Mayor Bayani Alonte vs Judge Maximo Savellano, NBI & People of the PhilippinesDue Process in Criminal Proceedings Waiver of Right to Due ProcessAlonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonetes house who was then the mayor of Bian, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Bian. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.ISSUE:Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.HELD:The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
PEOPLE VS. DRAMAYO [42 SCRA 60; G.R. L-21325; 29 OCT 1971]Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted byCoffeeholic WritesLabels:Case Digests,Political Law
Facts:Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case where he is an accused. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who wasreturningfrom Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. Only Dramayo and Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for murder. Hence the appeal
Issue:Whether or not the accusedscriminal liabilityproved beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:Yes. It is to be admitted that thestartingpoint is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to thefundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on theprosecutiondemonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is moral certainty. "By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mindrest easyupon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded bythe lawto convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense."
Thejudgment ofconviction should not have occasioned anysurpriseon the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by theprosecution. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted,the elementof conspiracy likewise being allegedlypresent, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability.
MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC Case DigestMARQUEZ vs. COMELEC243 SCRA 538
Facts:It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that country.
Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondents certificate of candidacy on the ground of the candidates disqualification was filed by petitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but the latter dismissed the petition.
Issue:Whether private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice.
Held:The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
Article 73. Disqualifications The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) xxxx
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment.
It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons who has been convicted by final judgment. However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly denied the petition for quo warranto. The Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceed with the case.
Corpuz v People 194 SCRA 73 (1991)Facts:Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower courts decision finding him guilty formalversationof public funds. The accused was the acting supervising cashier at the Provincial Treasurers office. He denied having misused the whole amount ofP72,823.08 which was discovered to be a shortage from thegovernment fundscontending that the P50,000.00 was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their paymaster Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued while the petitioner was on leave and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer Aluning to post said amount in hiscash bookdespite not actually receiving the amount.Issue:Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the accused of the charge against him
Held:It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield to the positive findings that he malversed thegovernment fundsconsidering all the evidences presented that point out to his guilt on the charge imputed against him. Records shows that the checks issued for the paymaster were duly liquidated to the accused and there were inconsistent entries on hiscash booksand that he was not really on leave on the day the said checks were disbursed by the paymaster.
Feeder International Line vs. CAFacts:The M/T "ULUWAI"foreignvesselof Honduranregistry,owned and operatedbyFeeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, wascarrying 1,100 metric tons ofgas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation ofZamboanga. The vessel anchored in Iloilo without notifying the customs authorities,who upon knowing this, discovered that itdid not have the required ship and shippingdocuments. The vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure andDetention over the samewas issued after dueinvestigation.The vessel was thenfound guilty ofviolatingthe Tariff and CustomsCode of thePhilippines. This decisionwas affirmed both by the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of appeals.Issue:WON petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its rightto be presumed innocent was notrecognized and the decision was not supported byproof beyond reasonable doubtHeld:Proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in naturesince they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition uponhim of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify theforfeiture of the goods. In this case, the degree of proof required is merely substantialevidence which means such relevant evidence asa reasonable mind might accept asadequate to support a conclusion.In the case at bar, it was held that the Government has sufficiently established thatan illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been committed with theuse of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and itscargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code.Moreover, the petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke theright to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is anaccused in a criminal case
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR 1950]Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted byCoffeeholic WritesLabels:Case Digests,Political Law
Facts:Appellant Frisco Holgado was chargedin the courtof First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and withoutjustifiablemotive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr.Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter.
Issue:Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.
Held:Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held toanswerfor a criminal offense withoutdue processof law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." Incriminal casesthere can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show whether the supposedinstructionsof Mr.Ocampowas real and whether it had reference tothe commissionof the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposedinstructionis a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr.Ocampoand found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a merestatementof the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.
People v Agbayani 284 SCRA 315 (1998)Posted by EvelynFacts:The appellant was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter and was found guilty of the crime of rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the new counsel of the accused assailing the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his right to choose his own counsel and the violation of the appellants right for a 2 day preparation for trial.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of therecord todisclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse thejudgment ofconviction and to send the case back for a new trial.Held:It is settled that the failure of therecord todisclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right.
