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1. Classification of the 1987 ConstitutionThe Philippine Constitution is:a. Written- embodied in a set of documents, distinguished by the respective articles that it contains;b. Conventional- it is enacted, formally struck off at a definite time and place, following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body which, in turn, is the 1987 Constitutional Convention;c. Rigid- it can be amended only by a formal and difficult or tedious process;d. Normative- the government adjusts its actions to the norms of the Constitution

2. Brief History of the Philippine Executive Commission Order no. 1 (Japanese Occupation)The Philippine Executive Commission (PEC) was issued on January 23, 1942with Jorge Vargas as its first Chairman. This was organized by Order No. 1 by the Commander of the Japanese forces and was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. The PEC was created as the temporary care-taker government of the Greater Manila area and eventually of the whole Philippines during the Japanese occupation of the country during World War II. General Masaharu Homma dissolved the Commonwealth of the Philippines and established the Philippine Executive Commission, a caretaker government, with Vargas as its first chairman in January 1942. KALIBAPI Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas (Tagalog for the "Organization in the Service of the New Philippines") was formed by Proclamation No. 109 of the Philippine Executive Commission (Komisyong Tagapagpaganap ng Pilipinas), a piece of legislation passed on December 8, 1942, banning all existing political parties and creating the new governing alliance.On May 6, 1943, Japanese Premier Hideki Tojo during a visit to the Philippines, pledged to establish the Republic of the Philippines. This pledge of Tojo prompted the "KALIBAPI," to call for a convention on June 19, 1943 and twenty of its members were elected to form the Preparatory Commission for Independence. The commission tasked to draft a constitution for the Philippine Republic and elected head was Jose P. Laurel.The Preparatory Commission presented its draft Constitution on September 4, 1943 and three days later, the "KALIBAPI" general assembly ratified the draft Constitution.By September 20, 1943, the "KALIBAPI's" representative groups in the country's provinces and cities elected from among themselves fifty four (54) members of the Philippine National Assembly, the legislature of the country, with fifty four (54) governors and city mayors as ex officio members.Three days after establishing the National Assembly, its inaugural session was held at the pre-war Legislative Building and elected Benigno Aquino, Sr. as its first Speaker and Jos P. Laurel as President of the New Philippine Republic.The Japanese-sponsored establishment of the Republic of the Philippines was proclaimed on October 14, 1943 with Jos P. Laurel being sworn-in as President.3. Art. 2 Sec 1PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, et al., respondentsFACTS: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services (in excess of their 8 regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be of more than eight (8) hours daily.Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction. Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from CA No. 444 which was denied and dismissed by RTC and CA. Motion for Reconsideration were also DENIED.ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is exempt from CA No. 444.RULING: It is an intrinsic state role which makes the govt obligated to support its people and promote their general welfare. The case portrays the expanded role of government needed by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant functions, which the Chief Justice points out, is already irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. He says that "The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete." The distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is now considered obsolete. The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration be DENIED.

4. Article 2 Sec 28ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE, respondents.

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, DOTC entered into a ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of PhP 16 Billion. The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege.

ISSUE: Whether or not the executive privilege is a reasonable condition to protect public interest

RULING: The action of invoking the executive privilege is valid. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose is to assure that the nation will receive the benefit of untrammeled communication and exchange of information between the President and his/her advisers in the process of forming policies in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution.The reason in invoking the privilege is to protect the presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim.

WHEREFORE, respondent Committees Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

5. Article 6, Section RODOLFO S. BELTRAN,et al., Petitioners vs THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Respondent

Facts: Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks. Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation of RA 7719 or the National Blood Service Act. Section 7 of RA 7719 provides phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said provision on the ground, among others, that such represents undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power

Ruling: Yes, the validity of RA 7719 is affirmed.

The promotion of public health is an essential obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.

Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2.

6. Article 6, Section 5PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), petitioner v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts: Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a motion for reconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These resolutions delisted PGBI from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. PGBI filed its opposition to Resolution No. 8679 and likewise, sought for accreditation as a party-list organization.ISSUE: whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBIRuling: No, because PGBI only failed to meet the second requisite for disqualification and not the first one. The law is clear the COMELEC may upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.

