-
'~ilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, pp. 155-169, in
Workin~ Papers from "the Urban & Regional Development
Vniversity of California-~erkeley, 1973.
Dilemmas in a General Theory oi Planning*· HORSI' W~ J. Rm'EL .
"-l-•1* Scia« of Dailrf, Ulli~y •I Cllllifonio. &ruky
MELVIN M. WEBBER l'rrl/astK of Cily ,__., Ulfillenily of
01/ifonUQ. llnuky
ABSTJtACT
Tk x:udl f« ICialti6&: buts f« coafroalia& probtems o(
social polic:y is bouDd to fait, beamt: o( the DatiiR of lilac
problc:ms. Tiley are ~- problems. wllaa.s ICicDcz has developed 10
deal with "'WDc" problam. Policy problems c:aaor be ddiDitiwl)'
describecl. Moreower. ill a pluralist&: IOCicty thcR is
IIOtbilla like the mdisp9cable public aood; thcr'e is DO otljectM
cldinitioa of lqllity; policies tbal rapood to IOCiaJ problaas
CUIDOC be me:aniqfully aJmiCl or fabc; ad it lll&bs eo ICIISe
ro Wlc aboul "optimal solutions" to social problems .Jess sew:rc
qua!jfic:a•iaas are imposed 6nt. E._ -. rlleft art no '"soluliaas"
in lhc - of dc6nitiYc ad ob,ieatne ~
. . George Bernard Shaw diagnosed the case several years aao; in
more reecnt times popular protest may have already become a soc:ial
movemcDL Shaw averred that .. every profession is a conspiracy
apiDst the laity." Tbe contemporary pablics are respondin& as
though they have made the same discovery.
Few of t.be modem professionals seem to be immUDe from the
popular attack--whether they be social worJccrs. educators. bowers,
public health oftic:ials. policemen. city pla.nnen. bilflway
aJiDecrs or physicians. Our restive clients have been tdlinf us
that they don't like the educatioaal pro,rams that schoolmen haw
been ofrerinr. t.be Rdevdopmcat projects urban rc=Wal al'tftcies
have been proposiq. t.be Jaw. CDfon:emeDt styles of the police. the
admiDistrati¥C behavior of the welfare qencies, the locations oC
the bipways. and 10 OD. ID the courts; t.be streets. and the
political c:ampaips. we'Ye heeD hearias ewr-IOuder public protests
apiDSt the proCcssioDS' diaposes ot tbt c:licats' problems. apinst
professioaally designed ~ prosrams. qaiast professionally certified
standards for the public scnices.
It does *Z!l octd that this attack should be comiDa just when
professionals ia
155 IZ
-
tile social scrvica are lqinDina to .:quire prore:ssioDal
c:Ompetencics. It aupt seem that our publics are bcia& pencnc.
haviD& condoned professionalism when it was rally only clrateMp
amalellrism and CODdcnlniq profcsslonaJism when - finally IICJII to
IJc .W. JOOCI at our jobs. Pa waae thoup the laity may be. surely
the profasioaals thcaadwa ._'WC bcCD behind this attack as
well.
Sollie of tile .-raton of the c:oafrontation ha'WC beCu
intdJcctuaJ in oripn. The aati-professioaaJ JDOI.olallalt sacms in
part from a -recoDCCptualizatioa of the pro-f'asioufs task. Otbcn
are more in the characcer or bis&oric:al imperatives. i.e.
con-
. ditiolls ha'WC bcca tbrowD up by the coune or soc:i Ul C'WCDIS
that call for dill'eran _.. or ildcrw:ntioD.
The protessioul's job was oDCC seen as solviD& an assortment
or problems that appeared to IJc dc6aable. UDdersCandablc and
consensual. He was hired to eliminate daose c:oDCtitioDs that
predonrinmt opinion judpd undcsirablc. His record has been quite
spec~KU~ar, of counc; the contemporary city and contemporary urban
society iland as c:lcaD C'ridcDc:es of professional prowess. The
streets ha'WC ~ pawd. and roads DOW conDCCt aU plac:cs; houses
shelter vinually ncryonc; the dn:ad diseases are vinuaDy aooe; deaa
water is piped into acatfy ncry buildin&; sanitary sewers c:any
wastes from them; sc:bools and hospitals scr'WC vinually C'WCf)'
district; and so on. The accomplishments of tile past ca~tury in
these RSpCCU ba'WC bcCD truly pheDO-mcnal, howe'WCr short oC some
persons' aspirations they might ha'WC been.
But DOW that these rdativdy easy problems ha'WC bcaJ dealt with,
WC ha'WC IJcen tUI'IIiq our attcDticm to others that arc much more
aubbom. The tests for cffic::icftq, that were aacc so uaef'uJ u
measures of accomplisbmcat; arc beina cbaDeoJCd by a racwed
prcoccapacioa with coasequeaccs for equity. The sccmift&
coasensus, that mialu aacc ha"WC allowed distributional problems to
be dealt with, is being eroded by tbc.-powiq awarcecss or tbc
Dation's pluralism and of tbc difl'eraltiatioa of values that
aa:omplllics dilfacntiatioa of publics. The profcssioaalized
copiti'WC and oc:capaticmal styJcs that were refined in tbc first
half of this century, baed in NewtoaiaD mcch•rristic physic:s, ate
DOt radiJy adapccd to contemporary conc:cptions of iJdc:ractiD&
opali)'Slalls and to contemporary CODCCrDS with equity. A powiag
aensitivity to tile ~ o( ~ons that ripple through such systemic
DCtWOrts and to tbc Yalue coaseqUCDCeS of those ~OilS has pncraled
tbc recet~t re-aami!"tioD or recciwd Yalues aad the recent search
for national JO&Is. Tberc seems to be a JrOwiDa rcalizatioa
that a weak strut in tbc professional's sappon. SJSUm lies at the
juDcture wbcre pi-formulation, ·problem-definition and equity
issues JDeCt. We should lite to address these matters in tum.
