Description and Uncertainty: The Sociological Relevance of Heidegger's Formal Indication

KOLYO KOEV

New Bulgarian University (Sofia)

DESCRIPTION AND UNCERTAINTY: ON THE SOCIOLOGICAL RELEVANCE

OF HEIDEGGER’S FORMAL INDICATION

In 1930s Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg developed the

so-called “uncertainty principle”, tracing out the trajectory

of the “new discourse” in quantum mechanics. This principle, as

is well-known, entails the impossibility to specify a

particle’s position, momentum, or other parameters, except as a

result of measurements. The measuring itself however, as Bohr

and Heisenberg established, exerted an influence upon the

particle even though this influence was noticeable only at an

atomic scale. The measurement and even the mere observation

modify the initial position of the particle: its quantum status

turns out to be extremely “fragile”. In the final analysis the

uncertainty principle was formulated as referring not only to

the obstinate quanta, but also to the veracity of their

description by the physicists, as well as to the objectivity

(in a traditional sense) of the very description. When applied

to sociology the principle of Bohr and Heisenberg reveals a

dimension of uncertainty, which concerns not only the everyday

behavior of sociological objects – usual topic in the recent

discussions on this problem. There comes to the fore the

indeterminacy of the sociological interpretation in its double-

edged situation: the necessity, on the one hand, to focus on

the own language of the objects under study and, on the other

hand, not to treat this language as an unquestionable resource

of sociological description. Writers like H. Garfinkel, H.

Sacks, E. Schegloff - in their notion of “ethnomethods” - raise

with exceptional acuteness this dilemma of contemporary

sociology. Typical for the ethnomethodological perspective is

that uncertainty in this sense does not trigger a quest for

epistemic stability in the field of scientific knowledge (no

matter how it is being understood); quite the contrary: it

leads to a specific relativising of sociology (and science) as

one among various “ethnocultures”. A condition for this is

treating the everyday practices as disclosing their own order

and their own organizing power. It is not by accident that the

first sentence in Studies in Ethnomethodology reads: „In doing

sociology, lay and professional, every reference to the ‚real

world’, even where the reference is to physical or biological

events, is a reference to the organized activities of everyday

life”. (Garfinkel 1967: VII).

In 1920s Martin Heidegger revealed an unsuspected depth of

this set of problems through the prism of the so-called “formal

indication” (formale Anzeige”). The method of the formal

indication presupposes a fundamental rethinking of the

relationship between theorizing position and everyday practices

and is tantamount to a destruction of traditional metaphysics.

Heidegger developed this method above all in his “hermeneutic

of facticity”, but its roots can be traced back to his

habilitation of 1915 The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus.

In the present paper I shall focus on the relation between

“formal indication” and what Heidegger together with Duns

Scotus called haecceitas (“thisness” or “this-now-here”). As a

rule this relation escapes the notice of the Heidegger experts,

but I shall try to show that far reaching conclusions stem from

it concerning the indeterminacy/uncertainty of the scientific

stance (respectively of the specifics of scientific vision and

observation). All the more that it discloses the significant

link of this stance with a notion, which Heidegger in Being and

Time will call “everyday indifference”, which however could be

deciphered already at the time of his habilitation, in

dimensions at that, critical for Heidegger’s later

(fundamental-ontological) ideas. Heidegger’s interpretation of

Duns Scotus is of special interest for sociologists also

because about 100 years after the young Heidegger no less

radically disposed to traditional sociology Harold Garfinkel,

at a later stage of his career, used the same scholastic

concept, haecceity, as a more relevant designation of what he in

Studies in Ethnomethodology called “indexicals”. In Ethnomethodology’s

Program haecceity becomes a characteristic constituent of the

“endogenously produced and accountable” order of the “immortal

ordinary society” (see Garfinkel 2002: 67). Thus, irrespective

of the fact that Heidegger will stay at the center of my

analysis, he will be involved in an incessant (implicit or

explicit) dialogue with the viewpoint of Garfinkel and other

ethnomethodologists. As I hope, the mutual reflexion of the

positions will allow us to discern problems which otherwise

remain impervious from the narrow perspective of each

particular standpoint.

