Digests

Ricardo Cheng vs. Ramon B. Genato, Ernesto R. Da Jose and Socorro B. Da JoseG.R. No. 129760 [December 29, 1998] Martines, J.Facts:Respondent Ramon B. Genato is the owner of two parcels of land located at Paradise Farms, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan with an aggregate area of 35,821square meters. He entered into an agreement with respondent-spouses Ernesto R. Da Jose and Socorro B. Da Jose over the stated two parcels of land. The agreement concluded in the execution of a contract to sell for which the purchase price was P80.00 per square meter. The contract was in a public instrument and was duly annotated at the back of the two certificates of title on the same day.Da Jose spouses, not having finished verifying the titles asked for and was granted by respondent Genato an extension of another 30 days. However, according to Genato, the extension was granted on condition that a new set of documents is made seven days from October 4, 1989. This was denied by the Da Jose spouses.Pending the effectivity of the extension period, and without due notice to the Da Jose spouses, Genato executed an Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell. Likewise, no annotation of the said affidavit at the back of his titles was made right away.Petitioner Ricardo Cheng went to Genato's residence and expressed interest in buying the subject properties. On that occasion, Genato showed to Ricardo Cheng copies of his transfer certificates of title and the annotations at the back thereof of his contract to sell with the Da Jose spouses. Genato also showed him the Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell which has not been annotated at the back of the titles. Regardless of the same, Cheng went ahead and issued a check for P50,000.00 upon the assurance by Genato that the previous contract with the Da Jose spouses will be annulled for which Genato issued a handwritten receipt.Genato deposited Cheng's check. On the same day, Cheng called up Genato reminding him to register the affidavit to annul the contract to sell. The following day Genato caused the registration of the Affidavit to Annul the Contract to Sell in the Registry of Deeds, Meycauayan, Bulacan.Da Jose spouses they met Genato by coincidence at the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Da Jose spouses discovered about the affidavit to annul their contract. The latter were shocked at the disclosure and protested against the rescission of their contract. They were willing and able to pay the balance of the agreed down payment, later on in the day, Genato decided to continue the Contract he had with them. The agreement to continue with their contract was formalized in a conforme letter.Thereafter, Ramon Genato advised Ricardo Cheng of his decision to continue his contract with the Da Jose spouses and the return of Cheng's P50,000.00 check. Consequently, Cheng's lawyer sent a letterto Genato demanding compliance with their agreement and threatening legal action.Genato sent a letter to Cheng enclosing a BPI Cashier's Check for P50,000.00 and expressed regret for his inability to "consummate his transaction" with him. After having received the letter, Cheng returned the said check to the former via RCPI telegramreiterating that "our contract to sell your property had already been perfected." Cheng executed an affidavit of adverse claimand had it annotated on the subject TCT's.Cheng filed a complaintfor specific performance to compel Genato to execute a deed of sale to him of the subject properties plus damages and prayer for preliminary attachment. In his complaint, Cheng averred that the P50,000.00 check he gave was a partial payment to the total agreed purchase price of the subject properties and considered as an earnest money for which Genato acceded. Thus, their contract was already perfected.The lower court ruled that the receipt issued by Genato to Cheng unerringly meant a sale and not just a priority or an option to buy.On appeal to the Courtof Appeals, it reversed the said judgment and ruled that the prior contract to sell in favor of the Da Jose spouses was not validly rescinded. The subsequent contract to sell between Genato and Cheng, embodied in the handwritten receipt, was without force and effect due to the failure to rescind the prior contract and that Cheng should pay damages to the respondents being found to be in bad faith.Issue:Whether or not the Da Jose spouses' Contract to Sell has been validly rescinded or resolvedWhether or not Ricardo Cheng's own contract with Genato was not just a contract to sell but one of conditional contract of sale which gave him better rights, thus precluding the application of the rule on double sales under Article 1544, Civil CodeHeld:The petition must be denied for no reversible error can be ascribed to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there was no valid and effective rescission or resolution of the Da Jose spouses Contract to Sell, contrary to petitioner's contentions and the trial court's erroneous ruling.1. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code cannot be made to apply to the situation in the instant case because no default can be ascribed to the Da Jose spouses since the 30-day extension period has not yet expired. The Da Jose spouses' contention that no further condition was agreed when they were granted the 30-days extension period from October 7, 1989 in connection with clause 3 of their contract to sell dated September 6, 1989 should be upheld. Genato could have sent at least a notice of the affidavit to annul the contract to sell, there being no stipulation authorizing him for automatic rescission, so as to finally clear the encumbrance on his titles and make it available to other would be buyers.2. The records of this case are replete with admissionsthat Cheng believed it to be one of a Contract to Sell and not one of Conditional Contract of Sale. But even if we are to assume that the receipt is to be treated as a conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force since it was subject to suspensive condition that the earlier contract to sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should first be cancelled or rescinded a condition never met, as Genato, to his credit, upon realizing his error, redeemed himself by respecting and maintaining his earlier contract with the Da Jose spouses.