I. Goal Formalatioa The leU'Cb for capliCit JOIIs was iaitiated
in force with the OpaUDJ of tbc 1960s. Ia a 1960 RAND pubticatioa.
Cbadcs J. Hitch ufll!d that •we must lc:aril to look It tlflt'
tlb)«tha as aiticaDy and as pro(essioaaJiy as we look at our models
and 011r otbcr ilrpats." 1 The sablequa:at wort iD 1JStC1DS ualysis
Rd&rmcd that injUDctioD.
I a.rla J. Rilcb, "'On die~~ ill $,._ Stailia• CSaala Naaica,
Calilonia: 'l1lc &AND Calpnaiaa. JMO; P-WS). p. 19.
156
-
Men in a wide array of fields 'WCt'e prompted to redefine the
systems they dealt with in the sy11tu of verbs rather than nouns-to
ask .. What do the systems do'!" rather a !\;In .. What are they
made of"! -and then to ask the most difficult question of all : ..
What shtnlld these systems do'r Also 1960 was inaugurated with the
publication of Gt~t~ls for ArMrictlfU, the report of President
Eisenhower' s Commission on National Cioals.Z There followed then a
wa~ of similar efforts. The Committee for Economic De\'Clopment
commissioDed a follow-up rc-eum ination. So did the Brookinss
lastitution, the Americ:an Academy of Arts and Scienc:es, and then
President Nixon throo.1gh his National Goals Research Staff.
But)hese may be only the most apparent attempts to clarify the
nation's direc:tions.J
Perhaps more symptomatic in the .. U.S . . were the efforts to
install PPBS. v.-hich requires explication of dniru outcomn; and
then the more m:ent attempts to build systems of social
indic::~tors, v.·hich are in effect surrogates for statements Clf
desired conditions. As we all now know, it has turned out to be
terribly diffic:ult, if not im-possible. to make either of these
systems oper:ltional. Although there are some small success stories
ru:ountcd in a few civilian •ncies. successes are still rare.
Ciool-findin!! is tuming out to be an extraordinarily obstinate
task. Bec::~use &;oaJ-finding is one of the central functions
of pbnnin&, we shall shortly w:~nt to ask why that must be
so.
At the same time that these formalized attempts were being
~r.adc: to disco .. -er OiJr latent aims. the nation was bulfcted
by the revolt of the blacks, then by the: revolt of the students,
then by the widespread revolt apinsl the war, more recently •ith a
nev.· eonsumerism and conservationism. All these movements were
striking out at the underlying S)'Stemic processes of contemporary
American society. In a style rather different from those of the
systems analysts and the Presidential commissioners, participants
in these: revolts were seeking to restructure the value and goal
systems th:u affect the distribution of social product and shape
the directions or national policy.
Systems analysis, pis commissions, PPBS, social indicators. the
several revolts, the poverty program, model cities, the current
concerns with environrnenul quality and with the qualities of urban
life, the search for new r-eli&;ions among contemporary youth,
and the increasing attractiveness of the pbnning idea-all seem to
be dri"-en by a common quest. Each in its peculiar way is asking
for a clarification of purposes,
· for a redefinition of problems, for a·re-orderin!!
ofpriorilies to match stated purposes. for the design of new kinds
or goal-directed actions, for ~ n:orienution or the pro-fessions to
the outputs of professional activities rather than to the inputs
into them, w then Jor a redistribution or the outputs of
!!overnmental pr~ms among the competing publics.
A ~running current of optimism in Americ:i'ln thought seems to
h&\': been propdlin& these diverse searches for
direction-finding instruments. But at the s:ame lime, the
Americans' t~~....; ;;dlh in a paranteed Pro~ is being eroded by
the same W&\'CS that aR wearing down oJi1 beliefs in the
5.x:ial order's inherent JOOdDCSS and ia hist~ry's intrinsic
bcDcvolenc:e. Candide is dead. His place is being
J The rqtOt1 - published "" $clecUulllloob. Prauiae-HaU. 1960. ,
Ac the - time co lie Aft. counter wooicla -uDCOmlonablc to many~
daimiac tbac the
-..ciocl's 4irec:&ioft- praenu 1a0 aanial(ul
rd'etaK:CI)'Sian ac an. owina co the worldwide dla~ ollllc PfObbns
and cbc CMf'SPiD of crilcs across nalioaal boun4aric:s.
157
-
OCQJpied by a new conception o( future history that, rejecting
historicim~, is searching for ways of exploiting the intdlectual
and inventive eapabilities of men.
This belief comes in two quite contradictory form~ On the one
hand, there is the belief in tbe .. makcability," or unrestricted
malleability, of future history by means of the planning
intdlect-by reasoning, rational d iscourse, and civilized
negotiation. At the same time, there are ¥OCal proponents of the ..
feeling approach," of com-passionate enpgement and dramatic aaion,
e\~ of a revi,-al of mysticism, aiming at overcoming The System
which is seen as tbe evil source o( misery and suffering.
The Enlighten~• -:-~:· be coming to full maturity in the late
20th cc:.tury, or it may be on its deathbed. Many Americans seem to
believe both t~t ·~ can perfect future history-t~t we can
deliberately shape future outcomes to accord ·•ith our wishes-and
that there will be no future history. Some have arrh~ at deer
pcssimil>ln and some at resignation. To them, planning for lar;e
social systems ~s proved to be impossible without loss of liberty
and equity: Hence,· for them the ultimate goal of planning should
be anarchy, because it should aim at the elimination of govern·
mcnt over olhc~ Still another group has arrived at the conclusion
that liberty and equity are luxuries which cannot be afforded by a
modem society, and that they should be substituted by ..
cybernetically feasible" values.
