Deterrence, Defense, Arms Race, Security Dilemma, Arms Control, and the Balance of Power Iwan Sulistyo
Deterrence,Defense,ArmsRace,
SecurityDilemma,ArmsControl,and
theBalanceofPower
Iwan Sulistyo
Deterrence?
• Deterrenceàmembuatpelbagaiancamanmiliteryangdigunakanuntukmencegahaktorlainmelakukan4ndakanagresif.
• Deterrenceberupayamenghen4kansegala4ndakanyang4dakdikehendakisebelumterjadi.
• Konsepdeterrencemencakupdenial(penyangkalan)danretalia;on(pembalasan).
Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations, MacMillan Press, London, 1987, p. 136. 2
h=p://www.en.ism.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/et_temp/BarryB-22880_200x200.jpg
Prof.BarryBuzanGuruBesar(Emeritus)IlmuHI,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoli4calScience(LSE),theU.K.
Deterrence?• Deterrencestrategyàmenghen4kanpihaklawandaripenggunaankekuatanpertamakaliyangdilakukannya,bukanmenggagalkansuatuserangansetelahseranganituterjadi.(Buzan,p.140.)
• Prinsipdasaryangsederhanadarideterrenceà“oneactorpreventsanotherfromtakingsomeac3onbyraisingthela7er’sfearoftheconsequencesthatwillensue.”
(Buzan,p.163.)3
• Selaindeterrence,adajugakonsepdefensedanoffense.
• Terdapatperdebatandalampemahamantentangdefensedandeterrence.
(Buzan,p.135)
4
Offense,Deterrence,Defense?• “Offensiveopera;onsareac3onsinwhichastateusesforcetoa7ackanotherstate’smilitaryornonmilitaryassetstoconqueritsterritoryorcompelcompliancewithpolicydirec3ves(imposeitswillontheotherstate).”
5K.R. Adams, ‘Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance’, International Security,
Winter 2003/04, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 53.
h=p://grizalum.org/imx/Events/charterday/2015/BioPhotos/KarenAdams.jpg
KarenRuthAdams,associateprofessorofpoli4calscienceattheUniversityofMontana,theU.S.
Defense?• Defensiveopera;onsà“ac3onsinwhichastateusesforceagainstanotherstate’smilitaryassetstorepelandlimitdamagefromthatstate’sa7ackstoretaincontrolofitsterritoryandavoidhavingtheotherstateimposeitswilluponit.”(Adams,p.53)
6K.R. Adams, ‘Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance’, International Security,
Winter 2003/04, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 53.
Deterrence?• Deterrentopera;onsà“ac3onsinwhichastatepreparestouseforceordemonstrateitsabilitytouseforcetoa7ackanotherstate’snonmilitaryassetstodeterthatstatefroma7ackingitortodeteritfromfurthera7acksonceawarhasbegun.”(Adams,p.53.)
7K.R. Adams, ‘Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance’, International Security,
Winter 2003/04, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 53.
• Deterrenceà“keepinganopponentfromdoingsomethingbythreatofpunishmentorbypossessingcapabili3estheadversaryknowswillblockordenyanysucha7empt.”
• Extendeddeterrenceà“threatsdesignedtodeterandprotectothercountriesfromana7ackbyacommonenemy.”
• Defenseà“programsandcapabili3esdesignedtorepelordeteranenemya7ack.”
• Warfigh;ngà“theapplica3onofviolencetoachieveone’spoli3calandmilitaryobjec3ves.”
8P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics, 5th edn, (New Jersey: Pearson, 2013, p. 308.
MutualAssuredDestruc<on(MAD)?
• “anucleardeterrencedoctrinethataimstoavoidwarbyreciprocalthreatofpunishmentthroughanunacceptablelevelofdestruc4on.”
9P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics, 5th edn, (New Jersey: Pearson, 2013, p. 312.
MinimumorFiniteDeterrence?
• “adoctrineinwhichastatemaintainsarela4velysmallnumberofnuclearorotherweaponsofmassdestruc4onforuseinmakingdeterrencethreat.”
