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Developing board strategic capability in sport organisations:The
nationalregional governing relationship
Lesley Ferkins *, David Shilbury
Sport Management Program, School of Management & Marketing,
Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood, Victoria 3125,
Australia
1. Introduction
Thosewho lead sport are facing increasing scrutinywhich has
inevitably resulted in questions of governance practice.
Thetransition of many sports from predominantly volunteer
administered organisations anchored in an amateur ethos,
toprofessionally managed entities catering to a more sophisticated
market place has created unique challenges for thegovernance of
sport (Cuskelly, Taylor, Hoye, & Darcy, 2006; Schulz &
Auld, 2006; Shilbury, 2001). The question remains,however, as to
the options available to national sport organisations for
identifying suitable structures and processes ofgovernance that
combine the essence of good business practice within the leisure
framework in which sportingorganisations operate.
Hoye and Cuskelly (2007) noted . . . there is no universally
agreed denition of sport governance (p. 9). They drew ondenitions
cited by Sport and Recreation New Zealand (2006) and the Australian
Sports Commission (2005) to dene sportgovernance in noting that it
involves concepts of direction, control and regulation. Explicit
denitions offered by authors arealso limited and the terms board
and governance are often used interchangeably. In the corporate
setting, Tricker (1984)captured a meaning of governance which has
remained relevant for todays environment observing that it involves
thecreation, use and limitation of powers to direct, control and
regulate activitieswithin an organisation. In essence, governanceis
the responsibility for the functioning and overall direction of the
organisation and is a necessary and institutionalisedcomponent of
all sporting codes from club level to national bodies, government
agencies, sport service organisations andprofessional teams around
the world (Kikulis, 2000).
Sport Management Review 13 (2010) 235254
A R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 2 May 2009
Received in revised form 12 November 2009
Accepted 20 January 2010
Keywords:
Sport
Board processes
Governance
Inter-organisational relationships
Power-sharing
Board strategic capability
Action research
A B S T R A C T
It is well established that the strategic function is a central
role of the non-prot sport
board. Little is known, however, about board strategic
capability in any context. This study
investigated how boards of national sport organisations might
develop their strategic
capability. Interpretive action research focusing on the case of
Tennis New Zealand
(TNZ) found that the boards strategic role is signicantly
impacted by its inter-
organisational relationships. In particular, the boards ability
to enact its strategic
priorities could be enhanced by creating amore collaborative
partnership with its regional
entities and engaging in a power-sharing approach that seeks to
develop regional
capability.
2010 Sport Management Association of Australia and New Zealand.
Published byElsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 3 925 17407; fax: +61 3 925
17083.
E-mail address: [email protected] (L. Ferkins).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Sport Management Review
journa l homepage: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /smr
1441-3523/$ see front matter 2010 Sport Management Association
of Australia and New Zealand. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.doi:10.1016/j.smr.2010.01.009
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This present study seeks to advance our understanding of
governance by investigating how boards of NSOs can developtheir
strategic capability. The strategic role of the board, while
recognised as a key function, is a fuzzy concept for many. vander
Walt and Ingley (2003) found that . . . little empirical or
theoretical research has been conducted on the boards role
instrategic decisions and strategic outcomes (p. 17). Stiles (2001)
agreed, stating that, Unpacking this concept is . . . rare inthe
empirical literature (p. 629). While this study targets the specic
board grouping, it also encompasses aspects that areseen to impact
directly on the boards ability to be strategic. The broader
governance system such as the structure of thesport, member
organisations, people and processes were therefore part of this
investigation. Henry and Lee (2004) made thedistinction between
thework of the board in sport organisations, which they term
corporate governance, and the interactionof organisations and
groups working across the sport as systemic governance. In both
instances, there are obvious gaps inthe body of empirical knowledge
on the governance of sport, as it applies to board strategic
capability by virtue of thisemerging discipline and the small
volume of active researchers in the eld (Ferkins, Shilbury, &
McDonald, 2005; Ferkins,Shilbury, & McDonald, 2009). This lack
of academic interest is not necessarily reective of the
intensifying interest frompractitioners.
National sport organisations (NSOs) in New Zealand were chosen
as the population for this study. The nature and form ofNSOs have
been well developed in sport organisation theory (Babiak, 2007;
Inglis, 1997a, 1997b; Kikulis, Slack, & Hinings,1995; OBrien
& Slack, 2003). NSOs are the national representatives of their
sport. These organisations are responsible formaintaining the rules
and organisation of a particular sporting code and have
traditionally worked with state, regionalassociations and clubs of
the same code to deliver services to their members. NSOs in New
Zealand have evolved, like theirAustralian and Canadian
counterparts, from small and independent member-based associations
with volunteer executivesto organisations with paid staff and
administrative ofces. While the role of an NSO has come to
encompass the governanceof the sporting code at all levels, there
exists within that jurisdiction, multiple separate legal entities
(i.e., national, state/region, club/local). Each entity is most
typically an incorporated organisation and has its own constitution
and governingcommittee. This together yet separate structure has
created a tension in the way these entities have interfaced in
thedelivery of sporting opportunities (Sport & Recreation New
Zealand, 2006). As is demonstrated by this study, this has provedto
be a major stumbling block in the national boards ability to enact
its strategic priorities.
In order to best address the research question and to enable the
research process to directly benet the participating sportbody,
action research was used as the research method. This highly
collaborative approach to research (where the researchsubjects
become research partners) is designed to create change and to
provide rich empirical data fromwhich new andimproved methods of
governance practice are promoted. The use of action research in
this setting is rare, but has thepotential to facilitate a deep
level of understanding found to be missing in governance research
to date (Leblanc, 2004;Parker, 2008).
The action research programme developed in collaboration with
Tennis New Zealand, as reported in this paper, drew onrelevant
theories to inform the intervention as it unfolded. Relevant
theories included stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984),resource
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and supporting
theoretical constructs including inter-organisationalrelationships
(Thibault & Harvey, 1997), aspects of board power (Pettigrew
&McNulty, 1995), and board strategic capability(van derWalt
& Ingley, 2003). Although these theories emerged during the
action research programme, they are introducedin the rst half of
this paper to provide context for the ensuing results and
discussion presented in the second half of thispaper. The second
half of the paper describes the action research approach used and
specically the four phases of theresearch programme. Each phase is
then used to tell the story that emerged from the intervention
designed incollaboration with Tennis New Zealand.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Stakeholder and resource dependence theory
The tenets of stakeholder theory are considered central to the
strategic management of organisations encompassinggovernance and
board strategic function (Freeman, 1984; Laplume, Sonpar, &
Litz, 2008; Stoney, 2001). Proponents ofstakeholder theory argue
that organisations need to take into account the range of
individuals and groups affected by thework of the organisation
(Stoney, 2001). Sternberg (1997) distinguished between the original
meaning of the concept,claimed to be rst used in the 1960s, and the
contemporary meaning, in stating: Originally, stakeholders were
identied asthose without whom an organisation could not survive,
those in whom the organisation had a stake. Now, in
contrast,stakeholders are more commonly identied as those who have
a stake in an organisation (p. 3).
There is much debate however, regarding the extent to which
boards should be representative of their stakeholders(Donaldson
& Preston, 1995; Stoney, 2001; Sternberg, 1997). In the
corporate context, Sternberg (1997) argued there is littleplace for
such a philosophy. Stakeholder theory is indeed intrinsically
incompatible with all substantive objectives, andundermines both
private property and accountability (p. 3). In contrast, Stoney
(2001) considered stakeholder theory to berelevant for corporate
and non-prot organisations alike in claiming . . . from blue chip
companies to the Royal Society ofArts (RSA) the stakeholder concept
is being embraced and actively promoted as an inclusive philosophy
and framework forsustainable development (p. 604). The issue of
stakeholder representation and the extent towhich the board
assimilates theviews of individuals and groups affected by the work
of the organisation arose during the course of this action
researchproject and, as later discussed, helped explain and
untangle events as they unfolded.
L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010)
235254236
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Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) is
considered by some to be the dominant theoretical approachused to
guide research efforts focused on non-prot boards of directors
(Brown, 2005; Miller-Millesen, 2003). The theory isfounded on the
notion that organisations are open systems and do not operate in a
vacuum, rather, they rely on otherorganisations for resources and
must adapt to changing external circumstances (Scott, 2003).
Indeed, Pfeffer and Salancik(1978) argued that the ability to
acquire and maintain resources is essential to organisational
survival. In relation to thegovernance of non-prot organisations,
Cornforth (2003) asserted that organisations enter into
inter-organisationalrelationships (IORs) in order to obtain the
resources and information they need for their ongoing development.
