29Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
Gonzales v. COMELECPetitioners assail the constitutionality of
RA 4880 on the grounds that it violates their rights such as
freedom of speech, of assembly, to form associations or societies.
More so, they question the forms of election campaigns enumerated
in the act.Facts:1. Congress passed a statute (RA 4880) which was
designed to maintain the purity and integrity of the electoral
process and calling a halt to the undesirable practice of prolonged
political campaigns, bringing in their wake serious evils not the
least of which is the ever-increasing cost of seeking public
office.2. Cabigao was an incumbent council in the 4th district of
Manila and the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the
position of Vice Mayor. He was subsequently elected to that
position. Meanwhile, Gonzales is a private individual, a registered
voter in the City, and a political leader.3. They claim that the
enforcement of RA 4880 would prejudice their basic rights such as
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and right to form
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law.
Specifically, they challenge the validity of two new sections
included in the Revised Election Code under RA 4880 which was
approved and took effect on June 17, 1967. The said sections
prohibit the too early nomination of candidates and limit the
period of election campaign and political activity. More so, after
defining the terms candidates and election campaign/partisan
political activity, the acts which constitute election campaign
were specified, and that simple expression of opinion and thoughts
concerning the election was not to be considered as part of an
election campaign. This prohibition was furthered by a proviso
which provided that nothing stated in the Act shall be understood
to prevent any person from expressing his views on current
political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the
candidates for public office whom he supports.4. The acts deemed
included in the terms election campaign of partisan political
activity are: (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs,
committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against
a party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign
or propaganda for or against a candidate; (c) making speeches,
announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against
the election of any party or candidate for public office; (d)
publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials; (e)
directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party; (f)
giving, soliciting, or receiving contribution for election campaign
purposes, either directly or indirectly.Ruling:1. The Court held
that the challenged statute cannot be declared unconstitutional on
several grounds. First, it is premature to challenge the statutes
validity. Second, the required number of votes was not met when the
Court deliberated on the scope of election campaigns or partisan
political activities. Precisely, the Court declared that RA 4880
could have been narrowly drawn and practices prohibited be more
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as
to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger
doctrine.2. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of
expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system.
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press. What does it embrace? At the very least, free speech and
free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or
punishment. There is to be then to previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel
suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages or contempt
proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.3. The vital
need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression is
undeniable whether as a means of assuring individual
self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation
by the people in social including political decision-making, and of
maintaining the balance between stability and change. The trend as
reflected in Philippine and American decisions is to recognize the
broadest scope and assure the widest latitude to this
constitutional guaranty. It represents a profound commitment to the
principle that debate of public issue should be uninhibited, robust
and wide-open. It is not going too far, according to another
American decision, to view the function of free speech as inviting
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces
a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger.4. Freedom of speech and of
the press thus means something more than the right to approve
existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend
support to official measures, to take refuge in the existing
climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence.5. From the
language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear
that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be
passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The
realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal
interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would
be too much to insist that, at all times and under all
circumstances, it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There
are other societal values that press for recognition.6. As for
freedom of assembly, the Bill of Rights as thus noted prohibits
abridgment by law of freedom of speech or of the press. The Bill of
Rights likewise extends the same protection to the rights of people
peaceably to assemble. As pointed in US v. Bustos, this right is a
necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements
the right of free speech. 7. Assembly means a right on the part of
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs. 8. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking
for the majority in Thomas v. Collins, it was not accident or
coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press
were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable.
They are cognate rights and assurance afforded by the clause of
this section of the Bill of Rights, wherein they are contained,
applies to all. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right
(right of people peaceably to assemble) is not to be limited, much
less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.9. Our
Constitution likewise recognizes the freedom to form association
for purposes not contrary to law. With or without a constitutional
provision of this character, it may be assumed that the freedom to
organize or to be a member of any group or society exists. With the
explicit provision, whatever doubts there may be on the matter are
dispelled. Unlike the cases of other guarantees, which are mostly
American in origin, this particular freedom has an indigenous cast
and could be traced to the Malolos Constitution.10. In a sense,
however, the stress on this freedom of association should be on its
political significance. If such a right were non-existent, then the
likelihood of a one-party government is more than a possibility.
Authoritarianism may become unavoidable. Political opposition will
simply cease to exist; minority groups may be outlawed,
constitutional democracy as intended by the Constitution may well
become a thing of the past.11. Nonetheless, the Constitution limits
this particular freedom in the sense that there could be an
abridgment of the right to form associations or societies when
their purposes are contrary to law. It is submitted that the phrase
for purposes not contrary to law is another way of expressing the
clear and present danger rule for unless an association or society
could be shown to create an imminent danger to public safety, there
is no justification for abridging the right to form associations or
societies.12. In considering whether Republic 4880 is violative of
the rights of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly and
freedom of association, the Court cannot ignore the legislative
declaration that its enactment was in response to a serious
substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in
danger of happening, but actually in existence, and likely to
continue unless curbed or remedied. To asset otherwise would be to
close ones eyes to the realities of the situation. Nor can we
ignore the express legislative purpose apparent in the proviso that
simple expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the elections
shall not be considered as part of an election campaign, and in the
other proviso that nothing herein stated shall be understood to
prevent any person from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates
for public office whom he supports. Such limitations qualify the
entire provision restricting the period of an election campaign or
partisan political activity.13. According to the act, [i]t shall be
unlawful for any political party, political committee or political
group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted
for at large earlier than 150 days immediately preceding an
election, and for any other elective public office earlier than 90
days immediately preceding an election. This provision affects the
right of association. Political parties have less freedom as to the
time during which they nominate candidates; the curtailment is not
such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their
scope of legitimate activities, save the above cited, is not unduly
narrowed. Neither is there such an infringement of their freedom to
assemble. They can do so, but not for such purpose. Thus, the Court
sustained its validity unanimously.14. On the one hand, it cannot
be denied that the limitations thus imposed on the constitutional