Professionalism has been understood to be one of the major
instruments for perfectability, an agent sustaining the traditional
American optimism. Based in modem science, each of the professions
has been conceived as the medium throu~h which the knowledge of
science is applied. In effect, each profession has been see'n as a
subset of engineering. Planning and the emerging policy sciences
are amonr the more optimistic: of those professions. Their
representatives refuse to believe that planning for betterment is
impossible, however grave their misgivings about the
appropriateness of past and present modes of planning. They have
not abandoned the hope that the instruments of perfectability can
be perfected. It is that view that we want to eum.ine, in an effort
to ask whether the social professions are equipped to do what they
are expected to do.
n. Problem Defi.Ditioa During the induwial age, the idea of
planning. in cc,mmon with the ide.a of pro-fessionalism. was
dominated by the pervasive idea of r/ficirncy . Drawn from 18th
century physics, c:1assic:a1 economics and the principle or
least-means, cllic:iency was seen as a condition in which a
specified task could be performed with low inputs of resources.
That bas been a powerful idea. It has long been the avidin&
concept of civil engineering, the sc:ieDtific management
JDO\'CmeDt. much of coatemporary operations research; and it still
pervades modem sovemment and industry. When altiCbed to the idea of
planning, it became dominating there too. Pluming was then SCCil as
a proc:as or desipina problem-solutions that miaht be installed and
operated cbeaply. Jec:auie it was fairly easy to act consemus on
the nature of problems during the early industrial period. the wk
could be assigned to the tec:hnicaDy Wiled, who in tum could be
tnasted to accomplish the simplified end-in-view. Or, in the more
work-a-day scniDg, we could ieJy upon the cfticiency expert to
diaposc a problem
158
-
and then solve it. while simuhaneou51y reducin~ the resource
inputs into wfl:uever it was we were doiftl.
We have come to think about the planning task in very different
ways in recent ,cars. We have been learning to ask whether what we
arc doing is the ritht thin& to do. That is to say. we have
been leamin& to ask questions about the outputs of actions and
to pose problem statements in valuative frameworks. We have been
leamin& to sec social proc:csscs as the links tying open
systems into large and interco~ed DCtworks of systems, such that
outputs from one ~me inputs to others. In that structural framework
it has become less apparent where problem centers lie. and less
apparent ·~ and how we should intervene nen if we do happen to know
wt..at aims we seek. We are now sensitized to the waves of
repercussions generated by a problem-solving action directed to any
one node in the network. and we arc DO longer · s\1,.-j,rised to
find it inducing problems of ueater severity at some other aode.
And so we have been for=! to expand the boundaries of the systems
we deal with. trying 'o intemalize those .externalities.
This was the professional style of the systems analysts. who
WCT'e commonly seen as forebearers of tbe universal
problem-solvers. With arropnt confideuc:e. the early systems
analysts pronounced themselves ready to take on anyone's percei\'ed
problem, diagnostically to discover iu hidden character, and then,
having exposed its true nature, skiDfully to excise its root
causes. Two decades of experience have wom the self-assurances
thin. These analysts are coming to realize how valid their model
really is. for they themselves have been caught by the very same
diagnostic difficulties that troubled their clients.
By now we arc all beginning to realize that one of the most
intractable problems is that of defining problems (of knowing what
distinruishes an observed c:oDdition from a desired condition) and
of locating problems (finding where in the complex causal netWorks
the trouble really lies). In tum, and equally intractable. is the
problem of identifyina the actions that might effectively narrow
the pp between what-is and what-ouJht-to-be. As we seek to improve
the effectiveness of actions in punuic of val~ outcomes, as System
boundaries JC1 stretched, and as we become more sophisticated about
the complex workings of open societal systems. it bec:ome5 ever
more diftlcult to make the planninc idea operational.
Many now have an image of ltt~t~• an itkaliud planning system
would fUDCtion. It is bcin1 seen as an on·aoing. cybernetic process
of governance. inc:orporatinc systematic proczdures for
continuously searching out aoa.Js; iclentifying problems ;
forecasting uncontrollable contextual chanees: inventing altemative
stiatqies, tactics, and time-sequenced actions; stimulatinc
alternative and plausible action sets aDd their coo-sequences;
eva.luatift& altematively forecasted out~mes; swistic:aJly
mOnitoring those tcmditions of the publ~ at.d oi S)'SlCmS that arc
judged to tte &erm≠ feeding beck information to the simulation
aad decision clwtne1s so that errors can be corrected-all in a
simuhancoasJy.(unc:t.ioning JOvcnUng process. Tbat let of steps is
familiar to aD of us. for it comprises what is by now the
modet~Klassical model of planning. And yet we all know that such a
planning system is unattainable, eveft as we seck more dosdy to
approximate it. It is nen questionable whether sud! a plan-DiD&
system is desirable.