Cornforthalso considered that . . . the main function of the board
. . . is to maintain good relations with key external stakeholders
inorder to ensure the ow of resources (p. 8). For the present
research, resource dependency theory highlighted the
boardsboundary-spanning responsibility and offered insight into
ways in which board power and inuence had the capacity toaffect
inter-organisational relationships.
2.2. Inter-organisational relationships
Governance authors in a generic sense do notmake the connection
between inter-organisational relationships (IORs) andboard
strategic capability (e.g., Brown, 2005; Cornforth, 2003; Stiles,
2001). Scholars writing about the governance of sporthave more to
say about the signicance of IORs and their impact on the governance
function (e.g., Mitchell, Crosset, & Barr,1999). Hoye and
Cuskelly (2007) in particular make the connection between IORs and
the execution of the governancefunction for national sport
organisations. However, they also noted Federated networks within
non-prot sport have notbeen studied extensively and Studies of
federated networks and IORs within the wider non-prot sector are
also limited(p. 52). In particular, these studies, do not
specically link national and regional sport organisation
relationship issues to theboards ability to function strategically
and as such perhaps miss the opportunity to inform the governing
relationshipsbetween national and regional sporting bodies.
An increasing number of studies are emerging that consider why
sport organisations enter into partnership relationshipsacross
non-prot, government, and private sectors (Babiak & Thibault,
2009; Shaw&Allen, 2006). Babiak (2007) claimed thatin order to
deal with changing environmental factors the practice of
collaborating, coordinating, developing partnerships,and
co-operation between organisations, have become central principles
for the strategic management of organisations. Ininvestigating IORs
within the sport setting, she dened the concept as, A voluntary,
close, long term, planned strategicaction between two or more
organisations with the objective of serving mutually benecial
purposes in a problem domain(p. 339). This denition had relevance
for the present study and the connections made between the
governing role of TennisNew Zealand and the governing relationship
with its regional entities.
2.3. Board power
Power has been used as a construct to explain the relationship
between senior professional staff (executive) and theboard in
non-prot and sport settings (Hoye, 2006). It has also been used to
understand the level of inuence exerted bychairmen and
non-executive directors in the corporate setting (Pettigrew &
McNulty, 1995, 1998). In considering howboard members shape the
content and process of corporate strategy (among other aspects),
Pettigrew and McNulty(1995) designed the tripartite model of power
and inuence. Using this model (see Fig. 1) in a governance study of
thetop 50 United Kingdom nancial institutions, Pettigrew and
McNulty found that the power and inuence of boardmembers . . . is
shaped by the simultaneous and interactive effects of a set of
structural and contextual factors,positions and skill in mobilizing
a constellation of power sources and skill and will in converting
potential power intoactual inuence (p. 845).
Fig. 1. The tripartite analysis of power and inuence. Source:
Pettigrew & McNulty (1995, p. 845).
L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010)
235254 237
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In translating this model into a sport organisation context,
there is much evidence to suggest that changing structuralaspects
such as board composition, voting and selection, altered, in large
part, by changing contextual forces, such as howbureaucratisation
and professionalisation have impacted on the strategic role of the
board (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2003; Shilbury,2001). Countering this,
there is a small body of work around institutionalisation of sport
organisations which suggests thatconservative forces such as
history and tradition have slowed the change process (Kikulis,
2000; Kikulis et al., 1995). Kikulisstated that In NSOs . . . the
volunteer board is a deep structure and core practice that
demonstrates traditionality (2000, p.308). In relation to the
present study, this aspect of the model raised issues relating to
structural and contextual factors andtheir inuence on the strategic
functioning of the Tennis New Zealand board.
The second part of the model, that explored the sources of power
available to board members of sport organisations,probes aspects
such as legitimate power sources, the situational nature of power
and stakeholder representation. Theseaspects are all potentially
important sources of power for boards ofmember benet organisations
(Hoye & Cuskelly, 2003). Auseful extension of the Hoye and
Cuskelly (2003) study, which considered aspects of board
performance and patterns ofpower, would be to consider how power
sources (or lack of) impact on the boards strategic capability.
The nal part of the Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) model is the
will and skill of individual members. At board levelswhere
personalities may be large and individuals can be selected for
personal qualities, then willingness to intervene andskill in
matching behavior to the requirements of the situation can all be
fateful for inuence and impact (p. 853). Again,there is much
empirical evidence to suggest that the strategic capability of a
sport board is directly affected by the ability ofindividual
members (Hoye & Auld, 2001; Shilbury, 2001). In a national
sport organisation setting, an exploration of how thewill and skill
of individual board members might impact on the boards overall
ability to think and act strategically is, as yet,undeveloped.
An important feature of themodel is its emphasis on the
relationship between the three aspects. The reality of power
andinuence in and around the boardroom requires the simultaneous,
dynamic, and complementary analysis of context, andwill and skill
in creating and using a constellation of power sources (p. 853).
Pettigrew and McNulty (1995, 1998) arguedthat each aspect changes
and inuences the other. Conceptualising the strategic capability of
the board in terms of this three-part holistic model of power and
inuence offered both a theoretically sound and empirically valid
way of understandingwhat both enables and constrains board member
strategic contribution.
2.4. Board strategic capability
In one of the few studies focusing on the boards strategic role
in the non-prot setting, Edwards and Cornforth (2003)identied two
primary problems in explaining board strategic contribution. The
rst is the blurring of the boundary betweenoperational detail and
strategic focus. The boards . . . understanding of strategic issues
may come from exposure tooperational detail . . . (p. 78). In
essence, they argued that operational detailmay be a necessary
element of strategic decisionmaking. The second concern noted by
Edwards and Cornforth (2003) is the distinction between policy and
strategy. Theyemphasised that strategy relates to how organisations
position themselves competitively, while policy is . . . about
givingsubstance to collective values (p. 78). They considered that
the boundary has become blurred in practice within the publicand
non-prot setting and that . . . the discourse of strategy has
become predominant (p. 79). In summary, the authorsconsidered that
strategic contribution is a contested term: how boards interpret it
depends on perceptions about the verypurpose of quasi-autonomous
public and non-prot organisations (p. 79). For the purposes of
their research theyarticulated strategic contribution as board . .
. assessment of the organisations overall resource and capability
strengths andweaknesses, their relative performance and their
options and priorities for future development . . . (p. 79).
Work in the non-prot arena has also advanced support for the
widely held assumption that a focus on strategicorganisational
development will enhance organisation effectiveness (Brown, 2005).
Indeed, the Carver model, althoughcriticised for its arbitrary
distinctions between the role of paid staff and board members
(Leland, 1999), strongly advocatesfor board members to focus their
energies on strategic activities such as policy development. Work
by Inglis and Weaver(2000) on prioritising strategic activities on
the board agenda provided an insight into how particular actions
can inuencethe level of strategic contribution by the board.
Moreover, Hoye and Inglis (2003) presented an overview of
non-protgovernance models and considered how these models could be
adapted for the context of leisure organisations. In doing so,they
noted the association between governance models, organisation
effectiveness and strategic expectations. More studiesof this kind
are needed in order to increase the empirical knowledge-base around
how to build strategic capability.
In the for-prot setting, again there are few studies that have
specically investigated the strategic function of the
board.Although there is much support in the scholarly literature
for a focus on strategic contribution as a central function of
theboard, it remains under-researched (Heracleous, 2001; Leblanc,
2004; Lorsch & Clark, 2008; Nadler, 2004; van der Walt
&Ingley, 2003). Heracleous (2001) argued that accepted best
practice in corporate governance has failed to nd a
convincingrelationship between best practice and organisation
performance. In doing do, he draws attention to . . . the need for
anexplicit focus on the strategic role of the board of directors,
by scholars, practitioners, and regulators, if
meaningfulrelationships between corporate governance and
organization performance are to be established (p. 165).
Furthermore,there are an increasing number of studies that have
identied a lack of strategic involvement on behalf of the board
(Ingley &Van der Walt, 2001; Kerr &Werther, 2008;
Siciliano, 2008; Stiles, 2001). Stiles (2001), for example, found
that boards in thefor-prot setting fail to realise their potential
in the strategic decision making process. While the size, resource
imperativesand purpose for existence of sport organisations may
differ, the central arguments found in the for-prot governance
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235254238
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literature are universal. That is, there is concern about the
intensity of investigation and the latent role of the
board,regarding its responsibility for strategic development.
In laying out this theoretical background, helpful questions
become evident for the governance of sport organisations.What do we
know about the strategic contribution of the board in sport
organisations? What might be preventing sportboards from realising
their potential in strategic decisionmaking?Withmuch evidence to
suggest there needs to be a greaterstrategic focus, the present
study concentrated on one primary research question: how can boards
of national sportorganisations develop their strategic
capability?