rights of free speech and press, of assembly, and of associations
cut deeply into their substance. On the other, it cannot be denied
either that evils, substantial in character, taint the purity of
the electoral process. The justification alleged by the proponents
of the measures weighs heavily with the members of the Court,
though in varying degrees, in the appraisal of the aforesaid
restrictions to which such precious freedoms are subjected. They
are not unaware of the clear and present danger that calls for
measures that may bear heavily on the exercise of the cherished
rights of expression, of assembly and of association.15. The Court,
with five justices unable to agree, is of the view that no
unconstitutional infringement exists insofar as the formation of
organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of
persons for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda or both for or against a candidate or party
is restricted and that the prohibition against giving, soliciting
or receiving contribution for election purposes, either directly or
indirectly, is equally free from constitutional infirmity.16. The
restriction on freedom of assembly as confined to holding political
conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or
other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or against a
candidate or party, leaving untouched all other legitimate exercise
of such poses a more difficult question. Nevertheless, the Court
rejected the contention that this should be annulled.17. The other
acts, likewise deemed included in election campaign or partisan
political activity tax, to the utmost, the judicial predisposition
to view with sympathy legislative efforts to regulate election
practices deemed inimical because of their collision with the
preferred right of freedom of expression. From the outset, such
provisions did occasional divergence of views among the members of
the Court. Originally, only a minority was for their being adjudged
as invalid. It is not so any more. This is merely to emphasize that
the scope of the curtailment to which freedom of expression may be
subjected is not foreclosed by the recognition of the existence of
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of
the electoral process.18. The majority of the Court is of the
belief that the ban on the solicitation or undertaking of any
campaign or propaganda, whether directly or indirectly, by an
individual, the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries
or holding interview for or against the election for any party or
candidate for public office, or the publication or distribution of
campaign literature or materials, suffers from the corrosion of
invalidity. However, to call for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, it lacks one more affirmative vote to that
effect.19. It is understandable for Congress to believe that
without the limitations set forth in the challenged legislation,
the laudable purpose of RA 4880 would be frustrated and nullified.
Whatever persuasive force such approach may command failed to
elicit the assert of a majority of the Court. This is not to say
that the conclusion reached by the minority that the above portions
of the statute now assailed has passed the constitutional test is
devoid of merit. It only indicates that for the majority, the
prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the
holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or
candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication
or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the
solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or that
undertaking of any campaign or propaganda for or against any
candidate or party, is repugnant to a constitutional command. To
that extent, the challenged statute prohibits what under the
Constitution cannot by any law be abridged.20. In terms of the
permissible scope of legislation that otherwise could be justified
under the clear and present danger doctrine, it is considered
opinion of the majority, though lacking the necessary vote for an
adjudication of invalidity, that the challenged statute could have
been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as
to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger
doctrine.21. It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. For precision of
regulation is the touchstone in an area so closely related to our
most precious freedoms.22. It is of the opinion that it would be
premature, to say at least, for a judgment of nullity of any
provision found in RA 4880. The need for adjudication arises only
if in the implementation of the Act, there is in fact an
unconstitutional application of its provisions. Santiago v. Far
East BroadcastingSantiago, the campaign manager of the Popular
Front Sumulong, asked Far East Broadcasting for the purchase of air
time for the broadcast of the political speeches delivered at the
Opera House. However, respondent would only do so if the party
submits in advance the complete manuscript of the speeches to be
delivered.Facts:1. Petitioner (Santiago), being the campaign
manager of the political party Popular Front Sumulong, asked
respondent (Far East Broadcasting) for the purchase of air time for
the broadcast of the partys political speeches at the Opera House
on September 3, 1941.2. However, respondent refused to do so except
should the party submit in advance the complete manuscript of
contemplated speeches. Because of this, petitioner questioned the
act of respondent in refusing to allow the use of its station for
broadcasting the speeches and constitutes unlawful censorship and a
violation of the freedom of speech guaranteed by our
Constitution.Ruling:1. It is clear from the laws and the
regulations adverted to that the respondent had the right to
require the petitioner to submit the manuscript of the speeches
which he intended to broadcast. 2. The Court failed to perceive the
cogency of such argument. It does not bolster up the case for the
petitioner. It impliedly admits that a speech that may endanger
public safety may be censored and disapproved for broadcasting. How
could the censor verify the petitioners claim that the speeches he
intended to broadcast offered no danger to public safety or pubic
morality, if the petitioner refused to submit the manuscript or
even its gist? If the petitioner had complied with respondents
requirement and the respondent had arbitrarily and unreasonably
refused to permit said speeches to be broadcasted, he might have
reason to complain.Primicias v. FugosoThe Coalesced Minority Party
applied for a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza
Miranda for purposes of petitioning the government for redress to
grievances. However, the City Mayor, founding his actions on
Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927, did not issue the
permit.Facts:1. The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit
for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on a Sunday
afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the
government for redress to grievances.2. However, the Mayor of the
City of Manila (Valeriano Fugoso) did not issue the permit. For
this purpose, the campaign manager of the party (Cipriano
Primicias) instituted this action for mandamus.3. Section 1119 of
the Revised Ordinances of 1927 provides the power of the City Mayor
of Manila to grant or issue permits for the holding of assembly or
meeting, parade or procession. Moreover, he would be able to
determine where to hold such activities.Ruling:1. The right to
freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal
rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions
of democratic countries. But, it is a settled principle growing out
of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of
those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it
shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which
is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare
of the people.2. Under Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of
1927 of the City of Manila, that the holding of athletic games,
sports or exercises during the celebration of national holidays in
any streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint
day of any district may be permitted provided that a permit be
issued by the Mayor who shall determine the streets, or public
places or portions thereof where said activities may be held. From
the Revised Ordinance of the City, there is no express and separate
provision regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at
any street or public places.3. As Section 1119 is susceptible to
two constructions: one, that the Mayor of the City is vested with
unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly or meeting in the streets and other
public places of the City, and second, that the applicant has the
right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only
to the latters reasonable discretion to determine or specify the
streets or public places to be used for the purpose, the Court
believed that it must adopt the second construction. It means that
the ordinance does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to
grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit,
to determine or specify the streets or public places where the
parade or procession may pass or the meeting be held.4. The other
alternative when adopted because it would mean that the Mayor has
the power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be
tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets
and other public places for holding of meetings, parades or
processions. Moreover, said construction would render the ordinance
invalid and void as it contravenes constitutional limitations.5.
