IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety, Safety Demonstration of Advanced Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants 6 – 9 June 2017 Design Safety Considerations for Water-cooled Small Modular Reactors As reported in IAEA-TECDOC-1785, published in March 2016 Hadid Subki (IAEA/NENP/NPTDS), Manwoong Kim (IAEA/NSNI/SAS), K.B. Park (KAERI, Republic of Korea), Susyadi (BATAN, Indonesia), M.E. Ricotti (Politecnico di Milano, Italy) and C. Zeliang (UOIT, Canada)
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IAEAInternational Atomic Energy Agency
International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety,
Safety Demonstration of Advanced Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants
6 – 9 June 2017
Design Safety Considerations for Water-cooled
Small Modular Reactors As reported in IAEA-TECDOC-1785, published in March 2016
Hadid Subki (IAEA/NENP/NPTDS), Manwoong Kim (IAEA/NSNI/SAS),
K.B. Park (KAERI, Republic of Korea), Susyadi (BATAN, Indonesia),
M.E. Ricotti (Politecnico di Milano, Italy) and C. Zeliang (UOIT, Canada)
IAEA
SMR: definition & development objectives
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Advanced Reactors to produce up to 300 MW(e), built in factories and
transported as modules to sites for installation as demand arises
IAEA
SMRs for immediate & near term deploymentSamples for land-based SMRs
Water cooled SMRs Gas cooled SMRs Liquid metal cooled SMRs
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Water cooled SMRs (Only Examples)
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Marine-based SMRs (Examples)
KLT-40S FLEXBLUE
FPU and Fixed Platform
Compact-loop PWR
• 60 MW(e) / 200 MW(th)• Core Outlet Temp.: 322oC• Fuel Enrichment: < 5%• FPU for cogeneration• Once through SG, passive
safety features• Fuel cycle: 30 months• To be moored to coastal or
• Ensure measures for prevention and mitigation of
hydrogen explosions
• Enhance containment venting and filtering system
• Enhance robustness of spent fuel cooling
• Use PSA effectively for risk assessment and
management
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Accident Management and on-site
emergency preparedness and response
• Ensure on-site emergency response
facilities, equipment and procedures
• Enhance human resource, skill and
capabilities
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Off-site emergency preparedness and
response
• Strengthen off-site infrastructure and
capability
• Strengthen national arrangements for
emergency preparedness and response
• Enhance interaction and communication with
the international communities
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IAEA
CRPs to start in 2017 and 2018
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Launch a new CRP in 2017
CRP I3 2010 on “Design and Performance
Assessment of Passive Engineered Safety Features in
Small Modular Reactors” with 1st RCM in October
2017
Objectives:
1. Propose a common novel approach for designing
passive safety features for SMRs and provide
methods for assessing their performance and
reliability
2. Report validation of methodologies for SMR’s
engineered safety features performance assessment
using experimental test facilities
Launch a new CRP in 2018
CRP I3 1029 on “Development of Approaches
and Criteria for Determining Technical Basis
for Emergency Planning Zone for SMR
Deployment” with 1st RCM in March 2018
Background:
• SMRs may be deployed for sites located
nearer to the intended users
• SMRs characteristics: small power/source
term, enhanced safety
• Emergency Plan required to assure that on-
site & off-site emergency preparedness
provides assurance of adequate measures be
exercised in the event of a nuclear
incident/accident
Objectives:
1. Review implementation of DiD in SMRs
2. Develop approach and formulate technical
basis for guidance on emergency
preparedness & response focusing on EPZ
sizeUS Emergency Planning Zone: 10
miles
CAORSO site
France Evacuation Zone:
5 km
IRIS: 1 km
IAEA
Technical Summary (1)
Various extreme natural hazards (specific to the site) occurring simultaneously have to be considered in the design
For multiple unit plant, ensure un-precedented accident scenario and common cause failures are considered, and counter measures can be carried out on the site if meltdown occurs.
Consider electrical power unavailability and ensure core cooling and decay heat removal.
At least one success path to cope with accident to cool down the reactor core by active, passive, manually aligned systems or suitable combination.
The Fukushima daiichi accident has unveiled many issues regarding the
weakness of the existing plant design especially regading the design of
engineered safety features in order to withstand extreem natural hazards
and cope with the emergency situation of extended station blackout
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IAEA
Technical Summary (2)
Assure containment vessel integrity, diverse shutdown, core cooling and decay heat removal.
Provide diverse cooling system for containment and provision for connecting portable equipment.
Survivability of emergency power supply system should be assured to cope with extreem natural hazards
Hydrogen concentration must be controlled by adopting appropriate technology. The vent system should be
able to prevent catastrophic failure of containment and reduce pressure with filtering capabilities.
Ensure DC power availability for post accident monitoring system.
Designs should prevent failure of safety related SSC and accommodate failure with compensatory measure