Ganzon v. Court of AppealsGRN 93252, Aug. 5, 1991
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints
were filed against him on grounds of misconductand misfeasance of
office. TheSecretary ofLocal Government issued severalsuspension
orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed
against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension.
Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the
suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987
Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter
ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987
Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What
was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory
power.ISSUE:Whether or not theSecretary ofLocal Government, as the
Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local
officials.HELD:Yes.Ganzon is under the impression that the
Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which
supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her
control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a
mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.The SC had occasion to
discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the
President over local government officials in contrast to the power
of control given to him over executive officials of our government
wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and
supervision, are two different things which differ one from the
other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision
means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail
or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.Control, on
the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it
cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the
President over local government officials does not include the
power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public
service so requires.TheSecretary ofLocal Government, as the alter
ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid
power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.
League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENRG.R. No. 175368.
April 11, 2013
FACTS:This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus,praying that this Court order the following: ( 1) declare
as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 and
Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the
People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar
respondents from exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare
as illegal the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy and
Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation
of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor
of Bulacan.
ISSUES:(1)Whether or notSection 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160
and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional for providing
for executive control and infringing upon the local autonomy of
provinces.(2)Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying,
voiding and cancelling the small-scale mining permits amounts to
executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved
powers of all provinces.
HELD:(1)No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the
authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control
over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining
Program is subject to control by respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitutionprovides that "the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State." Under said
provision, the DENR has the duty to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the
country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale
mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision,
control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of
1991, while the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides
that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by
the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local
government agencies. The Court has clarified that the
constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art.
X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local government
units or the decentralization of government authority.It does not
make local governments sovereign within the State. The Local
Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the
small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its
enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of
the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority,
of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
country's natural resources.
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a
co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears emphasis
that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle
that a statute is presumed to be valid. This presumption is rooted
in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the
three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy
for each other's acts.This Court, however, may declare a law, or
portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,leaving no doubt
or hesitation in the mind of the Court.
(2)No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary
was rendered in accordance with the power of review granted to the
DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for
in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing
Rules and Regulations. The decision of the DENR Secretary,
declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was
valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale
Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the
power of review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's
power to review and decide the issue on the validity of the
issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial
Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function,
which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the
legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the
matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts
obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.The DENR
Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in
settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting
claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can
neither be equated with "substitution of judgment" of the
Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor
"control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a
determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based
on the law.LEAGUE OF PROVINCES VS. DENR DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, THE
PETITION IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. NO COSTS.SO
ORDERED.XXXXXXXXXXXXXSUBJECTS/DOCTRINES:WHAT IS THE ISSUE IN THIS
CASE? AT ISSUE IS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 17 (B )(3)(III)
OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND SECTION 24 OF R.A.
NO.7076.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXIF THE VALIDITY OF THE STATUTE IS BEING
QUESTIONED, WHAT IS THE PRESUMPTION? THAT IT IS VALID.
XXXXXXXXXXXXX WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THIS PRESUMPTION? THE DOCTRINE
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS WHICH ENJOINS THE COURT TO OBSERVE COURTESY
TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH.XXXXXXXXXXXXXX WHEN THEREFORE WILL A
COURT DECLARE A STATUTE INVALID? WHEN PETITIONER HAS SHOWN A CLEAR
AND UNEQUIVOCAL BREACH OF THE CONSTITUTION, LEAVING NO DOUBT OR
HESITATION IN THE MIND OF THE COURT. Before this Court determines
the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the
Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence
is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be
valid. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the
Government a becoming courtesy for each others acts.21 This Court,
however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional
where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution,22 leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the
Court.23 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX HAS DENR CONTROL OVER SMALL-SCALE MINING
IN THE PROVINCES? YES.IT IS GRANTED UNDER THREE STATUTES: THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE, THE PEOPLES SMALL SCALE MINING ACT AND THE
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT.Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over
small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three statutes:
(1) R.A. No. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A.