3. Method
In summarising the method used for the study, this section rst
introduces the research paradigm, explains the actionresearch
method and provides a rationale for the approach chosen. It then
justies the choice of research sites, theparticipants involved and
the techniques used to generate and analyse data. Research validity
is also addressed.
3.1. Research paradigm and action research method
This study was undertaken within the framework of an
interpretive research paradigm (Guba, 1990). The paradigmstresses
the constructed and evolving nature of social reality and seeks to
understand social reality through the eyes of thosebeing studied
(Devine&Heath, 1999). There are few studies that have utilised
the interpretive paradigm to study governancein any setting
(corporate, non-prot or sport). Indeed the advancement of dominant
theories of corporate governance hasbeen driven by quantitative and
positivistic approaches (Heracleous, 2001; Leblanc, 2004). McNulty
and Pettigrew (1999)noted there ismuch known about board structure
and composition in a quantitative sense andmuch less known about
boardprocess and behaviour. Behaviour in UK boardrooms is not
nearly as transparent as the structure and composition of UKboards
(p. 47). There is still less understood about the behaviour of
boards where knowledge has been constructed from aqualitative and
interpretive paradigm.
Most often aligned with the interpretative paradigm and
qualitative methods, the term action research creates
theexpectation that those involved will be researching a particular
situation with the intention of taking action that will make
adifference. Signicantly, for this study, action research sought to
combine practical transformation (Huxham & Vangen,2003, p. 384)
and the advancement of knowledge. The basic premise of action
research is that change and research are notmutually exclusive,
that is, a simultaneous focus on improving practice and developing
theory is possible (Coghlan &Brannick, 2001). The work of Heron
and Reason (2001), Cardno (2003) and Coghlan and Brannick (2001)
framed the actionresearch approach adopted for this study, chosen
for the potential to create positive change and advancement for
sportorganisations.
3.2. Research sites and participants
In selecting a research site, Stake (2003) argued that the
primary basis for selection should be the potential to learn
aboutthe phenomena. Purposeful samplingwas therefore used to select
a case organisation that would rst and foremost offer
theopportunity to learn about board strategic capability within the
sport setting. Seven NSO research sites were deliberatelyselected
by the researchers whose criteria also encompassed a willingness
and ability to engage with the action researchprocess, logistical
considerations (e.g., proximity and access), and high experience
levels of the phenomena under study(Pettigrew, 1990; Reason &
Bradbury, 2001). The selected research sites were also considered
case studies. Merriam (2002)noted that a qualitative case study is
a holistic and intensive analysis of a social unit, single
instance, or phenomenon. Use ofthe case study approach assisted the
researchers to understand the specic organisation context including
the factors thatmight be impacting on the boards ability to develop
its strategic capability.
Three case study organisations were selected from a list of
seven possible sites. This paper reports on the experience ofone
NSO case study, Tennis New Zealand (TNZ).While the researchers were
known to personnel within TNZ through generalnetworks, they did not
hold any insider position within the organisation. Discussion was
therefore rst initiated with theCEO and thereafter the primary
research participants consisted of the CEO, seven board members
including the chairpersonand an additional three members of a board
sub-committee. The eldwork component of the study spanned 18
months,beginning in July 2005 and concluding in January 2007.
3.3. Data generation and analysis: action research phases
The data generation and analysis process was guided by amodel
specically developed for the present study and derivedfrom an
amalgam of previous action research conceptualisations (Cardno,
2003; Coghlan & Brannick, 2001; Heron & Reason,2001). As
presented in Fig. 2, four main phases were used for the study.
Within these phases, a range of data generation andanalysis
techniqueswere employed, namely, document analysis, participant
observation, focus groups, interviews,
reectivejournalingmemorandums, theming, writing andmember checking.
The lead researcher also acted as facilitator in numerousboard
meeting settings, drawing out data, testing and reecting on
conclusions with research participants. All boardmeetings, focus
groups and interviewswere video or audio taped, producing 20 tapes,
comprising over 1200 hours of data for
L. Ferkins, D. Shilbury / Sport Management Review 13 (2010)
235254 239
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the TNZ case study. For the purposes of this paper, quotations
used from the TNZ case data have been coded as 3, denotingTNZ board
members and 4 denoting the board sub-committee, followed by the
letters ranging am. This allows data tobe cross-referenced back to
individual participants, and demonstrates diligence in the data
generation and analysis process.
The rst action research phase, Context Analysis, involved
reconnaissance work where background data on theorganisation and
its environment was collected. This involved both interviews and
document analysis. Phase two, IssueIdentication, concentrated on
exploring a focal area for the study. This was done in
collaboration with the researchers andthe research participants. A
broad question, derived from a gap in the literature, and informal
discussion with boardmembers and other governance practitioners was
established by the researchers. This was used as the starting point
forcollaboration in each of the phases and guided the subsequent
interventions. Phase three, Intervention and Action,encompassed a
collaborative approach (between researchers and participants) to
designing an intervention that would helpdevelop board strategic
capability. In this phase, the planned strategies were put into
action and were subject to purposefulmonitoring and reection to
inform further action. As portrayed in Fig. 2, a second action step
was also undertaken as part ofthis phase. Phase four, Evaluation of
Intervention and Action, involved the researchers and participants
critically reectingon the outcomes of the planned action in
relation to the research question. Exploring change and learning
was a centralcomponent of this phase.
The action research model developed for and employed by the
present study also integrated the notion of meta learning(Coghlan
& Brannick, 2001). This involved the inclusion of mini-cycles
placed around the outside of the square to promotea strategic view
of the cycles and phases that were undertaken (see Fig. 2). This
strategic view promoted simultaneousconsideration of content (what
was happening); process (how it was happening); and premise (why it
was happening). AsCoghlan and Brannick noted, it is the dynamic of
these learning phases that . . . enables action research to be more
thaneveryday problem solving (p. 19). In essence, it is . . .
learning about learning, in other words meta learning (p. 19).
3.4. Research validity
Validity of the action research processwas achieved on a number
of different levels. Specically, the research participantsregularly
checked conclusions and written summaries to verify the ndings
(Tolich & Davidson, 1999). This also involvedchecking that the
goals of the research were being met as well as verifying that data
recorded, matched participant reality
Fig. 2. Action research model for developing strategic
capability.
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235254240
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(Coghlan & Brannick, 2001). Triangulation was also used to
protect the validity of the study (McTaggart, 1998). As well
asmultiplemethods of data collection, information frommultiple
sources was also gathered in order to generate layers of data.Such
sources included ofcial documents (e.g., strategic plans, internal
reports, annual reports, board minutes), paid full-time CEOs, and
volunteer board members and co-opted sub-committee members. This
information was used to analyseconsistencies and inconsistencies in
establishing a representation of critical events.
In addition to considering research validity, it is useful to
briey note the inherent limitations of using an action
researchmethod to address the research question. In order to
achieve change and formalised knowledge development, actionresearch
is by nature a highly complex and contextualised research method
(Coghlan & Brannick, 2001). This study was noexception. A
challenge of this particular study was therefore the numerous
distractions from the central question and thechallenge in merging
the agendas of the researcher and research participants. More
denitive and generalised outcomescould have been derived had a
different method been used. A rich insight into the complexities in
enacting what wasconsidered to be good practice was the pay-off
achieved via this method.
4. Results and discussion
This section presents a summary ofwhat occurred during each
phase of the action research process aswell as highlightinginsights
discovered and changes that occurred for TNZ. Relevant literature
is integrated into the discussion and tentativeconclusions are
established in relation to board strategic capability.
4.1. Phase one and two: Context Analysis and Issue
Identication
The reconnaissancework for TNZ spanned fourmonths from July to
October 2005 and consisted ofmeetingswith the CEO,members of the
board sub-committee (Maiden Committee) board advisors, and board
members. The researchers rstMaiden Committee meeting (18 October,
2005) also formed part of the reconnaissance phase. In addition, a
review of TNZdocuments was undertaken to establish the environment
within which the study would take place. This reconnaissancework
canvassed background information on the organisation, board
function and a proposal to re-design the governancestructure of the
sport.
At the time the eldwork commenced therewere seven staffmembers
including the CEOworking for Tennis NewZealand(TNZ). In terms of
playing numbers, there were approximately 43,792 registered tennis
players, 477 afliated clubs, 66unafliated clubs, 25 regional
associations, 28 sub-associations and six special interest afliates
such as the veteransassociation, and the International Tennis Club
of New Zealand. Of concern for the organisation were estimates
ofparticipation gures showing a much higher number of people
participating than registered as members. The Sport andRecreation
New Zealand (2005) survey conducted for the period 20002001
determined there were 317,900 adults takingpart in tennis, the
second highest individual adult participation sport in New Zealand
behind golf.