Danao Coal Mining Syndicate, Ltd. vs. Cenon LaurenteG.R. No. L-20075 [November 27, 1968] Reyes, J.Facts:Transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 7567) covered a parcel of land situated in Camansi, Danao, Cebu. The same was issued in 1928 by the Register of Deeds of Cebu in favor of H. M. H. Nemazee, the proprietor of the original applicant, Danao Coal Mining Syndicate, Ltd.In a quitclaim deed, the heirs of Nemazee transferred and quitclaimed in favor of Southwestern University their rights, title, interest and participation in, including their mining and leasehold rights over, subject land.Southwestern University petitioned the lower court to order: (1) the cancellation of the annotation of encumbrances on the ground that the condition and agreement constituting the same were cancelled and rendered inoperative by the outbreak of World War II as well as by the death of all the listed beneficiaries thereof; (2) the registration of the quitclaim deed; and (3) the cancellation of TCT No. 7567 itself, and issuance of a new certificate of title in its name. The petition was immediately granted and a new certificate of title (TCT No. RT-2164) was thereafter issued in favor of Southwestern University.Cenon Laurente moved for reconsideration of the order of cancellation, specifically of the second portion of the annotation of encumbrances in question. He alleged that Southwestern University had filed an ejectment suitbefore another branch of the same court against him and several other occupants of the land covered by TCT No. 7567, over which land, he claimed, he might possibly have an interest as a purchaser of a certain parcel of land situated also in Camansi, Danao, Cebu, from Filomeno del Mar, one of the persons in whose favor "the use of occupancy of the surface of the ... land" covered by said TCT No. 7567 was reserved. Laurente thus argued that the cancellation of the annotation of the incumbrance in favor of Filomeno del Mar and others should not have been ordered without giving notice, at least through publication, to the parties who, like him, being a successor-in-interest of said Filomeno del Mar, might thereby be adversely affected. Laurente's alleged interest was, however, never registered.The motion for reconsideration was denied reasoning that inasmuch as the law specifically provides notice to parties in interest, such notice if any, should be limited to the parties listed or annotated on the certificate of title. Hence,if such parties are already dead, as had been alleged and substantiated by petitioner Southwestern University, thennotice to said parties would be superfluous or notice would not be necessary. The Court acting within its limited jurisdiction as a Court of Land Registration, can only act on what appears on the face of the certificate of title, and cannot go beyond what appears therein as movant Cenon Laurente would now want this Court to believe. Notice by Publication is not necessary in connection with the petition which has been duly filed in accordance with Section 112 of Act 496.Granting that the use and occupancy which was annotated in the certificate of title is a real right which could be transferred or disposed of by the person named in the certificate of title to a third person (Cenon Laurente), the lattershould have taken the precaution of having his right annotatedon said (certificate of title).His failure to do so is therefore fatal, in the sense that this Court cannot consider him as a party in interest who is entitled to noticebefore the petition for cancellation of encumbrance could be acted upon.Issue:Whether or not court erred in denying the motion for reconsideration filed by a third person whose interest, purportedly, might have been prejudiced by the cancellationHeld:No. Cancellation of registered interests that have terminated and ceased may be ordered by the land registration court under the Land Registration Act. The new owner, Southwestern University, of the land herein involved took the right step by petitioning the court under said section to have the registered interests the deceased persons' rights of use and occupancy of the surface of said land ordered cancelled on the ground that the same had terminated and ceased. Notice was no longer necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the petition insofar as the second portion of the annotation of encumbrances was concerned. With the death of all the registered adverse claimants thereof, there were no more parties in interest to be notified.Appellant Laurente was not and cannot now be considered a party in interest entitled to notice. He was a stranger representing no adverse claim as to render the petition for cancellation controversial and, thereby, divest the lower court of its jurisdiction. The cancellation of the right of the persons recorded as entitled to use and occupancy of the surface of the landis too vague and unsubstantial to give him standing to claim right to notice or to contest the order of cancellation. Before a claimant can be considered as possessing a genuine adverse interest that would deprive the Registration Court of jurisdiction to proceed in the absence of notice to him, there must be a showing of theprima facietruth and validity of such adverse interest. Laurente has failed to make such a showing. His motion merely speaks of apossibilityof being prejudiced.

