DFA vs NLRC
Facts:On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an
illegal dismissal case against Asian Development Bank. Two
summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other
through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified
respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and
Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for
borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to
Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the
Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and
Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank and The Government Of
The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the
"Headquarters Agreement").The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the
complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic
immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor
Magnayi.The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03
November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its
referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment."
When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it
filed a petition for certiorari.Issues:1. Whether or not ADB is
immune from suit2. Whether or not by entering into service
contracts with different private companies, ADB has descended to
the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving
rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit3. Whether or not the DFA
has the legal standing to file the present petition4. Whether or
not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this
caseHeld:1.Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB
enjoys immunity from legal process of every form, except in the
specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as
the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Banks
officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts
performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the
Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are
treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government which must be respected.Being an
international organization that has been extended a diplomatic
status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law."One of the
basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from
local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs
and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is
found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such
an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in
their operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local
jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge
its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its
member-states."2.No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an
ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which should have
constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into
service contracts with different private companies. There are two
conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory,
a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in
the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized
only with regard topublic acts or acts jure imperiiof a state, but
not with regard toprivate act or acts jure gestionis.Certainly, the
mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private
party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the
start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign
state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business.
If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or
trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when
it is not undertaken for gain or profit.The service contracts
referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB
for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of
immunity would not attach.3.Yes. The DFA's function includes, among
its other mandates, the determination of persons and institutions
covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when
challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to
seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations.
The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or
advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the
Philippine government before the international community. When
international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are
deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to it
that their agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this task
falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive
department with the competence and authority to so act in this
aspect of the international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario,
Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:"In
Public International Law, when a state or international agency
wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign
court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued
to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to
immunity."In the United States, the procedure followed is the
process of 'suggestion,' where the foreign state or the
international organization sued in an American court requests the
Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is
entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the
defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney
General to submit to the court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is
entitled to immunity. "In the Philippines, the practice is for the
foreign government or the international organization to first
secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys
its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic
Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the
respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic
immunity. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242
(1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a
telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the
U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the
Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United
States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to
respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion'
in a manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae."In the case at
bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of
Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on
the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to
file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign
immunity."In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was
submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through
their private counsels. In cases where the foreign states bypass
the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make
their own determination as to the nature of the acts and
transactions involved."4.Yes. Relative to the propriety of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has, under special
circumstances, so allowed and entertained such a petition when (a)
the questioned order or decision is issuedin excess of or without
jurisdiction, or (b) where the order or decision is apatent
nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to
obtain in the present case. When an adjudicator is devoid of
jurisdiction on a matter before him, his action that assumes
otherwise would be a clear nullity.Petition for certiorari is
GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August
1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID. (DFA vs NLRC,G.R. No.
113191, 18 September 1996)Municipality of San Fernando vs Judge
FirmeMUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. FIRME
G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991
Facts:
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the
Estate of MacarioNieveras, a gravel and sand truck owned by
Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact,
several passengers of the jeepney including LaureanoBania Sr. died
as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) others
suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a
compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger
jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party
Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of
petitioner.
Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such
as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State,
prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and
driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the
collision.
Respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme ordered defendants Municipality
of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and
severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses.
Private respondents stress that petitioner has not considered
that every court, including respondent court, has the inherent
power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice.Issue: Whether or not the
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the
State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
Ruling:
Non-suability of the state.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided
for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the
State may not be sued without its consent."Consent takes the form
of express or implied consent.
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities,
are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental
functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from
suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that
they can sue and be sued.
"Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued,
liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that
it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it
does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the
state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable."
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for
the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the
municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf
of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary
functions.
Dual capacity of LGU.
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their
functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing
from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties
pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental.
Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing
a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and
servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities
exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from
their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their
officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in
behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual
capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power."
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are
suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and
be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and
can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in a proprietary capacity.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the
municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilianriver
to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's
municipal streets."
