Developing Peace Partnership in Africa - Bundesheer · of this sentence the slogan of oppression I know very ... fight for peace has no other connection to our world is ... cooperation

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DA FAVORITA PAPER 02/2005

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CONTENTS PREFACE Ursula PLASSNIK 5 INTRODUCTION Jiří GRUŠA 7 John L. HIRSCH 9 Raimund SCHITTENHELM 13 PROGRAM 15 WELCOMING REMARKS Roland ERTL 19 Hans WINKLER 23 BACKGROUND PAPER Cyrus SAMII 25 CONFERENCE REPORT Cyrus SAMII 37 SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING AFRICA Babacar GAYE 49 MILITARY REQUIREMENTS Martin L. AGWAI 61 ECOWAS AND PEACE-BUILDING IN WEST AFRICA Ismail RASHID 69 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Ismail RASHID 77 COOPERATION IN PEACEBUILDING Funmi OLONISAKIN 83 AFRICAN OWNERSHIP OF PEACE OPERATIONS Daniel OPANDE 107 Felix MOSHA 111 PARTICIPANTS 113 ABOUT THE AUTHORS 125

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PREFACE

Dr. Ursula PLASSNIK Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria

Austria has a long-standing tradition in all areas of conflict prevention, be it through mediation on a diplomatic level, the contribution of peacekeeping personnel or promoting projects of reconciliation, reintegration and institutional reconstruction. Therefore, Austria has been working closely with the International Peace Academy for decades. This year, Africa has come to the fore of Austrian foreign policy. Being already one of the focal points of the UK’s presidency of the European Union, an EU strategy for Africa will be adopted for the first time by the European Council in December of this year. Austria is actively participating in the elaboration of this strategy with a view to advance its implementation during the Austrian EU presidency in the first half of 2006. For all these reasons, I consider IPA’s decision well timed to choose “Developing Peace Partnerships in Africa” as the topic for its 35th Vienna Seminar. Over the last years, the cooperation in security and military matters - with the Peace and Security Council of a newly defined African Union - has become an important element of the EU’s foreign policy. The collaboration in various operations, especially in AMIS, the African peacekeeping force in Darfur serves as an example for such peace partnerships. The EU makes substantial financial as well as logistic contributions to the African Mission in Sudan, which has already proven to be successful. At the same time the European Union strives towards a political solution for this crisis which continues to put into question the implementation of Sudan’s comprehensive peace agreement. Due to its long experience and its wide-spread network in Africa, the International Peace Academy is capable of adopting the necessary comprehensive approach and – as has been proven once more in Vienna – to bring together African and international actors to address these highly important issues.

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Ambassador Jiří GRUŠA Director, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

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INTRODUCTION

Ambassador Jiří GRUŠA Director, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

Rarely was an idea underlined so strongly like our seminar on peace keeping. The terrorist attack in London two days ago shows that developing of war has still some lead. But the less we can promise a developed result the more we have to insist on our significant words: Peace and Diplomacy. They are adjectives of our Academies and they are substantials of our activity. That is why I want to express my admiration and my warm welcome. This conference can adapt the common concentration on hate and violence in the analysis of their roots and in proposals of prevention. Continuing the tradition of my predecessor Ernst Sucharipa who has begun with our cooperation I will pay him respect and follow his preliminary work. The contributions of our meeting are published in this representative compendium dedicated to his memory. One year ago we have celebrated another coincidental event. Two centuries anniversary of Immanuel Kant, the philosopher of eternal peace and its conditions. For him war was war an animal disposition in us, a curse to be disciplinated by means of reason. He was the first thinker who described a general order in a linked up world. A global citizenship in an association of peaceful people. His era – nevertheless – tended more to the ideas of his compatriot and contemporary Clausewitz for whom the peace was a side effect of politics and the war its continuation – “mit anderen Mitteln”. And we must admit that minimally Europe has listened more to Clausewitz than to Kant. Yet – the Kantian point of view is our horizon now. The global narrowness became reality and the self-discipline of men a vital condition for future. To understand the peace only as a longer or shorter coffee break could be a lethal drink for everybody. The peace became a crucial issue even for desperados, even if they do not know about it. Peace is something to be fought for. Coming from a country that some years ago made of this sentence the slogan of oppression I know very well about the opaque dimension of similar things. But in the sentence which sounded: Bourz za mir, Friedenskampf, fight for peace has no other connection to our world is interesting for me only the slavic-indoeuropean word MIR. It means measure, system of measurements. Not a

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status but a float balance, the steered stream. Something what depends on individuality and creativity, on the freedom as a power category of persons trying to find out clever differencies of being. This is a risky job of imagination. Not a cadaver obedience to final prescriptions combined with the duty to kill every alternative. In our Kantian world-village is any old bivalency the source of terror. And terror is beastly behaviour that executes a sacred annihilation. Peace is never interested in distinction and freedom at the same time. So the seminar on peace to be developed is a proper workshop for it, an extremely promising laboratory of compatible dissents.

Ambassador John L. HIRSCH Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy

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INTRODUCTION

Ambassador John L. HIRSCH Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy

On behalf of President Terje Rod-Larsen and my colleagues at the International Peace Academy, it is my great pleasure to welcome you to this year’s Vienna Seminar entitled “Developing Peace Partnerships in Africa”. This marks the 35th consecutive year that we have convened this Seminar with our Austrian partners, again this year in cooperation with the National Defence Academy, the Diplomatic Academy, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Our thanks go to our co-hosts General Raimund Schittenhelm, Ambassador Jiři Gruša and Ambassador Georg Lennkh for their warm reception. Your hospitality is in the spirit of Austria’s longstanding commitment to the cause of peace, the strengthening of the United Nations, and the development of closer relations with Africa’s leaders. We commend the participation of thousands of dedicated Austrian soldiers and diplomats in United Nations peacekeeping operations since 1960. Recently, Austrian peacekeepers have served ably and admirably in operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan, as well as previously in the Kuwait-Iraq border area, the Golan Heights and elsewhere. As you know, IPA’s commitment to Africa is deep and ongoing, ever since the inception of the Africa Program in 1992. Under the leadership of Olara Otunnu and Dr. Margaret Vogt, IPA assisted the Organization of African Unity in formulating its conflict resolution protocol and establishing its conflict resolution mechanism. Since 2000, Dr. Adekeye Adebajo and Dr. Ruth Iyob, former Directors of the Africa Program, have carried our work forward in seeking to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s subregional organizations. Through seminars, workshops and publications, IPA has worked to ensure that our close relationship with the UN and our partners in Europe are an asset to those in Africa working toward peace and sustainable development. We have worked to ensure that our relationships in Africa serve the United Nations in fulfilling its peacekeeping and peacemaking mandate. 2005 is a year of extraordinary decision opportunities in Africa, at the United Nations, and in capitals all over the world. This is due in large measure to initiatives taken by leaders and activists in Africa. As we meet here, the African Union and subregional organizations are proving their commitment to their promotion of durable peace, good governance and economic development. Ongoing efforts to address the crisis in Darfur, the Eritrean-Ethiopian border and Cote d’Ivoire, the AU and ECOWAS mediation role

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in Togo and their response to the Marburg virus in Angola, underscore the range of continuing political, security and public health challenges which the continent faces. We are encouraged when political will is exercised in the service of peace, as demonstrated by the African Union in Burundi and Sudan, ECOWAS across West Africa, and IGAD in Somalia and Sudan. But we frankly have reason for concern about whether this will is sufficient to address the root causes of conflict. Civil society leaders across Africa work courageously to promote democracy and human rights but they often face harsh conditions if not direct oppression. We are fortunate indeed to have some of the continent’s most distinguished civilian and military officials, scholars and civil society activists here to discuss these issues. This is a fantastic opportunity to refine our understanding. We meet today at a particularly important juncture when the international community’s attention is focused on Africa – between the just concluded African Union summit in Libya and the G-8 meeting in Gleneages, Scotland this past week and the high level summit of world leaders at the United Nations General Assembly this September. The G-8 meeting has made important decisions and commitments, pledging $50 billion in increased aid over the next five years and the cancellation of the debt for 18 of the world’s poorest nations. The Gleneagles communiqué ties its peace and security commitments to the African Union’s roadmap and the goals in UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s report In larger freedom. This kind of coordination is heartening. But we have to be vigilant in monitoring implementation of G-8 promises. With no Secretariat or monitoring mechanism of its own, G-8 commitments often stumble on the way to implementation. The role of the United Nations is central to our objectives for Africa, and in his report, In Larger Freedom, the Secretary General is quite clear. Progress toward a more secure and prosperous world depends crucially on progress in Africa. The Secretary General has put forward a compelling agenda for the September summit. In relation to peace operations, the Secretary General’s agenda includes proposals for two areas in urgent need of attention: strengthening the UN’s relations with regional organizations and improving the coordination of peacebuilding efforts through the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission. Our agenda focuses on another major aspect – the urgent need to further strengthen Africa’s own peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacities. The African Union is taking major steps to establish an African Stand-by Force by 2010, to strengthen its prevention,

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mediation and negotiation capacities, and to promote and implement basic principles of good governance, democratic practice, human rights and fiscal responsibility. The agenda for our meeting provides us the opportunity first to offer specific concrete recommendations in support of the African Union’s primary security agenda; second to give tangible meaning to the concept of partnership among African continental and regional organizations, the European Union, bilateral initiatives, and the United Nations; and third to deepen and expand tangible support for United Nations post conflict peacebuilding. Let us aim over the next three days to develop specific recommendations on all three of these areas. Hopefully they can also be of use to the Government of Austria as it assumes the Presidency of the European Union in January 2006. IPA is working on parallel initiatives to ensure that upcoming opportunities for the international community are effectively seized. Many of these opportunities are especially related to promoting peace and sustainable development in Africa. We are giving intense attention to the Secretary General’s reform agenda and to ongoing initiatives to strengthen the Security and Development nexus. We are eager to promote linkages to related G-8 and European Union efforts as well as bilateral programs. The discussions here this week are meant to keep this momentum going. Ladies and Gentlemen, let me finally thank the staff from the National Defence Academy, the Diplomatic Academy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and IPA for their work in organizing this event. Special thanks go to Lieutenant Colonel Ernst Felberbauer and his very able assistant, Ms. Beatrice Agyarkoh. Members of our Africa Program and other IPA colleagues provided guidance on the substance of the Seminar. I also wish to thank again in advance all of our excellent speakers, and to wish this seminar an outstanding success.

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Lieutenant General Martin L. AGWAI (Chief of Army Staff, Nigerian Army) General Raimund SCHITTENHELM (Commandant, Austrian National Defence Academy)

General Roland ERTL (Chief of Defence Staff, Austrian Ministry of Defense)

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INTRODUCTION

General Raimund SCHITTENHELM Commandant, Austrian National Defence Academy

It is also a pleasure for me to welcome you here at the NDA. One can say this year’s IPA Vienna Seminar is a special one: It is not only the 35th IPA Vienna Seminar, we also have two new program-chairs Amb. Rod-Larsen, our new IPA President and Amb. Jiři Gruša, the new director of the DA. This seminar is also special because we will be focusing on Africa for the second time in a row. We have decided to do so in view of the ongoing need for Peace-operations in Africa and I am sure that one or the other speaker or participant will refer back to topics of last year’s seminar. And finally because for the first time we are starting the seminar out at the NDA. Allow we to make few remarks about our NDA and the premises we are on. The NDA is located in the VII district of Vienna - not very far from the DA, where we will move to tomorrow. As you can see, we are in a recently renovated building here - the so called “Akademietrakt” (academy wing). We are here in the late baroque room - Sala Terrena - which is used for conferences, seminars and representative purposes. The NDA is the highest military training and research institution of the Austrian Aremd Forces. The main tasks of the NDA are:

• education and further education of staff and general staff officers • training of military leaders (battalion level and above) and • teaching and research on security policy

I would like to wish us a good start for the seminar and fruitful discussions and hope that the continuation of dealing with African issues will yield very positive results.

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Developing Peace Partnership in Africa 35th IPA Vienna Seminar

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PROGRAM

July 10 – 13, 2005 DEVELOPING PEACE PARTNERSHIPS IN AFRICA

PROGRAM CHAIRS

Ambassador Terje Rød-Larsen

President, International Peace Academy

Ambassador Jiři Gruša Director, Diplomatic Academy Vienna

General Raimund Schittenhelm

Commandant, National Defense Academy

Sunday, July 10 15:00 – 15:30 Introduction Remarks by the Program Chairs 15:30 – 17:00 Keynote presentations: Security Challenges Facing Africa Chair: General Raimund Schittenhelm Keynote Speakers: Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, Force Commander United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo Ambassador Said Djinnit, Commissioner for Peace & Security, African Union Discussion

Monday, July 11

DAY ONE: THE AFRICAN SCENE

09:00 – 10:45 Panel One: Africa’s Security Architecture Chair: Ambassador John L. Hirsch, Director IPA Africa Program Panel: Ambassador Said Djinnit, Commissioner for Peace & Security,

African Union

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Lieutenant General Martin Luther Agwai, Chief of Army Staff, Nigerian Army Discussion 11:15 – 13:00 Panel Two: Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations in Africa Chair: Ambassador Brigitte Öppinger-Walchshofer, Ambassador of Austria to Ethiopia and the African Union Panel: Mr. Charles Mwaura, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Addis Abeba, Ethiopia Dr. Ismail Rashid, Associate Professor, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York Discussion 14:00 – 15:00 Introduction to the Breakout Groups 1 – 3: Strengthening African Peacekeeping Capacity Chair: General Raimund Schittenhelm Presenters: 1. Rapid Response: Brigadier General Gregory B. Mitchell, Deputy Force Commander, United Nations Mission in Sudan 2. Military Requirements: Lieutenant General Martin Luther Agwai, Chief of Army Staff, Nigerian Army 3. Building Planning Capacity: Ambassador Dr. Georg Lennkh, Special Envoy for EU-African Affairs of the Austrian EU-Presidency 15:00 – Breakout Groups 1 - 3: Facilitators:

1. Rapid Response: Brigadier General Gregory B. Mitchell

2. Military Requirements: Lieutenant General Martin Luther Agwai

3. Building Planning Capacity: Ambassador Dr. Georg Lennkh

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Tuesday, July 12

DAY TWO: BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS 09:00 – 10:45 Panel Three: Partnerships in Peace Operations Chair: Ambassador John L. Hirsch Panel: Mr. David Harland, Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Mr. Charles Mwaura, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Discussion 10:45 – 11:15 Break 11:15 – 13:00 Panel Four: Cooperation in Peacebuilding Chair: Ambassador Gerhard Weinberger, Ambassador of Austria to Senegal Panel: Dr. Funmi Olonisakin, Director, Conflict Security and Development Group, King's College, London Mr. El Ghassim Wane, Head of Conflict Management Division, African Union 14:00 – 15:00 Introduction for Breakout Groups 4 - 6: Bridging the Security – Development Divide Chair: Ambassador Dr. Georg Lennkh Presenters: 4. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): Mr. David Harland, Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations 5. Security Sector Reform (SSR): Dr. Ismail Rashid, Associate Professor, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York 6. “Securitisation” of the African Development Agenda: Dr. Funmi Olonisakin, Director, Conflict Security and Development Group, King's College, London

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15:00 – 17:30 Breakout Groups 4 – 6: Facilitators: 4. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): Mr. David Harland 5. Security Sector Reform (SSR): Dr. Ismail Rashid 6. “Securitisation” of the African Development Agenda: Dr. Funmi Olonisakin

Wednesday, July 13

DAY THREE: THE WAY FORWARD 09:00 – 10:30 Plenary Session: Conclusions from Breakout Groups 1-6 Chair: Brigadier General Dr. Walter Feichtinger Rapporteurs: from Breakout Groups 1-6 Discussion 11:00 – 12:15 Panel Five: African Ownership of Peace Operations Chair: Ambassador John L. Hirsch, Senior Fellow, Director IPA Africa Program Panel: Lieutenant General Daniel Ishmael Opande, Force Commander, United Nations Mission in Liberia Ambassador Felix Mosha, Executive Director, African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management, Arusha, Tanzania Discussion 12:15 – 12:30 Conclusions

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WELCOMING REMARKS

General Roland ERTL Chief of Defence Staff, Austrian Ministry of Defense

I would like to welcome you on behalf of the Austrian Minister of Defense on the occasion of the Vienna Seminar of the International Peace Academy which is held today for the 35th time. This year’s topic "Developing Peace Partnerships in Africa" is a continuous follow-up to previous International Peace Academy initiatives in their "Africa Program" together with the Vienna Seminar. The International Peace Academy is particularly well placed to conduct these projects given its long-standing engagement with African institutions. Over the last months, several unresolved conflicts on the African Continent have gained public attention again. Solutions to these conflicts require the exchange of opinions, realistic approaches with different views, and understanding of opposing positions, trust and mutual respect as important preconditions. The International Peace Academy is a perfect platform to provide these conditions, being an independent, international institution dedicated to promoting the prevention of armed conflicts as well as the settlement of armed conflicts among states and within states through policy research and development. Thus it is striving

• to strengthen international organizations • to encourage innovative and effective approaches to conflict prevention – and • to promote the peaceful and just settlement of armed conflicts in the 21st century.

Peace Operations include different actors for the support of political, military, humanitarian, electoral, civil-police, human-rights, and logistical activities. Peace Operations are no magic treatment for the problems of the planet, but they do offer flexible, low-key, low-cost options for the promotion of international peace and security. Virtually all the regional conflicts which have involved some type of peacekeeping effort have been conflicts within states (intra-state). Due to the permeability of African state borders nearly all of these conflicts have had a regional dimension. Confronted with vast distances in rugged terrain African countries are extremely challenged by the

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need to control their own territory and to the end cross border actions, particularly when international boundaries cut through rather than following ethnic divides. New questions arise while learning the lessons from the management of violence in crisis areas in Africa. The aim of crisis management in Africa is certainly to contain violence, to prevent local problems from spreading regionally and to transform the society in dispute towards a prosperous and democratic system. Thus crises management should promote stability within the society and throughout the region. Analysis of ongoing UN-led Peace Operations underlines the demand for more policemen for such missions because there are “more police and less military tasks” to cover. But how to overcome the shortage in police staff? Most probably we will have to develop more specialized military units, which can support the local civil societies and communities especially by protecting law and order. The training package of our peace support contingents actually does already contain some police techniques like crowd and riot control in addition to the already well-established peacekeeping skills. Aside from practical military factors, success or failure of peace support operations in Africa will specifically depend on the character of the political commitment of the African Union together with its partners from the International Community. It is important to note, that the African Union has shown bright prospects for the nature of conflict resolution and management in the continent. Through its commitment to several conflicts it has already gained high respect as one unifying body drawing peacekeeping experience from member states such as Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya among others. Its efforts supporting the sub-regional organizations to undertake peacekeeping operations cannot be understated therefore. Such efforts would be less effective, however, without the complementary role of the UN and the International Community to establish an operationally firm security framework that supports capacity building efforts in the long run. As part of this security framework the Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Force SHIRBRIG has offered to support the AU in the establishment of African Stand-by Forces. Based on its experience this formation could serve as a model. SHIRBIRG proved its utility when it deployed for the first in UNMEE, the UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Additionally, its planning support to ECOWAS for the Liberia issue as well

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as the inclusion in the HQ staff of UNMIL and the early involvement in the planning activities for UNAMIS as well as the current participation in UNMIS has shown the strong commitment of the SHIRBRIG member states to the capacity building together with African Initiatives. Further, in August 2005 a co-ordination meeting will take place between representatives from the AU and SHIRBIRG to implement the first steps of the envisaged cooperation to improve the peacekeeping capacities in African states focusing on the African Stand by Forces. One key factor of these forces will be the logistic capabilities. Therefore a plan was drawn up to build two logistics bases – one on the west and one the east coast of Africa – following the ex-ample of UNLB - United Nations Logistics Base BRINDISI. In view of the anticipated costs for these efforts additional financial partnerships are encouraged. Let me now turn to the European Union and the African Union. The “EU Council Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa” advocates a proactive, comprehensive and integrated approach bringing together all instruments at the EU disposal like development, trade, economic, diplomatic and politico-military means. In the beginning, the focus will be on topics like early warning capacity, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, proliferation of light weapons and illicit arms trafficking. With regard to African peacekeeping capabilities, the AU has requested the EU to fund peace support and peacekeeping operations conducted under the authority of the AU. Against this background the Commission has developed the Peace Facility for Africa with the overall objective to build the African capacity and ownership to promote peace and security. Thoughts to use ESDP capabilities in support of AU or sub regional crisis management will be taken forward in close coordination and co-operation with the UN. A concrete example is the support the EU is presently providing, together with other International Organizations and States to the effort of the AU to resolve the crisis in Darfur. Since a good partnership is based on bilateral understanding and agreement I am sure that this seminar will be able to remove some obstacles from our path to develop together some elements for improving cooperation for peace in Africa. The excellent co-operation between the International Peace Academy, the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Austrian Ministry of Defense, the Diplomatic Academy and our National Defense Academy have been well established. It is in this spirit that I wish the conference an outstanding success.

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Dr. Hans WINKLER State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs

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WELCOMING REMARKS

Dr. Hans WINKLER State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs

The International Peace Academy and Austria are looking back on a long tradition of cooperation. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the International Peace Academy, but also our Austrian partner, the Ministry of Defence and we are looking forward to continue our cooperation hopefully for another 35 years. The seminar can be considered, besides our traditional contributions of military and police personnel to peacekeeping operations, as an additional part of the Austrian effort to support the United Nations in achieving a key goal, namely peace. As questions of peacekeeping and peace partnerships in Africa have become crucial in today’s world, the organizers decided already in 2004 to dedicate the 35th Vienna seminar once more to Africa. While last year’s focus was on peacekeeping operations in Africa, this year’s seminar objectives are “peace partnerships in Africa”. We hope for fruitful discussions, which will contribute to answers to new security challenges on the African continent. Kofi Annan’s Report In larger freedom and the most recent discussion at the G-8 summit in Gleneagles underline the importance of this issue. As a member of the European Union we hope to find ways and means to employ the EU African Peace Support Operation Facility more regularly in assisting African Union deployments. Furthermore, Austria as a founding member of SHIRBRIG is proud that SHIRBRIG has started to play a more active and useful role in Africa and contributed to the build up of the UN-mission in Sudan. Since April of this year Austrian officers are deployed in Sudan. In this context I would like to mention that over the past 50 years, Austria has sought to contribute effectively to the work of the United Nations, in particular in the fields of peace and security. Over 50.000 Austrians have served in UN peacekeeping operations worldwide. Currently about 1500 Austrians are deployed in peace operations all over the world. As one of the organizers we hope that the seminar will continue to be a forum of high-ranking international political and military leaders which contribute to shape the discussions on urgent problems in the field of peacekeeping. The Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs together with its partners is looking forward to hosting next year’s seminar on an equally important issue.

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Rapporteurs: from Breakout Groups 1-6

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BACKGROUND PAPER

Cyrus SAMII International Peace Academy, New York

I. BACKGROUND The 35th IPA Vienna Seminar on Developing Peace Partnerships in Africa comes at a time of major initiatives in Africa and the broader international community to respond to the threats and challenges of the 21st century. African leaders have taken the initiative at the start of this century to build institutions for security and prosperity on the continent. Efforts have been taken to strengthen the new African Union (AU), founded in 1999 to succeed the Organization of African Unity, and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), promulgated in 2001 by leaders from Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa to provide a “strategic framework for Africa’s renewal.” These continental initiatives come along with processes at the subregional level to develop operational capabilities for peace support, including efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The United Nations Secretary-General has given special attention to security and development in Africa in his March 2005 report, In larger freedom (A/59/2005). The report sets out an ambitious agenda for the United Nations’ sixtieth anniversary summit in September 2005. In the report, the Secretary-General indicates that our interest in a more secure and prosperous world could hardly be better served than through concerted international efforts to enhance partnerships for peace in Africa1. In addition, the current surge in demand for peace operations in Africa and the risk that current capacities will be overstretched makes it imperative to find ways to transform the broad concept of partnership into a more effective reality2. Such efforts should draw on the comparative strengths of international and African capabilities. As the Secretary-General put it in his November 2004 report on Enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity, “[t]he challenge today is to move beyond purely ad hoc arrangements and to put in place a

1 United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security, and Human Rights for All

[Report of the Secretary-General], (A/59/2005), 21 March 2005. 2 Eight of the sixteen active UN peacekeeping operations are in Africa, as are seven out of the UN’s

current eleven joint peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations: (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp#).