In terms of high performance, New Zealand tennis players have
produced mixed results at the international level with asmall
number of players achieving top 20 world rankings. Since the
mid-1990s, (and to the time of this research)international
performance has waned, however, with players competing overseas
struggling to make the top 100 in worldrankings. Financially, TNZs
turnover was more than $1,400,000. While its reserves position was
sound, the organisationrecorded a decit over the previous four
years (20022005) ranging between $70,481 in 2005 and $410,026 in
2006.
During the time of the research project, the board comprised
sixmales over 40 years of age and one female in hermid-30s.There
was a mix of lawyers and business people and six of the seven
members of the current board had been together sinceMay 2004. As
stipulated by the constitution, the term of ofce was a maximum of
three years at which time the incumbentmust retire and be
re-elected if they wished to continue. Board members were also
restricted from holding ofce as anelected regional or afliated
association member or from being a staff member. This governance
structure replaced a 10-member board of management, voted out at
the October 1999 AGM. In an early interviewwith the CEO he noted
that he wasnot sure the previous management committee . . . fully
realised the implications of such a change (personalcommunication,
12 July, 2005). In particular, there was concern that the board, in
effect, was 100% appointed and heindicated that the regions felt a
certain disconnection between the national board and regional
perspectives as aconsequence.
The CEO involved in this studywas appointed in January 2004 as
part of amove to becomemore strategically focused. As aboard member
for TNZ prior to his appointment, the CEO played a major part in
preparing the strategic plan spanning theperiod 20042007. The CEO
was previously a company director for a large New Zealand exporter.
He had been involved intennis most of his life and was in his late
50s at the time of this research.
A health check on the state of tennis in New Zealand, carried
out by TNZ revealed concerning trends in participation,Most areas
are experiencing the same problems of declining senior numbers,
resulting in diminishing interclubcompetitions, declining volunteer
numbers, crippling nancial losses and a lack of funds to carry out
basic maintenancerequirements (Tennis New Zealand, 2004a, p. 3).
According to Sport and Recreation New Zealand (2005) statistics
thenumber of registered tennis players in 1985 was 63,500,
declining to 54,000 in 1990 and further declining to present
levels.The health-check report also noted that 70% of clubs have
fewer than 100 members. This health-check report alongside anumber
of previous internal reports about the state of tennis in New
Zealand provided the catalyst for the board to initiateaction
around major structural change. In particular, the CEO noted in a
presentation to the international club in 2004 that
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the current structure of theNSO composed of 25 associations is
convoluted and unnecessarily complex. Tennis NewZealandis hamstrung
by associations and associations are the same. There is little
convergence or alignment of goals (Tennis NewZealand, 2004a, p. 4).
Signicantly, the CEO also noted the sport in its current form is
ungovernable.
At the AGM on 23 July, 2005 a motion proposed by the board to
restructure TNZ in the form of a regional model (that is,reduce the
number of associations, currently numbering 25), was carried. It
was also agreed that the board establish acommittee to undertake
further consultation on the specic nature of an appropriate
regional model and to formulatedetailed recommendations to the
board of TNZ (Tennis New Zealand, 2005a). The committee chaired by
Sir Colin Maidencame to be known as theMaiden Committee. Sir Colin
had previously been Vice Chancellor of the University of Auckland
andwas a commercial director and member of the International Tennis
Club of New Zealand. The committee also comprisedseven other
members including two TNZ boardmembers, four nominees from the
regional associations and one high proleformer player.
Additionally, the committee had the powers to recruit independent
appointees to add expertise andknowledge.
While the current governance structure of tennis in New Zealand
appeared to be the primary issue for the national board interms of
its strategic capability, the individual interviews with board
members revealed additional insights into the boardsperception of
its strategic function. These perceptions included the composition
of the national board and the emphasis on askills-basedboard as
distinct fromregional representation.One boardmember conceded that,
Down the road, the governancestructure (of the national board) may
need to change (3a, 31 August, 2005). Another noted . . . the
skills based board throwsopen the composition issueof
representationversus appointed (3f, 1 September, 2005). This
issuewas tobecomean importantaspect of the overall change
process.
When the researchers approached TNZ, the organisation was
already engaged in a major change process. The boardsdesire to
transform the relationship with the regional associations was the
major item on its agenda. Although heavilyengaged in this change
process, throughout the CEOwas very open andprepared to support the
research bymaking himselfavailable as requested. After ve
meetings/contact with TNZ personnel, the developing picture for the
researcher was oneof a sport grappling with a decline in on-court
performance, participation and national inuence with its
regionalstakeholders.
In the researchers opinion (drawn from the reconnaissance phase
including individual interviews, 18 August1September, 2005), board
personnel appeared to be highly capable, concerned for thewellbeing
and future of the organisationand skilled in governance processes
and practices. The organisation had undergone a Sport and
Recreation New Zealand (thegovernment agency for sport and
recreation also known as SPARC) capability review and had recently
implemented anumber of actions to further improve governance
processes. The interviews indicated that board members were
committedto a change in the regional relationship and in the words
of one board member: If TNZ can get to the stage where there is
aframework where TNZ can assume responsibility for the sport, then
weve done our job (3g, 1 September, 2005). Anotherpriority for
several board members was a re-design and regional roll-out of the
high performance programme potentiallythreatened by the current
regional structure.
4.2. The emerging issue for Tennis New Zealand
After careful consideration of the internal reports and
theMaiden Committee terms of reference, the researchers decidedthat
involvement in this process would contribute to seeking answers to
the research question. Data collected thus farindicated to the
researchers that the national boardwas struggling to enact its
strategic priorities because of the nature of therelationship with
its regional entities. Currently, there is no vehicle for TNZ to do
this to create a high performancepathway (3c, 30 August, 2005). It
appeared that structural change was part of the strategy to redene
the nationalregionalrelationship and allow greater governance of
the sport from a national perspective. Another board member stated
that TNZhas to achieve an effective merger of regional interests .
. . Quite how it will manifest itself is uncertain (3b, 1
September,2005).
A previous internal report found that Tennis in New Zealand is
ungovernable because it has been demonstrably unableto confront a
raft of inter-related problems already identied. The response to
successive reports over 12 years, all calling forsignicant change,
has been ineffectual (Tennis New Zealand, 2004b, p. 6). In
particular, the report goes on to state that Theambiguity about the
relationship between Tennis NZ and major associations also means
there is no agreed agenda for thesport. The duplication inherent in
25 associations is a confusing and possiblywasteful use of
resources (p. 7). In otherwords,the ability of the TNZ board to
strategically lead the sport appears to be hamstrung by the current
regional governingstructure. Working with TNZ to assist in
effecting structural change and tracking the results of this
process so thatgovernance theory can be advanced, therefore, became
a key aim for the researchers.
In framing the issue, which would lead to action designed to
develop strategic capability, the researchers acknowledgedthe
following conditions: the national board appeared to have personnel
who were strategic thinkers and had a soundunderstanding of the
sport and its environmental inuences, the board had been involved
in designing and articulating itsstrategic priorities and the
processes that encouraged a strategic focus appeared to be in place
during board meetings. Theissue arose in the enacting of TNZs
strategic priorities through its regional network. In the opinion
of the TNZ board andmanagement, this was caused by an unwieldy
regional structure, too many regional entities and within some
regionalassociations, an imbalance in power and inuence that meant
the national body was hamstrung in its desire to directnational
initiatives.
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For the purposes of this research the issue that emerged within
the TNZ case study was therefore articulated as: anational sport
organisation in decline seeking to rejuvenate by further
centralising its functions, and by shifting thebalance of power in
favour of greater national inuence in the governing of the sport.
The strategy to enable this was achange in regional structure and
reduction of the number of regional entities. This articulation of
the issue was checkedwith board members and the CEO prior to the
researchers presenting at a conference in early 2006. It was also
formallyveried by the participants during the evaluation phase,
with one respondent stating: Yes I agree. The key issue is
aroundbeing more strategically focused and having the right
delivery mechanisms. This interviewee further stated that I
couldsee straight away there was a dysfunctional structure/delivery
mechanism . . . and that they would have to change thestructure and
business model to allow delivery of the strategy (4c, 9 November,
2006). The next stage of the actionresearch process was to work
with the Maiden Committee to assist them in determining the nature
of the new regionalmodel and nationalregional relationship.
4.3. Phase three: Research Intervention and Action
The intervention and action phase spanned a 10-month period
between November 2005 and August 2006. This involvedmultiple
iterations to maximise learning generated, and to strengthen the
validity of the research process (refer Fig. 2). Theterms
intervention and action have been chosen to represent the
distinction between researcher-led steps (i.e.,intervention) and
participant-led steps (i.e., action). At times, both terms are used
jointly denoting integration betweenresearcher-led intervention and
participant-led action. This is done to clarify researcher and
participant roles and to furtheraid transparency of process and
ultimately research validity.
