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Instituting a Safety Culture in our Instituting a Safety Culture in our Transportation System: Parallel Visions Transportation System: Parallel Visions

w/some comments on w/some comments on Los Alamos, New MexicoLos Alamos, New Mexico

LA-UR-07-3261

Khalil J. Spencer

Chair, LANL Traffic Safety CommitteeChair, Los Alamos County Transportation BoardBoard Member, Bicycle Coalition of New Mexico

Information taken from ongoing projects by: National Center for Bicycling and Walking The American Automobile Assn. Foundation LANL’s Traffic Engineering Staff (Charlie Trask, John Bradley… and others

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Some background for this talkSome background for this talk

Presented as invited talk at Pro-bike/Pro-walk 2006 Traffic Justice Project (i.e., I’m not speaking for LANL)

Hence relevance to Bike to Work Day Added LANL crash data (thanks, Charlie Trask and

John Bradley) for relevance to local traffic situation TJP: How do we better protect people, esp. most

vulnerable users: cyclists and pedestrians? Promote justice, i.e., instead of designing cars

which are safe to crash into other cars (crash-mitigation), design transportation so it is safe for all, including the most vulnerable users—those not in cars!

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Present situation at LANL (look at Charlie’s & John’s data)

Scores of crashes (up to 100) per year Many crash-related complaints, injuries, some

debilitating injuries, and three total deaths (1 since 2000)

Many are “at fault” accidents What are the costs to business, i.e., sick time,

traffic delays, lost productivity, worker morale? (Steve Booth research idea)

OSHA: When a worker has an on-the-job crash that results in an injury, the cost to their employer is $74,000. Costs can exceed $500,000 when a fatality is involved.

Can we institute a safety culture that extends to our drive time and reduces the risk?

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LANL/DOE road crashes per year

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year

No.

of C

rash

es

LANL Crash DataLANL Crash Data

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complaints, injuries, and fatalities

0

10

20

30

40

50

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year

com

pla

ints

an

d

casu

alti

es

killed

incapacitated

visible injuries

complaints

K

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roadway conditions

0.00%

20.00%

40.00%

60.00%

80.00%

100.00%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year

% "

day

tim

e, c

lear

an

d d

ry"

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% of crashes at intersections

0.00%

20.00%

40.00%

60.00%

80.00%

100.00%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year

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Accident type codes: some clearly Accident type codes: some clearly involve error or malfeasanceinvolve error or malfeasance

1 Loss of Traction

2Driver

Inattention

3 Poor Visibility

4Too

fast/speeding

5 Right angle

6 Rear-ender

7 Sideswipe

8 Head-on

9 Pedestrian

10 Bicycle

11 Hit and Run

12 Parked Vehicle

13 Rollover

14 Animal

15 DWI

16 Asleep at Wheel

17 Failure to Yield

18 Brake Failure

19 Cross Centerline

20 No Pass Zone

21 Follow too close

22 Evasive action

23 Other

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% of crashes w/mistakes, citations, errors(author's somewhat subjective interpretations from listed

"accident type code")

0.00%20.00%40.00%60.00%80.00%

100.00%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year

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U.S. vs. elsewhere: 2005 road fatalities per million population (source: European Conference of Ministers of Transport)

0

50

100

150

200

250

Aus

tralia

Aus

tria

Bel

gium

Can

ada

Cze

chÂ

 Rep

ublic

Den

mar

k

Finl

and

Fran

ce

Ger

man

y

Gre

ece

Hun

gary

Icel

and

Irela

nd Italy

Japa

n

Kor

ea

Luxe

mbo

urg

Net

herla

nds

New

 Z

eala

nd

Nor

way

Pol

and

Por

tuga

l

Slo

vakÂ

 Rep

ublic Spa

in

Sw

eden

Sw

itzer

land

Turk

ey

Uni

tedÂ

 Kin

gdom

Uni

tedÂ

 Sta

tes

Rus

sian

 F

eder

atio

n

Slo

veni

a

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Trends not good, either

fatalities per million pop

0

50

100

150

200

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

US

W. Europe

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Can we do better?Can we do better?