Apolinio Egao and Beatriz Egao vs. Court of Appeals, Severo Dignos and Severo BontilaoG.R. No. L-79787 [June 29, 1989] Padilla, J.Facts:Private respondents filed an action Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Possession and Ownership before the RTC of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon,against petitioners Apolonio and Beatriz Egao. They alleged that they are the legitimate owners and possessors of two parcels of land situated at Lonocan, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, per deed of absolute sale. Upon purchase of the lot from Roberto Marfori, improvements were introduced and taxes paid by private respondents. Sometime in June 1983, petitioners allegedly occupied illegally portions of the land.In their answer, petitioner claims that Apolonio Egao is the registered owner of the parcel of land evidenced by OCT No. P-3559 issued by the Register of Deeds of Bukidnon pursuant to Free Patent No. 298112 dated 12 August 1965. He also claim that the land has never been sold by reason of the prohibition against alienation under Commonwealth Act No. 141The Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered respondent Severo Bontilao to immediately deliver to the Egaos the owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No. P-3559.Private respondents went to the Court of Appeals and the same set aside the RTC decision.Issue:Whether or not the respondents has a right over the disputed land, they being the transferees of MarforiHeld:No. It clearly appears that all deeds were executed within the prohibited period of five years. Respondents who are not innocent purchasers for value have no standing to question petitioners' right to the land and to file an action for quieting of title.An "innocent purchaser for value" is deemed, under the Torrens system, to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrancer for value.Where a purchaser neglects to make the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases the property without making any further investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith for value.The rule ofpari delicto non oritur actio(where two persons are equally at fault neither party may be entitled to relief under the law), admits of exceptions and does not apply to an inexistent contract, such as, a sale voidab initiounder the Public Land Act, when its enforcement or application runs counter to the public policy of preserving the grantee's right to the land under the homestead law.

Pacifico Garcia vs. Benjamin Gozon, et al.G.R. Nos. L-48971 & 49011 [January 22, 1980] Aquino, J.Facts:A deed of sale for two parcels of land of the Hacienda Maysilo, located in Malabon, Rizal and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 983, was executed in favor of Ismael Lapus abona fideoccupant thereof. The deed was executed pursuant to an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 391,Negao vs. Vidal, a partition proceeding involving the said hacienda.The deed of sale was presented for registration and was recorded as Primary Entry No. 7710. However, the deed of sale was not annotated on OCT No. 983 and that title was apparently not cancelled.As a result of the registration of that deed of sale, Transfer Certificate of 'Title No. 4910 was issued to Lapus for the two parcels of land and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4911 was issued for the remaining five lots covered by OCT No. 983.Lapus on different occasions mortgaged the two parcels of land to secure his obligations to the PNB, the Government and the Philippine Trust Company. He died in 1951. The two parcels of land were inherited by his daughter, Carolina Lapuz-Gozon. She became the registered owner of the two lots. She subdivided them into 55 lots. She sold some of the subdivision lots to her co-respondents-appellees herein. Lapus and his successors-in-interest have been in possession of the two parcels even before 1910.In 1962, the alleged heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal filed a motion in Land Registration alleging that they were deprived of their participation in the Hacienda Maysilo covered by OCT No. 983 and for other titles and that, since only OCT No. 983 was supposedly unencumbered, all the land covered by that title should be adjudicated to them. The court granted the motion notwithstanding the fact that OCT No. 983 appears to have remained uncancelled although the sale to Lapus of two parcels covered by it and the fact that it had been replaced by TCT Nos. 4910 and 4911.On June 7, 1963, OCT No. 983 was definitely cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 112236 was issued to the Riveras. Later, Lots 5 and 7 of the said title were assigned by Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz and Pacifico Garcia and TCT Nos. 112743 and 112742 were issued to Cruz and Garcia, respectively. Thus, two sets of transfer certificates of title for Lots E and G or 5 and 7, originally covered by OCT No. 983, were issued, one to the heir of Ismael Lapus and another set to the successors-in-interest of the Riveras.On October 22, 1964, Garcia subdivided Lot 7 (G) into Lots A and B. As a consequence of the assignment, TCT No. 112742 was cancelled and TCT No. 134957 was issued to Muoz. In 1965, he mortgaged Lot B to the Associated Banking Corporation to secure a loan of P200,000.On