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity
of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section
3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that
the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks
pertaining to his office.
We already stressed in the case ofPalafox, et.al.vs.Province of
IlocosNorte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer
(102 Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads in
which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident
are admittedly governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence,
We arrive at the conclusionthat the municipality cannot be held
liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was
then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.
MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs. DUMDUM, JR.
G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010, Peralta,J:p
FACTS: A complaint was filed by Lim Chao against the
Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan for collection of sum of money and
damages. The complaint alleged that a contract was entered into by
Lim Chao and the Municipality for the delivery of motor vehicles,
which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental
undertakings in the municipality. Lim Chao then delivered to the
Municipality of Hagonoy 21 motor vehicles amounting to
P5,820,000.00. However, despite having made several deliveries, the
Municipality allegedly did not heed Lim Chaos claim for payment.
Thus, she filed a complaint for full payment of the said amount,
with interest and damages and prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against the Municipality. The trial court
issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment directing the sheriff "to
attach the estate, real and personal properties" of the
Municipality.
The Municipality filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the claim on which the action had been brought was unenforceable
under the statute of frauds, pointing out that there was no written
contract or document that would evince the supposed agreement they
entered into with respondent. It also filed a Motion to Dissolve
and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment already issued,
invoking, among others, immunity of the state from suit. The
Municipality argued that as a municipal corporation, it is immune
from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution
and garnishment. Lim Chao on her part, counters that, the
Municipalitys claim of immunity from suit is negated by the Local
Government Code, which vests municipal corporations with the power
to sue and be sued. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
order.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment
against the Municipality of Hagonoy is valid.
HELD: No. The universal rule is that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit claimants action "only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power
of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must
be covered by the corresponding appropriations as required by law.
The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects.
Sabili vs COMELEC
Facts:
1. COMELEC denied Sabilis Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of
Lipa due to failure to comply with the one year residency
requirement.
2. When petitioner filed his COC1for mayor of Lipa City for the
2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of
the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months.
3. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC
during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at
his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan,
Batangas.
4. respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a
"Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for
Disqualification
5. Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC
that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and
eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local
elections.
6. In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010,41the COMELEC Second
Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared
petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa
City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a
resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the statutory
one-year residency requirement under the law.
7. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May
2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the
duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number
of votes cast for the said position. He accordingly filed a
Manifestation42with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.
8. In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010,43the COMELECen
bancdenied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.
9. Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition
for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance
of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of
this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17 August
2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC.
Issues:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year
residency requirement for local elective officials.
Ruling:
1. As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the
COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However,
exceptions thereto have been established, including when the
COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly
unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these
instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional
duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.
2. As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact
definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty
3. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We
have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations
in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's
action with grave abuse of discretion.
4. Closely related with the limited focus of the present
petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by
substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable.
5. In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact,
we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC
in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of
jurisdiction.
6. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on
the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of
its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the
Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to
intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting
errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment
to one of jurisdiction.
7. Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELECs use
of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding the issue of
whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation of his
residency qualification in his COC as to order its
cancellation.
8. Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner had not
sufficiently shown that he had resided in Lipa City for at least
one year prior to the May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence
adduced by the parties and the COMELECs appreciation thereof.
9. Basically, the allegations of the Petitioner Sabili are
tantamount to allege that the COMELEC, in denying his COC committed
grave abuse of discretion. The court here defined what grave abuse
of discretion is; and by that chose and ruled to review the acts of
COMELEC under its jurisdiction.
10. Eventually he was able to prove that he was a resident of
Lipa and the SC granted his petition.