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time. It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded.Only when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial.Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right. It is untenable to believe that the counsel who represented the appellant was not prepared during the trial as records showed he was able to cross-examine the complainant and there was no ground to claim he is incompetent to represent the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Amion v Chiongson 301 SCRA 614 (January 22, 1999)Posted by EvelynFacts:This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the respondent judge for ignorance of the law and oppression for vehemently insisting of appointing the accused-appellant counsel de officio despite the appellants opposition because he has his own counsel of choice in the person of Atty.Depasucat. However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat did not appear in court which prompted respondent judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to represent the accused stating on record that his representation is without prejudice to the appearance of the accused own counsel. This was done in order to avoid delay of the trial since the complainant already expressed frustration on the so many postponement of the hearing.Issue:Whether or not there ismeritof invoking the right to counsel of his own choice as asserted by the accused in the case at bar.
Held:The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent judge devoid ofmerit.Anexaminationof related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigationrather than one who is the accused in a criminalprosecution. Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive andconstitutional rightto due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduledhearings. It was the strategic machination of delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave rise to the need of appointing him counsel de officio by the court as delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to speedy disposition of a case and causes delay in the administration of justice.
PEOPLE VS. QUITLONGVITUG ; July 10, 1998NATUREAppeal from the decision of the RTCFACTS- Calpito was astudent from Baguio city.One time,he wanted some fishballs so he and Gosil boughtsome fishballs worth P15.When Calpito countedhischange, he found out that he only received P35 forhisP100.Confrontedby Calpito andGosil, thefishball vendor would not admit that he had short-changed Calpito.The 3men keptarguing.Momentslater,Soriano saweight menrushingtowardsGosiland Calpito.Calpito got stabbed and fell totheground.- The RTC found Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlongand Emilio Senoto guilty of murder for the killing ofJonathan Calpito.Accused-appellants,shortlyafterthe filing of the information, submitted a motion forreinvestigation alleging that it was a certainJesusMendozawho stabbed the victim.The trial courtacted favorably onthe motion.The City Prosecutorfiled a motion to admit an amended information onthe basis of affidavits.The information, as amended,included Jesus Mendoza among the named accused.But unlike accused-appellants who were immediatelyarrested afterthe commission ofthe crime, JesusMendoza remained at large.At their arraignment,the detained accused pleaded not guilty to the crimecharged.-On21April 1995, thetrialcourt, followinghisevaluationoftherespectivesubmissionsoftheprosecution and the defense, including their rebuttaland sur-rebuttal evidence, rendered its now assaileddecision.ISSUES1.WON the RTC abused its discretion and/oracted in excess of or without jurisdiction infindingthat therewas conspiracy betweenand among the accused-appellants2.WON the RTC gravely abused its discretionand/oractedinexcessoforwithoutjurisdiction in finding the accused-appellantsguilty ofthe crime ofMurder instead ofHomicideHELD1.YES, Quitlong is guilty of murder while the other 2are only accomplices.2. NO,the crime was qualified The crime committedwasqualifiedbyabuseofsuperiority.Whilesuperiorityinnumberwouldnotpersemeansuperiorityin strength, enough proofwas adduced,however, to show that the attackers had cooperatedinsuchawayas tosecureadvantageoftheirsuperiority in strength certainly out of proportion tothemeansofdefenseavailabletothepersonattacked.- Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, inparticular, mandates that no person shall be heldanswerableforacriminaloffensewithoutdueprocess of law and that in all criminal prosecutionsthe accused shall first be informed of the nature andcause of the accusation against him. The right to beinformed of any such indictment is likewise explicit inprocedural rules.- object of informing an accused in writing of thecharges against him: First. To furnish the accusedwith such a description of the charge against him aswill enable him to make his defense; and second, toavailhimselfofhisconvictionoracquittalforprotection against a further prosecution for the samecause; and third, to inform the court of the factsalleged,sothatitmay decidewhethertheyaresufficient in law to support a conviction, ifone shouldbe had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542).In order that this requirement may be satisfied, factsmust be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crimeis made up of certain acts and intent; these must besetforthinthecomplaintwithreasonableparticularityoftime, place, names(plaintiff anddefendant),andcircumstances.Inshort,thecomplaint must contain a specific allegation of everyfact andcircumstancenecessary toconstitute thecrime chargedDISPOSITIONappellant Ronnie Quitlong is foundguilty ofthe crimeofmurder forthe killing ofJonathanCalpito.AppellantsSalvadorQuitlongandEmilio Senoto, Jr., are found guilty as accomplices inthe commission of the crime
Pecho v People 262 SCRA 518 (1996)Posted by EvelynFacts:The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the complex crime of attemptedestafathru falsification of official and commercial document was assailed with the contention of the defense that the accused may not be convicted of the crime for double jeopardy. The charge against the accused wasonviolation of RA 3019 of which he was acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime. In the absence of evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accused was acquitted but the court held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for attemptedestafathru falsification of official and commercial document which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the defense of double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a bar forprosecutionon the crime of attemptedestafathru falsification of official and commercial document and that the accused was not informed of this charge against him in thefilingof the information.Issue:Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to which he is convicted
Held:The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as follows:
1. Tofurnishthe accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense;2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a furtherprosecutionfor the same cause;3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of law.The complaintmust contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime.What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law.It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he can be convicted for both or either of the charges.
