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1. MARY ROSE A. BOTO v. SENIOR ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR VILLENA, ET AL.
A.C. No. 9684, Septembe 18, !"1#$ACTS%
An Information for libel was filed against complainant Boto before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig City and a warrant of arrest was issued on the same
day against her. After posting bail and before the scheduled arraignment, she filed a
Motion to Quash Information on the ground of lack of urisdiction since libel is within
the e!clusi"e urisdiction of the #egional Trial Court. Instead of dismissing the case, the
trial udge re$uired the trial prosecutor, %enior Assistant City &rosecutor 'illena to file
his comment within () days, but the latter did not file his comment nor mo"ed for
e!tension of time to file the same, resulting in the resetting of the case, delaying the
process by * months and "iolating her constitutional right to a speedy trial. In his
Comment, &rosecutor 'illena opposed the motion to $uash, contending that the court had
already determined probable cause, and mooted any $uestion about urisdiction, "enue
and sufficiency of e"idence against the complainant.
In her Complaint+Affida"it, Boto charged respondents 'illena, Manabat and e
ios with gross ignorance of the law for filing the information for libel before the MeTC
and for opposing the motion to $uash despite the knowledge that the said first le"el court
had no urisdiction o"er the case.
In their separate comments, the respondents denied liability. The trial prosecutor,
'illena, countered that the filing of the information was not within his discretion as he
was not the in"estigating prosecutor and that it was not his duty to re"iew the resolution
of the in"estigating prosecutor as he had no authority to appro"e or disappro"e an
information or its filing in court. -is participation commenced only after it was filed with
the MeTC. Manabat, the City &rosecutor who appro"ed the Information, stated that the
information was filed inad"ertently with the MeTC and that there was no ignorance of the
law or malice in"ol"ed as they had pre"iously filed cases of libel with the #TC.
Moreo"er, the inad"ertent filing was already corrected when the information was later on
filed with the #TC and that after the filing of the information with the #TC, the said court
issued an order finding that probable cause e!isted to hold Boto for trial. e ios, the
in"estigating prosecutor, a"erred that the information for libel against complainant was
filed before the MeTC due to inad"ertence and that no malice or gross ignorance of the
law attended it. -e added that the information was later on filed with the #TC+&asig after
the case filed before the MeTC was $uashed.
The records disclose that on ctober (/, 0)(0, the Information was properly filed
with the #TC, Taguig City.
ISSUE%
1hether or not the respondents should be held administrati"ely liable for gross
ignorance of the law.
RULIN&%
2es.
Article 34) of the #e"ised &enal Code pro"ides that urisdiction o"er libel cases
are lodged with the #TC. The criminal and ci"il action for damages in cases of written
defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the #TC of the pro"ince or
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city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
e ios admitted that inad"ertence attended the filing of the information for libel
with the MeTC. -e did not, howe"er, proffer any ustification or e!planation for the error.
-e did not claim that the mistake was either typographical or was a result of theapplication of a default form or template. In the Court5s "iew, it was plain carelessness.
As no malice can be attributed, he merely deser"es a reprimand.
Manabat, on the other hand, should ha"e been more cautious and careful in
re"iewing the report and recommendation of his subordinate. -e should not ha"e
appro"ed the information and its filing in the wrong court considering that his office was
"ery knowledgeable of the law that urisdiction in libel cases lies with the #TC. In fact,
he cited se"eral libel cases which his office filed with the proper court. As the head of
office, he should be admonished to be more careful as his office is in the forefront in the
administration of criminal ustice.
1hile e ios and Manabat can "alidly claim inad"ertence, 'illena cannot
in"oke the same defense in his handling of the case. Indeed, he did not file the
information with the MeTC as he was not the in"estigating prosecutor, but merely the
trial prosecutor. -e, howe"er, mishandled the case which preudiced the complainant.
'illena should ha"e e"en initiated the mo"e for the dismissal of the case on the ground of
lack of urisdiction. Instead of taking the initiati"e, he e"en opposed the motion to $uash
the information. At any rate, respondents are not barred from refiling the case before the
proper court if probable cause to hold the complainant liable really e!ists. -is dismal
failure to apply the basic rule on urisdiction amounts to ignorance of the law and reflectshis lack of prudence, if not his incompetence, in the performance of his duties.
6undamental is the rule that urisdiction is conferred by law and is not within the
courts, let alone the parties themsel"es, to determine or con"eniently set aside. It cannot
be wai"ed e!cept for those udicially recogni7able grounds like estoppel. And it is not
mooted by an action of a court in an erroneously filed case.
!. 'ECTOR TRENAS v. PEOPLE,
&.R. NO. 19(""!, )*+*- !(, !"1!
$ACTS%
%ometime in ecember (888, Margarita Alocila wanted to buy a house+and+lot inIloilo City. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager recommended theappellant -ector Treas to pri"ate complainant 9li7abeth, who was an employee and nieceof Margarita, for ad"ice regarding the transfer of the title in the latter:s name. To co"er the e!penses, 9li7abeth ga"e &(*), ))) to -ector who issued a corresponding receipt and prepared a eed of %ale with Assumption of Mortgage. -ector ga"e 9li7abeth a re"enueofficial receipt for &0;, ))). -owe"er, when she consulted with the BI#, she was
informed that the receipts were fake. 1hen confronted, -ector admitted to her that thereceipts were fake and that he used the &(0), ))) for his other transactions. 9li7abethdemanded the return of the money. To settle his accounts, -ector issued in fa"or of 9li7abeth a check in the amount of &(0), ))), deducting from &(*), ))) the &3), ))) asattorney:s fees. 1hen the check was deposited with the &CIBank, Makati Branch, thesame was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. espite repeateddemands, appellant failed to pay.
An Information was then filed by the ffice of the City &rosecutor in the#egional Trial Court of Makati City. The #TC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of 9stafa.
ISSUE
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1hether or not the accused is re$uired to present e"idence to pro"e lack of urisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution e"idence. RULIN&%
=o.
The o"erarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases,"enue is urisdictional. A court cannot e!ercise urisdiction o"er a person charged with anoffense committed outside its limited territory.
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa wascommitted within the urisdiction of the #TC of Makati City. The Affida"it of Complainte!ecuted by 9li7abeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense wascommitted. Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other e"idence was presented by the prosecution to pro"e that the offense or any of its elements wascommitted in Makati City. There is nothing in the documentary e"idence offered by the prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. Are"iew of the testimony of 9li7abeth also shows that there was no mention of the placewhere the offense was allegedly committed.
Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner wasdishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa.Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution e"idence which e"en mentions that any of the elements of the offense werecommitted in Makati. The rule is settled that an obection may be raised based on theground that the court lacks urisdiction o"er the offense charged, or it may be consideredmotu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreo"er, urisdiction o"er the subect matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by e!press wai"er or otherwise. That urisdiction is conferred by theso"ereign authority that organi7ed the court and is gi"en only by law in the manner andform prescribed by law.
&etition granted.
#. PEOPLE v. MARIANO&.R. No. L4"(!/, )+e #", 19/6
$ACTS%
Mariano was appointed as a >iaison fficer by the Municipal Mayor =olasco of %an ?ose del Monte, Bulacan. -e was authori7ed to recei"e and be receipted for @%e!cess property of @%AI=9C for the use and benefit of said municipality. The saidaccused Mariano once in possession of the said items and far from complying with hisobligation and in spite of repeated demands, misappropriated and con"erted to his own personal use and benefit the said items "alued at /(/.*) or &;,/8/.3*
n ecember (, (8/;, the office of the &ro"incial 6iscal of Bulacan filed an
Information accusing pri"ate respondent Mariano of estafa.
n 6ebruary (8, (8/*, Mariano filed a motion to $uash the Information on thegrounds that the court trying the cause has no urisdiction and that the criminal action has been e!tinguished. In his motion to $uash, Mariano claimed that the items which were thesubect matter of the Information against him were the same items for which Mayor =olasco of %an ?ose was indicted before a Military Commission under a charge of mal"ersation of public property, and for which Mayor =olasco had been found guilty, andthat inasmuch as the case against Mayor =olasco had already been decided by theMilitary Tribunal, the Court of 6irst Instance of Bulacan had lost urisdiction o"er thecase against him.
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n March (;, (8/* respondent ?udge issued an rder granting the motion to$uash on the ground of lack of urisdiction.