No. 7076 or the Peoples Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3)
R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of
1995. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX THE DENR SECRETARY DECLARED THE APPLICATION
FOR EXPLORATION PERMIT OF AMTC VALID AND CANCELLED THE SMALL-SCALE
MINING PERMITS GRANTED BY THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR. WAS THE DECISION
OF THE DENR SECRETARY VALID? YES. HIS DECISION EMANATED FROM THE
POWER OF REVIEW GRANTED TO THE DENR SECRETARY UNDER R.A. NO. 7076
(PEOPLES SMALL SCALE MINING ACT). Hence, the decision of the DENR
Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of
AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the
Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor,
emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary
under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE POWER OF THE DENR TO
DECIDE ON THE ISSUE CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS? IT IS A QUASI JUDICIAL FUNCTION WHICH
INVOLVES THE DETERMINATION OF WHAT THE LAW IS, AND WHAT THE LEGAL
RIGHTS OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES ARE, WITH RESPECT TO THE MATTER IN
CONTROVERSY AND, ON THE BASIS THEREOF AND THE FACTS OBTAINING, THE
ADJUDICATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS. The DENR Secretarys power
to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on the
validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the
Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial
function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and
what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect
to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the
facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respectiverights.53
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX THEN, IS THE ACT OF THE DENR SECRETARY A
SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OR CONTROL OVER
HIM? NO. IT IS JUST THE DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS OF AMTC. The
DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No.
7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent
necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over
conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR
Secretary can neither be equated with substitution of judgment of
the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor
control over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a
determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based
on the law. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX WHAT IS THE FUNDAMENTAL CRITERION
IN DETERMINING THE LEGALITY OF A STATUTE? THAT ALL REASONABLE
DOUBTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A
STATUTE. In determining whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are
unconstitutional, the Court has been guided by )Jeltran v. The
Secretary of Health, which held: The fundamental criterion is that
all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it
must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond
reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law,
or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis
therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail. 55
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXIn this case, the Court finds that the grounds
raised by petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Section
17 (b )(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24
of R.A. No.7076 failed to overcome the constitutionality of the
said provisions of law.DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR
ADIONG, DATU MACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTANA
BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY
ABBAS, representing the other taxpayers of
Mindanao,petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, and HONORABLE
GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT,respondents.G.R. No. 89965 November 10, 1989ATTY.
ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O,petitioner,vs.HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Budget, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,respondents.Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas &
Associates for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 89651 and 89965.Abdullah D.
Mama-o for and in his own behalf in 89965.CORTES,J.:The present
controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces
and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan,1scheduled for November
19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao."These consolidated petitions pray that the Court:
(1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting
the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from
releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare
R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional .After a
consolidated comment was filed by Solicitor General for the
respondents, which the Court considered as the answer, the case was
deemed submitted for decision, the issues having been joined.
Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a "Manifestation with Motion
for Leave to File Reply on Respondents' Comment and to Open Oral
Arguments," which the Court noted.The arguments against R.A. 6734
raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of
the following:(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the
Constitution, and(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734
conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.The Tripoli Agreement, more
specifically, the Agreement Between the government of the Republic
of the Philippines of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation
Front with the Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial
Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary
General of the Organization of Islamic Conference" took effect on
December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy
in the southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and
enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of
autonomy."2In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for
the first time provided for regional autonomy, Article X, section
15 of the charter provides that "[t]here shall be created
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines."To effectuate this mandate, the
Constitution further provides:Sec. 16. The President shall exercise
general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws
are faithfully executed.Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and
responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.Sec.
18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous
region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by
the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies.
The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for
the region consisting of the executive and representative of the
constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise
provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution
and national laws.The creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution
shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both
Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras.Sec. 20. Within its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide
for legislative powers over:(1) Administrative organization;(2)
Creation of sources of revenues;(3) Ancestral domain and natural
resources;(4) Personal, family, and property relations;(5) Regional
urban and rural planning development;(6) Economic, social and
tourism development;(7) Educational policies;(8) Preservation and
development of the cultural heritage; and(9) Such other matters as
may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
of the people of the region.Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and
order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local
police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised,
and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and
security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National
Government.Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734
was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.1. The Court
shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised by
petitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict
with the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement.Petitioners premise
their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is
part of the law of the land, being a binding international
agreement . The Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli
Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having been entered into
by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign state and
ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987
Constitutions, nor a binding international agreement.We find it
neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the
nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the
Philippine Government whether under public international or
internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the
Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the
validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in
the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A.