1.

In the habilitation Heidegger turns his attention to an

immediacy of recognizing the facticities, which is not

emphasized so strongly in his later works. It is about

something which the medieval thinkers call simplex apprehensio,

“simple apprehension”, immediate correlation between concept

and worldly things – about the “immediate life of subjectivity

and its immanent contexts of meaning, without winning out a

clear conception of subject” (Heidegger 1972: 343). “Whatever

gets pointed out stands before us in its selfness and,

graphically put, can be grasped immediately… Over the immediate

there can be no doubt, probability, and delusions. For, as

immediate it has, as it were, nothing between itself and the

apprehension (simplex apprehensio)” (Heidegger 1972: 155).

The interest of Heidegger in Duns Scotus’ doctrine of

categories becomes clearer in the context of the problem of

intersection between the order of universals and the order of

lived experiences, because his attention is focused on the so-

called haecceitas, various “this-now-here” as forms of

individuality (or individual forms), among which and with which

the medieval man lives. Under individual here I do not

understand necessarily, nor exclusively – even not first and

foremost – a human individual, but every (principally

heterogeneous) structure, endowed with reality and meaning,

which immediately or in a mediated way influences the unfolding

of practical experience. Moreover, when from such a perspective

a human individual is meant, he/she is neutralized to practical

ability in a wider context of interactions and handlings, which

is usually functionally indicated and not represented through

the expression “human individual”. By the same token for

example H. Garfinkel and H. Sacks formulate the important

ethnomethodological notion of “member”: “We do not use the term

‚member’ to refer to a person. It refers instead to mastery of

natural language” (Garfinkel and Sacks 1986: 163).

Haecceitas can be a natural object, a social institution, or

a certain indefinite and unnamed (from an outer viewpoint)

elementary everyday situation, however compressed to a “point”,

which might be pointed out as a specific form and thus can co-

participate in the composition and reproduction of worldly

order. (I am deliberately broadening Heidegger’s thought field,

in order to demonstrate the sociological relevance of the

notion of haecceitas). Strange – one could say: everyday –

entities, which in a mysterious way overcome the abyss between

thinking and living. These however are not forms, brought about

by the conceptual consciousness into the empirical reality, but

“actually existing” facticities; actually existing – as givens,

which show up to us already before we are in the position to

judge about the character of the reality sphere

(“supernatural”, “natural”, or “psychic” according to the

hierarchy of medieval realities). We might call them also

individual essences, provided that under “essences” we

understand not constructs, which preserve their determinateness

irrespective of the empirical situation, but rather

superpersonal identifications of the practical thought, which

provide for the reproduction of local order. They might appear

“accidental” from the perspective of theorizing thought, but in

fact they are a stable fulcrum of practical comprehension and

operation in the world, limiting at the same time its freedom

and its arbitrariness.

The notion of individual form or individual essence

presupposes that otherwise irreducible to one another in their

empirical being individuals are being projected into a certain

homogeneous medium. Within this medium we are interested in

their formal, rather than in their matter-bound - encapsulating

them in their heterogeneity - determinateness; in other words,

we consider them from a certain perspective (Hinsicht). But, says

Heidegger following Duns Scotus: “that such perspectives exist

cannot be proved a priori by deductive means. They can be read

off only from the empirical reality”. On the other hand, the

empirical reality, in which one lives, is never a reality of

brute facts, one always sojourns among meanings – in and

through them he experiences facticities, in a sense he is the

facticities and they are him. Precisely in this garb

facticities are haecceitas, individuals in their quality of

“irreducible ultimate” and precisely haecceitas give “primal

determinateness” (Urbestimmtheit) to “actual reality”. The

different meanings cannot be substituted for one another, but

they can be thought by analogy, which means that heterogeneous

realities are being parallelized. The means for such

parallelization is the language (everyday or whatever), which

binds in a common relationship different, externally not

belonging to one another objects. In this context Heidegger

lays special emphasis on the following thesis: the ordering

power of the analogy in the realm of the real is not that of

pure generalizing in terms of genus in the same sense, as this

is the case in, for example, a system of zoology and botany

(see Heidegger 1972: 203). Practical analogizing always implies

meaningful identification of differing things, of one thing as

another; the everyday language deals with equivocations,

ambiguities, which not only do not paralyze its demonstrative

power, but even endow it with real efficacy.