ISSUE%
1hether or not ci"il courts and military commissions e!ercise concurrent urisdiction o"er the offense of estafa of goods "alued at not more than &4,))) andallegedly committed by a ci"ilian.
RULIN&%
=o.
By reason of the penalty imposed on the offense of 9stafa which e!ceeds 4
months imprisonment, the offense alleged to ha"e been committed by the accused, now
respondent, Mariano, falls under the original urisdiction of Courts of 6irst Instance. This
is not disputed by respondent ?udge. 1hat he claims in his rder is that his courte!ercises concurrent urisdiction with the military commission and because the latter
tribunal was the first to take cogni7ance of the subect matter, respondent court lost
urisdiction o"er it .That statement of respondent court is incorrect.
#espondent court gra"ely erred when it ruled that it lost urisdiction o"er the
estafa case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the mal"ersation charge against
Mayor =olasco before the Military Commission. 9stafa and mal"ersation are two
separate and distinct offenses and in the case now before the Court the accused in one is
different from the accused in the other. But more fundamental is the fact that in the
present case, there is no situation in"ol"ing two tribunals "ested with concurrent urisdiction o"er a particular crime so as to apply the rule that the court or tribunal which
first takes cogni7ance of the case ac$uires urisdiction thereof e!clusi"e of the other. The
Military Commission is without power or authority to hear and determine the particular
offense charged against respondent Mariano, hence, there is no concurrent urisdiction
between it and respondent court to speak of. 9stafa as described in the Information falls
within the sole e!clusi"e urisdiction of ci"il courts.
4. )ESSE P'ILIP B. EI)ANSANTOS v. SPECIAL PRESI0ENTIAL TAS $ORCE1(6, REPRESENTE0 BY ATTY. VENTURA&.R. No. !"#696, )+e !, !"14
$ACTS%
The %pecial &residential Task 6orce (*4 conducted an in"estigation against some public officials of the ne %top %hop Inter+Agency Ta! Credit and uty rawback Center of the epartment of 6inance. The said public officials were the e"aluators ande!aminers of the Center who were in"estigated for possible gra"e misconduct inconnection with the anomalous issuance of 3; Ta! Credit Certificates amounting to atleast ((),(8;,(*.
%&T6 (*4 was created by former &resident ?oseph 9strada in ctober (888 tore"iew, in"estigate and gather e"idence necessary to prosecute the commission of irregularities in the "arious offices and agencies of the 6. The life of %&T6 (*4 wase!tended by former &resident Dloria Macapagal Arroyo in ctober 0))(. %&T6 (*4 wasfurther mandated to in"estigate the irregularities committed at the Center and to reco"er and collect lost re"enues. &ursuant to this mandate, Atty. #eyes, %&T6 (*4 lawyer+consultant, conducted an independent in"estigation on the alleged anomalous issuancesof TCCs to 9"ergreen 1ea"ing Mills, Inc.
By "irtue of its BI registration, 9"ergreen was entitled to a package of incenti"es such as ta! credits on capital e$uipment purchased and on raw materials usedin the manufacture, processing or production of e!port products and access to bonded
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manufacturingtrading warehouse system. 9"ergreen represented that it made local purchases for the purpose of manufacturing spun yarn and wo"en fabrics, which wereallegedly sold to direct e!porters through a common bonded warehouse, namely, 6ilipino-and Common Bonded Corporation. It submitted proofs of local purchases in the form of sales in"oices and deli"ery receipts of the supposed suppliers. 9"ergreen also submitted
certificates of deli"ery and receipts attesting to the sales made to direct e!porters. Thesecertificates represented the bases of 9"ergreen:s claims under the Ad"anced Ta! Credit%cheme or the Constructi"e 9!portation.
>ater, 9"ergreen:s application or claims for ta! credit were e!amined at 3 le"els, performed and conducted by the e"aluator, re"iewer and recommending officer from theCenter. 6rom ?anuary (88; to ?une (88, a total of 3; TCCs worth at least &((), (8;,(*were issued to 9"ergreen. These TCC:s were utili7ed either through own use or transfer to other companies.
Based on the In"estigation #eport submitted by Atty. #eyes, it appeared that
9"ergreen:s e!istence was $uestionable. The suppliers and buyers were in e!istent or could no longer be found. The sales in"oices and deli"ery receipts which were used as bases of the ta! credit claims of 9"ergreen were fake and the TCC transfers werefictitious.
6or said reason, %&T6 (*4 9!ecuti"e irector Atty. 'entura filed criminal chargesfor 'iolation of %ection 3EeF of #A 3)(8 and 9stafa Thru 6alsification of &ublicocuments, against those in"ol"ed in the anomalous transactions, and likewiseadministrati"e charges for gra"e misconduct against the public officials in"ol"ed.n ?uly (), 0))4, the &rosecution and Monitoring Bureau of the mbudsman rendered adecision finding the in"ol"ed public officials guilty of gra"e misconduct with the penaltyof dismissal from the ser"ice including all its accessory penalties and without preudice tocriminal prosecution.
9iansantos filed a petition for re"iew before the CA assailing the decision andorder of the mbudsman. -e argued, among others, that he could not be held guilty of gra"e misconduct as he dutifully performed his responsibilities as e"aluatorG that hisduties and responsibilities basically in"ol"ed the preparation of an e"aluation reportsubmitted to his immediate superior, AranasG that he was not pri"y to the process bywhich the TCC was issued because its appro"al and release were an altogether differentduty which he did not e!erciseG that he performed his duties based on the directi"es andmanner taught to him in the CenterG and that the documents submitted by 9"ergreenappeared to be authentic without any hint of falsity which he had no reason to doubt.
n May (, 0)(0, the CA rendered a decision affirming the decision of thembudsman.
ISSUE%
1hether or not the Court of Appeals gra"ely erred in its discretion when itaffirmed the assailed decision of the office of the ombudsman which amounts to lack or in e!cess of urisdiction.
RULIN&%
=o.
As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the ffice of thembudsman:s e!ercise of its in"estigati"e and prosecutorial powers, and respects theinitiati"e and independence inherent in the ffice of the mbudsman. 1hile thembudsman:s findings as to whether probable cause e!ists are generally not re"iewable by the Court, where there is an allegation of gra"e abuse of discretion, the mbudsman:sact cannot escape udicial scrutiny under the Court:s own constitutional power and dutyto determine whether or not there has been gra"e abuse of discretion amounting to lack or e!cess of urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Do"ernment.
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The petitioner failed to show the e!istence of gra"e abuse of discretion in thiscase. In this regard, the Court agrees with the CA that there was no error committed bythe mbudsman. The record shows that there is enough e"idence on record warrantingthe finding of guilt for gra"e misconduct against the petitioner.
(. *2 0IMAYU&A et *3. v. $ERNAN0E, et *3.&.R. No. L1891#, Ap53 1(, 19!!
$ACTS%&laintiffs are Chiropractic octors who practice their profession in Manila.
imayuga appeared before the -onorable %ecretary of the Interior, the -onorableirector -ealth and the Board of Medical 9!aminers for the purpose of submitting to,and taking, an e!amination, if any was re$uired. -e was ad"ised that he could practicehis profession so long as there is no e!press pro"ision against it. The Board of Medical9!aminers informed plaintiff that it could not gi"e him any e!amination, because no one
of its members had any knowledge of chiropractics. The irector of -ealth held that hedid not ha"e any obection to the plaintiff5s practicing chiropractics in the &hilippines solong as there is no complaint against his treatment. efendants are about to arrest and persecute them in the e!ercise of their profession.
The defendants demurred to the complaint on the grounds that the acts alleged donot constitute a cause of action and that the court has no urisdiction.
n %eptember, (80(, a complaint was filed against imayuga in the Court of 6irstInstance of Manila charging him with the illegal practice of medicine, and that the chargeis still pending in that court.
At the time the petition was presented before the Court, a temporary restrainingorder was granted against the defendants.
ISSUE%
1hether or not defendants acted with malicious moti"es when they were about toarrest plaintiffs.
RULIN&%
=o.
efendants are acting upon the written ad"ice of the city attorney as to theconstruction of the law. The records show that the defendants are seeking to dischargetheir official duties as they understand them, and there is no e"idence that either they areacting from malicious or dishonest moti"es. =either is there any e"idence that thedefendants are threatening plaintiffs with daily arrest or a number of oppressi"e prosecutions, or that they are disposed to in"ol"e them in e!pensi"e litigation. There is noallegation that 6iscal Torres was not acting in good faith in the gi"ing of his ad"ice, or that he is not honest in his opinion. The "ery most that is charged against him is that he ismistaken in the construction of a law, which has ne"er been udicially construed andwhich can be construed in the case now pending, to which one of the plaintiffs is a party.