High hazard industries (HHI) mitigate risks, drive down accidents, reduce corporate & public risk

What if we used a HHI model to manage traffic safety?

Tanker catches fire, causes Calif. road collapseFallen interchange connects highways to Oakland-San Francisco Bay Bridge – from MSNBC.com

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What is a “safety culture” What is a “safety culture” and how would it work?and how would it work?

A worldview that asserts that safety is not a goal, but a core value that must be preserved in the workplace

Not sacrificed to expediency Core values drive goals and

objectives, not the other way around.

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Parallel Visions: AAA Foundation Parallel Visions: AAA Foundation

and NCBW and NCBW AAA Foundation: promote a “safety culture.” (develop) a Safety

Culture Index (SCI), with which to quantify the present state of affairs ...

(focus) upon developing safety cultures in highway safety agencies at the state and local levels

National Center for Bicycling and Walking: redefine societal perspective on motor vehicle

crashes, reducing their occurrence, and… significantly decreasing the …number of injuries and fatalities.

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But the problem…context!But the problem…context! Chapter 9: Fragments of a Movement—

(Lisa Lewis, Partnership for Safe Driving)

“Many…movements (for roadway safety) … have something in common…organizing around a single problem…without awareness of or concern for the context in which it is occurring…”

A Safety Culture provides such a context

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So how does one achieve a So how does one achieve a safety culture?safety culture?

Competing visions of safety: “Garbage Can” (Cohen, et al. 1972) model—safety is

one of the competing, sometimes incompatible interests at the table (i.e., the present traffic situation).

High Reliability model: safety is a compelling interest and core value.

(see Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents

In a safety culture, safety is a core value. All aspects of an endeavor are constrained by how they influence safety (nuclear, airline, chemical industries)

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ALARA: ALARA: borrowed from the nuke borrowed from the nuke industry —sets minimizing injury as a industry —sets minimizing injury as a core valuecore value

“As Low As Reasonably Achievable” ALARA asks and we answer before we start: how

do we minimize accident/injury while accomplishing the goals of the organization?

Goals must be worth the residual risks after mitigation

Integrated approach: examine all aspects of a problem for the risk analysis before endeavor goes forward.

Retains focus on safety as core value in spite of other competing values (faster, cheaper, sexier, bigger)

Translates into tangible concepts in accident minimization, as follows…

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ALARA ToolsALARA Tools Substitution of a less dangerous device such

as a bicycle, transit, Corolla (i.e., a small car) Reduced exposure: lower VMD requirements

for same connectivity--smart P&Z Engineering Controls that protect and control

without user input: Antilock Brake Systems, Stability Management Systems, speed governors linked to GPS

Administrative Controls that elucidate hazards and social engineering (speed laws, driving tests)

Personal Protective Equipment such as seat belts, helmets. Use indicates awareness of safety.

Realistic, often-repeated training and drills to ensure competency in a crisis: real driver ed.

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Weaknesses of these “tools” if not Weaknesses of these “tools” if not

seen as parts of a safety cultureseen as parts of a safety culture Inconsistent with “closed course, don’t try this at home” or

“"The (Nissan) Frontier sends a message: 'Get out of my way'."

Unsafe driving in North American automobile commercials, P. C. Shin, D. Hallett, M. L. Chipman, C. Tator and J. T. Granton Jour. of Public Health Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 318–325

Create passive behavior, i.e., the gizmo will protect me “ Engineered controls can be expensive (SMS) or seen as

“oppressive” (GPS-based speed limiters) Admin. rules (traffic laws) ignored if insufficient negative

consequences for violating them Vehicle structure mismatch can defeat defensive measures

(i.e., body-on-frame truck vs. unibody subcompact) Low quality of driver training & licensing not reflective of

real world safe driving requirements, (none required for bike-walk)

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Safety culture: behavioral-Safety culture: behavioral-based based

Get inside people’s heads! Civil, not defensive driving (society, not

“me”) Change risky behavior before it leads to

an incident 40,000 dead and 2.5 million injured per

year. Convince people that they have a stake in the outcome: their lives or those of their loved ones

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Some behavior that needs to change: inattention to driving and speeding

(Apr. 2006) Virginia Tech Transportation Institute and NHTSA report on inattention

almost 80 percent of crashes and 65 percent of near-crashes involved some form of driver inattention within three seconds of the event*.