The theoretical concepts that might explain what was occurring
for TNZ and help direct the intervention and action weretwofold.
The rst was drawn from Pettigrew and McNultys (1995) tripartite
model of power and inuence. This related tothe proposed change in
governing structure for the organisation aspired to by the board in
order to further advance itsstrategic priorities. In the
application of thismodel, the authors encourage consideration
ofmultiple elements: structure andcontext, will and skill, and
power sources, in order for potential power of the board to be
converted into actual inuence.
While this model was designed in relation to the power and
inuence of independent directors (non-executive directors)within
the corporate boardroom, the model also offers insight into the
tennis context. How much would the board rely onstructural change
to exert increased inuence and how much would the behavioural
aspects such as relationship buildingand communication with
regional entities come into play? Would the legitimate power
afforded by the constitution be thesource of the boards power base
or would other sources of power, such as expert or referent power
(i.e., a former highprole player), be utilised? How committedwere
individual boardmembers to the change process in terms of exerting
theirwill and skill? Indeed, would the structural change allow
greater determination by the board of its strategic
priorities?Would other signicant factors, not included in themodel,
emerge from the research process?While some answers began toemerge
during the intervention and action phase, many of these questions
were not answered until the evaluation phase ofthe research
process.
The second theoretical concept was connected to board
composition in relation to issues of constituency representation.At
the time of the researchers involvement, the TNZ board was a fully
appointed board (by an appointments board asspecied in the
constitution) as distinct from an elected system. Comment was made
by board members in early interviewswith the researchers regarding
the issue of regional representation at national board level,
signalling that a change to theappointed model may be required.
There is much debate in the literature regarding the extent to
which boards should berepresentative of their stakeholders
(Sternberg, 1997; Stoney, 2001). Similarly, within the TNZ
situation there were varyingviews regarding the appropriateness of
a representative board for TNZ. The presence of this issue within
TNZ restructuringdeliberations provided an opportunity for the
researcher to expose practitioners to aspects of this theoretical
debate.Similarly, it also presented an opportunity for the
researchers to draw from the empirical evidence to inform the
theoreticalconversation.
4.4. First major intervention and action step: agreement on
regional centres
The research intervention for TNZ emerged from the desire by the
board to expose the Maiden Committee to theexperience of other
sports and theories of practice that might inform decision making.
As explained by one board member. . .we are keen to keep leading
practice in front of theMaiden Committee (3f, 20 December, 2005).
The CEO considered theresearchers role as providing . . . academic
independence (20 December, 2006) to help provide answers to what,
at times,would be a highly political debate. While the research
intervention was a small part in a broader course of change for
tennisin New Zealand, it allowed the researcher to become involved
in the larger process and gain access to data that wouldcontribute
to the overall research question.
It was agreed between researchers and research participants that
a range of case studies detailing the experience of othersports
would be prepared by the researchers. In total, three case studies
detailing changes to regional governing structuresfor Squash New
Zealand, New Zealand Soccer and New Zealand Cricket were prepared.
A matrix comparing the regionalgoverning structures of nine other
sports was also prepared as well as a matrix setting out the
membership categories andvoting systems of seven other national
sport organisations. This information was included in theMaiden
Committee agendapapers for 29 November, 20 December, 2005 and 9
February, 2006 meetings.
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A review of literature on governing models in Australia and New
Zealand sport and other non-prot organisations(Shilbury, Ferkins,
& Sherry, 2004) was also forwarded to committee members. The
researchers worked closely with thecommittee project manager in
determining the type of information required. The project manager
would pose questionssuch as How have other sports managed their new
structures to bring in everyone? What sort of committees and
advisorygroups have they established? How do the new relationships
between the national and regional levels work? (2 December,2005).
In an attempt to address these questions the researchers included a
section within each case study that summarisedthe lessons learnt
for each sport as per their documentation.
In a summary of the rst round of information prepared for the 29
November, 2005 Maiden Committee meeting, theresearchers highlighted
key lessons from other sports as well as conclusions from the
literature regarding governingstructures and change processes
(e.g., Kikulis, 2000; Shilbury et al., 2004; Skinner, Stewart,
& Edwards, 1999). Summarypoints included:
That regional/state delivery structures appeared to be the
number one issue facing NSOs in New Zealand and Australia. For some
sports, it was considered an opportunity to build regional
capability and for others it was considered necessary todismantle
the existing delivery mechanism and to re-build as a centralised
model.
The overall trend was to reduce the number of regional/state
associations. Two NSOs in Australia had changed to a unitary model.
In New Zealand, many NSOs had reduced the number retaining between
6 and 12 regional entities. One NSO had added alayer.
Many had found the implications of change very signicant and in
particular had realised the need to re-orientate the NSOas a
service organisation.
Committee members were attentive to the implications of a
restructure in terms of the additional service role for theNSO. Im
particularly interested in the lessons from soccer where you say
the national body needs to play a proactive role insupporting the
implementation of the federations. This is the greatest weakness to
date, of the federation structure (4f, 29November, 2005).
After the research was discussed and the results of an a survey
of regional associations was tabled, the Maiden
Committeechairperson decided to . . . lead from the chin (29
November, 2005) and present his recommendations regarding a
proposedregionalmodel that could thenbeopen todebateby the
committee. I thinkwehave tomove forward in the interestsof tennis
its a great sport and weve just got to do better. We just cant stay
where we are otherwise we will continue to decline (29November,
2005). The chairperson then distributed a set ofwritten
recommendations that after some amendments fromothercommittee
members became the Maiden Committee recommendations to the TNZ
board. Of the 11 recommendations, thecentral point was to reduce
the number of regional associations from 25 to 6, creating regional
centres.
After a short period of silence in the meeting where it appeared
the reaction was uncertain, there were expressions ofstrong support
for the recommendations from other Maiden Committee members. Of
particular signicance was theendorsement received from members who
were from regional associations and at times had expressed concern
at theproposed restructure. Of the eight voting members, four held
positions within regional associations. One such member wasrst to
respond: I would like to endorse in general terms the proposed
recommendations from the chair . . . There is a clearmessage that
we must consult with our stakeholders and that the role of TNZ must
be clearly dened (4d, 29 November,2005).
A further regional respondent stated: What youve come out with
is certainly xs (regions) views. We do want to seethe number of
regions reduced and we do want to see the role of Tennis New
Zealand claried (4e, 29 November, 2005).Another commented about the
positive nature of the six regional centres because . . . it places
signicant responsibility backon the regions (4c). One of
themembers, who also sat on the TNZ board, stated: I support it. It
goes a long way to achievingwhat we want in terms of national
leadership (4f).
Following some discussion regarding the detail of the
recommendations the chairperson then proposed that . . .
theserecommendations be given to the Tennis New Zealand board and
that they are also sent to the regions along with the resultsof the
survey (29 November, 2005). In response to this anothermember
commented: I need a bit more detail as to how thesmaller regions
might join with the larger regions. I think this should be included
in what we send to the regions (4i). Inconcluding, and further
justifying his choice to promote six regions, the chairperson
stated: I looked at all options includingthe unitary model and
having three regions, and after the survey I decided that the
unitary model is just not on at themoment and probably not
appropriate at the moment.
4.5. Second major action step: constitutional
recommendations
Once a recommendation was agreed by the Maiden Committee to
designate six associations as regional centres, the nextstep was to
agree on draft constitutions that would set the framework for the
proposedmodel. It was intended that both thenational and regional
constitutions would change as a consequence of the change in
governing structure. Two key issuesfrom this action were
particularly relevant for the research project: the decision
regarding the make up of the TNZ board interms of appointed
positions versus elected positions; and the wording regarding
regional autonomy and the regionalcentres.
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The debate as to the composition of the TNZ board was an
intriguing one. The committee members were working from adraft
constitution prepared by a sports lawyer who formed part of the
professional services team for theMaiden Committee.The solicitor
had provided an opinion advising the committee to adopt a hybrid
board with a mix of three elected and veappointed directors. She
noted that some all-appointed boards have trouble understanding the
sport at a practical level andall-elected boards often result in
inadequate skills around the table.
The solicitor also advised that TNZ directors should not be ofce
holders of regional associations in order to reduce thepotential
for conict of interest. The chairperson asked the lead researcher
for her opinion on this in terms of conclusionsfrom the literature.