The Mayor reasoned that, in granting the permit, the speeches
delivered in the meeting would undermine the faith and confidence
of the people in their government and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a
disruption of public order. In reiterating the pronouncements of
the US Supreme Court in Whitney v. California, [f]ear of serious
injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function
of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground
to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced.
There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent.Mutuc v. COMELECMutuc seeks to be a
delegate of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. In his campaigns,
he used political jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound
systems and loud speakers.Facts:1. Amelito Mutuc is a candidate for
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. In his making his
candidacy known, he used jingles in his mobile units equipped with
sound systems and loud speakers.2. By a telegram sent to him on
October 29, 1970, the COMELEC informed Mutuc that his certificate
of candidacy was given due course, but prohibited him from using
jingles in his mobile units. However, according to Mutuc, the said
order is violative of his constitutional right especially his
freedom to speech.3. However, COMELEC contends that the
justification for the prohibition was premised on the provision of
the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for
candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample
ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters,
fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes and
the like whether of domestic or foreign origin. More so, the
contention was that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is
the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material, under the above statute subject to
confiscation.Ruling:1. In unequivocal language, the Constitution
prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been
our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more
for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally
vital right of suffrage.2. What the COMELEC did, in effect, was to
impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this
constitutional right is directed. Nor could COMELEC justify its
action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to
taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others,
to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional
guarantee is not to be emasculate by confining it to a speaker
having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through
tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to
sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be
distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly
done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express
terms assures.3. Mutuc was allowed to use political taped
jingles.Navarro v. VillegasThe City Mayor offered the Sunken
Gardens, instead of Plaza Miranda, as venue for an
assembly.Facts:1. The Mayor of the City of Manila (Villegas)
expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful
assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays
when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the
normal activities of the community and has further offered Sunken
Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of
demonstration sought to be held that afternoon.2. The Mayor
believes that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as to compared to
one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more
imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace,
criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such
assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of
preventing such disorders.Ruling:1. Every time that such assemblies
are announced, the community is placed in such a state of fear and
tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed,
storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation
disrupted, to the general detriment of the public.2. Petitioner has
failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of Mayor to
grant petitioners application for permit unconditionally. Thus, the
Court denied the writ prayed for by Navarro and dismissed their
petition.Reyes v. BagatsingThe Anti-Bases Coalition planned to hold
a peaceful march and rally. It would start in Luneta Park and end
at the gates of the US Embassy. After the march, a program would
follow whereby two brief speeches were to be delivered. However,
the City Mayor did not act on the request of organization for
permit.Facts:1. Retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the
Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the City of Manila to
hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to
5:00 in the afternoon. The route is from the Luneta, a public park,
to the gates of the US Embassy which is two blocks away. The march
would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such
conference.2. A short program would be held after the march. During
the program, there would be a delivery of two brief speeches. After
which, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day
by the International Conference for General Disarmament, World
Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila,
would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its
personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the US
Ambassador.3. The Mayor of the City of Manila however intruded by
not acting on the request of the organization for permit. Rather,
he suggested with the recommendation of the police authorities that
a permit may be issued for the rally if it would be held at the
Rizal Coliseum. As such, Reyes, on behalf of the organization,
filed a suit for mandamus.Ruling:1. Reyes petition was granted.2.
The Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate
rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the
denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit that [n]o
law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances. Free speech,
like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without
censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint
on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in
libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or
contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.3. Freedom
of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is
entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and freedom of
expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the State has a right to prevent. It is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom
of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the State has a right to prevent.4. Even prior to the 1935
Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a
necessary consequence of our republican institutions and
complements the right of free speech.5. Reiterating the ruling in
Thomas v. Collins, the American Supreme Court held that it was not
by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and
of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of
the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for
redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are
inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation
placed on the exercise of the right, the judiciary is called upon
to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation.
The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this
right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic
institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health, of other legitimate public interest.6. What is guaranteed
by the Constitution is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate
disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under
the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult
attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and
outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not
required. As pointed out in US v. Apurado, [i]t is rather to be
expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly
of the people to protest against grievances whether real or
imaginary, because on such occasions, feeling is always wrought to
a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievances and the
more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the
disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible
followers. It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to
be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of
vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to ones destructive
urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the
high estate occupied by intellectual liberty is our scheme of
values.7. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so
as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their
use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an
individual or a group. If it were, then the freedom of access
becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection
question. The principle under American doctrines was given
utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: The question, if
the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be
preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is
held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the
speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the
freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.8. There could be
danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked
by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character.
Even then, only the guilty parties should be held accountable. It
is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not
devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would
be granted. While prudence requires that there be a realistic
appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably
occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption
especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public
place is that the permit must he for the assembly being held there.
The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberta,
speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be abridged on
the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.9. The
applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the
licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the
time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may
be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but
at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be
the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that
there is such an imminent sad grave danger of a substantive evil,
the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his
decision, whether favourable or adverse, must be transmitted to
them at the earliest opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have
recourse to the proper judicial authority.10. Free speech and
peaceable assembly, along with other intellectual freedom, are
highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be
too strongly stressed that on the judiciary even more so than on
the other departments rests the grave and delicate responsibility
of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No
verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with
what has been felicitously termed by Justice Holmes as the
sovereign prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption
must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side
of suds rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.Cabansag
v. FernandezCabansag wrote a letter to the Presidential Complaints
and Action Commission seeking for the fast resolution of his case
pending at the CFI of Pangasinan. Fernandez prayed that Cabansag be
declared in contempt of court for a line in his letter.Facts:1.