July 17, 1964 Cruz sold to Santiago Go Lot 5 (E). Go mortgaged Lot 6 to PNB to secure a loan of P50,000 which was later increased to P60,000.Muoz and Go did not pay their mortgage debts. The two banks foreclosed the mortgages. The PNB bought the mortgaged lot at the auction sale. The sheriff issued to it a certificate of sale but at that time there was already a notice oflis pendensannotated on the title of the mortgaged lot. TCT Nos. 212163 and 236881 for the mortgaged lots were issued to the Associated Banking Corporation and PNB, respectively.Gozon later learned that the Riveras had acquired the land. Her lawyer and a surveyor informed her that parcels E and G, which she inherited from her father, were identical to Lots 5 and 7 which were conveyed to Cruz and Garcia. She registered adverse claims on the titles covering Lots 5 and 7. On December 27, 1965 she and the persons to whom she had transferred portions of parcels E and G filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City against the Riveras, Cruz, Muoz, Garcia, Associated Banking Corporation, PNB and others an action to quiet title and for damages.The trial court in its decision declared valid TCT Nos. 141802 to 141855 and 143512 issued to Mrs. Gozon and her co-plaintiffs. It voided TCT No. 112235 issued to the Riveras and all titles and transactions emanating therefrom insofar as those titles covered the lots embraced in plaintiffs' titles.On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.Issue:Whether or not the1920title issued to Lapus and the titles derived therefrom should prevail over the1963title issued to the Riveras and the subsequent titles derived from itHeld:Yes. The title of Lapus and the titles derived therefrom should be given effect. The title of the Riveras and the titles springing from it are void. Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value. He validly transmitted to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title or ownership over the disputed lots. That title could not be nullified by the issuance 43 years later to other persons of another title over the same lots due to the failure of the register of deeds to cancel the title preceding the title issued to Lapuz. This must be so considering that Lapus and his interest remained in possession of the disputed successors in lots and the rival claimants never possessed the same.It is settled that is this jurisdiction the maximprior est in tempore, potior est in jure(he who is first in time is preferred in right) is followed in land registration matters.

People of the Philippines vs. Mizpah ReyesG. R. No. 74226-27 [July 27, 1989] Cortes, J.Facts:The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land located in Lipa City registered in their names under TCT No. T-7471. They were survived by the following children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes and the complainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R. Vergara and Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City that the said property had already been transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes under TCT No. T-9885 effected through a notarized deed of sale executed and signed on by their parents Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo. The deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on May 26, 1961. Upon examination of the document, they found that the signatures of their parents were falsified and that accused also made an untruthful statement that she was single although she was married. The document was referred by the complainants to the N.B.I. for examination of the signatures of their parents and a report was returned with the finding that the signature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia Pampo was forged. Upon complaint, the fiscal filed with the RTC of Batangas, 2 Informations both for falsification of public document, the first for allegedly making it appear in the notarized deed of sale that Patricia Pampo, the mother of the accused, participated in the sale of a parcel of land by falsifying Pampo's signature, and the second for allegedly making an untruthful statement of fact in the deed of sale by stating that accused was single.Accused filed a motion to quash both informations on grounds that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription of the crime and the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the person of accused because of non-compliance with the pre-conciliation requirement of P.D. No. 1508. The trial court granted the motion.On appeal, the decision was affirmed.Issue:Whether or not the discovery of the crime may be deemed to have taken place from the time the document was registered with the Register of Deeds, consistent with the rule on constructive noticeHeld:No. Registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains.The Court does not subscribe to the conclusion that the presumptions and rules of interpretation used in the law on prescription of civil suits, including the rule on constructive notice, cannot be applied in criminal actions.The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a public document having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged has prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's order quashing the two informations on the ground of prescription.

Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-40824 [February 23, 1989] Regalado, J.Facts:Private respondents, spouses Isabelo R. Racho, together with the spouses Flaviano Lagasca, executed a deed of mortgage in favor of GSISand subsequently, another deed of mortgage in connection with two loans granted by the latter in the sums of P 11,500.00 and P 3,000.00, respectively.A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 38989 of the Register of Deed of Quezon City, co-owned by said mortgagor spouses, was given as security under the aforesaid two deeds.On July 11, 1961, the Lagasca spouses executed an "Assumption of Mortgage" where they obligated themselves to assume the aforesaid obligation to the GSIS and to secure the release of the mortgage covering that portion of the land belonging to herein private respondents and which was mortgaged to the GSIS. This undertaking was not fulfilled.Upon failure of the mortgagors to comply, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and caused the mortgaged property to be sold at public auction.More than two years thereafter, herein private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner and the Lagasca spouses in the former Court of First Instance of Quezon City,praying that the extrajudicial foreclosure be declared null and void. It was further prayed that they be allowed to recover said property, and/or the GSIS be ordered to pay them the value thereof, and/or they be allowed to repurchase the land. Private respondents alleged that they signed the mortgage contracts not as sureties or guarantors for the Lagasca spouses but they merely gave their common property to the said co-owners who were solely benefited by the loans from the GSIS.The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for failure to establish a cause of action. However, such decision was reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals.Issue:Whether or not private respondents are liable under the mortgage contractHeld:Yes. Contrary to the holding of the respondent court, it cannot be said that private respondents are without liability under the aforesaid mortgage contracts.So long as valid consent was given, the fact that the loans were solely for the benefit of the Lagasca spouses would not invalidate the mortgage with respect to private respondents' share in the property. In consenting thereto, their share in the property shall nevertheless secure and respond for the performance of the principal obligation. The parties to the mortgage could not have intended that the same would apply only to the aliquot portion of the Lagasca spouses in the property, otherwise the consent of the private respondents would not have been required.The supposed requirement of prior demand would not matter since the mortgage contracts created obligations with specific terms for the compliance thereof. The facts further show that the private respondents expressly bound themselves as solidary debtors in the promissory note hereinbefore quoted.On the extrajudicial foreclosure effected by GSIS, respondent court erred that lack of notice to the private respondents of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale impairs the validity thereof. There is no showing that the foregoing requirement on notice was not complied with in the foreclosure sale complained of .The respondent court erred in annulling the mortgage insofar as it affected the share of private respondents or in directing reconveyance of their property or the payment of the value thereof Indubitably, whether or not private respondents herein benefited from the loan, the mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were valid.

Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita Sajonas vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 102377 [July 5, 1996] Torres, Jr., J.Facts:Spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the petitioners on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell. The property was registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses. Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property, which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after.Domingo Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed a case for collection of sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. A Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties in the said case under which Ernesto Uychocde acknowledged his monetary obligation to Domingo Pilares. When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking, Pilares moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to which the court granted. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued by the CFI of Quezon City where the civil case was pending. Pursuant to the order of execution, a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985 where defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.When the deed of absolute sale was registered, TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was issued in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title. Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon city, hence the auction sale of the subject property did not push through as scheduled.Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon Pilares. Despite said demand, Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation. In view thereof, petitioners filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal against Domingo Pilares, the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes.The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Sajonas couple, and ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.On appeal, appellate court reversed the lower court's decision, and upheld the annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of title.Issue:Whether or not the petitioners has a better right over the property in questionHeld:Yes. The adverse claim provision in Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) does not provide for a period of effectivity of the annotation of an adverse claim. P.D. No. 1529, however, now specifically provides for only 30 days. If the intention of the law was for the adverse claim to remain effective until cancelled by petition of the interested party, then said provision in P.D. No. 1529 stating the period of effectivity would not have been inserted in the law.Since the adverse claim was annotated on August 27, 1984, it was effective only until September 26, 1984. Hence, when the defendant sheriff annotated the notice of levy on execution on February 12, 1985, said adverse claim was already ineffective. It cannot be said that actual or prior knowledge of the existence of the adverse claim on the Uychocdes' title is equivalent to registration inasmuch as the adverse claim was already ineffective when the notice of levy on execution was annotated. Thus, the act of defendant sheriff in annotating the notice of levy on execution was proper and justified.To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.