* ~1 football field at 60 mph

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Inattentive driving

Breaking news 4:29 pm: One dead in Highway 14 collision(6/27/07 Santa Fe New Mexican)

Santa Fe Sheriff Solano said a 16-year-old boy was headed south on N.M. 14 at 2:30 p.m. when he reached down to grab something he dropped on the floorboard. His truck drifted into the northbound lanes and hit a Honda Accord head-on, killing the 47-year-old woman who was driving.

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Speeding and Motorist miscalculation

Most motorists underestimate the distance needed to stop.

The effect this difference has on the outcome of a crash or emergency situation can mean the difference between life and death.

With acknowledgements to Bob McQuinn for this slide

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AccountabilityAccountability

Instead of auto “no fault”, use airline and nuke model: zero accidents are the goal and people & systems accountable for harm done

Long-term paradigm-shift in DWI is a potential model

Use of devices such as legally-certified EDR’s (automotive black boxes) to provide better crash data & better understanding of why crashes happened, assign responsibility fairly

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What would an ALARA-What would an ALARA-based safety program look based safety program look like?like?

A theme: crash prevention, not “crash control” Most vulnerable users define safety standards

(“Vision Zero” model—Sweden) Parts not ends in themselves, but part of a whole Accountability and recurrent training, certification Evaluate risk factors for a clear understanding of

how traffic works BEFORE operational decisions are made.

Ownership: not imposed, but buy-in

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What would an ALARA-based What would an ALARA-based safety program look like?safety program look like?

Constant review and improvement (feedback)

“High reliability organization” rather than a “garbage can” of competing and incompatible interests, which means…

Traffic engineers, marketers, law enforcement, lawmakers, health professionals, safety modelers, advocates, P&Z, end-users all on same page.

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Traffic Safety Locally: Diamond Drive, Los Traffic Safety Locally: Diamond Drive, Los Alamos, NMAlamos, NM

Downtown + res

High School + UNM

Middle School + resGrade

school + res

Grade school + res

to LANL

res

res

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Original Diamond Drive Profile-no Original Diamond Drive Profile-no shoulders or ADA sidewalks: “car is shoulders or ADA sidewalks: “car is king”king”

Don’t fall...

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New Diamond Profile—shared sovereignty? Bike lanes, ADA sidewalks, bus pullouts & ped crossing island shelters

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At the local level: At the local level: EducationEducation

One principle employer (LANL) & school district. If these institute a safety-culture based drive-bike-walk training program, would cover lion’s share of residents

Police Chief has regular community safety meetings

Safety op-eds by LAPD, BSC, T-Board

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At the local level, At the local level, EnforcementEnforcement

Low crime,so police can concentrate on traffic, since it could be people’s greatest risk.

LAPD has recently increased patrols, underage alcohol sales stings, and DWI checks

MANY have DOE security clearances. These are revocable for bad character. Fines (esp. speeding) > $250 must be reported. Can this be used as a “stick” to hold LANL drivers to a higher standard?

Make LANL employment contingent on safe site-wide driving behavior

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At the local level, At the local level, EngineeringEngineering

Diamond re-design in consideration of hazards (HS, College, and LANL on same main drag) (Co Bike Plan, “complete streets”)

Safety as high priority. (roundabouts vs. signalized intersections)

County’s new transit system (less dangerous device, alternatives for youth and elderly).

Large, higher speed roads (Trinity Drive) should not be a design feature of urban areas unless they are both grade separated and do not impede other modes or community access.

Effective traffic calming

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Central Ave: 85%-ile < posted 25 Central Ave: 85%-ile < posted 25 mph speed limitmph speed limit

Bulbouts & lane width reduction in commercial/government district

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Proposed model: Sweden’s Proposed model: Sweden’s Vision Vision ZeroZero

The concern for human life and health is an absolutely mandatory element in the design and functioning of the road transport system. This means that a road traffic safety mode of thinking must be clearly integrated into all the processes that affect safety within the road transport system. The level of violence that the human body can tolerate without being killed or seriously injured shall be the basic parameter in the design of the road transport.