The researcher agreed that current good practice was a hybrid
board. There was initial agreement on theve appointed; three
elected split but members were not in favour of excluding regional
ofcer holders. Im not so sureabout that I think we need the best
people for the job. It doesnt matter where they come from they
should act in the bestinterests of TNZ (4a, 20 December, 2005). It
was agreed that nominees for the elected positions could hold
regionalpositions. However, a clause was added into the nal
constitution explicitly allowing this provided the rules
regardingconict of interest and duties of the board were noted and
applied.
The second major issue of particular interest for the study was
the debate regarding the powers of TNZ and the desire bysome
regional personnel tomaintain full regional autonomy. This issuewas
raised to varying degrees of intensity throughoutthe Maiden
Committee deliberations but came to a head at the 9 February
meeting. The issue was prefaced by thefollowing exchange: I think
my major concern from an x (association) point of view is (4m, 9
February, 2006). Anothermember interjected before the rst speaker
could nish in stating: Youre here as a representative of a
committee of TennisNew Zealand acting with a hat on as a Tennis New
Zealand representative so take your Tennis New Zealand hat off and
putyour x (association) hat on and tell us what you think (4a).
The ensuing debate revealed the tension in attempting to align
national and regional interests. The original speakercontinued
stating that I think the associations are going towant to preserve
their autonomy. I think this is a key intention ofthis constitution
and I think its going to be very important (4m). Another member
disagreed. The whole idea is tostrengthen Tennis New Zealand so
that tennis in New Zealand does better . . . And so there will be
some constraints nottotally autonomous regions so that the
strategies are aligned (4a). In response, the association-based
speaker explained: Iwould suggest that its important to recognise
that the members control TNZ ultimately. There is an ownership
issue there.Because the current structure is ownership by the clubs
who own the regions and the regions effectively own TNZ (4m,
9February, 2006). In response, the chair asked for the views of
other members regarding what had been said. One regionallybased
member said he was strongly in favour of greater direction from TNZ
(4i). The debate moved to the next clause in theconstitution for
discussion. The issue did not appear to be resolved at this
time.
As illustrated by the exchange detailed above, it appeared there
was a clear difference of opinion regarding the levelof autonomy
for regional centres. From a national perspective, regional
autonomy had and would potentially inhibit theability of the TNZ
board to enact its strategic priorities and to effectively govern
the sport. From a regional perspective,national control threatened
independence and the regions ability to effectively govern their
region. Complicating thiswas the issue of ownership which
potentially held different meanings for the different parties. Who
owns TNZ?Certainly, based on the previous quotation the regional
person considered TNZ was owned by the associations andtherefore
should be owned by the six new regions. From a national
perspective, the researchers gleaned that ownershipwas not at
issue. Rather, the challenge was about how to work more effectively
with regional entities to deliver nationalstrategic priorities. In
so doing, TNZ would be discharging its governing duties. Shilbury
(2001) stated that . . . sportingorganizations exist in an
ownership vacuum (p. 260). Is it possible that the notion of
governance was being confusedwith ownership?
Shilbury (2001) also pointed out in relation to sport
organisations that . . . there is usually no one individual
orindividuals who legally own the rm and, as a consequence, control
is often a blurred concept (p. 260). He goes on to saythat,
Ownership of sport organizations andmany non-prots is a collective
phenomenon and thereforemore closely alignedwith stewardship theory
which posits shared, cooperative and collective behaviours . . .
(p. 260). The challenge thatappeared to be presentwithin this
debatewas how to overcome the regional concerns regarding loss of
autonomy in order tocreate a structure that encouraged cooperative
and collective behaviour. The new structure would need to preserve
theduciary responsibilities that regional entities held for tennis
within their jurisdiction while at the same time allowcollective
decision making that could advance national aims.
Were issues of ownership and control also at the heart of the
debate regarding national board composition and the needto allow an
election process? Certainly, the preservation of regional inuence
on the TNZ board was an important element.Was ensuring regional
inuence at the national board table a way of protecting owner
inuence or was it a mechanism toinclude a stakeholder perspective?
A stewardship theory of governance advocates behaviour and decision
making that iscollectivistic and has . . . higher utility than
individualistic, self-serving behaviours (Davis & Schoorman,
1997, p. 25). Davisand Schoorman explain that . . . even where the
interests of the steward and the principal are not aligned, the
stewardperceives greater utility in cooperative behavior and
behaves accordingly . . . (p. 25). There is evidence from the
MaidenCommittee discussion previously detailed that committee
members considered the role of the TNZ board was to act asstewards
on behalf of the organisation. If this role was to be undertaken by
including a stakeholder perspective, then thenational or collective
principles could easily apply.
However, if the concept of governing was considered from an
ownership perspective (i.e., the TNZ board was there togovern on
behalf of the owners) then why would the owners (i.e., regional
centres) risk being disadvantaged by collective
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decisions thatmay not address their regional concerns? Thismight
especially apply in a situationwhere the regional entitiesare
considered by the national body to be one of many stakeholders
(e.g., sponsors, media) and not necessarily the principalowners.
From the evidence that was emerging, the two distinct points of
view could be framed as:
NSO view: the regional entity exists to deliver national
priorities and programmes and keep the sport alive at the
regionallevel.
Regional view: the national body exists to coordinate our wishes
as owners of the sport. We tell themwhat to do andwhatthe strategic
priorities are.
In order to unravel the issues and for the restructuring process
to achieve the stated aims of creating a regional structurethatwas
best for tennis in NewZealand, the issue of ownership and how itwas
perceived by the different entitieswould needto be better
understood.
4.6. Monitoring the TNZ intervention and action steps
The nal outcome for the Maiden Committee was a set of
recommendations to the TNZ board regarding six new regionalcentres.
The committee also provided a recommended national constitution and
a regional template to the TNZ board. Theseconstitutions made
nomention of the word control or ownership within the objects or
powers and responsibilities withthe exception of a clause regarding
control of money. Instead terms such as promote, develop, enhance
and protectwere used in both draft constitutions. In contrast, the
former TNZ constitution and, for example, Tennis North
Harboursconstitution both containedmultiple citings of theword
control within the objects. The rst object in the TNZ
constitutionwas To foster, control and develop the sport of Tennis
. . . (Tennis New Zealand, 2005b, p. 2). Similarly, control
featured inthe rst object of the Tennis North Harbour
constitution.
The nal report also contained an introduction, background on the
case for change, a transition timeframe and detailregarding the
implementation process including the respective responsibilities of
TNZ and the regional centres. The nalreport of the Maiden Committee
to TNZ also noted that it did not achieve a consensus of opinion on
some key issues. Themost controversial issues in concluding this
report were voting powers of proposed regions, andwhether or not
members ofclubs, and individual clubs, should be members of Tennis
NZ. The committee was divided on both of these issues (4a,
17February, 2006).
Both issues appeared to be a manifestation of the differing
perspectives on control and ownership between regional andnational
personnel. In particular, the desire by national personnel to
engage directly with individual players and clubmembers was
motivated by the desire by TNZ to maintain an . . . accurate
national database for sponsorship and otherpurposes, and its
ability to obtain personal information and revenue from a growing
number of casual players (4a, 17February, 2006). From a regional
perspective the opposition to this direct line to clubs and
individual players was based onthe view that they considered clubs
and players to bewithin their jurisdiction and should remain under
regional control (4m,9 February, 2007). In the nal report, two
voting options were proposed for consideration, representing the
differingopinions. In addition, the regional centres remained as
the exclusive members of TNZ (plus afliates and life members,
etc.).As presently written, the proposed constitution of Tennis NZ
gives the power to effect both these objectives (i.e., a
nationaldatabase and revenue from casual players) without the
members of clubs, and clubs, being members of Tennis NZ (4a,
17February, 2006).
In terms of monitoring the recommendations by the Maiden
Committee, the next opportunity was the special generalmeeting
(SGM) followed by the AGM scheduled for 12 August, 2006. It was
intended that the motions proposing changes tothe TNZ constitution
and structurewould be put forward. Leading up to thismeeting,
therewere a number of further changesproposed by two of the major
associations, primarily relating to issues of regional
autonomy.
The motion to replace the existing TNZ constitution with a new
constitutionmandating six geographical areas, known asregional
centres, was approved unanimously by themembers of TNZ at the SGMon
12 August, 2006. Despite the controversyrelating to regional
autonomy and TNZ board authority, this was arguably the most
signicant change to the national bodysince it was established and
as such a major achievement for all concerned.
4.7. Phase four: Evaluation of Intervention and Action
The formal evaluation phase took place over a three-month period
between October 2006 and December 2006. Theprocess of how change
and learning within the TNZ setting might be evaluated was
discussed with some of the researchparticipants. Based on their
advice, and direction from authors of action research literature
(Cardno, 2003; Coghlan &Brannick, 2001), the researchers
decided to undertake the majority of interviews individually. An
interview prompt sheetwas designed by revising the key issues
previously identied, reviewing the major steps and questions of the
interventionand action phase and relating these to the overall
research question.