159
-
m. Pl•nninc ProWems are WICked Problems A put many barriers keep
us from perfecting such a planninJ/&ovnnin~ system : theory is
inadequate for clccent forecastin&: our intcUisenc:e is
insufficient to our tasks; plUrality of objectives hcJd by
pluralitieS of politics nWc5 it impossible to pursue unitary aims;
and so on. Tbc diftic;ultics auachcd to rationality arc ten:~cious.
and we have .:. :-..- Lecn unable to act untan&)cd from their
web. This is partly because the classical paracii&m of scicnc:c
aad cnJinecring-thc paradipn ata:lt has UDdcrwn modern
professionalism-is DOt applicable to the problems of open S4Xieul
systems. One: reason the publics ha~-e bcctl attackinclhc social
professions. we bclie~-e. is that tbC COJnitive . and .
occupational. styles of the profcssions-rnimickin! the cocnitive
style of scienc.c and the oa:upational style of engineering-have
just not worked on a wide array of social probkms. The lay
customers arc complaining because planners and other professionals
ha\·e not succeeded in solving the problems they claimed they could
solve. We shall want to suggest that the social professions were
misJecl somewhere alon& the line into assumin& they could
be applied scientists-that they could solve problems in the ways
scientists can solve t.hcir sorts of problems. The error has been a
serious one.
The kinds of problems that planners dc:aJ with-societal
problems-are inherently dift'erent from the problems that
scientists and perhaps some classes of engineers deal with.
Plannin& problems are inherently wicl.:cd.
As distin&uishcd from problems in the natural sciences,
which are de6ru:ble and scpa_rable and may have solutions that are
finclable, the problems of go\-emmental plannins.:-..aad espcciaUy
thOse of social or policy planning-.re ill-defined: :lnd they rely
upon dusivc political judpnent for resolution. (Not "solution. ••
Social proOicms are never solved. At best they are only
re-solved-over and over apin.) Permit us to draw a cartoon that
will help clarify the distinction we intend.
The problems that seicntists and engineers have usually focused
upon are nlOStJy '"tame" or .. benisn" ones. As an cumplc. consider
a problem of mathematics. such as solvin& an equation ; or the
task of an orpnic chemist in analyzing the structure of some
unknown compound ; or that of the chcssplayer attemptins to
accomplish checkmate in five moves. For each the mission is dear.
lt is clear. in turn. whether or DOt the problems have ~
solved.
Wicked problems, in contrast. have neither of these clarifying
traits; and they include aarly -all public policy issues-whether
the question concerns the location of a freeway. the adjustment oC
a tax rate. the modification of school curricula. or the
confrootation of crime.
'Ibm are at least tea distiapishina propctties of
plannin&·typc problems, i.e . .ncbd oaa. that plannen had
better be alert to and which we shaU coaunent upon in tum. As you
wiD see. we are callina them '"wickecr not because these properties
are themselves ethically depJorablc. We usc the term ""wicked .. ia
a meanin& akin to that of""malipant" fm contrast t~ .. bcnipj
or ""vicious" Oikc a cirde) or ""tricky .. (lib • leprechaun) or ..
qpasive" (like a lion. in contrast to the docility or a lamb). We
do Dot mean to personify these properties of social systems by
implying nWicious
160
-
iatent. But then, you may apec that it becomes morally
objectionable for the planDCr to treat a wic:bd problem as thoup it
Mre a tame one. or to lame a wicked problem prematurely, or to
refuse to ra:opize the .inherent wickedness of social problems.
~I. 1"Mft is 110 ~n f...aatioa ora wickt4 proWem For any aiven
tame problem, an ahausti~ formulation can be stated c:ontaining all
the information the problem-solwr needs for undcntaading and
solvift& the problem -provided be knows his .. art," or
course.
This is DOt possible with wicbd-problcms. The iafOI'IIIItion
needed to lllttkntt~nd the problem depends upon one's idea for
so/rinK it. That is to say: in order to describe a ~ked-problem in
sufficient detail, one has to develop an cxhausti~ inventory of all
conceivable solutions ahead or time. The reason is tlw ~ question
asking for additional information depends upon the understanding of
the problcm-:and its resolution-at that time. Problem understandin1
and problem resolution are c:on· c:omitant to each other.
Therefore, in order to anticipate all questions (m order to
anticipate aU information required for resolution ahead of time),
knowlcd,e of all conceivable solutions is required.
Consider, for example, what would be necessary in identifying
the nature of the po~)' problem. Docs po~y mean low income? Yes, in
pan. But what arc the determinants of low income? Is it deficiency
of the national and regional economics,
. or is it deficiencies of c:ogniti~ and occupational skills
within the labor force? If the latter. the problem statement and
the problem "solution" must encompass the educa· tiona!
proc::csscs. But, then, where within the educational system docs
the real problem lie? What then miJht it mean to "impro~ the
educational system"? Or does the po'-crty problem reside in
dcfteient physical and mental health? If so, we must add those
etiologies to our information pac:kagc, and search inside the
health services for a plausible cause. Docs it include cultural
deprivation? spatial dislocation? problems of CJO identity?
deficient political and social skills ?-.nd so on. If we can
formulate the problem by tracing it to some sons of sourc:cs-such
that we can say, .. Aha! That's the locus of the difficulty," i.e.
those arc the root causes ofthedift'erenc:es betv.un the .. is ..
and the .. ought to be •• c:onditions-then we ha"C tbueby also
formulated a solution. To find the problem is thus the same thing
as finding the solution; the problem can•t be defined until the
solution has been found.
The formulat ion of a wicked problem is the problem! The process
of formulatinr the problem and of c:onceivin& a solution (or
re-solution) arc identical. since C"Cry specification of the
problem is a specification of the direction in which a
tn;&tment is considered. Thus. if we I'CCIOiftizc deficient
mental health services as part of the problem, then-tnvially
cnough-.. impro~nt o • mental health services" is a IPCCification
of solution. If, as the DCXt step, we dedare the lack of community
centers ODe ddiciency .of the menl!l health scrvic:n system, theG
~t or COJDaiUDit)' centers" is the next specification of solution.
If it is inadequate tlaUDent within commUDity centers. then impro~
therapy trainin& of staJI' may be the locus of solution,
&Dd so on.