11. Aldovino VS COMELEC
12. FACTS:13. Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was
elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term
of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive
suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said
suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo
resumed the performance of the functions of his office.14. Asilo
then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in
2007. His disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the
ground that he had been elected and had served for three
consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional
limit.15. ISSUE:16. WON the suspensive condition interrupts the
three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?17. RULING:18. NO. The
preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their
term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).19. The
candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth
term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term
limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his
2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension
imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino,
Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilos
disqualification.20. Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not
involve an effective interruption of service within a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term
limitation, held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can
pose as a threat more potent than the voluntary renunciation that
the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as
it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed.Talaga vs COMELEC
LUCENA CITYIncumbent Lucena Mayor Barbara Ruby Talaga
(Lakas-Kampi) was unseated by the Supreme Court and replaced by her
vice mayor, Roderick Alcala (Liberal Party).
In an SC decision dated Oct. 9, 2012 but was only released
Thursday, a copy of which was posted on its website, the court
affirmed the decision of the Commission on Election en banc on May
20, 2011 that annulled the election and proclamation of Talaga as
mayor of Lucena and cancelled the certificate of canvass that
declared her as the winner in May 10, 2010 election.
The said Comelec resolution also granted the petition for
intervention of Alcala and ordered him to succeed Barbara as
provided under Section 44 or the succession rule for elected local
officials under Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991.
The poll body had reversed and set aside the resolution by the
Comelec 2nd Division in January 2011 that ruled Talagas election as
valid and legal.
Lucena Councilor Rey Olivier Alejandrino, Alcalas political
ally, said the vice mayor received the copy of the SC decision
Thursday afternoon.
The vice mayor is a nephew of Agriculture Secretary Proceso
Alcala, a close ally of President Benigno Aquino III.
Talagas youngest son, number one Lucena Councilor Ramil Talaga,
will replace Alcala as vice mayor.
Questions on the legitimacy of Talagas assumption to office
arose when she substituted for her husband Ramon Talaga Jr. then
the incumbent city mayor.
In 2010 election, Ramon, while then serving his last term, filed
his CoC with the belief that he was still qualified to run for a
fresh term because he was suspended for three months and thus
failed to serve three consecutive terms in office.
But the Comelec later ruled he was no longer qualified to run
for another term. Under existing elections law, a local elected
official (councilors to congressmen) can only serve for three
consecutive three-year terms.
Ramon had himself substituted by his wife just six days before
the elections, a fact that was hidden from their political foes and
the city electorate.
In the final tally, Ramon received 44,099 votes while his
opponent Philip Castillo, a former vice mayor, earned 39,615.
Based on existing election laws on substitution, the votes
garnered by Ramon were automatically considered votes for his
substitute, his wife Barbara.
Castillo consequently asked the Comelec to declare him as the
winner as he argued that since Ramons candidacy was found by the
poll body to be defective and null and void from the start, it
meant that he ran unopposed and thus should be declared as the
victor in the last election.
In the 26-page SC decision penned by Associate Justice Lucas
Bersamin, the high tribunal ruled that Ramons disqualification
rendered his CoC invalid and thus, could not be validly
substituted.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid
candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidatethat
a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly
substituted because a person without a valid CoC is not considered
a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a
CoC is not at all a candidate, the SC said.
However, the SC dismissed Castillos assertion that he was
entitled to assume the city mayoralty post for having obtained the
highest number of votes among the remaining qualified
candidates.
The high tribunal reiterated its earlier ruling that a candidate
obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested
office could not assume the office despite the disqualification of
the first placer because the second placer was not the choice of
the sovereign will'.
The SC added: There was to be no question that the second placer
lost in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and could
not assume the vacated position. No law imposed upon and compelled
the people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political
leader or their representative.
Although not an original party to the poll protest between
Castillo and Talaga, Alcala filed a petition for intervention with
the Comelec last July 22, 2010 to implement Section 44 or the
succession rule for elected local officials under RA 7160 or the
Local Government Code of 1991.
The SC said Talagas dismissal has resulted to a permanent
vacancy in the office of Lucena mayor and such vacancy should be
filled pursuant to the law of succession as defined under the Local
Government Code.
Ramon, who is the current city administrator, will clash with
Alcala for the mayoralty post in next year election.
Ramil, youngest son of theTalagas, will be the running mate of
his father. The youngTalaga will face opposition from Castillo
(LP).