7. MILES ANDREW MARI ROCES, petitioner, v HRET and MARIA ZENAIDA B. ANG PING, Respondents. Facts: Petitioner Miles Roces and former Congressman Harry Ang Ping filed their respective COCs for the position of Representative for the 3rd Cong District of Manila in the May 2004 elections.On January 5, 2004, a registered voter questioned Mr. Ang Pings candidacy before the COMELEC through a petition to deny his COC. The petition alleged that Mr. Ang Ping misrepresented himself to be a natural-born citizen, hence was disqualified for the position.COMELEC issued an order scheduling the promulgation of its resolution on May 5, 2004. Two days before the scheduled promulgation, Mr. Ang Ping filed with the COMELEC a Sworn Declaration of Withdrawal of his COC. The next day, the political party of Mr. Ang Ping, sought that Mr. Ang Pings wife, Ma. Zenaida Ang Ping to substitute for him. The COMELEC First Division, issued a resolution granting the petition to deny due course to Mr. Ang Pings COC and ordering the Board of Election Inspectors of Manila not to count any vote cast in his favor. It ruled that the resolution which was originally scheduled for promulgation on May 5, 2004 was instead promulgated on April 30, 2004, the same date that the notice of promulgation was issued. ON the day of the elections, Roces was proclaimed as the winner.Issue: Whether or not the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the petitioners motion to dismiss the caseRuling: The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives and has the power to promulgate procedural rules to govern proceedings brought before it. This exclusive jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether that state of facts exists which confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters which arise in the case legitimately before it. Accordingly, it has the power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction, both as to parties and as to subject matter, and to decide all questions, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction. One of the three essential elements of jurisdiction is that proper parties must be present. Consequently, the HRET merely exercised its exclusive jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to contest the election of Roces.

8. Pichay v Office of the Deputy Executive SecretaryFACTS: On November 15, 2010, President Aquino III issued E.O. 13, abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of 445,377 shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct.ISSUE: Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the Legislature to appropriate funds RULING: NO. There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds.To further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise given constitutional authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the savings in other items of the appropriation for his office. In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which is included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's own office budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office.

9. MIAA v MabunayFacts: MIAA terminates security service contract with Lanting Security & enters into a new contract with PASSCOR through negotiated contract without public bidding. Lanting challenges. MIAA invokes Sec. 68 of the GAA of 1995, which allows govt to enter into service contracts through public bidding or negotiated contract. Issue: Whether or not the "absolute prerogative" of the petitioners to award security services either through negotiated contract or public bidding is validRuling: By positive provision of the annual General Appropriations Acts government offices and agencies are authorized to enter into contracts for services related or incidental to their respective functions and operations, either through public bidding or negotiated contract, whenever it is impractical or more expensive for the government to directly undertake such functions and operation, subject to accounting or auditing rules and regulations. As earlier stated, these provisions are not to be construed as doing away with the general requirement of public bidding. Indeed, public bidding is the accepted method for arriving at a fair and reasonable price and it ensures that overpricing and favoritism, and other anomalous practices are eliminated or minimized and we reiterate that Section 68 of the General Appropriations Act has not dispensed with such requirement for contracts for services awarded thereunder. Although the legislature in making appropriations under its exclusive jurisdiction leaves largely to administrative discretion the choice of ways and means to accomplish the object of appropriation, that administrative discretion may not transcend the statutes.

10. Harlow v. FitzgeraldFacts: Two aides to the President were sued in a private civil matter for activities undertaken while in their positions. The suit stated that the two aides conspired while in their official capacity as aides to the President. The aides claimed at trial that they could not be sued while in their official positions due to executive immunity doctrine. Lower courts did not acknowledge the aides claim of immunity.Issue: Whether or not the aides to a President should be embraced to the executive immunity doctrine if sued for actions undertaken in their official positions.Ruling: No. Absolute immunity is granted for a variety of public officials because the threat of private lawsuit threatens their ability to properly undertake their jobs. In the case of certain categories of public officials, the court grants only partial immunity. Lower level staff with less discretion in terms of policy making should not be able to claim absolute immunity. The court argued that a claim of absolute immunity by a member of the executive staff can only hold up if it relates to their official duties handling foreign affairs or national security. The instant case regards domestic policy issues. However, lower courts did not address the issue of qualified immunity, which can be interpreted or construed as a good faith defense namely that the aides were acting good faith in their official positions, seeking to serve the public good.

11. Article 7 Section 16HERMOGENES P. POBRE, petitioner, vs. MARIANO E. MENDIETA, respondent

Facts: The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioner of the PRC.

On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed the petitioner, then an Associate Commissioner, as the PRC Commissioner/ Chairman. Even before Commissioner Pobre's appointment, the private respondent, Mariano A. Mendieta, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, filed a petition for declaratory relief against Commissioner Pobre, Executive Secretary Drilon, and Acting Secretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro, praying that they be enjoined from appointing, or recommending the appointment of Associate Commissioner Pobre as Chairman of the PRC because under Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, he (Mendieta), as the senior Associate Commissioner, was legally entitled to succeed Francia as Chairman of the PRC. His prayer for a restraining order was set for hearing on February 19, 1992 at 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

Pobre opposed the issuance of a restraining order because President Aquino had already appointed him PRC Chairman and he had, in fact, already taken his oath of office on February 17, 1992. Judge Somera denied the prayer for a restraining order as well as the petition for declaratory relief for being moot and academic.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of the President to Pobre is valid

Ruling: Yes, the appointment of petitioner Hermogenes P. Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the Professional Regulation Commission is declared lawful.