The fact that the criminal charge was filed in %eptember (80(, and that up to dateonly one complaint had been filed, and that from one cause of another the case had notyet been decided, is a strong e"idence that there had not been any disposition on the partof the defendants to make numerous arrests and in"ol"e the plaintiffs in oppressi"elitigation.
6or such reasons, The Court declined to pass upon the constitutional $uestions presented and hold that the temporary inunction should be dissol"ed and the demurrer sustained, with lea"e to plaintiffs to file an amended complaint.
b. 'ERNAN0E v. ALBANO
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&.R. No. L19!/!, )*+*- !(, 196/
$ACTS%#espondent Albano, Congressman of Isabela, lodged a complaint with the ffice
of the City 6iscal of Manila against petitioner -ernande7, then the %ecretary of 6inance
and &residing fficer of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank for "iolation of Article0(4 of the #&C, CA 404 and #A 04*. The complaint re"ol"es around petitioner5s alleged
shareholdings in the @ni"ersity of the 9ast, Bicol 9lectric Co., #ural Bank of =ue"a
Caceres, MD Inc, and @ni"ersity of =ue"a Caceres and the claim that said corporations
obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during
petitioner5s incumbency as presiding officer thereof.
At the oint in"estigation of the charges before respondent 6iscal Don7ales, the
complainant mo"ed to e!clude the alleged "iolation of Article 0(4 of the #&C because it
was already resol"ed by the Court in a case which was ad"erse to -ernande7. 6iscal
Don7ales granted the motion.
Then, petitioner sought the dismissal of the remaining charges upon the a"erment
that EaF "iolation of Article 'II, %ection ((, subsection E0F of the Constitution, punishable
under Commonwealth Act 404, should be prosecuted at the domicile of the pri"ate
enterprises affected there byG and that EbF "iolation of %ection (3 of #A 04* is not
criminal in nature. ismissal was deniedG reconsideration thereof failed.
To restrain the respondent 6iscals from continuing the in"estigation, petitioner
went to the Court of 6irst Instance of Manila on certiorari and prohibition with a prayer
for preliminary inunction. The Court dismissed the petition.
ISSUE%
1hether or not the prosecuting arm of the City of Manila should be restrained
from proceeding with the in"estigation of the charges le"elled against petitioner.
RULIN&%
=o.
The legal mandate in %ection (;, #ule (() of the #ules of the Court is that in all
criminal prosecutions the action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or pro"ince wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place. Thus, where an offense is wholly committed outside the
territorial limits wherein the court operates, said court is powerless to try the case.
%imilarly, the City 6iscal of Manila and his assistants may not in"estigate a crime
committed within the e!clusi"e confines of, say, Camarines =orte. This proposition offers
no area for debate. Because, said prosecuting officers would then be o"erreaching the
territorial limits of their urisdiction, and, in the process, step on the shoes of those who,
by statute, are empowered and obligated to perform that task. They cannot unlawfully
encroach upon powers and prerogati"es of the 6iscals of the pro"ince aforesaid.
&etitioner seeks to bar respondent 6iscals from in"estigating the constitutional
"iolation charged. -is claim is that the Manila 6iscals are powerless to in"estigate him.
-is reason is that the essence of the crime is his possession of prohibited interests in
corporations domiciled in =aga City E#ural Bank of =ue"a Caceres, @ni"ersity of =ue"a
Caceres and Bicol 9lectric Co.,F and in Mandaluyong, #i7al EMD Inc.FG and that the
place where the crime is to be prosecuted is the situs of such shares.
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In effect, petitioner asks us to car"e out an e!ception to the rule that said 6iscals
may not be enoined from conducting the in$uiry aforesaid. 1e would not hesitate to
state that, if it clearly appears that the crime or any essential ingredient thereof was
committed outside the boundaries of the City of Manila, petitioner5s argument should
merit serious consideration. 6or, orderly administration of ustice so demandsG
multiplicity of criminal actions is to be ob"iatedG the long arm of the law cannot be used
in an oppressi"e or "indicti"e manner.
In the case at bar, the charges are not directed against the corporations. =ot mere
ownership of or title to shares is in"ol"ed. &ossession of prohibited interests is but one of
the essential components of the offense. As necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that
petitioner was the %ecretary of 6inance. %o also, the fact that while head of department
and chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested in the
corporations aforesaid which so the dollar allocations, and that he had to act officially, in
his dual capacity, not in Camarines %ur, but in Manila where he held his office.
%ince criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime or
an essential ingredient thereof, took place, it stands to reason to say that the Manila under
the facts obtained here, ha"e urisdiction to in"estigate the "iolation complained of.
. $ORTUN v7. LABAN&, et *3.L#8#8#, M*- !/, 1981
$ACTS%
&etitioner ?udge 6ortun was accused by a member of the bar and a former employee in a letter complaint of a possible irregularity in his claim for gasolineallowance, originally considered by them sufficing to hold him liable administrati"ely.After ; months, the letter+complaint was endorsed to the respondent city 6iscal who thenga"e due course to said complaint by issuing a subpoena. The petitioner contested thelegality of the issuance of said subpoena and asked for the dismissal of the complaint butwas unsuccessful. It appeared that the complaint was only filed by a disgruntled member of the bar who lost 4 out of 8 cases in the petitioner:s sala. =o effort was made either bythe respondent or any of the pri"ate respondents to dispel in any way the doubts raised as
to the bona fides in filing of the complaint.
ISSUE%
1hether or not the respondents acted in accordance with law.
RULIN&%
=o.
The petition made reference to an 9!ecuti"e rder outlining the procedure on
complaints charging go"ernment officials and employees with commission of irregularities. It is therein pro"ided that complaints against presidential appointees, and
udges are included among them, shall be filed with the ffice of the &resident or the
epartment -ead ha"ing direct super"ision or control o"er the official in"ol"ed. At
present, the department head is the %upreme Court, the Constitution ha"ing e!pressly
"ested the power of super"ision o"er all courts to this Tribunal. The remo"al of such
power in the epartment of ?ustice in (8/3, now the Ministry of ?ustice, is a recognition
of the need to preser"e unimpaired the independence of the udiciary, especially so at
present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the e!ecuti"e and the
legislati"e branches. Many are the ways by which such independence could be eroded.
1hen such a case occurs, this Court must act and promptly to set matters right. This is
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what the Court did in its resolution immediately issuing a temporary restraining order
upon the petition being filed. It cannot be too strongly emphasi7ed that a udge of an
inferior court is deser"ing of the full protection of this Tribunal against any form of
"e!ation, incon"enience, or harassment, the more so when, as is $uite e"ident, haste and
recklessness marked the conduct of respondent City 6iscal. The power of administrati"e
super"ision precisely has been granted to the Court to assure that malefactors on the
bench suffer for their misdeeds. Con"ersely, howe"er, when a complaint was utili7ed to
embarrass and humiliate a member of the udiciary, it is broad enough to include such
remedial action in aid of a udge, who, to all the appearances is the "ictim of a deliberate
attempt to impugn his good name and reputation. The udicial power constitutionally
granted to the Court, independently of the grant of super"isory authority, ustifies the
inter"ention of the Court.
6. 0E LEON v. MABANA&/" P53 !"!
In %panish te!t.
/. PLANAS v. &IL&.R. No. L4644", )*+*- 18, 19#9
$ACTS%
In =o"ember (83, Carmen &lanas, then a municipal board member of Manila,
published a statement critici7ing the acts of certain go"ernment officials including &res.
Manuel Que7on in a newspaper. The following morning, she recei"ed a letter from ?orge
'argas, %ecretary to the &resident directing her to report before the Ci"il %er"ice
Commission C%C. %he was directed to e!plain and pro"e her allegations.
%he appeared before the C%C but she $uestioned the urisdiction of the C%C o"er
the matter. %he said that as an electi"e official, she is accountable for her political acts to
her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal
laws, and not to e!ecuti"e officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which
petitioner is affiliated. 6urther, she contends that her statement in the newspaper was
made by her as a pri"ate citi7en and in the e!ercise of her right to discuss freely political
$uestions and cannot properly be the subect of an administrati"e in"estigationG that the
issue is only cogni7able by courts of ustice in case the contents of said statement infringe
any pro"ision of the &enal Code. The C%C, acting through Commissioner ?ose Dil,
howe"er took cogni7ance of the case hence &lanas appealed to the %upreme Court. The
%olicitor Deneral replied for the C%C arguing that under the separation of powers marked
by the Constitution, the court has no urisdiction to re"iew the orders of the Chief
9!ecuti"e which are of purely administrati"e in character.