No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have
the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a
binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute
part of the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be
superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the
Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter
[SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253
(1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the
Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by
this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would
result in the granting of the reliefs sought.32. The Court shall
therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which have
been raised by petitioners.Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No.
6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao,
contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the
autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent
upon the outcome of the plebiscite.In support of his argument,
petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which
declares that "[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting
favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance
with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution." Petitioner
contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation
of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two
provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would
still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable
votes were obtained.The matter of the creation of the autonomous
region and its composition needs to be clarified.Firs, the
questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18,
Article X of the Constitution which sets forth the conditions
necessary for the creation of the autonomous region. The reference
to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it
clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall
take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements.
Second, there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions
(Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially
the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the
details, thus:SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2)
of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be
held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred
twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act:Provided,That only
the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall
be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing
administrative determination, merge the existing regions.Thus,
under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the
autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority
vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the
autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority
is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It
may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the
thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article
II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The
single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No.
6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be
an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and
cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise
it. [See III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 482-492
(1986)].As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the
Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the
approval "by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in
a plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The
question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it
refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in
all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent
units, or both?We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve
this question.If the framers of the Constitution intended to
require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the
plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII,
section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take
effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with
the provision on the creation of the autonomous region, which
reads:The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in
a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces,
cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para,
2].it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous
region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the
plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the
constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the
majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply
adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of
the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose."It is thus clear that what is
required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes
approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a
double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together,
as well as in the individual constituent units.More importantly,
because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in
which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article
X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they
ratified the Constitution.Invoking the earlier cited constitutional
provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other hand, maintains that
only those areas which, to his view, share common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics should be properly included
within the coverage of the autonomous region. He insists that R.A.
No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan,
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and
the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess
such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other
relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly
share the same characteristics. By including areas which do not
strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner
claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous
region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be
limited.Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays
down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas
should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these
constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas
that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the
legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would
have to go into the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do
without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers.
[Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936); Morfe v.
Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].After
assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for
lack of basis, petitioner Mama-o would then adopt the extreme view
that other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered.
He argues that since the Organic Act covers several non-Muslim
areas, its scope should be further broadened to include the rest of
the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the other non-Muslim
areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, and therefore
is violative of the Constitution.Petitioner's contention runs
counter to the very same constitutional provision he had earlier
invoked. Any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao
should compromise the autonomous region, taking into account shared
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics, would necessarily carry with it
the exclusion of other areas. As earlier stated, such determination
by Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act for
the autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative
prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this
Court.Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable
classification [People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1963); Laurel v. Misa,
76 Phil. 372 (1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land tenure
Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413].
InDumlao v. Commission on ElectionsG.R. No. 52245, January 22,
1980, 95 SCRA 392], the Court ruled that once class may be treated
differently from another where the groupings are based on
reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of equal protection
is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been
made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set
forth by the Constitution itself.Both petitions also question the
validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the
constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III,
sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act
which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim
Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the
one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah
courts created under the same Act should apply national law.
Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived
from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not
be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas
supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of
conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law,
wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a
Muslim's religious convictions.As enshrined in the Constitution,
judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
[Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be
exercised, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist
[Angara v. Electoral Commission,supra;Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No.