Benita Salao, et al. vs. Juan Salao, et al.G.R. No. L-26699 [March 16, 1976] Aquino, J.Facts:Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao. There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part of Manuel Salao's estate, if any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized on May 22, 1919. The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in representation of his deceased father.The documentary evidence proves that prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two children, Juan and Ambrosia, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a 47 hectare fishpond. It is also known as Lot No. 540 of the Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao later became a part of Bataan.The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.Juan and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital is not shown in any documentary evidence. Plaintiffs' version is that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no documentary evidence to support that theory.On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of lands purchased by Juan and Ambrosia in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908.After Juan and Ambrosia secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 they exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao.On December 1, 1911 Ambrosia Salao sold underpacto de retrofor P800 the Calunuran fishpond to Vicente Villongco. The period of redemption was one year. In the deed of sale Ambrosia confirmed that she and her brother Juan were thedueos proindivisosof the saidpesqueria.On December 7, 1911 Villongco, the vendee a retro, conveyed the same fishpond to Ambrosia by way of lease.After the fishpond was redeemed from Villongco, Ambrosia and Juan sold it underpacto de retroto Eligio Naval. The period of redemption was also one year. The fishpond was later redeemed and Naval reconveyed it to the vendorsa retroin a document.The Calunuran fishpond has an area of 479,205 square meters and that it was claimed by Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao, while the Pinanganacan fishpond (subsequently acquired by Juan and Ambrosia) has an area of 975,952 square meters (Exh. 22).Ambrosia Salao bought from the heirs of Engracio Santiago a parcel of swampland planted tobacawanand nipa.The record of Civil Case No. 136, General Land Registration Office Record No. 12144, Court of First Instance of Pampanga shows that Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao filed an application for the registration of that land in their names.Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for the said land. The decree was issued on February 21, 1917. On March 12, 1917 Original Certificate of Title No. 472 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga was issued in the names of Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao.The Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the Hermosa cadastre. It adjoins the Calunuran fishpond.Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his nephew, Valentin Salao, died. The intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudiciallybetween his two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo and Victorina Salao-Alcuriza. His estate consisted of the two fishponds which he had inherited in 1918 from his grandmother, Valentina Ignacio.Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece, plaintiff Benita Salao. As donee Benita Salao signed the deed of donation.On that occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to her and to the children of her sister, Victorina, the Calunuran fishpond if it were true that it was held in trust by Ambrosia as the share of Benita's father in the alleged joint venture.But she did not make any such demand. It was only after Ambrosia Salao's death that she thought of filing an action for the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond which was allegedly held in trust and which had become the sole property of Juan Salao y Santiago (Juani).During the Japanese occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's death, she donated her one-half proindivisoshare in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living with Juani's family. He was already the owner of the the other half of the said fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) The deed of denotion included other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct over the said properties during her lifetime.The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950.The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000.Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosias one-half share.Benita Salao and her nephews and niece asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salaos supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.Issue:Whether or not plaintiffs action for reconveyance had already prescribedHeld:Yes. Reconveyance had already prescribed. Plaintiffs action is clearly barred by prescription or laches.Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year.The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if they had any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is watchful of his rights.Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit in the claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most strongly when they are threatened or invaded. Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself.Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer to Pass upon the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assail that donation.Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to Ambrosias share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza.

Teodoro Almirol vs. Register of Deeds of AgusanG.R. No. L-22486 [March 20, 1968] Castro, J.Facts:Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds that Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is considered conjugal property; the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but since, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law.In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition formandamus, to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.In its resolution, the lower court, declaring that mandamusdoes not lie because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the petition.Issue:Whether or not mandamuswill lie to compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in questionHeld:No. Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction.The register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.The courta quocorrectly dismissed the petition formandamus. Section 4 of Republic Act 1151 provides that "where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds, the questionshall be submittedto the Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedymustbe resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.