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system capable of generating a rapid and flexible response to crises in Africa and elsewhere.”3 Africa’s major development partners have taken important preliminary steps toward building partnerships in recent years. The Group of Eight (G8) initiated its Africa Action Plan (AAP) at Kananaskis in 2002 to complement NEPAD and support the AU. The United Kingdom, which holds the current G8 presidency, has promised that the July 2005 Gleneagles Summit will provide a much-needed push, building on the recent report of the UK-initiated Commission for Africa. The European states have established the European Union (EU) Africa Peace Operation Support Facility and employed it in 2004 and 2005 to assist AU deployments to Sudan. SHIRBRIG has played an increasingly useful role, most recently with the UN advance mission in Sudan and previously in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ethiopia and Eritrea4. These multilateral processes come in addition to bilateral training and initiatives for logistical support, as well as improvement in private sector arrangements to address logistical needs. Yet, these impressive developments represent only a beginning. Many in the international community still wonder how the ghastly brutalities in Darfur can continue, whether the commitment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo is sufficient to end terror and exploitation in the massive country, and whether the support structure exists to ensure sustained peace in West Africa. Frameworks for partnership are a necessary and desirable solution, but they also necessarily involve complex coordination challenges at headquarters and in the field. For the challenges to be met, initiatives must be made operative through action plans and clear articulation of roles, responsibilities, and priorities. Institutions and organizations must be further rationalized to enhance efficiency and effectiveness. Political will must be galvanized to turn promises into realities.

II. SEMINAR OBJECTIVES This year’s Seminar will include discussions of security challenges facing Africa; Africa’s evolving security architecture; developments within the continent’s regional

3 United Nations, Enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity, (A/59/591), 30 November 2004, p.

4. 4 SHIRBRIG stands for “Multi-national Standby Force High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations”,

established in 1996 to serve UN peacekeeping operations. Current active members are Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Key activities have included planning, early entry, and headquarters set-up for UN peacekeeping operations.

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and subregional organizations; enhancing partnerships for peace operations; cooperation in peacebuilding; and African ownership of peace operations. Breakout groups will be tasked to explore key issue areas for enhancing African peacekeeping capacity and for bridging the security-development divide. The overall objectives of the seminar are as follows:

• To deepen and broaden the knowledge and expertise of participants on critical policy issues relating to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa,

• To provide a forum where participants can share insights and develop their professional relationships, and

• To promote the creation of a well-informed, worldwide leadership cadre of practitioners who have a broad, sophisticated understanding of peace operations and are well-equipped both to make policy and to lead operations in the field.

III. FORMAT AND THEMES The seminar will include keynote speakers, panel presentations, plenary discussions among participants, and small working groups. The topics to be addressed are described below, along with some issues for consideration, to help guide the discussions. Introductory Panel: Security Challenges Facing Africa In a sense, the surge in peacekeeping activity in Africa is a welcomed signal. It reflects the possibility that a number of the continent’s devastating violent conflicts may be ending. It also reflects increased interest in the international community to work toward ending these conflicts. These positive developments come along with the spread of democratic governance on the continent, a number of peaceful leadership transitions recently, and collective efforts to reverse and prevent coups. However, as the Secretary-General notes in his report, In larger freedom, the people of Africa continue to suffer disproportionately from the scourges of violent conflict, poverty, and disease5. The Darfur experience has shown the limits of the international community’s commitment to the “responsibility to protect.” Progress towards good governance in some places is matched by obduracy elsewhere. In some recent instances, it has been unclear whether African leaders’ formal commitments to NEPAD and the 5 United Nations, In Larger Freedom (A/59/2005).

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African Peer Review Mechanism really demonstrate willingness to take the steps necessary to entrench respect for human rights, transparency, and democracy. Without progress on these fronts, multiple threats to individual well-being and a high likelihood of violent conflict will persist. Issues for consideration

• In efforts to end violent conflict, poverty, and disease in Africa, in what cases is lack of resources the key obstacle, and in what cases is the key obstacle lack of cooperation? In what cases is it lack of attention by the international community and national governments? What kinds of mechanisms are necessary to sustainably overcome these obstacles? Whose responsibility is it to act?

• Do multilateral and bilateral assistance programs give adequate attention to the links between the democracy, human rights, economic development, and security agendas in Africa? Are existing programs to expand and deepen commitment to human rights, transparency, and democracy - such as those associated with NEPAD and the G8’s AAP - real forces for change on the continent?

Panel 1: Africa’s Security Architecture The institutions of the AU provide a framework for revising the continent’s political and economic relations in order to end cycles of poverty and devastating violent conflict. The AU has worked to implement a Continental Peace and Security Architecture for addressing Africa’s security challenges6. The AU institutions are laid over the five subregions of the continent, and the subregional organizations (including the Regional Economic Communities [RECs]) serve as a second institutional layer in the architecture. Some tangible progress has been made in operationalizing this architecture. The Peace and Security Council has been active since its fifteen members were elected in March 2004, notably in overseeing the AU’s Darfur observer mission and mediation efforts. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) and other related working bodies have convened regularly to outline requirements for establishing, by 2010, an African Standby Force (ASF)7.

6 The AU defines the Continental Peace and Security Architecture to include five elements: the Peace

and Security Committee (PSC), Panel of the Wise (POW), Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF), and Military Staff Committee (MSC).

7 The ASF is to consist of five subregional brigades and include a police and civilian expert capacity. The goals are outlined in the AU’s Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee, Annex I EXP/ASF-MSC-(2), 15-16 May 2003.

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Still, much work remains in rationalizing and implementing the security architecture. There are at least forty-two subregional organizations that will need to be integrated into AU’s architecture, and a planned memorandum of understanding to work out AU-REC relations has not been completed. In implementing the ASF plan, inconsistencies exist in that some countries’ memberships in RECs are mismatched with their assignments to regional ASF brigades8. This aberration comes in addition to the many operational capabilities that need to be developed (discussed in the next section). The Panel of the Wise has not been constituted and a work plan is still to be created for operationalizing the Continental Early Warning System in cooperation with the RECs. Finally, and more generally, some have expressed concern about the absence of quality national-level discussion (a “democracy deficit”) in developing regional arrangements like the security architecture. Issues for consideration

• How are security and development priorities related in AU, REC, and development partner programs?

• How can the UN, EU, G8, and other partners harmonize their support for the development of the African peace and security architecture? What capacity areas are receiving too little attention, and which ones are receiving too much? What are the next steps to enhance capacity-building partnerships?

• Should new mechanisms be established to monitor implementation of commitments?

Regional and Subregional Organizations in Africa In addition to developments in the AU’s agenda, African leaders have continued to work to develop operational capacities at the subregional level, particularly through the RECs9. ECOWAS has continued to apply lessons learned from its multiple deployments in developing its “security mechanism”, which resembles a miniaturized version of the continent wide AU architecture. SADC and IGAD are attempting to accomplish similar goals. Given the conflict that continues to rage in the DRC, there has been little progress in developing a similar arrangement for Central Africa, despite attempts through the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The countries of the

8 Tanzania, for example, is a member of SADC, but not IGAD. But Tanzania is included in the East

Africa Region under the AU architecture, and thus participates in the East African Standby Brigade, which is led by IGAD. Such mismatches create obstacles to operationalizing the Brigade concept. Only in West Africa (in ECOWAS) have such mismatches been avoided.

9 Adekeye Adebajo, “Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture,” in Peace Operations in Africa, Favorita Paper 03/2004. Vienna: Vienna Diplomatic Academy, 2004.

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Maghreb have found a regional security consensus to be elusive. Despite the ambitious agendas, a recent study of their implementation processes has found that “chronic human resource shortfalls in African institutions seriously undermine African strategic management capacity at the AU and in the regions”10. The limited pool of trained and skilled managers exacerbates the trade-off between responding to urgent short-term demands and committing to long-term institution-building. The strategic-level human resource gap has also limited the AU’s and the RECs’ abilities to offer clear proposals to external partners. As a result, human resource development is a major priority both for improving the functionality of AU and the RECs and enhancing partnerships. Issues for consideration

• Are the RECs and AU working toward common purposes in most cases? If there are instances of cross purposes or redundancy, what steps should be taken to harmonize efforts?

• What are the perspectives among development partners from the G8, EU, and UN about the steps the AU and subregional organizations should take to make partnerships easier to establish?

• What kinds of partnerships could be enhanced or established to overcome the strategic-level human resources gap in the AU and subregional organizations? What lessons could be shared from EU, OSCE, and NATO programs for developing strategic management capacity? What kinds of partnerships could be established to link these programs with efforts in Africa?

Breakout Groups 1-3: Strengthening Africa’s Peacekeeping Capacity In responding to the surge in demand for peacekeeping in Africa, both the UN and the AU have taken the initiative in identifying priority areas for capacity building. In his report on Enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity, the Secretary-General identified four key systemic capacity gaps that hinder UN peacekeeping in Africa, as well as elsewhere:

• The absence of a common doctrine and training standards; • Lack of equipment and adequate logistical support, including strategic sea and

10 Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji M.S. Bah, and Fanny Calder, The Implementation of the Joint Africa/G8

Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations, A Project of Chatham House, UNA-UK, and ISS, Pretoria, April 2005, p. 3.

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airlift capabilities; • Inadequate funding; and • Lack of institutional capacity for planning and management of peacekeeping

operations within the African Union and subregional organizations11.

In its own prioritization effort, the AU set out a Road Map for establishing the African Standby Force in a Communiqué issued after the 22-23 March 2005 Experts’ Meeting. The Road Map identified four priorities:

• The establishment of Planning Elements (PLANELMs) both at the level of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities;

• The completion, by 30 June 2006, of studies relating to the different aspects of the ASF (logistics, communication, training, SOPs, etc.), including through the convening of sectorial and technical workshops;

• The establishment of regional brigades; and • Funding, collaboration, and cooperation with partner countries and

institutions12. In relation to these prioritization efforts, the G8 itself has set out a plan for supporting peace operations’ capacity building, particularly in Africa. At the US-hosted summit in Sea Island in 2004, the G8 undertook to “train and where appropriate equip” 75,000 peacekeepers, mostly in Africa13. The G8 initiative builds on the US’ African Contingency Operations (ACOTA) and France’s Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) programs, as well as the UK’s peacekeeping-related activities through its African Conflict Prevention Pool. The challenge remains for the AU, subregional organizations, UN, and other partners to address these priority areas and build institutions to ensure that responses are quicker, more consistent, and more effective. Some funding and support arrangements need to be institutionalized rather than always being mission-specific. Technical and operational concerns must be seen within the broader strategic and normative context on the continent. Peacekeeping should serve to create a foundation for broader goals of sustained peace and development.

11 United Nations, Enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity (A/59/591), p.5. 12 African Union, Experts Meeting on the Relationship Between the AU and the Region Economic

Communities (RECs) in the Area of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, EXP/AU-RECs/ASF/Comm.(I), 22-23 March 2004.

13 G8, G8 Action Plan: Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations, Sea Island, June 8 – 10, 2004 ) http://www.g8usa.gov/documents.htm).

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Given this context, Breakout Groups 1-3 will be tasked considering key operational issue areas for enhancing African peacekeeping. The aim will be to raise questions and, whenever possible, develop specific, actionable recommendations. Facilitators will give brief presentations to set the context for the Group discussions. The themes will include the following:

• Enhancing Rapid Response • Meeting Military Requirements • Building Planning Capacity

Panel 3: Partnerships in Peace Operations Capacity-building partnerships have been essential sources of support, but have also been sources of divisiveness. The links between the continental organizations and the UN are, of course, vital and should be deepened, and efforts are underway to coordinate the various operations deployed on the continent. In his report on inter-mission cooperation in West Africa, the Secretary-General indicated that cooperation could be significantly improved in the whole range of peace operations tasks14. However, arrangements such as the UN Office in West Africa (UNOWA) may sometimes serve as little more than an extra bureaucratic layer. Externally supported capacity-building programs, amounting to about half a billion dollars per year15, have been crucial. Still, bilateral interests and other internal divisions, such as the francophone-anglophone divide, sometimes complicate the G8’s and EU’s cooperative initiatives on the continent. Given that the G8 has neither standing implementation machinery nor a formal relationship with the AU, the coherence of the implementation of the G8’s plans for Africa has suffered16. Creative support arrangements have been devised repeatedly over the past decade to facilitate African-organization-initiated operations across West Africa, in Burundi, and most recently for the AU mission in Darfur. Such experiences could serve as models for useful institutional arrangements for funding and outfitting missions. Operational areas 14 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on inter-mission cooperation and possible

cross-border operations between the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire, (S/2005/135), 2 March 2005. Areas for improved coordination include information-sharing and joint planning military operations, DDR, small arms counter-proliferation, civilian policing, human rights promotion, child protection, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, rule of law promotion, public information, and administration and logistics.

15 Cyrus Samii, “Peace Operations in Africa: Capacity, Operations, and Implications. Report from the 34th Annual Vienna Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Seminar.” Peace Operations in Africa, Favorita Paper 03/2004. Vienna: Vienna Diplomatic Academy, 2004, pp. 29-30.

16 Ramsbotham et al, op. cit.

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that require attention include mandating, funding, command and control, and logistical support. The application of the EU Africa Peace Operation Support Facility for the Darfur deployment represents an interesting step in this direction.

• Are partners coordinating with the UN and AU and contributing adequately to develop capacity in key niche areas (e.g. strategic planning and analysis, logistical planning and management, francophone police, midlevel police managers, corrections and penal experts, etc.)?

• Are current funding mechanisms consistent with optimal peace operation strategies? Should assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping sometimes be used to finance operations by regional organizations, such as the AU and subregional organizations, as proposed by the UN’s High Level Panel?

• What ad hoc arrangements should be replaced by institutionalized arrangements to meet financial, logistical, troops, and other operational needs?

Panel 4: Cooperation in Peacebuilding A number of recent studies have shown that the signing of a ceasefire or peace agreement represents only the beginning of a very uncertain process toward sustainable peace17. Many cases in Africa over the past fifteen years show that the danger of a country sliding back into war is great18. Recognizing this challenge, the Secretary-General noted in In larger freedom that “there is a gaping hole in the United Nations machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace”19. He has proposed a Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office to fill this gap. The proposal has garnered momentum, but questions remain about whether these new institutions will facilitate or impede operations, expand or divert development assistance, or assert or undermine sovereign authority. Practitioners have also voiced concern about whether the new bodies will help to overcome key impediments to sustained cooperation: personality clashes, scarce resources, irreconcilable priority differences, and different “organizational cultures.” Burden-sharing between the UN, AU, RECs, and other partners has typically varied

17 Examination of civil war negotiated settlements in the post-World War II period shows that the

“mean survival time for a single civil war settlement is approximately 42 months.” Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild. “Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investiagatation of Some Key Variables.” International Organization. Vol 55 (Winter 2001), p. 195.

18 According to data collected by Page Fortna (Columbia University, USA), these include resumption of hostilities after ceasefires in Angola (1992, 1998), the Republic of Congo (1997), the Democratic Republic of Congo (1998), Eritrea/Ethiopia (2000), Liberia (1993, 2003), Rwanda (1994, 1998), Sierra Leone (1996, 1999), and Somalia (1991).

19 United Nations, In Larger Freedom (A/59/2005), p. 31.

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through phases of peace operations, and most operations have been assembled ad hoc. The AU or regional actors have provided the start for peacekeeping operations followed by absorption into a broader UN-led operation. However, when the situation stabilizes, it may be preferable for regional actors to assume again a more prominent role. But the AU and subregional organizations are limited in their ability to mobilize expertise in core tasks of peacebuilding, including strategic planning; DDR; building rule of law institutions; conducting elections; repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration of displaced persons; conducting reconciliation processes; and demining and ordnance clearance. Finally, an objective of peacebuilding is the establishment of state institutions that allow for the provision of public goods. Such public goods include legal mechanisms for peaceful dispute resolution; communications and transport infrastructure; public health services; and property rights, contract enforcement, and other protections for market exchange. The provision of public goods is associated with democratic governance, policing and enforcement, and public finance and taxation. If peace operations are to be terminal activities, then it is necessary to strengthen state institutions to perform these functions and provide these goods. A recent study of UN peacebuilding has identified four ways in which recent UN peace operations have weakened, rather than strengthened, state institutions20:

• By insufficiently incorporating local and national participation; • By bypassing the institutions of the state; • By failing to build national capacities in post-conflict situations as promptly,

rapidly and aggressively as they might; and • By conceptually overlooking the medium-term.

The implication of these findings is that peace operations have had difficulty in finding the right balance between local capacity building on the one hand, and responding to urgent needs on the other hand. Issues for consideration

• What are the steps for boosting African peacebuilding capacity? Are the AU and the subregional organizations working to meet these needs (and not making the UN’s mistake of overlooking them)? What kinds of partnerships could be forged to meet these needs?

20 Charles Call, “Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Concept Peacebuilding Concepts and

Issues for DPA.” United Nations Department of Political Affairs. 31 January 2005.

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• What is the appropriate timeframe for peacebuilding efforts in Africa? What are the optimal financing arrangements for peacebuilding over the short, medium, and long run? What is the appropriate distribution of responsibilities for the AU, subregional organizations, UN, IFIs, EU, state leaders, and other development partners?

• When a post-conflict situation is sufficiently stabilized, but third-party security provision is still necessary, should strategic transfer to an AU or subregional organization peace operation be the objective? Is EUROFOR (Bosnia) an appropriate model for the AU or ECOWAS?

• What have been the key obstacles to greater cooperation between security, development, and humanitarian actors in Africa? Which peace operations in Africa are models of effective sustained cooperation, and which have been exceptionally bad? How will the UN Secretary-General’s proposal for a Peacebuilding Commission help in improving such coordination?

• How can current peace operations in Africa be improved to ensure that state institutions are being strengthened, rather than weakened?

Breakout Groups 4-6: Bridging the Security-Development Divide These breakout groups will allow participants to delve deeper into key issues relating to peacebuilding and the links between security and development. The facilitators will each provide some context for each Group, drawing from current research and policy-development processes. Again, the aim will be to raise questions and, whenever possible, develop specific, actionable recommendations. Topics will include the following:

• Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. • Security Sector Reform • “Securitisation” of the African Development Agenda

Panel 5: African Ownership of Peace Operations The final seminar panel will deal with the issue of “African ownership”. Ownership is a principle applicable to both capacity development programs and to operations. At the level of capacity development, key concerns for all actors involved include respecting (and enhancing) decision-making autonomy, in order to set proper priorities, and the clear designation of responsibilities, to ensure proper implementation. These issues relate to financing and mandating arrangements, among others. Respect for decision-making autonomy should operate at multiple levels, not only pertaining to partnerships

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between the AU, subregional organizations, and external partners, but also (as discussed above in relation to the “democracy deficit”) in subjecting these regional processes to national level scrutiny. At the operational level, key concerns include the manner in which operations are mandated, staffed, and outfitted. The consultative and authoritative relationships between the AU, RECs, UN Security Council, and external partners should be assessed for effectiveness. The nature of UN procedures for selecting mission staff and troops lends to suspicions of favoritism and has raised questions about UNDPKO’s commitment to regional capacity building. Similar concerns surround the manner in which operations are outfitted. Of course, in order to revise procedures to address these concerns, regional actors like the AU and RECs would have to demonstrate their own capacity to mobilize resources with sufficient quantity, quality, and speed.

• How should the AU and/or RECs be involved in establishing mandates for UN operations? How should other partners, like the EU, NATO, or SHIRBRIG be engaged?

• Are the AU Peace and Security Committee and the UN Security Council likely to agree in most instances on how to respond to crises? What mechanisms exist for dealing with disagreements? What role should the AU leadership (including the PSC) play for operations under UN command?

• What resources can Africa itself mobilize to contribute to the continent’s peace and development? What challenges does the AU face in using its internal funding mechanisms for peace operations (e.g. the Peace Fund)? How about for the RECs in funding their security mechanisms?

• Are development partners willing to provide more to an enhanced AU and subregional organizations than what has been provided to African peace operations through the UN?

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CONFERENCE REPORT

Cyrus SAMII International Peace Academy, New York

1. INTRODUCTION

The 2005 Vienna Seminar aimed to give tangible meaning to the notion of “peace partnerships” in Africa by identifying specific projects for assisting the African Union in realizing its Peace and Security agenda. The theme was inspired by African-led initiatives to construct a framework for promoting peace, security, and prosperity on the continent. Seminar participants sought to contribute to policy development processes associated with the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and African sub-regional economic communities (RECs) such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD, in East Africa). These processes have become the focal points for support by the G8, the European Union (EU), and bilateral development partners to promote peace and prosperity in Africa. The 2005 Seminar, which built upon the 2004 Vienna Seminar on Peace Operations in Africa, was also a response to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s call for institutionalizing partnerships to promote peace in Africa, rather than continuing to rely on ad hoc approaches. Bringing together diplomats, military officers, officials, researchers, and civil society representatives from Africa, Europe, and the US, as well as from the UN bodies, the Seminar was co-hosted by the International Peace Academy (New York), the Austrian National Defence Academy, the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, and the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Peace partnerships in Africa were high on international agendas in 2005, making the Seminar especially timely. The Seminar took place on the heels of the 2005 G8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland/UK, and the AU Summit in Tripoli, Libya. Presided over by the UK and driven by the recommendations of the Commission for Africa, the G8 Summit resulted in initiatives to combat poverty and support the development of peace operations capabilities in Africa. The AU Summit resulted in an improved financing arrangement for the AU, an AU position on UN Security Council reform, and a welcoming of the G8’s proposal for debt cancellation. Seminar participants had the opportunity to discuss these developments. Participants also looked ahead to the September 2005 Millennium Review Summit at the UN, the agenda for which was to

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build on the UN SG Annan’s March 2005 report, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. The SG’s report confirms that peace and sustainable development in Africa are at the heart of the UN’s mission. Finally, with Austria assuming the EU Presidency in January 2006, members of the Austrian foreign policy establishment were given the chance to consider new ideas for the EU-Africa agenda. Discussions at the seminar addressed a number of core issues, including the paradigm shift embodied in the AU’s agenda; principles to guide new partnerships; the state of play in operationalizing the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture; and priorities for developing African post-conflict peacebuilding capacity. 2. PARADIGM SHIFT

Peace and security challenges in Africa have necessitated a “paradigm shift” from the “non-interference” of the now defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) to “non-indifference” of the AU. A new generation of African leaders and civil society organizations has taken notice of the international community’s negligence in dealing with crises in Liberia (1990), Somalia (1993), and Rwanda (1994) and of the fact that intra-state conflicts can have devastating regional consequences. The new thinking triggered by these experiences, along with recognition of the need to revitalize economic development in Africa, led to the establishment of the AU in July 2002. The AU has a mandate to address all peace, security, and humanitarian problems, including intra-state conflict, at any time. The body executing this mandate, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), is composed of 15 elected members having to be in good standing with the organization and its principles. Given the expansiveness of the mandate and the selection criteria, the PSC may be institutionally more response-ready than the UN Security Council1. The challenge remains to translate this into an operational reality. Nonetheless, changes are well perceivable. A contrast was noted between the AU’s deployments to Burundi and Sudan and the OAU’s non-interference in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict in the 1990s, despite the OAU’s headquarters being in Addis Ababa. The paradigm shift has important implications for realizing peace partnerships in Africa. Meaningful peace partnerships depend on African leaders’ commitment to intra-state

1 As evidence of this response-readiness, the PSC suspended Mauritania’s AU membership the day

after the military coup d’etat on August 3, 2005.