Thus, the analogy as a constitutive principle of reality

is instrumental in better understanding both the

incommensurability and the necessary connection between

identity and difference. Characteristic interweaving between

them - that is the formula of the analogy. “In spite of a

certain unity of the viewpoint the multiplicity remains

preserved; its presence, on the other hand, does not eliminate

the identity of the viewpoint. There results a peculiar unity in

the multiplicity and a multiplicity in the unity” (Heidegger

1972: 199). The elements of the multiplicity always co-

participate in forms. Realities are being “overtaken by forms”

(but not the other way round), says Heidegger together with E.

Lask (see Heidegger 1972: 209, 225). But the plenty of the

multiplicity is always more than every formed element

whatsoever.

As is well-known, the control over this superabundance is

a permanent trouble of social sciences and especially

sociology. A paradigmatic case of overcoming the trouble is the

(essentially neokantian) solution of the problem of social

order in Parsons’ sociology. Discussing the so-called “Parsons’

plenum” (Parsons’ plentitude) with its motto: “There is no

orderliness in the plenum”, Garfinkel suggests a radically

different perspective, which proceeds from the fact of “order”

within the multiplicity itself, within haecceitas, taken as

identical to themselves ordinary everyday practices (Garfinkel

2002: 97, 137; Garfinkel 1991). Only from a theorizing

position, which takes for granted the subsuming of the restive

facticity under concepts, “empirical reality” appears as an

indefinite heterogeneous multiplicity. Sojourning time and

again among facticities the everyday man never stumbles upon

the problem of reality as “indefinite multiplicity” as well as

the question of the “deficiency” of the language he is

condemned to use.

2.

At a different level however the language turns out to be

a problem. Living with and among facticities means initial

nondiscrimination between” I” and “object”, it means that the

“I” is a part of the facticities and vice versa; this entity

(and its various metamorphoses) acquire linguistic expressions,

which are not discernable by the logifying thought. If we

transpose this situation into the sphere of sociological

knowledge it can be expounded in the following (inevitably

simplified) manner. The question is: what as a matter of fact

does an elementary sociological description depict? The

possible generalized answer: the ways in which the empirical

ego deals with objects and objective contexts, conforming those

ways to its actual and virtual relations with other egos and

social collectives, with dominant social orders and forces etc.

(Mutatis mutandis in the centre of the description may be the

social group, the respective social order or the social

institution). Hence the characteristic sociological language

with its typical conceptual constitution: individual, other

ego, action, meaning, social action, social relation… The

problem with such a language is that it presupposes an initial

disunity: individual, object, other individuals etc,

correlating them only afterwards in the sociological

reflection. Thus it ignores the unity in the “in-difference” of

the practical experience, the so-called equiprimordial (or co-

original) moments. On the other hand, the words we use in our

everyday experience never display the univocal character and

the definiteness which imparts to them the scientific knowledge

(not only the pure theory, but also the empirical sociological

knowledge, which in no lesser degree deals with de-

contextualized terms in describing its “empirical data”). The

everyday expressions themselves have contextually referring

rather than “subsuming” character. Dealing with them in one or

another practical situation, “we” always “know” what we are

doing, what we “mean”, and what else we imply (without

explicating it). Precisely this “knowledge” however turns out

to be hopelessly lost in the system of classifying concepts.

What is necessary therefore is a different, corresponding to

the primordial everyday indifference kind of conceptual

structuring and a different way of prodding its dynamic.

Another dimension of this problem is the requirement to

treat the everyday language as an object of sociological

interest proper rather than to use it as a resource for

sociological descriptions (because there is no guarantee that

the sociological description is capable to “better” the

everyday one). An early paper by Harvey Sacks (Sociological

Description) is an eloquent example for such a call (see Sacks

1963). In other words, the requirement not to use the everyday

language as an ultimate resource, but instead to focus on it as

an object reveals a second aspect: discovering the logic of

production of linguistic organization through the very everyday

language.