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the crime ofestafabeyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was deemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was acquitted.
SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [131 SCRA 184; G.R. NO.L-65952; 31 JUL 1984]Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted byCoffeeholic WritesLabels:Case Digests,Political Law
Facts:Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst.Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the course of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, markedbill, and he had supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and CorruptPracticesAct (R.A.3019). Amotionfor reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.
Issue:Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as contract or transaction within the purview of .RA.3019.
Held:R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corruptpracticesofpublic officers- In addition to acts or omissions ofpublic officersalready penalized byexistinglaws, the following shall constitute corruptpracticesof any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Govt. and any other party wherein the public officer in hisofficialcapacity has to intervene underthe law.
The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC and not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged and is not included in the offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).
The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial orbusiness transaction, but includes all kinds of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative innature.The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was neither a contract nor transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions. And this element is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC.
BORJA VS. MENDOZA [77 SCRA 422; G.R. NO.L-45667; 20 JUN 1977]Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted byCoffeeholic WritesLabels:Case Digests,Political Law
Facts:Borja was accused of slight physical injuries inthe Cityof Cebu. However, he was not arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It wasallegedthat the failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was alsoallegedthat without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered TheSolicitor Generalcommented that the decision should be annulled because there was no arraignment.
Issue:Whether or Not petitionersconstitutional rightwas violated when he was not arraigned.
Held:Yes. Proceduraldue processrequires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is also not justdue processthat requires an arraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on thenatureof the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With the violation of theconstitutional rightto be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that theSolicitor Generalagreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of therequirementsofdue processto ensure a fair and impartial trial.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. SeniningdatedDecember 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. MendozadatedNovember 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded tothe CityCourt of Cebu for theprosecutionof the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect andobservanceof the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.
People v Tee GR No. 140546-47 (January 20, 2003)Posted by Evelyn"rightsof the accused to speedy trial"
FactsThe case involves an automatic review ofjudgmentmade against Tee who was convicted for illegalpossession of marijuanaand sentenced to death. The defense assailed the decision of the court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant. They further contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of theprosecutionto produce their witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearingdatesthereby slowing down the trial procedure.
IssueWhether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during the hearing of the case.HeldThe court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be in general 180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduledhearingsof the case.The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured;or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
It was shown by the records that theprosecutionexerted efforts in obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct ofprosecutionand the accused and the prejudice and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation ofthe constitutional rightsof the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always subjected to postponement for reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused.
Flores Vs. People (December 10, 1974)
Flores vs. PeopleGR L-25769 | December 10, 1974
FACTS:
Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were accused for robbery.Information was filed in December 1951.They were found guilty of the crime charged in November 1955.Notice of appeal was file in December 1955.It was until February 1958 that action was taken by CAa resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the disposition of the case.Such resolution was amended dated August 1959 which granted the petitioners to set aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on new facts may be received and a new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered.The case was returned to the lower court but nothing was done for about a year because the offended party failed to appear despite the 6/7 dates set for such hearing.Furthermore, when the offended party took the witness stand, his testimony was characterized as a mere fiasco as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime and even failed to identify the 2 accused.
The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the records to the appellate tribunal.5 more years elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought dismissal of the case against them due to inordinate delay in the disposition (from December 1955- May 1965).CA was unresponsive notwithstanding the vigorous plea of the petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second MR dated January 1966.CAs defense is that the case was not properly captioned as People of the Philippines and without Court of Appeals being made a party to the petition.
ISSUE:WON constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.
HELD:YES.Petition for certiorari was granted.Orders denying Motion to dismiss as Motion to Reconsideration are set aside and nullified.Criminal Case against petitioners was dismissed.
Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.An accused is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity.He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time.The Constitution does not say that such right may be availed only where the prosecution of a crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal.It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals.Where a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced.
Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation.There should not be too much significance attached to the procedural defect (refer to CAs defense).CA failed to accord respect to this particular constitutional right amounting at the very least to a grave abuse of discretion.