ISSUE%
1hether or not the %C has urisdiction to re"iew orders issued by the &resident.
RULIN&%
2es.
The acts of the Chief 9!ecuti"e performed within the limits of his urisdiction are
his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain e!ecuti"e action in such cases.
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The rule is non+interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow
that the %C is precluded from making an in$uiry into the "alidity or constitutionality of
his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The
classical separation of go"ernmental powers "iewed in the light of political philosophy is
a relati"e theory of go"ernment.
In the present case, the &resident is not a party to the proceeding. -e is neither
compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The C%C is the party respondent and
the theory is ad"anced by the %olDen that because an in"estigation undertaken by him is
directed by authority of the &resident of the &hilippines, the %C has no urisdiction o"er
the present proceedings instituted by &lanas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that
a subordinate officer of the go"ernment is acting under orders from the Chief 9!ecuti"e
may be an important a"erment, but is neither decisi"e nor conclusi"e upon this court.
>ike the dignity of his high office, the relati"e immunity of the Chief 9!ecuti"e from
udicial interference is not in the nature of a so"ereign passport for all the subordinate
official and employees of the e!ecuti"e epartment to the e!tent that at the mere
in"ocation of the authority that it purports the urisdiction of this court to in$uire into the
"alidity or legality of an e!ecuti"e order is necessarily abated or suspended.
=e"ertheless, the %C ruled that the C%C can take cogni7ance of the case. &lanas
was not denied the right to "oice out her opinion but since she made allegations against
the administration it is but right for her to pro"e those allegations. The C%C has the right
to elicit the truth.
8. *. YOUN& v7. RA$$ERTY&.R. No. 1"9(1, $eb*- 14, 1916.
$ACTS%
n ecember 08, (8(;, the lower court issued a preliminary inunction against
the defendant, his agents, etc., Hordering them and e"ery one of them absolutely to desist
and refrain from in any manner whatsoe"er enforcing or attempting to enforce the
pro"isions of the regulation contained in Internal #e"enue Circular >etter =o. ;4/, in so
far as it refers to the language in which any day book shall be kept, and from arresting,
procuring the arrest or prosecuting criminally or administrati"ely any person who fails tomake the entries re$uired by said circular.H After the termination of the trial of the case
upon its merits, the preliminary inunction was made permanent. The defendant has
appealed.
The circular letter abo"e mentioned re$uires, among other things, e"ery merchant
and manufacturer, with certain specified e!ceptions, subect to the ta! imposed by section
;) of Act =o. 0338, to keep a record of their daily sales either in the 9nglish or the
%panish language, and pro"ides that any "iolation of or failure to comply with the
pro"isions of the circular will subect the guilty person to prosecution under the
pro"isions of section (* of Act =o. 0338.
ISSUE%
1hether or not the regulation is a proper case for inunction.
RULIN&%
2es.
1hile courts of e$uity ha"e no urisdiction o"er the prosecution and punishment
of crimes and misdemeanors and in ordinary criminal cases, such courts will not restraincriminal prosecutions e"en under a "oid law or municipal ordinance, yet courts or e$uity
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may enoin the enforcement of an in"alid law or municipal ordinance where irreparable
inury to property rights would result or where persons would be subect to a municipality
of suits incurred by reason of the penalty attached to a recurring act or omission.
b. YU CON& EN& v. TRINI0A0&.R. No. L!"4/9, $eb*- 6, 19!(
$ACTS%
Act =o. 08/0 EAn act to pro"ide in what languages account books shall be kept,
and to establish penalties for its "iolationF, also known as the Chinese Bookkeeping
Act,J was passed by the &hilippine >egislature and appro"ed in (80(. It pro"ides<
%ection (. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or
corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other acti"ity for the purpose of profitin the &hilippine Islands, in accordance with e!isting law, to keep its account books in
any language other than 9nglish, %panish, or any local dialect.
%ection 0. Any person "iolating the pro"isions of this act shall, upon con"iction,
be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not
more than two years, or both.
2u Cong 9ng, a Chinese merchant, keeps the books of account of his lumber
business in Chinese, as he cannot read, write nor understand 9nglish, %panish, or any
local dialect. -e was arrested for "iolating Act =o. 08/0, and his books were sei7ed.
Trial was about to proceed when 2u Cong 9ng and another petitioner Co >iam
Eon behalf of all other Chinese merchants in the &hilippinesF filed a petition against the
fiscal, the collector of internal re"enue, and the presiding udge.
ISSUES%
1hether or not the temporary inunction issued by the court be stayed if pro"en
that Act =o. 08/0 is constitutional.
RULIN&%
2es.
The %upreme Court is granted both concurrent urisdiction in prohibition with
Courts of 6irst Instance o"er inferior tribunals or persons, and original urisdiction o"er
Courts of 6irst Instance when such courts are e!ercising functions without or in e!cess of
their urisdiction. It is a urisdiction, howe"er, which must be e!ercised circumspectly, for
otherwise, the court would usurp the powers of udges of 6irst Instance. The law ha"ing
gi"en to udges of 6irst Instance urisdiction to try criminal cases, the appellate court
should not meddle with the initiation or trial of such cases, e!cept for good reasons, and
should not permit the substitution of e!traordinary proceedings for appeal.
As before held by the Court, and by the 6ederal courts, e$uity has power, to be
e!ercised in power cases, to restrain criminal prosecutions under unconstitutional
statutes, and to grant preliminary inunctions where the constitutionality of a gi"en penal
law is doubtful and fairly debatable, and permanent inunctions where the laws are held
in"alid. The remedy by inunction to restrain the enforcement of unconstitutional statutes
or abuse of authority under a "alid statute, seems to be limited to cases where property
rights are threatened with irreparable inury or where persons would be subected to a
multiplicity of suits.
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9. SAN&ALAN& v7. PEOPLE AN0 AVENI0A,&.R. No. L1616", Otobe #1, 196"
$ACTS%
n April (,(8*0, an information was filed by the assistant city fiscal with the
C6I of Manila against Magdalena %angalang et al., wherein it was alleged that she and
her cohorts committed theft by taking and carrying away (*,))) empty ute bags
belonging to the =A#IC. The case was dismissed due to insufficiency of e"idence. More
than ;years later, the same assistant city fiscal again charged petitioner and one >eandro
Castelo, this time with the crime of 9stafa alleged to ha"e been committed by them by
inducing one 9nri$ueta &asco$uin to buy certain =A#IC in"oices for (*,))) empty
sacks, which in"oices turned out to be fictitious and falsified. A third information was
filed for the same and identical offense of 9stafa charged in the second case in spite of
the order of dismissal therein which had long become final and conclusi"e. Again
in"oking double eopardy, the petitioner filed a motion to $uash the information, but therespondent udge denied the motion and ordered petitioner:s arraignment.
ISSUE%
1hether or not the respondent udge:s action is in accordance with law.
RULIN&%
=o.
An order sustaining a motion to $uash on the ground of double eopardy
constitutes a bar to another prosecution for the same cause. The record clearly shows that
in the second criminal charge petitioner:s motion to $uash on the ground of double
eopardy was sustained and the case dismissed as against her. In not therefore dismissing
the information in the third proceedings charging the petitioner with the same offense, the
responding ?udge committed gra"e abuse of his discretion.
1". Lope v7. C5t- ):;eL!(/9S, Otobe !9, 1966
$ACTS%
In the month of 6ebruary (84;, petitioner #oy 'illasor, as administrator of the
intestate estate of the spouses Manuel M. Meia and Dloria, together with his co+
petitioners Angelina Meia >ope7 and Aurora Meia 'illasor and other heirs of said
spouses, entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad >a7atin for the de"elopment
and subdi"ision of 3 parcels of land belonging to said intestate estate. %ubse$uently
>a7atin transferred his rights under the contract to the Terra e"elopment Corporation.