The vacancy in the position of Chairman of the Professional Regulation Commission cannot be filled by the Senior Associate Commissioner by operation of law (or by succession) because it will deprive the President of the power to appoint the Chairman in accordance with Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

12. PHILIPPINE RETIREMENT AUTHORITY (PRA), petitioner, vs. JESUSITO L. BUAG and ERLINA P. LOZADA, respondents.Facts: Jesusito Bunag (former deputy GM) & Erlinda Lozada (Incumbent Dept. Mgr.) received benefits such as Cost of Living Allowance, amelioration allowance, additional COLA, rice subsidy, meal subsidy, children allowance, representation & transportation allowance in addition to regular salary from the PRA (a GOCC). It was later found by Exec. Secretary to be unauthorized allowances & were ordered cancelled. Bunag & Lozada appealed to the DBM which upheld the decision of the Executive Secretary.Then it was then reversed upon further appeal to the Office of the President which ordered the award of such allowances & benefits.Issue: Whether or not PRA is still subject to the review of the DBMRuling: Yes. It is the function of the DBM to supervise & ensure that proposed compensation is consistent with the law. Even if the PRA Charter grants certain exemptions from the Office of Compensation & Position Classification (under DBM), the PRA is still subject to the review of the DBM. Since the said compensation was found to be unauthorized, they cannot be cured by the transitory provisions of the Salary Standardization Act which upholds compensation in excess of incumbents.

13. Article VIII Sec 1EN BANC

G.R. No. L-68635May 14, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA

Facts:This case is about Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court promulgated on March 12, 1987, finding him guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending him indefinitely from the practice of law.Atty. Laureta argues that:1. the Order of suspension without hearing violated his right to life and due process of law and by reason thereof the Order is null and void; 1. that the acts of misconduct imputed to him are without basis; 1. that the charge against him that it was he who had circulated to the press copies of the Complaint filed before the Tanodbayan is unfounded such that, even in this Court's Resolution, his having distributed copies to the press is not stated positively; that the banner headline which appeared In the Daily Express is regrettable but that he was not responsible for such "misleading headline;1. that he "did nothing of the sort" being fully conscious of his responsibilities as a law practitioner and officer of the Court

Issue:

Whether or not the court can suspend Atty Laureta with its judicial power

Ruling:Yes. The Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. In this case, the court has the right to find him guilty because of his impudence and lack of respect to the court in his Motion for Reconsideration.

14. Art VIII Sec 1 Torrecampo v MWSS

Torrecampo filed the petition for injunction pursuant to Sec. 3 of R.A8975 on July 1, 2009, a day after DPWH entered a portion of Barangay Matandang Balara to implement the C-5 Road Extension Project. Torrecampo insists that the RI-PADA area is a better alternative to subject lots for the project.

Through RA 6234, MWSS explains its participation in the C5Road Expansion Project. The MWSS explains that they have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all the sewerage and water works systems located in Metro Manila, Rizal province, and a portion of Cavite province.

MWSS issued a resolution that allowed DPWH to use the 60-meter Right-of-Way for preliminary studies of the road expansion project. The court issued that Torrecampo is not entitled to an injunction. Thus, Torrecampos petition is denied.

Issue: Whether or not the petition does not present ajusticiablematter that requires the Court to exercise its power of judicial review

Ruling: Yes. Torrecamposeeks judicial review of a question of Executive policy, a matter outside this Courts jurisdiction. Torrecampofailed to show that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion that would warrant the exercise of this Courts extraordinary certioraripower. Despite the definition of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, an inquiry on issues raised byTorrecampowould delve into matters that are exclusively within the wisdom of the Executive branch.

15. Art 8 sec 3EN BANC

G.R. No. 103524April 15, 1992

CESAR BENGZON, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, ET AL., respondents.

Facts:

On January 1992m some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the court providing for appropriations for the retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as well as the members of the Constitutional Commission.

Issue:Whether or not the intrusion of the president weakens the fiscal autonomy ensured to the judiciary

Ruling:The intrusion of the President to the Judiciarys Fiscal Autonomy is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The reason of the fiscal autonomy is to strengthen the Supreme Courts independence and should not be dictated by the other branches of the Govt of how its funds should be consumed. Hence, the veto of the specific provisions in the GAA is repugnant to the fiscal autonomy granted to the Judiciary (Art. 8, Sec. 3).

16. Art 8 sec 5EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31685July 31, 1975

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. IMELDA R. MARCOS, et al.