CONDE VS. RIVERA [45 PHIL 650; G.R. NO. 21741; 25 JAN 1924]Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted byCoffeeholic WritesLabels:Case Digests,Political Law
Facts:AureliaConde, formerly amunicipalmidwife inLucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no lessthefive information for variouscrimesandmisdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel athearingsno less than on eight different occasions only to seethecause postponed, has twice been required to come totheSupreme Court for protection, and now, afterthepassage of more than one year fromthetime whenthefirst information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue:Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.
Held:Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in allcriminal prosecutionstheaccused shall enjoytheright to have a speedy trial.AureliaConde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay downthelegal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements ofthetrial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year,theaccused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal oftheinformation, or if he be restrained of his liberty, byhabeas corpusto obtain his freedom.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.Section 1.Title. This Act shall be known as the"Speedy Trial Act of 1998."Sec. 2.Mandatory pre-trial in criminal cases. In all cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:cralaw(a) Plea bargaining;(b) Stipulation of Facts;(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.Sec. 3.Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or entered into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used in evidence against the accused. The agreements in relation to matters referred to in Sec. 2 hereof is subject to the approval of the court:Provided,That the agreement on the plea of the accused to a lesser offense may only be revised, modified, or annulled by the court when the same is contrary to law, public morals, or public policy.Sec. 4.Non-appearance at pre-trial conference. Where counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his/her lack of cooperation, the pre-trial justice or judge may impose proper sanctions or penalties.Sec. 5.Pre-trial order. After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.Sec. 6.Time limit for trial. In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.Sec. 7.Time limit between filing of information and arraignment and between arraignment and trial. The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court.If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence.Sec. 8.Time limit following an order for new trial. If the accused is to be tried again following an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may extend such period but in any case shall not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of time shall make trial within thirty (30) days impractical.Sec. 9.Extended time limit. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. 7 of this Act, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by Sec. 7 of this Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80) days.Sec. 10.Exclusions. The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:cralaw(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and hearing on his/her mental competency, or physical incapacity;(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the accused;(3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided, That the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the accused or an essential witness.For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness shall be considered absent when his/her whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he/she is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his/her whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. An accused or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his/her whereabouts are known but his/her presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he/she resists appearing at or being returned for trial.(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, or any offense required to be joined with that offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable under this Sec. unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.Sec. 11.Factors for granting continuance. The factors, among others, which a justice or judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (f) of Sec. 10 of this Act are as follows:cralaw(a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this Act.No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Sec. 10 shall be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor.Sec. 12.Public attorney's duties where accused is imprisoned. If the public attorney knows that a person charged of a crime is preventively detained, either because he/she is charged of a bailable crime and has no means to post bail, or is charged of a non-bailable crime, or is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution, the public attorney shall promptly:cralaw(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner mandating such person to so advise the prisoner of his/her right to demand trial.(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of his/her right to demand trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs the person having custody that he/she demands trial, such person shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly supported request for temporary custody of the prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made available to that public attorney.Sec. 13.Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit. If an accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Sec. 7 of this Act as extended by Sec. 9, the information shall be dismissed on motion of the accused. The accused shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with the exclusion of time under Sec. 10 of this Act.In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution on the implementation of this Act and on the administration of justice. Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this Sec..Sec. 14.Sanctions. In any case in which counsel for the accused, the public prosecution or public attorney:cralaw(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is totally frivolous and without merit;(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he/she knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act, the court may, without prejudice to any appropriate criminal and/or administrative charges to be instituted by the proper party against the erring counsel if and when warranted, punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows:(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused, by imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty percent (50%) of the compensation to which he/she is entitled in connection with his/her defense of the accused;(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public prosecutor a fine not exceeding Ten thousand pesos (10,000.00); and(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to practice before the court considering the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.The authority to punish provided for by this Sec. shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to the court. The court shall follow the procedures established in the Rules of Court in punishing any counsel or public prosecutor pursuant to this Sec..Sec. 15.Rules and regulations. The Supreme Court shall promulgaterules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars which shall seek to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases.The rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars formulated shall provide sanctions against justices and judges who willfully fail to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act.Sec. 16.Funding. For the effective implementation of the rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars promulgated under this Act, the amount of Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) annually shall be appropriated from the allocation of the Supreme Court under the General Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such additional amounts as may be necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.Sec. 17.Act not a bar to speedy trial claim under the Constitution. No provision of this Act shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by Article III, Sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.Sec. 18.Repealing clause. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.Sec. 19.Separability clause. In case any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect.Sec. 20.Effectivity. This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation:Provided,That Sec. 7 of this Act shall become effective after the expiration of the aforementioned third-calendar-month period provided in Sec. 9 of this Act.
