Digest

MO YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATIONGR L-21289, 4 October 1971

41 SCRA 292

Fact of the case:  

On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962,she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer forpreliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue:

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriageto a Filipino citizen.

Held:Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying aFilipino,

native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is notdisqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise,an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows thePhilippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalizationas Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through anaturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it shouldfollow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytimethe citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case,Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to suchcitizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed outagain and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to havebecome a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al asEdilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

REPUBLIC VS. DELA ROSA232 SCR 785

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992.On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of th Philippines. The respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule, that it shall be done on January instead of having it on March, " where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. The motion was granted and the hearing was moved on February. Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court.Issue:

WON the petitioner was duly re-admitted o his citizenship as Filipino.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

YU VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO169 SCRA 364

Doctrine: Reacquisition of citizenship

FACTS:

Petitioner Yu, originally a Portuguese national, was naturalized as a Philippine citizen on 10February 1978. However, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued a renewed PortuguesePassport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. SaidConsular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986.The CID detained the petitioner pending his deportation case. The petitioner, in turn, filed a petition forhabeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not

petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship

HELD:

Yes. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. Petitioner, while still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980. Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED. Respondent’s motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediately executory. While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to “maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

LABO, JR. VS. COMELEC176 SCRA 1

FACTS:

Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being bigamous.

Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship.

According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance.

Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be annulled.

ISSUES:

The original issue raised before the Supreme Court concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition for quo warranto was not filed on time, hence the COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding his citizenship. However, the SC decided to rule on the merits of the case, given that the issue is also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen holding public office in the Philippines), and in the interest of the speedy administration of justice.

1. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship?

2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen?

3. Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines?

4. If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace him?

HELD/RATIO:

1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not require the

payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in this case.

2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation.

- Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest.

- The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy.

- The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.

3. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was elected.

4. Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo.

*Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.):

Although no decision has been rendered by the COMELEC and elevated to the SC for review, it is undeniable that a foreigner cannot be allowed to hold public office in the Philippines. It is regrettable, however, that Labo should be disqualified on the basis of his citizenship because he has already achieved a lot while serving as Mayor during the pendency of the case.

TOPIC: ARTICLE IV OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE

FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC257 SCRA 727Jne 28, 1996

Ponente: Justice PANGANIBAN, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner Frivaldo filed his certificate for Candidacy for Governor about 3 weeks before the election. Private Respondent Lee, another candidate for the said position, filed a petition to disqualify Frivaldo by reason of not being a citizen of the Philippines. A week before the election, Second Division of COMELEC promulgated a resolution granting the petition of Lee. A motion for Reconsideration was filed by Frivaldo which remained un acted until after the elections. Thus, his candidacy continued and he was voted during the elections. Few days after the Election, COMELEC En Banc affirmed the promulgated resolution of the Second Division. Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes in the said election. Lee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as Governor. Lee was then proclaimed as Governor. Frivaldo filed a petition for annulment of the proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation alleging that he had already taken his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines which he filed a couple of months ago before the election.

Frivaldo’s motion was recognized and was then proclaimed as Governor.

Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by COMELEC En Banc.

ISSUES:

Private Respondent Lee filed this instant petition for Certiorari, Preliminary Injunction, and Annulment of the COMELEC decision and resolution.

W/N Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and legal. If it, did was it able to cure his lack of citizenship.

If not, may it be given a retroactive effect?

DECISION:

The Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of COMELEC. Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be: A Citizen of the Philippines The court held that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. At the same time, literally speaking, such qualification of citizenship should thus be Possessed when the “elective [elected] official” begins to govern. In the instant case, Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective official) began; he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold the office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.

FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC174 scra 245

Facts:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not aFilipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agent abroad.

Issue:

Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.

Held:

No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entiretenure. Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. In the certificate of candidacy he filed, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the United States,unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen, "meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime. The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of

effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each Stateto determine under its law who are its nationals." It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States. If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned isnot that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. Gutierrez Jr, Concurring: I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural infinities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a person who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of any province. It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protest whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory and jurisdictional. As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and proclamation should have been filed with ten days after the proclamation of election results. The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within which petitions against the results of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of such disputes. The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against any public officer who performs an act which works a forfeiture of his office. However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that there are no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, the Court should allow a person like Estuyeor his league to bring the action. I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, I believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly. The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the procedure prohac vice.