L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677]. In the present case, no
actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no
conflicting claims involving the application of national law
resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being
so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what
is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the
Muslim Code and national law.Petitioners also impugn the
constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734
which, among others, states:. . .Provided,That only the provinces
and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities
which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions:Provided, however,that the President may, by administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.According to petitioners,
said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a
power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the
President. That the President may choose to merge existing regions
pursuant to the Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict with
Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution which provides:No
province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.It must be
pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger
of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National
Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces
for administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972),
which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres. dec. No. 1,
Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not territorial and
political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power
to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in
the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged
with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of
the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the
President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional
provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government
units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly
applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not
to administrative regions.Petitioners likewise question the
validity of provisions in the Organic Act which create an Oversight
Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region of the
powers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional
government by the organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said
provisions mandate that the transfer of certain national government
offices and their properties to the regional government shall be
made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee,
and that such transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years
from the organization of the regional government.It is asserted by
petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because while
the Constitution states that the creation of the autonomous region
shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the requirement of
organizing an Oversight committee tasked with supervising the
transfer of powers and properties to the regional government would
in effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.Under the
Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on
the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by
majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled
plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes
effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.Under the
constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on
the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by
majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled
plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes
effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an
oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a
different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of
the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the
Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth
transition period for the regional government. The constitutional
objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no
bases therefor.Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925);
Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734;
Morfe v. Mutuc,supra;Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March
11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those who petition this Court to declare a
law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the
basis for such a declaration. otherwise, their petition must fail.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal
of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.WHEREFORE, the
petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.Fernan, C.J.,
Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.Footnotes1 Art. II, Sec
1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 provides that "[t]he plebiscite shall be
conducted in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur,
Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and
Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog,
General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, and
Zamboanga."2 The provinces enumerated in the Tripoli Agreement are
the same ones mentioned in R.A. No. 6734.3 With regard to the
controversy regarding the alleged inconsistencies between R.A. No.
6734 and the Tripoli Agreement, it may be enlightening to quote
from the statement of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., the principal
sponsor of R.A. No. 6734:xxx xxx xxxThe assertion that the organic
Act is a "betrayal" of the Tripoli Agreement is actually misplaced,
to say the least. Misplaced because it overlooks the fact that the
Organic Act incorporates, at least, 99 percent of the provisions of
the Tripoli Agreement. Misplaced, again, because it gratuitously
assumes that the Tripoli Agreement can bring more benefits to the
people of Mulim Mindanao than the Organic Act.The truth of the
matter is that the Organic Act addresses the basis demands of the
Muslim, tribal and Christian populations of the proposed area of
autonomy in a far more reasonable, realistic and immediate manner
than the Tripoli Agreement ever sought to do.The Organic Act is,
therefore, a boon to, not a betrayal, of the interest of the people
of Muslim Mindanao.xxx xxx xxx[Consolidated Comment, p. 26].
Court on November 7, 1985 enjoining said respondents, their
agents and representatives, and the police and other peace officers
from enforcing the aforesaid Order of the respondent committee is
made permanent. Petition is GRANTED. No costs.SO ORDEREDTeehankee,
C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Ordillo vs. COMELEC case brief summaryOrdillo vs. COMELEC case
briefsummary
Facts:Theprovinceof Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra,
Kalinga-Apayao, and Baguio City cast their vote in a plebiscite
held in pursuant to R.A. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. The result of the plebiscite showed that the creation of
the Region was only approved by Ifugao. In consideration of the
proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting
favorably shall be included in the CAR.
ISSUE:Whether or not the province of Ifugao can validly
constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Ruling:No, in constuing the word region in Article X Sec 15 of
the1987 Constitutionit includes provinces, cities, municipalities
and geographical areas, that a region is to be made up of two or
more constituent unit.Therefore, Ifugao itself cannot solely
constitute a region.ISSUE:whether the sole province of Ifugao can
be validly constituted in the Cordillera Autonomous Region under
Section 15, Article 10.
RULING:No. the keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas connotes that a region consists of more than one
unit. In its ordinary sense region means two or more provinces,
thus Ifugao cannot be constituted the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
Bai Sandra Sema vs.COMELECPosted onSeptember 10, 2012G.R. No.