The language of description is not thematized in

Heidegger’s habilitation, but he nevertheless incessantly comes

across it and incessantly highlights it. It is meant for

instance in the above-mentioned case of the analogy within the

“natural world” as irreducible to the order of generalization

according to genera and species. If we apply this kind of

generalization to the actuality, supposes Heidegger, it will

destroy precisely the order of the analogy with heterogeneity

inherent to it, and this actuality will be treated as pervaded

by homogeneity. Generalization, subsumation, the order of

description, based on reduction to genera and species is not

capable to express the order of the analogy or whatever

everyday order, preserving its actual heterogeneity.

3.

The alternative, offered by Heidegger had to do with a

method, which he developed in the early 1920s, but did not

thematize it explicitly, and which he applied operatively later

in Being and Time: the so-called “formal indication”. Let me

first of all briefly present the nature of the formally

indicative concepts.

The “formal” in those concepts liberates them from their

confinement to objects’ content (and hence from confinement to

prejudices) and redirects the look from isolated objects to the

whole of interdependencies. At the same time this whole itself

is not taken as formally empty static presence at hand, but

“indicates” instead the possibility for “understanding” its own

concrete dynamic through inner “transformation” of our

“ordinary conceptions of beings” “into the Dasein in us”. As

Heidegger notes, the “genuinely acquired” concepts are formally

indicative in the sense that they “can only ever address the

challenge of such a transformation to us, but can never bring

about this transformation themselves” (Heidegger 1995: 296).1

It is about something like provoked (self-) questioning of

“Dasein’s everydayness”, which catalyzes the tension between

“authentic and inauthentic existence” (eigentlicher und uneigentlicher

Existenz). Undoubtedly this possibility is based on a primordial

meaning of “transformation”, which refers to a certain

conversion of “us” in order to “let” the phenomenon “be”

(seinlassen): the meaning of everyday passivity. Important in

this case is that an essentially philosophical step is being

1 For three different dimensions of the method of formal indication (“critical”, “genetic” and “phenomenally-indicative”) see Sabeva 2006.

energized by an everyday being-in-the-world rather than

remaining a procedure, external to it. Moreover, the structure

of formally indicative concepts does not represent “something

like a system of Dasein”, but manifests an “interconnection of

concepts” naturally “established through Dasein itself”, the

viability of which depends not upon the “degree of subjective

reflection”, but “upon the extent to which Dasein in each case

comes to itself” (Heidegger 1995: 298). From such a viewpoint

these concepts are always “fuzzy” - and not reduced to

comfortable univocity of meaning, - ontically noncommittal and

open-ended. “They point into Dasein. But Dasein – as I

understand it – is always mine. These concepts are formally

indicative because in accordance with the essence of such

indication they indeed point into a concretion of the

individual Dasein in man in each case, yet never already bring

this concretion along with them in their content” (Heidegger

1995: 296).

The contentwise “display”, on the other hand, implies a

direct grasp of the meant object as present at hand and

isolated, which is at variance with the idea of formal

indication. For, as Heidegger notices in his “Comments on Karl

Jaspers’s Psychology of Worldviews”, a certain “deformalization”

should be correlative to every formalization. This question

however, continues Heidegger, can be resolved not “in

deductive-formalistic way”, but only “starting from and in

conformity with given phenomenal contexts”.

Here we come across an essential subtlety. In his lecture

course “Logic” (winter semester 1925/26) Heidegger makes the

important distinction between “worldly assertion” (weltliche

Aussage), which intends directly something “present-at-hand”,

and “primordial meaning of the assertion” (primärer Aussagesinn),

which is indicated by the worldly assertion and requires

“transformation of the understanding”, in other words: “letting

Dasein understand itself” (Verstehenlassen von Dasein). When taken

as formal indication, the worldly assertion acquires the

character of “hermeneutic indication” (Heidegger 1976: 410).

Formally indicative concepts are methodical means because they

help prepare the ground for phenomenological interpretation;

but they have nothing to do with anything like detached from

the objects technique. From such a perspective they are method

indeed, which however “is intimately bound up with the

substantive issue itself” (Heidegger 1995: 297).