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee vs.FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant

(58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974)

Facts:

Florentino Pilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child, Millian Pilapil, as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughter’s minority. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child, Melchora Cabanas, the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and the consideration of the child’s welfare. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy.

Issue:Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from the deceased.

Ruling:

With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis, the decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states that “the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." And Article 321 states that "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives.” With the added condition that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another rational consideration. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."

MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION114 SCRA 77FACTS:

1. Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 forpartition.2. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola.3. On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an appeal.4. On October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November 11, 1963.5. On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of the properties subject to partition under Civil Case No. 3010, was acquired by purchase by respondent Macariola and his wife, who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.,6. Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals “with acts unbecoming of a judge.”7. Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated , among others, Art. 1491, par. 5of the New Civil Code and Article 14 of the Code of Commerce.

ISSUE:

Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge?

HELD:

Article 1491 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. In the case at bar, when respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the elementary period hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of litigation. Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965,respondent’s order date October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long been final for there was no appeal from said orders. Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6,1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No.3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5,Article 1491 of the New Civil Code. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty , the political laws of the former sovereign ,whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

THE HOLY SEE VS. RTCGR 101949

Dec. 1, 1994

FACTS:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots. These lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana.

ISSUE:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. In the present case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

SEAFDEC VS. NLRCG.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA 580

FACTS:

Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner,Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National LaborRelations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases, theprivate respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment by thepetitioner.The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization composedof various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the jurisdictionof the public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases.The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is notimmune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has,however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.

RULING:

The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is aninternational agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. It has already been held in SoutheastAsian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor RelationsCommission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner Southeast Asian FisheriesDevelopment Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agencybeyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD),enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory itsoffice is located. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunityfrom local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by thetribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjectionof such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenientmedium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influenceor control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilitiesimpartially on behalf of its member-states.

ERNESTO CALLADO vs. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI)G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.:

Facts:

Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged with: (1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor; (2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery, and(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same.

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.

The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.

In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."

Issue:

Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship?

Held:

No. P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction.

The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned.

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS VS. NLRC (G.R. No. 113191)

(18 September 1996; J. VITUG, Ponente; First Division)

Facts:

A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed against the Asian Development Bank ("ADB"). Upon receipt of summonses, both the ADB and the DFA notified the Labor Arbiter that

the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement"). The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit, and issued a judgment in favor of the complainant. The ADB did not file an appeal, but the DFA sought a nullification with the NLRC. The latter denied the request.

Issue:

Whether or not ADB is immune from suit?

Ruling:

No. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Bank’s officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected.

Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."

The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with different private companies. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis. Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for

gain or profit. The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.

Issue:

Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition?

Ruling:

The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the international community. When international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive department with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the international arena.

JEFFREY LIANG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR 125865)

Date: March 26, 2001

Facts:

Two criminal information’s for grave oral defamation were filed against Liang, a Chinese national who was employed asan Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by his secretary Joyce Cabal, before the MeTC Mandaluyong City. The MeTC, acting pursuant to an advice from the DFA that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes,

dismissed the criminal information’s against him. The RTC Pasig City annulled and set aside the MeTC’s dismissal. Hence, Liang filed a petition for review before the SC which was denied ruling that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Hence, the present MR.

Issue:

WON Liang is immune from suit

Held:

No.

Ratio:

The Court found no reason to disturb the earlier decision. The slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. The issue of whether or not Liang’s utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine J. Puno’s concurring opinion:

Liang contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic immunity by the DFA is apolitical question. It is solely within the prerogative of the executive department and is conclusive upon the courts. Furthermore, the immunity conferred under the ADBCharter and the Headquarters Agreement is absolute. It is designed to safeguard the autonomy and independence of international organizations against interference from any authority external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow such organizations to discharge their entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this immunity is when there is an implied or express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by statute. The exception allegedly has no application to the case atbar."It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political questionand courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of the government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction." Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity and hence his immunity is not absolute. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other

hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, that is, only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes. This is the reason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers and employees only with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity.Liang cannot also seek relief under the mantle of "immunity from every form of legal process" accorded to ADB as an international organization.The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official acts. He stands charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering defamatory remarks against his secretary. Considering that the immunity accorded to petitioner is limited only to acts performed in his official capacity, it becomes necessary to make a factual determination of whether or not the defamatory utterances were made pursuant and in relation to his official functions as a senior economist.