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peace and justice on the continent. The AU now institutionalizes that commitment, providing a coordination hub for external partners to engage. 3. PRINCIPLES FOR PARTNERSHIP

Seminar participants identified a few principles to guide the formation of partnerships between the AU, RECs, UN bodies, and other development partners including the G8, EU, IFIs, and bilateral partners. These guiding principles include the following:

• Additionality, not burden-shifting: The general approach should be to create

partnerships to increase the overall capacity to promote peace and sustainable development on the continent. It is important that international support for the AU and RECs does not amount to an attempt to pass off international responsibility for peace and security in Africa. The UNSC has primary responsibility for ensuring peace and security in Africa and elsewhere. Indeed, most of the UNSC’s deliberations are focused on addressing conflicts in Africa. Enhancement of AU and REC capability builds primarily upon the commitment by African leaders themselves to assume more responsibility for mediation and resolution of conflicts on the continent as a whole.

• Comparative advantage: Given the limitations on the resources of the AU, RECs, UN bodies, and development partners, comparative advantages should be used to maximize efficiency. In designing programs and policies, comparative advantages should be weighed against other principles, such as “local ownership”. For example, post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa is likely to become the central security challenge on the continent for the next two decades. In developing African peacebuilding capacity, continental actors are at a comparative disadvantage relative to the World Bank and UN bodies in planning and financing post-conflict peacebuilding. At the same time, the AU and RECs may have an advantage in providing mediators, troops, and police. At least in the short run, rather than the AU duplicating what the World Bank and UN can already do well in planning and financing, it may make the most sense for the AU to concentrate on its strengths.

• National and regional ownership: Such ownership means bringing national and regional stakeholders into confidence early-on in policy development processes. A lesson on ownership was learned when the National Transition Government of Liberia (NTGL) and ECOWAS gave cold responses to the International Contact Group on the Mano River Basin’s proposal to establish a “Liberia Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program”. The

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Contact Group designed the assistance program to reduce corruption in Liberia, and the AU and UN supported the proposal. But the NTGL predictably saw the proposed program as a foreign imposition and resisted it, and ECOWAS was unwilling to put pressure on the NTGL to accept it. Although the issue was eventually worked out, the ill will that arose threatened the project. Seminar participants pointed out that had the NTGL and ECOWAS been taken into confidence early on, ECOWAS’s support could have been secured and the NTGL’s concerns assuaged. One participant suggested that in the future, the proposed UN Peacebuilding Commission could be the venue for such engagement.

• Subsidiarity: Subsidiarity helps to ensure that development assistance and resources committed to building peace operations capacity are properly matched to the variety of on-the-ground needs on the continent rather than being based on inapplicable generalizations. It also ensures that the capacity-building to address problems (the “learning by doing”) happens in African locales well-positioned to respond to future challenges rather than in distant capitals.

• Mutual learning: It is important to recognize that continental actors and development partners have much to learn from each other. It is not a one-way street. Western armies, for example, could learn from the wealth of experience of African peacekeepers, particularly those who have been involved in peace operations for over a decade in West Africa. African armies could be brought up to speed on technological and organizational advances in Western armies.

• No parallel tracks: Development partners often work on tracks parallel to the AU-REC framework, with such tracks based on former colonial ties or strategic interests. Without sufficient internal capacity to make use of resources offered by development partners, the AU/RECs rely on implementation partners - NGOs and think-tanks, seconded officers and officials, etc. While such parallel tracks to some extent make up for the AU/RECs’ lack of internal capacity, they also mean that the AU/RECs loses control over implementation, strategic coordination is compromised, and capacity building (“learning-by-doing”) happens outside the AU/RECs rather than within them. Partners should coordinate closely with the AU. NGO and think-tank implementation partners could offer personnel to be made available eventually as AU staff. Development partners could adopt a rule in which capacity building funds are directed through the non-AU channels only if there are compelling reasons for doing so. Funds could also be placed into trust or committed over the long term to give the AU time to organize implementation programs.

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• Inseparability of security and development: Integration of security and development programming in Africa is a necessary response to the inseparability of conflict, poverty, governance problems, and disease. The challenge is for security and development programs to work in tandem rather than in an overly compartmentalized fashion. Seminar participants noted that in current UN peace operations in Africa, such integration is still obstructed by personal tensions between program heads; bureaucratic rigidity at headquarters that effectively bars joint efforts in the field; and little time or opportunity for information sharing and genuine consultation between security, development, and humanitarian officers across the different UN bodies.

At the operations level, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) deployment to Darfur is an important test case for these partnership principles. Despite being a relatively small mission (deployment of up to 6,171 troops and 1,560 police), the mission involves complex coordination among an array of actors from the AU, African troop-contributing countries, UN bodies (which often act quite independently of each other), the EU, NATO, the United States, and the Sudanese government. Key issues are the reconciliation of different attitudes about priorities within these different organizations, maintaining the cooperation of the Sudanese government, and providing receiving points for the streams of support coming in from the international community. Also, language difficulties and insufficient training and experience with interoperability have created problems for military units and especially for civilian police units. At the capacity-building level, EU, G8 and bilateral pledges to support the AU and NEPAD represent progress toward realizing these partnership principles. Participants generally agreed that the objective is for these institutional channels to take prominence over ad hoc and/or bilateral channels. Participants also a discussed number of bureaucratic concerns. The AU, with its severe staff limitations, struggles to meet the stringent reporting requirements of the EU and Japan; the US’s approach with less complex reporting was taken to be much more efficient. The AU would thus welcome simplified and standardized G8 or OECD reporting formats. 4. OPERATIONALIZING THE PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The translation of “non-indifference” into an operational reality for the Africa Union has begun with the elaboration of a Peace and Security Architecture. The Peace and Security Council is at the center of the architecture, with the implementation arms being the Military Staff Committee, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning

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System, and the African Stand-by Force. Among these five elements, some are more advanced than others. At the Seminar, an update of the operationalization process was given and priorities for partnerships were highlighted. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) has been active as the executive body overseeing the establishment of the architecture as well as the deployments to Burundi and Darfur. Nonetheless, much remains to be done in assessing and improving the PSC’s working procedures. Without a dedicated Secretariat to support its work, the PSC relies on ad hoc reporting and implementation arrangements. Also, relations with the UN Security Council (UNSC) remain to be further clarified, requiring an “unpacking” of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. A specific issue pertains to the question of whether UNSC authorization of a PSC decision to deploy a peacekeeping operation entails any automatic implications for financing. The UN General Assembly and UNSC must also settle the issue of whether AU-mandated operations can be paid for with funds from UN assessed contributions. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) has met regularly, serving as the technical body guiding the deployments in Sudan and Burundi and the implementation of the ASF agenda. Seminar participants made no mention of concerns with the MSC. The Panel of the Wise (POW) composed of respected elders is intended to ensure that even if the PSC is unable to take action, the AU does not remain inert. Most of the members of the POW have been selected, but the body remains to be convened and given a support structure. Again, the main impediment has been AU headquarters staff limitations. The Continental Early Warning System is intended to allow for the AU to take preventive action and to respond rapidly and most effectively. Progress on the System has been slow, mostly because of staffing constraints at the AU headquarters. Nonetheless, a Road Map was expected to be completed by the end of the summer 2005. At the technical level, the System could draw from IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) Mechanism, which was presented and discussed at the Seminar. The CEWARN system systematically gathers and compiles information on conflict indicators and disseminates them into a network linking IGAD headquarters and member-state ministries. Some participants asked whether the AU’s early-warning approach should be more deliberative and locally engaged. Rather than merely gathering information at the local level and only engaging capital city elites, the early warning system should involve the regular dispatching of AU representatives to actively engage local community leaders and discuss ways to bring about positive changes.

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The African Stand-by Force seeks to harness continental readiness to respond in cases where the broader international community remains inert. Having approved an implementation Road Map in March 2005 and initiated systematic needs assessments, the Force is making steady progress, at least on paper. 5. CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTATION Seminar participants noted that the most important constraints on operationalizing the Architecture are (i) human resource and staffing limitations at the AU and the RECs, (ii) skepticism both on the continent and in development partner governments, and (iii) the continuance of parallel capacity-building tracks based on former colonial ties or bilateral strategic interests. These constraints translate readily into priorities for partnerships. Human resource development for the AU must be supported. Development partners in the G8 and EU should heartily encourage and incentivize African leaders’ implementation of AU decisions. Parallel tracks should be minimized to ensure the coherence of capacity-building on the continent. A number of questions were raised through the course of the Seminar, pointing out challenges for the implementation process to address:

• Could the AU headquarters staff and member states simultaneously manage

AU deployments and capacity-building? Such multi-tasking inevitably forces compromises in capacity-building.

• Should the AU make the ASF available for deployment anywhere in the world and under UN political leadership? If the AU was to agree to this, the ASF would complement the EU Battle Groups in adding to global capacities - a result that UNDPKO would welcome. It may also help to secure the international commitment to Africa. If an ASF brigade was committed to UNDPKO’s proposed Strategic Reserve, then this ASF brigade could qualify for inclusion in special UN financing arrangements.

• Should the subregional ASF brigades be committed primarily to dealing with crises within their own subregions or not? The experience of the proposed IGAD peacekeeping deployment to Somalia, has been instructive. The operation faces problems given Ethiopia’s tense relations with Somalia, Eritrea’s poor relations with other IGAD states, and Sudan’s own internal problems. This leaves Uganda as the only IGAD member with the needed capabilities and free of inhibiting political constraints. IGAD’s problems are in contrast to ECOWAS’s more positive experience in West Africa.

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In addition to these questions, Seminar participants made specific recommendations for operationalizing the architecture:

• AU member states should be mindful of the difficulties that may arise if ASF units are composed of small contributions (e.g. at the company level) from different countries. An alternative would be for single-country battalions to be the smallest component units, unless multi-nation battalions had adequate inter-operability training.

• Development partners should channel initiatives like RECAMP and ACOTA through the AU, rather than through bilateral or independent tracks. If so, the training would reinforce, rather than undermine, the AU. Training should be offered to African units dedicated to the ASF.

• The ASF and composite REC units should fully harmonize doctrine and assessment methodologies to ensure continual operational improvement. Partnerships with NATO, the EU, SHIRBRIG, and UNDPKO could be useful in developing common assessment methodologies and sharing lessons learned.

• AU member states and development partners should stick with the rapid response timelines in the ASF Road Map’s six deployment scenarios. The timelines are extremely ambitious even for an all-NATO deployment. But given the nature of the anticipated crises, they are necessary response times. Partnerships with NATO, the EU, SHIRBRIG, UNDPKO, among others, should focus on making these response timelines feasible.

• The AU should clarify the ASF’s funding mechanisms. As part of this, the UN Security Council and General Assembly should clarify if and how ASF operations could be funded from the UN’s assessed budget. It was noted that costs for the AU’s AMIS deployment to Darfur have far exceeded the ASF assessed budget. (Figures of “at least US$400 million” for AMIS and US$63 million for the ASF assessed budget were mentioned, but these figures remain to be verified.)

Participants also discussed issues relating to AU-REC relations. The AU has drafted Memoranda of Understanding to clarify the relationships with the seven most prominent RECs. The MOUs are being circulated and reviewed by the RECs, although staffing shortages at the AU and RECs are slowing this process too. A key concern is over differing norms at the continental and subregional levels, evident in the different approaches of the AU and ECOWAS in responding to developments in Togo over the past year. Some participants, however, did not see a problem in ECOWAS and the AU having different reactions to Togo.

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6. POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING AS A PRIORITY Post-conflict peacebuilding has, as yet, not been specified as a pillar of the Peace and Security Architecture. But given the progress in many peace processes on the continent, it is reasonable to expect that post-conflict peacebuilding will be the security priority in Africa in the coming decades. Seminar participants discussed institutions and strategies that could be applied to address peacebuilding challenges in Africa. The situation in Sierra Leone typifies many of the challenges. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) has brought about a palpable improvement in the security situation and helped to re-energize the political landscape. However, beyond elections, the government is weak and unsure and corruption is still high. The consolidation of a more professional and rational security sector is hampered by the government’s lack of confidence in being able to control the process. Limited economic development has prevented the absorption of an excess supply of young men in the country. It is unlikely that Sierra Leone will see the type of economic development that would lead to a significant reduction in poverty, exclusion, and thus vulnerability to conflict. These circumstances are not specific to Sierra Leone, as war recurrence has been a prevalent phenomenon on the continent. (See background paper.) Unfortunately there are many strategic and institutional gaps in meeting these challenges. In Africa, the NEPAD secretariat in Pretoria has released a policy framework document for “post-conflict reconstruction”. But as yet this policy framework has not been linked to any formal policy-development processes, whether in the AU or in the UN system, and thus remains a disembodied conceptual exercise. It is nonetheless useful insofar as it helps to concentrate minds on the peacebuilding challenges on the continent. Otherwise, as Seminar participants noted, the AU has yet to activate a policy process for developing its post-conflict peacebuilding capabilities. At the UN, it is widely expected that the September Summit will result in the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office, although here too much uncertainty and ambiguity remains about the roles of these new entities. An important role for these new entities would be to link strategic-level integrated planning with financing for peacebuilding. 7. TOWARD A POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING AGENDA

Participants noted ways in which the strategic and institutional gaps could be filled. As described at the beginning of this report, comparative advantages should be seized upon. The AU’s and RECs’ mediation, peacekeeping, and policing capabilities could be

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strengthened as complements to the financing and planning capabilities of the UN and IFIs. The AU and RECs could also do more to link their security initiatives with economic development initiatives. The compartmentalization of security, development, and humanitarian offices in national capitals impedes desirable integration in the field. The G8 and EU could make bureaucratic reforms to allow for integrated security, development, and humanitarian programs. The compartmentalization of security, development, and humanitarian offices in national capitals impedes desirable integration in the field. Donor guidelines, such as the OECD Official Development Assistance (ODA) guidelines, have also been a constraint, because they have excluded much security programming crucial to peacebuilding. Peacekeeping budgets are also not often available for programming such as security sector reform. Thus, ad hoc financing arrangements have had to be created for much security sector reform programming. This has complicated the coordination of peacekeeping, security sector reform, and development assistance programs. Some positive steps have been taken, as in the OECD’s creation of new ODA definitions that allow for certain types of “security system” reform programming. But development partners, the UN, and World Bank should still conduct assessments on the “impediments to integrating security and development programming for peacebuilding” and develop a shared agenda for improving integrated programming. Participants noted also that African trade is mostly with external markets rather than between countries on the continent, and that the continent has been vulnerable to regionalized civil wars. Overcoming this appalling lack of regional cooperation should be a priority for the AU and RECs, with the support of development partners. Incentives for regional economic cooperation through cross-border infrastructure projects would help to create peace-supporting neighborhoods. Development partners have other roles to play in helping to build sustainable peace in Africa’s conflict-ridden zones. Helping to control the flow of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) outside of Africa would lessen the opportunities for would-be militants to re-ignite civil war within Africa. In cases where the inflow of SALWs aggravates a conflict situation, SALW control regimes should trigger international sanctions on supplier countries and companies, most of which are outside Africa. The illegal exploitation of natural resources continues to undermine stability in Central and West Africa. Development partners should be more proactive in sanctioning the countries and companies engaged in these practices and in establishing and enforcing certification regimes, such as the Kimberley Process. Finally, the further removal of trade barriers between African countries and the EU and US would have positive

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consequences for peace in Africa by creating the economic opportunities necessary to sustain peace. Many of these points should be taken into consideration as the EU develops its comprehensive strategy for relations with Africa. 8. CONCLUSION Security cooperation among Africa leaders and their external partners has come mostly in response to crises. By establishing a Peace and Security Architecture, the AU has created a focal point for sustained and rational cooperation in promoting peace and sustainable development on the continent. The challenges are many, and peace partnerships will be essential in addressing them. But with a number of forward-looking plans on the table - including those of the AU, NEPAD, UN Secretary General, Commission for Africa, and G8 - many of the specific steps have already been identified. The summits of 2005 have also resulted in many important pledges. What remains is for national government, international organizations, NGOs, and think-tanks to vigilantly monitor whether pledges are being fulfilled and whether unity of purpose is being sustained. The EU under the Austrian Presidency in the first half of 2006 has a unique opportunity to strengthen EU cooperation in the implementation of these pledges for increased assistance, including direct support to the AU’s evolving Peace and Security Architecture.

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Lieutenant General Babacar GAYE Force Commander, United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

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SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING AFRICA

Lieutenant General Babacar GAYE Force Commander, United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

3,5 million dead, 2,5 million displaced, 200,000 victims of anti-personal mines and 1,300,000 AIDS patients - These alarming numbers do not quite cover the reality on the whole Continent, or even a single region of it. They exclusively concern the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where I have the privilege of currently serving the United Nations Organization. I have brought these numbers out because the current picture that Africa primarily shows of herself if that of wars, famine and AIDS. This media image is essentially deformed and exaggerated, for Africa is also that of the “Review of Peers” and of democratic progress in a number of countries. It remains though that the recent creation of the African Union Peace and Security Council translates the pre-eminence of security problems, while the main concerns of other continental organizations, set within the foundations of State democracy, are essentially economic and environmental. Moreover, the United Nations has put forward security issues in Africa, along with a significant global approach, which no longer limits them to the issue of armed conflicts only, but takes into account the extreme misery, pandemics, the massive exodus of populations, as well as transnational terrorism and criminal activities1. It is evident from the Organization’s official publications, and from personal analysis of its action, that in order to face these challenges, the United Nations (UN) has set into motion a global strategy that leans, among others, on diplomatic, legal and military resources, while trying to continuously adapt to the evolution of situations. It is quite obvious that the implementation of this strategy is hampered by limited resources - a shortfall that the UN attempts to compensate with the reinforcement of African Countries’ capacities, with the mobilization of the International Community. A review of the United Nations operation trends in past or current conflicts, and the handling of socio-economic and health issues as new threats, reinforces us in this view point.

1 A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the Chair of the High-level Panel on

Threats, Challenges and Change addressed to the Secretary-General, United Nations, A/59/565, A/59/565, 01/01/2004.

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For the African Continent, armed conflicts have been, and still are the most evident challenge to peace and security. About forty years now, dozens of conflicts - ones bloodier than others - ended up giving of Africa the picture of a chaotic battlefield2. Indeed, substantial progress has been accomplished, with a manifest receding in the number of conflicts. However, while some are on the way to be solved3 (Sierra Leone, Liberia) or promise to be4 (Democratic Republic of Congo), others explode (Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur), recalling that the road to peace is still long. On this sinuous road, filled with ambush, the UN is resolutely engaged, alongside African Nations, to help them face the challenge of global security5. It is, first of all, about preventing conflicts6 while acting on their generating factors, with means of aid to development, democracy, good governance, rule of law and respect of human rights. The United Nations is equipped with a relevant legal arsenal enabling the exercise, by way of the Security Council, of direct pressure on States and political leaders in order to diffuse crises. The International Criminal Tribunal and the creation of ad hoc criminal courts like on Rwanda and Sierra Leone, with the threat of sanctions targeting perpetrators of war crimes or against humanity, have to this respect a significant dissuasive effect. However, their efficiency is limited by the insufficient support received from great powers. Once precursor signs of potential conflict start surfacing, it becomes urgent to set into motion preventive diplomacy, in order to promote dialogue and search for negotiated solutions. In this area, the increase in UN missions of mediation throughout the Continent, particularly in the crises of Côte d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic, is proof of the credit that conflicting parties usually put in the Organization’s good offices, even though these missions sometimes stumble onto issues of State sovereignty. The main stake in preventive diplomacy is to coordinate and synchronize all international initiatives, define common positions and avoid the multiplication of antagonistic steps, prone to be exploited by conflicting parties or degenerate into side taking, which will end up in discredit.

2 The causes of conflicts and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa:

Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, S/1998/318, 13/04/1998. 3 Report of the Security Council Mission to West Africa, United Nations, S/2004/525, 02/072004. 4 Report of the Security Council Mission to Central Africa, United Nations, S/2004/934, 30/11/2004. 5 Security Council: Ensuring an effective role of the Security Council in maintenance of international

peace and security, particularly in Africa, United Nations, S/PRST/2001/10, 22/03/2001. 6 Security Council, Prevention of conflicts, United Nations, S/RES/1366, 30/08/2001.

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Within this framework, the implementation, since the early 1990s, of a closer partnership between the United Nations and multilateral, regional and sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and lately the African Union, constitutes a meaningful pole by which these institutions have succeeded to build more credible prevention, warning and mediation mechanisms. As another instrument of conflict prevention, control of the flow of light weapons also represents a sizeable challenge for the Continent; in that they constitute the essential of belligerents’ arsenal and create a vicious circle, whereby conflicts generate an increase in the flow of weapons, which in turn generates the propensity of curbing litigations by strength. Besides, the build-up and uncontrolled flow of these weapons, easily transferable from one country to another, contribute to increase the intensity and duration of conflicts, produce particularly violent crimes, maintain a chronic post-conflict insecurity and can even facilitate the resumption of hostilities. The United Nations strategy, with regards to this threat, articulates around the confidence-building measures (information sharing between States on their arsenals), the establishment of a classic weapon Registry and the establishment of reliable marking and tracing systems. The UN also lends its support to the restrictive measures of African organizations, such as the ECOWAS Moratorium on Fire Arms, the SADC Protocol on Fire Arms and the Nairobi Convention. However, the most important chapters, but also the most difficult to implement, are the enforcement of arms embargoes and the disarmament of demobilized fighters. On arms embargo, measures taken often stumble on the decay of the security and customs services of countries in conflict, the length and porosity of borders, and the rudimentary means of surveillance and control of UN Missions. Actually, difficulties encountered by the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) in the surveillance of arms embargo - in a huge country, bordered with lakes, covered with forests, and where State authority lacks in a good part of the territory - is an example. However, to the test of facts, prevention often showed its limits and the deployment of peacekeeping missions constitutes the most important response, but also most complex, that the UN attempts to bring to the challenges of internal conflicts in Africa. In this field, Africa is, of all the World’s regions, the one where the largest number of these missions is deployed. In fact, since the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956, the United Nations has deployed in Africa 21 missions; and half of the current missions are

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on the Continent. This long-standing experience, made of considerable successes but also of traumatic failures, has led to the concept of a peacekeeping approach that one can see at work today in the DRC or in Burundi. The first generation of missions, including MINURSO (Western Sahara) and MONUOR (Rwanda-Uganda Border), essentially consisted of supervising cease-fire agreements, troop withdrawal or border demilitarization. These missions poorly structured, of absolute neutrality and weakly armed, have evolved toward larger concepts, integrating the consolidation of political solutions (UNAVEM I in Angola) with a humanitarian component (MINUAR). With the end of the Cold War and the lift of the brakes on the United Nations action, more ambitious missions have been led, especially in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), with the objective of re-establishing peace also accompanied with institutional reconstruction, the return to democracy by the organization of elections, mine clearing, humanitarian aid, etc. This tendency of widening mandates - that went as far as integrating the coercive logic to a humanitarian goal, with ONUSOM (Somalia) - knew a brutal stop with the failure of this mission and the stiffness that resulted; with thereafter, the modesty of the missions deployed in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) and in Liberia (MONUL). However, since the end 1990s, UN peacekeeping operations have regained confidence, thanks to the important work of introspection and recast made, to adapt mandates, mechanisms and resources. As a result, more inclusive and ambitious programs have been elaborated, with the objective of managing transitional periods allowing countries coming out of conflicts to build the conditions for future development and sustainable growth. This new approach implies taking into account a broader responsibility in post-conflict reconstruction; and in some cases, we can even speak of nation-building. This approach appears more relevant, considering that, in the aftermath of conflicts, the institutional ability of African Countries, already limited even in peace time, is so much weakened and government structures, if they exist, are often too fragile. Henceforth, peacekeeping operations mandates in Africa enable missions to provide support on a broader spectrum, including electoral assistance, development of new political structures, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reinstatement of ex-combatants, as well as the laying of foundations for durable peace. This new strategy is designed at bringing a global efficient contribution to a sustainable

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rebuilding of countries in conflict7, including the fulfillment of their economic, social, structural and humanitarian needs, as well as their political and military requirements. Such a change entails new requirements in terms of organization and coordination of human and financial resources, and of military resources as well. In this context, the concept of an Integrated Mission is constantly reaffirmed. It involves a close interaction between UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, OCHA, etc.) and calls for the need to set in place a significant coordination mechanism between various interacting parties: peacekeepers, diplomats, politicians, lawyers, development and humanitarian actors, electoral experts, etc. This concept is presently implemented in the DRC, within the MONUC framework whereby the Deputy SRSG is also Coordinator of all UN Institutions represented in the country. Regarding human resources, there will be a need to find the best expertise in various specialized fields, such as disarmament, reinsertion, budget administration, fiscal issues, child protection, criminal justice, rule of law, gender, civil affairs, human rights, public information, constitutional and legal matters, elections, politics, information technologies, economic development, etc. This extensive array of skills is indispensable to start the process of State restoration. The financial implications of such undertakings are enormous. Further to deploying three major operations since October 2003 - in Liberia, Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire, significantly expanding the mission in the DRC and launching a major operation in Sudan, the issue of funding for the recruitment of adequate and proficient human resources lays at the center of peacekeeping challenges in Africa because, in most cases, it is of total rebuilding. This can be illustrated by the current MONUC budget, in the DRC - the largest peacekeeping mission in the history of the United Nations, nearly reaching the billion of US Dollars, and considerably weighing on the overall peacekeeping budget of the UN, estimated at 4.8 billions of US Dollars for the 2004-2005 exercise. The issue of sufficient funding will remain constant, requiring from the United Nations a recurrent plea to donors for sharing the cost of operations, with a corollary obligation to tangible results in all areas.