Months later, petitioners and the other co+heirs filed an action in the Court of 6irst
Instance of Que7on for the rescission of said contract for alleged gross and willful
"iolation of its terms. Thereafter, >a7atin and the Terra e"elopment Corporation, in
turn, filed with the 6iscal5s ffice of the City of Angeles a complaint against petitioners
for an alleged "iolation of the pro"isions of Article (/0 in relation to those of Article (/(,
paragraph ;, of the #e"ised &enal Code. After conducting a preliminary e!amination, the
City 6iscal of Angeles filed with the Court of said City an information charging
petitioners with the crime of falsification of a pri"ate document upon the allegation that
they made it appear in the contract that Aurora 'illasor was the HguardianH of the minor
Deorge Meia and that Angelina >ope7 was similarly the HguardianH of the minor
Ale!ander Meia, when in truth and in fact they knew that they were not the guardians of said minors on the date of the e!ecution of the document.
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@pon petition of the parties thus charged, the City 6iscal of Angeles
rein"estigated the case on March /, (84* to gi"e them an opportunity to present
e!culpatory e"idence, and after the conclusion of the rein"estigation the parties charged
mo"ed for the dismissal of the case mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles
had no urisdiction o"er the offense because the pri"ate document that contained the
alleged false statement of fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of said
city. As the resolution of this motion to dismiss was delayed and in the meantime the City
Court had set the Criminal Case for arraignment, the defendants secured from said court
se"eral postponements of the arraignment.
In "iew of the City 6iscal5s continued failure to act on the motion to dismiss the
case, petitioners filed on =o"ember 04, (84* with the City Court a motion to $uash upon
the ground that said court had no urisdiction o"er the offense charged. The complainants
in the case, with the conformity of the City 6iscal, filed an opposition thereto, and on
6ebruary 3, (844 the respondent udge denied said motion to $uash and reset the
arraignment of all the defendants on March * of the same year. &etitioners filed the
present action for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE<
1hether or not the City Court of Angeles City has urisdiction to try and decide
the Criminal Case for alleged falsification of a pri"ate document by the parties named in
the information.
RULIN&%
=o.
It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was
committed not only determines the "enue of the action but is an essential element of
urisdiction. Thus, under the pro"isions of %ection 4 of the ?udiciary Act of (8;,
municipal courts ha"e original urisdiction only o"er criminal offenses committed within
their respecti"e territorial urisdiction. Indeed, the lack of urisdiction of the City Court of
Angeles o"er the criminal offense charged being patent, it would be highly unfair to
compel the parties charged to undergo trial in said court and suffer all the embarrassment
and mental anguish that go with it.
11. RUSTIA v. OCAMPOCA&.R. No. 4/6", M* !(, 196"
$ACTS%
n %eptember 3), (83*, petitioner #ustia filed a criminal complaint for
dereliction of duty against respondent campo.
n ctober /, (83*, the respondent ?udge 'illareal, ha"ing been designated torecei"e the preliminary e"idence in support of the petitioner5s complaint, prior to the
issuance of the warrant for the arrest of the accused, proceeded in open court to recei"e
said e"idence, oral and documentary, and an affida"it of the clerk of the court, 'icente
Albert.
n ctober (*, (83* said respondent udge entered a resolution denying the
issuance of the warrant of arrest and dismissing the complaint.
&etitioner filed an appeal but it was denied.
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ISSUE%
1hether or not an appeal lies from the resolution of the respondent udge
refusing to issue a warrant of arrest and dismissing the complaint.
RULIN&% =o.
In the case at bar, the complaint was not filed in the ustice of the peace court but
in the Court of 6irst Instance, under the pro"isions of section 3/ of Act =o. (40/, from
whose decision, in preliminary in"estigations of crimes denounced to it, no appeal to this
court is pro"ided. The appeal pro"ided for in section (; is from resolutions of ustices of
the peace ordering the release of an accused after conducting the corresponding
preliminary in"estigation, but not from resolutions of Courts of 6irst Instance ordering
said release. Inasmuch as the right to appeal is not inherent in e"ery accused, but granted
by the constitution of law, appeal does not lie from a resolution of a Court of 6irst
Instance refusing to issue a warrant of arrest and dismissing a complaint.
1!. BORLON&AN, )R. ET AL. v. PE
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appro"ed by the Monetary Board of the B%&. Thus, the Monetary Board subse$uently
lifted &IC:s statutory recei"ership of the bank.
ISSUE%
1hether or not there was probable cause to pursue the criminal cases to trial.
RULIN&%
=one.
Based on the documents and the complaint+affida"it of Atty. &eKa, the City
&rosecutor concluded that probable cause for the prosecution of the charges e!isted. n
the strength of the same documents, the trial court issued the warrants of arrest. The
Court, howe"er, cannot find these documents sufficient to support the e!istence of
probable cause.
The re$uirement of personal knowledge should ha"e been strictly applied
considering that herein petitioners were not gi"en the opportunity to rebut the
complainant:s allegation through counter+affida"its.
The Court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the e!ercise of
the public prosecutor:s function without any showing of gra"e abuse of discretion or
manifest error in his findings. Considering, howe"er, that the prosecution and the court a
$uo committed manifest errors in their findings of probable cause, the Court therefore
annuls their findings.
1#. Reto v7. C*7te3o, 18 L.). =19(#>, 5te: 5+ R*?o* v7. A3ve+:5*, CA&.R. No.#"/!"R, Otobe 8, 196!
RULIN&%
As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with the
Court. The Court:s duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the
e!ecuti"e or udicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done
without or in e!cess of urisdiction or with gra"e abuse of discretion amounting to want
of urisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not
be restrained or stayed by inunction, preliminary or final. There are, howe"er, e!ceptions
to this rule, one of which is where the charges are manifestly false and moti"ated by the
lust for "engeance.
14.
&UIN&ONA, et *3. v. CITY $ISCALL6""##, Ap53 4, 1984
$ACTS%Clemente a"id in"ested with the =ation %a"ings and >oan Association, Inc.
E=%>AF from March 0), (8/8 to March (8(. -owe"er, n March 0(, (8(, =%>A was
placed under recei"ership by the Central Bank. -ence, a"id filed claims for his
in"estments and those of his sister. n ?uly 00, (8(, a"id recei"ed a report from the
Central Bank that only &3)*,0(.80 of those in"estments were entered in the records of
=%>A. Thereafter, a"id demanded for the remaining balances of his in"estments but
Duingona ?r., who was then =%>A &resident, paid only &0)),))). n ecember
03,(8(, pri"ate respondent a"id filed an action charging the directors and officers of
=%>A with 9stafa for misappropriating the balance of the in"estments, at the same time
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"iolating Central Bank Circular =o. 34; and related Central Bank regulations on foreign
e!change transactions.
At the inception of the preliminary in"estigation, The =%> officers mo"ed to
dismiss the charges against them for lack of urisdiction because a"id5s claims allegedly
comprised a purely ci"il obligation which was itself no"ated, but was denied.
ISSUE%
1hether or not the transactions between a"id and =%>A were simple loans
which are ci"il in nature, and not 9stafa.
RULIN&%
There was simple loan and not 9stafa.
There is merit in the contention of the petitioners that their liability is ci"il in nature and
therefore, public respondents ha"e no urisdiction o"er the charge of estafa. It must be
pointed out that when pri"ate respondent a"id in"ested his money with the bank, the
contract that was perfected was a contract of simple loan or mutuum and not a contract of
deposit. Thus, Article (8) of the =ew Ci"il Code pro"ides that fi!ed, sa"ings, and
current deposits of+money in banks and similar institutions shall be go"erned by the
pro"isions concerning simple loan.
The relationship between the pri"ate respondent and the =%>A is that of creditor
and debtorG conse$uently, the ownership of the amount deposited was transmitted to the
Bank upon the perfection of the contract and it can make use of the amount deposited for
its banking operations, such as to pay interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals. 1hile
the Bank has the obligation to return the amount deposited, it has, howe"er, no obligation
to return or deli"er the same money that was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to
return the amount deposited will not constitute estafa through misappropriation
punishable under Article 3(*, par. lEbF of the #e"ised &enal Code, but it will only gi"e
rise to ci"il liability o"er which the public respondents ha"e no+ urisdiction.
In conclusion, considering that the liability of the petitioners is purely ci"il in
nature and that there is no clear showing that they engaged in foreign e!change
transactions, the Court held that the public respondents acted without urisdiction when
they in"estigated the charges against the petitioners. Conse$uently, public respondents
should be restrained from further proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the case
to continue, e"en if the petitioners could ha"e appealed to the Ministry of ?ustice, would
work great inustice to petitioners and would render meaningless the proper
administration of ustice.