Garcia v Domingo 52 SCRA 143 (1973)
Facts: For the convenience of the parties the trial was held in the air conditioned chamber of the respondent judge Garcia.The complaintwas under the premise that such act is in violation of the right to hold a public trial.
Issue: Whether or not such proceeding of holdingtrialinthe chamberof the judge in violation to the principle ofrightto a public trial.Held: It is not in violation of the right to a public trial since the trial was still open to public and there is no showing that the public was deprived to witness the trial proceeding.
Re: Request For Live Tv Of Trial Of Joseph EstradaRe: Request For Live Tv Of Trial Of Joseph Estrada360 SCRA 248A.M. No 01-4-03-ScJune 29, 2001
Facts:The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo.
Issue:Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the court.
Held:The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of publics attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only be evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial, it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public. Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the multiple murder cases againstMaguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. June 14,2011. Right to fair trial v. freedom of the press.Right to fair trial v. freedom of the press. Prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the rightto a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test that the right of an accused to a fairtrial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is notper seprejudicial to theright of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impairedcapacity of ajudge to render a bias-free decision.FACTS: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitionerswere killed on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. This tragic incident came to beknown as Maguindanao massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and additionalcharges of rebellion against 197 accused. Almost a year later on November 19 2010, the NationalUnion of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMANetwork Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities andmembers of the academe filed a petition before this court prayingthat live televisionand radiocoverage of the trial in this criminal cases be allowed, recording devises be permitted inside thecourt room to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to governthe broadcast coverage and the use of devices.ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for radio and television coverage of the MaguindanaoMassacre should be allowed.HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The Court partially grants pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a livebroadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to certain guidelines as enumerated. The presentpetition which asserts the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fairand public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, rightof free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by theCourt.Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges,petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fairtrial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. andEstrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press,that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and thatthere must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-freedecision.Mere fear ofpossible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting inthe deprivation of the right toa fair trialIn this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise rightsin the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interferewith the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings.Indeed, the Court cannot glossover what advances technology has to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of keyconstitutional precept into the workable context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It isthe use and regulation thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to theadvantage and furtherance of the various rights involved, within the guidelines.
Talino vs SandiganbayanFACTSThe petitioner, along with several others, were charged infourseparate informations with estafa through falsification of publicdocuments for having allegedly conspired to defraud the governmentin the total amount of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairsclaimed to have been undertaken, but actually not needed and nevermade, on four government vehicles, through falsification of thesupporting papers to authorize the illegal payments.The cases weretried jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had rested,when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and petitionerTalino asked for separate trials, which wereallowed. They thenpresented their evidence at such trials, whilethe other accusedcontinued defending themselves in the original proceedings, atwhich one of them, Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony against thepetitioner, relating in detail his participation in the questionedtransactions. In due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decisionin all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat andRenato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimescharged while absolving the other defendants for insufficientevidence. This decision is nowchallenged by the petitioner on theground that it violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by theConstitution.ISSUEWON the right of confrontation was violatedHELDThe right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rightsguaranteed by theConstitutionto the person facingcriminalprosecution who should know, in fairness, who hisaccusers are andmust be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. Noaccusation is permitted to be made against his backor in hisabsence nor is any derogatory information accepted if itis madeanonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannotstand by their libels and must shroud theirspite in secrecy. That isalso the reason whyex parteaffidavits are not permitted unless theaffiant is presented in courtand hearsay is barred save onlyin thecases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration.The Court finds that the respondent court did not consider thetestimony given by Ulat in convictingthe petitioner. The part of thatdecision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulatat all butconfined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving thequestioned vouchers as proof of his complicityin the plot to swindlethe government.The petitioner makes much of the statement in the Comment that thepetitioner's guilt could be deduced "from the evidence for theprosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat,"but that was not therespondent court speaking. That was the Solicitor General'sanalysis. As far asthe Sandiganbayan was concerned, the saidtestimony was inadmissible against the petitioner because he "didnot cross examine Ulat and was not even requiredto be presentwhen the latter was testifying. In fact, the respondent court evenexpressed the wish that Ulat had been presented as rebuttal witnessin the separate trial of the petitioner as there would then have been"no impediment to the use of his testimony against the otheraccused. " As it was not done, the trial court could not and did notconsider Ulat's testimony in determining the petitioner's part in theoffenses