7 Security CouncilPresidential Statement: Peace building, towards a global approach, United Nations,

S/PRST/2001/5, 22/02/2001.

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To the military point of view, and with regard to the growing complexity of situations and the nature of theaters, challenges are defined in terms of significance of troop strength, modern equipment and supplies, enabling military components to carry out their mission of ensuring security of UN personnel and facilities, support to security sector reform, security of electoral processes, as well as achieving on the ground the force ratios that will bend, if need be, belligerents unyielding to dialogue. One should, unfortunately, recognize that countries with substantial military resources, capable of deploying units the size of a brigade, with elaborated Command and Control, sophisticated means of intelligence gathering and equipped with modern and potent weaponry, face difficulties in engaging their troops under the UN banner, due to public opinion memory of their failures in Somalia and Rwanda. One of the solutions to address this shortfall consists, for the UN, to sustain the development of peacekeeping capacities of regional and sub-regional organizations, such as the African Union or ECOWAS, and enable them to launch operations more and more autonomous or in conjunction with the United Nations. In one of his reports on conflicts in Africa8, Mr. Kofi Annan has, in these terms, underscored this necessity: i.e. "Within the context of the United Nations primary responsibility for matters of international peace and security, providing support for regional and sub-regional initiatives in Africa is both necessary and desirable. Such support is necessary because the United Nations lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa. It is desirable because wherever possible the international community should strive to complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa's problems." In this domain, rapid progress has been made, and the reinforcing of African peacekeeping capacities will remain one of the pillars of UN strategy for the years to come. Troops accordingly trained will represent valuable strategic reserves enabling early preventive deployments, provided the issue of equipment and logistical support is adequately addressed. The security challenge in Africa, previously mentioned, also includes the guarantee of a health, economic and social well-being. In this regard, the Continent still remains at the outskirt of mainstream international development and growth, with its flows of

8 The causes of conflicts and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa:

Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, S/1998/318, 13/04/1998.

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refugees, pandemics and humanitarian tragedies, exacerbated by situations of conflicts which they can, in a vicious circle, fuel in return. In this connection, the issue of refugees9 is one of the most severe challenges for security on the Continent. Not only is it a result of conflicts, but it also contributes to the deterioration of situations breeding this problem. The genocide in Rwanda and a number of other particularly violent civil wars, in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Darfur, have led millions of people to exodus. One estimates their actual number at above 6.5 millions. They are often installed in conditions of extreme instability, in countries often too poor to bear the burden. Added, is the more and more common issue of internally displaced people, which renders conflict resolution even more difficult. These refugee populations represent significant destabilization factors, for both their country of origin and host country as well. The Hutus Interahamwes of Eastern DRC are a good example. Indeed, their armed presence in the region continues to be a great factor of instability and maintains tense relations between Rwanda and its neighboring DRC. To face this gigantic challenge, UN resources are widely insufficient. The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) mainly, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the assistance of the international community, try to provide a durable solution, either by helping create conditions favorable to voluntary repatriation, or when not possible by helping refugees integrate their country of asylum. The AIDS pandemic, besides the health tragedy that it represents, also constitutes a particularly alarming security challenge, which real impact we are relatively unable to measure, in as much its repercussions are deep and wide. To date, the number of people infected with the HIV/AIDS virus in Africa has passed the 40 million mark. The implications for governments and institutions, like armed forces, are very serious. The pandemic has a devastating impact far beyond its direct victims, because it decimates the population of competent and experienced professionals of all categories: the young, the educated, farmers, entrepreneurs, civil servants, teachers and hundreds of thousands of parents. It contributes to starvation in regions where it has wiped out an important fraction of able bodies. It killed, in 2002 only, 2.4 millions of Africans, and the yearly infection rate continuously climbs. Several countries could literally disintegrate with the illness’ significant consequences on their productivity, social fabric, security forces, etc.

9 Economic and Social Council, Human Rights Commission: Internally displaced persons, United

Nations, E/CN.4/2005/L/60, 14/04/2005.

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The United Nations Organization, through structures like ONUSIDA at best, took appropriate measures to face the situation. Early detection and campaigns of sensitization have become critical elements in the prevention of HIV/AIDS; and efforts are being made to include these measures in peacekeeping missions. The UN also assists in training, in order to build national expertise. Most of all, an important coordination and sensitization effort is being made to ensure that leaders, at all the levels, of the international community have a wider understanding of the links between the spread of HIV/AIDS, development and security. However, one could only be very saddened by the minute capital committed by the international community to counter such a prevalent tragedy. Finally, poverty, generally-speaking, is among the humanitarian tragedies directly linked to security, particularly in its most tragic aspect, which is hunger. Out of 53 African countries, 43 experience a food deficit; and out of a population of about 840 millions, 38 millions do not have enough to eat. Starvation is quasi endemic in parts of the Continent, like the Horn of Africa, and is often subsequent or concomitant to conflict. The situation in Darfur is, in this respect, edifying. The deterioration of such situations contributes to stir up frustrations, resentments and quarrels around resources like water. Governments are weakened, discredited and accused of squandering resources or distributing them inequitably, making way to quickly gathering ingredients to fuel conflicts. Because of the Continent’s higher demography rate, Northern countries’ growth in spending and the deterioration of ecosystems, but especially the disparity and inadequacy of development aid, the poverty that overwhelms African countries is likely to worsen. The United Nations has proposed, alongside the objectives of the Millennium for Sustainable Development, an ambitious and beneficial plan for the Continent. The ball is hence in the camp of donor countries. Growth in bilateral and multilateral public aid for development, with cancellation of the debt especially, will not only contribute to relieve misery but set the foundations of peace and security in Africa. Finally, let me mention a set of new security challenges that have become more and more apparent, and which, if they are not promptly and vigorously addressed, will contribute to the increase of instability and insecurity on the Continent:

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International terrorism: First of all, I would like to hereby emphasize the threat of international terrorism, particularly linked to Islamic extremism, which we saw in action in Kenya, North Africa (Maghreb), Egypt etc. Convergent indicators increasingly confirm the progress of radical Islam’s influence on the Continent; and the particularly deadly confrontations between faiths that Nigeria knew lately are well the sign of exacerbation of interdenominational resentments in parts of Africa. African States are endowed with a relevant legal arsenal enabling them to face the threat of terrorism. Their primary goal is to prevent terrorist networks, pursued elsewhere, from redeploying on the Continent, by taking advantage of institutional weaknesses and limited security resources or, as usual, by exploiting extreme poverty. Trans-national organized crime:

Largely linked to the latter, trans-national organized crime spreads its tentacles over the Continent, with the exploitation of the same weaknesses mentioned above, particularly taking advantage of armed conflicts. This greatly contributes to undermine State foundations, by corrupting elite classes, setting chronic insecurity and stirring up conflicts. We have seen how some armed groups could degenerate into criminal organizations with lucrative objectives, like the illegal exploitation of natural resources, counterfeiting, money laundering, human trade, etc. International drug trafficking: Finally, the international traffic of narcotics has become increasingly preoccupying. Like organized crime, it is closely linked to conflicts, as it often is a source of funding for belligerents war efforts. For years now, international networks have turned African capitals into significant hubs for world trafficking, in order to bypass the security measures set by Western countries. The above-mentioned threats tend to rapidly grow, due to the weaknesses and inadequacy of anti-crime systems of African States. In addition, power struggle often creates common interests between criminal organizations and political leaders, with the former providing to the latter the resources needed for either their access or preservation into power (weapons bypassing embargos, money).

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To facing these threats, most African States lack of appropriate judicial systems to enable them to implement the international cooperation essential for the fight against these threats. In such situations, UN support10 is critical, in terms of developing a legal and regulated framework for training, expertise, coordination and mobilization of international solidarity. The security challenges facing Africa are multi-dimensional, and I would like to hereby reiterate, in concurrence with the high-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the need for a consensus on the global nature of security11. That will be the only way of bringing efficient and equitable responses to address such integrated issues. In an increasingly global world, none of the fundamental issues mentioned can find solution in a solely national framework, or even regional. They all require cooperation, partnership and burden sharing between governments, regional and sub-regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, private sector, civil society and the United Nations. As to the United Nations, they have invested considerable efforts in helping African countries overcome these challenges. However, one must say that they do not always receive the political and logistical support needed for the promotion of a prosperous, safe and secure world. The UN is not an independent actor and depends on the political will of member states; especially of the great powers, and their will to provide the financial and military resources that will enable genuine action, so that the UN can play its primary role of safeguarding peace and international security. Finally, if I have to close with the illustrating example of the UN’s engagement in the DRC, I would say that it is by far the most important commitment of peacekeeping in the United Nations’ history. Giant steps have been made. However, the challenge remains at the vast dimensions of this continent-size country, and evolves:

• Putting an end to the attacks against civil populations; • Demobilization and disarmament of still active militias in Ituri and in the

Kivus; with restoration, there, of State authority; • Reform the security sector; • Rebuilding of a national army worthy of its name;

10 Bangkok Declaration, United Nations Eleven Congress on Crime prevention and Criminal Justice,

A/CONF. 203/16/Add, 20/04/2005. 11 A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the Chair of the High-level Panel on

Threats, Challenges and Change addressed to the Secretary-General, United Nations, A/59/565, A/59/565, 01/01/2004.

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• Assistance to displaced populations, while encouraging their return; • Promotion of justice and respect of human rights; • Fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS; and, most of all, • Assist in organizing and securing free and transparent elections covering a

country as vast as Western Europe, with limited institutional capacity. The stakes are important for MONUC to succeed, at all levels; for reasons that go even beyond the framework of the DRC. The eyes of the international community and of donors as well are focused on what is going on in the DRC, and MONUC is put to the test. If the mission succeeds in putting this country in the path of democracy and sustainable development, the security and economic dividends will benefit the whole of Central Africa, with a direct positive impact on countries like Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, the Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and many others. The confidence of international donors, essential partners, will considerably increase and the United Nations will win the prestige and credibility that will enable them to enjoy an even larger international support. Hence, I think that it is critical to provide the United Nations with the means, particularly military, to efficiently control its area of responsibility, oppose trans-border arms trafficking and the illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources, protect civil populations against the attacks of predator militias, and especially enforce peace to radicals that deliberately choose war.

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Lieutenant General Martin L. AGWAI Chief of Army Staff, Nigerian Army

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MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

Lieutenant General Martin L. AGWAI Chief of Army Staff, Nigerian Army

INTRODUCTION Security has many essential components, one of which is the military. In a peace support operation (PSO), military activities represent a line of operation which is in support of either the diplomatic or economic efforts, but are crucial and at times the determinant of the political end state. The military will require some essential factors for the effective performance of assigned task for it to become a veritable partner in conflict resolution and peace initiatives. This assertion is true for all parts of the world especially Africa, where for the past 15 years, the issue of peace and security has impacted rather negatively on the development of the region. Conflict is virtually the order of the day in all the sub regions, which require a virile military intervention in the form of PSO to stem the tide. The military requirements for an effective PSO in Africa include integrated information and early warning system. There is the issue of operationalising the sub-regional security arrangements, capacity building and availability of strategic lifts. Other requirements include security reforms in the region, clear mandate for peacekeepers and increased involvement of the UN. INTEGRATED INFORMATION AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEM Underdevelopment has robbed Africa of the capacity to effectively monitor and evaluate events within the region. Ironically we are in the `information age’, which made things more critical given the fact that information is the driving force of the globalized world. Yet there is an acute dearth of information to plan and work with in the Continent. The situation would be more crucial with the 5 standby brigades being established for the sub region if the military are to be effective in the performance of their assigned roles. There is a great need for secured means of gathering and exchanging information. For the military to be ahead of any situation in a PSO environment, information integration is essential. There are factors that will impede on this issue, which include national interest of the troops contributing countries (TCC), organizational obstacles

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and availability of resources among many others. Despite these constraints the military must consistently be ahead of the situation, through adherence to constant observation, orientation, decision making and appropriate action, popularly referred to as the OODA Loop principle. To be able to do this, members of the force must have the technical knowledge of assigned tasks, be willing to do the job and have the tactical, technical and humanitarian skills to perform. There is a great requirement for liaison between the TCC, sub-regional organizations and the AU on one hand and between the AU, UN and other regional organizations and non governmental organizations (NGOs) globally. Although some sub-regional organization like the ECOWAS have tremendous experience in practical PSO much efforts are still required by all stake holders in Africa. OPERATIONALISING AU SECURITY ARRANGEMENT The standby high readiness brigade (SHIRBRIG) idea for Africa has been expanded resulting in the plan for 5 brigades, one each for the sub regions. At date, ECOWAS has gone as far as getting countries to pledge forces for its own brigade. Of recent necessary related activities have commenced in Southern and East Africa, which is a welcomed development for the Continent. As much as all these developments are in the right track for the way forward, a lot of issues need clarification by all concerned. It is imperative for everyone to be clear as to the modalities for assembling the troops and committing them to an operation. In addition the status of the contributed troops to the various national forces must be clarified. However, there should be no ambiguity as to the independence of contributed troops from the TCC. Furthermore, a lot of work is required for the various sub regional force to institutionalize their mechanism, which will make it easier to perform. Liaison will be needed at all levels of command and with the appropriate civil organizations and NGOs. Appropriate bodies and organs that will ensure a smooth running of all military activities must be emplaced. CAPACITY BUILDING More than 70% of all UN peacekeeping deployments in 2005 is in Africa. The UN deployment in Liberia by late 2004 was about 14,700 military personnel and 1,100 policemen, which shows the huge manpower requirement for PSO. The AU has just made a proposal for an enhanced deployment in Darfur, the Sudan. For instance Nigeria

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is expected to deploy 3 battalions as against 3 independent companies earlier provided for the Mission. Given the strive to have the region provide solutions to its security problems, there is a great challenge ahead if the AU is to achieve its objectives. Experience has shown that the AU is seriously limited in sustaining the Darfur operation, which is its maiden PSO. It is relying heavily on donor nations and the G8 in getting the requisite logistics requirement for the protection force. This is because the AU has neither the central logistic sustainment facilities nor the financial capabilities. It is also doubtful for both political and financial implications if the plan to establish the required logistics depot in the 5 sub regions will be attainable. It might therefore be expedient for the AU to establish 2 sub depots; one on the Atlantic and the other on the Indian Ocean to support its PSO activities. The equipment required are enormous which might have to be sourced for externally as African countries are poor and might not have the wherewithal needed. Such equipment among many others will include armored personnel carriers (APC), medical and communication materials However, there is the need to clarify the mode of operation of the depots and under whose control they will be. A diplomatic issue involving the position and relationship of the host nation and the depot require clarification. In simple term what happened to the equipment in a depot in a situation where the host nation is not in support of a mission which require equipment in a depot located within its territory. Related to the issue of logistics bases are the problems of training and manpower development. African countries have continued to receive support from partners on infrastructural development and training programs. Notable among these are the ACRI/ACOTA (USA), RECAMP (France), the British Peace Support Training and a host of others from Canada, Austria and the Nordic and Scandinavian countries. These initiatives have assisted tremendously in getting the military prepared for PSO activities. A lot of coordination is required as these initiatives to African countries have been mostly on bilateral level. The training must target dedicated African countries for it to be meaningful. The present provisions are inadequate to serve any meaningful preparation for the Continent’s PSO requirements. This was the factor that influenced the Nigerian Army in establishing its Peacekeeping Wing for its pre-induction training for a mission. Furthermore, there is the need for such training to prepare the military for asymmetric and guerilla warfare dimensions of present day PSO as the environment is not only fluid but dynamic. There is also the need to plan for training on stock piled equipment in a depot, which the troops might not be conversant with. This it should be realized will affect the deployment time of a troop into a theatre of operation.

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There is no point in glossing or over looking the problem of language in Africa, which if not settled early enough will affect the ability of troops from the different countries to perform optimally given the diverse tongues. From experience this issue may inhibit PSO efforts in the Continent for a very long time. For example, ECOMOG suffered seriously from the problem of language which led to some contingents withdrawing from the Mission. The use of interpreters which may be advocated as a solution have serious implications for military operations. On the long run it may impact on command and control. Further on command and control, the relationship between the force, the TCC and AU must be spelt out in very clear terms before the commencement of an operation. This is to prevent unnecessary interference by the various governments. This is a further reason why the language and invariably communication issues must be handled firmly from the onset. The totality of all these issues is the availability of funds for a particular operation. Funding for a PSO is enormous, which apart from the aforementioned logistics requirement include allowances and running costs for minor purchases and repairs. The usual practice is for TCC to deploy self sustained for an agreed specified period before the initiating organization assumes responsibility for administration. The ability of many African countries and indeed the AU to raise enough funds for this is doubtful, which again calls for assistance from outside. However, African countries must be awakened to their responsibilities. The various governments need to pay up their contributions and dues to the AU, which will provide some form of succor to the organization and reduce even if it minimal the request for assistance from outside. STRATEGIC LIFT The Darfur crisis has shown vividly the non availability of strategic lifts in Africa. All the TCC one way or the other have to rely on donor nations especially the G8 for the lift of their troops and equipment into theatre. This adversely affected the reaction time in the deployment of troops into Sudan. A way out of this problem is for the pooling of resources within Africa to save critical deployment time. Airlifting the men might not be much of a problem when compared to the requirement for moving the heavy contingent owned equipment like APCs. Again this might require donor nations coming in to assist the AU if any meaningful in road is to be made on lifts both air and sea. Suffice to say that it is possible on some

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occasions to raise the platforms in Africa but with serious financial implications. For instance the issue of airlift of troops could be done by hiring local aircraft, which could also be done for sea lifts, but as mentioned with substantial financial requirement. SECURITY REFORMS The reform of the security sector in Africa has been advocated in several fora, but with nothing concrete done about it. There are symbolic steps taken in stemming the influx of small arms into nearly all parts of Africa, but those responsible for the supplies are not being sanctioned. Furthermore complete disarmament and demobilization is required after resolving a conflict situation in any country. Failure to do this will definitely result in easy resumption of hostility with a minor squabble. A typical example was the Liberian issue when complete disarmament was not effected in 1997. The excuse given then was about the colossal amount of money required for compensation. However, because this was not done as at the material time, the situation erupted again in 2002 leading to another round of peace initiatives till date in that country. This definitely would have cost more in terms of funding, materiel and human sacrifices made. Furthermore, it should be noted that there is a correlation between security and development. If the Continent is not secured, all the economic and developmental plans will be in vain. It is therefore necessary for security reforms not to be limited to only military issues as it is an all encompassing matter. There should be adherence and supremacy to the rule of law. It is therefore important for the AU to undertake security reforms of the Continent in conjunction with the sub regional bodies. If the rule of law prevails and there is law and order in a particular society it is possible for some military gains to be made by peaceful settlement of conflicts through ‘good officers’, disarmament, arms control and coercive strategies. Although some might deliberately misconstrue and misapply the rules, such people could be sanctioned, if the political leaders responsible are willing and able. It should be realized that PSO is not only costly, but it is also very deadly, which have dampened states excitement in conflict management. AU member states would need to be committed to the ideals of the indivisibility of peace. The principles of ‘Africa Peer Review Mechanism’ should be imbibed to ensure good governance, which is a fundamental requirement for forestalling conflict in the Continent. African leaders

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should realize that globalization is gradually eroding the principles of state sovereignty and as such must come together to provide the necessary direction to prevent conflicts. CLEAR MANDATE It is imperative for the political leadership of AU to be un-ambiguous about the mandate given to peacekeepers on PSO, which will save not only time for clarification but also lives of those involved. At the onset it should be clear if the mission is for peacekeeping or peace enforcement. This will be made possible from a well organized early warning mechanism. It is also important for the AU to be clear on when to intervene especially when the security situation is getting completely out of hand. The early warning system will assist in getting the feeler once a conflict is brewing and in putting the necessary machinery in motion once an issue is becoming dicey. All these should be done in conjunction with the UN, which has global control of such matters. It is imperative for a firm action and commitment on issues once clarified and be devoid of any form of sentiment to save the region from further conflicts. INCREASED INVOLVEMENT OF THE UN Regional PSO initiatives have in the past transited to become UN missions. Most were successfully handed over, while a few had escalated the situation. Irrespective of the effect, the UN need to get more involved especially in Africa due to the reasons already enumerated above. The UN need to assist the AU with its strategy of resolving the myriads of African conflicts, which has become more compounding due to the weak financial situation. The current drive for regional conflict resolution is a fall out of the Brahimi Report which is encouraged by the UN. It therefore behoves on the UN to assist the AU in getting required assistance either directly or through 3 parties for the latter to be able to stem the monumental crises level. Furthermore, activities backed by the UN will attract greater acceptance from other regions, which invariably will be seen as a global decision. The UN needs to extend its programs to the AU and the sub regional organizations for better performance and effective coordination. It is this type of corroborative

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arrangement that will assist the AU security arrangement get on the right track and improve not only the performance of the military but the security situation generally. For instance more slots on the Standard Training Modules and seminars should be given to African countries to further enhance their preparation for PSO. CONCLUSION The military phase of a PSO is usually in support of either the diplomatic or economic phases of conflict resolution. The requirements for the military in forging a resolute partnership in PSO particularly in Africa are essentially on issues of establishing early warning system. This will assist in monitoring a deteriorating situation and plan adequately for deployment. There is also the need for effective communication, which is fundamental for any activity or existence of any organization. The G8 and other donor nations have assisted in capacity building for PSO in Africa but these had been more on bilateral basis, which therefore call for a strong requirement for coordination of such efforts. There is no gain saying that Africa lacks strategic lift capabilities, which need urgent attention to reduce reaction time for deployment. The AU political leadership must be clear in the mandate given to the military to save not only time, but also human lives. The UN as the overall body entrusted with global security must be more involved and committed to regional peace initiatives, more so in Africa given the poverty level.