177597July 16, 2008Facts:On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional
Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces
underSec.19,Art.VIof RA 9054, enactedMuslim MindanaoAutonomy Act
No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province ofShariff Kabunsuanin
the first district ofMaguindanao.The voters of Maguindanao ratified
Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on October 29,
2006.On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ofCotabato
Citypassed Resolution No. 3999 requesting theCOMELECto clarify the
status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First
District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act
201.In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 07-0407 maintaining thestatus quowith Cotabato City
as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the FirstLegislative District of
Maguindanao.However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections,
the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7845 stating that
Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of
Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May
10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending
Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as Shariff Kabunsan Province withCotabatoCity.Sema, who
was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902
and the exclusion from the canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for
that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to
one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.Issues:1. WhetherSec. 19, Art. VIofRA 9054delegating
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional.2. Whether a
province created under Sec. 19,Art.VIof RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in theHouse of Representativeswithout need of a
national law creating a legislative district for such
province.Held:1.Sec.19,Art.VIof RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities,for being contrary toSec. 5
ofArt.VIandSec.20of Art. Xof theConstitution, as well asSec.3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.The creation of LGUs is
governed bySec.10, Art.Xof theConstitution:No province, city,
municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code (LGC) and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.Thus, the
creation of anyLGUmust comply with 3 conditions: First, the
creation of an LGU must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC.
Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected.There is neither an express prohibition nor an
express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to
delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to create
LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can delegate to
local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any
provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and
barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria established in
the LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution is complied.However, the creation of provinces is
another matter. Under theLGC, only x x x anAct of Congress can
create provinces, cities, or municipalities.According to,Sec. 5
(3),Art.VIof theConstitution:Each City with a population of at
least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1
representative in the House of Representatives.Similarly,Sec. 3of
theOrdinance appended to the Constitutionprovides,Any province that
may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least 1 Member.Thus,only
Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of
legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise underSec.
5,Art.VIof theConstitutionandSec.3of theOrdinance appended to the
Constitution.2.Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned
only by an act of Congress. Under the Constitution, the power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives,
and to apportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in
Congress.Sec. 5 (1),Art.VIof the Constitutionvests Congress the
power to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives.Sec. 5 (4)empowers Congress to reapportion
legislative districts.The power to reapportion legislative
districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative
districts out of existing ones.Congress exercises these powers
through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted
by regional/local legislative bodies. The power of redistricting
xxx is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to
make laws, and is thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v.
COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995)].An inferior legislative body cannot
change the membership of the superior legislative body which
created it.Congress is a national legislature, and any changes in
its membership through the creation of legislative districts must
be embodied in national law.The power to create or reapportion
legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be
exercised by Congress itself.Even the ARMM Regional Assembly
recognizes this.The ARMM cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every
province shall have a legislative district.But this can never be
legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is
vested solely in Congress.Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot enact a law creating a national office becauseSec. 20,
Art.Xof the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative
powers of regional assemblies are limited only within its
territorial jurisdiction. (Nothing inSec. 20, Art.Xof the
Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to create/apportion
legislative districts for Congress.)It is axiomatic that organic
acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution.
Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact
laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative
district whose representative is elected in national elections.At
most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and
provinces.Thus,MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly,
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is
part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM
because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite
held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The
1stlegislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other
municipalities.A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic
Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities,
cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1stdistrict of
Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.For the purposes of
the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1stdistrict
is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it
later amended this stating that status quo should be retained;
however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district
should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also
while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos
status as a legislative district (or part of any).Bai Sandra Sema
was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S.
Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1stdistrict). Later, Sema was contending
that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and
that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably
because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in
fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon
creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically
gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes
Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a
representative in the HOR.COMELEC maintained that the legislative
district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being
created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its
representation.ISSUE:Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.HELD:RA 9054 is
unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is
governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.Thus, the creation of any of the four local
government units province, city, municipality or barangay must
comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local
government unit must follow thecriteriafixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in
the political units affected.There is neither an express
prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution
for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies
the power to create local government units. However, under its
plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises
with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils,
the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to
compliance with thecriteriaestablished in the Local Government
Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff
Kabunsuan province.Note that in order to create a city there must
be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province,
once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR.
Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there
must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City
did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is
untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the
province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative
district. But this can never be legally possible because the
creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At
most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and
provinces.
NORTH COTABATO V GRP PEACE PANEL>FACTS:The Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by the
Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement
of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North
Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
The agreement mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) to which
it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain
and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction
over all natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is
composed of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA).ISSUE:Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and
statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and
Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is
constitutionalHELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory
provisions on public consultation and the right to information when
they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are
unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions
of the constitution thereof.REASONING:The GRP is required by this
law to carry out public consultations on both national and local
levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the
mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace
process.Article III (Bill of Rights)Sec. 7. The right of people on
matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to official
records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.Article
IISec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law ,
that state adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest.LGC (1991),
require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic
consultations. No project or program be implemented unless such
consultations are complied with and approval mus be
obtained.Article VII (Executive Department)Sec. 21. No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.Article X. (Local Government)Sec. 1. The territorial and
political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as
hereinafter provided.Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as well
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.Section
16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.Sec.
18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units
in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.Sec. 20.
Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions
of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:1.
Administrative organization;2. Creation of sources of revenues;3.
Ancestral domain and natural resources;4. Personal, family, and
property relations;5. Regional urban and rural planning
development;6. Economic, social, and tourism development;7.
Educational policies;8. Preservation and development of the
cultural heritage; and9. Such other matters as may be authorized by
law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the
region.The President has sole authority in the
treaty-making.ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)Section 1. Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed
by:1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members; or2. A constitutional convention.Section 4. Any amendment
to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall
be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or
revision.MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be
reconciled with the present constitution and laws shall come into
force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and upon effecting
the necessary changes to the legal framework. The presidents
authority is limited to proposing constitutional amendments. She
cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments
will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a
plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend
therein.Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain G.R. No. 1833591, October 14, 2008
Decision:
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers
of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts
surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in
Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas
in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict.
Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act.
It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the
President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so
in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly
restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in
the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace
process effectively.
Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their
respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of
the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not
to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners,
specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled
signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the
concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties
beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On
July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement
on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they
signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27,
1998.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and
Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No.
183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern,
petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them
the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD,
pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the
holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
Issues:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the
disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA); and
(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local
Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that
consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the
draft;
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is
ripe for adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and
initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution,
Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution,
Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic
Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]
If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines would be BINDING itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)
as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to
conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act
No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly
Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF
ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the
authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines;
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North
Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered
by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question;
and
7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior
valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Held:
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands,
namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and
Governance.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to
resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic
questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual
cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary
in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will
not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the
Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with
the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of
the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel
mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present
petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle
in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved;
(b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public
interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements
necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the
present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that
could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions
compared to the original.
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases
is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact,
respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In
previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate
transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for
adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil
service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of
GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the
recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the
identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of
public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present
cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the
lives of the public at large.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed
grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No.
7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the
MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of
the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates
a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution
and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that
the same is on its way to independence.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of
the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared
contrary to law and the Constitution.Province of North Cotabato vs
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace PanelThe
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum
of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). This Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement of Peace of 2001 is a codification of consensus points
reached between GRP and MILF Peace Panel and of the aspiration of
the MILF to have a Bangasmoro HomelandAccording to the stipulations
in the MOA-AD, Ownership of the Bangasmoro Homeland is vested to
the Bangasmoro people. MOA-AD describes the Bangasmoro people as
the first nation with defined territory and with a system of
government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with
foreign nations. The Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted
by the MOA-AD the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangasmoro. It was also
stipulated that BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural
resources within its internal waters.Issues:1. Whether the
petitions have become moot and academic2. Whether the
constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of
the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.4. Whether there is a
violation of the peoples right to information on matters of public
concern.5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself.6.