10P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics, 5th edn, (New Jersey: Pearson, 2013, p. 309.
ForcePosture?
“numbers,types,loca4ons,andotherqualita4vefactorsconcerningastate’smilitaryforces.”
11P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics, 5th edn, (New Jersey: Pearson, 2013, p. 312.
ArmsRace?• Didalamlingkunganinternasionalyang
sifatnyaanarkis,terciptarasasalingtakutantarnegara-bangsakarenaadanyapemahamanyangkeliru.
• Dengankondisisalingcurigaitu,dimensisecuritymenjadiprioritasutamasehingga4ap-4apnegara-bangsaakanberusahameraihsertamemperkuatkeamanandengancarameningkatkanmilitaryexpenditure(belanjamiliter)-nya.
• Selainitu,upayaagarkianungguldarisegikemampuanmiliterjuga4dakdapatdilepaskan.
12J.H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma’, World Politics, vol. 2, no. 2, 1950, pp. 157-158. Lihat juga J.H. Herz, International
Politics in the Atomic Age, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, p. 231.
JohnHerz,ascholarofinterna4onalrela4onsandlaw,CityCollegeofNewYork.h=p://rzv039.rz.tu-bs.de/isw/sandra/lexikon/cmsimpleplus/images/herz_john_klein.jpg
ArmsRace?• Alhasil,terjadilahperlombaansenjataantarnegara-bangsa.Dengankatalain,manakalasuatunegaramencobameningkatkankekuatanmiliternya,makanegarayanglain,secepatitupula,jugaakanberupayamelakukanhalyangsama.(Herz,p.231)
• Dengandemikian,padakondisiinilah4apnegaraterjebakdidalamsuatudilema,yangkemudiandisebutsebagaidilemakeamananberupaperlombaansenjata(armsracing).(Herz,p.231)
13J.H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma’, World Politics, vol. 2, no. 2, 1950, pp. 157-158. Lihat juga J.H. Herz, International
Politics in the Atomic Age, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, p. 231.
Armsrace?• PerlombaansenjataàmerupakanimplikasidariperkembanganteknologimiliterdalamHI.(Buzan,p.69)
14
Armsrace?• Perlombaansenjataadalahsuatukondisiyangabnormal,terutamadalamkaitanantaraaspekrefleksinegaraataspersaingan/kompe4sisecarapoli4kdanaspekperasaansalingtakutterhadappotensikekuatanmiliternegaralain.(Buzan,p.70)
• Di44kini,persoalanyangmunculadalahbagaimanamembedakankondisiyangabnormalinidarinormaperilakuself-defensedibawahsuatustrukturyanganarkis?Alhasil,batasanantaranormaldanabnormalpunmenjadisuatukonsepyangambigu.(Buzan,p.70)
15
Armsrace?• Armsdynamic(dinamikapersenjataan)menjaditerminologiyangdigunakandalammenggambarkankeseluruhanrangkaiantekananyangmenyebabkan4apnegara-bangsamembangunkekuatanmiliter,termasukmengubahjumlahataupunmutunya.(Buzan,p.73)
16
Armsrace?• Didalamis4lah‘armsdynamic’terkandungaspekarmsracedanmaintenanceofthemilitarystatusquo(gambarankondisiyangnormaldaridinamikapersenjataan,yangjugadapatbereskalasimenjadiperlombaansenjata),yangberbedadarisegiderajatnya.(Buzan,pp.73-74)
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ArmsRaceGame(Prisoners’Dilemma)
18
(PaulD.Williams,p.47)
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TigaModeldidalamArmsRace• Dalamperlombaansenjata,ada3modelyangsalingmelengkapiyangdapatmenjelaskanprosessuatunegaradalammeningkatkankekuatanangkatanbersenjatanya:
1. Modelaksi-reaksi;2. Modelstrukturdomes4k;dan3. Modelimpera4fteknologis
20(Buzan,p.74)
1.ModelAksi-Reaksi• Negara-negaramengupayakanpenguatanpersenjataanmerekakarenapersepsiancamanyangdirasakandarinegaralain.Dengankatalain,modelinimenjelaskanbahwafaktoreksternalsebuahnegaraadalahpendorongutamadaridinamikapersenjataan.(Buzan,pp.74-76).