Petitioner (Apolonio Cabansag) sought for the ejectment of
Geminiana Fernandez from a parcel of land who, on the other end,
filed their answer and a motion to dismiss. Even though pleadings
were submitted, the hearings were suspended several times from 1947
to 1952.2. Upon President Magsaysays assumption in office and
creation of Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC),
Cabansag wrote the PCAC, a letter copy which he furnished the
Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the CFI of
Pangasinan. He claimed that the case which had been long been
pending be decided already. The Secretary of Justice indorsed the
said letter to the Clerk of CFI Pangasinan. 3. Counsel for
defendants (Atty. Manuel Fernandez) filed a motion before Judge
Morfe praying that Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an
alleged scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the PCAC when he
wrote thru the careful manoeuvres of a tactical lawyer.Ruling:1.
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right
on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. The
First Amendments of the Federal expressly guarantees that right
against abridgment by Congress. But mention does not argue
exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied
without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all civil and political
institutions principles which the 14th Amendment embodies in the
general terms of its due process clause.2. The freedom of the press
in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that
freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent
means of assuring judges their independence is a free press.3. Two
theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of
conflicting rights of similar import in an attempt to draw the
proper constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and
the independence of the judiciary. These are the clear and present
danger rule and the dangerous tendency rule. 4. The first as
interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence
of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be
punished. The danger to be guarded against is the substantive evil
sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the disorderly
and unfair administration of justice. This test establishes a
definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as
to what words maybe published. Under this rule, the advocacy of
ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear
and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice. The US Supreme Court has made the significant
suggestion that this rule is an appropriate guide in determining
the constitutionality of restriction upon expression where the
substantial evil sought to prevented by the restriction is
destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of
privacy. The Court furthers clear and present danger of substantive
evil as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial
proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high A public utterance or
publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of
freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial
proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in
such a case, it must be necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly
and fair administration of justice. The possibility of engendering
disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published criticism
of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify
impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and
press.5. As declared in Craig v. Harney, the US Supreme Court said
that the [f]reedom of speech and press should not be impaired
through the exercise of the punish for contempt of court unless
there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge may hold
in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make
him unpopular or to belittle him The vehemence of the language used
in newspaper publications concerning a judges decision is not alone
the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it
kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to
the administration of justice. Furthered in Pennekamp v. Florida,
[a]nd in weighing the danger of possible interference with the
courts by newspaper criticism against the right of free speech to
determine whether such criticism may constitutionally be punished
as contempt, it was ruled that freedom of public comment should in
borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to
influence pending cases. Thus, the question in every case,
according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree.6. The second, which is the dangerous tendency rule, has
been adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted in
determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of
courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy
to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in
that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right
to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the
Constitution, are not absolute. As held in Gilbert v. Minnesota,
[t]hey are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them
being the protection of the courts against contempt.7. As furthered
by the US Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New York, the dangerous
tendency rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered
create a dangerous tendency which the State has a right to prevent,
then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some
definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general
terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable
effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body seeks to prevent.8. It is a fundamental principle,
long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press,
which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute
right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may
choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives
immunity for every possible use of language, and prevents the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom. Reasonably limited, it
was said by story in the passage cited, this freedom is an
inestimable privilege in a free government; without such
limitation, it might become the scourge of the Republic.9. The
Court saw at once that it was far from Cabansags mind to put the
court in ridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it in the
eyes of those to whom the letter was addressed for. This is clearly
inferable from its context wherein, in respectful and courteous
language, Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when he said that he
has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful
manoeuvres of a tactical lawyer. Analyzing said utterances, one
would see that if they ever criticize, the criticism refers, not to
the court, but to opposing counsel whose tactical manoeuvres has
allegedly caused the undue delay of the case. The grievance or
complaint, if any, is addressed to the stenographers for their
apparent indifference in transcribing their notes.10. The only
disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the
motivating factor of the lodging of the contempt charge is the fact
that the letter was sent to the Office of the President, asking for
help because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. Such act
alone would not be contemptuous. To be so, the danger must cause a
serious imminent threat to the administration of justice. Nor can
the Court infer that such act has a dangerous tendency to belittle
the court or undermine the administration of justice for Cabansag
merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the
government for redress of a legitimate grievance.Ruiz v. GordonA
prayer rally and parade/march was to be conducted by petitioners.
They allege that the Mayor of Olongapo City, Gordon, did not act on
the matter.Facts:1. Petitioner (Ruiz) personally delivered to
respondent Mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) a letter
application which sought to request a permit to hold a prayer-rally
at the Rizal Triangle on December 4, 1983 from 1:00 pm to early
evening. Ruiz delivered the letter on behalf of the Olongapo
Citizens Alliance for National Reconciliation, Justice for Aquino
Justice for All, Concerned Citizen for Justice and Peace, Damdamin
Bayan na Nagkakaisa and United Nationalist Democratic
Organization.2. Aside from the holding of the prayer-rally, the
said groups sought to hold a parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the
Rizal Triangle starting at 1:00 pm. 3. In his manifestation,
respondent, among others written, mentioned in the Guardian that he
had granted the permit of the petitioner.Ruling:1. As shown both in
the manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus could
have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying
on November 23 whether or not a permit had been issued. A party
desirous of exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be
the one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a
request for a permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if
the day and time was designated for the decision of the request,
such part or his representative should be at the office of the
public official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the
decision reached, whether adverse or favourable, should be sent to
the address of petitioner. In that way, there need not be waste of
time and effort not only of the litigants but likewise of a court
from which redress is sought in case of a denial or modification of
a request for a permit.2. The petition is dismissed. The Court
deems it best to set forth the above to specify in more detail, the
steps necessary for the judicial protection of constitutional
rights with the least delay and inconvenience to the parties and
with the greater assurance that the factual background on which is
dependent the determination of whether or not the clear and present
danger standard has been satisfied.People v. PerezPerez uttered
phrases which called for the beheading of Wood in a discussion on
political matters.Facts:1. Respondent (Isaac Perez), while holding
a discussion with several persons on political matters in Pilar,
Sorsogon, uttered the phrases: Asin an mangna Filipinos na caparejo
co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo no Wood huli
can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot can Filipinas (and the
Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Woods head
for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines).2. Leonard
Wood was the Governor-General during that time, April 1, 1922. For
said phrases, Perez was accused for violating Article 256 of the
Penal Code.Ruling:1. It is our course fundamentally true that the
provisions of Act No. 292(Treason and Sedition Law) must not be
interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of
the people peaceably to assembly and petition the Government for
redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to
the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on
the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, is within the
range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be
seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is
seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and
press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures
designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the
supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of
the State.2. In the case at bar, the person maligned by the Accused
is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official
position, like the presidency of the US and other high offices,
under a democratic form of government instead of affording immunity
from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks.
