DESERTEC industrial initiative · Swiss Energy Council use only • Aktuelle Fragestellungen olg Firmenspezifische Fragenstellungen Geschäftsmodell Konzentration auf Kern-kompetenzen,
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•Die in der vorliegenden Präsentation enthaltenen Informationen wurden sorgfältig zusammengestellt und aus heutiger Sicht zutreffend gewichtet und bewertet. Eine Gewährleistung für die Zuverlässigkeit, Aktualität, inhaltliche Richtigkeit, Genauigkeit oder Vollständigkeit dieser Informationen wird nicht übernommen. Jegliche Haftungsansprüche wegen Schäden materieller oder immaterieller Art, die aus der Nutzung der hier enthaltenen Informationen entstanden sind, werden vollumfänglich ausgeschlossen.
Five work areas derived from Dii‘s mission and objectives
Roll-out plan
Economic assessment and implementation roadmap
Regulatory Concept
Creating a sustainable regulatory and legislative framework
Generation Converting RE from sun and
wind in the deserts
Markets Bridging the gap between
expected revenues and costs
Transmission Enabling transport from source to
local/remote markets
Our mission is to enable the roll-out of the Desertec concept with the target of supplying MENA and Europe with power produced from sun and wind energy sources.
The long-term goal is to satisfy both a substantial part of the energy needs of the MENA countries and to meet about 15% of Europe’s electricity demand by 2050.
•BearingPoint was leading or coordinating the following transmission working packages at Dii
Topic Analysis Result 1. Optimal transmission technology
Assessment of current & future (2030) high-voltage transmission technologies
Selection of high-voltage transmission systems for 2016–2030–2050
2. Optimal transmission path
GIS analysis to evaluate optimal transmission paths (topographical, technical, economical) and their feasibility to relax bottlenecks
Assessment of EUMENA interconnector capacities
Transmission paths to convey desert power
3. Transmission cost model
Evaluation of CAPEX and OPEX Calculation of Levelized Cost of Transmission (LCOT) Transmission cost model 2012–2030–2050
Cost of transmission systems 2012–2030–2050
4. Implementation challenges
Identification and prioritization of implementation challenges (regulatory, financing, markets, permitting, public acceptance, technical, operational)
Definition of action plan
Action plan for implementation challenges
5. Grid studies
Long term (2030-2050): Holistic grid analysis for the EUMENA region, measuring the impact of desert power on European grids and defining concrete new AC/HVDC lines along major MENA-EU transit paths
Short term (2016-2020): Grid analyses assessing congestions/reinforcement needs due to Dii reference projects on local MENA grids and on Spanish and on Italian grids.
EUMENA grid 2050 & Reference projects Congestion analyses NTC for 2030-2050 Required length of new lines Location of new lines and necessary grid
reinforcements Location of balancing power solutions Total costs of transmission
Transmission technologies for high capacity land and undersea electricity transport are already available
HVDC Land Cable
Australia: „Murray link“
Power capacity: 200 MW (150kV)
Distance: 180km
[ready for market: 1,100 MW]
State of the art transmission projects allow high capacity long distance transport over 2,000 km via OHL (in China) and over 500 km via sea cables (Norway-Holland)
Objective Transmission projects in Europe in the context of the 3 pillars of EU Energy policy: Security of Supply Renewable Energy Integration Internal Energy Market
AC> 300kV
29.600
DC
9.600
5.000
0 Total
Projects
42.100
AC< 300kV
2.900 45.000
40.000
35.000
30.000
25.000
20.000
15.000
10.000
new
upgrade km
A chance: Transmission projects in Europe according to ENTSO-E Ten-Year Network Development Plan
ENTSO-E: a trans-European network (2009): 42 TSOs from 34 countries 525 million customers 828 GW generation capacity 305,000 Km of transmission lines Total demand:3,400 TWh/year Electricity trade volume: 400 TWh/year
Only few transmission paths feasible due to deep waters of Mediterranean
•Red =>2000m depth, actual technical limit for laying submarine cables
However, cable manufacturers are confident that the depth technical limit can be extended to 3´000m before 2030. This will then open new corridors across the Mediterranean Sea!
Only few transmission paths feasible due to deep waters of Mediterranean
•Red =>2000m depth, actual technical limit for laying submarine cables
However, cable manufacturers are confident that the depth technical limit can be extended to 3´000m before 2030. This will then open new corridors across the Mediterranean Sea!
Desert power will have a negative impact on EU security of supply
Energy security is thus seen as a major challenge to RoP implementation.
A realistic and constructive
discussion, based on scientific literature
Showing positive effects important for EC: energy security is an important factor in infrastructure investment decisions (see 2nd Strategic Energy Review)
Driver of EU and member state support
Risks of political supply
interruption or terrorist attacks on infrastructure are generally minor and manageable.
Energy security should not be a defensive issue for desert power.
On balance, desert power will improve EU security of supply.
Positive stance: show positive net effects Negative stance: energy security as „negative“
•Terrrorist attacks on energy infrastructure: an international perspective (2005-2010)
Country # of attacks (% of global total)
Pakistan 743 28.9%
Iraq 669 26.0%
Colombia 261 10.1%
Afghanistan 215 8.4%
Nigeria 112 4.4%
Thailand 70 2.7%
Russia 70 2.7%
Philippines 67 2.6%
Israel 49 1.9%
Yemen 42 1.6%
Total 2298 89.3%
Countries with >40 attacks / year Dii countries vs. selected Western countries (bold)
Source: Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS, 2012) Terrorism is defined in statute [22 USC § 2656f(d)(2)] as: premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents. (“Noncombatant” includes civilians and military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty.)