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Dr. Ismail RASHID Associate Professor, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY

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ECOWAS AND PEACE-BUILDING IN WEST AFRICA

Dr. Ismail RASHID Associate Professor, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY

AN ORGANIC CRISIS: UNDERSTANDING WEST AFRICA’S CONFLICTS The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st Century has been largely a tragic historical moment for the peoples of West Africa. In the past two decades the region has been plagued by a series of violent national conflicts in Liberia (1989-1996, 2001-03), Sierra Leone (1990-2001), Guinea Bissau and Cote D’Ivoire (2002-), and regional conflicts in Northern Mali, Southern Senegal (Casamance) and the Nigerian Delta region. Rather than being simply primordial, barbaric and anomic events, these conflicts as has been suggested by some academics and journalists, they should be understood as complex reactions to decades of political exclusion, economic impoverishment and social alienation of the majority of citizens by autocratic regimes. The protagonists of these conflicts, which include the usual military suspects as well as newer rebel militias of youth (and children), have utilized conventional (coup d’etats and armed secession) and unconventional (armed insurrection and rebellion) strategies to mount disastrous challenges against despotic and undemocratic regimes. Even some of these different conflicts were interconnected and overlapped in some cases (Liberia-Sierra-Cote D’Ivoire), each had its own unique set of dynamics, shaped by the specific historical experiences, social contexts as well as different agendas of the different fighting forces. It should also be noted that while the struggle for the control, extraction and sale of certain natural resources (diamonds, timber etc) have played significant roles in some of these conflicts, for example in Liberia and Sierra Leone, this struggle must not be construed as the primary or sole motivation or object of the conflicts. The timing of the outbreak of these regional conflicts is also crucial to understanding their character, duration and outcomes. The conflicts occurred in the cusp between the collapse of the Cold War World and the emergence of the post-September 11, 2001 United States anti-terrorism driven world order. Initially regarded as un-strategic and marginal to the central issues shaping of the post-Cold War, West Africans were left largely to its own devices and resources and given minimal support by the international community to resolve the conflicts.

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This did not mean that there was complete lack of international interest or presence in the region. France, later followed by the United Kingdom, still continued to play major interventionist roles in the region. External international presence in the conflicts also came in form in business and financial connections between warring parties and dubious European companies and individuals. These companies and individuals offloaded arms to the warring factions and transacted in the resources looted by the warring factions in West Africa. The toll of the conflicts on West Africans in the last two decades has been catastrophic. Hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost. Thousands have been maimed. Over two million people have been displaced within the conflict countries and in neighboring countries. Over seven million small arms and light weapons were estimated to be in circulation in the subregion. State political institutions and national economies in the most vulnerable conflict countries (Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea Bissau) were seriously degraded or destroyed. Hundreds of thousands of poorly educated, unemployed and battle-scarred youth and children emerged. Sexually transmitted and other infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS, increased dramatically among young people. In nearly all of the conflicts - Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote D’Ivoire - the ability of vital security institutions like the army and police to maintain law, order or protect civilian lives were greatly compromised by the stress of war (and decades of autocratic governance). The ultimate consequence of the conflicts is that West Africans, one of the most prosperous groups of Africans at the dawn of independence in the 1960s, now live in one of the poorest, volatile, and conflict-ridden regions in the world. While initially it had seemed that the violence, especially in Sierra Leone and Liberia (the region’s poorest countries, was an aberration0, it is now evident, especially with the subsequent outbreak of conflict in Ivory Coast (the region’s richest country), that the region is experiencing a more organic and deeper structural crisis. It is a crisis, which should be located in the inefficacy of the inherited postcolonial political and social order and institutions after three decades of independence. It necessitates that West Africans (and Africans, in general) rethink and reorganize their societies to meet the challenges of the 21st post-Cold War, globalized, more regionally integrated, and unipolar world system.

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THE REGIONAL RESPONSE: THE ECOWAS INTERVENTIONS, 1990-2001 The outbreak of violent conflict and the attempt to search for peace would radically transform and provide a new lease of life for the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). Founded in 1975, the primary mandate of ECOWAS had been the economic cooperation and integration of sixteen West African countries (Mauritania subsequently pulled of the treaty in 2000) along the lines of the then European Common Market. In fifteen years, however, ECOWAS had made little program in the direction of integration and cooperation. The scale of human tragedy and collapse of the state in Liberia in 1989 shocked and alarmed West African leaders and people. They were very concerned about the regional consequences, especially refugee flows and spill over of the violence into neighbouring countries. In the shadow of the first Gulf War and the Balkan conflicts, the region’s leaders were also very much aware of the disinterest and unwillingness of the international community to intervene directly to stop the West African bloodshed. ECOWAS egged by Nigeria decided to send in a regional peacekeeping and enforcement force, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Despite the internal dissensions over it creation and deployment, especially from the Francophone countries (particularly Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire), the deployment of ECOMOG reflected unprecedented courage, initiative, and independence from the region’s traditionally lacklustre leadership. With mainly Nigerian money, military manpower and hardware, and the troop contributions of ten other West African countries (and two East African countries) as well as some financial support from the US and some EU countries, ECOMOG made genuine efforts to end the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. The exact amount of money expended and lives lost by the ECOMOG peacekeepers is not yet known, and may never be known. Along the way, the lack of experience, rigorous training, inadequate logistics and financial support of the ECOMOG troops as well as the unstable character of the leadership of Nigeria and other troop contributing countries became evident on ground in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. The rules of engagement and structure of the ECOMOG command were sometimes unclear. The lines between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement frequently became blurred. ECOMOG peacekeepers frequently became implicated in the violence and indiscipline they had been mandated to prevent. However, serious assessment and genuine criticisms of the performance and conduct of ECOMOG are not doubt in place, the tendency to sometimes draw moral equivalence

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between ECOMOG and rebel groups or dismiss outright the work and sacrifice of the force is patently unfair. In Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, their presence undoubtedly did far more good than harm – and in several instances did save lives. CIVIL SOCIETY If ECOMOG exemplified conflict resolution initiative from the top, the work of West African civil society organizations represented peace-building efforts from the bottom. Civil society organizations (CSOs), especially those spearheaded by women and “traditional” leaders, also contributed considerably to ending the different wars in the region. The CSOs helped to reenergize the populace, open up democratic spaces and empower women in these zones. In Mali CSOs worked with the Konaré government to end the Tuareg insurrection. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, CSOs helped build peace constituencies among the masses, bring different factions to the negotiating table, and support the post-conflict disarmament, integration and reconciliation programs. THE EXTERNAL REPONSES: UNITED NATIONS, 1996- 2005 The inability of ECOMOG to financially and materially sustain its peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone in 1999 and bloody invasion of the capital city, Freetown, compelled the UN to seriously take on its responsibility for maintenance of global security. The spectre of Somalia and Rwanda once more confronted the UN, and Secretary-General acted decisively. The initial UN military observer presence in Liberia (UNOMIL) had been ineffective, especially given Charles Taylor’s predatory activities in Sierra Leone, even winning the Liberian presidency in 1996. Building on and extending the work of ECOMOG, (amidst much tensions between the two organizations and some false starts) the United Nations mounted massive peace-keeping, DDR and peace-building operations in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 17,500 troops) and then in Liberia (UNOMIL, 14,000 troops). Both missions seemed to have decisively turned the tide in favour of peace in these two countries. In its five-year mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL under the dynamic leadership of the UN SRSGS ambassadors Oluyemi Adeniji and Daudi Mwakawago & force commanders Generals Daniel Opande, Martin Agwai and Sajjad Akram have overseen a number of crucial benchmarks including the DDR of combatants from the different warring factions, the expansion and consolidation of state authority in nearly all areas of the countries (Yenga, occupied by Guinean troops remains a thorny, and potentially

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dangerous, point of conflict between the two countries), the rebuilding of the national army and police force, the rehabilitation and rebuilding of a number of key state institutions and social institutions, and most crucially, the elections of government officials at National, District and Municipal levels. The mission also supported the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as well as the Special Court. The UN has reproduced certain aspects of the post-conflict Sierra Leone DDR and political transitional model in Liberia. The Liberia elections scheduled for October 11, 2005 like Sierra Leone elections of 2002 is a major benchmark to see the extent to which this has been successful. REGIONAL TRENDS AND PICTURE Beyond Sierra Leone and Liberia, there have also been some positive signals in conflict resolution in some of the other main flashpoints in the region. In Senegal, the signing of the ceasefire agreement between President Wade and father D. Senghor, the head of the Casamancais separatists holds out prospects for a final resolution of the conflict. In Guinea Bissau, the concession of defeat by Kumba Yalla the erratic former ruler, and that the final outcome of run-off between presidential candidates Bacar Sanha and Joao Bernardo Vieira this month (July 2005) is also expected to break the country’s cycle of violence and failed political transitions. In Côte d’Ivoire, President Thabo Mbeki on South Africa mediation has led to concession by President Laurent Gbagbo of the participation of Alhassan Ouattara in the forthcoming presidential elections and the rejoining of the New Forces rebels in the national unity government. In spite of these encouraging signs, it is clear that there are still many causes for concern in the region. The sheer numbers of the presidential candidates and political parties (over 100) in forthcoming Liberian Elections does not suggest that a stable postcolonial political order may easily emerge as in the case of Sierra Leone. In Cote D’Ivoire, the military and political stalemate characterized by frequent and sometime grave violations of the existing ceasefire between the government and rebel forces still continues. The deep mutual mistrust, and unwillingness by the different sides to disarm and demobilize their fighters, and the intransigence of the Gagbo-led forces to abandon the chauvinistic ideology of Ivoirité despite public commitments and signed agreements does not bode well for a quick and fundamental resolution of the conflict as has been seen in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

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LESSONS LEARNED: ECOWAS AND THE REGIONAL PARADIGMATIC AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES The deep organic and structural crisis in the region has forced ECOWAS/West African leaders, unconsciously as well as consciously to make some of the paradigmatic as structural changes necessary to meet the new military, political and social realities in the region and the world at large. The changes emanated from the initial emergency decisions taken in 1990 with the deployment of the initial ECOMOG force in Liberia as well as from the two other peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. The paradigm shift emanated from two realizations. The first was that the new conflicts of 1990s were not simply localized national violence but ones with profound regional impact and implications. Second, West African security and suffering were not priorities in the post-Cold war world, and that in the aftermath of UNOSOMI II in Somalia, the West was unwilling to put their troops on the line in Africa. The consequence of this realization by a number ECOWAS leaders (obviously driven by self-protection in some cases) that the principle of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of individual countries was unsustainable in the face of such atrocities, human suffering and a potential regional catastrophe. It also became evident that initiative and leadership of ending the conflicts had to come from within the region/continent given the minimal UN and Western commitment. The repeated deployment of troops in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau – with all their problems and difficult reflect the operationalization of this paradigm shift. The leaders of ECOWAS gradually realized that the paradigmatic shift, which had been ad-hoc had to be given legal force as well as institutional basis. The result of this realization is the creation of the ECOWAS Security mechanism in 1997 and the adoption of two protocols as annexes to this Mechanism in 1999 and 2001. The mechanism and its protocols instituted a sound legal and political basis as well as mandate for the organization’s efforts. The provisions of the mechanism and protocols attempted to also tried to systematize the ad-hoc and emergency political and military instruments that had been created during the different interventions as well as propose new ones to aid the tasks of conflict resolutions and peace-building. The initial mechanism focused on mainly the creation of a regular force (ECOMOG) to rapidly to respond to the conflicts. The protocol of 1999 elaborated the scope of the security mechanism. It created and empowered more programs and institutions beyond the ECOMOG forces. Among the

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proposed institutions were a Regional Observation and Monitoring centre with four zonal bureaux headquartered in Banjul (The Gambia), Cotonou (Benin), Monrovia (Liberia) and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso); A Committee of Elders; and a Mediation and Security Council. The Committee of Elders, drawn from eminent West African personalities, is expected to a play an advisory, mediatory, conciliatory and arbitrational role. The Council, consisting of nine members elected on a rotational basis, is expected take emergency decisions in crisis situations. The protocol also provided for a Defence and Security Commission, whose membership will be drawn from heads of various national security agencies, and is expected to discuss and advise security issues of regional importance to ECOWAS and the Mediation and Security Council. (EU provided 1.9 Euros for the operationalizing of some of the activities of the Mechanism.) The 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance adopted in contained fifty provisions on Constitutional Convergence Principles; Elections, Elections Monitoring and ECOWAS assistance, Role of Armed Forces in a democracy; Poverty Alleviation and Promotion of Social Dialogue; Education, Culture and Religion; Rule of Law, human Rights and Good governance; and Women, Youth and Children. The protocol signified the recognition of the inextricably link between security and politics and sought to address some of the political, social and economic root causes of conflict. ECOWAS also broaden its scope to include social matters, especially those relating to protection of children. Acting on the recommendation of the Accra Declaration and Plan of Action in 2000, the organization established a Child Protection Unit. There also been some engagement and commitment to working with civil society organizations. In May 2003, ECOWAS Secretariat held consultations with representatives of different West African civil society organizations on a number of issues ranging from conflict resolution to democratic governance and cooperation. The meeting ended with promise of Executive Secretary to appoint a liaison between ECOWAS and CSOs and the creation of an ad-hoc committee to continue the discussions and work on the recommendations of the meeting. The protocol and the institutions have been proposed and developed are formalizing the redefinition, reorientation and broadening of the 1975 mandate of organization that had been accelerated by the Liberian intervention. ECOWAS mandate is no longer limited to the fostering of economic integration and cooperation, it has now taken on maintaining regional security as well as fostering democratic government in the region. Thus it is a structurally different organization from what its founders envisaged in 1975.

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Yet the restructuring and reorientation of ECOWAS, which has seen the expansion of the secretariat and the employment of new officials, is still facing considerable challenges in terms of financing, capacity and institution building, and implementation. THE WAY FORWARD Despite all these problems, the ongoing paradigmatic shift on conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peace building in West Africa and the Africa generally is crucial. The recent case of Togo political transition following the death of its long-term autocrat, Glassine Eyebeam, underlines it positive potential as well as negative limitations for stability in the region. The biggest challenge might not be the building of new armies or peacekeeping forces but how to deepen this paradigmatic shift and to building the institutions that will embed it in the West African landscape. In our recently completed text, West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace Building in a Troubled Region (eds: Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid, Boulder, Co.: Lynne Renner, 2004), we have offered a number recommendations in six crucial areas on how to deepen this shift, build institutions and work out meaningful relations between the different West African countries, ECOWAS, AU, the UN and countries with interests in the region. We offer a number of recommendations in six crucial areas, namely:

1. Resolving and preventing conflict and building peace; 2. Building democracy and good governance; 3. Reforming the security sector and stemming the flows of illicit arms; 4. Mainstreaming, and integrating youth and children; 5. Creating dynamic economies responsive to national and regional needs; 6. Developing meaningful relationships with international organizations; and

external actors. In conclusion, a final area where considerable energy needs to be devoted is speeding up the processes and implementing the policies and institutions associated with the fostering regional economic cooperation, integration and unity at regional and continental levels. This is ultimately where the key to long-term stability lies.

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SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Dr. Ismail RASHID Associate Professor, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY

The codes words and the bases for Security Sector Reform in Africa are: define, identify, assess & fix. THE RATIONALE

• From Guinea Bissau to DRC, from Northern Uganda to Somalia, there has been, and still persists, widespread instability, conflict and insecurity in the several African countries and their devastating toll as on human lives, and absence of secure environments within which millions of Africans can live secure, productive and rewarding lives.

• The ability of states, institutions and communities to provide security in these countries, and in many parts of the continent has been severely compromised by these conflicts as well as the degradation of the states and state institutions responsible for security. The responsibility for this has sometimes been civilian governments, but they have also directly involved the very behaviour of some of the state institutions, especially army and police, who have been drawn into the centre of politics and governance?

• The considerable impoverishment of many countries over the past two decades have meant the reduction of resources allocated to either state institutions primarily responsible for the general maintenance of security.

• A general consensus exists within African subregional & continental and at UN levels that there is serious need for security sector reform in especially conflict and post-conflict countries.

THE EMERGING SECURITY DISCOURSE AND VISION

• What is the vision of security at all of these levels? How and where is this vision articulated? Is it clear, comprehensive, common vision at all of these levels or is it a limited, fragment and contradictory vision? Human security, regime security or state security?

• The discourse of security, particularly at regional, continental and at global (UN) levels have now been broadly conceived to not only military and police processes design to ensure the protection of civilians, regimes and

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governments but also to include the furtherance of political, social and economic processes and the development of institutions that guarantee and safeguard fundamental human rights.

• This discourse also includes the cultivation of governments, institutions and political practices that are accountable and responsive to the needs of people.

• The bottom line in the emerging security discourse is that there is a human security-development continuum and dialectic, namely good human security will provide the basis for sustained development and sustained development will improve human security.

• At the level of the United Nations, this vision has been recently been articulated in the Secretary-General’s Millennium Report and the proposal for UN Peace-Building Commission to work in tandem with UN peace-keeping operations. – The African Commission Report presents to the G8 also contains some of this vision.

• At the level of the African Union, it is enshrined in its constitutive principles, in the New Economic Plan for African Development (NEPAD); Conference for Stability, Security, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA).

• At the level of the ECOWAS, it has been elaborated in the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and its subsequent protocols the institutions that are being developed in line with it.

LEVELS OF SSR

• What is the level of security sector reform in Africa that we are taking about: national (local communities), sub-region, or continental or all three? Discussed a lot security mechanism at regional and continental levels – want to shift it a little to national level.

NATIONAL UNITS

• Want to assert that the building block of Security Sector Reform is the national unit since that is where is recent regional conflicts and greatest security challenges have emanated. Within these units, we have to look at the different institutions – broad executive, legislative and judicial institutions – and – specialized security agencies – and regular and irregular private and communal security bodies (New Forces, Rebel Forces, CDF, Bakassi and Delta Militia).

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1. Political and Legal Institutions: • Governmental Institutions: Executive, Legislative and Judicial (courts).

2. Specialized Public Security Agencies:

• Military, Police, Paramilitary, Special Intelligence, Customs and Border Patrol organizations

3. Others:

• Commercial & Private Security agencies • Communal security groups & irregular militias.

Concentrate on 2 & 3 security institutions, political and Legal Institutions & Public Institutions. What are the current state, capacity and operation of the bodies? What needs to be fixed or reformed in these institutions? LEADERSHIP ORIENTATION, ABILITIES, SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE

• Need the development of leadership abilities, skills, and knowledge at all levels in governmental institutions. This is an area where we did not necessarily have a great deal of capacity to start off with at independence and where we have suffered a considerable deficit over the years – processes and institutions designed to produce social and political leadership subverted or degraded in the past two decades. In the many of the post-conflict societies, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone & Liberia, the leadership is either inexperienced or simply bad. Bad leadership is a potential source of stability and security threat.

FUNCTIONING, EFFICIENT, ACCOUNTABLE INSTITUTIONS

• The governance institutions, especially legislatures and judiciaries are either inefficient because they inexperienced, weak or simply corrupt. * Over 60% percent of the members of parliamentarians in Sierra Leone are first time legislators – some of them poorly educated and poorly supported – Limited knowledge of their role, the process of law making, and providing oversight over government actions and the actions of other state institutions.

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JUST AND FAIR LAWS

• The legal systems and laws, which have a lot of either irrelevant or bad laws in their books inherited from the colonial period or postcolonial autocratic governments needs serious reforms. For many unemployed youth and many people who hold contrary political opinions, the legal system – laws, law enforcement agencies and courts are a site of victimization. This perception needs to change. Legal reforms to make the system just, fair, and efficient must be of government and security sector reform.

THE SPECIALIZED SECURITY AGENCIES

• What are the expected role of these specialized security agencies: this clearly to be based on the kinds of threats that military/security sector has to deal about: external threats (out of the region and counter-terrorism, transnational crimes), those within the continent (inter-country, border conflicts etc), and those arising from domestic causes (rebellions, coups, civil wars etc).

• Beyond the apparent to development systems and methods for collecting data, assessing threats and forecasting security needs.

• Support at bilateral or other levels: IGAD, AU, ECOMOG observation centers, UN and international community.

THE COST OF SECURITY

• Who pays for security and how these institutions are resourced in an environment of scare state final resources and the competition by other sectors – in many west African countries, even in Nigeria, the army has been receiving a declining share of the national budget. Even with the best intentions – a poorly resourced security agency, whether army or the policy is a source of instability and insecurity - military budgets and privileges (expensive institution – under funded & poorly remunerated in many cases).

PREFERENCES

• Which security agencies should be given preference in development (do we need/and can we really afford an army in Sierra Leone & Liberia – Costa Rica completely disbanded its army (good case scenario) as did Haiti (bad case scenario). Can we do better with a well-organized police force?

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REBUILDING SECURITY AGENCIES

• In reconstituting the army, think about the type, the kinds of recruitment (who joins the army), the size and the kinds of training and equipment that they receive (what kinds of threats). We have an army in Sierra Leone that is about 14,000 that will be reduced to 10,000 which despite the immense support from the UN – IMATT/UK/EU/US – and ECOWAS countries including Ghana & Nigeria – officer training.

DDR CHALLENGES

• The greatest security challenge in conflict/post-conflict situations is reconstituting the governmental security agencies, especially the Sierra Leone and Liberia – DDR – and it is going to be the same challenge in Cote D’Ivoire.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPECIALIZED SECURITY AGENCIES, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY?

• What is the relationship of the agencies to democratically constituted institutions and the rest of the society. These institutions should be subordinated and accountable to democrat-elected institutions and to the rest of society. How can this born and what mechanisms should into these security agencies?

CONCLUSION

• Identify very clearly security challenges and the setting of security priorities at the different levels.

• Working out the linkages and complementarily of security institution at national, regional, continental and international levels

• Clearly the interface between security institutions of different countries (ECOMOG, ACRI, RECAMP)

• Flexible and creative attitude to security sector reform – 1. Recognize that security needs, specialized institutions, practices will change over time 2. Develop short, medium and long-term strategies 2. Recognize that the maintenance of security transcends institutions and should be made part of the obligations.

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Dr. Funmi OLONISAKIN Director, Conflict, Security, and Development Group at King’s College, London

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COOPERATION IN PEACEBUILDING

Dr. Funmi OLONISAKIN Director, Conflict, Security, and Development Group at King’s College, London

WHAT PEACEBUILDING MEANS TO DIFFERENT ACTORS Boutros Boutros-Ghali described a conflict management cycle that includes four sequential but overlapping activities of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building. He defined peace building as ‘actions taken to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict1’. Peace building has since evolved and has been developed under different umbrellas including among others, post-conflict peace building, nation building or reconstruction. In support of the diplomatic and military activities undertaken to end hostilities and provide a secure environment in which humanitarian and other activities can resume, peace building entails a parallel longer-term process to consolidate the peace in order to prevent recourse to armed conflict. This process often entails activities that are geared toward building institutions, reconciling groups and people and rebuilding the economy. The Brahimi Report of 2000 was a response to improving efforts to limit the damage of conflicts. It interpreted peace building as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for peace building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war”2. This chronological view of the responses to conflict encouraged the compartmentalization of external efforts to contain or mitigate conflicts on the ground, as elaborated below. Like earlier attempts to develop better policy responses, the need to establish closer connection between security and development was not the primary preoccupation of Brahimi who he did not focus in any detail (and was not mandated to do so) on other aspects of the continuum – i.e. on conflict resolution and prevention now classified under the rubric of peace building. In 2001, the UN Security Council addressed the issue of sequencing by conceiving of peace building as a longer-term mission that serves a preventive role both pre and post 1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, United Nations, 1992 2 See Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, August

2000 at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs.

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conflict3. Thus, peace building activities could be employed to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict, to reduce the destructiveness of conflict once violence has broken out, and to end the conflict and prevent its recurrence. This concept of peace building reflects a perception of conflict prevention, management and resolution as a continuum. Thus fundamental objectives and expectations differ for different actors depending on their perspectives – the UN, other multilateral actors, recipients of assistance in Africa and their regional organizations. MEETING THE OBJECTIVES OF PEACEBUILDING Two key objectives guide those seeking to build peace:

1. The prevention of recurrence of violence (usually in a post-conflict setting) 2. The prevention of the onset of violence (in a pre-armed conflict setting).

However, available evidence suggests that in 44% of cases, peace agreements unravel within 10 years. Observations made by peace researchers and practitioners suggest that violent conflicts come to an end for one of two reasons. When conflicting parties reach a “saturation point” or “exhaustion level” in the use of violence as a means of pursuing their conflict and realize that this method is more costly than the initial injustice for which they were seeking redress4. Second, conflicting parties sign peace accords and agree to pursue their conflict via non-violent means following negotiations, which build expectations that the fundamental issues that led to violence in the first instance will be addressed. But in many such instances, despite hard won peace agreements, violence recurs because the expectation for social and economic justice has not been fulfilled. This is what Lederach calls “the justice gap” in peace building5. Ongoing research also indicates that there is no consensus over the precise role of external actors in the implementation of peace agreements even though there is a clear recognition that international attention and resources are crucial for successful implementation6.