1(. SALON&A v7. PA
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The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila
area in the months of August, %eptember and ctober of (8). 'ictor Burns >o"ely, ?r,
one of the "ictims of the bombing, implicated petitioner %alonga as one of those
responsible.
n ecember (), (8), the ?udge Ad"ocate Deneral sent the petitioner a =oticeof &reliminary In"estigationJ in &eople ". Benigno A$uino, ?r., et al. Ewhich included
petitioner as a co+accusedF, stating that the preliminary in"estigation of the abo"e+
entitled case has been set at 0
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espite the %C:s dismissal of the petition due to the case:s moot and academic
nature, it has on se"eral occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where
mootness was clearly apparent. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating bench and bar on the e!tent of protection gi"en by constitutional
guarantees.
16. RO0RI&UE v7. CASTELO L6#/4, A;7t 1, 19(#
RULIN&%
The rule is based not only upon respect for the in"estigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the ffice of the mbudsman but upon practicality
as well. therwise, the functions of the courts will be grie"ously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of in"estigatory proceedings conducted by
the ffice of the mbudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same
way that the courts would be e!tremely swamped if they could be compelled to re"iew
the e!ercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they
decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a pri"ate complainant.
There are instances, constituting e!ceptions to the general rule, when the Court
will inter"ene in the prosecution of cases, one of which is when the preliminary
inunction has been issued by the %upreme Court to pre"ent the threatened unlawful
arrest of petitioners.
1/. ROBERTS, ET AL. v. COURT O$ APPEALS&.R. No. 11#9#", M* (, 1996
$ACTS%
&etitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of &epsi Cola&roducts &hils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the &epsi =umber 6e"erJ
promotion by handlers of the supposedly winning 3;8J &epsi crowns. f the ; casesfiled against the petitioners, probable cause was found by the in"estigating prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.
n (0 April (883, the information was filed with the trial court without anythingaccompanying it. A copy of the in"estigating prosecutor:s ?oint #esolution wasforwarded to and recei"ed by the trial court only on 00 April (883. -owe"er, noaffida"its of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary in"estigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were foundin the records of the case as of (8 May (883.
n (* April (883, petitioners filed a petition for re"iew to the epartment of
?ustice seeking the re"ersal of the finding of probable cause by the in"estigating prosecutor. They also mo"ed for the suspension of the proceedings and the holding in
abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the public
prosecutor also mo"ed to defer the arraignment of the accused+appellants pending the
final disposition of the appeal to the ?.
n (/ May (883, respondent ?udge Asuncion issued the challenged order E(F
denying, on the basis of Crespo "s. Mogul, the foregoing motions respecti"ely filed by
the petitioners and the public prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of
arrest after ?une (883J and setting the arraignment on 0 ?une (883. In part, respondent
udge stated in his order that since the case is already pending in this Court for trial,
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following whate"er opinion the %ecretary of ?ustice may ha"e on the matter would
undermine the independence and integrity his court. To ustify his order, he $uoted the
ruling of the %upreme Court in Crespo, which stated< In order therefor to a"oid such a
situation whereby the opinion of the %ecretary of ?ustice who re"iewed the action of the
fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the %ecretary of ?ustice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for re"iew or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
&etitioners went to the CA, arguing that the respondent udge had not the slightest
basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest. After finding that a copy of the public prosecutor:s ?oint #esolution had in fact
been forwarded to, and recei"ed by, the trial court on 00 April (883, the CA denied
petitioners: application for writ of preliminary inunction. The CA ruled that the ?oint
#esolution was sufficient in itself to ha"e been relied upon by respondent ?udge in
con"incing himself that probable cause indeed e!ists for the purpose of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrestJ and that the mere silence of the records or the absence
of any e!press declarationJ in the $uestioned order as to the basis of such finding does
not gi"e rise to an ad"erse inference, for the respondent ?udge enoys in his fa"or the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty. #oberts, et al. sought
reconsideration, but meanwhile, the ? affirmed the finding of probable cause by the
in"estigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for mootness.
ISSUES%
(. 1hether or not ?udge Asuncion committed gra"e abuse of discretion in denying, onthe basis of Crespo "s. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance
the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for
re"iew filed with the ? shall ha"e been resol"ed.
0. 1hether or not ?udge Asuncion committed gra"e abuse of discretion in ordering the
issuance of warrants of arrest without e!amining the records of the preliminary
in"estigation.
3. 1hether or not the %upreme Court may determine in this proceeding the e!istence of
probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa.
RULIN&%
(. 2es. ?udge Asuncion committed gra"e abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of
Crespo "s. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance
of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for re"iew filed with
the ? shall ha"e been resol"ed.
There is nothing in Crespo "s. Mogul which bars the ? from taking cogni7ance of an
appeal, by way of a petition for re"iew, by an accused in a criminal case from anunfa"orable ruling of the in"estigating prosecutor. It merely ad"ised the ? to, as far
as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for re"iew or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court.J
1hether the ? would affirm or re"erse the challenged ?oint #esolution is still a matter
of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent ?udge Asuncion to deny the
motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following grounds.
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whate"er opinion the
%ecretary of ?ustice may ha"e on the matter would undermine the independence and
integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of administering ustice.
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The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing
of the aforementioned motions at that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to
withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for re"iew re"ersing
the ?oint #esolution of the in"estigating prosecutor. -owe"er, once a motion to dismiss
or withdraw the information is filed the trial udge may grant or deny it, not out of
subser"ience to the %ecretary of ?ustice, but in faithful e!ercise of udicial prerogati"e.
0. 2es. ?udge Asuncion committed gra"e abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of
warrants of arrest without e!amining the records of the preliminary in"estigation.
The teachings then of %oli"en, Inting, >im, Allado, and 1ebb reect the proposition that
the in"estigating prosecutor:s certification in an information or his resolution which is
made the basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the udicial
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In 1ebb, this
Court assumed that since the respondent ?udges had before them not only the 04+page
resolution of the in"estigating panel but also the affida"its of the prosecution witnessesand e"en the counter+affida"its of the respondents, they made personal e"aluation of the
e"idence attached to the records of the case.
In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on (0 April (883 with
the trial court. A copy of the ?oint #esolution was forwarded to, and recei"ed by, the trial
court only on 00 April (883. And as re"ealed by the certification of respondent udge:s
clerk of court, no affida"its of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the
proceedings during the preliminary in"estigation, or other documents submitted in the
course thereof were found in the records of this case as of (8 May (883. Clearly, when
respondent ?udge Asuncion issued the assailed order of (/ May (883 directing, amongother things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended
information, and ?oint #esolution as bases thereof. -e did not ha"e the records or
e"idence supporting the prosecutor5s finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he
made no specific finding of probable causeG he merely directed the issuance of warrants
of arrest after ?une 0(, (883.J It may, howe"er, be argued that the directi"e presupposes
a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional re$uirement for
the protection of indi"idual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conecture, or e"en
con"incing logic.
3. =o. the %upreme Court may not determine in this proceeding the e!istence of probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for
their prosecution for the crime of estafa.
rdinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in
an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the e!ecuti"e or udicial
determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in e!cess of
urisdiction or with gra"e abuse of discretion amounting to want of urisdiction. This is
consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed
by inunction, preliminary or final.
There are, howe"er, e!ceptions to the foregoing rule. But the Court refused to ree"aluate
the e"idence to determine if indeed there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest in this case. 6or the respondent udge did not, in fact, find that probable cause
e!ists, and if he did he did not ha"e the basis therefor. Moreo"er, the records of the
preliminary in"estigation in this case are not with the Court. They were forwarded by the
ffice of the City &rosecutor of Que7on City to the ? in compliance with the latter5s
(st Indorsement of 0( April (883. The trial court and the ? must be re$uired to
perform their duty.
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18. AL0IVIA v7. REYES&.R. No. 1"!#4!, )3- #, 199!
$ACTS%
&etitioner was charged with $uarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor5s
permit in "iolation of an rdinance of the Municipality of #odrigue7, #i7al.
The offense was allegedly committed on May ((, (88). The referral+complaint of
the police was recei"ed by the ffice of the &ro"incial &rosecutor of #i7al on May 3),
(88). The corresponding information was filed with the MTC of #odrigue7 on ctober
0, (88).
&etitioner mo"ed to $uash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was denied. n appeal to the #TC of #i7al, the denial was
sustained by the respondent udge.