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SecurityDilemma• Prak4s,kondisiseper4demikianakanmemunculkanapayangkemudiandisebutsebagaisecuritydilemmakarena4apnegara-bangsa4dakmudahmengambillangkah-langkahdalammeningkatkankekuatannyatanpamembuatnegaralainmerasakurangaman.
• Konsepsecuritydilemmapertamakalidibangunolehparapemikirseper4HerbertBu=erfield,JohnHerz,danRobertJervis.
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Prof.ShipingTang,GuruBesarpadaSchoolofInterna4onalRela4onsandPublicAffairs(SIRPA),FudanUniveristy,Shanghai,China,menelaahdankemudianmemetakandengancukupbaikperbandingankonsepsecuritydilemmayangdikemukakanolehke4gapemikirtersebutàLihatselengkapnyapaparanS.Tang,ATheoryofSecurityStrategyforOurTime:DefensiveRealism,PalgraveMacmillan,NewYork,2010,pp.33-96.
ModelAksi-Reaksi(lanjutan)
• Karenamodeliniterlihatsederhana,tetapirumitdalamimplementasinya,makaditengahkesulitandalamupayamengiden4fikasihalyangsangatspesifikdariprosesaksi-reaksi,Buzanmemberikananjurandenganmelakukanbeberapatahapanyangpatutdigunakan.(Buzan,p.84)
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• Dibagianawal,bisamemulainyadenganmengujiidiom(ungkapan)dariaksi-reaksi.Ar4nya,jenis-jenisaksiatau4ndakanyangdilakukanolehnegaradalamproses.
• Kemudian,variabel-variabeldalampolaresponyangdapatdiiden4fikasi,terutama:magnitude(besaranatauukuran),;ming(pilihanwaktu),danawareness(kesadaran)dariparaaktoryangterlibatdidalamproses.– Magnitudeàproporsireaksiapayangmenunjanguntukmemicuterjadinyaaksi;
– Timingàkecepatandanurutaninteraksi;– Awarenessàsejauhmanapihakyangterlibatdalamprosesmenyadaridampaksatudenganyanglain,danapakahmerekamengaturperilakumerekasendiri.
(Buzan,p.84)
25
• Selainke4gavariabeltadi,hallainyang4dakdapatdilepaskanialahaspekmo<f.Disini,mo4fantar-aktoryangbersaingmemilikiimplikasiyangutamadaripadavariabellaindalamprosesaksi-reaksidanakhirnyaaspekmo4fjugasulituntukdiduga.(Buzan,pp.89-90)
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• Idiom-idiomdalamaksi-reaksi–apakahterkaitekonomidanpoli4kataubahkanmiliter–dapatterlihatdalampelbagaibentuk,misalnyaperbedaansistempersenjataan,atausistemperlengkapanseper4an4-kapalselam,an4-pesawattempuratausisteman4-misilversuskapalselam,sertapengebomdanmisil.
• Variabel-variabelyangdianalisisinipunlebihrumitdaripadamodeldasarnya.(Buzan,pp.79-80and82-84)
27
2.ModelStrukturDomes<k• Gagasandasar:dinamikapersenjataandihasilkanolehkekuatandidalamnegara,yangmencakupkekuatanatasdinamikapersenjataandalamkaitandengandimensiekonomi,organisasi,danpoli<knegara-negara.(Buzan,p.74andp.94)
• Pelembagaanrisetmiliter(theins3tu3onaliza-3onofmilitaryresearchanddevelopment)memainkanperanyangsangatpen4ng.