Quinto vs COMELEC
The rule in elections, as people know it, is that an appointed
official is deemed automatically resigned from their positions once
he/she files the Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for any elective
position. This rule on automatic resignation does not apply to
elected officials. There is now a new rule. Appointed officials are
NO longer deemed resigned upon the filing of the CoC. This is the
ruling of the Supreme Court inEleazar Quinto vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
189698, 1 December 2009.
Background of the CaseIn preparation for the 2010 elections, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issuedResolution No. 8678
theGuidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties
in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.
Section 4 ofResolution No. 8678provide:
SEC. 4.Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person
holding a public appointive office or position including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers
and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall
be consideredipso factoresigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not
be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the same or any other elective office or
position.
Two appointive officers of the government who were planning to
run in the 2010 elections sought the nullification of Section 4(a)
on the ground, among others, that it is discriminatory and violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Applicable LawsSection 4(a) ofResolution No. 8678is a
reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 9369, which reads:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the
filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period
shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy:
Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid
campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of
the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or
-controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the
day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
The proviso, on the other hand, was lifted from Section 66
ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 881, or theOmnibus Election Code, which
reads:
Sec. 66.Candidates holding appointive office or position.Any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers
and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
Ruling of the Supreme CourtAccording to the majority, with
Justice Nachura as theponencia, Section 4 (a) of the Resolution is
null and void for being violative of the equal protection clause
and for being overbroad. The second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 ofR.A. 9369, and Section 66 of theOmnibus Election
Codewere also declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Challenged provision discriminatoryThere used to be a similar
provision in theElection CodeandR.A. 8436relating to the automatic
resignation ofelective officialsupon the filing of their CoCs, but
this was repealed byR.A. 9006, also known as theFair Election Act.
There was, thus, created a situation of obvious discrimination
against appointive officials who were deemedipso factoresigned from
their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective
officials were not.
Four (4) requisites of valid classification must be complied
with in order that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;(2) It must
be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) It must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and(4) It must apply equally to all
members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and
substantial differences between the classes treated differently.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does
not comply with the second requirementif it is not germane to the
purpose of the law. The third requirement means that the
classification must be enforced not only for the present but as
long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And,
under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as
invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
According to theSupreme Court, the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding
elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent
the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or
even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate.
The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency,
integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the
danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by
political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The
restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could
result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty
because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to
their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then
the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the
ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite
that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law.
Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one,
the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For
example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for
that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President
who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent
past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of
national housing, social welfare development, interior and local
government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head
executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them
differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the
present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example,
running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position
during the entire election period and can still use the resources
of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the
discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse
could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files
his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus
for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position
aspired for.
In considering persons holding appointive positions asipso
factoresigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but
not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically
the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between
those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective
posts, does not justify such differential treatment. The
classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be
germane to the purposes of the law.
Challenged provision overbroadFirst, the provision pertains to
all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as
to whether they occupy high positions in government or not.
Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be
considered asipso factoresigned once he files his CoC for the 2010
elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable
how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in
the political world.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek
public elective office are those who occupy relatively high
positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone,
or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective
office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the
qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the
laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic
so as to allow the widest participation of the citizenry and to
give free rein for the pursuit of ones highest aspirations to
public office. Such is the essence of democracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any
and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in
character, whether they be in the national, municipal
orbarangaylevel. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest
to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping
scale.
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly
broad measures that unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms of the
citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all
governmental power emanates from them.
Dissenting Opinions:Chief Justice Puno,Justice CarpioandJustice
Carpio-Morales. Full text ofEleazar Quinto vs. COMELEC.