FAROLAN VS CTA217 SCRA 298

Facts:

S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port of Manila carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Baging Buhay Trading (Baging Buhay). The import was classified under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B of the Tariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11,350.00.The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment upon hearing the information that the shipment consisted of mosquito net made of nylon under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs

Code. Upon re-examination, itturns out that the shipment was undervalued in quantity and value as previously declared. Thus the Collector of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the government. Private respondent filed a petition on August 20, 1976 for the release of the questioned goods which the Court denied. On June 2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales were released to Bagong Buhay after several motion. The sixteen remaining bales were missing. The respondent claims that of the 143,454 yards released, only 116,950 yards were in good condition and the rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it actually lost.

Issue:

Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards actually lost by the private respondent.

Held:

Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent’s claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state.

On this point, the political doctrine that “state may not be sued without its consent,”categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is defined not a proprietary function. Thus private respondents claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fails.

VETERANS MANPOWER VS COURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. 91359FACTS:

VMPSI (Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc.) alleges that the provisions of RA 5487(Private Security Agency Law) violate the provisions of the Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations of restraint of trade and tend to favor and institutionalize the PADPAO(Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Services, Inc.). Furthermore, VMPSI questions the provision on requiring all private security agencies or company security forces to register as members of any PADPAO chapter organized within the region. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for 8hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat

competition when it charged Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the MOA. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI. VMPSI filed a civil case against the PC chief and PC-SUSIA (Philippine Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security and Investigation Agencies). PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the case is against the State which had not given consent thereto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not VMPSI s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the Statewithout its consent.

HELD:

Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PCChief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents. Petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto.

M.H. WYLIE V RARANGG.R. NO. 74135, MAY 28, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioner M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Private Respondent (PR) Aurora Rarang was assigned as merchandise control guard in the Office of the Provost Marshal M.H. Wylie, in his capacity as asst. admin. Officer, supervised the publication of the so-called “Plan of the Day” (POD) published daily by the US Naval Base Station. The POD featured important announcements, necessary precautions and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of the regular features of the POD was the “action line inquiry” (NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY), a telephone answering device in the Office of the Admin Asst intended to provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer on matters they feel should be brought to

his attention for correction or investigation. On February 3, 1978, the POD under the (NAVSTA) action line inquiry, published and mentioned a certain “AURING” as “…a disgrace to her division and to the Office of theProvost Marshal. The same article explicitly implied that Auring was consuming and appropriating for herself confiscated items likelike cigarettes and foodstuffs. The PR was the only one who was named “Auring” in the Office of the Provost Marshal. As a result thereof, she was investigated by her superior. The PR commenced an ACTION FOR DAMAGES in the CFI of Zambales against M.H. Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the US Naval Base alleging that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. The TC ruled in favour of the PR and dismissed the suit against the US Naval Base. The IAC (now, CA) affirmed the judgment of the TC with modifications as to the amount of damages awarded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the American naval officers (such as Wylie and Capt. Williams) who commit a crime ortortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit. Does the grant of rights, power, and authority to the US under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes and torts?

HELD:The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith (Chavezv. Sandiganbayan).It may be argued, as a general rule, that Capt. Williams as commanding officer of the naval base was far removed in the chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base. However, in this particular case, the records show that the offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and that he approved it. ART. 2176, CC prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person’s act or omission constituting fault or negligence, stating that, “Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,..” Moreover, ART. 2219(7),Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation.”Indeed, the imputation of theft contained in the POD was a defamation against the character and reputation of the PR. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name “Auring” if the article will be published. The petitioners, however, were NEGLIGENT because under their direction, they issued the publication without deleting the said name. Such act or omission was ULTRA VIRES and CANNOT be deemed part of official duty. It was a TORTIOUS ACT which ridiculed the PR. As a result of petitioner’s act, PR suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, especially so, since the article was baseless and false. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities, are liable for the damages they caused the Private Respondent.