This property sheds some liJf\1 on the usefulness of the famed
.. I)'StemS-appr~ch"
161
-
for treating wicked problems. Tbe classical systems-approach of
the military and the space ~ is based on the assumption that a
planning project Qll be orpnizcd iauo clistinct phases. E~ acxtbook
of systems engineering starts with an CDJimcration of lhae phases:
""understand the problems or the mission," .. pthcr information,"
... D&Jyzc information, .. .. synthtsm information and wait for
the creati-wc leap," ""work out solution," or the like. For wicked
problems. howner,this type of scheme does DOl work. One caDnot
UDderstand the problem without knowing about its COIIIat; one
c:anaot meaniftl{uUy search for information without the oriemation
or a solution concept ; one c:anJM.t first understand, then solve
,. '"ystems-approach .. of the first sencratioR" is inadequate for
dealing with wicked-problems. Approaches .r the .. second
aeneration" should be based on a model of planning as an
arrunen-tati-wc proc:css ia the course of which an irnaae of the
problem and of the solution
. aneJ'FS sradually amona: .the panicipants, as a product of
incessant judament, . subjected to critical arzgment. The methods
of Operations Research play a prominent role in the
systems-approach of the first aeneration; they become operational.
how-eYer, only tft~ the most important dccWons have already been
made, i.e. after the problem has already been tamed.
Take an optimization model. Here the inputs needed include the
ckfiftition of the solution space, the system of constraints, and
the performance measure as a function of the planning and
contextual variables. But setting up and constraining the solution
space aDd constructing the measure of performance is the wicked
part of the problem. Very likely it is more essential than the
remaining steps of searching for a solution which is optimal
relative to the measure of performance and the constraint
system.
_2. WkUI prelllla.s un • stoppiac nle In solving a chess problem
or a~mathematical equation, the problem-solver knows
wbUI be has done his job. There are criteria that tell when tilt
or 11 solution has been found.
Not so with planfting problems. Because (according to
Proposition I) the proc:as of solving the problem is ideatical with
the process of understanding its nature, because there arc no
criteria for sufficient understanding and because there are DO ends
to the causal chains that link uneracting open systems, the
would-be planner can always try to do better. Some additional
in~tment of eft'on might increast the chances or Mding • better
solution.
Tbe planner terminates work on a wicked problem, not for
re&soDS inherent in the .. Iogie" of the problem. He stops for
considerations that arc extemal to the problem: he ruas ovt ·of
time, or J'DOney, or patience. J:le finally says, .. That's Jood
enough ... or ""This is the best J can do within the limitatioDS of
the project, .. or .. I like this IOivtioD." etC. . .
1 Sohltioas to wicked )II'OIIIcas ue 80t tne-or-false. .. ,
&oocl-or.W
There are coa¥CD~ criterii for objectively deciding whether the
otrered solution to an equation or whether the proposed structural
formula of a chemic:al compound is c:omct or f'alse. They can be
independently checked by other qualified
162
-
·persons who arc familiar with the established criteria ; and
the answer will be normally una.mbipous.
For wicked planning problems, there arc no true or false
answers. Normally, many panies are equally equipped, interested,
and/or entitled to judae the solutions, although none has the power
to set formal decision rules to determine corm:lncss. Their
jud,menu arc likely to difrer widely to accord with their aroup or
personal interests, their special vaJuNets, and their ideological
predilcctioM. Their assess-ments of proposed solutions arc
expressed as .. lood" or .. bad" or, more likely, as .. better or
wone'' or .. satisfying" or ''cood enough:"
4.. T'Mre is 110 Immediate ucl ., ··-··f lest or • solutialllO •
wick~ proWma For tame-problems one can determine on the spot how
good a solution-au~mpt
has been. More accurately, the test of a solution is entirely
under the control of abe few people who arc invol~ and interested
in the problem.
With wicked problems, on the ot her hand, any solution, after
being implemented, wiD aenerate waves of consequences over an
extcnded-vinuatly an unbounded-period of time. Moreover, the next
day's consequences of the solution may yield utterly undesirable
rcperc:ussions which outweigh the intended advantaaes or the
advaataaes accomplished hitherto. In such cases, one would have
been better oft" if the plan had never been carried out. ·
The fuJI consequences cannot be appraised until the waves of
rcpcn::ussiom have compleieJy run out, and we have no way of
tracing Gil the waves throu&h 1111 the afrected lives ahead
oftime or within a limited time span.
5. EftfJ tol111ioa to a wicked problem is a "GDe-Shol
operatioa"; llcnuse tbtft Is 110 oppol'mtily to lana •y
trial-aDIHrror, ntry altcmpt C'Oallts slplflcutly
In the sciences and in fields like mathematics, chess,
puzzle-solving or mcc:hanic:al engineering design, the
problem-solver can try various runs without penahy. What-ever his
outcome on tlaese individual experimental runs, it doesn't matter
much to the subject-system or to the course or societal affairs. A
lost chess pme is seldom consequential for other chess games or for
non-chess-players.
With wicked planning problems, however, 'rrry implemented
solution is con-~equcutial. Jt leaves "'traces" that caMot be
undone. One c:annot build a freeway to sec how it works, and then
easily correct it after unsatisfactory performance. l...arge
pubJic.works are cft'cctively irreversible., and the consequences
they ICDCtatc ha~ lon& half-lives. Many people's li"VeS ~ill
have been irreversibly iaft~ ud larJC amounts o( money wd1 have
beeo spent-another irrevemblc ac:L The same happcos with most other
larJe-scale public works ud with virt.wty aD publiC«nicc pro-pams.