• TidakadanegarayangdapatmenjadinegarayangsepenuhnyaindependendalamhalmemproduksipersenjataantanpabasisR&Dyangdimilikinya.(Buzan,p.96)
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3.ModelImpera<fTeknologis• Terkaitdenganbagaimanacaramemaknaidinamikapersenjataandalamkonteksproseskualita4fyangumumdalamkemajuanteknologi.(Buzan,p.74)
• Lebihmenekankandimensiteknologidaripadakontekspoli4k.Modelinihadiruntukmengiden4fikasiaspekindependendaridinamikapersenjataansecaramenyeluruh,yangmemang4dakmendapatsorotandidalammodelaksi-reaksidanmodelstrukturdomes4k.
• Teknologimiliter4dakdapatdilepaskandariberagamunsurilmupengetahuan,sertakeahlianteknik,pengembanganmaterial,danelektronik.(Buzan,p.105)
29
BalanceofPower?
• Sebuahkonsepkuncididalamparadigmarealisyangsecaraumummenunjukkansuatukondisiataupunkecenderunganyangseimbangantarnegara.
30
• Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), Part 4. • P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity, 3rd edn,.(New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), p. 44.
• Namun,konsepbalanceofpowerinimasihsangatluas.
• Adais4lahlain,yakni‘strategicstability’,yangmenggambarkanperimbangankekuatanantarnegaradenganlebihjelas.
• Is4lahstrategicstabilityinisendirimemangberlatar-belakangPerangDinginantaraduakekuatanadidaya,ASdanUniSoviet,dimanayangmenjadifokustelaahadalahsenjatanuklir.
31
StrategicStability“Strategicstability,regardedtechnicallystrictlyinmilitaryterms,wasdeemedtoresideinacontextwhereneithersidecouldsecureamajoradvantagebystrikingfirst.Inthecontemporaryjargonofdefenceanalysis,astablecontextwasoneinwhichthefirst-strikebonuswaslowornegligible.Suchacontextwassaidtobe‘crisisstable’.ThemostpopularthesisintheWestwasthatstrategicstabilitywasensuredbythemutualabilityofthesuperpowerstoinflictunacceptabledamageuponeachotherinanyandallcircumstances.Thisstrategic–perhapsan3-strategic–condi3oncametobeknownasmutualassureddestruc3on(MAD).Therolesofsocietyweretopayforthenucleararmedforcesandtoserveuncomplaininglyashostagetotheprudentandsoberbehaviorofitspoli3calleaders.”
32C.S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History, Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 213.
ColinGray,GuruBesarHubunganInternasionaldanKajianStrategispadaUniversityofReading,theU.K.
h=p://www.reading.ac.uk/web/Mul4mediaFiles/spirs-staff-colingray.jpg
Threats“Thethreatsfromnuclear,biologicalandchemicalweaponsarereal.Thepossibilitythatterroristsmightacquireandusenuclearweaponsisanurgentandpoten4allycatastrophicchallengetoglobalsecurity.Thereisbipar4sanagreementintheUnitedStatesthatthebiologicalthreatisasignificantconcern.Andwhilechemicalweaponsreceivesignificantlylessa=en4on,thehistoricalrecordshowsthattheyare,byfar,themostwidelyusedandwidelyproliferatedweaponsofmassdestruc4on.”
33
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Anarchy?• “Theabsenceofpoli4calauthority.Interna4onalpoli4csortheinterna4onalsystemissaidtobeanarchicasthereisnoworldgovernment—nocentralorsuperordinateauthorityoverstates,whichretaintheirsovereignrights.”
• “Inaworldcharacterizedbyanarchy,thereisnoworldgovernmentorcentralauthority,muchlessonewiththenecessarypowertoconstrainstatesorotherorganizedgroupsfromusingforceorengaginginwarfare.Insuchaworld,somestatesmaychoosetouseforcetoachievetheirobjec4ves.Whentheseac4onsconfrontotherstates,armedconflictmaybetheresult.”
34P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics, 5th edn, (New Jersey: Pearson, 2013, p. 298.