Here I would like to point out the conspicuous affinity

between Heidegger and the ethnomethodology in so far as in both

cases the emphasis on “method” is primarily an emphasis placed

on the method as a way of practical dealing (always “member’s

method” for production of local order in Garfinkel). There is

however one important difference: for Heidegger the “method”

undoubtedly shows a characteristic ambiguity, because in spite

of its boundedness with the “subject” of practical action, it

is simultaneously a method of hermeneutic interpretation,

whereas Garfinkel does not pay enough attention to this second

aspect, and in his later works even rejects such a possibility

(cf. Garfinkel 1996: 11n).

In Being and Time this methodical aspect is considered as

“demonstration” and “grounding” of “basic concepts”. The

concepts are basic, because they have to be acquired through

preliminary research of the corresponding “area of subject-

matter”; which is nothing else but “interpretation” of entities

“with regard to their basic state of Being”. In this sense

Heidegger contrasts the “‘logic’ which limps along after”

(nachhinkende Logik)”, and which is “investigating the status of

some science as it chances to find it, in order to discover its

‘method’”, with “a productive logic”, which works in an

outrunning regime: “it leaps ahead, as it were, into some area

of Being” (Heidegger 1962: 30-31). One could say that this

logic is productive, because it is closely connected to the

everyday existing of Dasein. In other words, it is unfolding

parallel to the understanding of the world – and from its

having been understood (from its totality) – by Dasein, which

is at the same time an incessant pro-duction of methods of

practical understanding: production of local order, according

to a familiar ethnomethodological expression.

4.

Let us go back to Heidegger’s habilitation and consider it

from the perspective of the later developed and briefly

presented here notion of formal indication. From this viewpoint

we immediately come across the idea of haecceitas. I shall allow

myself (trying to demonstrate Heidegger’s sociological

relevance) to designate “this-now-here” as practical

formalization of concrete things, which however are not taken

in isolation, but always indicate context of togetherness with

other things. Even when one names an individual “thing”, one

always intends more than “it itself”, more than naming a mere

presence-at-hand, and this “more” can be: running forward into

the immediate future, or back to what just has passed, a

virtual spatial coupling with another (absent) thing, “in

order” to get the expected result, implicit remembering,

“because” one always has dealt in the same manner with this

thing etc. These coalescences, references, forerunnings,

implicit retrospections are the everyday stuff of acting in the

world, which the formally indicative unfolding strives to

activate, rather than to encapsulate in abstractive concepts.

This of course is not the language of the habilitation, but it

can be extracted from the way Heidegger treats the scholastic

idea of simplex apprehensio.

The language of indication however, even in a nascent

form, breaks through the work on Duns Scotus. Coming back to

passages from a paragraph I already quoted, it is worth taking

notice of the words, underscored by the author himself”:

“Facticities can only be pointed out. What is the sense of this

showing, this de-monstrative display? That which is shown

stands before us in its selfness… the single thing that can be

pointed out holds the view fast” (Heidegger 1972: 155). It is

hardly necessary to emphasize specially that here “pointing

out” and “showing” express not thematically “gazing into”, but

an allusive practical referring. The moment of formalization,

on the other hand, is outlined as the inherent capacity of

living in the created world man to identify various -

individual in themselves – things by projecting them into a

homogeneous “categorial” medium. Heidegger incessantly insists

that instead of being pure entities, obtained by philosophers,

categories in this sense are rather inherent to the natural

reality points of view. In other words, they do not collapse

from the heavens of the higher theory into the created world,

but disturb the theoretical reflection precisely as lived

realities. In this sense, as Heidegger notes in the

“Conclusion” of his habilitation, they are a moment of

“history”, or rather history as eventful determines their

meaning. In the final reckoning, interpreted in this way (as

irreducible “ultimate”, convertible however with the worldly

things) category is not liable to “schoolbook definition”.