The cll'ccu or an uperimcrltal curriculum wiD foDow the pupils ioto
their adult lives. _ · ·
Wllclle\'Cr actions are drcc:tively i~rsible and wheaever the
half.Ji"VeS or the consequeoca are loll&. ~Y trill/ CtN~~~ts.
ADd ncry attempt to reverse a decision or to correct for the
undesired conscqueoccs poses another set of wicked problems, which
are in tuni subject to the same dilemmas.
16:
-
_,
' · Wiebe~ prolllems clo 1101 111ft -~ (or .. eu .. stinly
clescl'iMble) set of ,.._.., .......... is dleft a ·•·•scri'bed set
or penais.sl"bbe opentioiiS tat may .......... * ....
Tbere arc no criteria which enable one to prove that all
solutions to a wicked problem have been idellti6ed and
considered.
It may happen that 110 solution is found, owing to logical
inconsistencies in the "'picture" or the problem. (For aample, the
problem-sol vet' may arrivc at a problem ~ption requiring that botb
~ "",. ~ot-A should happen at the same time.) Or it might result
from his failing to develop an idea for solution (which does not
mean that someone else might be more suc:cessful). But normally, in
the pursuit of a wickeo plaaDing problem, a host or potential
solutions arises; and another host is never thought up. It is then
a matter of jwlzmmr whether one· should .. uy to cnlar&e the
available set or not . And it is, of course, a matter of judgment
which of these solutions should be pursued and implemented.
Chess has a finite set of rules. ac:c:ounting for all situations
that can occur. In mathematia, the tool chest of operations is also
explicit; so, too, although less rigorously, itt chemistry.
But not so in the world of social policy. Which
strategies-or-moves arc permissible in dealing with crime in the
streets, for example, have been enumerated nowhere. "Anything
goes," or at least. any new idea for a planning mcasu~ may become a
serious candidate for a ~Jution : What should we do to reduce
street crime ? Should we disarm tbe police, as they do in Engbnd,
since even criminals a~ less likely to shooc unarmed men? Or
l'q)e&l the laws that define crime, such as those that make
marijuana use a criminal act or those that make c:ar theft a
criminal ac:t? That would reduce crime by c:banJing definitions.
Try moral ramwncnt ·and substitute ethical self-control for police
and coun control ? Shoot all criminals and thus reduce the numbers
who commit crime? Give away free loot to would-be-thieYeS. and so
reduce the incentive to C:rime? And so on.
In such fields of ill-defined problems and hence ill-definable
solutioas, the set of feasil?le plans of action relies on ralistic
judgment, the capability to appraise .. exotic" ideas and on the
amount o( trust and credibility between planner and dientclc that
will lead to the conclusion, ""OK. let's try that."
7. £ftrJ wicUt problem is eneetieUy aaiqae
or course, for ~y two problems at least one distinguishinJ
property can be found (just as any number of propenies can be found
which they sha~ in common). and each of them is therefore UDique in
a trivial sense. But by .. UMiftitllly unique" we mean that,
despite Joq lists of similarities between a current problem aDd a
prnious ooe. theR always might be an additional distinpishing
property that is of owrriding impona~cc. Part o( the art of
dealin& with;widted problems is the art of not knowin& too
early which type ot aolution to apply. .
'Ibcre arc ao dtu.sel ot wicbd problems in the sense that
principles of solution can be dndoped to 6t till members of a
class. ID mathematics there arc rules for c:lassifyiog f'amilics or
problems DJ, of 10Jving a class ·of equations whcDe~ a )64
-
...Wn, qWt.........,.a6al "' or chanotmst;., .,......, th< -.
n.... ., ! explicit dwacteristics of tame problems ttw define
similarities among them, in , scch fashion that the same set of
techniques is likely to be eft'ecti'YC on all of them. '
Despite seeming similarities amonJ wicked problcm5. one can
ne¥Cr be t"rrtom that the paniculaB of a problem do not override
its commonalities with ocher prob-lems alrady dealt with.
The conditions in a city c:onstnacain& a subway may look
similar to t.1e conditions in San Francisco, say; but planners
"-ould be in-advised to transfer the San Francisco solutions
directly. Dift'ermces in commuter habits or raidential patterns may
far outweiJh similarities in subway layout.· downtown layout -and
the rest: In til .. .,:,ore complex world of social poliq planning.
C'YCrY situation is likely _to be one-of-a-kind. If we are riJ)lt
about that, the direet transferenc:e of the physical-science and
engineer-ing thou@htways into social poliq might be dysfunctional,
i.e. positively harmful . .. Solutions" miJ)lt be applied to
seemingly familiar problems which are quite in-compatible with
them.
I. E''UJ wicked problan cu be coasidcnd to be a symptom of
uodter prolllem
Problems can be described as di~pancies between the "state of
atrail'5 as it is and the state as it ought to be. The process of
resolving the problem starts with the search for causal explanation
of the di~panq. Removal of that cause poses another problem of
which the original problem is a .. symptom." Jn tum, it can be
considered the symptom or still another, .. higher level" problem.
Thus .. c:ritne in the streets" ca.n be considered as a symptom of
general moral decay, or permissiveness, or deficient opponunity, or
wealth, or poverty, or whatever causal explanation you happen to
like best. The level at which a problem is settled depends upon the
self-confidence of the analyst and cannot be decided on logical
grounds. There is nothing like a natural lc'YCI of a wicked
problem. Of course, the higher the level of a problem's
formulation, tbe broader and more general it becomes : and the more
difficult it becomes to do something about it. On the other hand,
one should not try to cure symptoms: aDd theref~re one 5hould try
to settle the problem on as hilh a level as possible.