• Didalamkondisiyanganarkis,4ap-4apnegara-bangsaakanterusberupayamemperkuatpower-nyadenganmempertangguhpersenjataannya,baikdarisegikualitasmaupunkuan4tas.
• Kondisitersebutmemunculkanperlombaansenjatadansecuritydilema.
35
• Pertanyaanyangmunculkemudian:Bagaimanamengendalikanperilakuagresifyangtanpabatastersebut?àMekanismedisarmamentdanarmscontrol
36
Disarmament• “Disarmamentisthemostdirect–andinasensethecrudest–responsetotheproblemofmilitarymeans.Itslogicisthatsinceweaponscreatetheproblem,thesolu4onistogetridofthem.Thislogiccanbeappliedtoallweapons–generalandcompletedisarmament(GCD)–ortospecificcategoriesofweaponsdeemedtobepar4cularlydangerous,suchasnuclearbombsandbiologicalwarfareagents.Itcanbeappliedunilaterallyormul4laterally,andcaninvolvepar4alorcompleteelimina4onofthespecifiedtype(s)ofweapon.Theconceptrefersbothtotheprocessbywhichmilitarycapabili4esarereduced,andtotheendcondi4onofbeingdisarmed.”(Buzan,p.237)
37
ArmsControl• “Likedisarmament,armscontrolisalsoconcernedwiththeimpactoftechnologyonthearmsdynamicanddeterrencestrategies.Althoughitsharesthisroot,armscontrolislessambi4ousandmoresophis4catedthandisarmament.Itdiffersfundamentallyfromdisarmamentintheprinciplesthatgovernitsapproachtotheproblemofmilitarymeans.”(Buzan,p.252)
• “Theul4mateobjec4veofdisarmamentistorenderarmsracinganddeterrencebothunnecessaryandimpossible.”(Buzan,p.252)
38
ArmsControlandDisarmamentAdayangmenyederhanakankeduakonseptersebutdenganpemahamanbahwa:
1. Armscontrolàmengurangi,membatasi,mengendalikanpersenjataan4daksecaramenyeluruh.
2. Disarmamentàmengurangisecaratotal/keseluruhan.
• Keduacaradiatasbiasanyadilakukanlewattrea;esatauregimes(perjanjian/kesepakatanataurezim)olehduaataulebihnegara/aliansi.
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Pelbagaitrea;esatauregimesyangberkaitandenganarmscontroldandisarmament
• BiologicalWeapons– Mul4lateral
• Conven3onontheProhibi3onoftheDevelopment,Produc3onandStockpilingofBacteriological(Biological)andToxinWeapons(BTWC)
• ProtocolfortheProhibi3onoftheUseinWarofAsphyxia3ng,Poisonous,orOtherGasses,andofBacteriologicalMethodsofWarfare(GenevaProtocol)
40h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
Pelbagaitrea;esatauregimesyangberkaitandenganarmscontroldandisarmament
• ChemicalWeapons– Bilateral
• India-PakistanAgreementonChemicalWeapons
– Mul4lateral• Conven3onontheProhibi3onoftheDevelopment,Produc3on,StockpilingandUseofChemicalWeaponsandonTheirDestruc3on(CWC)
– Regional• MendozaAgreement
41h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
Pelbagaitrea;esatauregimesyangberkaitandenganarmscontroldandisarmament
• Conven4onalWeapons– Mul4lateral
• ArmsTradeTreaty(ATT)• TreatyonConven3onalArmedForcesinEurope(CFE)• TreatyonOpenSkies
• NuclearSafety– Mul4lateral
• Conven3ononNuclearSafety• Conven3ononthePhysicalProtec3onofNuclearMaterial(CPPNM)
• JointConven3onontheSafetyofSpentFuelManagementandontheSafetyofRadioac3veWasteManagement
42h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
Pelbagaitrea;esatauregimesyangberkaitandenganarmscontroldandisarmament
• NuclearWeapons– Bilateral
• India-PakistanNon-A7ackAgreement• JointDeclara3onofSouthandNorthKoreaontheDenucleariza3onoftheKorean
Peninsula• LahoreDeclara3on• StrategicArmsLimita3onTalks(SALTI)• StrategicArmsLimita3onTalks(SALTII)• StrategicOffensiveReduc3onsTreaty(SORT)• TreatybetweenTheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheRussianFedera3onon