But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the
furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More than a
figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency of
feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws. Being the representative of
the executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the
sovereign power, a seditious attack on the Governor-General is an
attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American
sovereignty.3. As a matter of fact, Section 8 of the same act
contemplates the said situation. For such reasons, Perez has
uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for
unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and one an act which
suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, which tended to stir
up the people against the lawful authorities, which tended to
disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the
Government.US v. BustosThe justice of peace filed a case against
numerous citizens of Pampanga after the latters case was dismissed.
They were charged for the libellous statements against him.Facts:1.
Numerous citizens of Pampanga assembled, prepared and signed a
petition to the Executive Secretary through Crossfiled & OBrien
charging respondent Roman Punsalan, justice of peace of Macabebe
and Masantol with malfeasance in office. Likewise, they ask for
Punsalans removal.2. Punsalan was charged for three specific
charges which happened to Francisca Polintan, Valentin Sunga and
Leoncio Quiambao. They allege that Punsalan used his position to
benefit from their legal needs like keeping Polintan as a servant
for 4 days aside from taking her two chickens and twelve gandus.3.
The case against the justice of peace was dismissed. Thus, Punsalan
filed criminal charges against defendants for the libellous
statements against him.Ruling:1. The interest of society and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men
is necessary for free speech. As held in Howarth v. Barlow, the US
Supreme Court declared that [t]he people are not obliged to speak
of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath
in a free government, but only in a despotism. Moreover, the
guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of law is a matter
of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot
criticize a justice of peace or a judge the same as any other
public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. It is a
duty which everyone owes to society or to the State to assist in
the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty
of all to know of any official dereliction on the part of the
magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the
facts to the notice of those whose duty is to inquire into and
punish them.2. The right to assemble and petition is a necessary
consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the
right of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can
apply without fear of penalty to the appropriate branch or office
of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons
assembling and petitioning must assume responsibility for the
charges made.3. The doctrine of privileged communications rests
upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice, through, as an incidental result, it
may, in some instances, afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and
malignant slanderer. 4. Qualified privilege which may be lost by
proof of malice. A communication made bona fide upon any subject
matter in which the party communicating has an interest or in
reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a
person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contain
criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous
and actionable. Even when the statements are found to be false, if
there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the
charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still
cover the mistake of the individual. Personal injury is not
necessary. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the
communication is made in intemperate terms. Finally, if a party
applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake
as to the respective functions of various officials, such an
unintentional error would not take the case out of the privilege.5.
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such
excessive scrutiny will defeat the protection which the law throws
over privileged communications. 6. A petition prepared and signed
at an assembly of numerous citizens including affidavits by five
individuals, charging a justice of peace with malfeasance in office
and asking for his removal, was presented through lawyers to the
Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to
the judge of first instance of the district. The judge of first
instance, after investigation, recommended to the Governor-General
that the justice of the peace filing a motion for new trial, the
judge of first instance ordered the suppression of the charges and
acquitted the justice of the peace. Criminal action was then begun
against the defendants, charging that portions of the petition
presented to the Executive Secretary was libellous. On a review of
the evidence, the Court finds that express malice was not proved by
prosecution. Good faith surrounded the action of the petitioners.
Their ends and motives were justifiable. The charges and the
petition were transmitted through reputable attorneys to the proper
functionary. The defendants are not guilty and instead of punishing
them for an honest endeavour to improve the public service, they
should rather be commended for their good citizenship. 7. It is
true that the particular words set out in the information, if said
of a private person, might well be considered libellous per se. The
charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one
of a libel of a government official. As a general rule, words
imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace of dishonesty or
corruption or incapacity or misconduct, touching him in his office
are actionable.Lagunzad v. Soto vda De GonzalesThe parties entered
into a licensing agreement for the filming of The Moises Padilla
Story. Soto vda. de Gonzales is the mother of Moises. Moises
half-sister objecred to the movie as it exploited Moises
life.Facts:1. Lagunzad and de Gonzales entered into a licensing
agreement for the former was filming The Moises Padilla Story.
Manuel Lagunzad was a newspaperman and, through his MML
Productions, began the production of the movie. The movie was based
on the book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr.s The Long Dank Night in
Negros.2. Although the focus on the film on the Moises life, there
were portions which dealt with his private and family life
including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto
Vda. De Gonzales.3. The movie was scheduled for a premiere showing
on October 16, 1961. Thirteen days prior to it, Moises half-sister,
Mrs. Nelly Amante, objected to the movie as it exploited Moises
life.Ruling:1. The Court neither finds merit in petitioners
contention that the Licensing Agreement infringes on the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in
that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he has a right to express
his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without
prior restraint. 2. The clear and present danger rule was applied.
In quoting Gonzales v. COMELEC, [t]he prevailing doctrine is that
the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another
criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of
the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio,
television and the movies, is the balancing-of-interests test. The
principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation.3. In the case at bar, the interests
observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the
right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into
account eh interplay of those interests, we hold that under the
particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations
assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the
validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly
because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.Ayer
Productions Pty Ltd. V. CapulongAyer Productions Pty Ltd. sought to
film the EDSA Revolution. They informed Enrile regarding the motion
picture and he wrote that he would not approve the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/ore exhibition of his name or
picture or that of any member of his family in any cinema.Facts:1.
Hal McElroy owns the production company, Ayer Productions Pty Ltd.