In the present petition for re"iew on certiorari, the petitioner argues that the
information was filed way beyond the two+month statutory period from the date of the
alleged commission of the offense, hence the charge against her should ha"e been
dismissed on the ground of prescription.
6or its part, the prosecution contends that the prescripti"e period was suspended
upon the filing of the complaint against her with the ffice of the &ro"incial &rosecutor.
ISSUE%
1hether or not the filing of informationcomplaint before the fiscal:s office constituting a
"iolation of a special lawordinance interrupts prescription.
RULIN&%
=o.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 3), (83, two
months before the promulgation of the #ule on %ummary &rocedure on August (, (83.
n the other hand, %ection ( of #ule (() is new, ha"ing been incorporated therein with
the re"ision of the #ules on Criminal &rocedure on ?anuary (, (8*, e!cept for the last paragraph, which was added on ctober (, (8.
As it is clearly pro"ided in the #ule on %ummary &rocedure that among the
offenses it co"ers are "iolations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the
charge against the petitioner, which is for "iolation of a municipal ordinance of
#odrigue7, is go"erned by that rule and not %ection ( of #ule (().
@nder %ection 8 of the #ule on %ummary &rocedure, Hthe complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
e!amination or preliminary in"estigation.H Both parties agree that this pro"ision does not pre"ent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary in"estigation if he wants to.
-owe"er, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or
not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary in"estigation. This means that the
running of the prescripti"e period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that.
If there be a conflict between the #ule on %ummary &rocedure and %ection ( of
#ule (() of the #ules on Criminal &rocedure, the former should pre"ail as the special
law. And if there be a conflict between Act. =o. 3304 and #ule (() of the #ules on
Criminal &rocedure, the latter must again yield. &rescription in criminal cases is asubstanti"e right.
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It is the Court:s conclusion that the prescripti"e period for the crime imputed to
the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May ((, (88), and ended two
months thereafter, on ?uly ((, (88), in accordance with %ection ( of Act =o. 3304. It was
not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the ffice of the &ro"incial &rosecutor
on May 3), (88), as this was not a udicial proceeding. The udicial proceeding that
could ha"e interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the MTC of
#odrigue7, but this was done only on ctober 0, (88), after the crime had already
prescribed.
19. BUREAU O$ CUSTOMS v. PETER S'ERMAN, ET AL.&.R. No. 19"48/, Ap53 1#, !"11
$ACTS%
#espondent:s company, Mark %ensing &hilippines, Inc. imported from Australia
0**, /),))) pieces of finished bet slips and 0)*, 0)) rolls of finished thermal papers
from ?une 0))* to ?anuary 0))/. The shipment was released from the Clark %pecial
9conomic one, and was brought to the &hilippine Charity %weepstakes ffice for its
lotto operations in >u7on. -owe"er, M%&I did not pay duties or ta!es prompting the
Bureau of Customs to file a criminal complaint before the ? against the respondents.
%tate &rosecutor #ohaira >ao+Tamano found probable cause against respondents
and recommended the filing of Information against them.
#espondents filed a petition for re"iew before the %ecretary of ?ustice during the pendency of which the Information was filed on April ((, 0))8 before the Court of Ta!
Appeals.
nly respondents Caigal and >ingan were ser"ed warrants of arrest following
which they posted cash bail bonds.
n March 0), 0))8, the %ecretary of ?ustice re"ersed the %tate &rosecutor:s
#esolution and directed the withdrawal of the Information.
&etitioners motion for reconsideration ha"ing been denied, it ele"ated the case by
certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, &rosecutor >ao+Tamano filed before the CTA a Motion to
1ithdraw Information with >ea"e of Court to which petitioner filed an pposition.
#espondents mo"ed for the dismissal of the Information.
The CTA granted the withdrawal of the Information.
ISSUE%
1hether or not a public prosecutor has the power of direction and control o"er
prosecution of criminal cases.
RULIN&%
2es.
It is well+settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the e!ecuti"e department of
the go"ernment whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are
faithfully e!ecuted. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute "iolators.
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted
under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws,
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the e!igencies of public ser"ice sometimes re$uire the designation of special prosecutors
from different go"ernment agencies to assist the public prosecutor. The designation does
not, howe"er, detract from the public prosecutor ha"ing control and super"ision o"er the
case. The participation in the case of a pri"ate complainant, like petitioner, is limited to
that of a witness, both in the criminal and ci"il aspect of the case.
As petitioners: motion for reconsideration of the challenged CTA #esolution did
not bear the imprimatur of the public prosecutor to which the control of the prosecution
of the case belongs, the present petition fails.
!". PEOPLE v7. PA0ICA&.R. No. 1"!64(, Ap53 /, 199#
$ACTS%
The records show that >eon Maraas, ?r. EappellantF, #omeo &adica, >eslie Dans,
6lorentino 6abrigas, #omeo &rade7, >eonardo Maraas and >eopoldo Maraas were
originally charged in the latter part of (8/ with kidnapping for ransom with murder of
6rancis Banaga and illegal possession of firearms before Military Commission =o. 0/.
-owe"er, on ?anuary ((, (8/8, counsel for accused >eon Maraas, ?r. prayed for the
transfer of the case to the ci"il courts.
n August (/, (8(, the ffice of the &ro"incial 6iscal of #i7al filed an
information for kidnapping for ransom with murder against the accused, but with the
e!ception of appellant whose name was inad"ertently not included therein. A separatecharge for illegal possession of firearms was lodged but the case was later placed in the
archi"es some time in (8*.
Accused #omeo &adica and appellant were both arraigned on ?anuary (*, (80
and, with the assistance of their respecti"e counsel, both pleaded not guilty. It appears,
howe"er, that appellant entered his plea during the arraignment under the name of
H>eonardo Maraas.H
-owe"er, upon disco"ery of the omission of appellant5s name in the original
information, the prosecution filed a motion on =o"ember (4, (8; for the admission of an amended information including appellant5s name as one of the accused. The appellant
entered a plea of guilty upon being arraigned on the amended information. Accused
&adica was discharged from the information to be utili7ed as a state witness.
After more than years of trial, the trial court rendered its assailed decision
pronouncing the guilt of appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Tomas Banaga,
father of 6rancis Banaga, the sum of &3),))) as indemnity for the death of the child.
ISSUE%
1hether or not the failure of the prosecution to charge appellant as an accused in
the original information is a fatal defect.
RULIN&%
=o.
The rule is that the complaint or information should sufficiently allege the name
of the accused, failing which the complaint or information would be rendered in"alid.
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In the case at bar, there is no dispute that appellant was arraigned under the
original information and that he entered thereto a plea of not guilty under the name of
H>eonardo Maraas.H At that uncture, appellant should ha"e raised the error as to his
identity by filing a motion to $uash on the ground of lack of urisdiction o"er his person.
But appellant did not do so but instead "oluntarily appeared at the arraignmentand pleaded not guilty under a different name. Conse$uently, the trial court ac$uired
urisdiction o"er his person and it could ha"e rendered a "alid udgment of con"iction
based on the original information e"en without need of an amendatory information to
correct appellant5s name.
The subse$uent amendment to insert in the information >eon Maraas, ?r.5s real
name in"ol"ed merely a matter of form as it did not, in any way, depri"e appellant of a
fair opportunity to present his defense. Moreo"er, the amendment neither affected nor
altered the nature of the offense charged since the basic theory of the prosecution was not
changed nor did it introduce new and material facts. %uch an amendment is e!plicitlyallowed under the second paragraph of %ection /, in relation to %ection (;, #ule (() of
the #ules of Court, the pertinent portion of which pro"ides that the information or
complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without lea"e of court, at any time
before the accused pleadsG and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by
lea"e and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without preudice to
the rights of the accused. At any rate, whate"er irregularity may ha"e attended the
inclusion of appellant5s name as an accused in the amended information has been wai"ed
by his subse$uent appearance and entry of plea at his arraignment under said amendatory
information.
!1. *+: !!. PEOPLE O$ T'E P'ILIPPINES v. $ELICIANO, )R., et *3.&.R. No. 196/#(, M*- (, !"14
$ACTS%
n ecember , (88;, at around (0
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the #ules on Appeal, the case was remanded to the CA which affirmed the decision of the#TC. The decision of the CA was then brought to the %C for re"iew.
ISSUE%
1hether or not the Information is sufficient as to fully apprise the accused+
appellants of the charge against them.
RULIN&%
2es.
