improving agriculturalproductivity and food security,addressing climate change, andimproving the lives and livelihoodsof rural populations that livein poverty, through multi–stakeholder policy dialogues,creates unique opportunitiesfor policy innovation.

In 2010, the FANRPAN RegionalHigh Level Multi-stakeholder FoodSecurity Policy Dialogue focusedon livestock and fisheries policiesfor food security and trade ina changing climate.

Looking to DurbanTo ensure that Africa emergesfrom the 2011 UNFCCC negotiationswith a fair deal, strengthenedcoordination and negotiationstructures are needed.

Adding voice to the‘triple win’ of improvingagricultural productivityand food security,addressing climatechange, and improvingthe lives and livelihoodsof rural populations thatlive in poverty, throughmulti–stakeholderpolicy dialogues, createsunique opportunitiesfor policy innovation.

Bringing the voiceof affected ruralcommunities, wherethe greatest senseof urgency exists,more directly intothe negotiationprocess is key.

A more development-oriented approachis central to a long-term and sustainedsolution to climate change.

Africa has not been idle. However,sustaining home-grown goodpractice and innovation dependson equitable and fair partnershiparrangements and an enablingpolicy framework.

The clarion message for COP 17,hosted on African soil, should be“NO AGRICULTURE, NO DEAL”.

AlertNet (2011). ‘Climate Conversations -Beat back African poverty andemissions with ag green growth’.Available online at: <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/blogs/climate-conversations/beat-back-african-poverty-and-emissions-with-ag-green-growth/>.

Bellassen, V., Manlay, R.J., Chéry, J.P.,Gitz, V., Touré, A., Bernoux, M. andChotte, J.L. (2010). ‘Multi-criteriaSpatialization of Soil Organic CarbonSequestration Potential from AgriculturalIntensification in Senegal’, Climatic Change,Volume 98, Numbers 1-2, January 2010,pp. 213-243 (31). Available online at:<http://www.springerlink.com/content/0522527xq630622g/fulltext.pdf>.

ECA (2010). Report on Climate Changeand Development in Africa Meeting of theCommittee of Experts of the 3rd Joint AnnualMeetings of the AU Conference of Ministersof Economy and Finance and ECA Conferenceof African Ministers of Finance, Planning andEconomic Development, Lilongwe, Malawi,25 – 28 March 2010. Available online at:<http://www.uneca.org/cfm/2010/documents/English/Report-onClimateChange-andDevelopment-inAfrica.pdf>.

Food and Agriculture Organizationof the United Nations (FAO) (2010).“Climate-Smart” Agriculture: Policies,Practices and Financing for FoodSecurity, Adaptation and Mitigation, FAO.Available at: <www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1881e/i1881e00.pdf>.

Maplecroft (2010). ‘New Maplecroft IndexRates Pakistan And Egypt Among NationsFacing “Extreme” Water Security Risks’,retrieved 10 July 2010 from Maplecroftwebsite: <http://www.maplecroft.com/about/news/water-security.html>.

Meridian Institute (2011). Modalities forREDD+ Reference Levels: Technical andProcedural Issues, prepared for theGovernment of Norway by Arild Angelsen,Doug Boucher, Sandra Brown, ValerieMerckx, Charlotte Streck, andDaniel Zarin. Available online at:<http://www.REDD-OAR.org>.

World Development Report 2008. Availableonline at: <www.worldbank.org/wdr2008>.

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Centre for Inclusive Growth

International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC - IG)Poverty Practice, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDPEsplanada dos Ministérios, Bloco O, 7º andar70052-900 Brasilia, DF - BrazilTelephone: +55 61 2105 5000

E-mail: [email protected] URL: www.ipc-undp.org

Dimensions of Inclusive Development: Growth, Gender, Poverty and the Environment

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