Through this movie production company, he intended to make a movie
that would depict the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos
at EDSA in a six hour mini-series.2. The proposed motion picture is
entitled The Four Day Revolution, and was endorsed by the Movie
Television Review and Classification Board as well as the other
government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified
his approval of the intended film production. Petitioner McElroy
had likewise informed Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion
picture, enclosing a synopsis of it.3. Enrile replied that he would
not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction
and/or exhibition of his name or picture or that of any member of
his family in any cinema or television production. Because of this,
petitioners deleted the name of Enrile in the movie script and
proceeded to film the projected motion picture. Despite of the
deletion, Enrile still sought to enjoin petitioners from producing
the movie, which was later on granted.Ruling:1. Petitioners claim
that in producing the The Four Day Revolution, they are exercising
their freedom of speech and of expression protected under the
Constitution. Private respondent, on the other hand, asserts a
right of privacy and claims that the production and filming of the
projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into
his privacy which he is entitled to enjoy.2. The freedom of speech
and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion
pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theatres or to
diffuse them through television. In our day and age, motion
pictures are a universally utilized vehicle of communication and
medium of expression.3. This freedom is available in our country
both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture
companies. Furthermore, the circumstance that the production of
motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom
of speech and of expression. Indeed, commercial media constitute
the bulk of such facilities available in our country and hence to
exclude commercially-owned and operated media from the exercise of
constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of expression can
only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional
liberties in our country.4. The production and filming by
petitioners of the projected motion picture does not constitute an
unlawful intrusion upon private respondents right of privacy. More
so, the motion picture is not principally about, nor is it focused
upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile, but it is compelled, if it is to
be historical, to refer to the role played by Enrile in the
precipitating and the constituent events of the change of
government.5. The privilege of enlightening the public is not
limited to the dissemination of news in the scene of current
events. It extends also to information or education, or even
entertainment and amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films
and broadcasts concerning interesting phases of human activity in
general, as well as the reproduction of the public scene in
newsreel and travelogues. In determining where to draw the line,
the courts were invited to exercise a species of censorship over
what the public may be permitted to read; and they were
understandably liberal in allowing the benefit of the doubt.6. The
line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and
the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement
that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and
historical in its presentation of events. There must, in other
words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting
the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution.
There must be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling
private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or
embarrassing personal facts. To the extent that the motion picture
limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent
in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and
reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the
intrusion into private respondents privacy cannot be regarded as
unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even
without a license from private respondent.People v. AlarconA
columnist of the Tribune published the copy of a letter in his
article. The letter is about the conviction of 52 tenants of a
hacienda.Facts:1. A letter signed by one Luis Taruc was addressed
to his Excellency, the President of the Philippines, and a copy of
which, having found its way to a columnist of the Tribune, was
quoted in an article of the said newspaper in its September 23,
1937 issue.2. The letter is about the charging and conviction of 52
tenants in Flroridablance, Pampanga for robbery in band because
they took each a few cavans of palay for which they issued the
corresponding receipts, from the bodega in the hacienda where they
are working. The letter furthers that the tenants have the right to
take the palay for their food as the hacienda owner has the
obligation to given them rations of palay for their maintenance and
their families to be paid with their share of their crop.3. For
this purpose, respondent was required to show cause on grounds of
contempt of court.Ruling:1. The elements of contempt by newspaper
publications are well-defined by the cases adjudicated in this as
in other jurisdictions. Newspaper publications tending to impede,
obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering
justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is
otherwise after cause has ended. It must clearly appear that such
publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the
administration of justice before the author of the publications
should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-important
duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a
pending case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once
the court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to
reconsider or amend it. That, the Court believes is the case at
bar, for here the Court has a concession that the letter complained
of was published after the CFI of Pampanga had decided the
aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and after that
decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that a
motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the accused
therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important
consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or modify
the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and
could not have been influenced by the question publication.2. It is
suggested that even if there had been nothing more pending before
the trial court, this still had jurisdiction to punish the accused
for contempt, for the rule that the publication scandalized the
court. The rule suggested, which has its origin at common law, is
involved in some doubt under modern English law and in the United
States, the weight of authority, however, is clearly to the effect
that comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted under our
constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press. Other
considerations argue against our adoption of the suggested holding.
As stated, the rule imported into this jurisdiction is that
newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily
punishable by the courts; that the rule is otherwise after the case
has ended. In at least two instances, this court has exercised the
power to punish for contempt on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle (Villavicencio v. Lukban), on the corrective
and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment (In re: Lozano and
Quevedo). Contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal offense,
and in considering the probate effects of the article alleged to be
contemptuous, every fair and reasonable interference consistent
with the theory of defendants innocence will be indulged, and where
a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to the guilt of one
of the constructive contempt for interfering with the due
administration of justice, the doubt must be resolved in his favour
and he must be acquitted.3. Respondent was acquitted.In re: Vicente
SottoAtty. Vicente Sotto, a member of the Congress, was frustrated
with how the Court interpreted the law he authored in a particular
case. In his letter, he mentioned that he would file a bill seeking
the reorganization of the Court.Facts:1. Vicente Sotto issued a
written statement, published in the Manila Times and other daily
newspapers of the locality, in connection with the Courts decision
in In re: Angel Parazo.2. Sotto is disappointed with how the Court
interpreted the Press Freedom Law, of which he is the author, in
the case of Angel Parazo. More so, he declared the incompetency of
narrow-mindedness of the majority of the Courts members. He
furthers that the only remedy for the deliberate narrow-mindedness
is to change the members of the Court.Ruling:1. Mere criticism or
comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness
of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith
may be tolerated; because if well-founded it may enlighten the
court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed but
if it is not well-taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no
way, influence the Court in reversing or modifying its decision.
Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as
statement that our decision is wrong or that our construction of
the intention of the law is not correct, because it is different
from what he, as proponent of the original bill, which became a law
had intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated, for it
could not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo
case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the
bill presented by the respondent was amended by both Houses of
Congress, and the clause unless the Court finds that such
revelation is demanded by the interest of the State was added or
inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by
any particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and not
that of the respondent must be the one to be determined by this
Court in applying said act.2. The respondent does not merely
criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was
then and still is pending reconsideration of the Parazo case. He
not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the
presentation of a bill in the next Congress reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to
seven, as to change the members of this Court which decided the
Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and
narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said
case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But, the respondent also attacks the
honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of
bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading
the administration of justice.3. It is true that the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to
its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press
and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true
sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and
the free exercise of the right of citizen, is the maintenance of
the independence of the judiciary. In the words of Justice Holmes
in US v. Sullens, [t]he administration of justice and the freedom
of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and
neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts
have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold
the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former
receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The
right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and
care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case
where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business
unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the
impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration
of justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted
power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to
proceed with the disposition if its business in an orderly manner
free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional
functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an
impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises
the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as
an unprejudiced tribunal.4. Sotto was found guilty of contempt of
Court; thus, fined of Php 1,000.In re: LauretaIlustre, whose case
before the Supreme Court was resolved against her favour, wrote to
the members of the First Division of the Court and threatened them.
Furthermore, she filed a complaint before the Tanodbayan.Facts:1.
Wenceslao Laureta is the counsel of Eva Ilustre. Ilustre wrote to
the members of the First Division of the Supreme Court, namely
Justices Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano. In her letter, she
threatened the members for their minute resolution which went
against her favour.2. She threatened the members that the entire
Filipino population would know the procedures in the Court and to
charge them, which she apparently did so. She filed an
affidavit-complaint before the Tanodbayan for having knowingly and
deliberately rendered with bad faith, an unjust extended Minute
Resolution.Ruling:1. The Court finds Ilustre has transcended the
permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment
of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed
to the individual Justices; in the language of the charges she
filed before the Tanodbayan; in her statements, conduct, acts and
charges against the Court and/or the official actions of the
Justices; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer
expect justice from the Court. The fact that said letters are not
technically considered pleadings nor the fact that they were
submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does
not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The
constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy
cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the
Court.Zaldivar v. SandiganbayanGonzales filed a motion for
reconsideration. He was found guilty of contempt of court and of
gross misconduct as an officer of the court and a member of the
bar.Ruling:1. The clear and present danger doctrine invoked by
respondents counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all
problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of
the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court
to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent
proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger
doctrine has been an accepted method for making out the appropriate
limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It
is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and
applied by courts.2. Under either the clear and present danger test
or the balancing-of-interest test, the Court believes that the
statements here made by Gonzales are of such a nature and were made
in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. It is important to point out
that the substantive evil which the Supreme Court has a right and
duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of
physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of
public order. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme
Court to confront and prevent a substantive evil consisting not
only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular
case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation
of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the
standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar
and officers of the court. The substantive evil here involved, in
other words, is not as palpable as a threat to public disorder or
rioting, but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching
in its implications for society.
US v. KottingerKottinger was charged for keeping for sale in the
raided store of Camera Supply Co. of obscene and indecent pictures.
The pictures revealed six different postures of non-Christian
inhabitants of the Philippines.Facts:1. The premises of Camera
Supply Co. at 110 Escolta, Manila was raided and subsequent to said
raid, post-cards were used as evidence against the manager of the
company (J.J. Kottinger).2. Kottinger was charged for keeping for
sale in the store of obscene and indecent pictures in violation of
Section 12 of Act No. 277. Act No. 277 is the Philippine Libel Law.
Section 12 made obscene or indecent publications as misdemeanours.
The pictures reveal six different postures of non-Christian
inhabitants of the Philippines, including the Bontoc Woman, Moros,
and Kalinga Girls, among others.Ruling:1. The word obscene and the
term obscenity may be defined as meaning something offensive to
chastity, decency, or delicacy. Indecency is an act against good
behaviour and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed by the
courts in determining whether a particular publication or other
thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt
those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene
may fall. Another test of obscenity is that which shocks the
ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.2. The Philippine
statute does not attempt to define obscenity or indecent pictures,
writings, papers or books. But the words obscene or indecent at
themselves descriptive. They are words in common use and every
person of average intelligence understands their meaning. Indeed,
beyond the evidence furnished by the pictures themselves, there is
but little scope for bearing on the issue of obscenity or
indecency. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend
upon the circumstances of the case.3. Obscene as used in the
Federal Statutes making it a criminal offense to place in the mails
any obscene, lewd, or lascivious publication, according to the US
Supreme Court and lesser Federal courts, signifies that form of
immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, and has the same
meaning as is given at common law in prosecutions for obscene
libel.4. The pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in
native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in
which they live, are not obscene or indecent within the meaning of
the Libel Law. The pictures in question merely depict persons as
they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in
unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine
community, the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines,
would not be shocked by photographs of this type. The court is
convinced that the post-card pictures in this case cannot be
characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul or filthy.Gonzales
v. KatigbakThe Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television,
upon condition that certain parts be changed and removed,
classified the motion picture Kapit sa Patalim as for adults
only.Facts:1. The motion picture Kapit sa Patalim was classified
For Adults Only. As such, the president of the Malaya Films (Jose
Antonio Gonzales) questioned the scope of the power of the Board of
Review for Motion Pictures and Television and how it should be
exercised. The chairman of the said board is Maria Kalaw Katigbak
and Gen. Wilfredo Estrada as its vice-chairman.2. In classifying
the said movie as For Adults Only, there must be made certain
changes and deletions enumerated. For this purpose, a petition for
certiorari was filed.Ruling:1. Motion pictures are important both
as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of
the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people
of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the
prevailing cultural traits are considerable. Nor as pointed out in
Burstyn v. Wilson is the importance of motion pictures as an organ
of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to
entertain as well as to inform. There is no clear dividing line
between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such
distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic
right to free expression.2. Press freedom, as stated in the opinion
of the Court in Reyes v. Bagatsing, may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
concern without censorship or punishment. This is not to say that
such freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be
limited if there be a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the State has a right to prevent.3. Censorship or
previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech or
free press. As early as 1909, in the case of US v. Sedano, a
prosecution for libel, the Supreme Court already made clear that
freedom of the press consists in the right to print what one
chooses without any previous license.4. It is the opinion of the
Court that to avoid an unconstitutional taint on its creation, the
power of respondent Board is limited to the classification of
films. It can, to safeguard other constitutional objections,
determine what motion pictures are for general patronage and what
may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only.