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them "iolates
their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them. They argue that the prosecution should not ha"e included the phrase Hwearing
masks andor other forms of disguiseH in the information since they were presentingtestimonial e"idence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell
off.
@pon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor
against the accused, in compliance with the due process of the law. #ule ((), %ection (,
paragraph ( of the #ules of Criminal &rocedure pro"ides that< A complaint or information
is sufficient if it states the name of the accusedG the designation of the offense gi"en by
the statuteG the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offenseG the name of
the offended partyG the appro!imate date of the commission of the offenseG and the place
where the offense was committed.
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase Hwearing
masks andor other forms of disguiseH in the information does not "iolate their
constitutional rights.
9"ery aggra"ating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information.
6ailure to state an aggra"ating circumstance, e"en if duly pro"en at trial, will not be
appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the
aggra"ating circumstance of Hwearing masks andor other forms of disguiseH in the
information in order for all the e"idence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the
trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggra"ating circumstance because, like nighttime,
it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his
crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial e"idence that tends to pro"e
that the accused were masked but the masks fell off does not pre"ent them from including
disguise as an aggra"ating circumstance. 1hat is important in alleging disguise as an
aggra"ating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The
inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise theaccused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to
conceal their identity.
The introduction of e"idence which shows that some of the accused were not
wearing masks is also not "iolati"e of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes
that Hthe act of one is the act of all.H This would mean all the accused had been one in
their plan to conceal their identity e"en if there was e"idence later on to pro"e that some
of them might not ha"e done so.
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In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated
murder, and attempted murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is
that the elements of the crime ha"e been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to
the time, place, and persons in"ol"ed in the offense.
!#. *+: !4. PEOPLE O$ T'E P'ILIPPINES v. MAMARUNCAS, ET AL.&.R. No. 1/949/, )*+*- !(, !"1!
$ACTS%
Around noontime on 6ebruary (, (884, Baudelio Batoon, #ichard Batoon, ?uanitoDepayo and a certain =itoJ were working on "ehicles inside Baudelio Batoon:s autorepair shop situated along the highway in Tubod, Baraas, Iligan City.
Baginda &alao then entered the shop accompanied by appellants #enandangMamaruncas and &endatum Ampuan. Baginda &alao wore desert camouflage fatigueswhile his 0 companions wore &hilippine Army tropical green fatigues. Baginda &alaoshowed Baudelio Batoon an arrest warrant and told the latter he was ser"ing it againstBatoon.
The arri"al of Baginda &alao:s group prompted ?uanito Depayo and #ichardBatoon to stop their work and obser"e what was happening.
Baudelio Batoon told Baginda &alao to ust wait awhile, as they would settle thematter after he finishes tuning+up an engine he had been working on.
Baginda &alao reacted by slapping the "ictim:s stomach and pointing a .;* caliber pistol at him. Baudelio Batoon then tried to grab &alao:s gun, causing the 0 of them tograpple for the same. As these two wrestled for control of the gun, #enandangMamaruncas, who was behind Baudelio Batoon, shot from behind Batoon:s right thighwith a .3 cal. homemade gun. &endatum Ampuan, who was also standing behindBaudelio Batoon, followed up by shooting Batoon:s left arm pit with a .;* cal.homemade pistol. Baudelio Batoon fell to the ground and Baginda &alao finished him off with a single .;* cal. shot to the back. ?uanito Depayo and #ichard Batoon saw the entirescene, stunned and unable to do anything. 6rom their "antage points 3 to four ; metersaway, these witnesses had a clear and unobstructed "iew of the entire incident.
Meanwhile, &olice Inspector Draciano Miares, then Commanding fficer of theIligan City &=& Mobile 6orce Company, was riding a ci"ilian car along the highway,heading towards Iligan City proper. -e was accompanied by his dri"er, %&3 1illiam2ee, and %&3 Deorge Aleo. They heard the gunshots emanating from the auto repair shop at Baraas, prompting Inspector Miares to order his dri"er to stop the car. Theyalighted and proceeded to the source of the gunshots. At the repair shop, they saw 3 menin camouflage gear with guns drawn and pointed at a person already lying on the ground.Inspector Miares: group shouted at the camouflaged gunmen to stop what they weredoing and to drop their firearms, at the same time announcing that they were policemen.
The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at the policemen. The latter fired back. uring the e!change of gunfire, Baginda &alao ran behind the Batoon house, while#enandang Mamaruncas and &endatum Ampuan ran towards the road and a nearby car.Inspector Miares was able to hit Mamaruncas and Ampuan, while %&3 2ee likewise hitAmpuan. Mamaruncas, who managed to get inside the car, and Ampuan were thencaptured by the policemen. The lawmen also ga"e chase to Baginda &alao but he escaped.
ther responding policemen brought Mamaruncas and Ampuan to the hospital for treatment and they were e"entually placed under detention. Baudelio Batoon was broughtto the hospital by his wife but he was pronounced dead on arri"al.
The #egional Trial Court held them guilty as principals by direct participation inthe killing of Baudelio Batoon. It ga"e full faith and credence to the e"idence of the
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prosecution especially on the presence of conspiracy among the malefactors and rendereda "erdict of con"iction.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the #TC ecision. %aid courtruled that the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses: testimonies pointed out by the
appellants pertain only to minor and collateral matters which do not dilute the probati"eweight of said testimonies. #egarding the erroneous designation of appellant Ampuan:sname in the Information, the court held that such error was only a formal defect and the proper correction was duly made without any obection on the part of the defense.
ISSUE%
1hether or not the information filed before the trial court was substantiallydefecti"e.
RULIN&%
=o.
Appellants a"er that the Information filed before the trial court was substantiallydefecti"e considering that it accuses Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same personwhen in fact they were identified as different persons. As such, Ampuan was not able tocomprehend the Information read to him.
Appellants failed to raise the issue of the defecti"e Information before the trialcourt through a motion for bill of particulars or a motion to $uash the information. Their failure to obect to the alleged defect before entering their pleas of not guilty amounted toa wai"er of the defect in the Information. bections as to matters of form or substancein the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.J #ecords e"en show thatthe Information was accordingly amended during trial to rectify this alleged defect butappellants did not comment thereon.
!(. PEOPLE O$ T'E P'ILIPPINES v. LOMA@UE&.R. No. 189!9/, )+e (, !"1#
$ACTS%
Appellant was charged under separate Informations for (3 counts of #ape by%e!ual Intercourse allegedly committed against his stepdaughter HAAAH, a minor. 9!ceptas to the dates of occurrence and the age of HAAAH at the time of the commission of thecrimes, the accusatory portions in the Informations are similarly worded as theInformation in the criminal case. In addition, appellant was also charged with Acts of >asci"iousness committed against his stepdaughter AAA.J.
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all the Informations. %oonthe cases were set for &re+Trial where only the minority of HAAAH was stipulated upon.Accordingly, the oint trial on the merits ensued.
After trial, the #TC found HAAAH to be a credible witness and reected the
defense of denial and alibi proffered by the appellant. It rendered a decision declaringappellant guilty of / counts of rape by se!ual intercourse.
Appellant thus assailed his con"iction before the CA. The CA affirmed thedecision of the #TC.
ISSUE%
1hether or not the special $ualifying circumstance of relationship was properlyalleged in the Information and pro"ed during the trial.
RULIN&%
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=o.
@nder Article 044+B of the #e"ised &enal Code , rape is $ualified and the penaltyof death is imposed when the "ictim is below ( years of age and the offender is a parent,ascendant, step+parent, guardian, relati"e by consanguinity or affinity within the third
ci"il degree or the common+law spouse of the parent of the "ictim. To ustify theimposition of the death penalty, howe"er, it is re$uired that the special $ualifyingcircumstances of minority of the "ictim and her relationship to the appellant be properlyalleged in the Information and duly pro"ed during the trial. These two circumstancesmust concur.
The Court held that the court a $uo erred in finding appellant guilty of rape in its$ualified form. Indeed, the subect Information clearly a"ers the special $ualifyingcircumstances of minority of HAAAH and her filiation to the appellant. 1hile the prosecution was able to sufficiently pro"e HAAA:sH minority through the latter:stestimony during the trial and by the presentation of her Certificate of >i"e Birth showing
that she was born on %eptember (*, (8*, it howe"er, failed to pro"e the fact of relationship between her and the appellant. =otably, said alleged relationship was note"en made the subect of stipulation of facts during the pre+trial. The allegation thatHAAAH is the stepdaughter of appellant re$uires competent proof and should not be easilyaccept