In a 10-5 vote, the Supreme Court reversed its Decision rendered
in the case ofQuinto vs. Comeleclast December 2009 and declared
that appointed officials, including members of the judiciary and
the Comelec itself, who have filed their certificate of candidacy
for the May 10 elections are already deemed resigned. In the
Resolution dated 22 February 2010, the Court said that its December
2009 Decision failed to consider the threat to government posed by
the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the
danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a powerful political
machine that has amassed the scattered powers of government workers
so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp
on the reins of power. The Court added that in the case at bar, the
probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive
officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue
elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having
arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory
effect of a potentially overly broad statute.Mitra vs COMELEC
Certificate of candidacy; residency requirement.
The Omnibus Election Code provides that a certificate of
candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled if there is any
false representation of a material fact.
The critical material facts are those that refer to a candidates
qualifications for elective office, such as his or her citizenship
and residence.
The false representation must be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible.
Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates
qualifications for public office.
Thus, the misrepresentation cannot be the result of a mere
innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent
to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the
electorate results.
The foregoing are the legal standards by which the COMELEC must
act on a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy.
Thus, in considering the residency of a candidate as stated in
the certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC must determine whether or
not the candidate deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or
hide a fact about his or her residency that would otherwise render
him or her ineligible for the position sought.
The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in this case when, in
considering the residency issue, it based its decision solely on
very personal and subjective assessment standards, such as the
nature or design and furnishings of the dwelling place in relation
to the stature of the candidate. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs.
Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010.
Nature: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
canceled the certificate of candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham
Kahlil B. Mitra for allegedly misrepresenting that he is a resident
of the Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan where he ran
for the position of Governor. Mitra came to this Court to seek the
reversal of the cancellation.
Facts:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was
declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the
Second District of Palawan.
This district then included, among other territories, the
Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City.
He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto
Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three
(3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as
Representative), Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a "highly
urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of the
Province of Palawan.
The direct legal consequence of this new status was the
ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for
candidates for elective provincial officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the
position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voters
Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 ofBrgy. Sta. Monica,
Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality
of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for
the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R.
Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course
or to cancel Mitras COC.
Issue: Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of
Palawan.
Held: YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as
Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not
misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as
mandated by the Constitution.
RATIO:
The election ofAbraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in
the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3.
The respondentswere not able to presenta convincing case
sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and
residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this
point in his COC.
Likewise,the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable
basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his
residence was a misrepresentation."
Mitras domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City.
For him to qualify as Governor in light of the relatively recent
change of status of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a
highly urbanized city whose residents can no longer vote for
provincial officials he had to abandon his domicile of origin and
acquire a new one within the local government unit where he
intended to run; this would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a
domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC correctly
invoked, requires the following:
(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
(2) an intention to remain there; and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
Mitra, presented sworn statements of various persons (including
the seller of the land he purchased, the lessor of the Maligaya
Feedmill, and the Punong Barangay of the site of his residence)
attesting to his physical residence in Aborlan; photographs of the
residential portion of Maligaya Feedmill where he resides, and of
his experimental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock
farm; the lease contract over the Maligaya Feedmill; and the deed
of sale of the lot where he has started constructing his house. He
clarified, too, that he does not claim residence in Aborlan at the
house then under construction; his actual residence is the
mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill building.
Mitra has been proclaimed winner in the electoral contest and
has therefore the mandate of the electorate to serve
NOTES:
The minimum requirement under our Constitution and election laws
for the candidates residency in the political unit they seek to
represent has never been intended to be an empty formalistic
condition; it carries with it a very specific purpose: to prevent
"stranger[s] or newcomer[s] unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community" from seeking elective offices in that
community.
The purpose of the residency requirement is "best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a
given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by
origin or by choice."
Read and understood in this manner, residency can readily be
appreciated as a requirement that goes into the heart of our
democratic system; it directly supports the purpose of
representation electing those who can best serve the community
because of their knowledge and sensitivity to its needs. It
likewise adds meaning and substance to the voters freedom of choice
in the electoral exercise that characterizes every democracy.
To acquire a new domicile a domicile by choice the following
must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
(2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon
the old domicile. In other words, there must be an animus non
revertendi with respect to the old domicile, and an animus manendi
at the domicile of choice. The intent to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time and the
acts of the person must be consistent with this intent.