That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the
rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior
restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against
its validity.5. The test to determine whether freedom of expression
may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a
substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such
danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no
doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there
must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time
element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be
only probable. There is the require of its being well-nigh (almost)
inevitable. The basic postulate is that where the movies,
theatrical productions, radio scripts, television programs, and
other such media of expression are concerned included that they are
in freedom of expression censorship, especially so if an entire
production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest. There is merit to the observation of Justice Douglas that
every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what medium of
expression he may use, should be freed from the censor.6. It is the
consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less
liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike
motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television
reaches every home where there is a set. Children then likely will
be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. It cannot
be denied that the State as parens patriae is called upon to
manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.7. The
petition was dismissed because the enough number of votes was not
mustered.People v. Go PinGo Pin held an exhibition of what was
alleged to be indecent and/or immoral pictures in a recreational
center.Facts:1. Go Pin, a Chinese citizen, exhibited at the Globe
Arcade in Manila, a recreational center, a large number of one-real
16 mm films about 100 feet in length each, which are allegedly
indecent and/or immoral. He pleaded not guilty at first but when
allowed to change his plea, he did so.Ruling:1. Paintings and
pictures of women in the nude, including sculptures of the at kind
are offensive to morals where they are made and shown not for the
sake of art but profit would commercial purposes, that is, when
gain and profit would appear to be the main, if not the exclusive
consideration in their exhibition, and the case of art only of
secondary or minor importance.2. If such pictures, sculptures and
paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause
of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested in art,
there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here in
question were used not exactly for arts sake but rather for
commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic
qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the
cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit
would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive
consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising
if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance
fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and
persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions
and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but
rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and
taste, and lust, and for love for excitement, including the youth
who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and
shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these
pictures.3. The decision is affirmed.Dela Cruz v. ElaMembers of the
Jehovahs Witnesses applied for a permit from the Mayor of Sta.
Cruz, Zambales in order to hold a public meeting with a kiosk at
the public plaza. It was granted by the Mayor however specified
that they hold the meeting at the north-western part of the plaza.
Facts:1. Members of the Jehovahs Witnesses sought to hold a public
meeting at the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, together with
the kiosk on such date and time. As such, they applied for a permit
from the respondent Mayor (Norberto Ela).2. In his answer, Ela
stated that he had not refused the request of the petitioners to
hold a religious meeting at the public plaza as he gave them
permission to use the north-western part of the plaza on the said
date (July 27, 1952). However, the members of the Jehovahs
Witnesses declined to avail of it. As such, petitioners brought an
action to compel Ela to issue a permit.Ruling:1. The right to
freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by
our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order
that it may not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community
or society, and this power may be exercised under the police power
of the State.2. It is true that there is no law nor ordinance which
expressly confers upon respondents the power to regulate the use of
the public plaza, together with this kiosk, for the purposes for
which it was established, but such power may be exercised under his
broad powers as chief executive in connection with his duty to
issue orders relating to the police or to public safety within the
municipality (Section 2194(c) of the Revised Administrative Code).
And it may even be said that the above regulation has been adopted
as an implementation of the constitutional provision which
prohibits any public property to be used, directly or indirectly,
by any religious denomination.3. The power exercised by the
respondent cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary
considering the peculiar circumstances of this case. It appears
that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a
short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of
said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part of the
authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order, or the
happening of untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to
prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious denomination as a
place of meeting of its members. This was the policy adopted by
respondent for sometime previous to the request made by the
petitioners.US v. ApuradoSeveral individuals compelled the members
of the municipal council to dismiss several officials and replace
them with the people they had recommended.Facts:1. A large number
of individuals assembled about the building of San Carlos,
Occidental Negros, crowded into the council chamber and demanded
the dismissal from office of the municipal treasurer, the municipal
secretary and the chief of police, and the substitution in their
places of new officials who were suggested by the spokesman of the
party. This was done upon the opening of the session by the
municipal council.2. The council, even though the persons who took
part in the movement where wholly unarmed except that a few carried
canes, acceded to their wishes and drew up a formal document
setting out the reasons for its actions, which was signed by the
councillors present. Moreover, the crowd was fairly orderly and
well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into the council
chamber during a session of that body. The cause of such movement
was that the members of the movement believed that said officials
whom they want dismissed have outspoken allegiance to one of the
factions into which the town was at that time divided.3. Apurado,
together with several individuals, was convicted of the crime of
sedition.Ruling:1. It is rather to be expected that more or less
disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest
against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such
occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement,
and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the
less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the
leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution
be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly
conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to
characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising
against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition
for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and
the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in
the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part
therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the
purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing
to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct
occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought
out and punished therefore, but the utmost discretion must be
exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious
conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a
tumultuous uprising.2. The evidence does not establish the guilt of
the accused.Malabanan v. RamentoStudent leaders at the Gregorio
Araneta University, after holding the meeting, marched towards the
Life Science building using megaphones and giving utterance to
language severely critical of the school authorities. Classes were
disturbed while the non-academic personnels work was interrupted.
Facts:1. Petitioners organized a meeting, being officers of the
Supreme Student Council of Gregorio Araneta University Foundation.
They were granted the permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 a.m. to
12:00 p.m. on August 27, 1982 at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal
Science basketball court. However, they held the general assembly
at the second floor lobby of the VMAS, contrary to what is stated
in the permit.2. During the gathering, they manifested their
opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal
Science with the Institute of Agriculture, in a vehement and
vigorous language.3. After the assembly, at around 10:30 a.m., they
marched toward the Life Science building and continued their rally,
using megaphones and giving utterance to language severely critical
of the University authorities. As a result, classes were disturbed
aside from the work of non-academic employees within hearing
distance.4. The petitioners were placed under preventive suspension
for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in
front of the Life Scie