The researchers chose vemajor areas of questioning. First, the
researchers veried their articulation of the issuewith theresearch
participants about which therewas full agreement. Second, a series
of questionswere posed to reveal the perceivedstrengths and
weaknesses of the change process. Third, there were questions
relating to the role and impact of theresearchers involvement and,
fourth, there were questions about the impact of the change. Final
summary questions were
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asked of the participants to identify the most signicant change
for them and what they considered to be their primarylearning. This
format has been condensed into three sections as set out below.
Participants were interviewed between 29 October and 7 December,
2006. In total, 11 people were consulted. Ten peoplewere
interviewed face-to-face and one person providedwritten comment
because of geographical distance. Those consultedwere the TNZ CEO,
TNZ board chairperson, Maiden Committee chairperson, one other TNZ
board member not part of theMaiden Committee plus 8 of the
12members and advisers involved in theMaiden Committee (not
counting the researchers).A total of ve of the eight TNZ board
members were included. For reasons of convenience on behalf of the
participants, two(4d and 4g) were interviewed together. The
researcher noted a particular willingness to engage in the
evaluation phase onbehalf of the tennis participants. Many
interviews lasted at least 1.5 hours and some up to 3 hours. The
researchers alsodetected a sense of excitement and curiosity in
evaluating the change process. Participants appeared willing to
throwaround tentative research conclusions and theoretical
constructs relevant to their experience. In some instances,
theevaluative interview process appeared to take on a cathartic
quality and participants appeared to relish the opportunity
toexpress their personal views and reect on their experience.
4.8. Evaluating the process of change
Perspectives were drawn from regional and national ofce holders
as well as independent committee members on thestrengths and
weaknesses of the process of change. A participant on the national
board stated that I think the processworked really well. The one .
. . negative is not being able to get to other business. Its
affected where we are at in highperformance (3c, 8 November, 2006).
Another noted that We had full blown legal, nancial and research
support [for theMaiden Committee]. The project advisory support and
resources were a major positive (4f, 28 November, 2006).
Severalconsidered the appointment of Sir Colin Maiden as
chairperson of the committee to be a major milestone and a
positiveaspect of the process. I believe the committee worked well
under a highly skilled chair, and its recommendations were, onthe
whole, . . . exactly what would have progressively overcome the
problems tennis has faced in the past few decades (4i, 9November,
2006). Representative of a number of views, another respondent
stated Sir Colins appointmentwas amilestone.It was the rst time
someone has stepped up to lead this issue. His ability to cut to
the chase and lead it was a key to theprocess (4j, 27 November,
2006).
There was also a consistent view that a major challenge of the
Maiden Committee process was the requirement todetermine
constitutional detail. It broke down when the detail was asked for.
The detail is where the stumbling block was.However, at the end of
the day Im pleased the general thrust [of the Maiden Committee
recommendations] has beenexecuted (4a, 6 December, 2006). A
different respondent noted TheMaiden Committeewas given a brief far
beyondwhat itcould do (4b, 29 November, 2006). Another theme
relating to the perceived strengths of the process was involvement
fromthe government agency, SPARC. A tipping pointwas SPARC placing
a lot of pressure on sports to get their act together (4b,29
November, 2006). Similarly, a second participant stated,
SPARCsmoney helped sway thinking. SPARC became a leveragepoint (3a,
29 October, 2006).
Finally, there were several comments from both TNZ boardmembers
and outsiders regarding the national board functionduring the
process. One non-TNZ board member stated There was healthy debate
and team contribution. The chair, whowas a facilitator, drew on
different strengths at different times (4j, 27 November, 2006). In
recognising theway the nationalboard operated as an agent in the
process of change, this participant went on to say The board were
leading the decisionmaking and the CEO was providing his views. All
board members were committed to the outcome. Similarly, a TNZ
boardmember stated, I was able to air my point of view there was no
criticism of me or of each other (3c, 8 November, 2006).This board
member went on to pose the question How can this culture be
developed at regional level? We need to includepeople, to involve
people, provide feedback and be available. In respect to this
aspect, a non-TNZ board member alsocommented that There was common
sense and motivation from the board of TNZ to effect change (4b, 29
November,2006).
4.9. Impact of intervention and structural reform
In order to gauge a better understanding of the impact of the
research intervention as dened earlier, the lead researcherqueried
her rolewith participants. Therewas a sense frommost that the
information providedwas indeed useful backgroundfor decision
making. Everyone valued it at the time and found it useful to
understand and benchmark against (4c, 9November, 2006) was one
comment, for example. Another participant noted that It provided a
landscape gave somecontext kind of like a peep out the window. It
also offered, of course, an independent perspective which served to
educatepeople about the topic (4j, 27 November, 2006). This
participant also considered that . . . it would have been better if
youwere able to talk to it more there were some important lessons
in there. Other participants also noted the educative valueof the
information. We wanted . . . to knowmore about what others had done
(4a, 6 December, 2006). A further participantnoted, Your comments
gave us a good method of approach it was very helpful to have some
independent input weneeded to have a balance (4h, 10 November,
2006).
A signicant portion of the interview time was spent determining
the perceived impact and outcomes of the structuralreform. There
was little disparity in comments between national and regional ofce
holders. The lead researcher askedquestions relating to both the
impact of the change in structure as well as the impact of the
process of change.With regard to
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the former, a regional ofce holder stated, I feel more condent.
There is now a more efcient business model. There is amuch more eet
of foot structure and for communication, this has got to be better
(4c, 9 November, 2006). Anotherregional ofce holder asked and
answered the question Has the structural change allowed for the
outcomes desired? Yes . . .Now that we have six regions, four of
which have been challenged to lift the bar up. I want six strong
regions (4d, 7December, 2006).
A similar sentiment was expressed from a national point of view:
With the six regions, everyone now has the chance ofbeing more
equal (3a, 29 October, 2006). Also from a national point of view,
one participant commented that, Therestructure is a new drawing
board. We have established a dened relationship with the regions
and the MOUs[Memorandums of Understanding] have claried issues (3c,
8 November, 2006). The participant went on to explain: Imgetting
feedback from people regarding communication with TNZ . . . Theres
been an acceptance of responsibility of issuesand solutions. TNZ
has stood up and accepted responsibility. People dont feel like
they are in a vacuum any more.
Another national ofce holder described a similar outcome
stating, We have a better culture and awareness of the needfor
change and the cost of not seeing it through. We are more aligned.
Weve come through a tough negotiation process andweve still kept
those relationships intact (4f, 28 November, 2006). Similarly,
another participant considered that the . . .biggest achievement
was engagingwith each other.Whats decided on paper wont succeed if
they dont continue to engage.The process was effective in the end
because they got a result that everyone was happy with (4j, 27
November, 2006). Theparticipant went on to say, Now there are clear
boundaries and expectations regarding how the organisations can
worktogether. A regional ofce holder concurred. There is more
accountability and an opportunity for greater focus (4d, 7December,
2006).
As part of the questioning process regarding the impact of
change, the researcher specically probed the issues ofregional
autonomy, ownership and national control. Again, there was
remarkable consensus regarding the collectionof national and
regional views relating to this issue. The general view was that
the new constitution had indeed retainedregional autonomy and had
not granted any further powers to the national body and that this
was a workable outcome formost parties. A regional respondent
stated that There is no real change from a legal perspective. The
regions havent lost anyability to make autonomous decisions and I
dont think TNZ has gained any greater inuence (4c, 9 November,
2006).Another participant commented, As it [the constitution] is
written now, TNZ doesnt have enough power to dictateanything (4a, 6
December, 2006). Also in reference to the respective powers within
the new constitution, a national ofceholder said, Lets get to the
starting line and at least we know we are in the race. And over
time, as there is more trust andcommunication, we can develop it
(4g, 7 December, 2006). The respondent also rmly stated, It is
wrong for the nationalbody to have the mentality that it owns the
sport. A regional respondent also explained, There is room for
autonomy to beexercised at regional level (4d, 7 December,
2006).
Another TNZ board member also articulated this point of view by
explaining, You cant come in and dominate. We needto have a
collaborative approach to integrating the strategy into the
programmes and to draw on the expertise within theregions (3c, 8
November, 2006). Another national boardmember described their point
of view by using ametaphor relatingto the Americas Cup yacht race.
Dean Barker steers the boat but he gets his information from and
consults with nine othersregarding which way to go. Its TNZ who is
steering but there are six regional entities who can now be
involved in decision-making (4g, 7 December, 2006).