3 UNSC doc. S/PRST/ 2001/5, 20 February 2001 4 John Paul Lederach, “Justpeace – The Challenge of the 21st Century”, European Center for Conflict

Prevention, (Utrecht: People Building Peace), p. 4. See http://www.gpac.net 5 John Paul Lederach, ibid. 6 See, for example, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Civil Wars (Boulder, Co &

London: Lynne Reiner, 2002).

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The results of UN conflict management interventions have been mixed. These include successful endings of armed conflict (e.g. Angola, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Sierra Leone); recurrence of armed conflict or continued threat of violence (e.g. Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and the DRC); creation of new (transitional) administrations (e.g. in Kosovo and East Timor); shoring up of conflict environments where the hope of transformation from security to development is bleak at best (e.g. Haiti); and maintenance of the status quo in old conflicts through traditional peacekeeping/observation (e.g. Western Sahara, Cyprus and Lebanon). In almost all cases, the post-conflict situation remains precarious, without offering much hope for a move toward long-term stability and development. And in most cases, the post-conflict countries have remained consigned to the bottom of the human development rankings. Furthermore, the cases considered by the UN Security Council only tell part of the story of contemporary conflict around the world. Many conflicts are not on inscribed on its agenda. Some have the potential on impacting on regional/ international peace and security and could benefit from more systematic intervention, involving international action, regional mediation and single nation diplomatic efforts (e.g. Sri Lanka, Colombia, Chechnya, Togo, Zimbabwe, etc.) Still neglected are regional actors. Their contribution can extend beyond their contribution to UN peacekeeping missions and peace support operations. Regional organizations, given their relative proximity to the conflicts and the consequences for national and regional security tend to be more willing to apply radical but effective measures to nip deadly conflict in the bud. They have become more creative in the development of normative frameworks for conflict prevention. They can provide longer-term engagement in circumstances where the UN may be diverted from a long term commitment by the frequently changing postures of its powerful members. The African Union, for example, adopted the Algiers Declaration in 1999, effectively rejecting any unconstitutional take over of power in African states. Subsequent prevention efforts by ECOWAS7 leaders have sought to take early action to reverse military coups (e.g. Nigeria in Sao Tome) or to prevent take over by military personnel (ECOWAS in Guinea Bissau). While taking early action to prevent escalation of armed violence is in the interest of regional actors, the strengths of regional institutions have not yet been sufficiently harnessed to ensure more effective responses to conflicts. Overall, regional actors have intervened in far fewer conflict situations than the UN and those interventions have often not been as complex and as multifunctional as UN peace

7 The Economic Community of West African States

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support operations. They have been on a smaller scale, (e.g. EU operation Artemis in Ituri and AU in Burundi); and in several cases, they have focused on prevention and early political response (e.g. ECOWAS in Guinea Bissau and Liberia in 2003), offering a first line of peacekeeping response before the UN arrives on the scene (ECOMOG in Sierra Leone from 1997-2000; and in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire in 2003). Overall, recent experience shows that internal crisis attracts international attention only when all the early warning signals have been missed or more often ignored – when the neglect of group demands and poor governance arrangements degenerate to violence; and in some cases, when violence spills over across national boundaries – with increased human suffering and attendant security challenges. Thus, in reality, peace building action to prevent the onset of armed conflict is rare and even when peace support missions are deployed to address on-going conflict and prevent the recurrence of conflict, there are significant gaps between the shorter term security related objectives and longer term peace building/ development goals. One of the key lessons that emerge from more than a decade of responses to the outbreak of armed conflict through a roster of tasks from diplomacy to peace building is that international action has not yet produced effective and sustainable results on the ground and therefore the threat of recurrence of armed conflict is real in many post-war environments. A related lesson is the need for improved collaboration and clearer division of labour between the UN and the regional actors that are more likely to offer first hand response to crisis in their neighbourhood. Their complementary strengths have yet to be properly harnessed. The vast majority of conflict situations within states do not attract the attention of the United Nations, and in particular, the great powers. In the more than 50 civil wars that have ended since 1989, the UN was involved in the effort to address root causes through peace building in less than half of these cases8. Some explanations have been offered for the persistent failure of peacemakers to steer war-torn societies toward long-term security and development. First is the superficial linkage between various conflict management instruments including diplomacy, preventive deployment, peacekeeping and peace building, which emphasizes the “sequential” but not the “overlapping” nature of the activities described by Boutros-Ghali. This particular gap highlights the demerits of task-oriented responses rather than a strategic approach that is seeking to achieve a particular outcome or end state. Second,

8 See Shepard Forman, “Working Better Together: Implementing the High Level Panel’s

Recommendations on Peacebuilding”, Unpublished Paper, New York University Center on International

Cooperation (NYU-CIC), April 2005, p2.

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there are critical gaps in the execution of peace operations in support of peacemaking efforts. They must undergo significant transformation if they are to make a difference to development cooperation efforts for conflict management and prevention. A third explanation refers to the inadequate and half-hearted responses in pre-armed conflict settings such as the creation in some cases of early warning mechanisms that seldom lead to prompt action. Related to this is the failure to link peacemaking in conflict environments to the situations in neighbouring states where conflict might be imminent. As discussed below, the United Nations is slowly beginning to address this problem through regional DDR efforts although such efforts are not visible in the area of preventive diplomacy. Lastly, gaps remain in programs aimed at developing the capacity of regional actors to prevent and manage conflict. Regional organizations and their benefactors are not yet operating on the basis of a joint strategic vision, which marries local, and regional norms and values and locally-driven ideas to the sophisticated planning resources of the developed world. The dysfunction underlying all of these manifestations of failed interventions is referred to as “the process-structure gap” by Lederach. The mindset, language and thinking of all actors responding to peace, construes peace as either a process or a definite end state. Peace is considered a process until a peace accord is signed, after which those implementing the peace plan think only in bureaucratic terms, with processes that translate into structures on the ground with sharply defined roles for different actors. In fact, peace should be seen both as a process and as a structure. The result of conflict management efforts would be different in many cases if peace accords were not seen as the ending of conflict but rather as leading to a continuous process of relationship building while adapting to changes and real life situations on the ground. Lederach thus urges that long-term peace structures should be reconceived “such that they reflect the inherent responsiveness often present in periods of active negotiation and avoid trappings of isolating ‘peace’ functions in bureaucracies implementing time-bound mandates with little capacity to adapt and change to-on-the ground real-life needs”9.

9 See John Paul Lederach cited above.

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MODELS OF PEACEBUILDING Peace implementation on the ground is invariably a reflection of the immediate objectives and priorities of the underwriters of the peace plan. Much attention has been focused on the attainment of political stability and the creation of a secure environment rather than on a longer-term goal of creating lasting conditions for sustainable security and development. In UN-led operations, the problem of strategic linkages between various levels of response remains a challenge. At the core of this problem are the strictures of UN Security Council mandates. UN mandates usually envisage narrow, short-term objectives of political settlement and elections and encourage early exit without dealing with the root causes of the crises. This is compounded by inadequate interaction between the political/ security mission and the development side of the UN system in ways that will ensure a common strategic vision and linked actions, let alone the International Financial Institutions and non-governmental entities, which are also engaged in efforts to achieve the same goals. Although the UN has made efforts to address the problem of lack of coordination between many parts of the UN system by combining all field presence into one “Country Team” in each location; and more recently, through deployment of integrated missions (e.g. in Liberia and Afghanistan), the lack of strategic focus remains. This is despite best practices guidelines set by the UN Secretariat, which clearly outline objectives in multidimensional operations that go well beyond the establishment of a secure environment10. Planning for multi-dimensional operations now regularly includes support for the development of national institutions that guarantee accountable governments with respect for human rights and effective management of disputes and can implement national strategies for social and economic recovery – a key aim of peace building. Peace support operations therefore often encompass a combination of peacekeeping and peace building activities aimed at creating initial conditions and national capacity to meet the above objective, including the following:

• Military operations to monitor agreement and create a secure environment • Facilitation of political dialogue and negotiation • Disarming and demobilization reintegration of former combatants into society

10 See Handbook on United Nations Multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, UN Best Practices

Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003, Chapter VXI.

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• Human rights monitoring and support for a national truth and reconciliation process

• Facilitation of and monitoring of an electoral process • Facilitation of the establishment of governance and rule of law institutions –

this often entails training and support for national law enforcement services.

However, the execution of peace support operations in the field often reinforces the gaps and absence of coordinated action – a type (3) incoherence problem. In addition to short term mandates which make it difficult to undertake longer-term planning and implementation to achieve the peace building objectives highlighted above, funding is not always guaranteed, nor is it coherent. There remains evidence of compartmentalization and “territorialism” in the way initiatives are funded and implemented. The responses to complex crisis environments tend to reveal these gaps, most visibly demonstrated by separate funding appeals and forums and overlaps in planning and competing programs, particularly between a peacekeeping mission and agencies which existed in the field prior to the arrival of the mission, which sometimes leads to duplication of effort in the field. A key aspect of the disconnection between security and development in the implementation of peace support operations is the compartmentalization of different elements of peacemaking and conflict management. Components of peace operations, civil and military, have been fine-tuned and heavily professionalized such that each element is separated and confined to a narrow area of activity, often operating independently without a strategic linkage to other activities. This institutional approach has at times missed the opportunity to maximize the talent of contingents able to contribute meaningfully to long-term developmental objectives. The planning for military components of peace support operations, for example, focuses on the capturing of specific, often short-term objectives such as the provision of security in specific locations. In this regard, institutional attention is focused almost exclusively on the mechanics of the military operation. Even where the military devotes some of its time and talent for rebuilding programs (e.g. building of schools, or mosques often as part of quick impact projects discussed below), this is often not systematically done in ways that can directly advance other components such DDR. The fundamental objective of such actions by military personnel in peace support operations is to win hearts and minds11.

11 Handbook on United Nations Multi-dimensional peacekeeping, Chapter 1

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Likewise, civilian components of peace operations tend to focus on objectives that are deliverable in the short-term, even when the situation demands longer term attention. For example, elections are focused upon as a benchmark for achievement of democracy and thus provide for early exit of peace missions when there might be a strong case for ensuring a series of institutional reforms starting in some cases with a constitutional reform agenda (e.g. Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire) or in other cases, shepherding transition processes over a much longer term (e.g. East Timor). At the root of this problem however, is as discussed above, the nature of the mandate provided by authorizing bodies, which does not give room for longer-term planning. Political and peace building support offices The largely civilian tasks, which form the entire focus of UN peace building support offices offer potential bridges between security and development; and can, contribute significantly to a strategic vision leading to sustainable development. The UN Department of political affairs is in charge of 10 peace building missions around the world and half of these are in Africa12. The aggregate capacity in the 10 peace building offices consists of 436 international civilian staff; 37 military and civilian police advisers and liaison officers; 1,076 local civilian personnel; and 42 UN volunteers13. The central role of these missions is to assist in the establishment of legitimate states in post-conflict environments, with the capacity to protect its people, manage disputes and ensure respect for human rights. And more importantly, peace building missions offer a chance to address issues at the root of a conflict, which in many cases heightened group inequalities and a continued pattern of social exclusion. Externals could play a useful role in facilitating institutional reforms, including constitutional reforms to change patterns of revenue allocation and resource distribution, among other things. The role of the UN Department of Political Affairs as the focal point on peace building is to facilitate a coherent response by the UN system in these post-conflict environments. In reality, however, situations where peace building (or peace support) missions work toward a common strategic framework, driven by the needs of the local population are the exception rather than the norm. Only inclusion of local ideas through creative means can bring about the desired transformation in post-conflict settings. Yet in contexts

12 UN peacebuilding missions in Africa include those in Central African Republic (since February

2000), Office of the SRSG for the Great Lakes (since December 1997), Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau, (since March 1999), Political Office for Somalia (since April 1995), and the Office of the SRSG for West Africa (since November 2001).

13 See www.un.org/peace/ppbm

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where the society is divided sharply along ethnic lines or by other issues at the root of the conflict, finding a coherent local agenda can be difficult and it is a challenge for the UN to forge such coherence through its political presence on the ground. Each post-conflict context is unique and peace building agendas must creatively seek the right balance and level of relevance to local needs. The role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General The choice of an SRSG or in some cases RSG can determine the extent to which a peace mission will succeed. The UN Secretariat outlines a profile for the SRSG/ RSG – who are expected to serve as role models, be of a high standard, leading by personal example and observe the principle of impartiality and transparency14. In addition to this however, it is important for the Special Representative to possess certain attributes, which can serve the strategic vision of the peace mission. The S/RSG is expected to be diplomatically astute, with an excellent grasp of the issues of concern to the target communities; and her or his judgment should be respected by the local population, not least the conflicting parties who should have confidence in the peace process. This is all the more important in internal conflict situations where the SRSG’s role can be even more delicate given the possibility that s/he may have to work with armed groups that are not recognized by the international community. It is crucial that the S/RSG is able to take a strategic view in the implementation of the mandate and assume intellectual leadership on all aspects of peace implementation, ensuring their relevance to the situation on the ground. Thus, the choice of a Special Representative can make all the difference. In summary, the following lessons of experience should be heeded in the planning and conduct of peace operations:

1. Peace and development should be envisioned as both a process and a structure in order to avoid the current tendency of seeing the peace accord as an end state, after which new processes are launched to create local structures.

2. Peacemakers should avoid rigid bureaucratic practices and build sufficient flexibility into the processes of implementing peace agreements in order allow for relationship building and capacity to adapt to evolving realities on the ground.

14 See Handbook on UN multi-dimensional operations, Chapter 1

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3. The planning of peace support operations should envisage better linkages and use of QIPs in ways that they can add value to DDR and other reform initiatives further down the line.

4. More resources should be provided for QIPs so that they can have the desired impact and pave the way for the achievement of longer term objectives such as reintegration and community development.

5. SRSGs should provide intellectual leadership for the fulfilment of all aspects of UN activities on the ground, ensuring that the strategic vision is consistent with the needs of the communities that the UN is expected to serve.

6. Through the leadership provided by the SRSG, greater emphasis should be placed on conflict transformation so that the mindset of conflicting parties are changed toward pursuit of conflict via non-violent means. As such, peace missions should make better use of people with experience in conflict transformation actions that address the root causes of conflicts.

7. The attention of Peace Building Support Offices, which tend to focus largely on political actors on the ground should be broadened and sustained to address the transformation of people and institutions on the ground and to provide required leadership and support for national institutional reform processes, in security and other sectors.

IMPACT ON THE GROUND The way in which aspects of the peace building and civilian components of peace support operations are implemented has been crucial to the success or failure of the operations and in part determined whether or not the recurrence of violence has been successfully prevented. Three examples are DDR, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the nature of international response to youth crises. Lessons: DDR Perhaps the greatest gap in the implementation of DDR programs is the “disconnect” between the strategic objective that DDR is meant to serve and the actual results that this program achieves at the local level. In many cases, objectives sought by the planners of DDR fall short of what is required to ensure better linkage between security and development. As indicated above, the most common objective set by peace planners and those seeking to manage conflict in a post-war setting, is the attainment of relative political stability and security rather than a greater goal of ensuring conditions for sustainable security and development. This is the single most important factor in

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determining the contribution that a DDR program will make to sustainable security and development. Local ownership of a DDR process is crucial. Unless creative ways are found to include local ideas for demobilization and reintegration in the design and implementation of DDR initiatives, reversals in peace processes will continue to outnumber successes. Local communities not only have superior knowledge of their territory and of their own situation, they have to live with the consequences of armed conflict and of failed conflict management efforts. They very often have innovative ideas for reintegration that can lead to lasting solutions. But international institutions present in these environments often lack creative channels or the flexibility to accommodate local ideas and initiatives. This problem cuts across many internationally driven initiatives and is not limited to DDR. Even with all the brightest and most innovative ideas for an effective DDR, funding gaps can very easily derail the DDR process. More often than not, the failure to redeem pledges from donors or lack of commitment to longer-term reintegration and rehabilitation efforts ensures that those programs are doomed to fail and do not stand much chance of meeting even the shorter term objectives set in the first instance (even if inadequate). There is a tendency for donors to commit to relatively less costly short term initiatives. In Liberia, it is widely accepted that there is relatively little impact that a 5-day demobilization exercise could have on fighters who are skilled in the use of arms and have been engaged in the art of war making for the better part of a decade. But a program which seeks a longer period of cantonment (e.g. for at least 6 months), which ensures that these fighters are not free to roam the sub-region, in addition to preparing them for functional existence in society has failed to attract the support of donors who do not consider the country important to their wider interests. This is compounded by the attitude of development actors, who tend to shy away from ideas and programs, which no matter how innovative, appear to contain security elements rather than mainstream development activities. For example, an option which places ex-fighters in National Youth Service schemes, with a focus on community development for a sustained period, as part of the regional reintegration process in West Africa, may not be preferred by donors or development actors. Yet it offers the promise of a structured approach to youth reintegration. Not only will it be possible to monitor and document their progress over a sustained period their talent can be tailored toward implementation of relevant community service

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programs and thus offer them adequate training and apprenticeships that can provide alternative livelihoods. Security Sector Reform (SSR) Like DDR, reform of the security sector is critical for sustainable security and development not just in post conflict environments but it can also serve as a conflict prevention tool particularly in states exhibiting symptoms of collapse. However, collapsed states often present the best opportunity for a comprehensive reform of the security sector because they offer a “clean slate” and a chance for complete transformation. The strategic vision for SSR should be the same as those proposed for DDR, which must go beyond the need to achieve immediate stabilization of the conflict environment to a people-centred agenda for security and development. Thus the key principles behind SSR are designed to address some of the issues at the root of the breakdown in governance systems, which led to state collapse in the first instance. External aid can help withdraw the monopoly of the use of force back to the hands of the state and this must be done within the context of a longer-term objective of democratic governance. It also drew attention to the origins of the concept of security sector reform, which among other things, is aimed at achieving the following15:

• A security sector that is accountable to elected civil authorities and the establishment of oversight institutions

• A security sector that adheres to domestic and international law • Transparency, such that information on security sector planning and budgeting

is widely available • Civil authorities have capacity to exercise political control • Civil society has the capacity to monitor the security sector and to provide

constructive input into the political debate • Adequately trained, professional and discipline security personnel • An environment that is conducive to regional and sub-regional peace and

security In war-torn societies, moving the security sector from their pre-war and war-time state into a situation where the above good practice principles are applied, is a daunting task. Such transformation will be the result of a long-term reform process that transcends the

15 See Nicole Ball and Kayode Fayemi (eds), Security Sector Governance in Africa: A Handbook,

Centre for Democracy and Development, 2004.

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external conflict management intervention. But much depends on the ability of conflict managers to set the scene for this at an early stage in the peace process. Few peace agreements have included plans for comprehensive security sector reforms. The Liberia and Sierra Leone peace agreements are two of the few exceptions. Even so, the Lome Peace accord of 1999 (for Sierra Leone), did not make explicit reference to SSR, but rather it provides for the rebuilding of the Sierra Leone Army. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on Liberia in 2003 refers explicitly to SSR. Implementing SSR as part of a UN-led and other conflict management processes will entail overcoming a number of challenges in several areas. These are discussed below. The first challenge that confronts those seeking to implement SSR is the lack of an agreed conceptual framework. The concept of SSR is relatively new. This phrase was introduced into the lexicon of conflict prevention and development only in the late 1990s although some of the activities envisaged under SSR have long been in existence. The new SSR agenda focuses on a description of the security sector that is much broader than that previously accepted. It moves beyond organizations mandated to use force including the defence forces; and the police and intelligence services, to non-state security organizations such as militias, private security forces, etc. And crucially, it also includes the judicial and public safety bodies and civil oversight bodies. The concept of SSR has two key aspects – governance and operational – ensuring the establishment of oversight mechanisms that are consistent with the democratic norms; and creating affordable, professional security forces. SSR and democratization of the security sector is not just about security institutions, but about security and governance. Thus, if governance of the security sector is not addressed, it might become impossible to provide security for the majority of people, thus creating a dependence on non-state security groups, such as ethnic militias and vigilantes. While the presence of the UN or other multilateral actors can play an important role in pressuring local leaders to reform and offer direction on the contents and scope of SSR, it has been difficult to get the UN mission or other agency to provide intellectual leadership on SSR on the ground. The result of this is that SSR activities are undertaken in isolation without inclusion of all components and without a connection between the components being implemented.

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A gap exists between the guidelines that have now been put in place and actual activity on the ground being described as SSR16. There is a real need to operationalise these guidelines particularly in environments where the UN is leading conflict management and rebuilding efforts. It is unfortunate that despite OECD-DAC’s contribution to developing guidelines on Security System Reform, there is no knowledge or understanding of these issues on the ground in peace missions where the same OECD members have contributed massively to the regeneration of war-torn societies. The Liberia peace mission is a glaring example of situations where the UN undertakes police reform, with some actions in the justice sector, without strategic attention to the overall SSR strategy. Neither has the current mission provided any oversight of the program aimed at rebuilding the security forces: the US has not yet internalised the same approach to SSR as some of its OECD partners. The linkage between SSR and DDR and the synchronization of both activities is crucial for the success of a conflict management process. Actors are still grappling with the need to understand the complexities of both activities and their convergences and divergences. The extent to which this is achieved will determine the success of efforts to maintain the security-development continuum. In terms of operationalizing SSR guidelines, much attention has been focused, particularly in immediate post-conflict/ post state-collapse settings, on the defence sector. The challenge is to move beyond the defence sector to into justice and intelligence, which also require enormous reform assistance. Lastly, there are real challenges for the implementation of a comprehensive SSR even when the roles of strategic actors are better coordinated. These include, for example, the lack of tradition of democratic norms and practice; lack of understanding of varied political contexts; the need to balance the need for democratic accountability, with security sector professionalism and discipline. Dealing with excluded youth and with young people affected by armed conflict The concerns of disaffected and excluded youth constitute perhaps the single most prominent issue at the intersection of security and development; and one of the key

16 See Ball and Fayemi (eds) in note 22 above; OECD DAC, Security System Reform and Governance:

Policy and Good Practice, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, 2004, Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), A Handbook on Parliamentary Oversight, 2003 and also A Handbook on Intelligence oversight), 2005.