Facts:

Gonzales questioned the legitimacy of EO No. 30 forming the Cultural Center of the Philippines. The Center having as its estate the real and personal property vested in it as well as donations received, financial commitments that could thereafter be collected, and gifts that may be forthcoming in the future. It was also likewise alleged that the Board of Trustees did accept donations from the private sector and did secure from the Chemical Bank of New York assured by the National Investment and Development Corporation.

The petition was denied by the trial court in the argument that with not a single centavo raised by taxation, and the absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest of petitioner that could in any wise be prejudiced from those of the general public.

Issue:

Whether or not a the court can give a final judgement on the legality of EO No 30

Ruling:

Yes. This falls under the judicial review since the question is on the legality of a certain provision in the executive order done by the President. Sec. 5, Par a of Art. 8 states:

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the lawor the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

It was pointed out the funds administered by the president came from donations and contributions but not by taxation is unavoidable. Moreover, even on the assumption that public funds raised by taxation were involved, it does not necessarily follow that such kind of an action to assail the validity of a legislative or executive act has to be passed upon this Court.

17. Art 8 sec 5FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998]FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO, (in his capacity as chairman of the PCGG), respondents.

Facts:

Chavez, petitioner, enquires the court to define the nature and extent of the peoples constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner, citing his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicity all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition

Ruling: Yes, because the petitioner explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the legal personality to file the instant petition.He submits that since ill-gotten wealth belongs to the Filipino people and [is], in truth and in fact, part of the public treasury, any compromise in relation to it would constitute a diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest is for a full, if not substantial, recovery of such assets.Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of transcendental importance to the public.He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of paramount public interest; and if they immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people.

18. Art 8 sec 5 rule makingDamasco v LaquiPetitioner Atty. Eugenio S. Damasco was charged with the crime of grave threats committed for willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten Sumadohat with the infliction upon his person of a wrong amounting to a crime, that is, by then and there uttering the following remarks, to wit:BAKIT MO AKO GINAGANITO? MAGBABAYAD KA ... PAPATAYIN KITA ...MAYROON AKONG BARIL, BABARILIN KITA, TAGADIYAN LANG AKO. After trial, respondent judge found that the evidence presented did not establish the crime of grave threats but only of light threats. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the dispositive part of contending that he cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily included in grave threats charged in the information, as the lighter offense had already prescribed when the information was filed. He contended that the crime of light threats, which is a light offense, prescribes in two(2) months which means sixty (60) days but the information was filed after the lapse of 71 days.Issue:Whether or not it was proper for respondent Judge to still convict petitioner after finding him guilty of the lesser offense of light threats but which has already prescribed Held: No.Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction a circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.

19. Republic v GingoyonFACTS: NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO) was nullified.Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through expropriation filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending that a mere deposit of the assessed value of the property with an authorized government depository is enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court).However, respondents states that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued, direct payment of just compensation must be made to the builders of the facilities, citing RA No. 8974 and a related jurisprudence.ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation can be conducted by mere deposit of the assessed value of the property.HELD: No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only after direct payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the basis of fairness. The same principle applied in the 2004 Jurisprudence Resolution and the latest expropriation law (RA No. 8974).

20. Topacio v OngFacts: Petitioner implored the Office of the Solicitor General to initiate immediately a quo warranto proceeding against Gregory Ong. He points out that Natural-born citizenship is also a qualification for appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan and a qualification for appointment as member of Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship requirement. Ong, on the other hand, avers that the RTC already granted his petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen. The decision having become final, he caused the corresponding annotation thereof in his certificate of birth. The OSG informed Topicio that it cannot favorably act on request for the filing of a quo warranto petition until the RTC case shall have been terminated with finality. Topacio assails this position of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion.Issue: Whether or not the Office of the Solicitor General committed grave abuse of discretion in submitting the filing of a petition for quo warrantoRuling: No. The Court ruled that there was no abuse on the part of the OSG in deferring action on the filling of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simple because the affected parties disagree with it. The Sol Gen may suspend the institution of an action for quo warranto only if there are just and valid reasons.A private person suing must show a clear right to the contested office.

21. Art 8, Sec 14 Hernandez v CAFacts: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of Court of Appeals in which the court the Court acquitted the accused.Danilo Hernandez introduced by aunt to Remedios de Leon, who was in the business of buying and selling jewelry. Petitioner selected jewelries for which he issued a check as a payment. The amount of the check was filled in by Rosemarie Rodriguez and petitioner affixed his signature as drawer. However three of the checks issued were drawn against insufficient funds, while the other two were drawn against a closed account. Petitioner was charged in nine informations with estafa.Issue: Whether or not the decision of CA is violative of Art 8, Sec 14 of this constitutionRuling: No. The constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is based. There is no proscription made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the same in its own words.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

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