cralawWhether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North
Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered
by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question;
and7. cralawWhether MOA-AD is constitutionalHeld:Issue 1:The court
believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an exception
to the moot and academic principle in view of (a) the grave
violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional
character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the
need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.Issue 2:Yes. Any alleged violation of
the consti by any branch of the government is a proper matter for
judicial review. In the case at bar, the failure of the respondents
to consult the local government units or communities affected
amounts to a departure from the mandate under E.O. No. 3 and the
fact that the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act
of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution, rendered the
petition ripe for adjudication.Issue 3:The MOA-AD not being a
document that can bind the Philippines under international law
notwithstanding, respondents almost consummated act of guaranteeing
amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in
the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem,
the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen
willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino
people would give their imprimatur to their solution.Issue 4:Yes,
there is a violation of the peoples right to information.An
essential element of this right is to keep a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the people.The
contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern
involving public interest in the highest order.The invocation of
the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general
right to information or the specific right to consultation is
untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of
executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived
such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies
of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and
public scrutiny.Issue 5:No. The MOA-AD is not a document that can
bind the Philippines under international law. It would have been
signed by representatives of States and international organizations
not parties to the Agreement, this would not have sufficed to vest
in it a binding character under international law.Issue 6:Yes.
There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly
the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan
Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same
problem in the future as respondents actions are capable of
repetition, in another or any form.These petitions afford a proper
venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately
referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases.Issue
7:Yes. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it cannot be
reconciled with the present constitution. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them. The associative
relationship between the GRP and the BJE is unconstitutional
because the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a
state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.The
court denied the respondents motion to dismiss and granted the main
and intervening petitions.The basic procedural and substantive
doctrines cited in the said decision are summarized below for
purposes of legal research of the visitors of this blog insofar as
basic principles affecting the Justice System and the Rule of Law
are concerned, notable among which are the exceptions to the moot
and academic rule, the liberality in the interpretation of the
ripeness for judicial review rule, the expanded scope of the locus
standi rule, the constitutional right of full access to information
on matters of public concern, and the duty of public officials to
conduct local consultations. Thus:
1. The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of
respondents to consult the local government units or communities
affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under E.O. No. 3.
2. The respondents exceeded their authority by the act of
guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution.
3. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of
government is a proper matter for judicial review.
4. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the
petitioners have the requisite locus standi.
5. The non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of
the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the petitions. The present
petitions are an exception to the moot and academic principle in
view of:
(a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved;
(b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount
public interest;
(c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and
(d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
6. The peoples right to information on matters of public concern
under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid
symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of
the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of
the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the
duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure
derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
7. The contents of the MOA-AD are a matter of paramount public
concern involving public interest in the highest order.
8. E.O. No. 3 is replete with mechanics for continuing
consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal
forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular
dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of
society.
9. Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991
requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any
project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular
group of people residing in such locality, is implemented
therein.
10. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro
people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from
their total environment.
11. Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things,
the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the
statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government
agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain
claim by mere agreement or compromise.
12. The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a
defense to the general right to information or the specific right
to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions
fly in the face of executive secrecy.
13. The Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed
grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No.
7160, and Republic Act No. 8371.
14. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for
the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.
15. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an
associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government
is a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President
dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel.
16. As the said clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that
the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will
eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the
President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the
outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.
17. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international
agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines
under international law, respondents act of guaranteeing amendments
is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the
MOA-AD fatally defective.
1. Datu Kida v. Senate of the Philippines., GR 196271
(2012)(Constitutionality of RA 10153)/CONSTITUTIONAL
Facts: RA 6734 provided for the organic act mandated by the
constitution for the formation of ARMM. Unfortunately said organic
act did not provide for the exact date for the regional elections
in ARMM. Because of this, several Laws were enacted to provide for
the date of the election ; RA 9054- Second Monday of September
2001, RA 9140November 26, 2001, RA 93332nd Monday of August 2005.
And on the same date every three years thereafter.Pursuant to RA
9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but
sometime in June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for
the synchronization of the elections in ARMM with the national and
local elections.Several people, including herein plaintiff assailed
the constitutionality of the said enactment.