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issues straddling pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict settings. Yet peacemakers and conflict management strategies are yet to systematically address this issue. Much attention in post-conflict environments has been focused on children associated with fighting forces – usually under the age of 18. Child protection was first included as part of UN peace support operations in 1999 with UNAMSIL’s mandate in Sierra Leone and the first Child Protection Adviser was recruited in this mission in April 2000. The nature of the youth problem indicates that it requires a coherent approach across the board. Current trends in many parts of the developing world point to a multi-faceted youth crisis with the surging youth population creating pressures for employment, education and health among other things, while policy responses to these issues are slow, inadequate, or non-existent. The real concerns of the youth population have failed to attract the attention of peacemakers, policymakers and donors. Indeed, there is a remarkable absence of policy debate that would indicate that these concerns are a priority. Numerous indicators warn that if the youth problem is not addressed in the near future it will exacerbate insecurity and stall development efforts in many developing countries, particularly across sub-Saharan Africa where youth make up more than 50% of the population. On its own, this is not necessarily a negative factor or cause for concern, particularly in countries which focus on social development and which are in a position to use this resource to promote their nations’ development and economic growth. Countries with a “youth bulge” (i.e. a predominant percentage of young people, particularly of working age) can boost the economy by providing a stable labour market, which in turn boosts social security for the elderly. But this assumes a good education, skills training and apprenticeship system, and good opportunity structures to absorb the skills of the emerging youth population as in the case of South Korea. The converse has been true in many fragile states where conditions have not emerged that allow the growing youth population to be harnessed in a positive way for development. Despite the crisis outlined above, youth continue to be excluded from decision-making processes that affect their lives and from formal political participation. They are also marginalized in the global debate on poverty reduction and development, including discussions around the Millennium Development Goals. Peace-related matters affecting youth are not incorporated in the present Youth Global Policy Framework, although these matters are indirectly addressed in the World Programme for Action through topics such as discrimination, violence, post-trauma healing and integration and peace education. Employment creation is still regarded as of secondary importance to financial

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stability and the liberalization of goods and services, rather than a central priority for Government policy. Thus, the issues of youth exclusion and inequality, which deny youth access to economic opportunities, are still at the margins of most policy dialogues (not least of all in the education sector) which take place at the national level. These combined factors increase youth vulnerability and make them more susceptible to participation in illicit activities that provide alternative sources of livelihood, including crime and armed conflict. Countries such as Nigeria suggest that there is a very close link between the social and economic marginalization of youth and ethnic or religious violence. In Liberia it seems likely that the lack of effective policies to address the youth crisis helped to ignite and sustain the violence in this country during the 1990s. The mobilization or voluntary participation of even small numbers of youth in armed groups can pose immediate security challenges (e.g. Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire). But the more serious, longer-term challenge to security and development is the impact of a growing population of uneducated, unskilled, unemployed and idle youth population in a context of stagnant economic growth. In countries attempting to recover from the effects of war, youth face the difficult challenge of replacing a way of life they have become accustomed to with a new life which has uncertain prospects. Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration programs (DDR), implemented in post-conflict situations are often inadequate given the factors explained above including poor funding and the lack of capacity to absorb or fully integrate the large numbers of former combatants into the productive sphere – all of which are linked to the conversion issues highlighted in chapter four. Although only small minorities of a country’s youth typically belong to armed groups, long periods of armed conflict can result in the militarization of entire societies, a key part of the challenge to be addressed in the post-conflict phase. Invariably, once the imminent danger of armed confrontation is reduced, youth tend to be neglected and marginalized. Their aspirations and concerns are rarely dealt with in a systematic fashion in the context of peace agreements or during the peace-building and reconstruction phase. Thus, the opportunity is lost to transform the enthusiasm for peace shown during the peacekeeping phase into more sustainable foundations for peace. Failure to deal with the political and socio-economic aspects of reintegration can lead to heightened crime rates, widespread climate of insecurity, which may lead a country back to violent conflict. This was seen in Liberia, where a combination of two crucial factors led to a resumption of armed conflict: the consolidation of the political power base of a warlord, and the failure to provide viable social economic alternatives for

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young combatants who remained attached to the command structures of their former factions. Better study and analysis of the nature of the youth crises in fragile states, which further exacerbates the slide into armed conflict is required if the transformation to longer-term security and development is to be achieved. Such a study should examine existing opportunities for empowering young people and the channels through which increased opportunities including greater participation of young people can be created in the prevailing governance environment. Effective regional agendas should also be sought for promoting youth development across regions, particularly those with a growing number of fragile states, where there is a noticeable pattern of youth vulnerability and exclusion. In summary, if these issues at the intersection of security and development are to be effectively addressed (particularly in post-conflict settings) in ways that can guarantee lasting peace and development, greater attention must be paid to the following:

1. The planning of DDR must envisage creative ways to ensure reintegration of former combatants and include strategic linkages with related activities, such as security sector reform

2. The local communities in which DDR and SSR are undertaken should form an integral part of the plan for long term reintegration. Sufficient flexibility should be built into planning and programming to accommodate local ideas and proposals for reintegration. Only the mobilization of local (public and private) efforts can guarantee successful reintegration of former combatants.

3. Peace negotiations and agreements should strategically address critical issues such as the transformation of armed groups into political entities and actors.

4. Equally, peace agreements must specify conditions that must be fulfilled for institutional reforms such as the need to move beyond provision of training, to ensuring capacity development for oversight of the security sector among other things.

5. Creative solutions must be found for the re-engagement of idle, unemployed and uneducated young people, who did not necessarily serve as part of armed groups. This might include national service programs which focus on community development and provide for longer term apprenticeships that convert them from functional illiterates into productive members of communities.

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THE PREVENTION DEFICIT: WHERE WARS ARE WAITING TO HAPPEN It is often argued that conflict prevention work goes unnoticed and only failed attempts at prevention are recognized. Thus, the cases of failed prevention, which led to the situations of armed conflict, some of which are on the UN Security Council’s agenda mentioned above, tend to receive disproportionate global and regional attention. Yet the real prevention work is yet to be done in many fragile states which are at risk of war. The “tell-tale” signs of state failure and vulnerability to armed conflict are all too apparent in ‘shadow states’ where the existence of public institutions is only a façade. Beneath this veneer, one may detect indicators of impending disintegration and collapse. Some of the most common include: (i) the prevalence of armed groups other than those sanctioned by the state, including civil/ ethnic militia, vigilante and private security, groups – all which point to a state’s loss of monopoly over the use of force; (ii) other “self-help” initiatives occur beyond the provision of private security arrangements in these vulnerable societies; (iii) rampant ‘privatization’ of social services, i.e. growing use of private education and health services because of lack of access to public facilities or weakening of state capacities to deliver public goods and services. Often, these self-help programs are afforded only by the rich. The poor have little or no access to them particularly where wealth flows to those favored by political patronage. These problems are compounded by the youth crisis described above. With vast youth unemployment and lack of access to good quality health and education (since the majority cannot afford the private systems), they fall prey to the designs of criminals and warlords. Lastly, in states managing to avoid a slide into war, a thriving informal sector can be sued to provide much needed support for the common people but this further highlights the weakness of the state, which is unable to convert this into much needed revenue to extend its services. Others may be shored up by a high level of external aid, which makes up for much of their national budget (e.g. Uganda; Tanzania) thus creating aid dependence and potential risks of decline when the life support machine on which the state relies on is suddenly withdrawn. In these societies, peace building activities such as those described above – SSR, DDR and addressing youth vulnerability and exclusion through improved education, training and apprenticeship schemes and employment creation all of which can be linked to a longer term reintegration program for members of armed groups – can be conceived as conflict prevention tools. But the reality is that they are part and parcel of the long term development effort as highlighted in Chapter 4.

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Unfortunately, these approaches have yet to be given adequate emphasis in multilateral programs until after a conflict has erupted and has run its deadly cycle. Conversely, bilateral and civil society actors who deal with fragile states may not provide adequate or sustained resources to deal with the requirements. The UK support for the SSR program in Sierra Leone is one of the few exceptions. Even so, this is being delivered as part of a post-conflict assistance package. Only a change in aid allocation protocols combined with new and far more active policies of multilateral engagement in conflict prevention focused on fragile states will make a lasting difference. Currently, the incentives of the aid system point to the initiation of conflict in order to benefit from the vast allocation of resources that is associated with post conflict recovery programs. It would be more cost effective to focus on conflict prevention and peace building in fragile states before they slide into war or endure a complex humanitarian emergency. The various bilateral and multilateral assistance (EU) for capacity building for conflict prevention provided to African regional organizations such the African Union and ECOWAS, would be good platforms for initiating changes in development cooperation policies consistent with the demands of conflict prevention. In addition to building the capacity of regional organizations to prevent conflict and respond to crisis, there is a need for improvement in the coordination between regional organizations, the UN and other multilateral actors. It is important to establish clear division of labor and principles of burden sharing. It must be stressed however, that claims to national sovereignty (and moral hazard considerations) remain a serious challenge to any attempt to prevent conflict. Bilateral and multilateral actors seeking to manage and prevent conflict must find judicious entry points (apart from outbreak of armed conflict) to intervene. From this perspective, the focus of the proposed Peace Building Commission on post conflict operations and the reluctance of many countries to give it a conflict prevention mandate are very unfortunate. Despite the challenges and gaps highlighted above, conflict management processes have shown a steady improvement and organizational learning is evident in the UN and other multilateral and bilateral organizations in pursuit of better and more effective methods for keeping the peace and for triggering sustainable security and development in troubled and vulnerable regions. Acceleration of this learning process would yield rich dividends. There is evidence of momentum toward building a closer link between security and development. Academics, policy makers and civil society activists alike, are

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championing efforts to bring these two fields closer together in policy and action17. Additionally, the report of the Secretary-General’s High-level panel underscores the natural connection between the two fields and promises to take the UN a step closer to achieving the much needed convergence between these endeavors. Efforts to prevent conflict in fragile states should henceforth consider:

1. Implementing some of the programs previously restricted to post-conflict environments in these environments as part of prevention approaches (including DDR, SSR, special youth development programs, etc.)

2. Fragile states adjacent to war affected countries should be included in peace building initiatives taking place in the neighboring state instead of being restricted to DDR.

PARTNERSHIP WITH REGIONAL ACTORS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT/ PEACEBUILDING

The role of regional actors is critical for the success of conflict management. Their contribution to the management of regional conflict has received only limited recognition from international actors so far. While UN-led interventions have received by far the greatest resources (though still inadequate), in more than 50 wars that have ended since the end of the Cold War, UN peace building operations have been staged only in 21 cases. Regional actors are being left to pick the pieces in conflict situations that do not attract the United Nations. Given limited resources, these neglected post-conflict environments hold the potential of deadly reversals. Regional actors are crucial to the sustainable success of future conflict management efforts for several reasons. First, their proximity to the crises makes them more inclined and more responsive to calls for early action. Second, they often have a better grasp of the socio-political context in which a neighborhood crisis is unfolding. Third, given their experience of difficult neighborhood crises, regional actors, particularly African regional organizations, have evolved norms and standards for conflict prevention and management and robust approaches to dealing with violent conflict.

17 See for example, See Issue of the Journal of Conflict, Security & Development , Vol. 4, No. 3,

December 2004, devoted to a discussion of issues at the intersection of security and development and the challenges of achieving closer linkage between the two disciplines.

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For example, the African Union, and several sub-regional organizations including ECOWAS and SADC, have included in their treaties and guiding principles, the right of intervention in a member state when crisis or humanitarian tragedy is imminent. This principle is similar to but more robust than the “responsibility to protect” principle which emerged after the ECOWAS approach. Beyond bold statements and agreement on norms, some regional actors have taken daring steps to undertake conflict prevention work to halt the deterioration of situations that could have moved well beyond their conflict management ability (e.g. Nigerian in Sao Tome and Principe; ECOWAS in Guinea-Bissau and Togo). Fourth, some regional organizations have advanced further than the UN in their approach to collaboration with local actors, particularly civil society groups across the region. This is the case with ECOWAS, for example, which has formalized its involvement with West Africa civil society. The greatest criticism of the proposal for the Peace Building Commission among West African civil society actors, for example, is that it does not envisage the inclusion of civil society actors. More so when peace building in the region is undertaken more by civil society actors than by the regional organization, which focuses more on military operations. Regional organizations however have major weaknesses which the UN and other development agencies can remedy. In Africa, for example, while a number of member states have continued to contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations within and outside the continent, the capacity to deploy troops to the area of operation remains a challenge. While there is now a continental framework for peace and security, including planning and executing peace support operations, such a framework has yet to be created for peace building. The reason for this gap appears to be two-fold. First, the imperative has been to respond to emergency situations that require rapid responses. Second, African regional organizations are severely incapacitated in terms of provision of peace building support. Much of the peace building work on the continent is undertaken by local civil-society actors and non-governmental organizations (largely international NGOs). But crucially, regional organizations can play a critical role in terms of developing local and regional ideas on effective peace building that exist in abundance into a continent-wide strategy that could provide a basis for UN and international support and give the proposed Peace Building Commission a highly valuable regional partner. The complementary role of UN and regional actors is grounded in the notion of ‘subsidiarity’. The weaknesses of one can be overcome by the strengths of the other.

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And the success of emerging policy responses such as the proposal for the establishment of a Peace Building Commission calls for alliances between the UN, regional and local actors that the European Union might also encourage and support. The trinity of diplomacy, security and development, upon which the work of the Commission should focus would be well served by combining regional strengths in diplomacy and security (e.g. execution of peace operations) and UN / international community’s strengths in peace building and development assistance. The future of conflict management is burden sharing between regional, national and global actors. Those able to respond rapidly to regional crisis without Security Council constraints would do so as the UN and other international crisis continued to attend to situations on the Security Council agenda. The issue of capacity becomes all the more important in this regard. The efforts to develop the conflict management capacity of organizations in Africa, the region most affected by deadly conflict, appears to concentrate only on peace support operations in part for the same reasons why Africans themselves have focused on this area. The EU Africa Peace Facility of 250 million Euros is earmarked mostly for peace support operations and capacity development in this area. The UN has also been assisting in the development of planning cells at the African Union. In addition, several bilateral actors have been actively engaged with ECOWAS in developing its capacity for peacekeeping and for early warning. But focusing on capacity for peacekeeping alone, and in particular on the development of an African stand-by force of five regional brigades by 2010 seems myopic. Much of the planning fails to take into consideration the fact that the situations are not stagnant and as such, the terrain will continue to change as more conflicts are resolved or transformed and assume other forms. Thus, unless flexibility is built into the planning, Africans will find themselves unable to respond effectively to other security challenges, which might entail lower intensity conflicts and national crisis that stem from some of the issues discussed in this chapter such as the youth crisis. The capacity to undertake peace building planning and implementation related to DDR, the reform of the security sector and planning for better youth reintegration will very likely become a higher priority in the next decade.

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CONCLUSIONS If on-going regional and global attempts to improve conflict management approaches for security and development in regions in turmoil are to make meaningful impact on the ground, radical change must occur at several levels: in the minds of leaders; within regional and global institutions and among bilateral actors keen to make a difference. First, only changed leaders can evolve changed institutions. It is crucial that those in decision making positions within all the critical states and institutions see the need for a new approach and that they are committed to positive change. Some of the emerging policy responses are the result of commitment to change among some leaders. Second, there should be a rethinking of the strategic framework in which organizations – global and regional – and states respond to conflict in ways that closely link security and development. A strategic vision of the desired outcomes of conflict management must be well articulated and disseminated. And it is important that the UN assumes intellectual leadership of this process. This has begun in part with the Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel and the Secretary General’s subsequent report, “In Larger Freedom”. Third, UN peace support operations must be refocused on a strategic vision and desired outcomes and milestones that include among others, social and economic recovery; and community reintegration. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General should assume leadership for the connection of security and development objectives and activities in her area of operation. As such, the SRSG must have oversight for DDR, SSR and economic recovery and integration programs to ensure that they all flow toward the strategic vision. In addition the SRSG must promote and nurture strategic partnerships that will lead toward the strategic objective and collective vision. The EU might contribute to the process of seeking the best candidates for SRSG positions and influencing the UN to refocus on a coherent strategic vision that links security and development on the ground in war affected countries. Local and regional input must be factored into the planning of all responses to conflict, whether at the level of UN headquarters or in the field in the area of operation. The proposed UN Peace Building Commission might provide the opportunity to begin this. But this connection must also be made continuously in the field. It is important that structures and leaders responding to conflict allow for flexibility to accommodate local ideas and initiatives within the strategic framework.

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Fourth, much thinking should be done ‘outside the box’ if peace processes are to deliver the desired goal of security and development in the long-term. The area of youth reintegration and development is one where much-needed innovation must occur. As a contributor nation to UN operations, the EU might play a useful role in steering the UN toward the development of reintegration programs that focus on relevant, locally-driven long-term youth development. The proposal for national youth service programs focusing on community development is one area that is worth exploring. The current study of DDR commissioned by Sweden is a first step, which might lead to changes on the ground. Fifth, the UN should provide greater leadership in ensuring coherence of principles and practice particularly in the area of security sector reform. The EU should play a role in influencing the UN at headquarters and field to take on board the OECD guiding principles and apply them in a coherent manner in the field. The increased focus on anti-terrorism activities poses a major challenge for efforts to transform war-torn societies as well as fragile states and to establish a closer connection between security and development. It is important that external assistance does not undermine the capacity building and democratic reforms needed for sustainable peace and long term prosperity. This is especially relevant in the area of security sector reform, where there is a potential for states to hold on to (or revert to) old authoritarian modes of governance that are inimical to transparency and civilian oversight, e.g. by giving excessive scope to the unregulated activities of intelligence agencies and undermining human rights under the pretext of anti-terrorism. Lastly, despite the challenge created by continued insistence of states on national sovereignty and resulting restrictions for pre-conflict peace building by external organizations, it is important to ensure that the ‘responsibility to protect’ be backed by a ‘readiness to help prevent’ by the international community. For this kind of work, regional organizations have a distinct comparative advantage and offer the best hope for preventing more damaging and costly crises. This is a policy area where the European Union has a distinctive role to play.

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AFRICAN OWNERSHIP OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Lieutenant General Daniel OPANDE Former Force Commande,r United Nations Mission in Liberia

Africa is today facing greater peace needs than before, against this background Africans have embarked on various efforts in responding to the challenges posed by seemingly unending conflicts. Statements such as “African solutions for African problems” are essential calls in favour of finding solutions aimed at reducing intractable conflicts plaguing the continent. This is “a convenient slogan for clipping the role of the international community on the continent”. Perhaps what we should be looking for are “globally-supported African solutions for African problems”. In this context, new models of flexible partnerships have made valuable contributions as demonstrated by the recent African mission in Burundi and the ongoing Darfur Mission. Indeed most of us will agree that the African response to its long-standing armed conflicts has gained momentum – which represents a greater effort to deal with conflicts in Africa by Africans. The still fragile peace processes in Sudan and DR Congo, are some of the challenges facing Africa. Elsewhere in the continent, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau and Somalia, are examples of ongoing peace efforts which may bear fruits. These are commendable efforts of the AU, sub-regional organizations as ECOWAS, IGAD and individual states – signifying increased regionalization of peacemaking and peace operations within the continent. More African states are now contributing troops to the UN and AU peacekeeping operations than a decade ago. The much popularized sub-regional peace initiatives taking root have enhanced the continent’s ability to engage more constructively in managing violent conflicts. The AU’s conflict response mechanism is slowly taking root and is set to benefit immensely from the EU-funded Africa Peace Facility. Although the peace facility is short-termed, most developed countries have expressed willingness to support AU efforts to maintain security within the continent. African member states have also pledged full support for peace operations to commit troops for an African Standby Force (ASF) once it is operational. The envisaged deployment of some 1,700 troops in Somalia is a manifestation of its strong determination to act.

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Presently there are eight ongoing UN peacekeeping operations and one AU-led within the continent with a total of about 50,000 troops. Over 28 African countries are contributing almost three quarters of the current troops to UN operations in the continent. These numbers show clearly that enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity can advance the cause of lasting peace in the continent. Nevertheless further progress in this area would be hampered without the continued political determination and ownership by individual African governments. Similarly such effort is unachievable without the crucial support from developed countries. In this context, Africans should welcome the international community’s renewed focus in matters which promote its ownership of security destiny and principles of good governance. The USA, France, Great Britain and some Nordic countries are involved in common capacity-building programmes designed to strengthen and to co-ordinate respective country policies. Today, many African states are engaged in bilateral arrangements with developed countries for training and providing technical support to various African militaries. Such arrangements have enhanced establishment of peace support training centres within the sub-regions to cater for growing training needs to peace operations. UN-assisted pre-deployment training is regularly conducted in most troops contributing countries. A closer look at some countries with history of troop contribution to peacekeeping provides an indicator of where we are and what each country can realistically contribute to an ASF. Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco, Kenya, Ethiopia, Senegal, South African and to a lesser extent, Zambia, Namibia, and Guinea, have regularly contributed battalion-size (or more) contingents to UN operations in the continent. Approximately thirty five of the member states have made significant contributions to peacekeeping and they stand to develop a pattern of regular commitment to future AU operations. Further indicator of concrete actions can be seen in the establishment of AU’s Peace and Security Council (2002) as the decision making institution and sole authority to deploy and manage AU-led peace operations. I must say, this is a positive step towards addressing the continent’s response to peacekeeping. Despite significant constraints the AU has covered remarkable amount of ground work in a very short time. Plans are now underway to increase its Darfur force from 2,300 to 7,000 by September this year. Several donor countries have pledged financial assistance while considering AU’s request for armoured vehicles and other military hardware and communication equipment. The AU’s recent authorization to deploy some 1,700 troops to help the Somalia transitional government relocate to Mogadishu and train its security forces is another bold step in deed.

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Despite positive trends in several fronts, many challenges remain to be addressed in order to mount successful peace operations. The inadequate resources and varied standard of training of national contingents are some of the major challenges to the effectiveness of contemporary peace operations facing the continent. African contingents frequently lack capacity to deploy and to sustain sizeable troops on their own without significant outside assistance. Africa will therefore, need to develop key partnership as it makes progress towards acquiring the capabilities needed to meet its long-term vision of playing a significant role in its security. The existing programmes to build the African peacekeeping capability do not go far enough, and is simply out of reach of most countries. Secondly, the political will of member states to participate in regional security issues remains problematic. This is blamed on political nature of African bureaucratic systems which is extra sensitive in the use of military power. I must however point out that recent trends point towards greater effort to address such issues. It will take time and considerable resources to create conditions necessary to sustain a range of capabilities to fully undertake complex peace operations or deal with situations such as those we saw in Rwanda and now in Darfur. In conclusion, the African focus on peace operations has tremendously increased. The essential ingredient generally described as ‘political will’ – is now easily forth coming as seen in AU’s willingness to conduct operations in Darfur and Somalia. This calls for developing closer and pragmatic working relationships and institutional linkages between the AU, UN and key African sub-regional organizations. In this regard, the wider international community must be prepared to support Africa as an important peace and development partner if Africa is to take leading role in peace operations throughout the continent and to own it.

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Lieutenant General Daniel OPANDE (Former Force Commande,r UN-Mission in Liberia) Amb. John L. HIRSCH (Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy)

Amb. Felix MOSHA (Executive Director, African Dialogue Center for Conflict Management, Tanzania)

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AFRICAN OWNERSHIP OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Ambassador Felix MOSHA Executive Director, African Dialogue Center for Conflict Management, Arusha, Tanzania

The timing of this seminar comes at a historic moment because of the emerging capacity of the African Union, coupled with the increasing degree of readiness by international community to support peacemaking and peacekeeping in Africa. Thus, the 35th Annual Seminar is ideally placed to determine the best way forward. Let me emphasize that the partnership is already in place and Africans are effectively playing their role by actually being the first on the “line of fire”. This has been demonstrated by the fact that UN Peacekeepers had taken over from similar African Missions in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Ethiopia/Eritrea etc. While in Dafur, Africans are the only ones expected to be on the ground with logistical support from the USA; the EU (particularly the UK and the Netherlands); and Canada. This partnership will be strengthened further by the planned G8 package to train 20,000 African Peacekeepers; and Africa’s plan for a 15,000 African Stand by Army by 2010. The partnerships are also continuing in peacemaking in terms of support by the international community to peace negotiations between parties in conflict situations in Africa, such as in Dafur, Cote d’Ivoire etc.; and, support to African Sub-regional organizations - ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC in peacemaking activities. Otherwise, the thrust of this presentation is that developing peace in Africa needs more than peace keeping and peace making. These, are consequences. The fact that the worst civil wars in Africa were in countries where UN Peace Keeping had taken place is clearly visible in examples like Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia etc. Essentially, presently, there is no international mechanism to comprehensively assist countries from war to peace; a program of economic, political and social reconstruction that would move a country from the devastation of war to sustainable development. To start with, this demands a better understanding of the real problems and issues in Africa; the need to avoid the cynicisms and the “Afro-pessimists” who view African issues superficially. We need to call for a holistic approach aimed at human security as the only viable approach to peace in Africa. True international partnership for peace in Africa, demands a paradigm that would at its core alleviate poverty in Africa. And this is not just about aid. The fundamental requirement must be to give Africans the chance to compete fairly in the international market place. To process and package their coffee, tea, cocoa etc. for

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the developed markets, instead of an international trade regime that denies them the opportunity to domestically add value to these products. Equally important, is the removal of all subsidies by industrialized countries on agriculture commodities exported by Africa. These measures should combine with a total debt cancellation for African countries and huge inflows of well targeted development aid that given the emerging process of good governance in Africa will, taken together, enhance an enabling environment for increased foreign direct investments in Africa.