MeasuresfortheFurtherReduc3onandLimita3onofStrategicOffensiveArms(NewSTART)
• TreatybetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicsonStrategicOffensiveReduc3ons(STARTI)
• TreatybetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicsonStrategicOffensiveReduc3ons(STARTII)
• TreatybetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicsontheElimina3onofTheirIntermediate-rangeandShorter-rangeMissiles(INFTreaty)
• TreatybetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicsonUndergroundNuclearExplosionsforPeacefulPurposes(PNETreaty)
• TreatyontheLimita3onofAn3-Ballis3cMissileSystems(ABMTreaty)• US-DPRKAgreedFramework
43h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
Contohtrea;esatauregimesyangberkaitandenganarmscontroldandisarmament
• NuclearWeapons– Mul4lateral
• ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-BanTreaty(CTBT)• Interna3onalConven3onontheSuppressionofActsofNuclearTerrorism• TreatyBanningNuclearTestsintheAtmosphere,inOuterSpaceandUnder
Water(Par3alTestBanTreaty)(PTBT)• TreatyontheNon-Prolifera3onofNuclearWeapons(NPT)• TreatyontheProhibi3onoftheEmplacementofNuclearWeaponsandOther
WeaponsofMassDestruc3onontheSeabedandOceanFloorandintheSubsoilThereof(SeabedTreaty)
• AfricanNuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone(ANWFZ)Treaty(PelindabaTreaty)• Antarc3cTreaty• CentralAsiaNuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone(CANWFZ)• Nuclear-Weapon-FreeStatusofMongolia• SoutheastAsianNuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone(SEANWFZ)Treaty(Bangkok
Treaty)• SouthPacificNuclear-FreeZone(SPNFZ)TreatyofRarotonga• TreatyfortheProhibi3onofNuclearWeaponsinLa3nAmericaandthe
Caribbean(LANWFZ)(TlatelolcoTreaty)
44h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
Contohtrea;esatauregimesyangberkaitandenganarmscontroldandisarmament
• NuclearWeapons– ProposedMul<lateral
• ProposedFissileMaterial(Cut-off)Treaty(FMCT)• ProposedInterna3onallyLegally-BindingNega3veSecurityAssurances(NSAs)
• ProposedNuclearWeaponsConven3on(NWC)• ProposedPreven3onofanArmsRaceinSpace(PAROS)Treaty
45h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
Pelbagaitrea;esatauregimesyangberkaitandenganarmscontroldandisarmament
• SpaceArmsControl– Mul4lateral
• AgreementGoverningtheAc3vi3esofStatesontheMoonandOtherCeles3alBodies(MoonAgreement)
• Conven3onontheRegistra3onofObjectsLaunchedinOuterSpace(LaunchRegistra3onConven3on)
• TreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheAc3vi3esofStatesintheExplora3onandUseofOuterSpace,IncludingtheMoonandOtherCeles3alBodies(OuterSpaceTreaty)
46h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
ARMSDYNAMIC
• disarmament• armscontrol• armsreduc4on• armsmaintenance• militarymoderniza4on• armsbuildup• armsrace
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ArmsDynamic
48
• Disarmament• Armscontrol• Armsreduc4on• Armsmaintenance• Militarymoderniza4on• Armsbuildup• Armsrace
“Trust,butverify”
49h=p://www.ukrainebusiness.com.ua/modules/news/images/topics/4e1bbcd2-29d6-c617.jpg
Data?• Dataapayanglazimdijadikansebagairujukan/bahananalisisataurisettentangmiliter/pertahanan,perimbangankekuatanmiliter,sertapelbagaiisustrategislainnya?
50
IISS(theInterna<onalIns<tuteforStrategicStudies)
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