Here lies a difficulty with incrementalism. as well . This
doctrine advenises a policy or small steps, in the hope of
contributing systematically to overall improvement. If, however,
the problem is auacked on too low a level (an increment), then
success of resolution may result in making things worse., because
it may become more difficult to dal with the higher problems.
Marginal improvement does not cuarantee O\'Crall improvement. For
cumple. computerization or an administrative process may result in
reduced cost, case of operation, etc. But at the ~me time it
becomes more diffic:ult to incur structur:al changes in the
organization, because· technical perfection reinfoi"Ce\
orpnizational patterns and normally increases the cost of chan~.
The newly acquired power or the controlle1'5 of information may
then deter later modifications of their roles.
UDder these circwnstances it is not surprising that the memben
of an orpllizatio" tend to see the problems on a level below their
own level. If you ask a police chief what the problems or the
police are, he is likdy to demand better hardware.
16S
-
'· 'Be~., a .,,,.Fe, ..... 'W& a~ ......... cu - rq' . • ill
- u... wa)'So 11le dleice of tqllaatioll lletlnaiMs die ..a.e ol
1i11e ,...... •, ........
"'Crime iD the streets" can be explained by not eaoup police. by
too many aiminaJs. by iudcquate laws, too many poticc, cultural
deprivation, deficient opponuaity, too many JUns, phrenolocic
abcrratioas, ae. Each or these olrers a directioa for attaetina
crime in the streeu. Whidl one is riJht? Thcte is DO rule or
procedure to clecenniA.: the .. comet" cxplanatK-!! ~:
:..r..bination of them. The rasoo is tbat in clcalin& with
wicked problems there are sewraJ more ways of refuting a
laypothcsis than there are pcnrUssible in the sciences.
The mode of dealina with cooftictina cvidmcc that is customary
in science is as follows : ·uDder CODditiolls'C ud assumina the
validity- of hypothesis H, c&ct E must occur. Now, p'Val C,
£does not occur. Consequently His to be refuted." In the coatcxt of
wicked problems, howncr, funhcr modes arc admissible: one can deny
that the dl'ec:t E bas DOl occurred, or one can explain the
nonoc:currcnce of E by im~n& processes without having to
abandon H. Here's an example: Assume that somebody chooses to
explain crime in the streets by .. not enouJh police." This is made
the basis of a plan, and the size of the police force is increased.
Assume funher that in the wbsequent years there is an increased
number of arrests, but an increase of olfeDSCS at a rate sliJhtly
lower than the increase of GNP. Has the elfect E occurred? Has aimc
in the streets been reduced by iDCreasina the police force? If the
&nSWCr is DO, sewn) nonscicDtific explanations may be tried in
order to rescue the hypothesis H \IDcreasiDa the police fort~C
reduces crime in the streets"): .. If we bad not increased the
number of ofliccrs, the inctQSC in crime wouJd have been ~n pater;"
'"This case is u exception from ruJe H because there was an
irregular illflux of criminal elcrncnu;" ""Time is too shonto feel
the dfects yet;" etc. But also tbe answer .. Yes, E has oc:cumd"
can be dd'eDdcd: '"The number of amsu was increased," etc.
1ft dealina with wicked problems, the modes of rasonina used in
the arawnent are much ric:ber than those permissible in the
scieftti&c discourse. Because of the essaltiaJ UDiquenc:ss of
the problem (sec Proposition .7) and Jaekina opponunity ror
riaorous experimentation (sec Proposition 5). it is not possible to
put H to a c:rucia.l test.
That is to say, the choice of cxpJanalion is arbitrary in the
loJical sense. In actuality, attitudinal criteria JUidC the choice.
People choose those explanations which are most plausible to them.
Somewhat but not much eugcratcd, you miJht say that everybody
picks. that explanation of a discrepancy which fits his intentions
best and which conforms to the ac:tioo-prospec:ts that are
available to him. The analyst's "world view" is the lliOqest
clelcrmiDiq factor in explaiDin& a d~ and, therefore, in
raolvin&• wicked problem.
... 11le ,.._..,-...... - wr-c • As Karl Popper arpcs in 1M U,ic
of Sdmlific Diseomy,• it is a principle of
a::icnct that IOiutioas to problems are oaJy bypot.beses
olf'eted for refutation. This
• ScicMz Editioas. New YCIIt. 1961.
166
-
habit is based on the insipt that there are no proofs to hypot~
only potential rc{utations. The more a hypothesis withstands
numerous auempts at rc{utAtion, the better its .. corroboration ..
is considered to be. Consequently, the sc:icatifie community docs
not blame iu mcmbcn for postulating hypolhcscs that arc later
muted-so lona as the author abides by the nalcs of the pmc. of
course.
In the world of planning and wicked problems no such immunity is
tolerated. Here the aim is not to find the truth, but to impro~
some eharactmstic:s of the world where people Jive. Planners are
liable for the consequeoc:cs of the actions they JCIIU&lC; the
effcc:ts c:an matter a pat clcal to those people that arc touc:hcd
by those actions.
We arc thus led to conclude that the problems that planDerS must
deal with are wieked and ineorrigiblc ones. for they defy efforts
to delineate their boundaries and to identify their c:auscs, and
thus to expose their problematic nature·. The plaMcr who worlcs
with open systems is c:aught up in the ambrguity oftbeir c:ausal
webs. Morco~r. his would-be solutions arc confounded by a still
furthe~ set of dilemmas posed by the powing pluralism of the
contemporary publics, whose valuations of his proposals arc jud~
apinst an array or different and contradicting scales. Let us tum
to these dilemmas next.