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PARTICIPANTS Lieutenant General Martin Luther AGWAI Chief of Army Staff The Nigerian Army Headquarters Area 7 Garki Abuja Nigeria Tel: +11 234 9 234 0527/8 or +11 234 9 234 7441 Fax: +11 234 9 234 7106 Email: [email protected] Ms. Beatrice T. AGYARKOH Professional Development & Accounting Assistant International Peace Academy 777 UN Plaza New York, NY 10017 USA Tel: +1 212 225 9628 Fax: +1 212 867 8730 E-mail: [email protected] Lieutenant Colonel (GS) Thomas AHAMMER Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 23139 Fax: +43 1 5200 17200 E-mail: [email protected] Mag. Barbara AHAMMER National Defence Academy Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria E-mail: [email protected]

Mr Reham Zaki AMIN Second Secretary Egyptian Embassy Vienna Hohe Warte 50-54 1190 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 370 81 04 Fax: +43 1 370 81 04 27 E-mail: [email protected] Ms. Siri ANDERSEN Student Diplomatic Academy Favoritenstrasse 15a 1040 Vienna Austria Mag. Habiboulah Ndongo BAKHOUM Lecturer, University of Vienna Hetzendorfer Strasse 62/118 1120 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 699 1108 1646 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. André BANDEIRA Research Advisor/Counsellor NATO Defence College Via Giorgio Pelosi 1 00143 Cechignola Rome Italy Tel.: +39 0650 52 52 57 Fax: +39 0650 52 57 97 E-mail: [email protected] Ms. Sophia BEKELE President, Gov4Africa 1712 Parkside Drive California 94597 USA Tel: +1 925 818 0948 Fax: +1 925 935 1589 E-mail: [email protected]

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Mag. Michael BRANDSTETTER Ministry for Foreign Affairs Minoritenplatz 8 1014 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 050 11 50 3613 Fax: +43 050 11 59 3613 E-mail: [email protected] Mag. Brigitte BRENNER Federal Ministry of the Interior Crisis Management Minoritenplatz 9 1014 Vienna Austria Tel.: +43 1 53 126-3135 Fax: +43 1 53 126-3129 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Vova A. CHIKANDA Political Counsellor Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zimbabwe to the International Organisations in Vienna Strozzigasse 10/15 1080 Vienna Austria Tel.: +43-1-407 92 36 Fax: +43-1-407 92 38 E-mail: [email protected] Ms. Barbra CHIMHANDAMBA Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zimbabwe to the International Organisations in Vienna Strozzigasse 10/15 1080 Vienna Austria Tel.: +43-1-407 92 36 Fax: +43-1-407 92 38 E-mail: [email protected]

Mag. Patrycia CIEMPKA Military Policy Division Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 23031 Fax: +43 1 5200 17086 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Will CLOSE-BROOKS Student, Diplomatic Academy Vienna Favoritenstrasse 15a 1040 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 26026 4566 E-mail: [email protected] Colonel Anton DENGG Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management National Defence Academy Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 40710 Fax: +43 1 5200 17262 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Karl DEURETZBACHER Military Policy Division/UN Desk Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 23350 Fax: +43 1 5200 17088 E-mail: [email protected]

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Ambassador Said DJINNIT Commissioner, Peace, Security & Political Affairs African Union PO Box 3243 Addis Abeba Ethiopia Tel: +11 251 15 17 700 Fax: +11 251 15 12 622 E-mail: [email protected] Ambassador David DONOGHUE Embassy of Ireland Rotenturmstrasse 16-18/5 1010 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 715 42 46 Fax: +43 1 713 60 04 E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Adedeji EBO Senior Fellow Africa Working Group Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Rue de Chantepoulet 11 P.O. Box 1360 1211 Geneva 1 Switzerland Tel.: +41 22 741 7713 Fax: +41 22 741 7705 E-mail: [email protected] Ambassador Sayed Galal E. ELAMIN Embassy of the Sudan Reisnerstrasse 29/5 1030 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 710 23 43 Fax: +43 1 710 23 46 E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Mohiedine EL KADIRI Counsellor, Embassy of Marocco Vienna Opernring 3/4 1010 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 586 66 50 Fax: +43 1 586 76 67 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Khaled El MEKWAD Egyptian Embassy Vienna Hohe Warte 50-54 1190 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 370 81 04 Fax: +43 1 370 81 04 27 E-mai: [email protected] Mr. Rabah FASSIH Algerian Embassy Rudolfinergasse 18 1190 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 369 88 53 Fax: +43 1 369 88 56 E-mail: [email protected] Brigadier General Dr. Walter FEICHTINGER Director, Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management National Defence Academy Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 40700 Fax: +43 1 5200 17262 E-mail: [email protected]

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Lieutenant Colonel Ernst M. FELBERBAUER Military Adviser International Peace Academy 777 UN Plaza New York, NY 10017 USA Tel: +1 212 225 9630 Fax: +1 212 867 8730 E-mail: [email protected] Ambassador Taous FEROUKHI Permanent Mission of Algeria Rudolfinergasse 18 1190 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 369 88 53 Fax: +43 1 369 88 56 E-mail: [email protected] Ambassador Irene FREUDENSCHUSS-REICHL Director General, Head of the Department for Development Cooperation Ministry for Foreign Affairs Minoritenplatz 8 1014 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 (0)5 01150 4432 Fax: +43 (0)5 01159 4432 E-mail: [email protected] Lieutenant General Babacar GAYE Force Commander MONUC Post Office Box 4653 Grand Central Station New York, NY 10163-4653 USA Tel: +243 81 890 6000 Fax: +243 81 890 56208 E-mail: [email protected]

Ms. Esther GATUNDU Kenyan and Friends in Austria Tel: +43 676 57 28 524 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. James GATUNDU Kenyan and Friends in Austria Tel: +43 676 57 28 524 E-mail: [email protected] Colonel Hadi Ali GEBRAEL Operations Department Libyan Army Tripoli Libya Tel: +218 91 213 82 99 E-mail: [email protected] Ms. Dulce GOMES Embassy of the Republic of Angola +A33Permanent Mission to the International Organisations in Vienna Seilerstätte 15/10 1010 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 718 74 88 Fax: +43 1 718 74 86 E-mail: [email protected] General (ret) Günther GREINDL President, Blue Helmet Association Austria 2100 Korneuburg Austria Tel.: +43 2262 62175 E-mail: [email protected] Ambassador Jiři GRUŠA Director, Diplomatic Academy Vienna Favoritenstraße 15A 1040 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 505 72 72 116 Fax +43 1 504 22 65 E-mail: [email protected]

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Dr. Caroline GUDENUS Ministry for Foreign Affairs Minoritenplatz 8 1014 Vienna / Austria Tel: +43 050 11 50 3446 Fax: +43 050 11 59 3446 E-mail: [email protected] Mag. Gerald HAINZL Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management National Defence Academy Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 40740 Fax: +43 1 5200 17262 E-mail: [email protected] Dr. David HARLAND Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit Department of Peacekeeping Operations United Nations Room S-3640A New York, NY 10017 USA Tel.: +1-917-367 2323 Fax: +1-917-367 5365 E-mail: [email protected] Mag. Jürgen HEISSEL Ministry for Foreign Affairs Minoritenplatz 8 1014 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 050 11 50 3689 Fax: +43 050 11 59 3689 E-mail: [email protected]

Captain Benedikt HENSELLEK Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management National Defence Academy Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 40722 Fax: +43 1 5200 17262 E-mail: [email protected] Lieutenant Colonel (GS) Günther HESSEL Martin Barracks Ing. Hans Sylvester Strasse 6 7000 Eisenstadt Austria Tel: +43 2682 711 6001 Fax: +43 2682 711 1761 Ambassador John L. HIRSCH Senior Fellow, Director IPA Africa Programme International Peace Academy 777 United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017 USA Tel: +1 212 687 4300 Fax: +1 212 983 8246 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Hans HOEBEKE Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael" Clingendael 7 2509 AB The Hague Netherlands Tel: +31 70 314 19 53 Fax: +31 70 314 19 60 E-mail: [email protected]

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Dr. Peter HUBER Ministry for Foreign Affairs Minoritenplatz 8 1014 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 050 1150 3707 Fax: +43 050 1159 3707 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Ramadan IRHIAM Director General International Organisations, Libyan Foreign Affairs Tripoli Libya Tel: +218 21 34 62 703 Fax: +218 21 340 30 11 Lieutenant Colonel Magnus JÖRGEL Swedish National Defence College Valhallavägen 117 Box 27805 115 93 Stockholm Sweden Tel.: +46-70-66 76 208 E-mail: [email protected] Amb Julius Kiplagat KANDIE Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Vienna) Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the International Organisations in Vienna Neulinggasse 29/8 1030 Vienna Austria Tel.: +43 1 712 39 20 Fax: +43 1 712 39 22 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Vinzenz KASTNER, MSc Analyst, Bureau for Security Policy Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 27052 Fax: +43 1 5200 17112 E-mail: [email protected]

Ms. Reeham KHALIL Egyptian Embassy Vienna Hohe Warte 50-54 1190 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 370 81 04 Fax: +43 1 370 81 04 27 E-mail: [email protected] Commander Wolf KINZEL Bundeswehr Center for Transformation Security Policy/Military Strategy Division Julius Leber Kaserne Kurt Schumacher Damm 41 13405 Berlin Germany Tel.: +49 30 4981 3841 Fax: +49 30 4981 3802 E-mail: [email protected] Mag. Elisabeth KÖGLER Ministry for Foreign Affairs Minoritenplatz 8 1014 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 050 11 50 3470 Fax: +43 050 11 59 3470 E-mail: [email protected] Gertrude LEIBRECHT Austrian Development Agency Zelinkagasse 2 1010 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 90399 534 Fax: +43 1 90399 290 E-mail: [email protected]

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Ambassador Georg LENNKH Director General Austrian Development Cooperation Ministry for Foreign Affairs Minoritenplatz 9 1014 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 50 11 50 4432 Fax: +43 50 11 59 4432 E-mail: [email protected] Professor Dr. Walther LICHEM Ministry for Foreign Affairs Minoritenplatz 8 1014 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 050 1150 3310 Fax: +43 050 1159 3310 E-mail: [email protected] Ms. Elisabeth LINDENMAYER Assistant Secretary-General Deputy Chef de Cabinet Secretariat - Room S-3840-A New York, NY 10017 Tel: +1 212 963 89 22 Fax: +1 212 963 11 85 E-mail: [email protected] Brigadier General Bernd LUBENIK National Defence Academy Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 40010 Fax: +43 1 5200 17262 E-mail: [email protected] Mag. Nina LUKESCH Military Policy Division Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 23037 Fax: +43 1 5200 17086 E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Dominique Claire MAIR Austrian Development Agency Zelinkagasse 2 1010 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 90399 551 Fax: +43 1 90399 1551 E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Reiner MEYER Researcher, Austrian Institute for International Affairs Operngasse 20b 1040 Vienna Tel: +43 1 581 11 06 Fax: +43 1 581 11 06 10 E-mail: [email protected] BG Greg B. MITCHELL Commander SHIRBRIG, Dep Force Cmdr UNMIS UNMIS FHQ, Plot 110, Garden City P.O. Box 69 Burri Khartoum 11111 Khartoum Sudan Tel: +249 912 17 40 91 E-mail: [email protected] Ambassador Felix MOSHA Executive Director, Africa Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management & Development Issues P. O. Box 6202, Arusha Dar-es Salaam Tanzania Tel: +255 2725 07714/222136728 Fax: +255 2725 08482/222667963 E-mail: [email protected] Lieutenant Colonel (GS) Dieter MUHR Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 23513 Fax: +43 1 5200 17020 E-mail: [email protected]

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Mr. M. A. MUSAWA Embassy/Permanent Mission of Nigeria Rennweg 25 1030 Vienna Austria Mr. Charles MWAURA Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) Addis Abeba Ethiopia Tel: +2511 728093 Fax: +2511 721022 E-mail: [email protected] Major Valentine OKORO Aide-de-Camp to Gen Agwai Dr. Funmi OLONISAKIN Director, Conflict Security and Development Group The International Policy Institute King's College, University of London London United Kingdom Tel: +44 20 7848 2945 Fax: +44 20 7848 2748 E-mail: [email protected] Lieutenant General Daniel I. OPANDE DoD Kenya Defence HQ, Ulinzi House P.O.Box 40668 00100 Nairobi Kenya Tel: +254 20 27 17 087 Fax: +254 20 27 19 200 E-mail: [email protected]

Ambassador Brigitte ÖPPINGER-WALCHSHOFER Ambassador of Austria to Ethiopia and the African Union PO Box 1219 Addis Abeba Ethiopia Tel: +251 1 71 21 44 Fax: +251 1 71 21 40 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Mohamed OUZEROUHANE Permanent Mission of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria to the International Organisations in Vienna Rudolfinergasse 18 1190 Vienna Austria Tel.: +43 1 369 88 53 Fax: +43-1-369 88 56 E-mail: [email protected] Ambassador Biodun OWOSENI Embassy/Permanent Mission of Nigeria Rennweg 25 1030 Vienna Austria Ms. Anne-Christine PEHERSTORFER, MSc Analyst, Bureau for Security Policy Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 27053 Fax: +43 1 5200 17112 E-mail: [email protected] Mag. Daniela PFEFFER Diplomatic Academy, Vienna Lerchengasse 14/2/5 2340 Mödling Austria Tel: +43 650 30 10 803 E-mail: [email protected]

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Lieutenant Colonel Peter PÖCHER Military Policy Division Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 23361 Fax: +43 1 5200 17278 E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Alexander PSCHIKAL Federal Chancellery Hohenstaufengasse 3 1010 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 53 115 2190 Fax: +43 1 53 115 2196 E-mail: [email protected] Brigadier General Johann PUCHER Military Policy Division Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 23070 Fax: +43 1 5200 17265 E-mail: [email protected] Professor Ismail O.D. RASHID Vassar College Box 356 124 Raymond Avenue, Poughkeepsie New York 12604 USA Tel: +1 845 483 0450 Fax: +1 845 437 5925 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Michael REDER Security - Correction Service Ministry of Justice Pochestrasse 9 4010 Linz Austria Tel: +43 732 7601 4201 Fax: +43 732 7601 4400 E-mail: [email protected]

Mag. Astrid REISINGER CORACINI Research Assistant, Institute for Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure University of Salzburg Kapitelgasse 5-7 5020 Salzburg Austria Tel: +43 662 80 44 33 58 Fax: +43 663 80 44 33 57 E-mail: [email protected] Ambassador Terje ROD-LARSEN President, International Peace Academy 777 UN Plaza New York, NY 10017 USA Tel: +1 212 225 9615 Fax: +1 212 963 8246 E-mail: [email protected] Mag. Sephan RUTKOWSKI Ministry for Foreign Affairs Minoritenplatz 8 1014 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 050 11 50 4541 Fax: +43 050 11 59 4541 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Cyrus SAMII Senior Program Officer International Peace Academy 777 UN Plaza New York, NY 10017 USA Tel: +1 212 225 9612 Fax: +1 212 983 8246 E-mail: [email protected]

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General Raimund SCHITTENHELM Commandant National Defence Academy Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel.: +43 1 5200 40000 Fax: +43 1 5200 17105 E-mail: [email protected] Ms. Karin SCHLAGNITWEIT Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management National Defence Academy Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 40712 Fax: +43 1 5200 17262 E-mail: [email protected] Mag. Ernst SCHMID, LL.M. Legal Expert, Military Policy Division Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 23311 Fax: +43 1 5200 17085 E-mail: [email protected] Major General Christian SEGUR-CABANAC Head of Joint Command and Controll Staff Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43-1-5200 24000 Fax: +43-1-5200 17189 E-mail: [email protected]

Brigadier General Rene SEGUR-CABANAC Chief of Staff and Deputy Commandant National Defence Academy Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43-1-5200 40100 Fax: +43-1-5200 17105 E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Thomas SPIELBÜCHLER Lecturer, University of Salzburg Rudolfskai 42 5020 Salzburg Austria Tel: +43 662 80 44 47 54 E-mail: [email protected] Lieutenant Colonel (GS) Manfred STACHER Austrian Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Mag. Klaus STEINER Departement Devolpment Cooperation Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs Minoritenplatz 8 1014 Vienna Austria Tel.: +43 50 11 50 4474 Fax: +43 50 11 59 5474 E-mail: [email protected] Colonel Dr. Peter STEINER Austrian Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria

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Mag. Ursula STELLER Austrian Development Agency Zelinkagasse 2 1010 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 90399 533 Fax: +43 1 90399 290 E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Nicole STEMMER Bi- and Multilateral Affairs Federal Ministry of the Interior Minoritenplatz 9 1014 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 53126 3523 Fax: +43 1 53126 3884 E-mail: [email protected] Colonel (GS) Dr. Andreas STUPKA National Defence Academy Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 40900 Fax: +43 1 5200 17108 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Daniel TESHOME First Secretary, Ethiopian Embassy Wagramer Strasse 14/1/2 1220 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 710 21 68 19 Fax: +43 1 710 21 71 E-mail: [email protected] Envoyee Bert THEUERMANN Ministry for Foreign Affairs Minoritenplatz 8 1014 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 5 01150 3375 Fax: +43 5 01159 3375 E-mail: [email protected]

Mag. Gottfried TRAXLER Austrian Development Agency Zelinkagasse 2 1010 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 90399 544 Fax: +43 1 90399 290 E-mail: [email protected] Mag. Peter TROST Military Policy Division Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 23341 Fax: +43 1 5200 17086 E-mail: [email protected] Major Thomas WAGNER Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 24810 Fax: +43 1 5200 17116 E-mail: [email protected] Mag. Franziska WALTER Austrian Development Agency Zelinkagasse 2 1010 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 90399 554 Fax: +43 1 90399 290 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. El Ghassim WANE Head of Division, Conflict Management Division African Union P.O. Box 3243 Addis Abeba Ethiopia Tel: +251 1 51 38 22 Fax: +251 1 519 321 E-mail: [email protected]

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Major (GS) Wolfgang WEICHSELBERGER Ministry of Defence Rossauer Lände 1 1090 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 5200 23524 Fax: +43 1 5200 17020 Ambassador Gerhard WEINBERGER Ambassador of Austria to Senegal 18, rue Emile Zola Dakar Tel: +221 849 40 00 Fax: +221 849 43 70 E-mail: [email protected] Mag. Julia WERZER Ministry for Foreign Affairs Minoritenplatz 8 1014 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 050 11 50 3491 Fax: +43 050 11 59 3491 E-mail: [email protected] Ambassador Omar ZNIBER Embassy of Marocco in Vienna Opernring 3/4 1010 Vienna Austria Tel: +43 1 586 66 50 Fax: +43 1 586 76 67

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARTIN LUTHER AGWAI is the Chief of Army Staff of the Nigerian Army. He grew up from a Christian home and was the President of Fellowship of Christian Students at Government Secondary School, Zaria in 1967. In his military career, he has held the positions of the Deputy Force Commander of United Nations Mission in Sierra-Leone, Chief of Training and Operations of the Nigerian Armed Forces and Director of Military Training at the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna. He was the Nigerian Military Adviser at Harare, covering the whole of Southern Africa between 1993 – 1996. He was a Directing Staff and Chief Instructor at the Command and Staff College Jaji – Kaduna, Nigeria. Before becoming the Chief of Army Staff he was the Deputy Military Adviser at United Nations Headquarters. General Agwai is a graduate of the Nigerian Command and Staff College, British Army Staff College, Camberley, United States Army Armour School and United States Defence University, Washington D.C, where he obtained a Master of Science in National Resource Strategy. His military awards include Force Service Star, Meritorious Service Star, Distinguished Service Star and Fellow of the War College. He was one time a Council Member of the University of Jos and is decorated with Nigeria’s national award of the Commander of the Federal Republic. GENERAL DE CORPS D'ARMEE BABACAR GAYE est né le 31 janvier 1951 à Saint-Louis du Sénégal.Après avoir obtenu son baccalauréat en 1968, il prépare le concours de Saint-Cyr au Lycée Dumont d’Urville de Toulon et intègre en 1970 l’Ecole Militaire Spéciale de Saint-Cyr où il appartient à la Promotion «général de Gaulle» 1970-1972.Officier de l’Arme Blindée Cavalerie, après le Cours de perfectionnement des officiers subalternes qu’il suit à l’Ecole d’application de l’arme blindée cavalerie de Saumur en 1979, il commande une unité élémentaire de son arme à Tambacounda de 1980 à 1981, puis un bataillon à Thiès à deux reprises de 1984 à 1986 et de 1991 à 1993 à son retour de la Guerre du Golfe. Il est enfin le premier Commandant de la Zone Militaire de Kolda mise sur pied en 1997, poste qu’il quitte en 2000 pour les fonctions de Chef d’Etat-Major Général des Armées.Outre les séjours que voilà dans les Forces, le général GAYE diplômé de l’Ecole d’Etat-Major de Compiègne et breveté de l’Ecole Supérieure de Guerre française (100ème Promotion) a servi en état-major tour à tour comme Chef de division (1988-1990), Directeur de l’Information et des relations Publiques des Armées (1993-1994) et enfin Directeur de la Documentation et de la Sécurité Extérieure (1994-1997).Le général GAYE a participé à plusieurs opérations à l’extérieur notamment dans le cadre des Nations unies : FUNU/SINAI 1974-1975, FINUL/LIBAN 1980-1981 et TEMPETE DU DESERT 1990-1991 où il commande le bataillon sénégalais. Il a par ailleurs pris part en 1981 à l’opération Fodé KABA II en Gambie, et a séjourné à plusieurs reprises en Casamance.Promu général de brigade le 1er avril 2000 et nommé Chef d’Etat-Major Général des Armées le 1er mai 2000, le général GAYE occupera cette fonction jusqu’au 19 août 2003.Au moment de sa nomination à la tête des forces de la MONUC par le secrétaire général des Nations Unies, le Général Babacar GAYE était ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de la République du Sénégal en Allemagne, en Autriche et auprès des organes des Nations Unies de Vienne.Marié et père de deux (02) enfants, le général GAYE est titulaire de plusieurs décorations nationales et étrangères.

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AMBASSADOR FELIX MOSHA is the Executive Director, African Dialogue Center Tanzania. Formerly, Representative in Africa o the UN Commission; Chief Preventive Diplomacy and conflict Resolution UNIT. UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA); Deputy Director Africa 11 Division, UNDPA, Aide and Advisor to general Olusegun Obasanjo and Executive Director, Africa leadership forum; UN Advisor to the late Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere on the Burundi Peace Negotiations, and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia. DR. FUNMI OLONISAKIN is the Director of the Conflict, Security, and Development Group at King’s College, London. She previously served in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. She has been a MacArthur Foundation post-doctoral fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College, and worked as a research associate at the Institute for Strategic Studies, in Pretoria. Her work on regional security in Africa includes, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations (2000) and Peacekeepers, Politicians, and Warlords: The Liberian Peace Process (1999), co-edited with Abiodun Alao and John Mackinlay. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL DANIEL OPANDE from Kenya, Force Commander of United Nations Missions in Liberia. In a letter dated 29 September, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his intention to appoint Lieutenant-General Daniel Ishmael Opande of Kenya as Force Commander of the newly established United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Born on 18 August 1943, Lieutenant-General Opande is a graduate of the British Army Cadet School (Sandhurst), where he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in 1964. He has served as Commandant of the National Defence College, Kenya's highest military institution. General Opande is also a graduate of the British Army Staff College and the United States National Defense University. General Opande served as Deputy Force Commander with the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) from 1989 to 1990. He represented Kenya in the Mozambican peace process as a facilitator and negotiator between the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and the Government of Mozambique from 1990 to 1993, and served as Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) from 1993 to 1995. Since November 2000, he has served with distinction as Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). DR. ISMAIL RASHID is associate professor of history and Africana studies as Vassar College and the director of the Africana Studies Program. His primary research and teaching interests are slave and peasant resistance, Pan-Africanism and social conflicts in contemporary Africa. He has published a number of articles on these topics. His recent publications include West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region (2004), co-edited with Adekeye Adebajo; "Escape, Revolt and Marronage in 18th and 19th Century Sierra Leone Hinterland," in Canadian Journal of African Studies (2000); and "Subaltern Reactions: Lumpens, Students and the Left," in Africa Development (1997).