Heidegger says together with Duns Scotus, that “its essence can

only be described, pointed out (notificari)” (Heidegger 1972:

189).2 In other words, it cannot be deduced. Hence the

criticism against the theorizing objectivation, which

presupposes initial givenness of an object, standing over

against the ego: everything, which stands over against (Gegen-

stand) is something already “grasped” in the lived experience,

and the very “standing over against” (das Gegenüber) always

displays a certain “network of relevancies” (Bewandtnis) with

the thing. In spite of my various spatial localizations,

according to which I should as though always encounter

different things, I identify these things (the above-mentioned

practical formalization) from a certain viewpoint – every time

2 When liberated from the scholastic language this idea might be developed in an intriguing way from the viewpoint of D. Deyanov’s notion of the pre-predicative evidences of thought (see Deyanov 2001: 141ff.).

when I am changing my “position”, I retain the perspective (das

Gegеnüber), from which I behold things.

Essential for the present paper is that this relation

develops (and can be expressed through formal indication) from

a primordial (everyday) indifference, in which ego, subject of

action, effect of action, relationships with other egos, are

indistinguishable, but liable to practical differentiation in

every concrete situation. It seems to me that a passage, quoted

at the beginning, might be interpreted by the same token, the

passage which emphasized the necessity to disclose “a sensitive

and sure disposition of attunement to the immediate life of

subjectivity and its immanent contexts of sense, without

winning out a clear conception of subject” (Heidegger 1972:

343).

This rather vague statement from Heidegger’s habilitation

develops in Being and Time into a well thought-through and

comprehensive position, where the formal indication is

tantamount to a sensitivity to facticity not in its unmediated

concreteness, but rather in its everyday indifference: “At the

outset of our analysis it is particularly important that Dasein

should not be interpreted with the differentiated character

[Differenz] of some definite way of existing, but that it should

be uncovered [aufgedeckt] in the undifferentiated character

which it has proximally and for the most part. This

undifferentiated character of Dasein’s everydayness is not

nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this

entity” (Heidegger 1962: 69). From such a viewpoint the

indication should be precisely formal, setting a distance

against every dissolving in the immediacy of experience, which

means that the formal indication is taken as a way of being-in-

the-world, and simultaneously as a way, which retains the

understood character of that very being. In other words, the

practical being-in-the-world itself is structured rather than

amorphous: the everyday action even within the context of the

primordial indifference does not get lost in the flux of the

experiences and does not rely upon an external order to be

ordinary (both in the sense of ordered and normal) and

generating order. Only when this condition is valid, the formal

indication can be a method of interpretation as well.

I started this paper with the uncertainty of the

sociological interpretation expressed through the

ethnomethodological dilemma of the language of description; now

I would like to finish it with a brief commentary on an aspect

of the ethnomethodological problem of the method in which the

above-mentioned dilemma transforms itself. Critical for the

understanding of this transformation is the context of the

formal indication.

I mentioned already the “anticipatory” work, done by the

formal indication, when it accompanies the “productive logic”

of Dasein’s everyday existence. In Ethomethodology’s Program

Garfinkel formulates two distinctive ethnomethodological

“policies”: „EM’s unique adequacy requirement of methods and

EM’s requirement that methods be uniquely suited to the

phenomena whose production they describe” (Garfinkel 2002: 69).

In my opinion both policies pertain to the same productive

logic. Undoubtedly the above mentioned requirements cannot be

satisfied either for instance through “participating

observation” (redoubling the method), or through retrospective

description (imposing the method from without), but solely

through close building in the “endogenous” logic of local order

production. The methods of the so-called “formal analysis”,

which usually rely on retrospective descriptions of the social

order, are not able to reveal the “member’s methods” in their

quality of prospective functioning. While as a rule the

retrospective description refers to the matter-bound character

of quiddity (“what-ness” as a conceptually stabilized meaning

core), the prospective work of members relies usually on the

formality of haecceity. As Garfinkel says, reinterpreting

Durkheim, “the objective reality of social facts” is a

“fundamental phenomenon” for the reason that there is no

possibility of any “evasion” whatsoever the ongoing work of the

members, of “hiding out” from it, of “passing, postponement, or

buyouts”; in other words: there is “no time out” from it

(Garfinkel 1996: 11). Every work, examining members’ work would

plainly be a different temporal structure.

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