Some concernwas expressed relating to the potential lack of
constitutional power on behalf of TNZ. In terms of structure,theyve
made a leap, however, I do have some concerns that the regions
could become more entrenched (4j, 27 November,2006). Another
participant stated that in order to move forward . . . it will
require a lot of good will . . .. A three year reviewwill be
terribly important (4a, 6 December, 2006). Similarly, a further
respondent explained that, We have a constitutionthat is a vanilla
product without teeth from an authority point of view. I sense its
swung a little too far back to theregions in terms of power (4c, 9
November, 2006).
In contrast to the idea that the regions had not relinquished
any of their powers, a regional ofce holder considered thatWemade
concessions to allow TNZ to govern and inuencemore. From a regional
point of view there was somemistrust ofTNZ previously (4d, 7
December, 2006). This respondent went on to say, however, Im
quietly condent that over the nextve, six, seven years that given
new leaders and successors, I believe we could naturally move to a
model with more controlat the top.
Overall, the researchers gleaned a sense of enthusiasm and
optimism from respondents that surprised them. The processof change
had demanded signicant energy, was drawn out and difcult. However,
the evaluation interviews clearly showeda shift away from the them
and us attitude that had pervaded the sport at the commencement of
the Maiden Committeeprocess. The researchers noted a much greater
willingness on the part of key national and regional personnel to
worktogether. Somehow, the structural change had facilitated a
shift in the perception of collaboration within the sport.
Thisperception is summed up by the comment from a regional ofce
holder, For me, its been a demonstration of teamwork anda
willingness to consult (4d, 7 December, 2006).
These comments contrast sharplywith thosemade a year earlier
regarding the level ofmistrust and noted difculty in
therelationship between the national and regional entities. Indeed,
there was reference to a . . . misunderstanding, suspicionand fear
(4h, 10 November, 2006) that appeared to characterise the
relationship, within the evaluation interview as anhistorical
state. What springs to mind was some of the emotion and perception
like hijack, asset grab, unitary model(4g, 7 December, 2006) was a
statement made in reference to how the relationship was previously
perceived. TNZ weresaying one thing verbally but constitutionally
said a different thing from a regional point of view (4d, 7
December, 2006).
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Even as late as April 2006, there was still a large measure of
concern regarding the nature of communication betweennational and
regional entities. What we want with TNZ is far greater
communication and cooperation (4e, 29 April, 2006).
There is signicant evidence within the evaluation interviews
that the boards desire to transform the relationship withthe
regional associations was in fact achieved. As alluded to earlier,
the structural change as difcult as it was to achieve wasthe rst
part of a strategy to redene the nationalregional relationship and
allow greater governance of the sport from anational perspective.
Clearly, the national boards ability to govern, lead and inuence
appears to now be dependent onforging newly dened collaborative
relationships. In the absence of constitutional power a truly
collaborative partnershipwill be essential. Interestingly, there
was not a hint of disappointment from national board members that
they hadeffectively conceded constitutional power. Rather, therewas
excitement at the sea change that had reportedly taken place.
There was a sense that the national board was indeed on the cusp
of creating an environment where it could enact thestrategic
priorities designed with the regions as distinct from for the
regions.With six regions providing greater equity interms of
playing numbers and voting power across regional centres and a
sense of teamwork, which contrasted sharplywithprevious
descriptions of the relationship, it was understandablewhy this
optimismexisted. Having noted this shift, however,there was also a
sense that there was a lot more work to be done regarding the level
of national and regional collaboration toallow the sport to move
forward.
4.10. Learning about board strategic capability
There were several standout messages in terms of how the
structural change might impact on the boards ability to enactits
strategic priorities. The rst was concerned with how the agreed
change in nationalregional relationships might enablethe
organisation to work in a more collaborative way. In the model we
came up with, the regions will all participate in thestrategic
plan. Having agreed on it, why couldnt it then be implemented? (4a,
6 December, 2006). It also appeared thatmostparticipants considered
that the new structure of six regional entitieswould facilitate
this enhanced relationship. The secondpoint, also acknowledged by
most participants, related to the imperative now placed on the
quality of the nationalregionalrelationship because of the lack of
constitution powers afforded to the national body in the new
constitution. We still donthave the ability to enforce board
decisions at regional level was a comment made by a national ofce
holder in regard toboard strategic capability (4h, 10 November,
2006). That participant went on to say, however, that board
leadership wassomething that they believed peoplewanted to see . .
.wehave greater trust for this now. These pointswere captured in
thefollowing statement:
The ability to deliver strategies across the sport is not about
words in a constitution. Its through relationships . . . Whygo
through the process because its the process that has allowed them
to get to this point of communication. It waspart of a process to
create new and improved ways of working together. (4j, 27 November,
2006)
Several other participants also raised the notion of improved
opportunity for national body leadership as distinct fromgreater
control in the delivery of strategic priorities. In particular,
there was a sense of an enhanced relationship regardingthis. Weve
tapped into the goodwill of members. The most signicant change for
me has been a change in the culture andattitude (4f, 28 November,
2006). This national board member also went on to say, . . . there
is an element of openness andtransparency. The signs are there
butweve got a lot of work to do . . .. Other participantswho
heldmore of an independentrole on the Maiden Committee also echoed
this sentiment. Trust and condence have improved. Everyone has
aired theirdirty linen and there is a sense ofmoving on (4j,
27November, 2006). The . . . in-ghting hopefully has gone.Wemight
haveturned a corner in working together (4b, 2 November, 2006).
Another perspective on an improved leadership relationship
related to the view that in driving the process of change,
thenational body had rstly engaged the regions in a way that had
not been previously achieved and secondly encouraged theregions to
consider a national view of the sport and its declining
performance. There was an acceptance by the tenniscommunity for
change (3c, 8 November, 2006). This national board member also went
on to say,
I think its been led really well because everyone has been
encouraged to keep their eye on the big picture. There was
anegative culture that wasnt necessarily collaborative it was
focussed on individual concerns. I can see now howwecan break down
that barrier. I can see a change in culture. Regional people are
interactingwith national. People look atTNZ differently we are not
seen as the bad guy because wewere the ones who instigated the
change. It has openedup the organisation people are more positive.
(3c, 8 November, 2006)
Another stated, I think there was learning for the membership
regarding their contribution they have a responsibilitytomake a
contribution that if theywanted to have their say, they needed to
give it when asked (4j, 27 November, 2006). Inrelation to the
national bodys initiation of the changes, a regional ofce holder
stated that it, . . . seemed to galvanise peopleinto taking a
personal stake in the change process (4c, 9 November, 2006).
Another commented that it . . . forced the hand ofassociations to
become involved (4b, 29 November, 2006). When asked about the most
signicant change a national ofceholder noted that, . . . we have
created an environment where TNZ can lead nationally where there
are KPIs [keyperformance indicators] and a focus on outcomes (4g, 7
December, 2006).
Further learning regarding national board strategic capability
was expressed in terms of a greater appreciation for otherpoints of
view. I learned the importance of . . . understanding where your
stakeholders are coming from. Understandingwhere you have common
ground and where you differ, for example, autonomy and ownership
(4f, 28 November, 2006).
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Similarly, another participant noted that, People learned about
other points of view. The process cleared the air in a lot ofareas
(4b, 29 November, 2006). Everyone has quite a different thinking
approach and way of looking at it in a changesituation (4c, 9
November, 2006). Another participant considered there was learning
regarding . . . where others werecoming from (4b, 29 November,
2006).
The sentiments noted above further demonstrate how the process
of change has created a positive shift in therelationship between
national and regional entities. This shift, perhaps an unwitting
one, has established an environmentwithin which greater national
board leadership can be achieved. As noted by one board member in
an initial interview withthe researcher, TNZ has to achieve an
effective merger of regional interests . . . Quite how it will
manifest itself is uncertain(3b, 1 September, 2005). The notion
that TNZ would not gain greater constitutional power and the
regional entities wouldretain their autonomy in an environment that
allows the merger of national and regional interests, was a
situation none ofthe research participants had previously
articulated. While the desired sequence of events as described
below is yet to playout, there are strong indications from
participants that it could be achieved. While there is legal
autonomy [for theregions], the constitutions will be aligned. TNZ
can say heres our idea and we can debate it and have something
agreed once agreed, the national body can co-ordinate it (4h, 10
November, 2006).
There appears to have been signicant learning from the TNZ
experience for the participants generally and for the boardmembers
in relation to their strategic role. As noted in the evaluation
interviews, the learning appears to have come from agreater
understanding of the role of regional entities and their desire to
remain autonomous with an ownership stake in thenational body. The
learning regarding the strategic role of the board concentrated on
the importance of engaging withregional personnel to build a
relations