Issue/s:
1. WON ARMM is a distinct from an ordinary local government unit
and therefore should not be required to hold its election during
the local elections mandated in the constitution.
2. WON RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted
the president the power to appoint OIC for several elective
positions until such positions be filled during the May 2013
elections.
Held:1. No ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not
exempt from the synchronization of election. SC held that the
inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political
subdivisions of the State under the heading Local Government
indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider
autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.
That the Constitution mentions only the national government and
the local governments, and does not make a distinction between the
local government and the regional government, is particularly
revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate
forms of government, but as political units which, while having
more powers and attributes than other local government units, still
remain under the category of local governments. Since autonomous
regions are classified as local governments, it follows that
elections held in autonomous regions are also considered as local
elections.2.Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of
RA 10153stating thatthere is no incompatibility between the
Presidents power of supervision over local governments and
autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within
the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior
officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in
accordance with law.This is distinguished from the power of control
or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.
The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged
power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the
Presidents appointment power includes the power to remove these
officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the
appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as
representatives of the President and not of the people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners
supposition. The provision states:Section 3. Appointment of
Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-in-charge
for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed
office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has
appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor
and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same
officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly
elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this
provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the
appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in
this regard are more apparent than real.
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA,in his personal capacity, and in
representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC.,et al., Petitioners, v.SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, et al.,Respondents.FACTS:On August 1, 1989 or two
years after theeffectivityof the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted
through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for
an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."The
initially assenting provinces wereLanaodelSur,Maguindanao, Sulu
andTawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for
the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60
days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.Thereafter, R.A.
No. 9054was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under
R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September
2001.RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the
ARMM regional elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the
same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No.
9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.Pursuant to RA
No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected.But onJune 30, 2011, RA No.
10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC
stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections.Several cases
forcertiorari, prohibition andmadamusoriginating from different
parties arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and
R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of said laws.OnSeptember
13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent
elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions
should these cases not be decided by the end of their term
onSeptember 30, 2011.The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No.
9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and
thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA
No. 9094 in order to become effective.The petitions assailing RA
No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its
failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section
26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.Also cited as grounds are the
alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM,
as well as the failure to adhere to the "elective and
representative" character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the
grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake
the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials
elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed
office.Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment
also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in
complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the
Constitution.ISSUE:A. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates
the synchronization of electionsB. Whether or not the passage of RA
No. 10153 violates the provisions of the 1987
ConstitutionHELD:Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the
constitutionality of R.A. 10153intoto.The Court agreed with
respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position
that the Constitution mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1,
2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987
Constitution. While the Constitution does not expressly state that
Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought
to attain synchronization of elections.The objective behind setting
a common termination date for all elective officials, done among
others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning
senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the
holding of all future elections whether national or local to once
every three years.This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations.
Furthermore, to achieve synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas to
reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should
have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed
schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166
to be held in May 2013).InOsmev. Commission on Elections,the court
thus explained:It is clear from theaforequotedprovisions of the
1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President
and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same
hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.It is likewise evident
from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term
ofsynchronizationis used synonymously as the phraseholding
simultaneouslysince this is the precise intent in terminating their
Office Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This common termination
date will synchronize future elections to once every three years
(Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol.
II, p. 605).That the election for Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art.
XVIII)willhave to be synchronized with the election for President
and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident
from the xxxrecordsof the proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]Although called regional elections,
the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and
structure of the Constitution.Regional elections in the ARMM for
the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly
representatives fall within the classification of "local"
elections, since they pertain to the elected officials who will
serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective of
the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the
forms of local governments, as evident from Article Xof the
Constitution entitled "Local Government."Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article
the article wholly devoted to Local Government.Second
issue:Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within
due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light
of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands.
Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive
duty or of a refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason to
accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of
discretion.In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the
synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and
established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling
as the other.If their compelling force differs at all, the
difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and
affects the whole country, while regional autonomy