IV. 1be Social Context There \\as a time during the 'Fifties.
when the quasi-sociological literature was pre· dieting a Mass
Society-foreseen as a rather homogeneously shared culture iD which
most persons would share values and beliefs. would hold to common
aims. would follow similar life-styles, and thus would beha~ in
similar ways. (You wtll rcc:all the popular literature on s"burbia
of ten yean ago.) It is now apparcat that those fore-casts \\'ere
wrong.
Instead. the high-scale societies of the Western world arc
becoming increasingly hctero~neous. They arc becoming increasingly
differentiated, comprising thousanc1s of minority groups, ttzch
joined around common intcrc:sts, common value systems, and shared
stylistic prcferenecs that differ from those of other aroups. As
the sheer volume of information and knowledae increases, as:
technoloJi
-
loin& tO be I Jona-run phenomenon or DOt. One could write
sc:cnarios that ,.-ould ~ · cquaUy plausible either way. But one
thin& is dear: larp: population siu will mean
that small minorities can comprise loar;e numbers of people:
and, as we have been leCinJ, neD smaJJ m.iDOritics c:an swin&
lar;e political inftuenc:e.
Ill a scttiaa iD which a plur.ality of publics is politically
pursuing a diversity of pb, how is the larpr aoc:iety to deal with
its wicJced problems in a planful way? How arc pJs to be set, when
the valuative bases are 50 diverse? Surely a uniuary conception o(
11 unitary .. public: Wf'lfare- is an anachronistic: one.
We do not ncn h:ave a theory that teUs us how to find out
-.it.at mi;nl be considered a societally best state. We have no
theory that tells us what distribution or the wc:i:ll product is
bcst-wbdhcr those outpull arc expressed in thc.coinagc of money
income, information income, cuhural opportunitic$, or whatever. We
have come to realize that the concept or th~ 50Cial product is not
very mcaninsful; possibly there is no agreptc measure for the
welfare · of a hi&hly diversified society, if this measure is
claimed to be objective and non-partisan. Social sc:icnce has
simply been unable to uDC:Over a soc:ia.J-wclfarc function that
would sugJcst which decisions Yo'ould contri-bute to a societally
best state. Instead, we have had to rely upon the axioms of
in-dividualism that underlie economic: and political theory,
deduc:in&. in effect, that the ltugn--public welfare derives
from summation of individualistic choices. And yet, we know that
1his is not necessarily so, ·as our current experience with air
poll:.aion has dramatized.
We also know that I1WIY societal processes have the character of
zero-sum prnes. As the population becomes incrusingly pluralistic:,
inter-group differences arc likely to be rdlcacd &S inter-Jroup
rivalries of the zero-sum sons. If they do, the prospects for
inventing positive non-uro-sum development stratesics would become
increasin&IY difficult. ·
Perhaps we c:an illustrate. A few years ago there was a nearly
universal consensus in America that full-employment, high
productivity, and widespread distribution of consumer durablcs
fitted into a development strategy in which all would be winners.
That consensus is Dow bcina eroded. Now, when substitutes for wages
~re being disbursed to the poor, the coiJeae student, and the
retired, as well &S to the more traditional recipient of
oonwaae iocomes, our conceptions of .. employment" and of a
full-employment economy arc havin& to be revised. Now, when it
is ftCOgnized that raw materials that enter the economy end up
&S residuals polluting the air mantle and the rivets, many are
becoming wary of risin& manufacturing production. And, when
some of the new middle-clus religions are exon::isins worldly pocls
in favor of less tangible communal ••aoods." the
consumption-oriented society is beinr c:hal-lenaed-oddly cnoup, to
be sure~ by those who were reared in its afftuencc.
What was ooc:c a dear
-
Our point, rather, u that diverse values arc held by different
lfOUps of iDd.ividuah-that what satisfia one may be abhorrent to
another, that what comprises problem· solution for one is
probJcm.,eneration for another. UDder such circu.mstances. and ill
the abscDCC of an overriding socia1 theory or an overriding soc:iaJ
ethic. there is no pinsaying wiUc:h IJ'Oup u riJht and wbic:h
5hould have its ends scrwd. ..
One traditicmal approach to the m:oociliation of social values
and individual choice is to entrust th f«to decision-making to the
wise and knowlcdpble professioaaJ apcns and politicians. But
whether one finds that ethically tolerable or DOl, we hope we have
made it clear that nen such a tactic only bqs the question, for
there are no value-free, true·false answers to uy of the 1ric:kcd
problems JOYCnUDeDts must deal with. To substitute expert
professional judgment for those of contending ·political groups may
make the rationales and the repercussions more explicit, but it
would not acc:es.sarily make the outcomes better. The one-best
anWter is possible with tame problems, but not with wicked
ones.
Another traditional approach to the reconciliation of social
values and individual choice is to bias in favor of the latter . .
Accordingly, one would promote wideDed differentiation of goods,
services, environments, and opportunities, such that indivi-duals
might more doscly satisfy their individual preferences. Where
large-system problems are J!CDCrated, he would seek to ameliorate
the efl'ccu that be judges most deleterious. Where latent
opportunities become visible, he would seck to exploit them. Where
positive non-zero-sum developmental strategies can be desiJned, be
would of course work hard to install them.
Whichever the tactic, though, it should be clear that the expert
is also the player in a politic:al pme, seeking to promote his
private vision of goodness over others'. Planninr is a component of
politics. There is no escaping that truism.
We are also suggesting that none of these tactics wiU an5Wer the
difficult questions attached to the soru of wicked problems
planners must deal with. We have neither a theory that can locate
societal goodness, nor one that might dispel wickedness, DOt one
that might resolve the problems of equity that rising pluralism is
provoking. We are inclined to think that these theoretic dilemmas
may be the most wicked conditions
· that confront \IS.
169